从此走进深度人生 Deepoo net, deep life.

巴菲特致股东的信2021-

2025

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

这封信是伯克希尔年度报告的一部分。作为一家上市公司,我们需要定期向你们披露许多具体的事实和数据。

This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire’s annual report. As a public company, we are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.

然而,“报告” 一词意味着更大的责任。除了规定的数据外,我们认为还应该向你们提供关于你们所拥有的资产以及我们的想法的额外评论。我们的目标是以一种换位思考的方式与你们沟通 —— 也就是说,如果你们是伯克希尔的首席执行官,而我和我的家人是被动投资者,将我们的积蓄托付给你们,我们希望你们也能以这样的方式与我们交流。

“Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were reversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors, trusting you with our savings.

这种方式使我们每年都会讲述你们通过持有伯克希尔股票间接拥有的众多企业的发展情况,包括好的和坏的方面。不过,在讨论特定子公司的问题时,我们会遵循汤姆・墨菲 60 年前给我的建议:“表扬要指名道姓,批评则应笼统概括”。

This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60 years ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.”

错误 —— 没错,伯克希尔也会犯错

Mistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire

有时,我在评估伯克希尔收购的企业的未来经济前景时会犯错,这都是资本配置不当的例子。无论是对可交易股票的判断(我们将这些视为企业的部分所有权),还是对公司的全资收购,都可能出现这种情况。

Sometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve purchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both judgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and the 100% acquisitions of companies.

其他时候,我在评估伯克希尔聘请的管理人员的能力或忠诚度时也会犯错。忠诚度方面的失望带来的伤害可能不止于财务影响,那种痛苦堪比婚姻破裂。

At other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.

在人事决策上,能有一个不错的成功率就已经很不错了。最严重的错误是拖延纠正错误,或者像查理・芒格所说的 “犹豫不决”。他常对我说,问题不会凭空消失,需要采取行动,尽管这可能让人不太舒服。

A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.” Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however uncomfortable that may be.

在 2019 – 2023 年期间,我在给你们的信中使用了 16 次 “错误” 或 “失误” 这个词。许多其他大型公司在这期间从未使用过这两个词。我得承认,亚马逊在 2021 年的信中做了一些非常坦诚的自我剖析。在其他地方,通常都是一片乐观的言论和画面。

During the 2019 – 23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon, I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it has generally been happy talk and pictures.

我也曾担任大型上市公司的董事,在这些公司的董事会会议或分析师电话会议上,“错误” 或 “失误” 是禁忌词汇。这种禁忌暗示着管理层的完美,这总是让我感到不安(不过,有时可能存在法律问题,使得有限的讨论更为明智。我们生活在一个诉讼频发的社会)。

I have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection, always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)

我现在94岁了,格雷格·阿贝尔很快就会接替我成为首席执行官,并撰写年度信件。格雷格认同伯克希尔的信条,即一份“报告”是伯克希尔首席执行官每年对股东应尽的义务。他也明白,如果你开始欺骗股东,很快你就会相信自己的鬼话,进而欺骗自己。

At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually owes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well. #

皮特·利格尔——独一无二的人才

Pete Liegl – One of a Kind

让我给你们讲一讲皮特·利格尔的非凡故事。大多数伯克希尔股东都不认识他,但他为股东们的总财富贡献了数十亿美元。皮特于11月去世,享年80岁,直到去世他仍在工作。

Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete died in November, still working at 80.

我第一次听说森林河公司(Forest River)是在2005年6月21日。这家位于印第安纳州的公司由皮特创立并管理,是一家休闲车(RV)制造商。那天,我收到一位中间人来信,详细介绍了该公司的相关数据。写信人说,森林河公司的唯一所有者皮特别希望将公司卖给伯克希尔。他还告诉了我皮特期望的售价。我喜欢这种直截了当的方式。

I first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about the company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100% owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.

我向一些休闲车经销商做了些调查,对了解到的情况很满意,于是安排了6月28日在奥马哈会面。皮特带着他的妻子莎伦和女儿丽莎一起来了。见面时,皮特向我保证,他想继续经营这家企业,但如果能确保家人的财务安全,他会更安心。

I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he could assure financial security for his family.

皮特接着提到,他拥有一些出租给森林河公司的房地产,这在6月21日的信中并未提及。几分钟内,我们就确定了这些资产的价格,因为我表示伯克希尔无需进行评估,我会直接接受他的估值。

Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.

然后我们谈到了另一个需要明确的问题。我问皮特他的薪酬应该是多少,并补充说,无论他说多少,我都会接受。(我得补充一句,这不是我推荐普遍使用的方法。)

Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I recommend for general use.)

皮特停顿了一下,他的妻子、女儿和我都倾身向前。然后他让我们大吃一惊:“嗯,我看了伯克希尔的委托书,我不想挣得比我的老板还多,所以给我年薪10万美元吧。” 我惊讶得差点从椅子上掉下来,这时皮特又说:“但我们今年会赚到X(他说了一个数字),我希望每年能从公司超出目前业绩的收益中获得10%的奖金。” 我回答说:“好的,皮特,但如果森林河公司进行任何重大收购,我们会根据所使用的额外资本进行适当调整。” 我没有定义 “适当” 或 “重大” 的含义,但这些模糊的表述从未引发过问题。

Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: “Well, I looked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay me $100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he named a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what the company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I didn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem.

随后,我们四人去奥马哈的快乐山谷俱乐部共进晚餐,之后一直合作得很愉快。在接下来的19年里,皮特表现出色,没有竞争对手能与他的业绩相媲美。

The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha’s Happy Hollow Club and lived happily ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his performance.

并非每家公司都有易于理解的业务,也很少有像皮特这样的所有者或管理者。当然,我在评估伯克希尔收购的业务时也会犯错,有时在评估合作对象时也会失误。

Every company doesn’t have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few owners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I’m dealing.

但我也在业务潜力以及管理者的能力和忠诚度方面收获了许多惊喜。我们的经验是,一个成功的决策随着时间推移能带来惊人的改变。(想想收购政府雇员保险公司(GEICO)这个商业决策,选择阿吉特·贾恩作为管理者的决策,还有我幸运地找到查理·芒格这位独一无二的合作伙伴、私人顾问和忠实朋友。)错误会逐渐淡化,而成功的决策会不断开花结果。

But I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can make a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal advisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.

在选择首席执行官方面,我还有一点要补充:我从不看候选人的毕业院校。从不!One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to school. Never!

当然,有很多优秀的管理者毕业于名校。但也有很多像皮特这样的人,他们可能受益于就读不太知名的院校,甚至没有完成学业。看看我的朋友比尔·盖茨,他认为在一个正在改变世界的新兴行业中起步,远比为了一张能挂在墙上的文凭留在学校重要得多。(读一读他的新书《源代码》。)

Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even by not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.)

不久前,我通过电话结识了杰西卡·图恩克尔,她的继父本·罗斯纳曾长期为查理和我经营一家企业。本是一位零售天才,在准备这份报告时,我向杰西卡确认本的学历,我记得他学历有限。杰西卡回复说:“本只读到六年级。”

Not long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner, long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited. Jessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6th grade.”

我很幸运能在三所优秀的大学接受教育。我坚信终身学习。然而,我观察到,很大一部分商业才能是天生的,先天因素比后天培养更重要。

I was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in lifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate with nature swamping nurture.

皮特·利格尔就是一个天生的商业奇才。

Pete Liegl was a natural.

去年的业绩

Last Year’s Performance

2024 年,伯克希尔的表现超出了我的预期,尽管我们 189 家运营公司中有 53% 的公司收益出现了下降。由于美国国债收益率提高,且我们大幅增加了对这些高流动性短期证券的持有量,投资收益实现了大幅增长,这对我们起到了推动作用。

In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating businesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings of these highly-liquid short-term securities.

我们的保险业务收益也大幅增长,这主要得益于政府雇员保险公司(GEICO)的出色表现。在过去五年里,托德・库姆斯对 GEICO 进行了重大改革,提高了效率,并使承保业务与时俱进。GEICO 是一颗长期持有的 “宝石”,需要大力打磨,而托德一直在不懈努力完成这项工作。虽然改革尚未完成,但 2024 年取得的进展非常显著。

Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way, increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done. Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.

总体而言,2024 年财产意外险(“P/C”)的定价有所提高,这反映出对流风暴造成的损失大幅增加。气候变化的影响可能已经显现。然而,2024 年并未发生 “灾难性” 事件。但总有一天,可能随时会发生极其严重的保险损失,而且无法保证每年只会发生一次。

In general, property-casualty (“P/C”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024, reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been announcing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a truly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one per annum.

财产意外险业务对伯克希尔至关重要,本信件后面将对其进行更深入的讨论。

The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that appears later in this letter.

伯克希尔的铁路和公用事业业务,这是我们除保险业务外最大的两个业务板块,其总收益有所改善。不过,这两个业务仍有很大的提升空间。

Berkshire’s railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish.

在去年年底,我们以约 39 亿美元的价格将公用事业业务的持股比例从约 92% 提高到了 100%,其中 29 亿美元以现金支付,其余部分以伯克希尔 “B” 股支付。

Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to 100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in Berkshire “B” shares.

总体而言,我们在 2024 年实现了 474 亿美元的运营收益。我们经常(可能有些读者会厌烦地说 “没完没了”)强调这一指标,而不是第 K – 68 页上按照通用会计准则(GAAP)规定报告的收益。

All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly, some readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that are reported on page K-68.

我们的衡量指标不包括我们持有的股票和债券的资本利得或损失,无论这些利得或损失是否实现。从长期来看,我们认为收益很可能占上风(不然我们为什么要购买这些证券呢?),尽管每年的数据会有大幅波动且难以预测。我们进行此类投资的期限几乎总是远远超过一年。在很多情况下,我们的投资决策考虑的是几十年的时间跨度。这些长期投资有时会带来丰厚的回报。

Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else would we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and unpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year. In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes make the cash register ring like church bells.

以下是我们对 2023 – 2024 年收益的详细分析。所有计算均扣除了折旧、摊销和所得税。息税折旧摊销前利润(EBITDA)是华尔街偏爱的一个指标,但存在缺陷,我们并不采用。

Here’s a breakdown of the 2023 – 2024 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for us.

令人惊讶!一项重要的美国记录被打破

Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed

六十年前,现任管理层接手了伯克希尔。这一举措是个错误 —— 是我的错误,它困扰了我们二十年。我要强调的是,查理立刻就发现了我这个明显的错误:虽然我收购伯克希尔的价格看起来很便宜,但它的业务 —— 一家位于美国北部的大型纺织企业 —— 正走向衰落。

Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a mistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize, spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its business – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction.

美国财政部在某种程度上已经提前察觉到了伯克希尔的命运。1965 年,该公司一分钱的所得税都未缴纳,这种情况在公司已持续了大约十年,这实在令人尴尬。对于那些极具魅力的初创公司来说,这种经济表现或许可以理解,但对于一家美国工业的老牌支柱企业而言,这就像是一个闪烁的黄灯,警示着问题的存在。伯克希尔正走向衰落。

The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire’s destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had generally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be understandable for glamorous startups, but it’s a blinking yellow light when it happens at a venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.

六十年后的今天,想象一下当美国财政部发现,还是这家公司 —— 仍以伯克希尔哈撒韦的名义运营 —— 缴纳的公司所得税比美国政府从任何其他公司(甚至是那些市值高达数万亿美元的美国科技巨头)收到的都要多时,他们会有多惊讶。

Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same company – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions.

确切地说,伯克希尔去年向美国国税局(IRS)缴纳了四笔税款,总计 268 亿美元。这约占美国企业总纳税额的 5%。(此外,我们还向外国政府和 44 个州缴纳了相当数额的所得税。)

To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8 billion. That’s about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.)

请注意,实现这一创纪录纳税额的一个关键因素是:在1965 – 2024年期间,伯克希尔股东仅收到过一次现金股息。1967年1月3日,我们进行了唯一一次股息支付 —— 总额为101,755美元,即每股A类股支付10美分。(我都记不起来为什么会向伯克希尔董事会提议这一举措了。现在回想起来,就像一场噩梦。)

Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders during the same 1965 – 2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we disbursed our sole payment – $101,755 or 10¢ per A share. (I can’t remember why I suggested this action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.)

六十年来,伯克希尔股东支持持续再投资,这使得公司的应税收入不断增加。向美国财政部支付的现金所得税在最初十年微乎其微,如今累计已超过 1010 亿美元,而且这个数字还在不断增加。

For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S. Treasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than $101 billion . . . and counting.

庞大的数字可能让人难以直观理解。让我换个方式来描述我们去年支付的268亿美元。

Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last year.

如果在 2024 年全年,伯克希尔每 20 分钟就向美国财政部开出一张 100 万美元的支票(想象一下,2024 年是闰年,全年有 366 个日日夜夜),到年底我们仍会欠联邦政府一大笔钱。实际上,要到 1 月下旬,美国财政部才会告诉我们可以稍作喘息,睡上一觉,然后准备 2025 年的纳税事宜。

If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of 2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our 2025 tax payments.

你的钱都投在哪里了

Where Your Money Is

伯克希尔的股权投资活动具有两面性。一方面,我们控制着许多企业,至少持有被投资公司 80% 的股份,通常情况下我们持有 100% 的股份。这 189 家子公司与可交易普通股有相似之处,但又不尽相同。这些子公司的总价值高达数千亿美元,其中包括一些罕见的 “瑰宝”,许多表现良好但远称不上卓越的企业,还有一些令人失望的落后者。我们没有投资会造成重大拖累的业务,但也有一些是我本不该收购的。

Berkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%. These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems, many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments. We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.

另一方面,我们持有十几家大型高盈利企业的少量股份,这些企业家喻户晓,如苹果、美国运通、可口可乐和穆迪等。这些公司中的许多企业在运营所需的有形净资产上获得了极高的回报率。截至年底,我们的部分持股价值为 272 亿美元。可以理解的是,真正出色的企业很少会整体出售,但这些 “瑰宝” 的一小部分股份在周一至周五可以在华尔街买到,而且偶尔还能以优惠的价格购得。

In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and Moody’s. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for their operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion. Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very occasionally, they sell at bargain prices.

我们在选择股权工具时不偏袒任何一方,根据哪里能更好地配置你们(以及我家人)的储蓄来进行投资。通常情况下,没有什么投资看起来很有吸引力;极少数情况下,我们会发现自己面临众多投资机会。格雷格和查理一样,在这种时候都能果断行动。

We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon where we can best deploy your (and my family’s) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very infrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to act at such times as did Charlie.

对于可交易股票,如果我犯了错误,调整起来相对容易。需要强调的是,伯克希尔目前的规模削弱了这一宝贵的选择灵活性。我们不能随意进出市场。有时,建立或退出一项投资需要一年或更长时间。此外,作为少数股东,我们无法在需要时更换管理层,也无法在对资金使用决策不满意时控制资金流向。

With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake. Berkshire’s present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can’t come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can’t change management if that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the decisions being made.

对于控股公司,我们可以决定这些决策,但在处理错误投资时,灵活性要小得多。实际上,除非面临我们认为无法解决的问题,否则伯克希尔几乎从不出售控股企业。不过,有些企业主因为我们的坚定态度而选择与伯克希尔合作。偶尔,这对我们来说是一个明显的优势。

With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for us.

尽管一些评论人士认为伯克希尔目前持有大量现金,但你们的大部分资金仍然投资于股票。这种偏好不会改变。虽然我们去年持有的可交易股票价值从354亿美元降至272亿美元,但我们非上市控股股票的价值有所增加,并且仍然远远高于可交易股票投资组合的价值。

Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won’t change. While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from $354 billion to $272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far greater than the value of the marketable portfolio.

伯克希尔的股东可以放心,我们将永远把大部分资金投资于股票,主要是美国股票,尽管其中许多公司都有重要的国际业务。伯克希尔永远不会偏好持有现金等价资产,而放弃拥有优质企业,无论是全资控股还是部分持股。

Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority of their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.

如果财政政策不当,纸币的价值可能会蒸发。在一些国家,这种鲁莽的做法已经习以为常,而在我们美国短暂的历史中,也曾经接近过这种边缘。固定息票债券无法抵御货币失控带来的风险。

Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country’s short history, the U.S. has come close to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency.

然而,只要企业的产品或服务受到国民的需求,企业以及拥有所需才能的个人通常都能找到应对货币不稳定的方法。个人技能也是如此。由于我缺乏诸如卓越的运动天赋、美妙的歌喉、医疗或法律技能等资产,在我的一生中,我不得不主要依靠股票投资。实际上,我一直依赖美国企业的成功,并且还会继续这样做。

Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country’s citizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will continue to do so.

无论如何,公民明智(更理想的是富有想象力)地配置储蓄,是推动社会不断增加所需商品和服务产出的必要条件。这种经济体系被称为资本主义。它有自身的缺陷和弊端(在某些方面,现在比以往任何时候都更加严重),但它也能创造出其他经济体系无法比拟的奇迹。

One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by citizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now than ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems.

美国就是最好的例子。自 1789 年美国宪法通过、国家活力得以释放以来,这个国家在仅仅 235 年的时间里取得的进步,即使是最乐观的殖民者也无法想象。

America is Exhibit A. Our country’s progress over its mere 235 years of existence could not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted and the country’s energies were unleashed.

诚然,美国在建国初期有时会从国外借款以补充国内储蓄。但与此同时,我们需要许多美国人持续储蓄,然后需要这些储蓄者或其他美国人明智地配置这些资金。如果美国人把生产的所有东西都消费掉,这个国家就会原地踏步。

True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own savings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.

美国的发展历程并不总是一帆风顺的,我们国家一直有许多无赖和骗子,试图利用那些错误地将储蓄托付给他们的人。但即便存在这种不法行为(如今这种现象依然猖獗),以及由于激烈的竞争或颠覆性创新,许多资金配置最终失败,但美国人的储蓄还是带来了远超殖民者梦想的产出数量和质量。

The American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with their savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output beyond the dreams of any colonist.

从最初仅有 400 万人口,尽管早期还经历了一场残酷的内战,美国在转瞬之间改变了世界。

From a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on, pitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.

在某种程度上,伯克希尔的股东通过放弃股息,选择再投资而非消费,参与了美国的这一奇迹。最初,这种再投资微不足道,几乎可以忽略不计,但随着时间的推移,它如滚雪球般增长,这得益于持续的储蓄文化,以及长期复利的魔力。

In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding.

伯克希尔的业务如今已遍布美国各个角落。而且我们并未就此满足。许多公司会因各种原因倒闭,但与人类不同的是,企业的老化本身并非致命因素。如今的伯克希尔比 1965 年时要年轻得多。

Berkshire’s activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished. Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal. Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.

不过,正如查理和我一直承认的那样,伯克希尔如果换个地方,就不可能取得如今的成就,但即便伯克希尔从未存在,美国也依然会取得现在的成功。

However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the success it has been if Berkshire had never existed.

所以,谢谢你,山姆大叔(美国的拟人化称呼)。有一天,伯克希尔的后辈们希望能向你缴纳比 2024 年更多的税款。请明智地使用这些钱。照顾好那些在生活中运气不佳的人们,这并非他们的过错,他们理应得到更好的生活。永远不要忘记,我们需要你维持稳定的货币,而这需要你具备智慧并保持警惕。

So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on your part.

财产意外险业务

Property-Casualty Insurance

财产意外险仍然是伯克希尔的核心业务。该行业遵循一种在大型企业中极为罕见的财务模式。

P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire’s core business. The industry follows a financial model that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses.

通常情况下,公司在销售产品或服务之前(或同时)会产生劳动力、材料、库存、厂房和设备等成本。因此,它们的首席执行官在销售产品之前就能很好地了解产品的成本。如果售价低于成本,管理者很快就会意识到问题。现金的大量流失是难以忽视的。

Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment, etc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to ignore.

在承保财产意外险时,我们先收取保费,很久之后才会知道我们的产品成本是多少 —— 有时这个 “真相时刻” 会延迟 30 年甚至更久。(我们仍在为 50 多年前发生的石棉相关风险支付大量赔款。)

When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our product has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years. (We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years ago.)

这种运营模式的好处是,在产生大部分费用之前,财产意外险公司就能获得现金,但也存在风险,即在首席执行官和董事们意识到发生了什么之前,公司可能已经在亏损,有时甚至是巨额亏损。

This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing money – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is happening.

某些保险业务可以最大程度地减少这种时间差,比如农作物保险或冰雹损失保险,这些保险的损失能很快被报告、评估和赔付。然而,其他一些保险业务可能会让公司在走向破产的同时,还让高管和股东们沉浸在喜悦之中。想想医疗事故保险或产品责任险等。在 “长尾” 保险业务中,一家财产意外险公司可能会多年甚至数十年向所有者和监管机构报告大量但虚假的利润。如果首席执行官是个乐观主义者或骗子,这种会计处理方式可能会特别危险。这些情况并非凭空想象:历史上有大量这样的例子。

Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical malpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious profits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful: History reveals a large number of each species.

近几十年来,这种 “先收钱,后赔付” 的模式使伯克希尔能够投资大量资金(“浮存金”),同时总体上实现了我们认为的小额承保利润。我们对 “意外情况” 进行预估,到目前为止,这些预估是足够的。

In recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed Berkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small underwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been sufficient.

我们不会被业务中不断增加的巨额赔付所吓倒。(在我写这封信时,想想野火造成的损失。)合理定价以承担这些损失,并在意外发生时冷静接受损失,这是我们的工作。我们还有责任对不合理的判决、无理的诉讼和公然的欺诈行为提出质疑。

We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our activities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally take our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.

此外,格雷格、我们的董事们和我个人在伯克希尔都有大量投资,这与我们获得的任何薪酬相比都要多得多。我们不使用期权或其他单边补偿形式;如果你们亏损,我们也会亏损。这种方式鼓励谨慎行事,但并不能确保我们有先见之明。

Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of compensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not ensure foresight.

财产意外险业务的增长依赖于经济风险的增加。没有风险,就不需要保险。

P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for insurance.

回想 135 年前,那时世界上还没有汽车、卡车或飞机。如今,仅美国就有 3 亿辆汽车,庞大的车队每天都造成巨大的破坏。飓风、龙卷风和野火造成的财产损失巨大,而且还在不断增加,其发生模式和最终成本越来越难以预测。

Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.

为这些风险提供 10 年期保单是愚蠢的,甚至可以说是疯狂的,但我们认为,一般来说,承担一年期的此类风险是可控的。如果我们改变主意,我们会改变提供的合同。在我有生之年,汽车保险公司通常已经放弃了一年期保单,转而采用六个月期保单。这种改变减少了浮存金,但有助于更明智地进行承保。

It would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages, but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float but allowed more intelligent underwriting.

没有任何一家私人保险公司愿意承担伯克希尔所能承受的风险规模。有时,这一优势非常重要。但当价格不合理时,我们也需要缩减业务。我们绝不能为了继续参与市场而承保定价过低的保单。这无异于企业自杀。

No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That policy is corporate suicide.

合理为财产意外险定价既需要艺术,也需要科学,而且绝对不适合乐观主义者。招募阿吉特的伯克希尔高管迈克・戈德堡说得好:“我们希望我们的承保人员每天上班时都保持警惕,但不要畏缩不前。”

Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”

综合各方面因素,我们喜欢财产意外险业务。伯克希尔在财务和心理上都能从容应对极端损失。我们也不依赖再保险公司,这为我们带来了实质性且持久的成本优势。最后,我们拥有出色的管理人员(他们都不是乐观主义者),并且特别适合利用财产意外险业务带来的大量资金进行投资。

All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers (no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance delivers for investment.

在过去二十年里,我们的保险业务从承保中获得了 320 亿美元的税后利润,约为每美元销售额 3.3 美分的税后利润。与此同时,我们的浮存金从 460 亿美元增长到了 1710 亿美元。随着时间的推移,浮存金可能会略有增长,如果承保明智(再加上一些运气),浮存金有望实现零成本。

Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our float has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and, with intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.

伯克希尔增加对日本的投资

Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments

我们投资重点虽在美国,但对日本的投资逐渐增加,这是一个虽小却重要的例外。

A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in Japan.

自伯克希尔开始购买五家日本公司的股票以来,已过去近六年。这五家公司的运营模式与伯克希尔自身有相似之处,且都非常成功。按字母顺序,这五家公司分别是伊藤忠商事株式会社(ITOCHU)、丸红株式会社(Marubeni)、三菱商事株式会社(Mitsubishi)、三井物产株式会社(Mitsui)和住友商事株式会社(Sumitomo)。这些大型企业各自在众多业务领域拥有权益,许多业务立足日本,同时也有遍布全球的业务。

It’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The five are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but others that operate throughout the world.

伯克希尔在 2019 年 7 月首次对这五家公司进行投资。我们简单查看了它们的财务记录,就对其股票的低价格感到惊讶。随着时间的推移,我们对这些公司的钦佩与日俱增。格雷格多次与他们会面,我也定期关注他们的进展。我们俩都欣赏他们的资本配置、管理层以及对待投资者的态度。

Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their managements and their attitude in respect to their investors.

这五家公司都会在适当的时候增加股息,在合理的情况下回购股票,而且它们的高管薪酬计划比美国同行更为克制。

Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.

我们对这五家公司的持股是长期的,并且我们致力于支持它们的董事会。从一开始,我们也同意将伯克希尔对每家公司的持股比例保持在 10% 以下。不过,当我们接近这一限制时,这五家公司同意适度放宽上限。随着时间的推移,你可能会看到伯克希尔对这五家公司的持股比例都会有所增加。

Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting their boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire’s holdings below 10% of each company’s shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire’s ownership of all five increase somewhat.

截至年底,伯克希尔对这五家公司的总投资成本(以美元计)为 138 亿美元,持股的总市值达到 235 亿美元。

At yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was $13.8 billion and the market value of our holdings totaled $23.5 billion.

与此同时,伯克希尔一直在(但并非依据任何公式)增加日元计价的借款。所有借款都是固定利率,没有 “浮动利率” 借款。格雷格和我对未来的外汇汇率没有看法,因此我们寻求近似货币中性的头寸。然而,根据通用会计准则(GAAP)的规定,我们必须定期在收益中确认所借日元的任何收益或损失。截至年底,由于美元走强,我们已计入 23 亿美元的税后收益,其中 8.5 亿美元是在 2024 年实现的。

Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality. We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024.

我预计格雷格和他未来的继任者将在未来几十年内继续持有这一日本投资头寸,并且伯克希尔未来还会找到其他方式与这五家公司进行富有成效的合作。

I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five companies in the future.

我们也喜欢目前日元平衡策略的收益情况。在我写这封信时,预计 2025 年来自日本投资的年度股息收入总计约 8.12 亿美元,而我们日元计价债务的利息成本约为 1.35 亿美元。

We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about $812 million and the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about $135 million.

奥马哈年度股东大会

The Annual Gathering in Omaha

我希望你能在 5 月 3 日来到奥马哈参加我们的股东大会。今年我们的日程安排略有变化,但基本内容保持不变。我们的目标是让你得到许多问题的答案,让你与朋友们相聚,并让你对奥马哈留下良好的印象。这座城市期待着你的到来。

I hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3rd. We are following a somewhat changed schedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your questions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of Omaha. The city looks forward to your visits.

我们将有一群热情的志愿者,为你提供各种各样的伯克希尔产品,让你在购物的同时也能收获快乐。和往常一样,我们将在周五中午至下午 5 点开放,有可爱的 Squishmallows 玩偶、Fruit of the Loom 的内衣、Brooks 跑鞋以及许多其他物品等你来选购。

We will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire products that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday from noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks running shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.

同样,我们今年只出售一本书。去年我们推出了《穷查理宝典》(Poor Charlie’s Almanack),全部售罄,周六营业结束前 5000 本就销售一空。

Again, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie’s Almanack and sold out – 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday.

今年我们将推出《伯克希尔哈撒韦 60 年》(60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway)。2015 年,我请负责管理年会诸多事务的卡丽・索瓦(Carrie Sova)尝试编写一本关于伯克希尔的轻松历史书。我让她充分发挥想象力,她很快就创作出了一本书,其创意、内容和设计都让我惊叹不已。

This year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway. In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova, who among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand at putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full reign to use her imagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and design.

随后,卡丽离开伯克希尔去组建家庭,现在她有三个孩子。但每年夏天,伯克希尔的员工们都会聚在一起观看奥马哈风暴追逐者队(Omaha Storm Chasers)与美国职业棒球大联盟三级联盟对手的比赛。我会邀请一些老员工参加,卡丽通常也会带着家人一起来。在今年的活动中,我厚着脸皮问她是否愿意为伯克希尔成立 60 周年再出一版,重点展示查理的照片、语录和鲜为人知的故事。

Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with her family. At this year’s event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue, featuring Charlie’s photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.

即便要照顾三个年幼的孩子,卡丽还是立刻答应了。因此,我们将在周五下午以及周六上午 7 点至下午 4 点出售 5000 本新书。

Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently, we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.

卡丽拒绝为她在这本新 “查理” 版书籍上所做的大量工作收取任何报酬。我提议我和她共同签名 20 本书,捐赠给为奥马哈南部无家可归的成年人和儿童提供服务的斯蒂芬中心(Stephen Center),任何向该中心捐款 5000 美元的股东都可获得一本。基泽家族(Kizer family)从我的老朋友、卡丽的祖父老比尔・基泽(Bill Kizer, Sr.)开始,几十年来一直在支持这个有意义的机构。通过出售这 20 本签名书筹集的任何款项,我都会进行等额匹配捐赠。

Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family, beginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed books, I will match.

贝基・奎克(Becky Quick)将在周六报道我们经过重新安排的股东大会。贝基对伯克希尔了如指掌,她总是能安排与管理层、投资者、股东以及偶尔的名人进行有趣的访谈。她和她所在的 CNBC 团队在将我们的会议传播到全球以及存档大量与伯克希尔相关的资料方面做得非常出色。这一存档创意要归功于我们的董事史蒂夫・伯克(Steve Burke)。

Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers, investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.

今年我们不会播放电影,而是会提前一点在上午 8 点开始会议。我会做一些开场发言,然后我们会立即进入问答环节,由贝基和现场观众轮流提问。

We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions between Becky and the audience.

格雷格和阿吉特将和我一起回答问题,上午 10:30 我们会休息半小时。11 点重新开始时,只有格雷格会和我一起留在台上。今年我们将在下午 1 点结束会议,但展览区会一直开放到下午 4 点供大家购物。

Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at 10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.

随后,卡丽离开伯克希尔去组建家庭,现在她有三个孩子。但每年夏天,伯克希尔的员工们都会聚在一起观看奥马哈风暴追逐者队(Omaha Storm Chasers)与美国职业棒球大联盟三级联盟对手的比赛。我会邀请一些老员工参加,卡丽通常也会带着家人一起来。在今年的活动中,我厚着脸皮问她是否愿意为伯克希尔成立 60 周年再出一版,重点展示查理的照片、语录和鲜为人知的故事。

Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with her family. At this year’s event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue, featuring Charlie’s photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.

即便要照顾三个年幼的孩子,卡丽还是立刻答应了。因此,我们将在周五下午以及周六上午 7 点至下午 4 点出售 5000 本新书。

Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently, we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.

卡丽拒绝为她在这本新 “查理” 版书籍上所做的大量工作收取任何报酬。我提议我和她共同签名 20 本书,捐赠给为奥马哈南部无家可归的成年人和儿童提供服务的斯蒂芬中心(Stephen Center),任何向该中心捐款 5000 美元的股东都可获得一本。基泽家族(Kizer family)从我的老朋友、卡丽的祖父老比尔・基泽(Bill Kizer, Sr.)开始,几十年来一直在支持这个有意义的机构。通过出售这 20 本签名书筹集的任何款项,我都会进行等额匹配捐赠。

Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family, beginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed books, I will match.

贝基・奎克(Becky Quick)将在周六报道我们经过重新安排的股东大会。贝基对伯克希尔了如指掌,她总是能安排与管理层、投资者、股东以及偶尔的名人进行有趣的访谈。她和她所在的 CNBC 团队在将我们的会议传播到全球以及存档大量与伯克希尔相关的资料方面做得非常出色。这一存档创意要归功于我们的董事史蒂夫・伯克(Steve Burke)。

Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers, investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.

今年我们不会播放电影,而是会提前一点在上午 8 点开始会议。我会做一些开场发言,然后我们会立即进入问答环节,由贝基和现场观众轮流提问。

We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions between Becky and the audience.

格雷格和阿吉特将和我一起回答问题,上午 10:30 我们会休息半小时。11 点重新开始时,只有格雷格会和我一起留在台上。今年我们将在下午 1 点结束会议,但展览区会一直开放到下午 4 点供大家购物。

Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at 10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.

你可以在第16页找到周末活动的完整详细信息。特别要注意的是周日上午一直很受欢迎的布鲁克斯跑步活动(我会睡个懒觉)。

You can find the full details regarding weekend activities on page 16. Note particularly the always-popular Brooks run on Sunday morning. (I will be sleeping.)

我那位睿智又漂亮的妹妹伯蒂(Bertie),我去年写信提到过她,她将和她的两个女儿一起参加这次会议,她的两个女儿也很漂亮。观察者们都认为,产生这种出色基因的源头只在家族女性一方(真让人难过)。

My wise and good-looking sister, Bertie, of whom I wrote last year, will be attending the meeting along with two of her daughters, both good-looking as well. Observers all agree that the genes producing this dazzling result flow down only the female side of the family. (Sob.)

伯蒂现在91岁了,我们每周日都会用老式电话聊天。我们会聊聊老年生活的乐趣,讨论一些有趣的话题,比如我们各自拐杖的优缺点。对我来说,拐杖的作用仅限于防止我摔倒。

Bertie is now 91 and we talk regularly on Sundays using old-fashion telephones for communications. We cover the joys of old age and discuss such exciting topics as the relative merits of our canes. In my case, the utility is limited to the avoidance of falling flat on my face.

但伯蒂经常会让我自愧不如,她声称自己还能享受到一个额外的好处:她告诉我,当一个女人拄着拐杖时,男人就不会再对她 “献殷勤” 了。伯蒂的解释是,男性的自尊心使得他们不会把拄着拐杖的小老太太当作合适的追求对象。目前,我还没有数据来反驳她的说法。

But Bertie regularly one-ups me by asserting that she enjoys an additional benefit: When a woman uses a cane, she tells me, men quit “hitting” on her. Bertie’s explanation is that the male ego is such that little old ladies with canes simply aren’t an appropriate target. Presently, I have no data to counter her assertion.

但我对此有所怀疑。在会议上我在台上看不清太多东西,如果参会者能帮我留意一下伯蒂,我将不胜感激。如果拐杖真的起作用了,就告诉我一声。我打赌她会被男士们团团围住。对于上了一定年纪的人来说,这一幕会让人想起《乱世佳人》中斯嘉丽·奥哈拉(Scarlett O’Hara)和她那群男性爱慕者的场景。

But I have suspicions. At the meeting I can’t see much from the stage, and I would appreciate it if attendees would keep an eye on Bertie. Let me know if the cane is really doing its job. My bet is that she will be surrounded by males. For those of a certain age, the scene will bring back memories of Scarlett O’Hara and her horde of male admirers in Gone with the Wind.

伯克希尔的董事们和我都非常高兴你们来到奥马哈,我预计你们会度过一段愉快的时光,还可能交到一些新朋友。
The Berkshire directors and I immensely enjoy having you come to Omaha, and I predict that you will have a good time and likely make some new friends.

2025年2月22日 February 22, 2025
沃伦·E·巴菲特 Warren E. Buffett
董事会主席 Chairman of the Board

2024

查理·芒格——伯克希尔哈撒韦的建筑师

查理·芒格于11月28日去世,离他的百岁生日只有33天。虽然他在奥马哈出生和长大,但他一生中80%的时间都住在美国其他地方。因此,直到1959年他35岁时,我才第一次见到他。1962年,他决定从事资金管理工作。

三年后他告诉我——没错!——我做了一个愚蠢的决定,买下伯克希尔的控股权。但是,他向我保证,既然我已经迈出了这一步,他会告诉我如何改正我的错误。

在我接下来要讲的事情中,请记住,查理和他的家人没有一分钱投资于我当时管理的小型投资合伙企业,而我用他们的钱购买了伯克希尔。此外,我们谁也没想到查理会拥有伯克希尔的股票。

然而,查理在1965年立即建议我:“沃伦,别再想买伯克希尔这样的公司了。但现在你控制了伯克希尔,加上以合理价格收购的优秀企业,放弃以优惠的价格购买公平的企业。换句话说,抛弃你从你的英雄本·格雷厄姆那里学到的一切。它是有效的,但只有在小规模的实践中。”后来,我反复地听从了他的指示。

许多年后,查理成为我经营伯克希尔的合伙人,当我的旧习惯浮现时,他不断地把我拉回理智。直到他去世,他一直扮演着这个角色,我们一起,还有那些早期投资我们的人,最终取得了比查理和我所梦想的要好得多的成就。

实际上,查理是现在的伯克希尔的“建筑师”,而我则是“总承包商”,为他的愿景日复一日地进行建设。

查理从未试图把自己作为创作者的功劳揽在自己身上,而是让我来领奖。在某种程度上,他和我的关系既是哥哥,又是慈爱的父亲。即使他知道自己是对的,他也会把缰绳给我,当我犯错时,他从不——从不——提醒我我犯的错误。

在现实世界中,伟大的建筑与他们的建筑师联系在一起,而那些浇筑混凝土或安装窗户的人很快就被遗忘了。伯克希尔已经成为一家伟大的公司。虽然我长期负责施工队;查理应该永远被认为是建筑师。

致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东:

伯克希尔有300多万个股东。我负责每年写一封信,这封信将对这个多样化和不断变化的股东群体有用,他们中的许多人希望更多地了解他们的投资。

查理-芒格一直是我管理伯克希尔几十年过程中的合作伙伴,他对我的这一义务有着和我同样的看法,并希望我今年能像往年一样与您沟通。他和我对伯克希尔股东的责任意见完全一致。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

作家们发现,在头脑中描绘他们所寻求的读者群很有用,而且他们通常希望吸引大量读者。 在伯克希尔,我们的目标群体十分有限:他们是那些将自己的储蓄托付给伯克希尔,并不期望转售伯克希尔股票的投资者(类似于那些为了买农场或物业而储蓄的人,而不是那些更愿意用自己的多余资金购买彩票或“热门”股票的人)。

多年来,伯克希尔吸引了数量非同寻常的“终身”股东及其继承人。我们珍惜他们的存在,认为他们每年都有权利,直接从他们的首席执行官那里听到好消息和坏消息,而不是从一个永远提供乐观和糖浆的投资者关系官员或沟通顾问那里得到消息。

在知道伯克希尔的股东是什么样的人后,我很幸运有一个完美的心智模型。我的妹妹伯蒂。让我来介绍她。

首先,伯蒂聪明、睿智,喜欢挑战我的思维。然而,我们从来没有吵过架,我们的关系也从未破裂过。我们永远不会。

此外,伯蒂和她的三个女儿也有很大一部分积蓄购买了伯克希尔的股票。它们的所有权跨越了几十年,每年伯蒂都会读我要说的话。我的工作是预测她的问题,并给她诚实的回答。

伯蒂和你们大多数人一样,了解许多会计术语,但她还没有准备好参加注册会计师考试。她关注商业新闻——每天阅读四份报纸——但并不自认为是经济专家。她很理智——非常理智——本能地知道专家永远应该被忽视。毕竟,如果她能够可靠地预测明天的赢家,她会自由地分享她的宝贵见解,从而增加竞争性的买方吗?这就像找到黄金,然后把宝图递给邻居,指出黄金所在的位置。

伯蒂了解激励的力量——无论好坏——人性的弱点,以及在观察人类行为时可以识别的“信息”。她知道谁在“卖”,谁可以信任。简而言之,她不会受到任何人的愚弄。

那么,伯蒂今年会对什么感兴趣呢?

经营业绩、事实和虚构

让我们从数字开始。官方年度报告从K-1报告开始,长达124页。它充满了大量的信息——有些重要,有些微不足道。

在其披露中,许多所有者以及财经记者将关注K-72页。在那里,他们会找到众所周知的“底线”,标有“净收益(亏损)”。这些数字显示,2021年的净收益为900亿美元,2022年为230亿美元,2023年为960亿美元。

这到底是怎么回事?

你在寻求指导,并被告知计算这些“收益”的程序是由一个清醒和有资质的财务会计准则委员会(以下简称“FASB”)颁布的,由一个敬业和勤奋的美国证券交易委员会(以下简称“SEC”)授权,并由德勤(以下简称“D&T”)的世界级专业人士进行审计。在K-67页上,德勤毫不留情:“我们认为,财务报表......在所有重大方面(斜体字)公平地呈现公司的财务状况。及其运营结果 . .截至2023年12月31日止三年中的每一年......

如此神圣,这个一点用也没有的“净收入”数字,很快就通过互联网和媒体传播到世界各地。各方都认为他们已经完成了自己的工作——而且从法律上讲,他们已经完成了。

然而,我们感到不舒服。在伯克希尔,我们的观点是,“收益”应该是一个明智的概念,伯蒂会发现在评估企业时会有一些用处,但只是作为一个起点。因此,伯克希尔还向伯蒂和你报告我们所说的“运营收益”。以下是他们讲述的故事:2021年的运营收益为276亿美元;2022年为309亿美元,2023年为374亿美元。

伯克希尔公司所偏好的规定数字与强制规定数字之间的主要区别在于,我们排除了有时可能超过每天50亿美元的未实现资本收益或损失。具有讽刺意味的是,我们的偏好在2018年之前基本上是规则,当时才被强制规定的“改进”所取代。几个世纪前,伽利略的经历本应教会我们不要随意改变来自高层的规定。但在伯克希尔,我们可能会很固执。

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毫无疑问,资本收益的重要性不容忽视:我预计在未来几十年,它们将是伯克希尔价值增值的一个非常重要的组成部分。否则,我们为什么要像我一直以来对自己的资金所做的那样,将您的大量资金(包括伯蒂的)投入到可交易的股票中呢?

自1942年3月11日(我第一次购买股票的日期)以来,我记不得有任何时期,我没有将大部分净资产投入到股票中,而且是美国的股票。到目前为止,一切都很顺利。那个命运多舛的1942年那一天,道琼斯工业平均指数跌破了100点,而我“扣动扳机”时,我的亏损大约为5美元。很快,情况就好转了,现在这个指数已经稳定在了大约38000点。美国对投资者来说是一个了不起的国家。他们所需要做的就是安静地坐着,不听任何人的话。

然而,基于“收益”来判断伯克希尔的投资价值,考虑到这些“收益”包含了变幻莫测的日日夜夜、甚至年复一年的股市波动,这种做法远远不够理智。正如本·格雷厄姆教导我的,“短期内市场行为如同一台投票机;而长期来看,它会变成一台称重机。”

我们的做法

我们在伯克希尔的目标很简单:我们希望拥有享有良好、基本和持久经济效益的企业,要么全部拥有,要么持有一部分股份。在资本主义体系中,一些企业将会长期蓬勃发展,而另一些则会被证明是无底洞。要预测哪些企业会成为赢家、哪些会成为输家比你想象的要困难得多。那些声称他们知道答案的人通常要么是自欺欺人,要么是江湖郎中。

在伯克希尔,我们特别青睐那些未来能够以高回报率投入额外资本的稀有企业。拥有一家这样的公司,然后静静地坐着,几乎可以创造无法估量的财富。甚至这样的持有者的继承人也有时可以过上终身的悠闲生活。

我们也希望这些受青睐的企业由能干和值得信赖的管理者运营,尽管这是一个更难做出的判断,然而,伯克希尔也曾经历过一些失望。

1863年,美国第一任主计长(Comptroller)Hugh McCulloch给所有国家银行写了一封信。他的指示中包括这样的警告:“永远不要指望你能阻止一个流氓欺骗你。”许多自认为可以“管理”这个无赖问题的银行家,已经从McCulloch的建议中学到了智慧我也一样。人不是那么容易读懂的。诚意和同理心很容易伪装。与1863年一样,现在也是如此。

我所描述的收购业务的两个必备条件的结合,长期以来一直是我们收购的目标,有一段时间,我们有大量的候选者需要评估。

如果我错过了一个我错过了很多另一个总是会出现。

那些日子早已一去不复返了;规模让我们筋疲力尽,尽管收购竞争加剧也是一个因素。

到目前为止,伯克希尔哈撒韦的GAAP(美国通用会计准则)净资产是美国企业中最高的。创纪录的营业利润和强劲的股市导致年底的数字达到5610亿美元。而其他499家标普500指数公司2022年的净资产规模为8.9万亿美元。(2023年的数字尚未统计,但不太可能大幅超过9.5万亿美元。)

按照这一衡量标准,伯克希尔哈撒韦目前占据了近6%的份额。在五年内将我们的庞大基数翻一番是不可能的,特别是因为我们非常反对发行股票(这一行为会立即增加净值)。

在这个国家,能够真正改变伯克希尔哈撒韦公司命运的公司屈指可数,而且它们一直被我们和其他公司没完没了地挑中。有些我们可以估价,有些我们不能。而且,如果我们可以的话,它们的价格必须要有吸引力。在美国以外的地方,伯克希尔哈撒韦公司基本上没有对资本配置有意义的候选目标。总而言之,我们不可能有令人瞠目结舌的表演。

尽管如此,管理伯克希尔哈撒韦公司基本上是一件有趣的事情,而且总是很有趣。积极的一面是,经过59年的整合,我们现在拥有各种业务的一部分或100%,按加权计算,这些业务的前景略好于大多数美国大公司。凭借运气和勇气,从大量的数十个决定中涌现出几个巨大的赢家。我们现在有一小群长期担任经理的人,他们从来不会考虑去其他地方,他们把65岁仅仅视为另一个生日。

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伯克希尔受益于不同寻常的坚定不移和明确的目标。虽然我们强调保护好我们的员工、社区和供应商谁不想这样做呢?但我们将永远忠于我们的国家和我们的股东。我们永远不会忘记,虽然你的钱和我们的钱在一起,但它不属于我们。

有了这样的重点,再加上我们目前的业务组合,伯克希尔应该比一般的美国公司做得好一点,更重要的是,在运营中,资本永久损失的风险也应该大大降低。不过,任何超出“稍微好一点”的东西都是一厢情愿的想法。当伯蒂把全部赌注押在伯克希尔的时候,这种谦虚的愿望还没有实现——但现在已经实现了。

我们并不那么秘密的武器

偶尔,市场和/或经济会导致一些基本面良好的大型企业的股票和债券出现惊人的错误定价。的确,市场能够——也必将——不可预测地失灵,甚至消失,就像1914年的4个月和2001年的几天那样。如果你认为美国投资者现在比过去更稳定,那就回想一下2008年9月的情况。通信的速度和技术的奇迹使世界范围内的即时瘫痪成为可能,自烟雾信号以来,我们已经走了很长一段路。这种即时的恐慌不会经常发生——但它们会发生。

伯克希尔能够以巨额资金和业绩的确定性迅速应对市场动荡,这可能会给我们提供偶尔的大规模机会。虽然股票市场比我们早年大得多,但今天的活跃参与者既没有比我在学校时情绪更稳定,也没有比我在学校时受过更好的教育。不管出于什么原因,现在的市场表现出比我年轻时更像赌场的行为。赌场现在存在于许多家庭中,每天都在诱惑着住户。

金融生活中的一个事实永远不应该被忘记。华尔街——用这个词的比喻意义来说——希望它的客户赚钱,但真正让它的客户热血沸腾的是狂热的活动。在这种时候,任何可以推销的愚蠢的东西都会被大力推销——不是每个人都这么做,但总是有人这么做。

偶尔,场面也会变得丑陋。政客们被激怒了;最明目张胆的犯罪分子逍遥法外,有钱而不受惩罚;而你隔壁的朋友会变得困惑、贫穷,有时还想要报复。他了解到,金钱压倒了道德。

伯克希尔的一条投资规则没有也不会改变:永远不要冒资本永久损失的风险。多亏了美国的顺风和复利的力量,如果你在一生中做出了几个正确的决定,避免了严重的错误,那么我们经营的领域一直是——而且将会——得到回报。

我相信伯克希尔能够应对前所未有的金融灾难。我们不会放弃这种能力。当经济动荡发生时,伯克希尔的目标将是成为国家的一笔资产——就像它在2008- 2009年以一种非常微小的方式发挥作用一样——并帮助扑灭金融大火,而不是成为众多无意或有意点燃大火的公司之一。

我们的目标是现实的。伯克希尔的优势来自于它在扣除利息成本、税收和大量折旧及摊销费用(“EBITDA”在伯克希尔是被禁止使用的衡量标准)后巨大多样化的收益。我们对现金的要求也很低,即使国家遭遇长期的全球经济疲软,恐惧和几乎瘫痪。

伯克希尔目前不支付股息,股票回购是100%的自由裁量权。年度债务到期日从来都不重要。

你们的公司持有的现金和美国国债数量也远远超出了传统观点所认为的必要水平。在2008年的恐慌中,伯克希尔从运营中获得现金,没有以任何方式依赖商业票据、银行贷款或债券市场。我们没有预测到发生经济危机的准确时间,但我们总是为此做好准备。

极端的财政保守主义是我们对那些加入我们伯克希尔所有权的人做出的企业承诺。在大多数年份里——实际上是在漫长的几十年里——我们的谨慎很可能被证明是不必要的行为——就像对一座被认为是防火的堡垒式建筑的保险政策一样。但伯克希尔并不想对伯蒂或任何信任我们的个人造成永久性的财务损失——长期的收益缩水是无法避免的。

伯克希尔希望长盛不衰。

让我们感到舒适的非受控企业

去年我提到了伯克希尔长期持有的两只股票,可口可乐和美国运通。这些都不像我们对苹果的持仓那么大。每只股票只占伯克希尔公司公认会计准则净值的4-5%。但它们是有价值的资产,也说明了我们的想法。

美国运通于1850年开始运营,可口可乐于1886年在亚特兰大的一家药店诞生。(伯克希尔不太喜欢新公司)。多年来,两家公司都试图向不相关的领域扩张,但都没有取得什么成功。在过去——但现在肯定不是——两者甚至都管理不善。

但两家公司都在其主营业务上取得了巨大成功,并根据情况在各地进行了重塑。而且,最重要的是,他们的产品“四处旅行”。可口可乐和美国运通的核心产品都在世界范围内家喻户晓,而现金流和对毋庸置疑的金融信任的需求是我们这个世界永恒的必需品。

在2023年,我们没有买卖美国运通或可口可乐的股票——延续了我们自己的《李伯大梦》式的沉睡期(《李伯大梦》是美国小说之父华盛顿·欧文的小说“Rip Van Winkle”的中文译名)。这种沉睡期现在已经持续了二十多年。去年,这两家公司再次通过提高盈利和股息来奖励我们的不作为。事实上,在2023年,我们从美国运通获得的收益份额,已经大大超过了我们很久以前购买的13亿美元成本。

美国运通和可口可乐几乎肯定会在2024年提高股息——美国运通的股息可能提高16%——而且我们肯定会全年保持我们的持股不变。我能创造一个比这两家公司更好的全球业务吗?正如伯蒂会告诉你的那样:“不可能。

尽管伯克希尔在2023年没有增持这两家公司的股票,但由于我们在伯克希尔进行的股票回购,您去年对可口可乐和美国运通的间接所有权有所增加。这种回购有助于增加您对伯克希尔拥有的每一项资产的参与。对于这个显而易见但经常被忽视的事实,我补充了我通常的警告:所有股票回购都应该取决于价格。以商业价值为折价回购的明智之举,如果以溢价回购,就会变得愚蠢。

持有可口可乐和美国运通股票的得失教训?当你找到一个真正出色的企业时,请坚持下去。耐心是有回报的,一项出色的业务可以抵消许多不可避免的平庸决定。

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今年,我想描述另外两项我们预计无限期维持的投资。与可口可乐和美国运通公司一样,这些承诺相对于我们的资源而言并不大。然而,它们是值得的,我们能够在2023年增加这两个仓位。

截至年底,伯克希尔拥有西方石油公司27.8%的普通股,还拥有认股权证,在五年多的时间里,这些认股权证使我们能够选择以固定价格大幅增加我们的所有权。尽管我们非常喜欢我们的所有权和选择权,但伯克希尔对收购或管理西方石油公司没有兴趣。我们特别喜欢它在美国拥有的大量石油和天然气,以及它在碳捕获计划方面的领导地位,尽管这种技术的经济可行性尚未得到证实。这两项活动都非常符合我国的利益。

不久前,美国严重依赖外国石油,碳捕获没有有意义的支持者。事实上,在1975年,美国的石油产量为每天800万桶油当量(以下简称“BOEPD”),远远低于本国的需求。依靠在二战中动员起来的有利能源地位,美国已经退缩成为严重依赖外国(可能不稳定)的供应商。预计石油产量将进一步下降,未来使用量将会增加。

很长一段时间以来,悲观主义似乎是正确的,到2007年,产量下降到了500万桶油当量/日。与此同时,美国政府在1975年建立了战略石油储备(“SPR”)以缓解(尽管并没有完全消除)美国自给自足能力的削弱。

然后——哈利路亚!——页岩油经济在2011年变得可行,我们的能源依赖结束了。现在,美国的产量超过了1300万桶油当量/日,而石油输出国组织不再占据上风。西方石油自身的美国年产油量每年都接近于SPR的整个库存。如果美国国内产量保持在500万桶油当量/日,并且发现自己极度依赖非美国来源,我们的国家今天将会非常——非常——紧张。在那个水平上,如果外国石油不可用,SPR将在几个月内被耗尽。

在Vicki Hollub的领导下,西方石油正在为国家和所有者做正确的事情。没有人知道未来一个月、一年或十年油价会怎么样。但Vicki知道如何将石油从岩石中分离出来,这是一种不寻常的才能,对她的股东和她的国家都是有价值的。

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此外,伯克希尔继续持有对非常大的五家日本公司的被动和长期利益,每家公司都以一种高度多样化的方式经营,有些类似于伯克希尔自身的经营方式。去年,格雷格·艾伯尔和我前往东京与这些公司的管理层进行了会谈后,我们增加了对这五家公司的持股。

伯克希尔现在对每家公司持股约为9%。(一个小细节:日本公司计算未流通股的方式与美国的做法不同)伯克希尔还向每家公司承诺,不会购买使我们的持股超过9.9%的股份。我们对这五家公司的成本总计为1.6万亿日元,而这五家公司年末的市值为2.9万亿日元。然而,日元近年来已经贬值,我们年末的未实现收益以美元计算为61%,即80亿美元。

格雷格和我都不相信我们能够预测主要货币的市场价格。我们也不相信我们能够雇佣具备这种能力的人。因此,伯克希尔用1.3万亿日元债券的收益为其在日本的头寸提供了大部分资金。这笔债务在日本受到了很好的接受,我相信伯克希尔拥有的日元计价债务比其他任何美国公司都多。日元贬值使伯克希尔年末获得了19亿美元的收益,根据GAAP规定,这笔款项已在2020-23年期间定期计入收入。

在某些重要方面,伊藤忠、丸红、三菱、三井和住友这五家公司都采取了对股东友好的政策,这些政策远远优于美国通常实行的政策。自从我们开始购买日本股票以来,这五家公司中的每一家都以有吸引力的价格减少了其未流通股的数量。

与此同时,与美国的典型情况相比,这五家公司的管理层对自己的薪酬远没有那么激进。还要注意的是,这五家公司中的每一家都只将其收益的约1/3用于股息。这五家公司保留的大笔资金既用于建立许多业务,也用于回购股票,但程度较小。和伯克希尔一样,这五家公司也不愿发行股票。

伯克希尔的另一个好处是,我们的投资可能会为我们带来机会,让我们与五家管理良好、备受尊敬的大型公司在世界各地建立合作伙伴关系。他们的利益比我们的广泛得多。就他们而言,让日本的CEO们感到欣慰的是,伯克希尔哈撒韦公司将永远拥有巨大的流动性资源,这些资源可以立即用于此类合作伙伴关系,无论它们的规模如何。

我们在日本的购买从2019年7月4日开始。考虑到伯克希尔哈撒韦公司目前的规模,通过公开市场收购建立头寸需要极大的耐心和较长时间的“友好”价格。这个过程就像是让一艘战舰转弯。这是一个较大的劣势,我们在伯克希尔的早期没有面临过。

2023年的记分卡

我们每个季度都会发布一份新闻稿,以类似于下面所示的方式报告我们汇总的运营收益(或亏损)。以下是全年数据:

2023年2022年

保险-承保……54.28亿美元亏损3000万美元

保险-投资收益……95.67亿美元64.84亿美元

铁路……50.87亿美元59.46亿美元

公用事业和能源……23.31亿美元39.04亿美元

其他业务及杂……149.37亿美元145.49亿美元

运营利润……373.50亿美元308.53亿美元

在2023年5月6日的伯克希尔年会上,我展示了当天一大早发布的第一季度业绩。然后我对全年的前景做了一个简短的总结:(1)我们的大多数非保险业务在2023年面临收益下降;(2)我们最大的两个非保险业务BNSF和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司的良好业绩将缓解这种下降,这两家公司加起来占2022年营业利润的30%以上;(3)我们的投资收入肯定会大幅增长,因为伯克希尔持有的巨额美国国债头寸终于开始开始回报,且远远超过我们一直收到的微薄收入;(4)保险可能会做得很好,这既是因为它的承保收益与经济中其他领域的收益没有相关性,而且,除此之外,财产意外伤害保险的价格已经走强。

保险如期通过了。然而,我对BNSF和BHE的期望都错了。让我们分别来看看。

铁路对美国经济的未来至关重要。从成本、燃料使用量和碳排放强度来衡量,这显然是将重型材料运往遥远目的地的最有效方式。卡车运输在短途运输中获胜,但美国人需要的许多货物必须运送到数百甚至数千英里以外的客户那里。这个国家离不开铁路,而铁路行业的资金需求永远是巨大的。的确,与大多数美国企业相比,铁路消耗资本。

BNSF是覆盖北美的六大铁路系统中最大的。我们的铁路拥有23,759英里的主干线,99条隧道,13,495座桥梁,7,521台机车和其他各种固定资产,资产负债表上的资产总额为700亿美元。但我的猜测是,复制这些资产至少需要5000亿美元,完成这项工作需要数十年。

BNSF每年的支出必须超过折旧费用,以维持其目前的业务水平。无论投资于哪个行业,这种现实对所有者都是不利的,但对资本密集型行业尤其不利。

在BNSF,自我们14年前收购以来,超出GAAP折旧费用的支出总计达到了惊人的220亿美元,即每年超过15亿美元。哎哟!这种差距意味着,除非我们定期增加这条铁路的债务,否则BNSF支付给其所有者伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股息将经常大大低于BNSF公布的盈利。这是我们不打算做的。

因此,伯克希尔在收购价格上获得了可接受的回报,尽管可能比它看起来的要少,而且在房产的重置价值上也微不足道。这对我和伯克希尔董事会来说并不奇怪。这就解释了为什么我们可以在2010年以其重置价值的一小部分收购BNSF。

北美的铁路系统单程长途运输大量的煤炭、粮食、汽车、进出口货物等,而这些旅行往往会给回程带来收入问题。极端的天气条件经常阻碍甚至阻碍轨道、桥梁和设备的使用。洪水可能是一场噩梦。这些都不足为奇。虽然我坐在一间舒适的办公室里,但铁路是一项户外活动,许多员工在艰难、有时甚至危险的条件下工作。

一个不断演变的问题是,越来越多的美国人不再寻求一些铁路运营中固有的困难、往往孤独的就业条件。工程师们必须面对这样一个事实:在美国3.35亿人口中,一些孤独或精神失常的美国人会选择躺在100节车厢前自杀,这是一列非常沉重的火车,在不到一英里或更远的距离都停不下来。你想成为那个无助的工程师吗?这种创伤在北美大约每天发生一次;它在欧洲更为普遍,并将永远伴随着我们。

铁路行业的工资谈判最终可能掌握在总统和国会手中。此外,美国铁路被要求每天运送许多危险的货物,而这些货物是铁路行业宁愿避免的。“公共承运人”一词定义了铁路的责任。

去年,由于营收下降,BNSF的盈利下滑幅度超出了我的预期。尽管燃料成本也有所下降,但华盛顿公布的工资涨幅远远超出了国家的通胀目标。这种差异可能会在未来的谈判中再次出现。

尽管BNSF运输的货物和资本支出比北美其他五大铁路公司中的任何一家都多,但自我们收购以来,它的利润率相对于其他五大铁路公司都有所下滑。我相信我们广阔的服务领域是首屈一指的,因此我们的利润率可以而且应该提高。

我特别为BNSF对国家的贡献感到自豪,也为那些在北达科他州和蒙大拿州冬天在零下的户外工作以保持美国商业动脉畅通的人们感到自豪。铁路在运行时不会受到太多关注,但如果铁路无法使用,整个美国都会立即注意到这个这里。

一个世纪后,BNSF仍将是国家和伯克希尔的重要资产。你可以放心。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

去年,我们第二次也是更严重的盈利失望发生在BHE。其大部分大型电力公用事业业务,以及其广泛的天然气管道,表现与预期相符。但一些州的监管环境已经引发了零盈利甚至破产的可能(加州最大的公用事业公司已经破产,夏威夷公用事业公司目前面临破产威胁)。

在这样的司法管辖区,很难预测曾经被认为是美国最稳定的行业之一的收益和资产价值。

一个多世纪以来,电力公司通过各州承诺固定的股本回报率(有时对业绩优优者还会有少量奖金),筹集了巨额资金,为其增长提供资金。通过这种方法,大量的投资被用于未来几年可能需要的产能。这一前瞻性规定反映了一个现实,即公用事业公司建设发电和输电资产往往需要多年时间。BHE在西部广泛的多州输电项目于2006年启动,距离完成还有几年时间。最终,它将服务于10个州,占美国大陆面积的30%。

私人和公共电力系统都采用了这种模式,即使人口增长或工业需求超出预期,电力供应也不会增长。对监管机构、投资者和公众来说,“安全边际”方法似乎是明智的。现在,固定但令人满意的回报协议已经在一些州被打破,投资者开始担心这种破裂可能会蔓延。气候变化增加了他们的担忧。地下输电可能是必需的,但在几十年前,谁愿意为这种建设支付惊人的费用呢?

在伯克希尔,我们对已经发生的损失金额做出了最佳估计。这些成本来自森林火灾,如果对流风暴变得更加频繁,森林火灾的频率和烈度都会变得更加严重,并且可能还会愈演愈烈。

我们还需要很多年,才有可能知道巴菲特旗下伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司(BHE)遭受森林火灾损失的最终数字,才能明智地决定未来在脆弱的西部州进行投资的可取性。其他地方的监管环境是否会发生变化还有待观察。

其他电力公司可能面临类似于太平洋瓦电公司以及夏威夷电力公司的生存问题。以没收的方式解决我们目前的问题,显然对伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司不利,但公司和伯克希尔本身的结构,都能在负面的意外中幸存下来。我们在保险业务中经常遇到这些,我们的基本产品是风险承担,它们将在其他地方发生。伯克希尔可以承受财务意外,但我们不会花冤枉钱。

无论伯克希尔的情况如何,公用事业行业的最终结果可能是不祥的:某些公用事业公司可能再也无法吸引到美国公民的储蓄,从而被迫采用公共电力模式。内布拉斯加州在1930年代做出了这个选择,而在全美,有许多公共电力业务在运行。最终,选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们更喜欢哪种模式。

当尘埃落定时,美国的电力需求和随之而来的资本支出将是惊人的。我没有预料到甚至没有考虑监管回报的不利发展,我和伯克希尔在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司的两位合伙人都没有这样做,我们一起犯了一个代价高昂的错误。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

问题已经够多了:我们的保险业务去年表现异常出色,在销售、保费和承保利润方面都创下了纪录。财产险与意外伤害保险(以下简称“P/C”)是伯克希尔福祉和增长的核心。我们已经从事这项业务57年,尽管我们的业务量增长了近5000倍——从1700万美元增加到830亿美元——但我们仍有很大的增长空间。

除此之外,我们经常痛苦地了解到很多关于什么类型的保险业务和什么样的人应该避免。最重要的教训是,我们的承销商可以是瘦的、胖的、男性的、女性的、年轻的、老年人的、外国的或国内的。但他们不能在办公室里成为乐观主义者,无论生活中的质量通常多么令人向往。

财产险与意外伤害保险业务的意外情况——可能在六个月或一年保单到期几十年后发生——几乎总是负面的。这个行业的会计应该认识到这一现实,但估计错误的程度可能大得离谱。当碰到江湖骗子时,识别过程通常既缓慢又昂贵。伯克希尔将始终试图准确估计未来的损失,但通货膨胀——包括货币和“合法”的通货膨胀——会产生不可预知但巨大的影响。

我已经讲述了我们的保险业务的故事很多次,所以我只会把新手们引向第18页(注:这是一种玩笑说法,本年股东信共17页)。在这里,我只会重申,如果阿吉特·贾因在1986年没有加入伯克希尔,我们的地位就不会是现在这样。在那个幸运的日子之前,除了1951年初开始并永远不会结束的与GEICO几乎难以置信的美妙经历之外,我在努力建立我们的保险业务时基本上是在茫茫荒野中徘徊。

自加入伯克希尔以来,阿吉特的成就得到了我们各种财产/意外保险业务中一大批极具才华的保险高管的支持。他们大多数人的名字和面孔对大多数新闻界和公众来说是未知的。然而,伯克希尔的管理团队对于财产/意外保险业来说就像库珀斯敦(注:Cooperstown位于纽约州中北部,坐落着大名鼎鼎的美国棒球名人堂)的荣誉得主对于棒球一样。

伯蒂,你可以为拥有一家在全球范围内运营、拥有无与伦比的财务资源、声誉和人才的不可思议的财产/意外保险业务而感到自豪。它在2023年取得了胜利。

奥马哈股东会进展如何?

来参加2024年5月4日的伯克希尔年度股东会。在台上,你将看到三位现在负责带领你的公司的主要经理。你可能会想,这三个人有什么共同之处?他们看起来肯定不像。让我们深入挖掘一下。

格雷格·艾伯尔负责伯克希尔的所有非保险业务,从各个方面来看,他都已经准备好明天就成为伯克希尔的CEO。他出生并成长在加拿大(他现在还打曲棍球)。然而,在20世纪90年代,格雷格在奥马哈住了六年,就在离我几个街区的地方。在那段时间里,我从未见过他。

大约十年前,出生、成长和接受教育都在印度的阿吉特·贾因和他的家人住在奥马哈,距离我的家只有一英里左右(我自1958年以来一直住在那里)。阿吉特和他的妻子Tinku在奥马哈有很多朋友,尽管他们搬到纽约已经有三十多年了(为了身处再保险业务的主要活动地点)。

今年舞台上缺少的是查理。他和我都出生在奥马哈,距离你在五月的聚会上坐的地方大约两英里。在他的前十年里,查理住在伯克希尔长期作为办公室的地方大约半英里远。查理和我都在奥马哈的公立学校度过了童年,并且我们的童年在奥马哈的影响是深刻的。然而,我们直到很晚才见面。(一个可能让你惊讶的注脚:在美国45位总统中查理经历了15位。人们称拜登总统为第46位,但这个编号系统将格罗弗·克利夫兰计为第22和第24位,因为他的任期不是连续的。美国是一个非常年轻的国家。)

在公司层面上,伯克希尔于1970年从在新英格兰待了81年的地方搬迁到奥马哈定居,把麻烦抛在身后,在新址蓬勃发展。

作为“奥马哈效应”的最后一个标点,伯蒂——是的,就是伯蒂——早年在奥马哈的一个中产阶级社区度过,几十年后则成为了美国最伟大的投资者之一。(译者注:伯蒂为巴菲特的妹妹)

你可能会想,她把所有的钱都投到了伯克希尔,然后就跟着“躺赢”。但事实并非如此。1956年组建家庭后,伯蒂在金融领域活跃了20年:她持有债券,将1/3的资金投资于一家公开持有的共同基金,并偶尔交易股票。她的潜力没有被注意到。

1980年,46岁的伯蒂不顾哥哥的任何催促,决定搬家。在接下来的43年里,她只保留了共同基金和伯克希尔,没有进行任何新的交易。在此期间,她变得非常富有,即使是在做了大量慈善捐赠(想想有九位数)之后。

数以百万计的美国投资者本可以遵循她的推理,这些推理只涉及她小时候在奥马哈不知怎么吸收的常识。伯蒂没有冒险,每年5月都会回到奥马哈再充充电。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

那么到底是怎么回事呢?这是奥马哈(Omaha)的水吗?是奥马哈的空气吗?这是不是某种奇怪的行星现象,类似于牙买加短跑运动员、肯尼亚马拉松运动员或俄罗斯国际象棋专家的诞生?我们一定要等到有一天AI给出这个谜题的答案吗?

保持开放的心态。五月来到奥马哈,呼吸空气,喝水,和伯蒂及她漂亮的女儿们打招呼。谁知道呢?这不会有什么坏处,而且无论如何,你会玩得很开心,会遇到一大群友好的人。

最重要的是,我们将推出新的第四版《穷查理年鉴》(Poor Charlie’s Almanack)。拿一份复本。查理的智慧会改善你的生活,就像我一样。

沃伦·E·巴菲特 董事会主席 2024年2月24日

Charlie Munger – The Architect of Berkshire Hathaway 

Charlie Munger died on November 28, just 33 days before his 100th birthday.

Though born and raised in Omaha, he spent 80% of his life domiciled elsewhere. Consequently, it was not until 1959 when he was 35 that I first met him.

In 1962, he decided that he should take up money management.

Three years later he told me – correctly! – that I had made a dumb decision in buying control of Berkshire. But, he assured me, since I had already made the move, he would tell me how to correct my mistake.

In what I next relate, bear in mind that Charlie and his family did not have a dime invested in the small investing partnership that I was then managing and whose money I had used for the Berkshire purchase. Moreover, neither of us expected that Charlie would ever own a share of Berkshire stock.

Nevertheless, Charlie, in 1965, promptly advised me: “Warren, forget about ever buying another company like Berkshire. But now that you control Berkshire, add to it wonderful businesses purchased at fair prices and give up buying fair businesses at wonderful prices. In other words, abandon everything you learned from your hero, Ben Graham. It works but only when practiced at small scale.” With much back-sliding I subsequently followed his instructions.

Many years later, Charlie became my partner in running Berkshire and, repeatedly, jerked me back to sanity when my old habits surfaced. Until his death, he continued in this role and together we, along with those who early on invested with us, ended up far better off than Charlie and I had ever dreamed possible.

In reality, Charlie was the “architect” of the present Berkshire, and I acted as the “general contractor” to carry out the day-by-day construction of his vision. Charlie never sought to take credit for his role as creator but instead let me take the bows and receive the accolades. In a way his relationship with me was part older brother, part loving father. Even when he knew he was right, he gave me the reins, and when I blundered he never – never –reminded me of my mistake.

In the physical world, great buildings are linked to their architect while those who had poured the concrete or installed the windows are soon forgotten. Berkshire has become a great company. Though I have long been in charge of the construction crew; Charlie should forever be credited with being the architect.

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire has more than three million shareholder accounts. I am charged with writing a letter every year that will be useful to this diverse and ever-changing group of owners, many of whom wish to learn more about their investment.

Charlie Munger, for decades my partner in managing Berkshire, viewed this obligation identically and would expect me to communicate with you this year in the regular manner. He and I were of one mind regarding our responsibilities to Berkshire shareholders.

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Writers find it useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or “hot” stocks).

Over the years, Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such “lifetime” shareholders and their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.

In visualizing the owners that Berkshire seeks, I am lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce her.

For openers, Bertie is smart, wise and likes to challenge my thinking. We have never, however, had a shouting match or anything close to a ruptured relationship. We never will.

Furthermore, Bertie, and her three daughters as well, have a large portion of their savings in Berkshire shares. Their ownership spans decades, and every year Bertie will read what I have to say. My job is to anticipate her questions and give her honest answers.

Bertie, like most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA exam. She follows business news – reading four newspapers daily – but doesn’t consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible – very sensible – instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location.

Bertie understands the power – for good or bad – of incentives, the weaknesses of humans,

the “tells” that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She knows who is “selling” and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobody’s fool.

So, what would interest Bertie this year?

Operating Results, Fact and Fiction

Let’s begin with the numbers. The official annual report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount of information – some important, some trivial.

Among its disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page K-72. There, they will find the proverbial “bottom line” labeled “Net earnings (loss).” The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96 billion for 2023.

What in the world is going on?

You seek guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these “earnings” are promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte & Touche (“D&T”). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: “In our opinion, the financial statements . . . . . present fairly, in all material respects (italics mine), the financial position of the Company . . . . . and the results of its operations . . . . . for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2023 . . . . .”

So sanctified, this worse-than-useless “net income” figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their job – and, legally, they have.

We, however, are left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our view is that “earnings” should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find somewhat useful – but only as a starting point – in evaluating a business. Accordingly, Berkshire also reports to Bertie and you what we call “operating earnings.” Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9 billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.

The primary difference between the mandated figures and the ones Berkshire prefers is that we exclude unrealized capital gains or losses that at times can exceed $5 billion a day. Ironically, our preference was pretty much the rule until 2018, when the “improvement” was mandated.

Galileo’s experience, several centuries ago, should have taught us not to mess with mandates from on high. But, at Berkshire, we can be stubborn.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Make no mistake about the significance of capital gains: I expect them to be a very important component of Berkshire’s value accretion during the decades ahead. Why else would we commit huge dollar amounts of your money (and Bertie’s) to marketable equities just as I have been doing with my own funds throughout my investing lifetime?

I can’t remember a period since March 11, 1942 – the date of my first stock purchase – that I have not had a majority of my net worth in equities, U.S.-based equities. And so far, so good. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell below 100 on that fateful day in 1942 when I “pulled the trigger.” I was down about $5 by the time school was out. Soon, things turned around and now that index hovers around 38,000. America has been a terrific country for investors. All they have needed to do is sit quietly, listening to no one.

It is more than silly, however, to make judgments about Berkshire’s investment value based on “earnings” that incorporate the capricious day-by-day and, yes, even year-by-year movements of the stock market. As Ben Graham taught me, “In the short run the market acts as a voting machine; in the long run it becomes a weighing machine.”

What We Do

Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. It’s harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.

At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies – and simply sitting tight – can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can – ugh! – sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.

We also hope these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share of disappointments.

In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the wisdom of Mr. McCulloch’s advice – and I have as well. People are not that easy to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it was in 1863.

This combination of the two necessities I’ve described for acquiring businesses has for long been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates to evaluate. If I missed one – and I missed plenty – another always came along.

Those days are long behind us; size did us in, though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.

Berkshire now has – by far – the largest GAAP net worth recorded by any American business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend figure of $561 billion. The total GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies – a who’s who of American business – was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)

By this measure, Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period, particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that immediately juices net worth).

There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others. Some we can value; some we can’t. And, if we can, they have to be attractively priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.

Nevertheless, managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side, after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who regard 65 as just another birthday.

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Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well – who wouldn’t wish to do so? – our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.

With that focus, and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American corporation and, more important, should also operate with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond “slightly better,” though, is wishful thinking. This modest aspiration wasn’t the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire – but it is now.

Our Not-So-Secret Weapon

Occasionally, markets and/or the economy will cause stocks and bonds of some large and fundamentally good businesses to be strikingly mispriced. Indeed, markets can – and will – unpredictably seize up or even vanish as they did for four months in 1914 and for a few days in 2001. If you believe that American investors are now more stable than in the past, think back to September 2008. Speed of communication and the wonders of technology facilitate instant worldwide paralysis, and we have come a long way since smoke signals. Such instant panics won’t happen often – but they will happen.

Berkshire’s ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and certainty of performance may offer us an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock market is massively larger than it was in our early years, today’s active participants are neither more emotionally stable nor better taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.

One fact of financial life should never be forgotten. Wall Street – to use the term in its

figurative sense – would like its customers to make money, but what truly causes its denizens’

juices to flow is feverish activity. At such times, whatever foolishness can be marketed will be

vigorously marketed – not by everyone but always by someone.

Occasionally, the scene turns ugly. The politicians then become enraged; the most flagrant

perpetrators of misdeeds slip away, rich and unpunished; and your friend next door becomes

bewildered, poorer and sometimes vengeful. Money, he learns, has trumped morality.

One investment rule at Berkshire has not and will not change: Never risk permanent loss of capital. Thanks to the American tailwind and the power of compound interest, the arena in which we operate has been – and will be – rewarding if you make a couple of good decisions during a lifetime and avoid serious mistakes.

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I believe Berkshire can handle financial disasters of a magnitude beyond any heretofore experienced. This ability is one we will not relinquish. When economic upsets occur, as they will, Berkshire’s goal will be to function as an asset to the country – just as it was in a very minor way in 2008-9 – and to help extinguish the financial fire rather than to be among the many companies that, inadvertently or otherwise, ignited the conflagration.

Our goal is realistic. Berkshire’s strength comes from its Niagara of diverse earnings

delivered after interest costs, taxes and substantial charges for depreciation and amortization

(“EBITDA” is a banned measurement at Berkshire). We also operate with minimal requirements

for cash, even if the country encounters a prolonged period of global economic weakness, fear and

near-paralysis.

Berkshire does not currently pay dividends, and its share repurchases are 100%

discretionary. Annual debt maturities are never material.

Your company also holds a cash and U.S. Treasury bill position far in excess of what

conventional wisdom deems necessary. During the 2008 panic, Berkshire generated cash from

operations and did not rely in any manner on commercial paper, bank lines or debt markets. We

did not predict the time of an economic paralysis but we were always prepared for one.

Extreme fiscal conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in

ownership of Berkshire. In most years – indeed in most decades – our caution will likely prove to

be unneeded behavior – akin to an insurance policy on a fortress-like building thought to be

fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage – quotational

shrinkage for extended periods can’t be avoided – on Bertie or any of the individuals who have

trusted us with their savings.

Berkshire is built to last.

Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable

Last year I mentioned two of Berkshire’s long-duration partial-ownership

positions – Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple

position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire’s GAAP net worth. But they are meaningful

assets and also illustrate our thought processes.

American Express began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta

drug store in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into

unrelated areas over the years and both found little success in these attempts. In the past – but

definitely not now – both were even mismanaged.

But each was hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions

called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.

During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke – extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase.

Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 – about 16% in the case of AMEX – and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.”

Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium.

The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many mediocre decisions that are inevitable.

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This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to our resources.

They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both positions during 2023.

At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum’s common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s interest.

Not so long ago, the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (“BOEPD”), a level far short of the country’s needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S. mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily dependent on foreign – potentially unstable – suppliers. Further declines in oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.

For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve(“SPR”) in 1975 to alleviate – though not come close to eliminating – this erosion of American self-sufficiency.

And then – Hallelujah! – shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our country would be very – very – nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.

Under Vicki Hollub’s leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that’s an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.

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Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very

large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar

to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel

and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.

Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies

calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also

pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%.

Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion.

However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.

Neither Greg nor I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also don’t believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds. This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The weakened yen has produced a yearend gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over the 2020-23 period.

In certain important ways, all five companies – Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo – follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number of its outstanding shares at attractive prices.

Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 1⁄3 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.

An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.

Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire’s present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of “friendly” prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.

The Scorecard in 2023

Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation: (in $ millions)

At Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the outlook for the full year: (1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023; (2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of operating earnings in 2022; (3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and (4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.

Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let’s take a look at each.

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Rail is essential to America’s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way – measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity – of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can’t run without rail, and the industry’s capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.

BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.

BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries.

At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $11⁄2 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF’s reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do.

Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That’s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value.

North America’s rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls. Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.

An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can’t be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.

Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities.

Last year BNSF’s earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.

Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.

I am particularly proud of both BNSF’s contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads don’t get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America.

A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.

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Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii).

In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.

For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.

With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?

At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred.

These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.

It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.

Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.

Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous:
Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.

When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.

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Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshire’s well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume – from $17 million to $83 billion – we have much room to grow.

Beyond that, we have learned – too often, painfully – a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can’t be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.

Surprises in the P/C business – which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired – are almost always negative. The industry’s accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation – both monetary and the “legal” variety – is a wild card.

I’ve told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day – aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end – I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.

Ajit’s achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown’s honorees are to baseball.

Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.

What is it with Omaha?

Come to Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company. What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don’t look alike. Let’s dig deeper.

Greg Abel, who runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire – and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow – was born and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey).

In the 1990s, however, Greg lived for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I never met him.

A decade or so earlier, Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I’ve lived since 1958). Both Ajit and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it’s been more than three decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action in reinsurance takes place).

Missing from the stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years, Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn’t meet, however, until much later. (A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of America’s 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were not consecutive. America is a very young country.)

Moving to the corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and blossoming in its new home.

As a final punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie – yes that Bertie – spent her early formative years in a middle-class neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the country’s great investors.

You may be thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it.

But that’s not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 1⁄3 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.

Then, in 1980, when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic gifts (think nine figures).

Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances, Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

So what is going on? Is it Omaha’s water? Is it Omaha’s air? Is it some strange planetary phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica’s sprinters, Kenya’s marathon runners, or Russia’s chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday yields the answer to this puzzle? Keep an open mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows? There is no downside, and, in any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people.

To top things off, we will have available the new 4th edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Pick up a copy. Charlie’s wisdom will improve your life as it has mine.

February 24, 2024

 Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

2023

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们:

  伯克希尔拥有超过三百万的股东账户。我负责每年写一封信,这封信对于这个多样化且不断变化的所有者群体来说是有用的,许多人都希望更多地了解他们投资的公司。

  查理·芒格,过去几十年里作为我管理伯克希尔的搭档,也认同这一义务。相信他一定会期望我今年继续以常规的方式与你们沟通。在对伯克希尔股东的责任上,他和我意见一致。

  对于作家而言,去设想他们试图吸引的读者是有用的,而且他们常常希望吸引大量的读者。在伯克希尔,我们有一个更有限的目标:那些信任伯克希尔,用他们的储蓄进行投资而不期望再卖出的投资者(这种态度类似于那些为了购买农场或出租物业而储蓄的人,而不是那些更喜欢用他们的剩余资金购买彩票或“热门”股票的人)。

  多年来,伯克希尔吸引了大量这样的“终身”股东,以及他们的继承人。我们珍视他们的存在,并相信他们有权每年都直接从我们的CEO那里听到好消息和坏消息,而不是来自一个永远兜售乐观和甜言蜜语的投资者关系官员或沟通顾问。

  在设想伯克希尔寻求的所有者时,我很幸运有一个完美的心理模型,我的妹妹,贝蒂(Bertie Buffett)。让我来介绍她。

  首先,贝蒂聪明、睿智并且喜欢挑战我的思考。然而,我们从未有过大声争吵或接近破裂的关系。我们永远也不会。

  此外,贝蒂和她的三个女儿也将他们大部分的储蓄投资于伯克希尔的股票。她们的所有权跨越了几十年,每年贝蒂都会阅读我的股东信。我的工作是预见她的问题并给予她诚实的回答。

  贝蒂,就像你们大多数人一样,了解许多会计术语,但她还没有准备好参加注册会计师考试。她关注商业新闻——每天阅读四份报纸——但不认为自己是经济专家。她很理智——非常理智——本能地知道总是应该忽略那些专家的言论。毕竟,如果她能可靠地预测明天的赢家,难道她会免费分享她宝贵的见解、从而增加竞争性购买吗?那就像是发现了金子,然后递给邻居一张显示其位置的地图。

  贝蒂理解激励——无论好坏——的力量,人类的弱点,当观察人类行为时可以识别的“迹象”。她知道谁在“卖东西”以及谁可以被信任。简而言之,她不是任何人的傻瓜。

  那么,今年有什么能引起贝蒂的兴趣呢?

  运营结果,事实与虚构

  我们从数字开始。官方年度报告从K-1页开始,延伸到124页。它包含了大量的信息——有些重要,有些微不足道。

  在其披露中,许多所有者,连同财经记者,将关注K-72页。在那里,他们将找到俗话所说的“损益表底线”,标签为“净收益(亏损)”。数字显示2021年为900亿美元,2022年为(230亿美元),2023年为960亿美元。

  到底发生了什么?

  你寻求指导并被告知,计算这些“收益”的程序是由严肃且有资格的财务会计准则委员会(“FASB”)颁布的,由一群专注且努力工作的证券交易委员会(“SEC”)委员强制实施的,并由世界级的专业人士在德勤(“D&T”)审计的。在K-67页,德勤毫不讳言:“依我们看法,财务报表……在所有重大方面公正地呈现了公司……的财务状况……以及其运营结果……对于截至2023年12月31日的三年期间……”

  如此神圣化,这个比无用更糟的“净收入”数字很快就通过互联网和媒体传遍了世界。所有相关方认为他们已经完成了他们的工作——从法律上讲,他们确实如此。

  然而,我们还是感到不舒服。在伯克希尔,我们的观点是“收益”应该是一个有意义的概念,贝蒂会发现它在评估一个业务时有些用处——但仅仅是一个起点。因此,伯克希尔还向贝蒂和你们报告我们所称的“营业收益”。这里是他们讲述的故事:2021年为276亿美元;2022年为309亿美元,2023年为374亿美元。

  伯克希尔偏爱的数字与强制信披数字之间的主要区别在于,我们排除了有时每天可以超过50亿美元的未实现资本收益或亏损。讽刺的是,我们的偏好在2018年之前几乎就是规则,但在那时强制实施了一些“改进”。几个世纪前加利略的经历应该教会我们不要干涉上级的命令。但是,在伯克希尔,我们可以很固执。

  绝不要误解资本收益的重要性:我预计在未来几十年中,它们将是伯克希尔价值增值的一个非常重要组成部分。否则,我们为什么要用你们(和贝蒂的)巨额资金投资于股票市场,就像我在我的投资生涯中一直对自己的资金所做的那样?

  自1942年3月11日——我第一次购买股票的日期——以来,我不记得有哪一个时期我没有将我大部分的净资产投资于股票,特别是美国股票。到目前为止,一切都很好。那个命运多舛的1942年,当我“扣动扳机”时,道琼斯工业平均指数跌破了100点。到放学的时候,我大概亏了5美元。不久,情况发生了转变,现在那个指数徘徊在38,000点左右。美国对投资者来说是一个了不起的国家。他们需要做的就是安静地坐着,不听任何人的。

  然而,基于将股市每天甚至每年的反复无常的变动纳入“收益”中来判断伯克希尔的投资价值,是非常愚蠢的。正如本·格雷厄姆教给我的,“短期内市场表现得像一个投票机;长期来看,它成为一个称重机。”

  我们的目标

  伯克希尔的目标很简单:我们希望完全或部分拥有那些享有良好经济基础并且持久的企业。在资本主义中,一些企业将会长期繁荣,而另一些则会证明是金钱黑洞。预测哪些将是赢家和输家比你想象的要困难。而那些告诉你他们知道答案的人通常要么是自我欺骗,要么是“卖蛇油的骗子”。

  在伯克希尔,我们特别青睐那些未来能够以高回报投入额外资本的稀有企业。仅仅拥有这样一家公司——并且坐着不动——可以带来几乎无法衡量的财富。甚至这样一家公司持仓的继承人也可以——啊!——有时过上一辈子的闲适生活。

  我们还希望这些受青睐的企业由能干且值得信赖的管理者运营,尽管这是一个更难做出的判断。当然,伯克希尔也曾有失望的时候。

  在1863年,美国首任银行监理官休·麦卡洛克向所有全国性银行发送了一封信。他的指示中包含了这样一个警告:“永远不要期望你能防止一个无赖欺骗你。”许多认为他们可以“管理”无赖问题的银行家已经学到了麦卡洛克先生建议的智慧——我也是。人们并不容易读懂。真诚和同理心很容易被伪装。这一点现在和1863年一样真实。

  我所描述的这两个购买公司必需条件的组合,长久以来一直是我们购买企业时的目标。有一段时间,我们有大量的候选对象可供评估。如果我错过了一个——事实上我错过了很多——总会有另一个出现。

  那些日子早已经过去了;我们的规模让我们陷入困境,尽管购买公司时的竞争增加也是一个因素。

  伯克希尔现在拥有——迄今为止——任何美国企业记录中最大的GAAP净资产。创纪录的营业收入和强劲的股市使得年终数字达到5610亿美元。其他499家标普公司——美国企业的精英——在2022年的总GAAP净资产为8.9万亿美元。(标普2023年的数字尚未统计,但不太可能实质性超过9.5万亿美元。)

  以这个衡量标准,伯克希尔现在占据了其所运营宇宙近6%的份额。在例如五年的时间内,简单地翻倍我们庞大的基数是不可能的,特别因为我们极度反对发行股票(一个立即增加净资产的行为)。

  在这个国家,只有少数几家公司有能力真正推动伯克希尔的发展,而且它们已经被我们和其他人无休止地审视过。我们可以对一些公司进行估值;对另一些则不能。即便我们能够估值,它们也必须拥有吸引人的定价。在美国以外,基本上没有任何有意义的选择可以用于伯克希尔的资本部署。总的来说,我们没有实现惊人表现的可能性。

  尽管如此,管理伯克希尔的大多数时候是有趣且始终有趣的。从积极的方面来说,经过59年的组合,公司现在完全或部分拥有的各种企业,在加权基础上,比大多数大型美国公司的前景稍好一些。通过运气和勇气,从众多决策中涌现出了一些巨大的赢家。而且我们现在有一小群长期的管理者,他们从不考虑去其他地方,而且认为65岁只是另一个生日。

  伯克希尔受益于一种不寻常的恒定性和目标明确性。虽然我们强调善待我们的员工、社区和供应商——谁不希望这样做呢?——我们的忠诚永远属于我们的国家和我们的股东。我们永远不会忘记,尽管你的钱与我们的混合在一起,但它并不属于我们。

  凭借这样的关注点和我们目前的业务组合,伯克希尔应该会比普遍而言的美国公司表现得稍好一些,更重要的是,能够在大幅降低永久性资本损失风险的情况下运营。不过,除了“略好一些”外,其余的部分都是奢望。这种谦逊的愿景在贝蒂全力投资伯克希尔时并非如此——但现在是。

  我们(不那么秘密)的武器

  有时,市场和/或经济会导致一些大型且基本面良好的公司的股票和债券被极度错估。实际上,市场可以——并且会——不可预测地崩溃甚至消失,就像1914年的四个月和2001年的几天那样。如果你认为现在的美国投资者比过去更稳定,回想一下2008年9月。通信速度和技术奇迹促成了瞬间的全球性瘫痪,我们已经从放烟雾信号的时代发展了很长一段路。这种瞬间的恐慌不会经常发生——但它们将发生。

  伯克希尔能够立即以巨额资金和确定的表现响应市场紧缩,可能为我们提供偶尔的大规模机会。尽管股票市场比我们早年时大得多,但今天的活跃参与者既没有比我上学时更情绪稳定,也没有受到更好的教育。出于某种原因,市场现在表现出比我年轻时更多的赌场行为。“赌场”现在存在于许多家庭中,每天都在诱惑着住户。

  金融生活中的一个事实永远不应被忘记。华尔街——用这个词的比喻意义——希望其客户赚钱,但真正让其股民激动的是狂热的活动。在这种时候,任何愚蠢的东西都会被大力推销——不是每个人都这样做,但总有人这样做。

  偶尔,场面会变得丑陋。然后,政治家们变得愤怒;最公然的恶行施行者悄无声息地逃脱,富有且未受惩罚;而你的邻居朋友则变得困惑、变穷,有时还会怀有复仇心态。他开始学习到,金钱已经胜过了道德。

  伯克希尔的一条投资规则没有且不会改变:永远不冒永久性资本损失的风险。得益于美国的顺风和复利的力量,我们运营的领域已经是——并将继续是——如果你一生中做出几个好决定并避免重大错误,就会获得回报的。

  我相信伯克希尔能够应对一场,烈度超越所有已有历史的金融灾难。我们不会放弃这种能力。当经济动荡发生时,就像它们肯定会发生那样,伯克希尔的目标将是作为国家的资产——就像在2008-2009年的微小方式中那样——帮助扑灭金融火灾,而不是成为许多受灾公司的一员,不管是无意遭牵连,还是以其他方式引发大火。

  我们的目标是现实的。伯克希尔的力量来自于其在扣除利息成本、税收和大量折旧及摊销费用后(“EBITDA”是伯克希尔禁止使用的衡量指标)提供的多元化收益。我们的运营对现金的要求也很少,即便国家长期遭遇全球经济疲软、恐惧和近乎瘫痪时也是如此。

  伯克希尔目前不支付股息,股票回购完全是自由决定的,债务到期从未构成什么大问题。

  你们的公司还持有远超常规智慧认为必要的现金和美国国债票据头寸。在2008年的恐慌中,伯克希尔从运营中产生现金,没有以任何方式依赖商业票据、银行额度或债务市场。我们没有预测经济瘫痪的时间,但我们始终为之做好了准备。

  极端的财务保守主义,是我们对那些与我们共同拥有伯克希尔的人做出的承诺。在大多数年份,我们的谨慎可能被证明是不必要的行为——就像防火堡垒式建筑的保险单一样。但伯克希尔不想给贝蒂或任何信任我们的人带来永久的财务伤害——当然,他们持有的资产的市场价值在一段较长的时间内可能会经历一定程度的下跌,这是投资市场的自然波动的一部分,无法避免。

  伯克希尔的建造理念,就是为了经得起时间的考验。

  让我们感到舒适的非控股业务

  去年,我提到了伯克希尔的两个长期持仓——可口可乐和美国运通。这两家并非像我们对苹果的巨大投资那样。每个只占伯克希尔公认会计准则下净资产的4-5%。但它们是有意义的资产,也展示了我们的思考过程。

  美国运通于1850年开始运营,可口可乐于1886年在亚特兰大的一家药店推出。(伯克希尔不青睐新来者。)这两家公司多年来曾尝试扩展到无关领域,但在这些尝试中几乎没有成功。在过去——但现在绝对不是——它们甚至遭遇过错误的管理。

  但每家公司在其基础业务中都取得了巨大成功,根据情况需要进行了这样那样的调整。而且,关键的是,它们的产品“走出去了”。可口可乐和美国运通都成为全球范围内可识别的名字,就像它们的核心产品一样。对液体的消费,和对无可置疑财务信任的需求,是我们世界永恒的基本需求。

  在2023年期间,我们既没有购买也没有出售美国运通或可口可乐的任何股份——延续了我们自己的瑞普·凡·温克尔式的沉睡,这已经持续了二十多年。去年,这两家公司再次通过增加它们的利润和股息来奖励我们的不作为。实际上,我们在2023年来自美国运通的收益,远远超过了很久以前购买股票所花的13亿美元。

  美国运通和可口可乐在2024年几乎肯定会增加它们的股息——美国运通方面大概会是16%——而我们几乎一定会在整个年度保持持股不变。我能创造出比这两家更好的全球性业务吗?正如贝蒂会告诉你的:“不可能”。

  尽管伯克希尔在2023年没有购买这两家公司的任何股份,但去年你对可口可乐和美国运通的间接所有权,因为我们在伯克希尔进行的回购而略有增加。这种回购作用于增加你在伯克希尔所拥有的每一项资产中的参与度。对于这个显而易见但经常被忽视的真理,这里我添加一份说了很多遍的警告:所有的股票回购都应该依赖于价格。在低于业务价值的折扣时进行回购是明智的,而在溢价时进行则是愚蠢的。

  从投资可口可乐和美国运通中能学到什么?当你找到一个真正了不起的企业时,坚持下去。耐心是有回报的,一个了不起的企业可以抵消许多不可避免的平庸决策。

  今年,我想描述我们预期将无限期保持的另外两项投资。像可口可乐和美国运通一样,这些承诺相对于我们的资源并不巨大。然而,它们是有价值的,而且我们在2023年期间增加了这部分的持仓。

  截至年末,伯克希尔拥有西方石油公司普通股的27.8%,还拥有超过五年时间的认股权证,给予我们以固定价格大幅增加所有权的选项。尽管我们非常喜欢这些股票和认股权证,伯克希尔对买下或管理西方石油没有兴趣。我们特别喜欢它在美国的庞大石油和天然气业务,以及其在碳捕获倡议上的领导地位,尽管这项技术的经济可行性尚未被证明。这两项活动都非常符合我们国家的利益。

  不久前,美国在外国石油上的依赖程度可悲地处于高位,碳捕获几乎不存在有意义的支持者。实际上,在1975年,美国的石油当量日产量(“BOEPD”)为800万桶,远远低于国家的需求。美国在第二次世界大战中处于有利的能源地位,但现在却严重依赖外国(甚至可以称为不稳定的)供应商。据预测,随着未来用量的增加,石油产量将进一步下降。

  长期以来,这种悲观情绪似乎是正确的,到2007年,产量降至每天500万桶石油当量(BOEPD)。同时,美国政府在1975年创建了战略石油储备(SPR),以缓解——尽管没有完全消除——美国自给自足能力的侵蚀。

  然后——哈利路亚!——2011年,页岩油经济变得可行,我们的能源依赖结束了。如今,美国的产量超过了每天1300万桶石油当量,欧佩克不再占据上风。西方石油公司自己的美国石油年产量几乎接近SPR的全部库存。如果国内产量仍然维持在每天500万桶,并且发现自己严重依赖非美国来源,我们的国家今天会非常、非常紧张。在那个水平上,如果无法获得外国石油,SPR将在几个月内被耗尽。

  在Vicki Hollub的领导下,西方石油公司为其国家和所有者做了正确的事情。没有人知道未来一个月、一年或十年内油价会怎样。但Vicki确实知道如何从岩石中分离出石油,这是一种不寻常的才能,对她的股东和她的国家都很有价值。

  此外,伯克希尔继续保持对五家非常大的日本公司的被动和长期兴趣,每家公司都以类似于伯克希尔自身运作的方式进行高度多元化的经营。在格雷格·阿贝尔和我前往东京与它们的管理层会面后,去年我们增加了所有五家公司的持股。

  伯克希尔现在大约拥有这五家公司每家9%的股票。(一个次要点:日本公司计算在外股份的方式与美国的做法不同。)伯克希尔还向每家公司承诺,不会购买股份使我们的持股超过9.9%。我们对这五家公司的投资成本总计为1.6万亿日元,而2023年末持仓市值为2.9万亿日元。由于近年来日元贬值,我们的年末未实现收益率以美元计算为61%,即80亿美元。

  格雷格和我都不认为我们能预测主要货币的市场价格。我们也不认为我们能雇佣有这种能力的人。因此,伯克希尔是用发行1.3万亿日元债券的收入,资助其大部分的日本头寸。这些债券在日本非常受欢迎,我相信伯克希尔拥有的日元债务比任何其他美国公司都多。日元贬值为伯克希尔带来了19亿美元的年末收益,根据通用会计准则,这笔收入在2020-2023年期间已经定期确认。

  在某些重要方面,这五家公司——伊藤忠、丸红、三菱、三井和住友——遵循的对股东友好政策,比美国通常的做法要好得多。自我们开始购买日本股份以来,这五家公司每家都以有吸引力的价格减少了其在外股份的数量。

  与此同时,这五家公司的管理层在自己的薪酬方面远不如美国典型情况那样激进。同样值得注意的是,这五家公司中的每一家只将其盈利的大约三分之一用于分红,保留的大额资金既用于发展其众多业务,也在较小程度上用于回购股份。与伯克希尔一样,这五家公司不愿意发行股份。

  对伯克希尔而言的一个额外好处是,我们的投资可能会带来与五家大型、管理良好且享有盛誉的公司在全球范围内合作的机会。它们的利益比起我们要广泛得多。而且,从它们的角度看,日本的CEO们安心于知道伯克希尔将始终拥有巨额的流动资源,这些资源可以立即用于此类合作,无论其规模大小如何。

  我们买入这些日本股票始于2019年7月4日。鉴于伯克希尔目前的规模,通过公开市场购买建立头寸需要很多耐心和一个长期“友好”的价格,这个过程就像转动一艘战舰。这是我们在伯克希尔早期不用经历的重要不利因素。

  2023年的记分卡

  每个季度我们都会发布一份新闻稿,报告我们的汇总运营收益(或亏损),方式类似于下面所示。以下是全年的汇编:image

(注:从上到下分别为保险-承销、保险-投资利润、铁路、公用事业和能源、其他业务和杂项,以及应用利润)

  在2023年5月6日伯克希尔的年度股东会上,我介绍了当天早晨公布的第一季度结果。随后,我简要总结了全年的展望:(1)我们大多数非保险业务在2023年面临收益下降;(2)这种下滑将得到我们两大最大的非保险业务——BNSF铁路公司和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司(“BHE”)的良好业绩缓冲,这两家公司在2022年的运营收益中占比超过30%;(3)我们的投资收入肯定会显著增长,因为伯克希尔持有的巨额美国国债仓位终于开始为我们带来远超之前所获得的微薄金额;(4)保险业很可能表现良好,这既因为其承保收益不与其他地方的收益相关联,而且,物业和意外伤害保险价格已经上涨。

  保险业如预期那样实现了目标。然而,我对BNSF和BHE的预期却出现了错误。让我们分别来看一下。

  铁路对美国的经济未来至关重要。就成本、燃料使用和碳强度而言,它显然是将重物料运往远距离目的地的最高效方式。对于短途运输,卡车运输占优势,但许多美国人需要的商品必须运送给数百甚至数千英里。国家离开了铁路就无法运转,而且这个行业的资本需求将永远巨大。实际上,与大多数美国企业相比,铁路公司可以说是在“吃”资本。

  BNSF是覆盖北美的六大主要铁路系统中最大的一个。我们的铁路业务以700亿美元的资产负债表价值,携带着它的23,759英里的主轨道、99个隧道、13,495座桥梁、7,521辆机车和其他各种固定资产。但我猜,复制这些资产至少需要5000亿美元,且需要几十年时间来完成这项工作。

  仅仅为了维持其目前的业务水平,BNSF每年必须花费的钱超过其折旧费用。这一现实对于任何行业的所有者来说都是不利的,对于资本密集型行业尤其是这样。

  在BNSF,自我们14年前购买以来,超出GAAP折旧费用的支出总计高达220亿美元或每年超过15亿美元。哎哟!这种差距意味着,除非我们定期增加铁路公司的债务,否则BNSF支付给伯克希尔的红利将大大低于BNSF的报告收益。而这是我们不打算做的。

  因此,伯克希尔对BNSF购买价格的回报是可以接受的,尽管比表面上看起来的要少,而且资产的重置价值也很低。这对我或伯克希尔的董事会来说都不足为奇。这解释了为什么我们能在2010年以其重置价值的一小部分买下了BNSF。

  北美的铁路系统运输大量的煤炭、谷物、汽车、进出口商品等,这些货物常常需要长途单向运输,这些行程经常创造返程时收入问题。极端天气条件,经常妨碍甚至阻碍轨道、桥梁和设备的利用。洪水可能是一场噩梦。所有这些都不是什么新鲜事。虽然我坐在一个始终舒适的办公室里,但铁路运输是一项户外活动,许多员工在艰苦甚至危险的条件下工作。

  一个日益严重的问题是,越来越多的美国人不愿意从事铁路运营中某些困难且常常孤独的工作。工程师必须面对这样一个事实:在3.35亿美国人口中,一些孤独或心理受挫的美国人,会选择躺在无法在一英里或更远的距离内停下的100节、异常沉重的火车前自杀来结束生命。你想成为那位无助的工程师吗?这种创伤在北美大约每天发生一次;在欧洲更为常见,且这种情况将永远伴随我们。

  在铁路行业,工资谈判可能最终落到总统和国会的手中。此外,美国铁路公司每天都被要求运输其他行业更愿意避免的危险产品。“公共承运人”这个词定义了铁路的责任。

  去年,随着收入下降,BNSF的收益降低程度超过了我的预期。尽管燃料成本也有所下降,但华盛顿颁布的工资增长远远超出了国家的通胀目标。这种差异在未来的谈判中可能会重现。

  尽管BNSF运输的货物量更多,资本支出也超过北美其他五大主要铁路公司,但自我们购买以来,其利润率相对于这五家公司却出现下滑。我相信,我们广阔的服务是无与伦比的,因此我们的利润率可以而且应该改善。

  我特别为BNSF对国家的贡献,以及在北达科他州和蒙大拿州冬季零下气温时在户外工作,保持美国商业动脉畅通的人们感到骄傲。当铁路运行顺畅时,它们可能不会引起太多关注,但如果它们不可用,整个美国将立即感受到空缺。

  从现在起一个世纪,BNSF将继续是国家和伯克希尔的重要资产。这一点你可以相信。

  去年我们的第二个也是更严重的收益失望发生在BHE。它的大多数大型电力公用事业以及广泛的天然气管道表现大致符合预期。但一些州的监管环境,提高了这个行业零利润甚至破产的风险(加利福尼亚最大公用事业的实际结果和夏威夷州当前面对的威胁)。在这样的司法管辖区,很难预测这个曾经被认为是美国最稳定行业(之一)的收益和资产价值。

  一个多世纪以来,电力公司通过各州承诺的固定股本回报率(有时业绩优异会有小额奖金)筹集巨额资金,为公司发展提供资金。通过这种方式,对几年后可能需要的发电能力进行了大规模投资。这种前瞻性监管反映了一个现实,即公用事业公司建设发电和输电资产往往需要多年时间。BHE在西部的大型多州输电项目于2006年启动,距完工还有数年时间。这些项目最终将服务10个州,占美国大陆总面积的30%。

  私营和公共电力系统都采用这种模式,即使人口增长或工业需求超出预期,电灯也不会熄灭。在监管者、投资者和公众看来,这种”安全边际”的方法是明智的。现在,这种“固定但令人满意的回报”的约定在几个州被打破了,投资者开始担心这种破裂会蔓延开来。气候变化加剧了他们的担忧。地下输电可能是必需的,但几十年前,谁愿意为这种建设支付高昂的费用呢?

  在伯克希尔,我们对已经发生的损失做出了最佳估计。这些成本来源于森林火灾,其频率和强度已经增加——如果对流风暴变得更加频繁,这种情况很可能会继续增加。

  我们还需要很多年才能知道BHE在森林火灾中的最终损失,才能明智地决定未来在脆弱的西部各州进行投资的可取性。其他地方的监管环境是否会发生变化,我们拭目以待。

  其他电力公司可能会面临与太平洋天然气与电力公司和夏威夷电力公司类似的生存问题。

  如果以没收的方式解决目前的问题,显然会对BHE造成不利影响,但该公司和伯克希尔公司本身的结构都能应对不利的意外情况。我们的基本产品是风险承担,我们的保险业务经常会出现这种情况,其他业务也会出现这种情况。伯克希尔公司可以承受财务意外,但我们不会故意把好钱往坏处扔。

  无论伯克希尔公司的情况如何,公用事业行业的最终结果可能是不祥的:某些公用事业公司可能不再吸引美国公民的储蓄,将被迫采用公共电力模式。内布拉斯加州在20世纪30年代就做出了这样的选择,全国各地也有许多公共电力公司。最终,选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们更喜欢哪种模式。

  当一切尘埃落定,美国的电力需求和随之而来的资本支出将是惊人的。我和伯克希尔公司在BHE的两位合伙人都没有预料到甚至没有考虑到监管回报的不利发展,我犯了一个代价高昂的错误。

  说够了问题:我们的保险业务去年表现出色,创下了销售、浮存金和承保利润的记录。财产及意外伤害保险(“P/C”)构成了伯克希尔的福祉和增长的核心。我们从事这一业务已经57年,尽管我们的业务量几乎增长了5000倍——从1700万美元增至830亿美元——我们还有很大的增长空间。

  除此之外,我们还学到了许多重要课程——往往是通过痛苦的方式——关于应该避免哪些类型的保险业务和哪些类型的人。最重要的一课是,我们的承保人可以是瘦的、胖的、男性、女性、年轻的、老的、外国的或本国的。但他们在办公室里不能是乐观主义者,尽管这个品质在生活中通常是可取的。

  P/C业务中的意外几乎总是负面的,这些意外可能在六个月或一年期保单到期后的几十年里发生。这个行业的会计设计是为了认识这一现实,但预估错误可能会非常巨大。如果涉及到江湖骗子,发现起来往往既慢又费钱。伯克希尔公司总是试图准确估算未来的损失赔付,但通货膨胀(包括货币和“法律”方面的通货膨胀)是个未知数。

  我已经讲述了我们保险业务的故事很多次了,因此我将直接指导新来者去看第18页。在这里,我只想重复,如果阿吉特·贾恩没有在1986年加入伯克希尔,我们的地位就不会是现在这样。在那个幸运的日子到来之前,除了1951年初在GEICO开始的一段几乎令人难以置信的美好经历之外,我一直在荒野中徘徊,努力建立我们的保险业务。

  阿吉特自加入伯克希尔以来的成就,得到了我们各个P/C业务中一大批极具才能的保险高管的支持。他们的名字和面孔对大多数媒体和公众来说都是陌生的。然而,伯克希尔的管理团队对于P/C保险来说,就像棒球名人堂的成员对于棒球那样。

  贝蒂,你可以为自己拥有一部分在全球范围内运营、拥有无与伦比的财务资源、声誉和才能、不可思议的P/C业务感到高兴。它在2023年发挥了重要作用。

  奥马哈有什么特别之处呢?

  来参加2024年5月4日的伯克希尔年度股东会吧。在舞台上,你将看到现在承担引领你们公司重要责任的三位管理者。你可能会好奇,这三个人有什么共同点呢?他们显然看起来并不相像。让我们深入了解一下。

  格雷格·阿贝尔,负责伯克希尔所有非保险业务的运营——在各方面都已准备好成为伯克希尔的下一任CEO——出生并在加拿大长大(他至今仍然打冰球)。然而,在1990年代,格雷格在奥马哈住了六年,就在我家附近几个街区。在那段时间里,我从未见过他。

  比格雷格要大个十岁左右,出生、成长并在印度受教育的阿吉特·贾恩,与他的家人住在奥马哈,距离我家(我自1958年以来一直居住的地方)只有一英里左右。尽管阿吉特和他的妻子Tinku已经搬到纽约超过三十年了(为了靠近再保险业的许多行动),但他们在奥马哈有许多朋友。

  今年不在舞台上的是查理。他和我都出生在奥马哈,距离你们5月聚会时将坐的位置大约两英里远。在他出生的头十年里,查理就住在距离伯克希尔办公室大约半英里远的地方。查理和我都在奥马哈的公立学校度过了我们的早年时光,被我们在奥马哈的童年深深地塑造。然而,我们直到很久以后才相遇。(一个可能会让你惊讶的脚注:查理在美国45位总统中经历过15位。人们把拜登总统称为第46任总统,但这个编号将格罗弗·克利夫兰计为第22任和第24任,因为他的任期不是连续的。美国是一个非常年轻的国家。)

  转到公司层面,伯克希尔本身在1970年,从其位于新英格兰的81年居所搬迁到了奥马哈,把它的麻烦留在了身后,并在新家中茁壮成长。

  作为“奥马哈效应”最后的标点,贝蒂——是的,那个贝蒂——在奥马哈的一个中产阶级社区度过了她早期的成长年岁,几十年后,成为了国内一位伟大的投资者。

  你可能会认为她把所有的钱都投入到伯克希尔,然后简单地坐等财富增长。但事实并非如此。在1956年成立家庭后,贝蒂在接下来的20年里在财务上一直保持活跃:持有债券,将她资金的三分之一投入到一家上市的共同基金,并且频繁交易股票。她的潜力未被注意到。

  然后,在1980年,贝蒂46岁时,独立于她兄弟的任何建议或劝说,贝蒂决定采取行动。除了保留共同基金和伯克希尔外,她在接下来的43年里没有进行任何新的交易。在那段时间里,即使在进行了大额慈善捐赠(九位数)之后,她依然非常富有。

  数百万美国投资者本可以遵循她的投资逻辑,这只涉及她不知不觉从小在奥马哈吸收的常识。而且,不冒任何风险,贝蒂每年五月都会回到奥马哈重新获得能量。

  那么,到底发生了什么?是奥马哈的水吗?是奥马哈的空气吗?是某种奇怪的行星现象,类似于令牙买加盛产短跑运动员,以及肯尼亚的马拉松跑者或俄罗斯的国际象棋专家那样么?我们必须等到某一天让人工智能解开这个谜题吗?

  保持开放的心态。五月来奥马哈,呼吸这里的空气,喝这里的水,向贝蒂及她那漂亮的女儿们问好。谁知道呢?这没有坏处,无论如何,你会玩得很开心,结识一大群友好的人。

  作为压轴消息,我们将提供《穷查理宝典》的第四版。去买一本吧,查理的智慧将改善你的生活,就像我的生活一样。

  2024年2月24日  沃伦·E·巴菲特董事会主席

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc

  Berkshire has more than three million shareholder accounts. I am charged with writing a letter every year that will be useful to this diverse and ever-changing group of owners, many of whom wish to learn more about their investment.

  Charlie Munger, for decades my partner in managing Berkshire, viewed this obligation identically and would expect me to communicate with you this year in the regular manner. He and I were of one mind regarding our responsibilities to Berkshire shareholders.

  Writers find it useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or “hot” stocks).

  Over the years, Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such “lifetime” shareholders and their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.

  In visualizing the owners that Berkshire seeks, I am lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce her.

  For openers, Bertie is smart, wise and likes to challenge my thinking. We have never, however, had a shouting match or anything close to a ruptured relationship. We never will.

  Furthermore, Bertie, and her three daughters as well, have a large portion of their savings in Berkshire shares. Their ownership spans decades, and every year Bertie will read what I have to say. My job is to anticipate her questions and give her honest answers.

  Bertie, like most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA exam. She follows business news – reading four newspapers daily – but doesn‘t consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible – very sensible – instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location.

  Bertie understands the power – for good or bad – of incentives, the weaknesses of humans, the “tells” that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She knows who is “selling” and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobodys fool.

  So, what would interest Bertie this year?

  Operating Results, Fact and Fiction

  Lets begin with the numbers. The official annual report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount of information – some important, some trivial.

  Among its disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page K-72. There, they will find the proverbial “bottom line” labeled “Net earnings (loss).” The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96 billion for 2023.

  What in the world is going on?

  You seek guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these “earnings” are promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte & Touche (“D&T”). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: “In our opinion, the financial statements . . . . . present fairly, in all material respects (italics mine), the financial position of the Company . . . . . and the results of its operations . . . . . for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2023 . . . . .”

  So sanctified, this worse-than-useless “net income” figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their job – and, legally, they have.

  We, however, are left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our view is that “earnings” should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find somewhat useful – but only as a starting point – in evaluating a business. Accordingly, Berkshire also reports to Bertie and you what we call “operating earnings.” Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9 billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.

  The primary difference between the mandated figures and the ones Berkshire prefers is that we exclude unrealized capital gains or losses that at times can exceed $5 billion a day. Ironically, our preference was pretty much the rule until 2018, when the “improvement” was mandated. Galileos experience, several centuries ago, should have taught us not to mess with mandates from on high. But, at Berkshire, we can be stubborn.

  Make no mistake about the significance of capital gains: I expect them to be a very important component of Berkshire‘s value accretion during the decades ahead. Why else would we commit huge dollar amounts of your money (and Bertie’s) to marketable equities just as I have been doing with my own funds throughout my investing lifetime?

  I cant remember a period since March 11, 1942 – the date of my first stock purchase – that I have not had a majority of my net worth in equities, U.S.-based equities. And so far, so good. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell below 100 on that fateful day in 1942 when I “pulled the trigger.” I was down about $5 by the time school was out. Soon, things turned around and now that index hovers around 38,000. America has been a terrific country for investors. All they have needed to do is sit quietly, listening to no one.

  It is more than silly, however, to make judgments about Berkshires investment value based on “earnings” that incorporate the capricious day-by-day and, yes, even year-by-year movements of the stock market. As Ben Graham taught me, “In the short run the market acts as a voting machine; in the long run it becomes a weighing machine.”

  What We Do

  Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. Its harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.

  At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies – and simply sitting tight – can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can – ugh! – sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.

  We also hope these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share of disappointments.

  In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the wisdom of Mr. McCullochs advice – and I have as well. People are not that easy to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it was in 1863.

  This combination of the two necessities Ive described for acquiring businesses has for long been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates to evaluate. If I missed one – and I missed plenty – another always came along.

  Those days are long behind us; size did us in, though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.

  Berkshire now has – by far – the largest GAAP net worth recorded by any American business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend figure of $561 billion. The total GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies – a whos who of American business – was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)

  By this measure, Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period, particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that immediately juices net worth).

  There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others. Some we can value; some we cant. And, if we can, they have to be attractively priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.

  Nevertheless, managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side, after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who regard 65 as just another birthday.

  Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well – who wouldnt wish to do so? – our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.

  With that focus, and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American corporation and, more important, should also operate with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond “slightly better,” though, is wishful thinking. This modest aspiration wasnt the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire – but it is now.

  Our Not-So-Secret Weapon

  Occasionally, markets and/or the economy will cause stocks and bonds of some large and fundamentally good businesses to be strikingly mispriced. Indeed, markets can – and will – unpredictably seize up or even vanish as they did for four months in 1914 and for a few days in 2001. If you believe that American investors are now more stable than in the past, think back to September 2008. Speed of communication and the wonders of technology facilitate instant worldwide paralysis, and we have come a long way since smoke signals. Such instant panics wont happen often – but they will happen.

  Berkshire‘s ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and certainty of performance may offer us an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock market is massively larger than it was in our early years, today’s active participants are neither more emotionally stable nor better taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.

  One fact of financial life should never be forgotten. Wall Street – to use the term in its figurative sense – would like its customers to make money, but what truly causes its denizens juices to flow is feverish activity. At such times, whatever foolishness can be marketed will be vigorously marketed – not by everyone but always by someone.

  Occasionally, the scene turns ugly. The politicians then become enraged; the most flagrant perpetrators of misdeeds slip away, rich and unpunished; and your friend next door becomes bewildered, poorer and sometimes vengeful. Money, he learns, has trumped morality.

  One investment rule at Berkshire has not and will not change: Never risk permanent loss of capital. Thanks to the American tailwind and the power of compound interest, the arena in which we operate has been – and will be – rewarding if you make a couple of good decisions during a lifetime and avoid serious mistakes.

  I believe Berkshire can handle financial disasters of a magnitude beyond any heretofore experienced. This ability is one we will not relinquish. When economic upsets occur, as they will, Berkshires goal will be to function as an asset to the country – just as it was in a very minor way in 2008-9 – and to help extinguish the financial fire rather than to be among the many companies that, inadvertently or otherwise, ignited the conflagration.

  Our goal is realistic. Berkshires strength comes from its Niagara of diverse earnings delivered after interest costs, taxes and substantial charges for depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA” is a banned measurement at Berkshire). We also operate with minimal requirements for cash, even if the country encounters a prolonged period of global economic weakness, fear and near-paralysis.

  Berkshire does not currently pay dividends, and its share repurchases are 100% discretionary. Annual debt maturities are never material.

  Your company also holds a cash and U.S. Treasury bill position far in excess of what conventional wisdom deems necessary. During the 2008 panic, Berkshire generated cash from operations and did not rely in any manner on commercial paper, bank lines or debt markets. We did not predict the time of an economic paralysis but we were always prepared for one.

  Extreme fiscal conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in ownership of Berkshire. In most years – indeed in most decades – our caution will likely prove to be unneeded behavior – akin to an insurance policy on a fortress-like building thought to be fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage – quotational shrinkage for extended periods cant be avoided – on Bertie or any of the individuals who have trusted us with their savings.

  Berkshire is built to last.

  Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable

  Last year I mentioned two of Berkshire‘s long-duration partial-ownership positions – Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire’s GAAP net worth. But they are meaningful assets and also illustrate our thought processes.

  American Express began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta drug store in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into unrelated areas over the years and both found little success in these attempts. In the past – but definitely not now – both were even mismanaged.

  But each was hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.

  During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke – extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase.

  Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 – about 16% in the case of AMEX – and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.”

  Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium.

  The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many mediocre decisions that are inevitable.

  This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to our resources. They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both positions during 2023.

  At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum‘s common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s interest.

  Not so long ago, the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (“BOEPD”), a level far short of the countrys needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S. mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily dependent on foreign – potentially unstable – suppliers. Further declines in oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.

  For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) in 1975 to alleviate – though not come close to eliminating – this erosion of American self-sufficiency.

  And then – Hallelujah! – shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our country would be very – very – nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.

  Under Vicki Hollub‘s leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that’s an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.

  Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.

  Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.

  Neither Greg nor I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also dont believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds. This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The weakened yen has produced a yearend gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over the 2020-23 period.

  In certain important ways, all five companies – Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo – follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number of its outstanding shares at attractive prices.

  Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 13 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.

  An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.

  Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshires present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of “friendly” prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.

  The Scorecard in 2023

  Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:image

  At Berkshire‘s annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the outlook for the full year: (1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023; (2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of operating earnings in 2022; (3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and (4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.

  Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Lets take a look at each.

  Rail is essential to America‘s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way – measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity – of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can’t run without rail, and the industrys capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.

  BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.

  BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries.

  At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $1 2 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF‘s reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do.

  Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That‘s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value.

  North Americas rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls. Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.

  An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that cant be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.

  Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities.

  Last year BNSF‘s earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.

  Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.

  I am particularly proud of both BNSF‘s contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads dont get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America.

  A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.

  Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at Californias largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.

  For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHEs extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.

  With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory-return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?

  At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.

  It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHEs forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.

  Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.

  Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.

  When the dust settles, America‘s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.

  Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshires well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume – from $17 million to $83 billion – we have much room to grow.

  Beyond that, we have learned – too often, painfully – a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they cant be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.

  Surprises in the P/C business – which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired – are almost always negative. The industrys accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation – both monetary and the “legal” variety – is a wild card.

  Ive told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day – aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end – I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.

  Ajit‘s achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstowns honorees are to baseball.

  Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.

  What is it with Omaha?

  Come to Berkshire‘s annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company. What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don’t look alike. Lets dig deeper.

  Greg Abel, who runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire – and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow – was born and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey). In the 1990s, however, Greg lived for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I never met him.

  A decade or so earlier, Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I‘ve lived since 1958). Both Ajit and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it’s been more than three decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action in reinsurance takes place).

  Missing from the stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years, Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn‘t meet, however, until much later. (A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of America’s 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were not consecutive. America is a very young country.)

  Moving to the corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and blossoming in its new home.

  As a final punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie – yes that Bertie – spent her early formative years in a middle-class neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the countrys great investors.

  You may be thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it. But thats not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 13 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.

  Then, in 1980, when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic gifts (think nine figures).

  Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances, Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.

  So what is going on? Is it Omaha‘s water? Is it Omaha’s air? Is it some strange planetary phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica‘s sprinters, Kenya’s marathon runners, or Russias chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday yields the answer to this puzzle?

  Keep an open mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows? There is no downside, and, in any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people.

  To top things off, we will have available the new 4th edition of Poor Charlie‘s Almanack. Pick up a copy. Charlie’s wisdom will improve your life as it has mine.

  February 24, 2024  Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board

2022

致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东:

查理·芒格,我的长期合作伙伴,我们的工作是管理很多人的储蓄。我们感谢他们持久的信任,这种关系往往贯穿他们成年后的大部分时间。在我写这封信的时候,我首先想到的就是那些热心的储蓄者。

一种普遍的看法是,人们选择在年轻时存钱,希望以此来维持退休后的生活水平。这一理论认为,死者死后留下的任何资产通常会留给家人,也有可能留给朋友和慈善机构。

我们的经历有所不同。我们认为,伯克希尔的个人股东基本上属于“一次储蓄,永远储蓄”的类型。虽然这些人生活得很好,但他们最终会把大部分资金捐给慈善机构。反过来,这些资金又通过旨在改善与原来的捐助者无关的许多人的生活的支出进行重新分配。有时,结果是惊人的。

金钱的处置揭示了人的本性。查理和我高兴地看到伯克希尔产生的大量资金流向公共需求,同时,我们的股东很少选择炫耀资产和王朝建设。

谁不喜欢为我们这样的股东工作呢?

我们做什么

查理和我把你在伯克希尔的存款分配给两种相关的所有权形式。首先,我们投资于我们控制的企业,通常是100%的收购。伯克希尔对这些子公司进行资本配置,并挑选出负责日常运营决策的首席执行官。在管理大型企业时,信任和规则都是必不可少的。伯克希尔对前者的强调达到了一种不同寻常的——有些人会说是极端的程度。失望在所难免。我们理解商业错误;我们对个人不端行为的容忍度为零。

在我们的第二类所有权中,我们购买公开交易的股票,通过这些股票我们被动地拥有企业的一部分。持有这些投资,我们在管理上没有发言权。

我们持有股权的目的都是,对具有长期良好经济特征和值得信赖的管理者的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意,我们持有公开交易的股票是基于我们对其长期经营业绩的预期,并不是因为我们把它们看作是短期买卖的工具。这一点很关键;查理和我选择的不是股票,我们选择的是公司。

这些年来,我犯了很多错误。因此,我们当前广泛投资的企业包括少数真正具有非凡经济效益的企业,许多企业享有非常好的经济特征,还有一大群企业处于边缘地位。在此过程中,我投资的一些企业已经倒闭,它们的产品不受公众欢迎。资本主义有两面性:这一体系创造了越来越多的输家,但同时提供了大量改进的商品和服务。熊彼特称这种现象为“创造性破坏”。

公开交易市场的一个优势是,偶尔可以很容易地以极好的价格买进一些极好的企业。重要的是要明白,股票交易的价格往往非常离谱,有可能是高得离谱,也有可能是低得离谱。“有效”市场只存在于教科书中。事实上,市场上的股票和债券价格常常令人困惑,投资者的行为通常只有在时过境迁后才能理解。

受控企业是另一种类型。它们的价格有时高得离谱,但几乎从来没有便宜的估值。除非受到胁迫,控股企业的所有者不会考虑以恐慌性估值出售。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

现在来看,我的成绩单是合格的;在伯克希尔58年的运营中,我的大部分资本配置决策都不怎么样。在某些情况下,我的一些坏棋被大量的运气挽救了。(还记得我们从美国航空公司(USAir)和所罗门公司(Salomon)的近乎灾难中逃生吗?我确实逃脱了。)

我们令人满意的业绩来自于十几个真正正确的决策——大约每五年一个——以及一个有时被人淡忘的优势,这个优势有利于伯克希尔这样的长期投资者。让我们看一看幕后。

秘密武器

1994年8月,是的,1994年。伯克希尔完成了对我们现在持有的4亿股可口可乐收购,先后花了7年时间,总成本为13亿美元。这在当时对伯克希尔来说是一笔非常大的数目。

1994年我们从可口可乐公司获得的现金分红是7500万美元。到2022年,股息增加到7.04亿美元。成长每年都在发生,就像生日一样确定无疑。查理和我只需要兑现可口可乐的季度股息支票。我们预计分红很可能会继续增加。

美国运通(American express)的情况大致相同。伯克希尔对美国运通的收购基本上是在1995年完成的,巧合的是,它也耗资13亿美元。这项投资的年度股息从4100万美元增加到3.02亿美元。这些数字似乎极有可能增加。

这些股息收益虽然令人满意,但远非壮观。但它们带来了股价的重要收益。截至年底,我们的可口可乐投资价值为250亿美元,而美国运通的投资价值为220亿美元。现在,这两个持股分别约占伯克希尔净资产的5%,类似于很久以前的权重。

假设一下:如果我在1990年代犯了一个类似规模的投资错误,这个错误导致投资价值持平、并在2022年简单维持在13亿美元价值的错误。(这方面的一个例子是买了30年期长期债券。)那么这项令人失望的投资,现在只占伯克希尔净资产的0.3%,并将为我们每年固定提供8000万美元左右的年收入。

给投资者的教训是:繁花绚烂盛开,蓬蒿默然枯萎。随着时间的推移,只需要几个赢家就能创造奇迹。而且,是的,尽早开始并活到90多岁也是很有帮助的。

过去一年的简介

伯克希尔在2022年度过了美好的一年。公司的营业利润——我们使用通用会计原则(“GAAP”)计算的收入术语,不包括股权持有的资本收益或损失——达到了创纪录的308亿美元。查理和我专注于这个运营数据,并敦促你也这样做。GAAP数据,如果没有我们的调整,在每个报告日都会剧烈而反复无常地波动。请注意它在2022年那杂耍一般的表现,这绝不罕见:

盈利(单位为10亿美元)

2022年季度 运营盈利 我们需要按照公认会计准则报告的收益
1季度 7.0 5.5
2季度 9.3 43.8
3季度 7.8 2.7
4季度 6.7 18.2

当按季度甚至按照年度业绩查看时,GAAP收益具有100%的误导性。可以肯定的是,在过去的几十年里,资本收益对伯克希尔来说非常重要,我们预计它们在未来几十年将产生有意义的积极价值。但是,它们季度的波动,经常被媒体盲目地报道,完全误导了投资者。

伯克希尔在过去一年的第二项积极进展是收购了Alleghany保险,这是一家由乔·布兰登(Joe Brandon)领导的财产-意外保险公司。我之前与乔共事过,他对伯克希尔和保险业都有独到见解。Allegany为我们带来了独特的价值,因为伯克希尔雄厚的财力能让保险子公司追求持久且有价值的投资战略,这是几乎所有竞争对手都无法企及的。

在Alleghany的帮助下,我们的保险浮存金在2022年从1470亿美元增加到1640亿美元。借助严格的核保,这些资金有很大机会随着时间的推移变成无成本资金。自1967年收购首家财产-意外保险公司以来,伯克希尔已经通过收购、运营和创新将浮存金增加了8000倍。尽管没有在财报中确认,但这些浮存金对伯克希尔来说已经成为一笔非同寻常的资产。新股东可以在A-2页上阅读每年更新的解释,了解其价值。

************

2022年,通过伯克希尔的股票回购以及苹果和美国运通的类似举措(这两家公司都是我们的重要投资对象),每股内在价值只有很小幅度的增长。在伯克希尔,我们通过回购1.2%的公司流通股,直接增加了您持有的我们独特业务组合的权益。苹果和美国运通的股票回购也在没有增加我们任何成本的情况下,增加了伯克希尔的持股比例。

计算过程并不复杂:当股本数量减少时,您持有的许多企业的权益都会增加。如果回购以增值价格实施,每增加一点都有帮助。同样可以确定的是,当一家公司为回购支付过高价格时,继续持有的股东会遭受损失。此时,获益的只有卖出股票的股东,以及热情推荐愚蠢购买行为但却收费高昂的投资银行家。

需要强调的是,通过增值回购获得的收益可以惠及所有股东——在所有方面都是如此。如果您愿意,可以思考下面的例子:一家当地汽车经销商有三个完全知情的股东,其中一个负责管理企业。如果其中一个被动股东希望将他的权益卖回给公司,而且价格对另外两位继续持有的股东有吸引力。当交易完成时,这笔交易是否会损害任何人的利益?这位管理者是否在某种程度上比继续持有的被动所有者更受偏爱?公众是否受到了伤害?

如果有人告诉你,所有的回购行为都对股东或国家不利,或者对CEO特别有利,此人要么是经济文盲,要么是一个巧舌如簧的煽动家(这两个角色并不互斥)。

查理和我,以及伯克希尔的许多股东,都喜欢研究这一部分列出的许多事实和数字。当然,这些并不是必读的。有许多伯克希尔的百万富豪,没错,还有一些亿万富豪,他们从未研究过我们的财务数据。

他们只知道,查理和我,以及我们的家人和好友,继续在伯克希尔哈撒韦有大量投资,他们相信:我们会像对待我们自己的钱一样,对待他们的钱。

这也是我们可以做出的承诺。

************

最后,还有一个重要的警告:财务报表中的“运营利润”是我们非常关注的,但这些数字很容易被经理们操纵,只要他们想这样做。CEO、董事和他们的顾问通常也认为,这种篡改行为是久经世故的。而记者和分析师也接受了它的存在。毕竟,超出业绩指引也是管理上的一次胜利。

这种行为令人厌恶。这种数字操纵并不需要天赋:只需要一种深深的欺骗欲望。正如一位CEO曾经向我描述的那样,“大胆的想象力会计”(Bold imaginative accounting)已经成为资本主义的耻辱之一。

58年—及其它几组数字

1965年,伯克希尔还只是一匹“只懂一种戏法的小马”(即一项简单业务),拥有一家历史悠久、但注定要倒闭的新英格兰纺织企业。随着这项业务走向死亡,伯克希尔需要立即有一个新的开始。回过头来看,我当时迟迟没有意识到问题的严重性。

但随后,好运降临:国民保险(National Indemity)于1967年成立,我们将资源转向保险和其他非纺织业务。

就这样,我们开始了通往2023年的旅程。这是一条坎坷的道路,涉及到我们所有者不断的储蓄(即通过他们的留存收益)、复利的力量、避免重大错误,以及最重要的“美国顺风”(American Tailwind)。如果没有伯克希尔哈撒韦,美国本可以做得很好。反之,则并非如此。

伯克希尔现在拥有“无与伦比的庞大和多元化业务”的主要所有权。让我们先看看每天在纳斯达克、纽约证券交易所和相关交易场所交易的大约5000家上市公司。在这一群体中,有标准普尔500指数的成员。“标准普尔500指数”是一个由大型知名美国公司组成的精英集合。

总体而言,这500家上市公司在2021年赚了1.8万亿美元。目前我还没有2022年的最终数据。

因此,使用2021年的数据,这500家公司中只有128家(包括伯克希尔)赚了30亿美元或更多。事实上,还有23家公司亏损。

截至2022年底,伯克希尔是其中八家巨头的最大股东:美国运通、美国银行、雪佛龙、可口可乐、惠普、穆迪、西方石油和派拉蒙全球。

除这8家标的外,伯克希尔还持有伯灵顿北圣太菲铁路运输公司(简称伯灵顿北)100%的股份和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源 92%的股份,每家的收益均超过上述的30亿美元(伯灵顿北为59亿美元,伯克希尔哈撒韦能源为43亿美元)。如果这两家公司公开上市,它们将被收录进那500家公司中。总的来说,我们的10家控股和非控股的巨头使伯克希尔公司比任何其他美国公司都更广泛地与本国的经济未来保持一致。(这一计算不考虑养老基金和投资公司等“信托”业务。)此外,伯克希尔的保险业务虽然通过许多单独管理的子公司进行,但其价值与伯灵顿北或伯克希尔哈撒韦能源相当。

至于未来,伯克希尔公司将一直持有大量现金和美国国债,以及一系列业务。我们还将避免任何会在关键时刻导致现金流不便的鲁莽行为,包括在金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失的时刻。我们的首席执行官将永远是首席风险官——尽管他(她)本不必承担这项责任。此外,我们未来的首席执行官们将有相当一部分的净资产收益是用自己的钱购买伯克希尔股票而获得的。是的,我们的股东将通过持续的获得收益来保证储蓄和繁荣。

在伯克希尔,一切永无止境。

一些关于联邦税的令人震惊的事实

在截至2021年的十年中,美国财政部收到了约32.3万亿美元的税收,而支出了43.9万亿美元。

尽管经济学家、政治家和许多公众对这种巨大失衡的后果有不同的看法,但查理和我,出于无知,还是坚信近期那些对经济和市场的预测简直毫无用处。我们的工作是以一种方式管理伯克希尔的运营和财务,这种方式将随着时间的推移取得可接受的结果,并在金融恐慌或全球严重衰退发生时保持公司无与伦比的持久力。伯克希尔还提供了一些适度的保护,以防通胀失控,但这些保护远非完美。巨大而根深蒂固的财政赤字是会带来后果的。

财政部通过个人所得税(48%)、社会保障和相关收入(34.5%)、企业所得税支付(8.5%)和各种较小的税目获得了32万亿美元的收入。在这十年中,伯克希尔公司通过企业所得税缴纳的税款为320亿美元,几乎是财政部所有收入的千分之一。

这意味着——请做好准备——如果美国有大约1000名纳税人的纳税额与伯克希尔的纳税额相当,那么就不需要其他企业或美国1.31亿家庭再向联邦政府缴纳任何税款了。一分钱也不需要。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

数百万、数十亿、数万亿——我们都知道这些词,但其中涉及的金额几乎无法理解。让我们用物理维度来理解这些数字:
如果你把100万美元兑换成新印的100美元,你会有一堆能和你胸口等高的钞票。
用10亿美元进行同样的操作——这越来越令人兴奋了!——会堆到大约3/4英里高的天空。
最后,想象一下伯克希尔2012-21年度联邦所得税支付总额达到320亿美元。现在,这些钱堆叠的高度已经超过21英里,大约是商用飞机通常巡航高度的三倍。

当涉及到联邦税收时,拥有伯克希尔的个人可以明确地说“我在办公室已给了”。

在伯克希尔,我们希望并有望在未来十年缴纳更多的税款。我们对这个国家的亏欠丝毫不减:美国的活力对伯克希尔取得的任何成功都做出了巨大贡献——伯克希尔永远都需要这种贡献。我们依靠的是美国顺风,虽然它有时会停滞不前,但它的推动力总是会回来的。

我从事投资已经80年了,超过了美国历史的三分之一。尽管我们的公民有自我批评和自我怀疑的倾向——甚至可以说是狂热——但我还没有看到什么时候有理由长期做空美国。如果这封信的读者在将来会有不同的体验,对此我将深表怀疑。

没有什么比拥有一个好搭档更好的了

查理和我的想法很相似。但我花了一页纸解释的东西,他会用一句话总结出来。而且,他的版本总是更清楚地推理,也会更巧妙地——有时可能会更直言不讳地陈述。

以下是他的一些想法,很多摘自最近的播客:
世界上到处都是愚蠢的赌徒,他们不会做得像耐心的投资者那样好。
如果你看世界的方式不是真实的,那就像是通过扭曲的镜头来判断事物。
我只想知道我将死在哪里,这样我就永远不会去那里。还有一个相关的想法:
尽早写下你想要的讣告——然后相应地采取行动。
如果你不在乎自己是否理性,你就不会努力。然后你就会变得不理智,变得一团糟。
耐心是可以学会的。注意力持续时间长,能够长时间专注于一件事是一个巨大的优势。
你可以从死人身上学到很多东西。读那些你既钦佩又厌恶的死者。
如果你能游到适合航海的船上,就不要乘坐正在下沉的船逃跑。
一家伟大的公司会在你离开后继续运作;一个平庸的公司不会这样。
沃伦和我不关注市场的泡沫。我们寻找好的长期投资,并顽固地长期持有。
本·格雷厄姆说过:“每一天,股市都是一台投票机;从长远来看,它就是一台称重机。”如果你不断创造更有价值的东西,那么一些明智的人就会注意到它,并开始购买。
投资没有百分之百的把握。因此,使用杠杆是危险的。一串奇妙的数字乘以0总是等于0。不要指望能富两次。
然而,你不需要为了变得富有而拥有很多东西。
如果你想成为一个伟大的投资者,你必须不断学习。世界变了,你也要变。
沃伦和我讨厌铁路股有几十年了,但世界变了,最终美国有了四条对美国经济至关重要的大型铁路。我们迟迟没有意识到这种变化,但迟到总比不到好。
最后,我要加上查理的两句话,这两句话几十年来一直是他做决定的关键:“沃伦,再考虑一下。你很聪明,但我是对的。”

就这样。每次和查理通话,我都会有所收获。而且,当他让我思考时,他也让我笑。

************

我将在查理的清单上加上我自己的一条规则:找一个非常聪明的高级伙伴——最好比你稍微年长一点——然后非常仔细地听他说什么。

奥马哈的家庭聚会

查理和我真是有点不知羞耻。去年,在我们三年来的第一次(线下)股东大会上,我们一如既往地以繁忙的商业喧嚣来迎接大家。
从开市铃一响,我们就直奔你们的钱包。在短时间内,我们的喜诗小摊卖给你们11吨营养花生糖和巧克力。在我们的P.T.巴纳姆(马戏之王)演讲中,我们向你们保证过长寿。毕竟,除了喜诗的糖果,还有什么能解释查理和我能活到99岁和92岁呢?
我知道你们迫不及待地想知道去年喧嚣的细节。
周五,大门从中午一直开到下午5点,我们的糖果柜台共卖出了2690份。周六,在早上7点到下午4点30分之间,喜诗又登记了3931笔交易,尽管在9个半小时的营业时间中有6个半小时,我们的电影和问答环节限制了商业客流。
算算看:喜诗在其黄金营业时间内,每分钟约有10笔销售(两天内销售额达400309美元),所有在同一地点购买的商品都是101年没有实质性改变的产品。在福特T型车时代对喜诗管用的方法现在也管用。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

查理,我和整个伯克希尔公司都期待着5月5-6日在奥马哈见到你。我们会玩得很开心,你也会得很开心。

2023年2月25日 沃伦-巴菲特

2021

致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东:

查理-芒格,我的长期合作伙伴,我的工作是管理你的一部分储蓄。我们很荣幸得到您的信任。

如果我们是缺席股东而您是经理,我们的职位有责任向您报告我们想知道的内容。我们喜欢通过这封年度信函以及年度会议直接与您交流。

我们的政策是平等对待所有股东。因此,我们不与分析师或大型机构进行讨论。此外,只要有可能,我们都会在周六早上发布重要的沟通信息,以最大限度地让股东和媒体在周一市场开盘前有时间消化吸收新闻。

公司在定期向美国证券交易委员会(SEC)提交的年度10-K报告中列出了伯克希尔公司的大量事实和数据,并且我们在K-1至K-119页上进行了复制。一些股东会觉得这个细节很吸引人;其他人只喜欢学习查理和我认为在伯克希尔公司的新事物或有趣的事物。

唉,2021年几乎没有此类行动。不过,我们确实在提高您的股票内在价值方面取得了合理进展。57年来,这项任务一直是我的首要职责。它将继续如此。

你拥有什么

伯克希尔公司拥有各种各样的企业,有些是全部,有些只是部分拥有。第二类主要由美国大型公司的有价普通股组成。此外,我们还拥有一些非美国公司股票,并参与了几家合资企业或其他合作活动。

无论我们采用何种所有权形式,我们的目标都是对具有持久经济优势和一流CEO的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意,我们持有股票是基于我们对其长期业务表现的预期,而不是因为我们将它们视为利用短时市场变动的工具。这一点很关键:查理和我不是选股者;我们是业务选择者。

我犯了很多错误。因此,我们范围广泛的业务包括一些具有真正非凡经济地位的企业,许多其他具有良好经济特征的企业,以及少数处于边缘地位的企业。我们的普通股持仓的一个优势是——有时——很容易以优惠价格分批购买优秀的企业。这种投机取巧的经历在谈判交易中是非常罕见的,而且从不会大量发生。当它在有价普通股市场上发生时,从错误中退出也容易得多。

惊讶,惊讶

以下是关于你们的公司的一些事情,即使是经验丰富的投资者也经常会感到惊讶:

许多人认为伯克希尔是一个庞大且有些奇怪的金融资产集合。事实上,伯克希尔拥有和经营的美国“基础设施”资产——在我们的资产负债表上被分类为房地产、厂房和设备——比其他任何美国公司拥有和经营的都多。这种优势从来都不是我们的目标。然而,这已成为事实。

截至年底,这些国内基础设施资产在伯克希尔的资产负债表上的价值为1580亿美元。这一数字在去年有所增加,并将继续增加。伯克希尔永远都在发展壮大。

每一年,你的公司都要缴纳大量的联邦所得税。例如,在2021年,我们缴纳了33亿美元,而美国财政部报告的企业所得税收入总额为4020亿美元。此外,伯克希尔还支付大量的州税和外国税。“我在办公室做贡献了”,这是伯克希尔股东们不容置疑的断言。

伯克希尔的历史生动地说明了美国政府和美国企业之间无形且往往不被承认的金融合作关系。我们的故事始于1955年初,当时伯克希尔精纺和哈撒韦制造同意合并他们的业务。在请求股东批准的请求中,这两家历史悠久的新英格兰纺织公司表达了对合并的高度期望。

例如,哈撒韦的询价向股东保证:“资源和管理的结合将造就纺织行业最强大、最高效的组织之一。”这种乐观的观点得到了该公司的顾问雷曼兄弟公司(Lehman Brothers)的支持(没错,就是那个雷曼兄弟)。

我敢肯定,对于福尔河(伯克希尔)和新贝德福德(哈撒韦)来说,这是一个令人愉快的日子。然而,当乐队停止演奏、银行家们回家后,股东们却收获了一场灾难。

在合并后的九年里,伯克希尔的所有者眼睁睁地看着公司的净资产从5140万美元跌至2210万美元。这种下降在一定程度上是由股票回购、欠考虑的股息和工厂关闭造成的。但数千名员工9年的努力也带来了经营亏损。伯克希尔的困境并不罕见:新英格兰的纺织业已经悄无声息地进入了漫长而不可逆转的死亡之旅。

在合并后的9年里,美国财政部也因伯克希尔的问题而蒙受损失。在此期间,这家公司总共只向政府缴纳了337,359美元的所得税——可怜啊,每天才100美元。

1965年初,事情有了转机。伯克希尔任命了新管理层,重新配置了可用的现金,并将几乎所有的收益投入到各种良好的业务中,其中大部分业务多年来一直保持良好。将收益再投资与复利的力量相结合,产生了神奇的效果,股东们发财了。

应该指出的是,伯克希尔的所有者并不是这次航向调整的唯一受益者。他们“沉默的合作伙伴”,即美国财政部。随后从该公司收取了数百亿美元的所得税。还记得每天100美元吗?现在,伯克希尔每天向财政部支付约900万美元。

公平地说,我们的股东应该承认—实际上应该大肆宣扬—伯克希尔的繁荣是由于公司在美国运营而得到大力培养的。 如果没有伯克希尔,我们的国家在1965年以后的几年里依然会表现得非常出色。 然而,如果没有我们在美国的家,伯克希尔永远不会成为今天的样子。 当你看到国旗时,请说声谢谢。

从1967年以860万美元收购National Indemnity开始,伯克希尔已经成为保险“浮动”资金的世界领导者—这些我们持有并可以投资的资金,但不属于我们。 包括一笔相对较小的人寿保险收入在内,伯克希尔的总浮动资金已从我们进入保险业务时的1900万美元增长到1470亿美元。

到目前为止,这些浮动资金的成本可以忽略不计。 虽然我们经历过好几年保险损失加运营费用超过保费的情况,但总体而言,我们从产生上市资金的承保活动中获得了55年的适度利润。同样重要的是,浮动金非常具有粘性。 我们保险业务的资金每天都在来来去去,但它们的总金额不会出现急剧下降。 因此,在浮动资产投资时,我们可以从长远考虑。

如果你还不熟悉浮动金的概念,我建议你参考第5页的长篇解释。 令我惊讶的是,我们的浮动金去年增加了90亿美元,这种价值的累积对伯克希尔的所有者来说很重要,但却没有反映在我们的GAAP(“公认会计原则”)的收益和净值报告中。

我们在保险业创造的巨大价值,很大程度上要归功于伯克希尔在1986年聘用阿吉特贾殷( Ajit Jain.)时的好运气。 我们第一次见面是在一个周六的早上,我很快地问阿吉特他在保险行业的经历。 他回答说:“没有。”

我说“人无完人”,然后就雇了他。 那是我的幸运日:阿吉特实际上是我能做出的最完美的选择。 更棒的是,35年后的今天,他依然如此。

关于保险的最后一个想法是:我认为,伯克希尔的浮动金很可能—但远非确定—能够在不造成长期承保损失的情况下得以维持。 但是,我可以肯定,在某些年里,我们将经历这种损失,也许涉及非常大的数额。

伯克希尔在应对灾难性事件方面的能力是其他保险公司所没有的—在我和查理去世后,这一优先地位将长期保持下去。

我们的四巨头

通过伯克希尔,我们的股东拥有数十家企业。 而其中一些公司又拥有自己的一系列子公司。 例如,Marmon有超过100个单独业务,从租赁铁路车厢到制造医疗设备。

尽管如此,我们“四大”业务公司的运营占了伯克希尔公司价值的很大一部分。 名列前茅的是我们的保险公司集群。 伯克希尔实际上拥有该集团100%的股份,我们之前描述过该集团庞大的浮动资金。 我们为支持这些保险公司的承诺而投入的巨额资金,进一步扩大了这些保险公司的投资资产。

保险业务是为伯克希尔量身定做的。产品永远不会过时,营收通常会随着经济增长和通货膨胀而增加。此外,诚信和资本将永远重要。我们公司能够而且一定会经营得很好。

当然,还有其他一些保险公司拥有出色的商业模式和前景。然而,要复制伯克希尔的经营模式几乎是不可能的。

苹果,按年底市值计算,是我们的亚军,是我们另一种类型的持仓。在这里,我们的持股比例仅为5.55%,高于一年前的5.39%。这个增幅听起来像是小菜一碟。但考虑到苹果2021年的收益中,每0.1%的持股都是1亿美元。我们并没有花费伯克希尔的资金进行增持,苹果的回购起了作用。

有一点值得一提,那就是只有苹果的股息才会被计入伯克希尔的财报。去年,苹果支付了我们7.85亿美元的股息。然而,按照我们在苹果公司的“持股份额”,利润达到了惊人的56亿美元。该公司保留了大部分利润用于回购苹果股票,这一举动值我们给它一个大大的赞。苹果公司才华横溢的首席执行官蒂姆-库克将苹果产品的用户视为自己的初恋,这无可厚非,但他的其他支持者也同样受益匪浅。

BNSF,我们的第三大持仓,依然是美国商业的头号动脉,它是这个国家和伯克希尔不可或缺的资产。如果BNSF运输的产品改用卡车运输,那么美国的碳排放量将井喷。

BNSF 2021年的利润达到了创纪录的60亿美元。这里需要指出的是,我们谈论的是我们喜欢的老式算法:扣除利息、税收、折旧、摊销和所有形式计提后的利润。(我们的这种算法也发出了一个警告:随着股市上涨,对利润的进行“调整”,礼貌的说法,已经变得更加频繁,也更加不切实际。恕我直言,牛市造就了财务造假...)

BNSF的火车去年行驶了1.43亿英里,运送了5.35亿吨货物。这两项成就都远远超过了其他任何一家美国铁路公司。你可以为你的铁路感到骄傲。

我们另一只重仓股BHE在2021年赚了创纪录的40亿美元。这比2000年的利润1.22亿美元增长了30多倍,那一年伯克希尔第一次购买了BHE的股票。现在,伯克希尔持有该公司91.1%的股份。

BHE的社会成就与其财务业绩一样引人注目。该公司在2000年没有风能,也没有太阳能发电。当时,它只是被认为是美国庞大的电力事业行业中一个相对较新的、较小的参与者。随后,在大卫-索科尔和格雷格-阿贝尔的领导下,BHE成为了一家公用事业公司(请不要抱怨),以及美国风能、太阳能和输电领域的领军企业。

格雷格关于这些成就的报告出现在A-3和A-4页。你会发现那里的介绍绝对不是时下流行的“洗绿”故事。早在2007年开始,BHE每年都会详细介绍其在可再生能源和输电方面的计划和业绩。

想进一步了解这些信息,请访问BHE的网站brkenergy.com。在那里,你会看到该公司长期以来一直在实施应对气候变化的举措,这些举措消耗了其所有的收入。但前方有更多的机会。BHE拥有良好的管理、经验、资本,可以满足国家对大型电力项目的需求。

投资

现在让我们来谈谈我们无法控制的公司,这个列表再次提到了苹果。下面表格列出了我们持仓市值最大的15只股票,其中几只是伯克希尔的两位长期投资经理托德库姆斯(Todd Combs)和特德韦施勒(Ted Weschler)选择的。到2021年底,这对明星投资经理对340亿美元的投资拥有完全的权力,其中许多投资都没有达到我们在表中使用的门槛值。此外,托德和特德管理的相当大一部分资金存在伯克希尔旗下企业的各种养老金计划中,这些计划的资产未包含在此表中。

※ 这是我们的实际买入价,也是我们的计税基础。
※※ 由BHE持有;因此,伯克希尔股东仅持有该头寸91.1%的权益。
※※※ 包括对西方石油公司100亿美元的投资,包括优先股和购买普通股的认股权证,这一组合现在价值107亿美元。

除了脚注位置的西方控股(Occidental holding)和各种普通股头寸外,伯克希尔哈撒韦公司还拥有卡夫亨氏(Kraft Hein)26.6% 的权益 (采用“股权”方法计算,而非市场价值,价值为131亿美元)和Pilot 公司38.6%的权益。Pilot公司是旅游中心的龙头企业,该公司去年的收入为 450 亿美元。

自从我们在 2017 年购买了Pilot 的股份以来,这部分股份已进行了“股权”会计处理。在2023年初,伯克希尔将购买Pilot的额外权益,这将使我们的所有权提高到80%,并导致我们在财务报表中充分整合Pilot的收益、资产和负债。

美国国债

伯克希尔的资产负债表包括1440亿美元的现金和现金等价物(不包括持有的BNSF和BHE)。其中,1200亿美元以美国国债的形式持有,全部在一年之内到期。这使伯克希尔为1%公开持有的国债中的约12提供了资金。

查理和我已承诺,伯克希尔(连同我们除BNSF和BHE以外的子公司)将始终持有超过300亿美元的现金和等价物。我们希望您的公司在财务上坚不可摧,从不依赖陌生人(甚至朋友)的善意。我们俩都喜欢睡个好觉,我们希望我们的债权人、保险索赔人和您也这样做。

但是需要1440亿美元之多?

我向你保证,这笔巨款并不是爱国主义的疯狂表现。查理和我也没有失去对企业所有权的压倒性偏好。事实上,80年前的1942年3月11日,当我购买了三股Cities Services优先股时,我第一次表现出对此的热情。它们的成本是114.75美元,花费了我所有的积蓄。(当天道琼斯工业平均指数收于99点,这一事实应该向你喊话:永远不要做空美国。)

在我最初遭受亏损之后,我总是将至少80%的净资产投资在股票上。在那段时间里,我最青睐的状态是100%—现在仍然如此。伯克希尔目前在企业中80%左右的仓位,是我未能找到符合我们长期持有标准的整个公司或其中一小部分(即可销售的股票)的结果。

查理和我在过去不时忍受着类似的重仓现金状况。这些时期从来不是令人愉快的,也不是永久性的。而且,幸运的是,在2020年和2021年期间,我们有一个温和的有吸引力的替代方案来部署资本。请继续阅读。

股份回购

我们可以通过三种方式增加您的投资价值。第一种方式始终是我们心目中的重中之重:通过内部增长或收购来提高伯克希尔控股业务的长期盈利能力。今天,内部机会带来的回报远高于收购。然而,与伯克希尔的资源相比,这些机会的规模很小。

我们的第二个选择是购买许多公开交易的良好或优秀企业的非控股部分权益。有时,这样的可能性既众多又极具吸引力。然而如今,我们几乎没有发现什么能让我们兴奋的东西。

这在很大程度上是因为一个真理:长期低利率推动所有生产性投资的价格上涨,无论是股票、公寓、农场、油井等等。其他因素也会影响估值,但利率始终很重要。

我们创造价值的最后一条途径是回购伯克希尔的股票。通过这个简单的举动,我们增加了您在伯克希尔拥有的许多受控和非受控企业中的份额。当价格/价值等式正确时,这条途径是我们增加您财富的最简单、最确定的方式。(除了为持续股东增加价值外,其他几方也获得了收益:回购对回购股份的卖方和社会都有一定的好处。)

周期性地,随着替代路径变得没有吸引力,回购对伯克希尔公司的股东来说变得很有意义。因此,在过去两年中,我们回购了截止2019年末外部流通股的9%,总成本517亿美元。这笔支出使我们的长期股东拥有伯克希尔所有业务的约10%,无论这些业务是全资拥有(如BNSF和GEICO)还是部分拥有(如可口可乐和穆迪)。

我想强调的是,要使伯克希尔公司的股票回购有意义,我们的股票必须提供适当的价值。我们不想为其他公司的股票多付钱,如果我们在回购伯克希尔股票时支出过高,那就得不偿失。从去年年底到2022年2月23日以来,我们以12亿美元的成本回购了更多股票。我们的胃口仍然很大,但将始终取决于价格。

应该指出的是,伯克希尔股票的回购机会有限,因为它拥有一流的投资者基础。如果我们的股票被短期投机者大量持有,其价格波动和交易量都会大幅放大。这种重塑将为我们提供更多通过回购创造价值的机会。尽管如此,查理和我更喜欢我们拥有的股东,尽管他们令人钦佩的买入并持有的态度限制了长期股东从机会性回购中获利的程度。

最后,伯克希尔公司特有的一个容易被忽视的价值计算:正如我们所讨论的,正确类型的保险“浮动金”对我们来说很有价值。碰巧的是,回购会自动增加每股“浮动金”额度。这一数字在过去两年中增长了25%——从每股“A”类股79387美元增至99497美元,如前所述,这在一定程度上归功于回购。

一个了不起的男人和一个了不起的生意

去年,保罗安德鲁斯去世。保罗是伯克希尔位于沃斯堡的子公司TTI的创始人兼首席执行官。在他的一生中—无论是在他的事业中还是在他的个人追求中—保罗都悄悄地展示了查理和我所钦佩的所有品质。他的故事应该被宣讲。

1971年,当灾难发生时,保罗正在通用动力公司担任采购代理。在失去一份巨额国防合同后,该公司解雇了包括保罗在内的数千名员工。

由于他的第一个孩子即将呱呱坠地,保罗决定赌上自己,用他的500美元积蓄创立了Tex-Tronics公司(后来更名为 TTI)。该公司开始销售小型电子元件,第一年的销售额总计112000美元。如今,TTI公司销售超过100万种不同的商品,年销售额达77亿美元。

但回溯到2006年:时年63岁的保罗发现自己对家人、工作和同事都很满意。但他有一个挥之不去的担忧,因为他刚刚目睹了一位朋友的早逝,以及随之而来的对其家庭和企业的灾难性后果。保罗在2006年问自己,如果他意外死去,许多依赖他的人会发生什么?

整整一年,保罗一直在为自己的选择而苦苦挣扎。把公司卖给竞争对手?从严格的经济角度来看,这种选择是最有意义的。毕竟,竞争对手可以预见到有利可图的“协同效应”——当收购方汰除TTI的重复业务部门时,就可以节省成本。

但是,这样的收购这肯定还会保留其首席财务官、法律顾问、人力资源部门。因此,TTI公司的同一职能部门将被集体裁员。而且啊!如果需要一个新的配送中心,收购方的家乡肯定会比沃思堡更受青睐。

不管在财政上有什么好处,保罗很快就得出结论,把公司卖给竞争对手不适合他。接着,他考虑寻找一个金融买家——这个物种曾被恰当地称为杠杆收购公司。但保罗知道,这样的买家会专注于“退出策略”。谁知道那会是什么呢? 考虑到这一切,保罗发现自己没有兴趣把自己35年苦心经营的成果交给一个中间商。

当保罗见到我时,他解释了为什么他把这两个备选买家排除在外。然后,他总结了自己的困境,用了比这更委婉的措辞——“在考虑了一年其他选择后,我想把公司卖给伯克希尔,因为你是唯一剩下的人。”所以我提出了报价,保罗答应了。一次会面,一顿午餐,达成了一笔交易。

说我们从此过上了幸福的生活,这样说都不足以表达。当伯克希尔收购TTI时,该公司有2387名员工。现在这个数字是8043。其中很大一部分增长发生在沃斯堡及其周边地区。公司的盈利增长了673%。

每年,我都会打电话给保罗,告诉他他的薪水应该大幅增加。每年,他都会告诉我,“我们可以明年再谈,沃伦,我现在太忙了。”

当格雷格阿贝尔和我参加保罗的追悼会时,我们见到了他的子女、孙辈、长期合作伙伴(包括TTI的首位员工),以及约翰罗奇(John Roach),他是伯克希尔在2000年收购的沃斯堡一家公司的前首席执行官。约翰把他的朋友保罗引到奥马哈,本能地知道我们会是绝配。

在追悼会上,格雷格和我听说了很多保罗默默支持的人和组织。他的慷慨是非凡的——总是致力于改善他人的生活,尤其是沃斯堡的人。

在所有方面,保罗都是个杰出的人。

运气——偶尔是非凡的运气——在伯克希尔发挥了作用。如果保罗和我没有共同的朋友约翰罗奇,TTI也不会在我们这里安家。但这份丰盛的幸运大餐仅仅是个开始。TTI很快就将伯克希尔引向了其最重要的收购。

每年秋天,伯克希尔的董事们都会聚集在一起,听取几位高管的陈述。我们有时会根据近期收购的地点来选择会议地点,这意味着董事们可以与新子公司的首席执行官见面,并更多地了解被收购方的活动。

在2009年秋天,我们选择了沃斯堡,这样我们就可以访问TTI。当时,总部同样位于沃思堡的BNSF是我们持有股份第三多的公司。尽管有这么多的股份,我却从来没有去过这家铁路公司的总部。

我的助理黛布·博萨内克(Deb Bosanek)将董事会的开幕晚宴安排在10月22日。与此同时,那天我安排早一点到达去见马特·罗斯(Matt Rose),他是BNSF的首席执行官,我一直钦佩他的成就。当我确定这个日期的时候,我并不知道我们的聚会将与BNSF在22日晚些时候发布第三季度盈利报告同时举行。

市场对这家铁路公司的业绩反应不佳。“大衰退”在那年第三季度全面爆发,BNSF的盈利情况反映了这种衰退。经济前景也很黯淡,华尔街对铁路或其他很多东西也不友好。

第二天,我再次与马特会面,并建议伯克希尔将为铁路公司提供一个比作为上市公司所能期望的更好的长期归宿。我还告诉他伯克希尔愿意支付的最高价格。

马特将这一提议转达给了他的董事和顾问。经过忙碌的11天后,伯克希尔和BNSF宣布了一项确定交易。在这里,我要做一个罕见的预测:BNSF将成为一个世纪后伯克希尔哈撒韦公司和我们国家的关键资产。

如果保罗安德鲁斯(Paul Andrews)没有将伯克希尔视为TTI的合适归宿地,BNSF的收购就永远不会发生。

致谢

70年前,我教了我的第一堂投资课。从那以后,我几乎每年都很享受与各个年龄段的学生一起工作,最终在2018年“退休”。

一直以来,我最难的听众是我孙子所在的五年级班级。11岁的孩子们在座位上扭来扭去,茫然地看着我,直到我提到可口可乐(Coca-Cola)及其著名的秘密配方。立刻,每个人都举起手来,我明白了“秘密”对孩子们来说是一种诱惑。

教学和写作一样,帮助我发展和理清了自己的思路。查理称这种现象为猩猩效应:如果你和一只猩猩坐在一起,仔细地向它解释你的一个宝贵想法,你可能会留下一只迷惑不解的灵长类动物,但你自己的思维会更清晰。

和大学生交谈则要有效得多。我敦促他们在(1)这个领域找工作,(2)如果他们不需要钱的话,找他们想找的人一起工作。我承认,经济现实可能会干扰这种寻找。即便如此,我敦促学生们永远不要放弃追求,因为当他们找到那种工作时,他们就不再是“工作”了。

查理和我,我们自己,在经历了一些早期的挫折后,走上了这条解放的道路。我们都是在我祖父的杂货店里做兼职,查理1940年,我1942年。我们每个人都被分配了无聊的任务,报酬也很少,这绝对不是我们想要的。后来,查理开始从事法律工作,而我则尝试着卖证券。我们对工作的满意度仍然不高。

最后,在伯克希尔,我们找到了自己喜欢做的事情。除了极少数例外,我们现在已经与我们喜欢和信任的人“工作”了几十年。与保罗安德鲁斯(Paul Andrews)或我去年告诉过你的伯克希尔大家庭这样的经理人共事,是一种生活乐趣。在我们的总部,我们雇佣正派和有才华的人-没有笨蛋。每年的平均流动率大概是一个人。

然而,我想强调另一件事,它使我们的工作变得有趣和满意—-为您工作。对查理和我来说,没有什么比获得个人长期股东的信任更值得的了。几十年来,他们加入我们,期望我们成为他们资金的可靠托管人。

显然,我们不能选择我们的股东,如果我们的经营形式是合伙的话,我们可以这样做。任何人今天都可以购买伯克希尔的股票,并打算很快再出售这些股票。当然,我们会有一些这样的股东,就像我们会有指数基金持有大量伯克希尔股票,只是因为它们被要求这么做。

伯克希尔的股东是一个庞大的个人和家庭团队,他们选择加入我们,意愿接近“至死不渝”,到了一个不同寻常的程度。他们把很大一部分——有些人可能会说是过多的存款托付给我们。

这些股东有时会承认,伯克希尔可能远不是他们本可以做出的最佳选择。但他们会补充说,在他们最满意的投资对象中,伯克希尔的排名靠前。一般而言,那些对自己的投资感到舒服的人,将比那些被不断变化的头条新闻、传言和承诺所影响的人获得更好的回报。

长线股东既是查理和我一直寻求的“合伙人”,也是我们在伯克希尔做决策时一直考虑的“合伙人”。我们想对他们说:“为你们‘工作’感觉很好,我们感谢你们的信任。”

年度股东大会

日期已经确定。伯克希尔公司将于4月29日(周五)至5月1日(周日)在奥马哈举行年度股东大会。关于股东大会的细节写在A-1和A-2页。奥马哈急切地等待着你的到来,我也一样。

我要用一个广告来结束这封信。“表弟”吉米-巴菲特设计了一款浮式“派对”游艇,目前由伯克希尔子公司Forest River生产。这款游艇将于4月29日在伯克希尔股东大会上发布。而且,仅在两天时间内,股东可以以10%的折扣购买吉米的杰作。你们的董事长会买一艘供家人使用,加入我吧。

2022年2月26日 沃伦·巴菲特 董事长


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