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标签: 历史

  • 马卫东:大一统源于西周封建说

    大一统思想是中国传统文化的重要内容之一,在两三千年的历史岁月中,对于促进中国国家统一、中华民族形成及中华文化繁荣,曾起到过巨大的作用。然而,大一统思想最早形成于什么时代,源于什么样的历史实际,学界却长期存在着不同的看法。多数学者认为,《公羊传》所提出的“大一统”,是战国时代才开始出现的学说,战国以前既无一统的政治格局,也无一统的社会观念。近年来,有的学者提出,中国早在西周时期已是统一王朝,“现在我们不能再以为,只有到了战国时期才开始有统一的意志”,但似乎并没有在史学界引起普遍反响。因此,有必要继续对大一统思想的渊源作进一步深入的探讨。

    本文认为,《公羊传》大一统思想的基本内涵是“重一统”。其具体内容,包括以“尊王”为核心的政治一统;以“内华夏”为宗旨的民族一统;以“崇礼”为中心的文化一统。历史表明,《公羊传》的大一统理论是对西周、春秋以来大一统思想的理论总结。周代的大一统思想,是西周封建和分封制度的产物,它源于西周分封诸侯的历史实际及西周封建所造成的三大认同观念:天子至上的政治认同、华夷之辨的民族认同、尊尚礼乐的文化认同。中国大一统的政治局面和思想观念由西周封建所开创,是西周王朝对中国历史的重大贡献之一。

    一、《公羊》大一统说的内涵及其思想渊源

    “大一统”的概念,最早是由战国时代的《公羊传》提出来的,系对《春秋》“王正月”的解释之辞。《春秋·隐公元年》:“元年,春,王正月。”《公羊传》释曰:“元年者何?君之始年也。春者何?岁之始也。王者孰谓?谓文王也。曷为先言王而后言正月?王正月也。何言乎王正月?大一统也。”

    “大一统”的“大”字,以往多解释为大小的大。其实,这不符合《公羊传》的本义。这里的“大”字应作“重”字讲。按《公羊传》文例,凡言“大”者,多是以什么为重大的意思。如《公羊传·隐公三年》:“君子大居正。”《庄公十八年》:“大其为中国追也。”《襄公十九年》:“大其不伐丧也。”以“大”为“重”,这在先秦两汉文献中不乏其例。《荀子·非十二子》:“大俭约。”王念孙曰:“大亦尚也,谓尊尚俭约也。”《史记·太史公自序》:“大祥而众忌讳。”即重祥瑞而多忌讳。

    “大一统”的“统”字,《公羊传·隐公元年》何休曰:“统者,始也,总系之辞。”许慎《说文解字》释“统”曰:“统,纪也。”又曰:“纪,别丝也。”段玉裁:“别丝者,一丝必有其首,别之是为纪;众丝皆得其首,是为统。”

    刘家和先生在汉人解诂的基础上,深入分析了《公羊传》“一统”的涵义,认为《公羊传》的“一统”,“不是化多(多不复存在)为一,而是合多(多仍旧在)为一。……但此‘一’又非简单地合多为一,而是要从‘头’、从始或从根就合多为一。”

    “大一统”的“一统”,学界往往解释为“统一”,实属误解。关于“一统”与“统一”的区别,台湾学者李新霖先生曾有精辟的论述:“所谓一统者,以天下为家,世界大同为目标;以仁行仁之王道思想,即一统之表现。……所谓统一,乃约束力之象征,齐天下人人于一,以力假仁之霸道世界,即为统一之结果。”

    综合古今诠释,对《公羊传》“大一统”的内涵,我们可以作如下的理解:“大一统”就是“重一统”,具体而言是“重一始”或“重一首”,即通过重视制度建设、张扬礼仪道德,以主体的、原始的、根本的“一”,来统合“多”而为一体(合多为一);“大统一”则是通过征伐兼并和强力政权消除政治上的“多”,实现国家统治的“一”(化多为一)。可见,从严格的意义上讲,“大一统”和“大统一”并不是两个等同的概念。

    《公羊传》根据《春秋》“王正月”,开宗明义地提出了大一统概念。在阐释历史事件时,又论述了大一统理论的具体内容。从《公羊传》的论述看,《公羊传》大一统理论主要包含三方面内容:以“尊王”为核心的政治一统;以“内华夏”为宗旨的民族一统;以“崇礼”为中心的文化一统。

    强调尊王,维护天子的独尊地位,是《公羊传》大一统理论的核心。《公羊传》首先通过对诸侯独断专行的批评,表达了尊王之义。如《春秋·桓公元年》:“郑伯以璧假许田。”《公羊传》释曰:“其言以璧假之何?易之也。易之,则其言假之何?为恭也。曷为为恭?有天子存,则诸侯不得专地也。”《春秋·僖公元年》:“齐师、宋师、曹师次于聂北,救邢。”《公羊传》释曰:“曷为先言次而后言救?君也。君则其称师何?不与诸侯专封也。”《春秋·宣公十一年》:“冬十月,楚人杀陈夏徵舒。”《公羊传》释曰:“此楚子也,其称人何?贬。曷为贬?不与外讨也。……诸侯之义,不得专讨。”在《公羊传》看来,诸侯的“专地”、“专封”、“专讨”都是违背“一统”的行为,所以《春秋》特加贬损,以维护周天子的权威。在《公羊传》中,关于尊王的论述很多,如“王者无外”(《公羊传·隐公元年》、《公羊传·成公十二年》),“不敢胜天子”(《公羊传·庄公六年》),“王者无敌”(《公羊传·成公元年》)等等,无不是主张“尊王”的慷慨之辞。在周代,天子是最高权力的代表,也是政治一统的标志。《公羊传》的尊王思想,实际上就是主张建立以天子为最高政治首脑,上下相维、尊卑有序的政治秩序,通过维护周天子的独尊地位来实现国家的政治一统。

    以华夏族为主体民族、尊崇华夏文明的“内华夏”思想,是《公羊传》大一统理论的另一重要内容。《公羊传·成公十五年》:“《春秋》,内其国而外诸夏,内诸夏而外夷狄。王者欲一乎天下,曷为以外内之辞言之?言自近者始也。”何休:“明当先正京师,乃正诸夏。诸夏正,乃正夷狄,以渐治之。叶公问政于孔子,孔子曰‘近者说,远者来’。”可见,如何处理华夷关系是大一统理论的应有之义。在华夷关系上,《公羊传》一方面确认华夷之辨,屡言“不与夷狄之执中国”(《公羊传·隐公七年》、《公羊传·僖公二十一年》),“不与夷狄之获中国”(《公羊传·庄公十年》),“不与夷狄之主中国”(《公羊传·昭公二十三年》、《公羊传·哀公十三年》),等等,反对落后的夷狄民族侵犯华夏国家。另一方面,又认为华夷之间的界限并非不可逾越,无论是华夏还是夷狄,只要接受了先进的周礼文化,就可成为华夏的成员,即唐代韩愈在《原道》一文中所概括的“诸侯用夷礼则夷之,进于中国则中国之”。因此,《公羊传》的“内华夏,外夷狄”思想,实际上就是主张建立以华夏族为主体民族,华夷共存、内外有别的民族统一体,并逐渐用先进的华夏文明融合夷狄民族,从而实现国家的民族一统。

    尊尚周礼文化的崇礼思想,也是《公羊传》大一统理论的重要内容之一。《公羊传》认为,天子与诸侯有严格的等级秩序和礼制规范。如《公羊传·隐公五年》:“天子八佾,诸公六,诸侯四。……天子三公称公,王者之后称公,其余大国称侯,小国称伯子男。”《公羊传》强调诸侯要严格遵守周礼,不得逾越,以维护天子的独尊地位。《公羊传》还通过天子、天王、王后、世子、王人、天子之大夫等名例表明尊王之义。如《公羊传·成公八年》:“其称天子何?元年春王正月,正也。”《公羊传·桓公八年》:“女在其国称女,此其称王后何?王者无外,其辞成矣。”《公羊传·僖公五年》:“曷为殊会王世子?世子贵也。”《公羊传·僖公八年》:“王人者何?微者也。曷为序乎诸侯之上?先王命也。”《公羊传》张扬周礼的目的,旨在“欲天下之一乎周也”(《公羊传·文公十三年》),即通过诸侯国和周边民族对周礼的认同,实现国家的文化一统,进而促成并维护国家的政治一统和民族一统。

    由上可知,《公羊传》大一统理论的最大特色就是“合多为一”。具体言之,在政权组织上,首先确认周王室为最高的政权机关,同时承认诸侯国地方政权的合法地位,由王室统合各诸侯国而实现国家的政治一统;在民族结构上,首先确认华夏族的主体民族地位,同时承认夷狄非主体民族,由华夏统合夷狄而实现国家的民族一统;在文化认同上,首先尊尚周礼文化为先进文化,同时涵容各具特色的地域文化,由周礼文化统合各地域文化而实现国家的文化一统。

    《公羊传》由阐释《春秋》而提出大一统学说,其理论直接源于《春秋》。《春秋》是孔子据《鲁春秋》编作的一部史书。在《春秋》一书中,孔子通过对春秋历史的笔削裁剪,表达了自己的政治观点,即所谓的《春秋》大义。其中,“大一统”便是《春秋》的首要之义。《孟子·滕文公下》:“《春秋》,天子之事也。”《史记·太史公自序》:“夫《春秋》,上明三王之道,下辨人事之纪,别嫌疑,明是非,定犹豫,善善恶恶,贤贤贱不肖,存亡国,继绝世,补敝起废,王道之大者也。”又《太史公自序》:“周道衰废……孔子知言之不用,道之不行也,是非二百四十二年之中,以为天下仪表,贬天子,退诸侯,讨大夫,以达王事而已矣。”《孟子》和《史记》所说的“天子之事”、“王道之大”、“以达王事”,即指《春秋》集中表达了孔子的大一统思想。

    除《春秋》一书外,孔子的大一统思想,在《论语》、《礼记》等文献中亦多有反映。如:《论语·季氏》:“天下有道,则礼乐征伐自天子出;天下无道,则礼乐征伐自诸侯出。”《礼记·坊记》:“子曰:‘天无二日,土无二王,家无二主,尊无二上。’”《礼记·曾子问》:“孔子曰:‘天无二日,土无二王,尝禘郊社,尊无二上。’”《论语·颜渊》:“四海之内,皆兄弟也。”《论语·子路》:“叶公问政,子曰:‘近者悦,远者来。’”《论语·子罕》:“子欲居住九夷,或曰:‘陋,如之何?’子曰:‘君子居之,何陋之有?’”以上的诸多论述,都是孔子大一统思想的体现。孔子的大一统思想,是《公羊传》大一统理论的直接来源。

    孔子所生活的春秋时代,天子日益衰微,诸侯势力坐大,“礼乐征伐自天子出”的政治格局趋于瓦解,社会陷入了诸侯争霸、战乱频仍的混乱局面。有鉴于此,孔子大声疾呼,推崇“一统”,渴望国家重新实现安定和统一。孔子的大一统思想也有其思想渊源。《论语·为政》:“殷因于夏礼,所损益可知也;周因于殷礼,所损益可知也;其或继周者,虽百世可知也。”《论语·八佾》:“周监于二代,郁郁乎文哉!吾从周。”《论语·阳货》:“如有用我者,吾其为东周乎!”可见,孔子的“大一统”思想,实质上是主张恢复上有天子、下有诸侯的西周式的、一统的社会秩序。《史记·太史公自序》载孔子曰:“我欲载之空言,不如见于行事之深切著明也。”这说明,孔子的大一统思想,应当有其更早的历史渊源。

    二、《公羊》“尊王”思想源于西周天子至上的政治认同

    从文献记载看,《春秋》和《公羊传》所阐述的大一统思想,早在西周、春秋时代已是一种重要的社会观念。“每一个时代的理论思维,从而我们时代的理论思维,都是一种历史的产物”,大一统思想亦不例外。历史表明,周代的大一统思想是西周封建和分封制度的产物,反映了周代社会的政治关系和意识形态。

    首先,西周封建和分封制度,加强了周天子的权力,使周天子确立了“诸侯之君”的地位。而周天子“诸侯之君”地位的确立,导致了西周一统政治格局与天子至上政治认同观念的形成。《公羊传》以“尊王”为核心的政治一统思想,源于西周一统政治形成的历史实际及周代对王权至上的认同观念。

    夏商时期,王权已经存在。在商代甲骨文和有关文献中,商王屡称“余一人”、“予一人”,表明商代的王权已经形成。然而,商代与西周的王权不可同日而语。在商王统治期间,邦畿之外方国林立。商王对外用兵,征服了一些方国,将其纳入王朝的“外服”。《尚书·酒诰》:“越在外服,侯、甸、男、卫、邦伯。”被征服的方国同商王朝有一定程度的隶属关系。然而,商代的“服国”不是出于商王朝的分封,其服国所辖的土地和人民并非商王赐予,而是其固有的土著居民;服国的首领原是方国的首长,同商王没有血缘关系;服国内仍保持着本族人的聚居状态;服国与商王朝的隶属关系在制度上也缺少明确的规定和保证。因此,商王在“外服”行使的政治权力是有限的。商王和服国首领之间,“犹后世诸侯之于盟主,未有君臣之分也”。在商王和服国首领君臣关系尚未确立的条件下,商王朝无法形成“礼乐征伐自天子出”的政治格局。

    西周的封建和分封制度的实行,“造成了比夏、商二代更为统一的国家,更为集中的王权”。分封制度下西周王权的加强,主要体现在天子与诸侯间君臣关系的确立以及相关的制度规定上。

    西周分封的基本内容,是“受民”、“受疆土”。“受民”、“受疆土”活动本身,便是对君主制的一种确认,即下一级贵族承认其所受的土地和民人,是出于上一级君主的封赐。分封的直接后果之一,是导致了天子与诸侯、诸侯与卿大夫之间君臣关系的确立。《左传·昭公七年》:“王臣公,公臣大夫,大夫臣士。”《仪礼·丧服传》郑玄:“天子、诸侯及卿大夫,有地者皆曰君。”《礼记·曲礼下》:“诸侯见天子曰臣某侯某。”周初经过分封,周天子由夏、商时的“诸侯之长”变成了名副其实的“诸侯之君”。

    天子与诸侯间的君臣关系,集中表现在西周天子的权利和诸侯所承担的义务上。对天子的权利和诸侯的义务,周王室有许多制度规定:

    策命与受命。周天子在分封诸侯时,要举行策命仪式,诸侯接受了策命,就等于接受了天子的统治。如周初封鲁,要求鲁公“帅其宗氏,辑其分族,将其类丑,以法则周公”;封卫,要求康叔“启以商政,疆以周索”;封晋,要求唐叔“启以夏政,疆以戎索”(《左传·定公四年》)。足证受命的诸侯要奉行天子的政令。诸侯国新君嗣位,也要经过天子的策命。《诗·大雅·韩奕》载韩侯嗣位,“王亲命之,缵戎祖考,无废朕命,夙夜匪解,虔共尔位”。周代的策命礼仪,实际是对分封制下天子和诸侯君臣关系的一种确认。

    制爵与受爵。在分封制下,周天子为诸侯规定了不同等级的爵命。《左传·襄公十五年》:“王及公、侯、伯、子、男、甸、采、卫、大夫各居其列。”《国语·周语中》:“昔我先王之有天下也,规方千里以为甸服。……其余以均分公、侯、伯、子、男,使各有宁宇。”《国语·楚语上》:“天子之贵也,唯其以公侯为官正也,而以伯子男为师旅。”爵命是诸侯的法定身份。诸侯阶层依据爵命分配权力、财富并对天子承担规定的义务。

    巡守与述职。在分封制下,天子有巡守的权利,诸侯有“述职”的义务。《孟子·告子下》:“天子适诸侯曰巡狩。”其具体内容便是“春省耕而补不足,秋省敛而助不给。入其疆,土地辟,田野治,养老尊贤,俊杰在位,则有庆,庆以地。入其疆,土地荒芜,遗老失贤,掊克在位,则有让。一不朝,则贬其爵;再不朝,则削其地;三不朝,则六师移之”(《孟子·告子下》)。可见,天子是通过巡守这一政治活动,来行使在政治上对诸侯的统治权力的。《孟子·告子下》:“诸侯朝于天子曰述职。”其具体内容,便是定期朝见天子,接受天子的政令。《国语·周语上》:“诸侯春秋受职于王。”《左传·僖公十二年》:“若节春秋来承王命。”《国语·鲁语上》:“先王制诸侯,使五年四王、一相朝。终则讲于会,以正班爵之义,帅长幼之序,训上下之则,制财用之节,其间无由荒怠。”述职是诸侯对天子履行义务的主要形式。

    征赋与纳贡。在经济上,天子有向诸侯征赋的权利,诸侯有向天子纳贡的义务。《国语·吴语》:“春秋贡献,不解于王府。”贡赋的多少,原则上根据诸侯的爵位高低来确定。《左传·昭公十三年》:“昔天子班贡,轻重以列。列尊贡重,周之制也。”不纳贡赋,要受到天子的惩罚。如春秋时齐桓公伐楚,理由之一是楚国“包茅不入,王祭不共”(《左传·僖公四年》)。

    调兵与从征。在军事上,天子有权从诸侯国征调军队,诸侯有从征助讨的义务。如在周初征讨东夷的战争中,鲁侯伯禽曾奉命“遣三族伐东国”。成王东征时,“王令吴伯曰:以乃师左比毛父。王令吕伯曰:以乃师右比毛父”。诸侯从征助讨,是义不容辞的义务。此外,诸侯征讨“四夷”或有罪之国有功,则应“献捷”、“献功”于周天子。《左传·庄公三十一年》:“凡诸侯有四夷之功,则献于王。”《左传·文公四年》:“诸侯敌王所忾而献其功。”诸侯向天子“献捷”、“献功”,实质上是对天子最高军事权力的一种确认。

    除了从制度上对最高王权进行确认外,西周统治者还从理论上对王权的至上性进行了阐述。西周统治者认为,周王的权力来源于上天。《诗·大雅·大明》:“有命自天,命此文王。”《诗·大雅·下武》:“三后在天,王配于京。”《诗·大雅·假乐》:“假乐君子,……受禄于天。”周王被视为上帝的儿子,代表上帝统治人间。《尚书·召诰》:“皇天上帝,改厥元子。”因此,周初统治者创造了“天子”一词,作为王的尊称。

    据统计,周法高《金文诂林》一书收集的青铜器,有65件有“天子”的称号。在《尚书》、《诗经》等先秦文献中,“天子”的称呼也屡见不鲜。如《诗·大雅·江汉》:“虎拜稽首,天子万年。……作召公考,天子万寿。明明天子,令闻不已。”刘家和先生深入分析了“天子”称号的历史意义:

    天只有一个,天下只有一个,天命也只有一个。……所以天之元子或天子在同一时间内应该也只能有一个,他就是代表唯一的天而统治唯一的天下的唯一的人。

    周代统治者通过王权神授理论,论证了王权的至上性。此外,还把“天命”和“德”联系起来,论证了王权至上的正当性。《尚书·召诰》:“王其德之用,祈天永命。”《尚书·大诰》:“天棐忱辞,其考我民。”《尚书·泰誓》:“天视自我民视,天听自我民听。”《尚书·康诰》:“天畏棐忱,民情大可见。”也就是说,上帝的旨意是通过“民情”表现出来的,周天子因为深得民心才获得了天命。周代统治者通过这种道德化的天命观,使王权获得了“天意”与“民心”的双重依据,有效地强化了周天子的绝对权威。

    西周天子与诸侯之间君臣关系的确立和王权的加强,使周天子在分封诸侯时,能够将周王室统一的社会制度推行到各个诸侯国。统一的社会制度在各个诸侯国的施行,表现在政治制度方面,主要是诸侯国都要实行分封制度、宗法制度、世卿世禄制等;在经济制度方面,诸侯国都要实行井田制度等;在军事制度方面,各诸侯国要实行国人当兵、野人不当兵及“三时务农一时讲武”的制度等。周天子与诸侯之间君臣关系的确立、统一的社会制度在各个诸侯国的施行,标志着西周政治一统格局已经形成。

    在分封制度下,各诸侯国一方面实行王室规定的统一的社会制度,另一方面又享有相当大的地方自治权。政治上,诸侯国有设置采邑地方政权和任命官吏的权力;经济上,诸侯国除向周王室交纳一定的贡赋外,其他经济收入一律归诸侯国所有;军事上,诸侯国有组建军队、任命将帅、调遣与指挥军队的权力。因此,西周分封制政体,不同于后世郡县制基础上的中央集权制政体。在中央集权制政体下,郡守、县令的任命权掌握在皇帝之手,郡县的财政归国家所有,郡县更无组建、调遣军队的权力。可见,西周分封制政体和后世的中央集权制政体,虽然本质上都是“一元”政治,但中央集权制政体的“一”之下,不存在着“多”,即不存在实行地方自治的郡县地方政权(周边少数民族地区的藩属政权除外)。而西周分封制政体的“一”之下,则存在着“多”,即存在着实行地方自治的诸侯国和采邑地方政权。

    为了实现分封制下的“一元”统治,西周王朝规定了本大末小的原则,使王室在各级政权机关中居于绝对的支配地位。据文献记载,天子的王畿有千里之广,诸侯国中的大国只有百里之地,而次国和小国尚不足百里。天子握有十四师的兵力,而诸侯大国不过三师、二师,小国仅一师。强大的经济和军事力量,保证了周王室在西周的政治格局中,成为了主体的、原始的、根本的“一”,能够统合其他的“多”(诸侯国)而为一体,建立起本大末小、强干弱枝的一统政治,即“礼乐征伐自天子出”的政治局面。

    随着分封制度的实行,王权至上观念也在畿内地区和各诸侯国境内得到极力宣扬,并且首先在上层社会形成了对王权至上的普遍认同。在周代文献中,对王权至上的认同和颂扬,记载颇多。如《尚书·洪范》:“惟辟作福,惟辟作威,惟辟玉食。臣无有作福、作威、玉食。”《诗·小雅·北山》:“溥天之下,莫非王土;率土之滨,莫非王臣。”《诗·大雅·下武》:“媚兹一人,应侯顺德。”《诗·大雅·文王有声》:“自西自东,自南自北,无思不服。”《诗·大雅·假乐》:“百辟卿士,媚于天子。”《大克鼎》:“天子其万年无疆,保乂周邦,畯尹四方”等等,都是周人尊王、王权至上观念的反映。

    孔子和《公羊传》以“尊王”为核心的政治一统思想,与西周以来天子至上的王权认同观念是一脉相承的,而这种天子至上的政治认同观念,又源于西周一统政治形成和确立的历史实际。周代的一统政治和一统观念,归根结底,都是西周封建诸侯与分封制度的产物。近代国学大师王国维在论述周初的分封诸侯时,曾有如下的论断:“新建之国皆其功臣昆弟甥舅,本周之臣子,而鲁卫晋齐四国又以王室至亲,为东方大藩,夏殷以来古国方之蔑矣。由是天子之尊非复诸侯之长,而为诸侯之君。……此周初大一统之规模,实与其大居正之制度,相待而成者也。”王国维先生以“大一统”源于周初封建,可谓是不易之论。

    三、《公羊》“内华夏”思想源于西周华夷之辨的民族认同

    西周封建诸侯和分封制度的实行,促成了华夏族的形成与华夏族主体民族地位的确立,而所谓的“华夷之辨”,则是反映了这一历史实际的民族认同。《公羊传》以“内华夏”为宗旨的民族一统思想,源于西周封建所造成的华夏族形成的历史实际以及周代社会“华夷之辨”的民族认同观念。

    关于华夏族,以往有些论著认为,它是随着夏代国家的形成而形成的。实际上并非如此。夏朝虽已产生了凌驾于社会之上的权力机构,但国家仍建立在氏族联合的基础之上。《史记·夏本纪》所载的夏后氏、有扈氏、有男氏、斟寻氏、彤城氏、褒氏、费氏、杞氏、缯氏、辛氏、冥氏、斟戈氏等,都是组成国家的不同氏族。即便商王朝的外服方国,也还是一些“自然形成的共同体”,其居民都是固有的土著居民。处于早期国家阶段的夏、商,组成国家的各氏族、方国都保持着相对单一的族属和血缘,它们与居于统治地位的夏族、商族之间存在着严格的血缘壁垒,彼此的生活方式、语言习惯、礼仪风俗有很大的差别。在这种国家形态下,难以形成一个具有民族自觉意识、共同文化和共同地域的更高形态的民族。

    华夏族作为中华民族统一体的主体民族,形成于西周大规模的封建之后,是周代封建和分封制度的产物。

    周人在克商以前,以周为首的反商联盟有了较大的发展。《逸周书·程典解》:“文王合六州之侯,奉勤于商。”周人把这个联盟称作“区夏”或“有夏”。《尚书·康诰》:“惟乃丕显考文王,……用肇造我区夏。”《尚书·君奭》:“惟文王尚克修和我有夏。”《尚书·立政》:“帝钦罚之,乃伻我有夏式商受命,奄甸万姓。”据沈长云先生研究,“‘夏者,大也’,《尔雅·释诂》及经、传疏并如此训。《方言》说得更清楚:‘自关而西,秦晋之间,凡物之壮大者而爱伟之,谓之夏。’……(周人)使用‘夏’这个人皆爱伟之的称谓来张大自己的部落联盟,来壮大反商势力的声威”。可见,周人是用“夏”来称呼以周邦为首的反商联盟。在周王朝大规模分封之前,这个在“夏”的名义下组成的军事联盟,尚未具有民族的含义。

    华夏族是在周初封建之后的历史进程中逐渐形成的。周初封邦建国时,所面临的最基本形势便是地广人稀。据朱凤瀚先生估算,周人当时的人口约十五万人。除了相当一部分留在王畿,剩下分到数十个国中,各国受封人口之少可想而知。周初分封的这种特殊的政治环境,造就了受封诸国“强烈的‘自群’意识”。周王室适应这一需要,于分封和分封之后的历史进程中,在周王室和各诸侯国的名称上冠以“夏”这个“人皆爱伟之的称谓”,即“诸夏”或“诸华”。所谓“诸夏”或“诸华”,是各诸侯国以整体的名义,一体向境内及周边其他各族所宣示的自称。后来,各诸侯国原有的各族居民,逐渐地接受了周人的礼乐文化,周王室和各诸侯国及其境内的居民,初步具有了“共同的语言、共同的经济基础、共同的地域、共同的文化意识”的民族要素。

    “诸夏”或“诸华”的共同标准语言——“雅言”。《论语·述而》:“子所雅言,《诗》、《书》、执礼,皆雅言也。”雅言即夏言,本是宗周地区的方言语音。随着分封的推行,雅言逐渐成为各诸侯国在举行礼仪活动等场合使用的标准语言。

    “诸夏”或“诸华”各国实行周王室规定的统一的政治、经济和军事制度。井田制度的普遍推行,表明各诸侯国已经具有了“共同的经济基础”。

    “诸夏”或“诸华”逐渐形成了原有各族居民的共同地域。周初封建打破了受封地区的血缘聚居局面,使不同族属的居民在同一地区实现了混居。《大盂鼎》云:“赐汝邦司四伯,人鬲自驭至于庶人六百又五十又九夫;赐夷司王臣十又三伯,人鬲千又五十夫。”鲁、卫、晋受封时,带去了“殷民六族”、“殷民七族”和“怀姓九宗”。这些不同族属的居民经过长时间的杂居、融合,到了西周后期,“在周封各诸侯国中已经基本看不到原有居民的身影,鲁国没有了‘商奄之民’,卫国没有了殷人……他们已共同融合为鲁人、卫人,标志着周封各诸侯国民族融合的完成”。这种情形,使得中原地区连成一片,逐渐演变成原有各族居民共同的地域。

    “诸夏”或“诸华”形成了共同的文化意识。随着分封,“诸夏”或“诸华”的居民逐渐接受了宗周的礼乐文化。《左传·定公十年》孔颖达疏:“中国有礼仪之大,故称夏。”《战国策·赵策二》:“中国者,聪明睿知之所居也,万物财用之所聚也,贤圣之所教也,仁义之所施也,诗书礼乐之所用也,异敏技艺之所试也,远方之所观赴也,蛮夷之所义行也。”“诸夏”或“诸华”居民对周礼文化的普遍认同,标志着“诸夏”或“诸华”共同文化意识的形成。

    总之,西周封建之后,受封诸侯国的各族居民经过融合,逐渐形成了一个有着“共同的语言、共同的经济基础、共同的地域、共同的文化意识”的民族——华夏族。

    华夏民族的形成,西周王朝的强大及其对境内和周边民族统治的加强,使华夏族的主体民族地位得以确立。而西周王朝的非主体民族,则是居于王朝境内和周边地区的“蛮夷戎狄”。华夏族的主体民族地位的确立,使华夏族在西周的民族格局中,成为了主体的、原始的、根本的“一”,能够统合其他的“多”(戎狄蛮夷)而为一体,共同组成了西周统一王朝的民族统一体。

    华夏族作为西周王朝主体民族的地位,在周王朝周边民族与周王朝的朝贡关系上有集中的反映。《逸周书·王会》记载了周成王召集的成周之会,参加这次盛会的有众多的东西南北的周边民族,各族都向周王献纳了方物。《王会》篇编撰于春秋末,周初是否有如此之多的民族参加了成周之会,史料上缺乏更多确切的说明。但西周时期许多周边民族与周王朝保持着朝贡关系,应当属实。《国语·鲁语下》:“昔武王克商,通道于九夷、百蛮,使各以其方贿来贡,使无忘职业。于是肃慎氏贡楛矢石砮,其长尺有咫。”《国语·周语上》:“今自大毕、伯士之终也,犬戎氏以其职来王。”《兮甲盘》:“王命甲政司成周四方积,至于南淮夷。淮夷旧我帛晦人,毋敢不出其帛、其积、其进人、其贾。”以上文献记载表明,臣服于周的民族与周王朝建立了朝贡关系。周朝还设官掌管戎狄蛮夷朝贡之事。《周礼·怀方氏》:“掌来远方之民,致方贡,致远物,而送逆之,达之以节。”《周礼·象胥》:“掌蛮、夷、闽、貉、戎、狄之国使,掌传王之言而谕说焉,以和亲之。”周边民族与周王朝的朝贡关系的建立,实质上是非主体民族对华夏主体民族统治地位在政治上的一种确认。

    华夏族形成之后,与周王朝境内和周边非主体民族的关系日益密切而广泛,民族融合的进程因此而大大地加速。《国语·郑语》记史伯所述西周末年的形势说:“当成周者,南有荆蛮、申、吕、应、邓、陈、蔡、随、唐;北有卫、燕、狄、鲜虞、潞、洛、泉、徐、蒲;西有虞、虢、晋、隗、霍、杨、魏、芮;东有齐、鲁、曹、宋、滕、薛、邹、莒;是非王之支子母弟甥舅也,则皆蛮、荆、戎、狄之人也。”可见,剩下的戎狄蛮夷已可得而数。春秋时期,大部分戎狄蛮夷在强国开疆拓土的过程中被征服而融合。西方的戎族,多被秦国所灭。北方狄族,多被晋国所灭。东方的夷族,多被齐、鲁所并。南方的群蛮,先后被楚国所灭。到了春秋末年,中原地区的戎狄蛮夷,已基本上融入华夏民族之中。

    随着华夏族的形成、华夏族主体民族地位的确立和华夏族的不断壮大,在西周、春秋时期,形成了“华夷之辨”的民族认同观念。周代文献中的“中国”、“华夏”、“四夷”、“五服”、“九服”等概念,都不同程度地反映了这种观念。

    “中国”一词,最早出现于成王时期的青铜器《何尊》铭文:“余其宅兹中国。”本义指京师洛邑地区。后来随着周人统治地域的扩大,“中国”一词的意义也逐渐改变,成为华夏诸国的代称。如《左传·庄公三十一年》:“凡诸侯有四夷之功,则献于王,王以警于夷,中国则否。”《左传·僖公二十五年》:“德以柔中国,刑以威四夷。”以中国指称华夏,正是华夏中心意识的一种反映。

    “华夏”一词,乃周人本其“尚文(彩)”之风尚,在沿用已久的“夏”字之前冠“华”而成的。《尚书·武成》:“华夏蛮貊。”孔安国传:“冕服采章曰华。”《左传·定公十年》:“裔不谋夏,夷不乱华。”孔颖达疏:“中国有礼仪之大,故称夏;有服章之美,谓之华。华夏一也。”华夏的称谓,体现了华夏族在文化上的优越感。

    五服与九服之说屡见于周代文献。《尚书·禹贡》:“五百里甸服。……五百里侯服。……五百里绥服。……五百里要服。……五百里荒服。”《国语·周语上》:“先王之制,邦内甸服,邦外侯服,侯卫宾服,蛮夷要服,戎狄荒服。甸服者祭,侯服者祀,宾服者享,要服者贡,荒服者王。”《周礼·职方氏》:“乃辨九服之邦国。方千里曰王畿,其外方五百里曰侯服,又其外方五百里曰甸服,又其外方五百里曰男服,又其外方五百里曰采服,又其外方五百里曰卫服,又其外方五百里曰蛮服,又其外方五百里曰夷服,又其外方五百里曰镇服,又其外方五百里曰藩服。”《荀子·正论》:“故诸夏之国同服同仪,蛮、夷、戎、狄之国同服不同制。封内甸服,封外侯服,侯卫宾服,蛮夷要服,戎狄荒服。甸服者祭,侯服者祀,宾服者享,要服者贡,荒服者终王。”五服、九服之说都把周王朝统辖的天下划分为三个层次:畿内、诸夏和夷狄,其意义与《春秋》的“内其国而外诸夏、内诸夏而外夷狄”基本一致,是华夷之辨原则在地域观念上的体现。

    在周人的观念中,华夷之辨主要表现在华夷之间在语言、习俗与经济生活等方面的区别。《论语·宪问》:“微管仲,吾其被发左衽矣。”孔子所说的“被发左衽”,即是夷狄的风俗。《礼记·王制》:“中国、夷、蛮、戎、狄,皆有安居、和味、宜服、利用、备器。五方之民,言语不通,嗜欲不同。”《礼记·檀弓》:“有直情而径行者,戎狄之道也,礼道则不然。”可见,周人主要以礼仪风俗作为区分华夷的标准。

    应当说明的是,华夷之辨的民族认同是双向的。《左传·襄公十四年》:“我诸戎饮食衣服,不与华同,贽币不通,言语不达。”《战国策·赵策二》:“远方之所观赴也,蛮夷之所义行也。”《史记·楚世家》载西周晚年楚国国君熊渠宣称:“我蛮夷也,不与中国之号谥。”至春秋中叶,楚武王仍云“我,蛮夷也”(《史记·楚世家》)。《史记·仲尼弟子列传》载子贡出使越国,越王亲往郊迎,曰:“此蛮夷之国,大夫何以俨然辱而临之?”《史记·秦本纪》载秦穆公曰:“中国以礼乐诗书法度为政,然尚时乱,今戎夷无此,何以为治?”这些例证都说明,西周、春秋时期中原地区之外的其他国家和民族,对华夷之别同样也是认同的。

    在周人的民族观念中,与华夷之辨相辅相成的,是华夷一统思想。《左传·昭公二十三年》:“古者,天子守在四夷。”《会笺》:“守在四夷,亦言其和柔四夷以为诸夏之卫也。”《左传·昭公九年》:“我自夏以后稷,魏、骀、芮、岐、毕,吾西土也;及武王克商,蒲姑、商、奄,吾东土也;巴、濮、楚、邓,吾南土也;肃慎、燕亳,吾北土也。”可见在周人的观念中,王朝的疆域包括周边各族在内。前文所引周代文献中的五服、九服之说,也无不把戎狄蛮夷包括在周王朝统辖的范围之内,诚如陈连开先生所言:“对于《禹贡》、《职方》中‘五服’、‘九服’的名称、内容,古今学者多有诠释,各家说法不尽相同,但都表达了以天子为首,以王畿为中心,包括华夷的统一思想。”

    《春秋》与《公羊传》的“内华夏、外夷狄”思想,与西周以华夏族为主体民族,华夷共存、内外有别的民族一统思想是一脉相承的。这种以“内华夏”为宗旨的民族一统思想,源于周初封建所造成的华夏族形成的历史实际以及周代社会对华夷之辨的认同观念。

    四、《公羊》“崇礼”思想源于西周尊尚礼乐的文化认同

    制礼作乐,是西周王朝统治集团为巩固政权而采取的一项重要措施。西周礼乐制度建设的成就,导致了尊尚礼乐的文化认同观念的形成。《公羊传》以“崇礼”为中心的文化一统思想,源于西周制礼作乐的历史实际以及周代社会尊尚礼乐的文化认同观念。

    关于周公制礼作乐,先秦文献中有明确的记载。《左传·文公十八年》:“先君周公制周礼曰:则以观德,德以处事,事以度功,功以食民。”《左传·哀公十一年》:“且子季孙若欲行而法,则周公之典在。”除《左传》外,《尚书·洛诰》还记载了成王对周公说:“四方迪乱,未定于宗礼,亦未克敉公功。”对制礼作乐的意义表示高度的重视。

    事实上,周公的制礼作乐,还处于周礼的草创阶段。经过后来数代君臣的补充和完善,西周中期以后周礼才渐趋完备。《诗经》中多次出现“以洽百礼”的诗句,反映了当时礼制的繁芜。据刘雨先生研究,西周金文材料所载的礼制,“周礼多数是在穆王前后方始完备”。詹子庆先生也认为,“从金文材料反映出,西周中期以后,各种礼仪制度化,如世官制、宗法分封制、昭穆制、册命制、舆服制等都有了定式”。因此,西周礼乐的系统化、完备化和程式化,是在西周中、后期才得以完成的。

    西周制礼作乐,对夏、殷之礼有继承,也有革新。《论语·八佾》:“周监于二代,郁郁乎文哉,吾从周。”《论语·为政》又说:“殷因于夏礼,所损益可知也;周因于殷礼,所损益可知也。”周礼与殷礼的不同之处,是殷礼亲亲,周礼尊尊。《史记·梁孝王世家》褚少孙补:“殷道亲亲,周道尊尊,其义一也。”“亲亲”与“尊尊”是殷周社会的两条重要政治原则。“亲亲”指血缘关系。“尊尊”指阶级关系。从“殷道亲亲”到“周道尊尊”的变化过程,“也就是阶级关系逐步支配并改造了血缘关系的过程”。因此,周礼最显著的特征体现为日益严密的等级制度,即《礼记·中庸》所说的:“亲亲之杀,尊贤之等,礼所生也。”

    西周制礼作乐,还赋予了周礼“德”的内容。周代的各种典礼都蕴含一定的道德意义,即所谓的“礼义”。《礼记·经解》:“故朝觐之礼,所以明君臣之义也;聘问之礼,所以使诸侯相尊敬也;丧祭之礼,所以明臣子之恩也。乡饮酒之礼,所以明长幼之序也;昏姻之礼,所以明男女之别也。”因此,周礼兼具政治统治和道德教化的功能,对维护和巩固西周政权发挥了重要作用。王国维先生说:“古之所谓国家者,非徒政治之枢机,亦道德之枢机也。……是故天子诸侯卿大夫士者,民之表也。制度典礼者,道德之器也。周人为政之精髓,实存于此。”

    西周封建诸侯和分封制度的实行,使周礼首先得到了受封诸侯国的认同。在分封制度下,各级政权之间的等级隶属关系集中反映在周王室制定的礼乐制度上。《左传·庄公十八年》:“名位不同,礼亦异数。”《左传·襄公二十六年》:“自上以下,隆杀以两,礼也。”周代的等级制度,在各种礼制中都有体现。如《国语·楚语下》:“天子举以大牢,祀以会;诸侯举以特牛,祀以太牢;卿举以少牢,祀以特牛;大夫举以特牲,祀以少牢;士食鱼炙,祀以特牲;庶人食菜,祀以鱼。”是为祭祀的等差;《礼记·礼器》:“天子七庙,诸侯五,大夫三,士一。”是为宗庙的等差;《周礼·小胥》:“正乐县之位,王宫县,诸侯轩县,卿大夫判县,士特县。”是为乐舞的等差;《周礼·大宗伯》:“以玉作六瑞,以等邦国:王执镇圭,公执桓圭,侯执信圭,伯执躬圭,子执谷璧,男执蒲璧。”是为命圭的等差;《周礼·典命》:“掌诸侯之五仪……上公九命为伯,其国家、宫室、车旗、衣服、礼仪皆以九为节。侯伯七命,其国家、宫室、车旗、衣服、礼仪皆以七为节。子男五命,其国家、宫室、车旗、衣服、礼仪皆以五为节。”是为不同等级的诸侯在宫室、车旗、衣服、礼仪等方面的等差。当然,《周礼》、《礼记》所提供的史料,有的要作具体分析,但绝大部分史料的来源是有根据的,可作为了解周礼的等级制度的参考资料。西周时期,受封诸侯国遵行周礼,既是诸侯国对其与周王室之间等级隶属的一种确认,也是受封诸侯国对周礼文化的一种认同。

    西周受封诸侯前往边陲建立邦国,带去了祝宗卜史等官吏、周之典籍以及各种天子赏赐的礼器等,也就把先进的周礼文化传播到了那个地区。西周诸侯受封建国后,又确立了以礼治国的方针,大力地推广周礼文化。周代文化以各诸侯国为中心,向四周辐射,使周礼逐渐得到了各国土著居民和周边民族的认同。如:

    鲁国原为东夷族的聚居区,东夷风俗盛行。鲁公伯禽受封之后,征服了徐戎、淮夷各族,“淮夷蛮貊,及彼南夷,莫不率从”(《诗·鲁颂·宫》)。同时“变其俗,革其礼,丧三年然后除之”(《史记·鲁周公世家》),对东夷风俗进行了改革,推行三年之丧等周礼。后来,被征服的东夷各族逐渐认同周礼文化,加速了东夷地区华夏化的进程。春秋时期,鲁国是“犹秉周礼”的礼仪之邦,后来成了儒家的发源地。

    齐国是在薄姑氏旧地上分封的国家,也处于东夷族的包围之中。太公至国,“修政,因其俗,简其礼”(《史记·齐太公世家》),因地制宜地推行周礼。春秋时期,齐桓公在建立霸业的过程中,“招携以礼,怀远以德”(《左传·僖公七年》),以周礼怀柔周边小国,周礼文化得到进一步传播。春秋后期齐相晏婴,原为“莱之夷维人也”(《史记·管晏列传》),却提出“礼之可以为国也久矣,与天地并”(《左传·昭公二十六年》)的主张,继承了齐人以礼治国的传统。经过几代人的努力,齐国成了“冠带衣履天下”(《汉书·地理志》)的文明大国。

    燕国原为商的势力范围,有山戎、孤竹、秽貊等族散居其地。燕国受封后,“修召公之法”(《史记·燕召公世家》),积极推广周礼文化,使周文化与当地的土著文化相互交融。1975年发现的昌平白浮墓,年代约在西周中期,墓主人为臣属于燕国的异族首领之一。“墓主的着装、佩戴的兵器遵循着本民族的习惯,而使用的青铜礼器和埋葬习俗已纳入西周燕国的轨道。”这反映出周礼文化与燕地土著文化融合的情形。春秋战国时期,周礼文化进一步传播到东北地区。《后汉书·东夷列传》:“东夷率皆土著,喜饮酒歌舞,或冠弁衣锦,器用俎豆。所谓中国失礼,求之四夷者也。”当地的民族文化,已融入了周礼文化的因素。

    晋国所封的唐地,“戎狄之民实环之”(《国语·晋语二》)。唐叔虞受封时,周成王令他“启以夏政,疆以戎索”(《左传·定公四年》)。春秋时期,随着晋国的对外扩张,周礼文化也向外辐射,对周边民族产生了深刻影响。晋卿狐偃原为狄族出身,但从其思想来看,他已经完全华夏化了。他倡导以礼教民,在城濮之战前,向晋文公陈述“民未知义”、“民未知信”、“民未知礼”(《左传·僖公二十七年》),强调周礼的基本精神。《左传·襄公十四年》载,戎子驹支面对范宣子的指责,义正词严地用历史事实驳斥晋国执政,最后赋《诗·小雅·青蝇》而退,大有中原饱学之士的风度。春秋后期,晋国周边的戎狄蛮夷基本融入了华夏族,这种民族融合是在“礼”的认同基础上才得以实现的。

    其他如楚、秦、吴、越等国,虽一度被视为蛮夷之邦,但后来逐渐接受了中原文化,也陆续加入了华夏的行列。这些国家都有独特的地域文化,不过始终都受到了周礼文化的影响。如楚大夫申叔时教太子诗、书、礼、乐及春秋、世、令、语、故志、训典等(《国语·楚语上》),与中原各国贵族教育的内容基本一致。吴国的公子季札受聘至鲁,“请观于周乐”,听乐工每奏一曲,都能逐一评论(《左传·襄公二十九年》),显示了很高的周文化修养。类似深谙周礼的人物,在秦、越亦不乏其例。这表明,周礼文化已传播到了楚、秦、吴、越等国,并逐渐得到了上述诸国的认同。

    西周时期尊尚礼乐的文化认同,使周礼文化在西周的文化格局中,成为了主体的、原始的、根本的“一”,能够统合其他的“多”(地域文化)而为一体,形成西周时期的文化一统格局。而文化一统又是促成政治一统的黏合剂,也是促进民族融合的催化剂。《春秋》与《公羊传》以崇礼为中心的文化一统思想,与周代尊尚礼乐的文化认同是一脉相承的。这种以崇礼为中心的文化一统思想,源于西周制礼作乐的历史实际以及周代社会尊尚礼乐的文化认同观念。

    东周以降,西周“礼乐征伐自天子出”的一统局面已被“礼乐征伐自诸侯出”所取代。但是,在思想上对“一统”的认同,仍在很大程度上支配着东周时期人们对历史走向和国家前途的认识,是人们重建统一王朝的精神动力。春秋大国争霸,仍以“尊王攘夷”为旗帜,藉天子的名义维护自己势力范围内的一统秩序。战国时期,“上无天子,下无方伯,力功争强,胜者为右”,重建统一王朝已成为历史发展的大势所趋。当时统治者梦寐以求和思想家大声疾呼的,无不是实现天下的统一。

    由于历史形势发生了变化,战国时期的大一统观念有了新的内容。《史记·李斯列传》:“今诸侯服秦,譬若郡县。夫以秦之强,大王之贤,由灶上骚除,足以灭诸侯,成帝业,为天下一统,此万世之一时也。”李斯所说的“天下一统”,实际上是“大统一”,即以武力兼并为手段,建立以郡县制为基础的中央集权式的统一国家。秦灭六国,建立了空前统一的大秦帝国。从此,中国古代的大一统思想进入了一个新的阶段。

    在中国历史上,自西周王朝以后,曾经历了春秋战国、魏晋南北朝、宋辽金西夏等几个分裂的时期,但始终没有像欧洲那样,形成多个独立的民族国家,而是在经过分裂、对峙和融合后,又出现了秦汉、隋唐、元明清等崭新的统一王朝,使中国社会一步一步地跨上更高的台阶。“一统”始终是中国历史发展的常态,而造就中国一统常态的重要原因之一,正是根植于中国传统文化中的大一统思想和精神。因此,弄清大一统思想的渊源及其历史发展,对我们深入理解在中国延绵两三千年之久、并对中华民族的历史产生过巨大影响的大一统思想,是十分必要的。

    本文原载《文史哲》2013年第4期

  • 陈伟:书于竹木:简牍文化及其载述的国家信史

    简牍及其周边

    简牍是指用于书写的竹、木片和写在竹、木片上的文献。从许慎《说文解字》开始,历代学者提出多种解释,大致认为简用竹制作,形状细长,也称牒、札;牍用木制作,比较宽厚,也称方、板。岳麓书院藏秦简中的令条规定:上呈皇帝的文书“对”(答问)、“请”(请示)、“奏”(报告),采用牍的时候,一牍不超过五行字(“用牍者,一牍毋过五行”)。三行、四行、五行牍的具体宽度,分别约等于3.45、3.83、4.34厘米。又说,“牍厚毋下十分寸一(约0.23厘米),二行牒厚毋下十五分寸一(约0.15厘米)”。综合起来看,容纳文字是在三行以上还是在两行以下,是牍与牒(也就是简)的主要区别。牍可以书写三至五行,比较宽厚;牒或曰简只能书写一或二行,比较窄而薄。这是对呈报皇帝文书的特别要求,但对了解一般简牍的状况也有参考意义。

    近年的发现显示,两行书写的简多用木制,但也有竹制;单行书写的简多为竹制,但也有木制。牍多用木制,但湖北、湖南也出土了竹制的牍。因而,简单地说“竹简”“木牍”,其实不够准确。

    单行和双行书写的简,往往用绳线连系成册以承载长篇文献。《史记·留侯世家》说黄石公“出一编书”,《汉书·诸葛丰传》说“编书其罪”,就涉及这一情形。这也是后世书籍观念中的编(也写作“篇”)、册(也写作“策”)的源头。牍的书写面比较大,可以单独承载不太长的文献,早先认为不存在编连的问题。不过,近期一再发现内容相关但形态各异的文书、簿籍编连成册。现在看来,只是典籍类文献才由形制相同的简书写编卷,而形态各异的文书簿籍造册归档时,并非如此规整。

    简牍上的文字,绝大多数是用毛笔蘸墨写成,偶尔也有红色字迹,即所谓“丹书”。古书中有所谓“漆书”,指的应是墨书。笔、墨、砚、刀,是简牍时代的文房四宝。写错的字,可用刀刮去再写。《史记·孔子世家》说:“至于为《春秋》,笔则笔,削则削,子夏之徒不能赞一辞。”当时处理文案的官员,因而被称作“刀笔吏”。《汉书·萧何曹参传》就说“萧何、曹参皆起秦刀笔吏”。

    《尚书·多士》记“惟殷先人有册有典”。甲骨文已有“册”字。由于“册”的字形类似简册,有学者推测商代已使用简牍。《诗经·小雅·出车》咏叹远征的军人“岂不怀归,畏此简书”。《左传》襄公二十五年记齐大臣崔杼作乱时,“南史氏闻大史尽死,执简以往”;襄公二十七年宋大夫向戌将赏赐文书拿给子罕看,子罕不以为然,“削而投之”。这些是西周、春秋时使用竹简的可靠记载。

    我国现代意义上的简牍发现,始于20世纪初,其后层出不穷,出土地点从西北地区扩展到大多数省份,迄今已发现200多批,总数超过30万枚、300万字。这些简牍的年代主要是战国中期至秦汉魏晋,最早一例是在公元前433年或稍晚入葬的随州曾侯乙墓竹简。春秋以前的简牍由于年代久远不易保存,加之埋藏条件的原因,目前尚未能得见。

    目前,已多次发现西汉纸张的遗存,居延、敦煌、放马滩等地所见的纸还带有文字或地图,显然是用于书写。不过,在东晋末年之前,简牍仍然是主要书写载体。《初学记》卷21“纸七”录《桓玄伪事》称:“古无纸故用简,非主于敬也。今诸用简者,皆以黄纸代之。”这是纸张取代简牍成为官方书写载体的标志。

    简牍的取材、制作、书写,都比较方便。《论衡·量知》就说:“截竹为筒,破以为牒,加笔墨之迹乃成文字。大者为经,小者为传记。断木为椠,析之为板,力加刮削,乃成奏牍。”《汉书·路温舒传》记载路温舒小时候放羊,自己制作木简,练习书写。可见简牍的便易性降低了识字、教育的门槛。商代、西周,学在官府,知识圈狭小,文献的种类、篇幅也有限,简牍的优势不容易发挥。春秋以降,私学勃兴,著述蜂起。战国时各国相继变法,建立以郡县制、官僚制为基础的新兴国家,文书、律令的行用骤然增长,简牍真正有了用武之地。在这个意义上可以不夸张地说,在我国春秋、战国、秦汉时期的政治发展和文化繁荣中,简牍扮演了重要角色。

    由于竹木带有天然纹路,并便于刻齿、挖槽,还可封泥、钤印,因而简牍还可衍生为具有保密、防伪功能的券、符、传、检、署等物件,在公私事务中发挥特别作用。

    (1)检、署

    署是在往来文书、信函上写明收件方以及传递方式的木片,同时也对文件内容起到屏蔽作用,类似于今天的信封。署与文件捆紧后,在捆扎处可敷设胶泥,再盖上印章,不开封不能看到里面的内容。

    检是封缄文书、物品的物件。《急就篇》卷三:“简札检署椠牍家。”颜师古注:“检之言禁也,削木施于物上,所以禁闭之,使不得辄开露也。”检有多种式样,但都带有封泥、钤印的凹槽。用检的文书,比只用署的文书保密效果更好。岳麓秦简“卒令丙三”说:“书当以邮行,为检令高可以旁见印章,坚约之,书检上应署,令并负以疾走。不从令,赀一甲。”这提示我们,检用于以邮行的文书,而不用于其他方式传递的文书。

    (2)券、符、传

    券是财务往来的凭据。一式两份或三份(“三辨券”),用同一木板或枝条剖分而成。券上通常有刻齿,用不同形态的齿表示不同数值,与所记载的数字对应,加强券的可靠性。

    符是从事一些特定事务的凭证。通常一式两份,通过“合符”来验证。西北汉简中发现较多出入符。居延汉简65.9长14.6厘米,刻齿在书写面的左侧,释文为:“始元七年闰月甲辰居延与金关为出入六寸符券齿百从第一至千左居官右移金关符合以行事……”表明这款符用于出入金关,一次制作1000套,各套的左符留在官署,右符放在金关。通关者领取左符到金关验符通行。居延汉简65.10刻齿在书写面的左侧,右半残缺,存留的一行文字与65.9相同。最近有学者测试,二者紧密契合,可能是一套符中的左符和右符。

    传是旅行证件。对因公出行者来说,传同时还是接受交通、食宿安排的凭据。云梦睡虎地秦简《法律答问》记:“今咸阳发伪传,弗智(知),即复封传它县,它县亦传其县次,到关而得。”显示传跟公函一样,封缄后由使用者携带,需要时拆开查验。

    从文物到文献

    简牍的出土位置,主要有墓葬、水井、工作或生活遗址。出土简牍的墓葬分布广泛,湖北地区发现最多。云梦睡虎地11号秦墓,1000多枚竹简集中放在棺内。而在大多数墓中,简牍是放置在棺外,比如椁室中。古井中堆积简牍,主要见于湖南。古人工作或生活遗址出土简牍,主要是在西北地区。

    简牍的揭取和保护通常由专业人员负责,在细心提取简牍的同时,还详细记录各个个体之间的相互关系,为后期的缀合、编连提供参照。在完成清洗、脱色后,需要及时拍摄图像,尽可能充分地获取各种信息。

    简牍文献的整理,是尽可能完整、系统地获取简牍中的文献信息,实现简牍从文物到文献的转换。主要工作环节可用以下几个例子说明。

    认字,是把简牍上书写的古代文字辨认出来。利用文字学、古文字学研究成果,简牍上的大多数字,学者可以认读。但也有一些难字需要推敲考订。郭店简中有一个字出现三次,整理者释为“蚄”,很难讲通。其实这个字是《说文》“杀”的古文,在简文中读“杀(shài)”,衰减的意思。《唐虞之道》7号简“孝之杀爱天下之民”,《语丛三》40号简“爱亲则其杀爱人”,是说把对亲人的爱推广给其他人,属于儒家仁爱的观念。《语丛一》103号简“礼不同、不奉(丰)、不杀”,与《礼记·礼器》所记孔子语相同,是这一释读的直接证据。

    断读,相当于标点,是通过阅读中的停顿,反映文章中的意群和脉络,从而正确地领会文意。断读分原则性断读和喜好性断读两种。喜好性断读,是指出于个人习惯,断句或长或短,不求划一。原则性断读,是说当断必断、当连必连,否则就会导致文句不通或使文意产生歧义。

    张家山汉简《二年律令》65~66号简整理本释文:“群盗及亡从群盗,……矫相以为吏,自以为吏以盗,皆磔。”注释说:“矫相,疑指矫扮他人。”简文中,“相以为吏”与“自以为吏”相对,是形容“盗”的两种情形。矫,指假托、诈称,同时修饰这两种情形。因而中间的逗号应改为顿号,读作“矫相以为吏、自以为吏以盗”,是说相互诈称官吏或者自我诈称官吏而进行盗窃。岳麓秦简《学为伪书》案卷中那位叫学的少年犯供述说:他父亲服劳役受欺侮,经常训斥他。“归居室,心不乐,即独挢(矫)自以为五大夫冯毋择子”,伪造书信进行诈骗。这就属于类似表述。

    编连与缀合,是简牍类文献整理的特殊作业。简牍出土时,原有的编绳大多朽断无存,简牍个体还往往开裂破碎。编连与缀合就是在这些情形下,重建业已丢失的、书写在不同简牍个体及其残片上的文本之间的联系和顺序。编连是对不同简牍个体之间顺序的安排。缀合则是针对同一支简牍而言,在简牍断裂之后,重新把残片拼合起来,以恢复原先的完整形态。在这里,简牍物质形态上的拼复与编次,与文本形态上的连接与整合相互依存,融为一体。

    郭店简《语丛一》31号简与97号简,分别书写“礼因人之情而为之”和“即(节)文者也”。整理本把二者分别看待。《礼记·坊记》说:“礼者,因人之情而为之节文,以为民坊者也。”《管子·心术上》说:“礼者因人之情,缘义之理,而为之节文者也。”《礼记·檀弓下》:“辟踊,哀之至也,有算,为之节文也。”相形之下,31号简显然应当与97号简连读,表述儒家对礼的起源的观念(礼基于人的情感并用仪节来调适)。在我提出这一看法的时候,“文”字还没有得到正确释读。而当学者随即释出“文”字后,这两枚简前后相次就更加确定了。

    缀合,是克服简牍破碎化,提升残片文献价值的关键步骤。我们在研撰《里耶秦简牍校释》过程中,把缀合的推进作为工作目标之一。下文引述亭“赀三甲”的木牍,由四个残片拼合后,方可知其大概。

    云梦睡虎地77号墓出土的西汉简牍《质日》,有的年份损坏严重。我们课题组同事用“寸简寸心”相激励,孜孜以求,一点一点地推进。经反复推敲,用8个残片缀合成一枚下半支简(“己酉 戊申道丈田来治籍 丁未将作司空”),并排定到《十一年质日》的2号位,就是集体攻关的一个实例。

    简牍文献记载的国家信史

    早前,因为简牍出土数量不足,并且大多支离破碎,其学术价值一般只说是证史、补史,处于辅助、补充的位置。现在由于资料的快速积累,尤其是有像睡虎地秦汉简这样数量多、保存也比较好的大宗材料,通过适当整理和互勘合校,简牍文献已经在行政与政区制度、律令与司法制度、经济制度、文书制度、算术与医药、风俗习惯等领域的创新性研究中成为主要的资料依据。

    简牍资料在秦郡县制方面提供了较多新知识,这里举三点说明。

    首先,新发现郡名“洞庭”“苍梧”。《史记·秦本纪》记载:“秦王政立二十六年,初并天下为三十六郡,号为始皇帝。”从南朝宋的裴骃开始,学者对三十六郡所指便聚讼不已。1947年,谭其骧先生发表《秦郡新考》,成为权威性意见。然而,秦简牍中有一些全新的发现。秦始皇二十七年的一件文书说:“今洞庭兵输内史,及巴、南郡、苍梧输甲兵……”(里耶秦简16-5)洞庭、苍梧与人们熟悉的巴郡、南郡并列,显然也是秦郡名。秦始皇三十四年的一件文书(里耶秦简8-758)说“苍梧为郡九岁”,表明在秦王政二十五年统一前夕,就已设立苍梧郡。在传世文献中,秦洞庭、苍梧二郡,毫无踪影。

    里耶秦简对洞庭郡及其属县有较多记录,因而可以推定秦洞庭郡其实相当于传世文献中的黔中郡。《汉书·武帝纪》记武帝元鼎六年“遂定越地”,设南海、苍梧等九郡。有学者认为,秦苍梧郡是西汉苍梧郡的前身,位于南岭以南。根据张家山汉简《奏谳书》所录秦案卷等简牍的证据,秦苍梧郡其实相当于传世文献中的长沙郡。

    其次,昭示中央直达基层的管理体制。在郡县制下,国家之于地方,“如身之使臂,臂之使指”,出土简牍使我们领略到这种体制实际运行的精致与效率。

    里耶秦简8-228记载丞相书的传递,从朝廷所在的内史开始,在传达至各县的同时,还传给南郡,南郡又传给洞庭,从而使这份文书迅速传播到郡县。里耶秦简9-2283是洞庭太守避免征发徭役的指令,从大概是郡治所在的新武陵分四条路线(“别四道”)传达给各县。迁陵县收到文书后,一面向上一站酉阳县回报,一面安排县内各官署传达:“迁陵丞欧敢告尉:告乡、司空、仓主听书从事。尉别书都乡、司空,司空传仓,都乡别启陵、贰春。皆勿留脱。”“别书”指另行抄录传递,在当时应是文书传播中的有效方式。

    最后,展现不同郡县间的行政、经济联系。秦代不同郡县之间可能有相当密切的联系。前面引述里耶秦简属于苍梧郡的指令,因为与洞庭各县有关,传达到洞庭郡迁陵县各乡。里耶秦简8-657则是由于琅邪尉的治所迁到即墨,琅邪郡通报各地。

    里耶秦简中常常出现的“校券”,是不同郡县间钱物往来的凭据。13-300记载迁陵县十四匹传马经过雉县(属南阳郡)时,借用了食料。雉县出具“稗校券”,要求迁陵接受“移计”,“署计年、名”反馈给雉县。这意味着,迁陵不需要交付钱物,而是借助“计”的形式确认债务,再通过中央财政平账。里耶秦简所记一段相关内容颇有故事性。亭来自僰道(属犍为郡),在迁陵担任“冗佐”(一种低层吏员)期间犯事,“赀三甲”,计4032钱。亭自称家里有能力赔偿。迁陵县出具校券,请僰道县索取。结果亭的妻子胥亡说:“贫,弗能入。”要求让亭在迁陵作劳役抵偿。于是迁陵要求僰道退还校券。

    这类事例显示,秦郡县制之下,除了中央与地方的纵向关系之外,地方郡县之间还存在密切的横向联系。这降低了各地政府的运行成本,增强了国家的凝聚力,也给民众带来一些便利。

    文书在秦汉国家治理中,发挥着重要作用。

    睡虎地秦简《秦律十八种》是秦统一之前的律典。其中在多种场合强调“以书”,显示当时已形成文书行政的规范。如《田律》要求“辄以书言”春雨和庄稼抽穗的情况;《金布律》要求官府输送财物时,“以书告其出计之年”;又要求在废旧公物需要及时处置的场合,“以书”呈报;《内史杂律》规定需要请示时,“必以书,毋口请”。

    里耶秦简是秦统一之后洞庭郡迁陵县的档案。较多文书写明“听书从事”,或者提出“书到时”如何运作的具体要求。

    民间的重要事务,如结婚、遗嘱、牛马奴隶等交易,也需要由官府用文书确认。岳麓秦简《识劫婉》案卷中,女主人翁婉,原本是一位叫沛的富豪的妾。沛的妻子在世时,婉已为沛生下两个孩子。沛的妻子去世后,沛免除婉妾的身份,成为庶人,又生了两个孩子。婉自述说,沛把她免为庶人后,娶她为妻,并让她参加宗族、乡里的活动。然而乡署的官员表示:沛免婉为庶人时,在户籍上登记“免妾”。但后来娶婉为妻,并没有报告,婉在户籍上的身份还是“免妾”。

    律令是秦汉帝国建立、运行的重要制度支撑。以睡虎地秦律发端,近五十年来,秦至西汉早期的律令简册层出不穷,蔚为大观。

    对于秦汉律的整体认识,学界颇有歧异,或比较笼统地称之为“律典”,或以为只有一条一条制定的单行律令,而不存在国家颁布的统一法典。

    较早出土的睡虎地秦律、张家山汉简《二年律令》,均已呈现出篇章分明的结构。云梦睡虎地汉律、荆州胡家草场汉律和益阳兔子山汉律目录大致相同,进一步展示出集篇为卷、两卷并存的格局。兔子山律目分为“狱律”“旁律”两部分,其中“狱律”包含告、盗、贼、囚、亡等十七篇,“旁律”包含田、户、仓、金布、市贩等二十七篇。当时的律分“罪名之制”和“事律”两类,大抵“罪名之制”是对犯罪行为的处罚规定,类似于刑事法律;“事律”是对违反制度行为的处罚规定,类似于行政法规。西汉早期律典中,“旁律”诸篇均属事律;“狱律”虽然以“罪名之制”诸篇为主,但却夹杂几篇“事律”(效、关市、厩律等)。这种安排很不好理解,或许与萧何制定“律九章”的历史有关。

    虽然律篇、律条的增删修订不断发生,但在一定时期内,全国存在一个统一的律典。这可以从几个方面来看。

    第一,在睡虎地秦律、里耶秦简和睡虎地汉简中,一再出现“雠律令”的记载。可见律令一有变动,就立即在全国组织校勘,保持同步。

    第二,秦汉时实行奏谳制度,重要案件向上级报告,疑难之狱请上级裁断。向上呈报时必须“具傅所以当者律令”(《岳麓书院藏秦简〔伍〕》66),把判决依据的律令一一附录在判决之后。可见全国上下遵循同一律令,中央立法机构掌握最终解释权。

    第三,张家山汉简《功令》规定各县道狱史在升任郡治狱卒史前,需要集中到中央司法部门(廷尉)参加“律令有罪名者”等内容的考试。考试作答、评分必定要有标准答案,这也显示统一律典的存在。

    第四,某些律篇、律条的变更,会带来律典的全面修订。例如张家山336号墓出土的《汉律十六章》,较多律篇与《二年律令》相同,但律条多有增删和补充,不再出现《收律》,相关律条皆删去“收”和“收孥相坐”的刑罚。这是文帝元年“除收帑诸相坐律令”的结果。胡家草场汉律是汉文帝十三年刑制改革后的律典,与此前的张家山《汉律十六章》和睡虎地汉律相比,刑罚制度判然有别。这证明律典中各篇各条存在密切关联,构成一个有机整体。

    刘邦军至咸阳,萧何“独先入收秦丞相、御史律令图书藏之”,并“作律九章”,奠定汉承秦制的基础。《史记·曹相国世家》记曹参去世后,民众歌颂说:“萧何为法,顜若画一。曹参代之,守而勿失。”司马贞《索隐》解释“顜”字说:“训直,又训明,言法明直若画一也。”《汉书·曹参传》写作“讲”,颜师古注:“讲,和也。画一,言整齐也。”“画一”之歌反映了当时人对律令整齐划一的真实感受。

    秦汉时期法的主要形态有律、令两种。令的资料目前公布的还不多,姑且不论。律就其具备的基本特征而言,称之为“律典”或者“早期律典”是适宜的。

    本文节编自《光明日报》( 2025年01月04日 10版)

  • 颜荻:秘索思与逻各斯的动力学:古希腊文明精神溯源

    引言 

    古往今来,任何一部文明史都是不同文明互鉴的历史。深刻认识文明互鉴的实践,是一种特有的文明自觉。文明研究有三个关键议题:其一,文明的起源性构造及根源性影响;其二,文明发展的动力原则及生成逻辑;其三,文明对自身历史的认识及系统化表达。无论在中国还是西方,三个议题都贯穿于文明发展的历程之中。可以说,任何一个角度的文明研究都应怀有这三个部分的问题意识并予以展开。 

    就西方文明而言,几乎所有起源性问题都可追溯至古希腊。古希腊作为开端,其始源性构造奠定了西方文明的最初样态。在始源性构造中,有一个议题十分重要,即“秘索思(mythos)与逻各斯(logos)”。它不仅深刻关涉上述三个关键的文明研究内容,且对古希腊文明乃至整个西方文明形成奠基性影响。 

     Mythos一般指“语词”“神话”“故事”与“虚构的言辞”,logos则指“理性”“秩序”“逻辑”和“规则”。二者首先从古希腊历史的发端处,以语言这一最基本的文明形式塑造了古希腊人对自身、社会、世界乃至宇宙的根本想象,同时作为两种不同的思维模式,其动态互动构成古希腊文明乃至西方文明的基本生成逻辑。传统研究将此互动过程经典地描述为“从mythos到logos的转变”,其发展路向通常被认为最终打开了西方理性主义与逻各斯中心主义(logocentrism)的大门,因而对近代以来的启蒙运动与科学主义兴起,乃至现代性的产生与发展形成深远影响。与之相应,在这一过程中西方文明所逐渐形成的对自身历史的认识与系统表达,可称之为历史书写。在logos成为一种权威表达方式时,西方的历史叙事乃至历史观也随之逻各斯化。历史越来越被看作一个理性发展的过程,以至到近代,这一观念进一步与进化论和目的论关联,发展出一系列西方文明对自身价值的评估与判断。 

    因此,mythos与logos一向是西方古典学与相关学科研究的经典课题。无论是围绕mythos与logos的词源学经典讨论,还是从文学、哲学、史学等出发的文本意义考察,均成果丰硕。基于“从mythos到logos转向”的基本框架,相关研究从不同侧面不断巩固“logos对mythos的胜利”这一主流观点,从而形成对mythos与logos关系及其奠基性意义的网络式理解。 

     然而,“logos的胜利”却无法涵盖所有现象。在人类似乎进入由理性、秩序、逻辑与规则构成的科学、中立、通约化的普遍历史世界时,mythos一直作为动力隐隐存在着。自19世纪开始,从“原始思维”到“理性文明”的表述,同时受到不同学科的严厉批评与审查。其中结构主义人类学强调神话作为“深层心智”绝非“野蛮的初级思维”,仪式/功能主义社会学对神话进行了社会功能阐释,神话哲学则努力在哲学中直接复兴神话的意义。这表明,mythos与logos的内在蕴涵显然比既有的线性阐释模式复杂得多。究其根本,在于mythos与logos间相互勾连、冲突与纠缠的状态,在其出现之初便已开始。二者在起源时所构成的此消彼长的动力学原则对西方文明发挥着根本而持续的作用。因此,要厘清整个西方文明在思想史层面的复杂发展脉络,就需回到始源,重新探讨mythos与logos的发生史。从这一视角出发,不仅能观察到西方文明所深含的内在力量,还能在此力量所具有的开放性与包容性中理解西方文明不断塑造与再造的过程,直至通解当下现代性所面临的复杂问题。 

    一、“颠倒”的秘索思与逻各斯 

    从最早的古希腊文献来看,mythos与logos最初即一组有关“言辞”的对立统一的概念。不过,在古希腊早期历史中,mythos与logos的意涵与现在所熟知的意义恰恰相反。早有学者如布鲁斯·林肯指出,logos在古风时期的语境中,所指涉的绝非后人所理解的“理性”与“真实性”,而是与“欺骗”“错误”和“谎言”相关联;反而,现在看似表达“虚构”与“假象”之意的mythos被认为具有更高的真理性甚至神圣的权威性,从而,在mythos与logos的起源之初,两者所表之意,实际正是后来意义的颠倒。 

    赫西俄德与荷马为此提供了经典的例证。例如,在赫西俄德《劳作与时日》中,几乎所有的logos都与虚构和谎言相关,诗人不仅以logos而非我们通常认为的mythos来指代“五代神话”这个虚构的故事,而且特地选用形容词haimulios(欺骗的)来对不同语境中的logos进行修饰。而在《奥德赛》中,足智多谋的奥德修斯,在与佩涅罗佩相认前夕,也讲述了(legein)(<logos)许多谎言(polla pseudea),那些谎言就像真的一样,令王后信任与哭泣。 

    在布鲁斯·林肯所列举的所有相关例证中,可以发现,“秘索思与逻各斯之争”正是始于这两者所包含的积极与消极意义的对立。而伴随着两极的分化,这两个词汇又被进一步赋予相应的性别化特质,从而,在譬喻性的层面上被完全对立。由于logos总带有欺骗与谎言的负面性质,因此,在古希腊整体的厌女(misogyny)语境下,自然与“女性化”的特性相关联。潘多拉“迷人的logoi,以及诡诈的性格”就是典型。而与logos相反,mythos则具有“男性化”的特质。一位英雄的理想就是成为一位“实践的行动者与mythos的言说者”,由此,mythos被显现为一种与英雄精神相关的特质,并时刻与这一男性化的、公共的、强大的力量正向关联。 

    Mythos与logos性别化的对立所反映的不仅是两性本身的问题,而且是在一个更广泛的社会文化意义上,将两者带向了不同的存在之域。与“男性”相关的mythos,其背后意味着“权力”“权威”以及由此而建立的“神圣性”与“真理性”,而logos则恰恰相反。在《荷马史诗》中,当阿伽门农面对克律塞斯(Chryses)的祈求要在集会中力排众议严词拒绝时,他必须使用mythos。因为,越是男性化的、越强大的人,越拥有言说mythos的资格与能力,反之,则被认为应当在mythos的领域保持沉默。与logos相关联的女人便更没有言说mythos的权利。特勒马库斯就明确告诉母亲:“你还是回到里屋,操持你自己的事……mythos是男人关心的事——所有男人,尤其是我,因为我是家中的掌权者。” 

     正如理查德·马丁所指出的,mythos总是一种力量之语,它是一个拥有权力或权威的人所说出的强权化的甚至粗暴的言辞。这种极端男性化的特质与史诗尤其荷马精神高度契合。战争作为英雄荣誉的来源,成为史诗必然歌颂的对象,而正是此“强有力”的话语,不仅标志着英雄取得胜利的强势力量,而且,连同英雄的行动一起,构成了诗歌中那些值得传颂的语言与故事。英雄之诗,从根本上而言,就是力量之诗。换言之,关于英雄的mythos,就是力量的mythos。它光明、正大、直接、不加掩饰,与欺骗、阴暗、迂回的logos形成强烈反差,由此,前者在英雄世界的价值体系中,在对伟大的英雄精神的渴望与追求下,被崇尚为一种揭示英雄本质的、本真性的语言形式,一种与“真实”所关联的“动人”的话语结构。在这个近乎二元对立的价值判别中,mythos——无论是言辞本身,还是其所构成的叙事——便拥有了绝对的权威性与崇高性,甚至与神圣世界关联起来。 

    在此,我们必然会想起赫西俄德《神谱》中缪斯女神谈论mythos的经典段落: 

    女神们首先向我讲出这些话语(mythos), 

    那些奥林波斯的缪斯,持大盾的宙斯的女儿们: 

    “荒野的牧人啊,你这可鄙的家伙,只知吃喝, 

    我们知道如何讲述(legein)谎言如真实一般, 

    也知道如何如我们所愿唱诵(gēruein)真实(alēthēs)。” 

    神圣之音,mythos,在缪斯作为神明的神圣权威中展开。她们对诗人说话,诗人聆听她们的语词。她们告诫诗人,女神可以讲述谎言,也能够唱颂真实,她们凭自己的意愿,在谎言与真话之间作出选择。若是谎言,则是将其讲出(legein),而若是真理,她们则会为之唱颂(gēruein)。“说”与“唱”标定了谎言与真实的界限,而女神们赐给赫西俄德的是一首“动人的歌”,所以诗人笃信,他从缪斯处所继承的,必然是神明们所歌颂的真实。在神圣的启示下,诗歌作为一种唱颂/言说形式,便接近了最高的真实性与永恒性,它从神圣世界获得了权威的力量,从而在世俗世界中,自然而然成为一种富有权威的真实性表达。 

    在神圣世界的关照下,诗人通过诗歌所唱颂的史诗、故事和神明谱系便与“真实”和“真理”深度勾连。Mythos成为一种罗伯特·福勒所谓的元诗学(metapoetic),一种先验的、不可辩驳的真理,而其所关联的所有语词、言说与话语都与虚假的、错误的、荒谬的logos世界相区离。而当这些“真实的”叙说在世代吟游诗人的口耳相传中成为古希腊的记忆时,mythos所构成的具有“真实性”的“历史”出现了。而这种深嵌于神圣权威之“真理”的真实性,已经超越了历史实证主义意义上的真实,在一种超历史的意义上成为最本真的存在。荷马与赫西俄德,也由此成为所有古希腊人的先师,其mythos之言说,构成了古希腊共同体“真知”的基底,从而塑造着古希腊人对其自身精神与历史意义的根本认识。 

    Mythos与logos在“真”与“假”的二元对立中展开了最初的对话:mythos表达真实的、男性化的、阳刚的、权威性的、公共的、动人的话语体系,logos则表达虚假的、女性化的、阴柔的、边缘性的、私人的、充满冲突的言说。从荷马与赫西俄德到公元前6世纪晚期,这一两极化的表达占据着古希腊世界的主流,mythos也因其所拥有的真理性与权威地位而一直被奉为圭臬。而当mythos的真实性开始受到质疑时,这一图景便开始转变。从希罗多德与前苏格拉底哲人,到修昔底德与智术师群体,最终到柏拉图,mythos逐渐被质疑为不可知的、不真实的、非权威性的话语,而logos则越来越被尊崇为可知的、可控的乃至权威的言说。如此转变使得mythos与logos两者发生结构性倒转,此倒转将影响西方文明对两者意义与关系的根本判摄。而mythos与logos之变是一个逐步发生的漫长过程。 

    二、被“悬置”的秘索思 

    对传统mythos意义的“反叛”,现存文献最早可以追溯至公元前6世纪晚期爱奥尼亚(Ionian)的阿那克里翁(Anakreon)。尽管阿那克里翁本人是一位抒情诗人,但他对mythos的使用却已颇为大胆与前卫。在其残篇中,最具代表性的例子是他在谈及人们反抗萨摩斯的(Samos)僭主波吕克拉特斯(Polykrates)时,用复数mythiētai(说mythos之人)来指涉那些反叛的领袖们。由此,mythos被阿那克里翁纳入政治行动的语境,在动乱的煽动性言辞下,政治领袖所言之mythos就不再是拥有神圣权威的史诗式话语,而是俗化为被世俗政治所利用的“工具与武器”。 

    无论阿那克里翁是否受同时代爱奥尼亚学派(Ionian School)的影响,他作为抒情诗人对mythos意义的创新性用法都可以被视作一个具有标志性意义的节点:当mythos不再与神圣世界确切关联而可以被人事所利用时,这样的言说本身是否还具有美德与权威就被打上了一个问号。这意味着,mythos从前所具有的天然的真理性受到质疑,进而受到优劣评判。在批评与赞扬的表述下,“好的”mythos就变成了一个被竞相争夺的对象,而“坏的”mythos则受到贬斥。这正是阿那克里翁之后的几十年所蔓延开来的景象。 

    诗人品达就常对mythos进行优劣之分,他会批评“有些人所说的mythoi……隐含着谎言和欺骗”而捍卫自己mythos的优越性,将其诗歌视为一种aretai(美德)的表达。在对自我与他人的扬抑之中,品达不断为自身的诗歌立法,以赢得诗人的“桂冠”。前苏格拉底哲学家也参与进了对mythos话语权的争夺中。克洛丰的色诺芬尼(Xenophanes)就曾批评“荷马与赫西俄德将人类中所有有害的、应当受到责难的东西都归因于了神明的力量”,而自己重提一套“好的”mythos的标准。巴门尼德更是明确强调要“听我的mythos!”这与思培多克勒捍卫自己的mythos的方式如出一辙。 

    诗人与哲人同时对自我mythos地位的捍卫,从某种程度上显现出后世所谓“哲学与诗歌之争”的雏形。但此时,哲学仍借用诗歌mythos的权威为自我正名,尚未求诸logos。然而,一旦人人都有权利声称自己的mythos才是更好的言说,mythos原本凌驾于一切的权威便决定性地让位于评判者自身。缪斯不再在场,“人的时代”悄然降临。而伴随着mythos本身超越性的下降,一个必然的问题便是:mythos一词还能否完全承担起其权威性的功能?或者说,mythos是否还具有不可置疑的真理性与说服性来作为人们认识与理解世界的基础? 

    从阿那克里翁到品达,再到前苏格拉底的哲学家,这些言说者尽管各有其立场与态度,但在面对上述问题时,他们对mythos一词的表达都越来越收缩与谨慎。若在公元前6世纪晚期至公元前5世纪早期,mythos还被部分作为一个正面、积极的词汇来使用,那么,到了希罗多德之时,他已不再能,或不再愿意用mythos来指代其自我表达。他将mythos束之高阁,转身求诸logos,赋予logos以更高的力量与权威。这可以说是logos之变的一个重要转折。 

    希罗多德的写作代表了神话(或mythos)时代对理性(或logos)时代的退让,从他开始,可以明显看到作家对传统mythos整体性的保留态度。在《历史》开篇,希罗多德点明:他希望去探究希腊人与波斯人纷争的原因,于是,详细记述了两者关于同一神话/故事的富有争议的说法。然而,在包括腓尼基人的说法被一一陈列后,这位历史学家以一句总结摒弃了对前述几种mythos的考察:“这两种说法,哪一种更合乎事实,我不想去讨论。下面,我将指出我本人确切知道的那个最先向希腊人发难的人,继而继续我的叙述(logos)。”由此,希罗多德转向了吕底亚国王克洛伊所斯(Kroisos)的故事,并借此将其历史探索追溯到公元前6世纪中叶这个可知的历史时代——它成为希罗多德历史叙述的真正起点,一个“不去论述神话”的历史性开端。 

    有一种历时化(chronological)的意识,清楚表明了希罗多德的记述愿意开展的范围与界限:在对历史“时间”的反复强调下,“历史”停留在“不可知其时”的神话叙事的边缘。对他而言,“神话”过于久远,无法验真与证伪,于是,选择将其悬置——只有那些可以客观知道并验真的时期与事件才是他本人希望去讲述(legein)的对象。这便意味着,在某种程度上,希罗多德将远古的“神话”与故事搁置在了其历史叙述框架之外,或至少,他本人的logos将不会包含传统意义上的mythos,而力图成为一种新的关于过去的叙事。 

    这并不是说希罗多德就此将神话直接贬损为欺骗性、虚假的叙事,而是在“悬置”的方法论原则中,对“神话”或我们称之为mythos的话语体系作出了一个不同于史诗传统的界定。福勒曾敏锐地指出,希罗多德在谈论公元前6世纪中叶的一起历史事件时,引人注目地使用了上文提到的“人的时代”(tēs anthrōpēiēs geneēs)这个不同寻常的短语:“波律克拉铁斯,据我们所知,是在希腊人中第一个想取得海洋统治权的人……不过,在我们所谓的‘人的时代’, 波律克拉铁斯就是第一人。”人类时代的“第一”要从头开始计算,它与神话人物所存在的“前人类时代”或“神话时代”相分离。这意味着,荷马与赫西俄德笔下的英雄与诸神,包括缪斯,都被修昔底德悬置在人类历史周期之外,将其归之于经验事实“不可知晓”“不可确信”或“不可触及”的领域。 

     这是希罗多德在他所处的“人的时代”对mythos作出的 “评判”,但其“悬置”方法使得这一评判相对温和,因为它将史诗传统与希罗多德自身的历史立场之间的张力模糊化了。不过,对于希罗多德而言,仍有一个他必须面对的问题,即,如何解释那些“不可确信”的神话人物所拥有的确定无疑的、流传至今的名字与故事。对此,希罗多德用一句几乎惊世骇俗的评论作出了解释:“每一个神从什么地方生产出来,或者他们是不是都一直存在,他们的外形是怎样的,这一切都可以说是希腊人在不久之前才知道的。因为我认为,赫西俄德与荷马的时代比我的时代不会早过四百年,是他们,把诸神的家世教给了希腊人,把他们的名字、尊荣和记忆教给了所有人并且说出了他们的外形。”希罗多德并不否认神明的存在,但他在可知与不可知的边界上,重新界定了赫西俄德与荷马的位置。这两位诗人“创造”了神灵的名字,正如荷马也同样“创造”了希罗多德本人未曾见过的传说中的欧凯阿诺斯(Ocean)河流一样。他们作为“人”本身,并不一定受到所谓的缪斯的神启,毋宁说,大多数神话故事与人物,不过是诗人自身的创造,它们即便很难证伪,也很难证实。由此,诗人所赋予希腊人的mythos,在希罗多德看来,就应当被排除在人类历史的考察范畴之外,而换个角度来说,书写人类历史的历史学家,也应当自觉地将mythos之言说与内容束之高阁,以确保其可知历史的可确证的真实性。 

     希罗多德在此将诗人的mythos与神圣世界作出了区分,神圣世界仍具有崇高的权威与神圣性,但诗人作为传统中讲述与唱颂mythos之人,却受到实质性质疑。在此意义上,我们或许可以理解,为何希罗多德特别有意识地将自己的叙述指涉为logos,并刻意避免使用mythos一词:他的logos是排除对传统mythos讲述的言辞,而他本人,则是区别于传统诗人的历史学家,是能够给希腊人带去一种新的(也更真切的)记忆的言说者。由此,希罗多德便能够从“可知性”与“真实性”出发为其自身的“历史的logos”赋予更高的位置。于是,当他拒绝采信关于居鲁士(Kyros)出生的三种说法时,他宣称将要告诉我们一个“真正的故事”(ton eonta logon);而那些希罗多德称之为logioi andres的人,则被认为是具有学养的权威人士,他们不仅通晓过去的故事,而且知道哪些才是值得聆听的。所有这一系列对logos的使用都表明传统诗人权威在明显下降。 

    从古典时期早期的诗人阿那克里翁与品达,到前苏格拉底哲学家,再到希罗多德,可以看到,mythos整体的权威性与神圣性越来越低,随之而来的,是logos以及与之相匹配的 historia(历史)的兴起。尽管,在这一阶段,mythos仍处于某种“中间状态”,希罗多德也仍在书中收集了大量传统神话故事,但mythos还是在historia的判断性“悬置”中受到了无形的挤压与价值重估。这恰恰是希罗多德在其“历史与诗歌之争”的框架下为mythos与logos之变所带来的一个具有深远意义的方向性影响,该影响到智术师与修昔底德之时,将会开展出全部的力量。 

    三、智术主义与逻各斯势力的兴起 

     随着启蒙运动与社会变迁的发展,普罗塔格拉 “人是万物的尺度”的宣言打破了mythos与logos最后微妙的平衡。当把人作为宇宙的中心来度量世界时,诸神便隐退天际,传统中神圣的mythos随之黯然失色。智术师是一个彻底转向logos之言说的群体。当mythos的真理性与说服性一再受到质疑,以“人”为万物中心的智者们,最终选择了彻底摈弃将mythos作为人们理解世界的基础,转而在logos处建立其认识论的根基。对智术师而言,logos之所以被认为是可靠的,是因为它是纯粹的人事:它更多与人类的语言和修辞相关联,与遥远的神话无涉。如此介乎人类现实行动之间的言说,在智术师看来,最能呈现真实的人类社会。高尔吉亚将logos与真实性(reality)联系起来,并在其《海伦颂》( Encomium of Helen )中,用logos的修辞学力量为海伦传统的mythos开脱,便是这一观念的典型体现。 

     对logos作为言辞力量的强调,是智术师处理与理解logos的一个显著特征。虽然荷马时代已有katalegein(准确地说)一类将logos作为言说之意的词汇,但公元前5世纪,logos在智术师运动下成为一种社会现象、方法论乃至世界观。就社会与政治背景而言,古希腊城邦对公共辩论的强调强化了logos的重要性,但更重要的是,在人本主义的思想逐渐兴起、传统mythos愈受质疑的大趋势下,logos所进入古希腊社会视野之中的意义。当人们返诸己身,以期对人类自身的行动作出自我解释时,logos作为影响政治行动乃至广泛人类行动的推动力,便获得了作为真实性基础的权威。换言之,通过理解logos在人类社会中所展现的力量,便能够理解人类社会最根本的真实性,而这种真实性又将成为指导人们行动的基础,它足够聚焦当下,不再需要神圣世界与遥远历史的参与。由此,logos与mythos彻底分离。而这一步,智术师们走得要比希罗多德激进许多,在他们对logos的强势追随下,mythos及其背后的整个传统世界与之渐行渐远,甚至隐没。 

    或许并不令人意外的是,在现存智术师的残篇中,mythos出现的情况少之又少。在讨论logos的诡辩与欺骗力量时,高尔吉亚未将该词与mythos相对比,而在《海伦颂》中,他所对比的却是poiēsis(诗歌)。这似乎显示出智术师试图超越既有“mythos与logos”之传统并重新界定两者关系的“野心”。 

    这一野心在智术主义的语境下是可以理解的。因为对智术师(例如高尔吉亚与普罗塔格拉)而言,logos总被认为拥有双重力量:既是一种说理的话语方式,也是一种欺骗性的话术。无论之前人们认为logos与mythos何者真实、何者虚假,在智术师这里,logos囊括了这两个方面,从而在“真实性”问题上不再与传统意义上的mythos相对。两者的关系因而需要被纳入一个新的框架。新的框架是什么?柏拉图的《普罗塔格拉》提供了一个可能是主流的智术师的回答。在这篇被认为很大程度上忠实于智术师本身作品的文本中,mythos被指涉为“给孩子们讲述的虚构的故事”,而logos则为“逻辑论辩”。这意味着,mythos与logos的对立不再是欺骗与真诚、谎言与真理之间的对立,而是“现实”与“虚构”之间的对立。 

    在智术师的现实主义关怀下,mythos被整体文本化(textualization)地处理几乎是一个必然的结果。由于被理解为虚构的,mythos只可能是一种人为的文学现象,而不再是来自缪斯的神启。在公元前5世纪日渐发达的书写体系下,随着口头传播的mythos被越来越多地记录下来当作文本资料和参考资料扩散流通,真实性本就受到质疑的mythos愈加丧失其传统宗教与社会的意义。从而,无论是在智术师群体中,还是在其他领域,mythos都越来越被排除在历史与现实的追问之外。 

    修昔底德无疑深受这一思潮的影响。与希罗多德相比,这位更年轻的历史学家除了精通智术师的作品以外,也更加坚决地将mythos排除在其文本写作之外,从而,在许多人(尤其实证史学家)看来,修昔底德是真正的“历史”书写的开端。尽管就对待mythos的立场而言,希罗多德与修昔底德之间是程度而非性质的差异,但在同时代智术师传统的强烈影响下,修昔底德对mythos与logos的争判更加毫无保留地偏向了logos,即其所代表的“非虚构”的、“现实理性”的一面。 

     修昔底德明确宣称,mythos,连同那些久远的传统记忆都不应当被纳入历史,因为记忆是脆弱、模糊的,甚至是具有欺骗性的——它永远是对历史的挑选、解释与重构。因此,“在这样的领域,很难去相信它们所呈现出来的信息”。作为一位史学家,修昔底德呼吁每一个人仔细甄别所有信息,去觉察那些记忆或传统说法中无法证实甚至不真实的成分,并识别出它们在经年累月后最终与mythōdes(神话)相结盟并倾泻出的那些不可信的言说。对修昔底德而言,现实与记忆之间存在着一个明显的“可信”与“不可轻信”的对立关系,而后者在诗人与故事记录者的笔下又更加严重。因为当诗人“夸大其词地为事件赋予流光溢彩”或当故事记录者“为了听者的愉悦而非为了事实”将未经证实的东西拼凑在一起时,那些令人怀疑的说法就彻底令人难以相信了。为此,修昔底德坚决提出,“如果我们希望能够看清过去的事实,借以预知未来”,就不应当像诗人和故事记录者那样为迎合人们的兴趣而写作,而是应当彻底地回到可信且可证实的“现实”之中。 

    那么,如何确保“现实历史”的真实性?修昔底德走得比智术师更远。他从logos(言辞)转向了ergon(行动),将所有历史书写都建立在现实行动事件的基础上。在《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》中,伯里克利有一个著名说法,即“真理寓于行动之中”,这可以说正是修昔底德的立场。如果说logos还有欺骗的可能性,那么,现实中“当下”的ergon则既不虚构也不虚假。《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》几乎不关注过去与传统,它处理古代(ta palaia),最多是为了通过看似逼真的证据来构建权力逐渐发展的模型。修昔底德所要创建的,是基于权力与战争概念的“行动的理论”,他将关注的视野聚焦于当下,以至于所有远离当下行动的诉说,都被谨慎地悬置甚至排除在外。这位理性主义与实证主义的历史学家不同于那些讲述故事的诗人,他就此将“神话”(mythos)与历史隔绝开来。 

    从智术师对logos的推崇,到其对mythos的文本化理解,再到修昔底德对mythos的排除,在公元前5世纪至公元前4世纪一系列启蒙运动思潮的推动下,mythos已被赋予完全不同于古风时期的位置与地位。一定程度上,mythos在修昔底德的笔下受到了最为激烈的挑战,这也是其在整个古希腊思想历史中所遭受的最为严峻的一次重击。在知识论层面,修昔底德对mythos的处理尤其具有颠覆性,几乎完全否认了mythos之于现实世界的意义,否认了mythos存在的正当性。这使得mythos几乎被驱逐出历史舞台,或至少被足够地边缘化。 

    但修昔底德的观念代表较极端化的立场,甚至,他是与大多数同代人充满分歧的少数派。与修昔底德同时期,存在mythos的另一个面向,且在希腊民间社会更加流行。这一面向在最大程度上保留了对mythos的敬意与推崇,其首要特点正是非历史性以及对神话的演绎,即悲剧。从悲剧中可以看到,尽管mythos无可辩驳地受到了冲击,但它对古希腊社会的影响力仍然强大。由此,历史学家、智术师与悲剧作家之间构成了一种对抗与竞争关系,这显示了秘索思与逻各斯之争在当时更加复杂且充满互动的动力学图景,而这种竞争最终对柏拉图关于mythos/logos问题的判摄形成了重要影响。 

    四、悲剧意识与秘索思逻各斯的此消彼长 

    与修昔底德的历史书写相比,悲剧是一种更加大众化与平民化的文体。虽然,悲剧作家是一群具有高度自觉性的知识精英,但由于悲剧演绎在古希腊尤其雅典城邦是一项面向公民、竞赛性的公共活动,因此,悲剧的受众决定了其与大众阶层更广泛的连接,也由此在一定意义上,可以被视为与陶瓶、壁画、建筑等艺术形式相似的大众文化的代表。尽管以精英与大众、贵族与平民、少数人与多数人等二元架构来与 “秘索思与逻各斯之争”相对应过于粗糙与简略,但悲剧对mythos的敬意与推崇在很大程度上反映了当时社会大众对mythos及其所代表的传统神话的态度与立场。 

    一个有趣的现象是,事实上悲剧经历了一个从历史剧到神话剧的转变。这一转变发生在普利尼克斯(Phrynichus)因其历史剧《米利都的陷落》(The Capture of Miletus)被罚之后。该剧以历史事件为题材,由于其生动呈演了前一年米利都被波斯人攻陷的悲惨遭遇而引得在场希腊观众动容痛哭,所以城邦重金惩罚了普利尼克斯。自此之后,几乎所有悲剧都改为神话题材,不再触碰现实历史,以此避免“悲剧”过于令人悲伤。就这样,现实历史题材在悲剧这个文体刚出现时就被禁止,所有故事又回到神话之中。 

    这是“虚构”的mythos在悲剧领域得到高度肯定的一刻,它在此后成为界定悲剧之所以为悲剧的一个核心要素。在悲剧舞台上,“虚构”是一个被刻意强化的特质。不仅演员会戴上面具、穿上戏服,运用大量台词、“假扮”成剧中人物,而且整个悲剧剧场也与外界隔离开来,被有意制造为一个独立于历史社会的虚构空间。而正是在此空间中,神话的故事被改编、演绎与观看,由此,观众对此“虚构性”形成高度的自觉。“有距离地观看”恰恰构成了虚构之于悲剧的价值,而正是在这多重的距离之下,悲剧及其mythos成为一个被凝视、审查与思考的对象。 

    当然,这里的mythos已不是古风时期意义上的高贵而神圣的话语。虽然同样属于“诗歌”与“神话”范畴,但悲剧特别强调作者对传统神话的独创性改编,这意味着悲剧的mythos是一个极具作者性与创造性的话语表达,而非来自缪斯的神启。就此而言,悲剧的mythos接续的仍是古典时期“去神圣化”的批评传统,它在本质上完全属于智术师意义下“虚构的、非真实的故事”序列。不过,与智术师和历史学家不同,悲剧作家不仅承认并且大大突出了虚构的价值与力量,还试图在“虚构”中,恢复mythos的“真理性”。 

     对悲剧作家而言,真知寓于虚构的故事情节之中。正如亚里士多德所言,悲剧是“对一系列行为的模仿”。戏剧如同镜像一般,通过对故事人物的悲剧性命运的“模仿”,展开了对真实世界中的人性与生命本质的深刻探讨。在一系列无解的悲剧冲突中,世界和人都被展现为充满问题、矛盾与含混性的存在,而恰恰借由“虚构”所带来的距离,那些本被现实世界所掩盖或回避的问题、黑暗与矛盾被充分而安全地暴露出来供观众审视。索福克勒斯的《僭主俄狄浦斯》是以虚构的mythos传达真理的典型,通过对俄狄浦斯悲剧命运的揭示,索福克勒斯表明了理性知识之于真理的局限性。埃斯库罗斯的“奥瑞斯提亚”(Oresteia)对“正义”的根基发出了诘问,在阿伽门农家庭悲剧的演绎中,揭露了绝对正义达成的困难与悖论。欧里庇得斯《美狄亚》《埃勒克特拉》和《希波吕托斯》同样如此,这些剧目都从不同侧面探讨了人与人之间最根本的关系纽带如何可能以及如何不可能。 

    对在场观众而言,这些深植于人性与社会的根本问题指向了他们所身处的真实世界,而恰恰是在这虚构的时空中,真理得以以一种超历史乃至于超人的方式显现出来。它向人们表明,舞台上的mythos,以一种historia和logos所不能达到的方式揭露了真相,此真相不仅比现实历史世界所显现出来的更加深刻,而且也比理性思辨所触及的更加复杂。我们在悲剧中不断看到诸如此类忠告:“你有视力,但你却没有看到你所陷入的困境”,“你根本不知道你过的是什么生活,不知道你在做什么,不知道你是什么人”。对于人们日常所熟悉的知识样态、伦理道德、社会结构乃至于人们自身,悲剧都重新发问,并以一种毁灭性的方式呈现出人类世界中被小心翼翼回避、保护与掩盖起来的难以承受的真相。由此,悲剧作为一种虚构的文学形式,重新给予了mythos最高的真理性。 

     那么logos呢?Logos作为悲剧中的对话与言辞被纳入了mythos的表意系统之中,成为一种工具性的——尽管十分强势的——存在。Logos对悲剧而言不可或缺,它贯穿于整个戏剧演绎,是人物思想表达与交锋最直接的通道。悲剧情节的推进,都在语言的诉说、往来、游戏与较量中达成。而语言的误解、诱惑、欺骗与劝说又构成了悲剧情节中最重要的反转与高潮。可以说,在悲剧中,是logos成就了mythos,这恰恰是悲剧作为一种对话式诗歌文体与史诗或抒情诗最大的区别。在此意义上悲剧充分吸收并利用了公元前5世纪理性主义与修辞学传统,为mythos注入了当代最前沿的活力。然而,悲剧对logos作为言辞乃至逻辑思辨的力量又始终保持谨慎。无论是“奥瑞斯提亚”中对克吕泰莫涅斯特拉修辞术的尖锐批评,还是《僭主俄狄浦斯》中俄狄浦斯诘问判案的反讽性演绎,三大悲剧作家的作品都一再表明,logos是危险的。在如此种种对人物语言的危险性的揭示下,悲剧的mythos毋宁将公元前5世纪的logos整体纳入了其对人性之真理的探讨之中,由此,mythos拥有了对logos进行审查与盘问的权力,进而,前者对后者建立起一种“真理”意义的权威。 

    这是悲剧对公元前5世纪智术师传统、理性主义和实证主义历史观向mythos发起的多重挑战的回应。从悲剧在雅典乃至泛希腊世界的受欢迎程度来看,这一回应无疑十分强劲有力,并且得到了民间社会的大力支持。在每年举行的酒神节中,悲剧在循环往复的宗教与仪式的时空中不断强化着其对古希腊社会的整体性影响。而这一影响首先发生在公民教育上。通过集体的排演与观看,城邦公民不仅形成了个体层面的对悲剧问题的反思,而且通过共同的投票,形成了对悲剧意义的共同意见,从而建立起一种公共的、政治的、社会性的思想基础。这恰恰是自荷马以来mythos对古希腊社会而言最重要的意义,正是悲剧将其延续下来。 

    从mythos所面临的败退之势来说,悲剧在启蒙运动的大背景下,对mythos精神的重新强化是相当不容易的事,但这也表明,mythos在希腊世界中拥有强劲且充满韧性的生命力,使得古希腊的根本特质深深扎根于mythos传统之中,即便深受启蒙运动的冲击,mythos也没有被新兴的思想浪潮所湮灭。比三大悲剧作家再晚一辈的柏拉图目睹了这一切,恰因如此,这位哲学家也显现出了最深的忧虑,他不仅明确发起了“诗歌与哲学之争”,并且还要从根源处对mythos与logos的关系进行彻底的哲学改造。 

    五、柏拉图对秘索思与逻各斯关系的哲学改造 

     柏拉图对传统mythos的批评几乎人所共知。在《理想国》第二、三卷中,他指出,传统诗人所编造的mythos都是虚假的故事,因为他们把伟大的神描写得丑陋不堪、把英雄塑造为无恶不作的恶棍,这样的mythos既不虔诚、也不真实,需要被排除在理想的城邦之外。从上文讨论中可以看出,柏拉图此处所针对的正是史诗与抒情诗传统之下的诗歌,尤其那些将英雄特质极端化的悲剧。对柏拉图而言,诗歌尤其悲剧以虚构的形式所展露出的引以为傲的“悲剧性真理”恰是最糟糕的,因为这些故事对不幸与罪恶“不加拣选地”模仿,并且夸大了欲望、痛苦、快乐这些灵魂中最低劣的部分,因此,这样的诗作极容易将mythos置于伦理的险境。倘若城邦中普通的公民无法分辨模仿的真伪与高下却跟随这些故事行事,那么人们的灵魂不仅不会变得更优秀,还将处于道德败坏的危险之中。因此,最好的办法,就是将那些“讲不道德的故事的”诗人驱逐出去,“至于我们,为了对自己有益,要任用较为严肃和正派的诗人或讲故事的人,模仿好人的语言,按照我们开始立法时所定的规范来说唱故事以教育战士们”。 

     柏拉图之所以对诗歌如此警惕,不完全是因为“虚构”本身对真理形成了威胁,尽管,它的确因其作为对真相的模仿而多少远离真实。他最深的忧虑在于——正如他所目睹的——传统mythos不仅道德含混,而且对公民的影响巨大。这正是柏拉图在“古已有之”的“诗歌与哲学之争”中看到的最大问题。柏拉图深知,在一座城邦中,要彻底驱逐诗歌与故事(mythos)是一件多么困难的事:“故事的制造者”(muthopoioi)在城邦中无处不在。她们首先是母亲和保姆,然后是老男人和老女人,还有忙着照顾新生儿的那些不知疲倦地喋喋不休的人,她们“向他们的耳朵里灌输迷人的话语”,为他们讲述口传的以假乱真的故事。由神话和美丽的故事所承载的整个模仿的情感结构吸引了年轻人的眼睛和耳朵,他们会被那些自发的“神话家”迷住,最终“变成身体、声音和思想的性格和第二本性”。从孩子的睡前故事,到所有公民都热衷于观看的戏剧演出,以情动人的文教无处不在,mythos强劲的生命力令其教育如此深入人心,若其真的道德败坏,那么它将对公民及社会形成毁灭性影响。因此,既然深知无法驱逐mythos本身,那么,至少应当将那些对城邦有害的mythos及其制造者排除在城邦之外,方能对城邦形成最大的保护。这正是柏拉图所谓“驱逐诗人”的真正原因。 

    需要指出的是,柏拉图并未驱逐所有诗人与mythos。在其哲学建构中,更重要的是用新的mythos去替代那些传统的、被驱逐的mythos。“任用较为严肃和正派的诗人或讲故事的人,模仿好人的语言”正是柏拉图在驱逐传统诗人之后,立即给出的一个替代性方案。那么,为何柏拉图要使用这样一个“不彻底的”方案? 

     从知识论的角度来看,这是因为,mythos仍是柏拉图哲学思辨与教育不可或缺的存在。正如柏拉图笔下的苏格拉底在《理想国》中所承认的,尽管知识最终通过logos获得,但在获取知识的哲学式的辩证法中,人们却必须“不使用任何感觉的对象,而只是通过纯粹的观念来推动达致观念的结果”,这种用非物理术语来对抽象概念和形式进行理解的方法无疑是困难甚至难以自证的。因此,logos的局限性本身就要求mythos作为一种语词性的、哲学的形象,作为“认知的桥梁”,承担起对真理的“可见和可感知的表达”。由此,mythos不仅要成为哲学上的“发言人”,甚至还要成为哲学论证尤其辩证法开始之前真理交流的第一原则(即起点或公理),去完成那些logos或辩证法难以达成的事情。《理想国》中的洞穴神话与厄尔神话等都是典型的例子,由此可以看出,神话对于哲学认知过程的开始和结束都是必要的。从某种程度上而言,它也可以解释为何mythos本身在公众世界中具有(比logos更加)普遍性的吸引力与知识传播的能力,无论结果好坏。 

     在此意义上,便可以理解柏拉图既要“驱逐诗人”又要“留下诗人”的看似矛盾的态度,而我们看到,这一态度远比被动的妥协要积极得多。那么,他所谓“正派的故事”和“好人的语言”是什么?在柏拉图的论证框架下,这两者自然就是由哲学/logos所引领的语言,而这正是柏拉图认为mythos本身所无法达成的东西。哲学之所以比mythos更加权威,是因为其思辨的logos包含了经由理性而得来的“理相”(eidos)。这些“理相”构成了真正的现实,且在那个“真理”的世界中永恒不变。因此,这些具有绝对稳定性的存在可以指明什么是真正的善,并引导人们走向德性。当然,柏拉图哲学“真理性”的自我辩护是一个相当复杂的体系性问题,无法在此展开,但倘若柏拉图假设了他的辩护是成功的,那么,在其理想的城邦建设中,哲学,logos,就成为包括诗歌在内的一切教育与立法的先导与模型,从而使得mythos必然处于一个从属地位。 

     基于此,城邦便可以容纳mythos,并且对其不可或缺的辅助力以及不可抗拒的影响力加以利用。于是,柏拉图提出:“logoi分为两种:一种真实,另一种虚假。必须让人在这两方面都得到教育,而且,首先得在虚假的方面……要首先对孩子们讲神话故事,因为总的来说,这些故事说的是假话,但其中也有真实的东西。”真实的logos,柏拉图指的是哲学的理性辩证;而虚假的logos,即智术师/历史学家意义上的mythos。在哲学向那“虚假的logos”注入“真实的东西”(即哲学真理)后,mythos便得以作为构成城邦logoi(复数)整体的一部分,继续对公民施加“第二本性”般的影响,并作为哲学教育的起点对公民实施真正的知识教育。当mythos成为logos,神话/诗歌成为哲学的一部分时,logos不仅实现了对mythos最好的规训,而且,哲学反过来也成为诗歌,成为“最伟大的一种缪斯的艺术”。 

    某种意义上,柏拉图对logos至高地位的赋予显现出其从智术师处接续而来的批评传统,在mythos与logos问题的整体框架下,柏拉图无疑是作为一位革新的思想家站在了启蒙运动的风口浪尖。然而,这位苏格拉底的学生对智术师传统是有所保留的。他不仅通过对“德性”的强调,用一个完全道德化的“善”的logos取代了智术师笔下“可善可恶”的logos,而且也在其对mythos的处理中,修正了智术师(以及修昔底德)彻底背离mythos传统的进路,将mythos在其理想的城邦中保留下来。这意味着,mythos在柏拉图的哲学中不仅获得了一席之地,而且,还在一个显性的“秘索思与逻各斯之争”中被一位哲学家重新赋予存在的根本价值。柏拉图本人以戏剧对话(mythos)的方式来呈现其哲学,便是最好的例证。 

     柏拉图之所以将mythos纳入其哲学体系,不单是因为其知识论上的前驱性意义及其对公民教育的影响力。《蒂迈欧》中梭伦的故事暗示,这一切或许还与mythos在古希腊的本质相关。这个故事讲述了梭伦前往埃及的见闻。梭伦在与当地最有经验的祭司谈话时发现,“不论他自己还是其他希腊人,可以说都对古老的事物一无所知”。对此,一位年迈的祭司道出了一句箴言:希腊人之所以不知过往,不是因为无知,而是因为“希腊人永远都是孩子”。.祭司的意思是,由于古希腊人总是用口头的方式传播故事,因此,并没有像古埃及那样的书写传统将一切记录下来。在古埃及的对比下,柏拉图指明,古希腊的历史实际总是留存于口头的记忆之上的,神话记忆而非历史书写构成了古希腊之所以为古希腊的本质。就此而言,mythos直抵古希腊精神的核心。它不仅不可能被驱逐,而且还在存在论意义上,牢固地锚定在了古希腊的内核之中。在如此社会里,神话就是历史,它为历史的起源不断输送能量,并塑造着古希腊人的历史与文明意识。我们看到,在此,虚构的故事就不仅是在知识与教育的意义上被需要,而且是在整个古希腊文明的意义上被需要。 

    恰是在这一点上,柏拉图有意识地将mythos融汇进了自己的理想城邦的建构之中,并且,以一种相当积极的方式对其本质进行了最大程度的利用。《理想国》中著名的“高贵的谎言”就是一个典型例证:这个被哲学规训的具有真理性的起源神话成为整个理想的文明城邦建立与教育的起点。这个看似“荒唐的”的传说,“虽然那些听故事的人未必会相信,但后代的后代,子子孙孙迟早会相信的”。在世代的流传下,高贵的谎言成为历史的起源,成为城邦立法最根本的、先验的无可辩驳的基础,从而,mythos也在这个对logos而言最理想的城邦之中成为一个最不可或缺的存在。 

    从柏拉图对mythos的批评来看,他一方面明显继承了智术师与理性主义传统对logos的尊崇,另一方面,也对mythos强韧的力量有着充分的自觉。因此,尽管在柏拉图的理论体系中,logos是绝对高于mythos的存在,后者必须受前者所指导,但无论是在教育意义上,还是在存在论与知识论意义上,柏拉图都承认,mythos对古希腊而言绝不可或缺。 

    由此,虽然在柏拉图这里,我们看到“logos对mythos的胜利”,但我们也看到,这一胜利建立在对mythos的承认、接纳甚至为己所用的基础上。就此而言,柏拉图可以说是从智术师和修昔底德的极端立场的某种后退。在人类的城邦与社会中,这位哲学家试图找到一种mythos与logos间平衡与共存乃至互补的关系,令其各司其职。这一后退,不仅是战略性的,而且深植于其对哲学思辨的理性认识以及古希腊文明本质的深刻理解之中。古希腊人,或人类,对mythos和logos两种精神的需求表明其任何一方都不能,也不可能,被完全否定与排除。恰因如此,可以看到,无论是在柏拉图之前,还是自柏拉图之后跌宕起伏的历史中,mythos与logos总是相互勾连牵延、此消彼长,时而彼此竞争,时而互为补充,直至今日。 

    结语 

    Mythos与logos自古希腊文明伊始,就在口述传统催生下,深深扎根于其文明精神的核心。二者在普遍的二元思维架构中,构成古希腊内在精神的两个面向,一同推动该文明向前发展。 

    Mythos与logos不单是两个词汇与概念,背后隐含的是认知世界及自身处境的表达方式与路径。二者的关系不仅关涉话语体系的构建方式,还包含对“真实与虚假”“神圣与世俗”“诗与思”等一系列问题的思考。因此,该议题既指向神话与历史、神话与哲学、历史与哲学,也在形而上层面与认识论、存在论乃至宇宙论问题关联在一起。正是在多层面的勾连与张力中,mythos与logos开启了一个极为丰富的希腊世界。 

    二者“二元辩证统一”的动力学关系构成古希腊极为关键的文明特质。两者之所以不断此消彼长,是由古希腊开放的宇宙论、世界观与不同时期的社会和思想共同造就的。对变迁动力追根溯源,除却神话与思想、诗歌与哲学、感性与理性这些对立概念本身内在的冲突与竞争,社会文化自身的发展、古希腊民间风俗的变化、传统宗教与世俗生活的抗衡,乃至外来文化与新兴思想的渗透等,也均是推动两者变化的重要因素。 

    进一步看,恰恰是这一相互制约又互相定义的动态特质,对此后西方文明的展开产生了本源性影响。古希腊之后,不仅秘索思与逻各斯之争一直根植于西方思想发展脉络之中,而且两者地位在不同时期的变化也持续影响着西方感性与理性演变的周期以及西方哲学在认识论上的几次重大转型。现代社会兴起后,这一动力学原则更进一步与理性主义、科学主义结合,强化了西方科学与宗教并立的辩证传统,至今仍是西方文明体系的核心结构,对现代性及其内在复杂性的形成产生了深远影响。 

    在mythos与logos经历地位反转与意义更迭后,西方对自身整体文明传统的自我认识与系统性表达也随之形成。Mythos被驱逐出历史叙事的范畴,logos与实证精神合流成为现代西方历史观的真正开端。尽管在古希腊时期,这一历史认识论仍属激进、并非主流,然而经由漫长的中世纪、文艺复兴而进入现代世界之后,它在现代社会发挥出巨大能量。实证主义的理性化书写、古史研究对虚构叙事的全盘否定都显现出自古希腊时期便已在神话、传说与历史之间划出的巨大鸿沟。尽管对神话的复兴一直若隐若现,但整体而言,理性的历史观仍占据上风。这两种历史观的反复纠缠是系统性的,而这正是在现代世界中不断显现的问题。 

    本文节编自《中国社会科学》2024年第10期

  • 胡宝国:魏西晋时期的九品中正制

    魏晋南北朝时期的九品中正制度由于存在时间很久,各个时期多有变化。因此,有必要对这一制度进行分阶段的考察。在这篇文章中,只讨论魏西晋时期的九品中正制。

    一、释“上品无寒门,下品无势族”

    创立于曹魏时期的九品中正制在西晋一朝遭到了大规模的抨击。当时许多人批评中正制度,其中尤以刘毅“上品无寒门,下品无势族”(1)一语最具代表性。涉及到九品中正制度的论著,大都据此得出结论:当时世家大族垄断了上品。本文认为,这一结论仍有值得商榷之处。(2)

    晋武帝时,段灼上表称:“今台阁选举,涂塞耳目,九品访人,唯问中正。故据上品者,非公侯之子孙,则当涂之昆弟也。”(3)段灼与刘毅都指出一部分人垄断了上品。刘毅称为“势族”,段灼称为“公侯之子孙”、“当涂之昆弟”,二者应该是相等的。只不过段灼说得更具体些。所谓“公侯”,即指封爵,“当涂”是指高官要位。当时也有一些人并未直接批评中正制度,而是指斥高官子弟垄断了某些官位。刘颂对晋武帝说:“泰始之初,陛下践阼,其所服乘皆先代功臣之胤,非其子孙,则其曾玄。”(4)愍怀太子被废,阎缵上疏为之申冤,更具体指出,东宫官属如太子洗马、舍人以及“诸王师友文学”等职任人不当,“皆豪族力能得者”(5)。刘毅与段灼,刘颂与阎缵所选择的批评角度虽然不同,但却有相通之处。九品之品与具体官职存在着一定的关系。

    《晋书》卷九○《邓攸传》:邓攸“尝诣镇军贾混。……混奇之,以女妻焉。举灼然二品,为吴王文学”。《晋书》卷五二《华谭传》:“太康中,刺史稽喜举谭秀才。……寻除郎中,迁太子舍人,本国中正。”《晋书》卷四六《李重传》:“李重……弱冠为本国中正,逊让不行,后为始平王文学。”《晋书》卷六一《周浚传》:“(周馥)起家为诸王文学,累迁司徒左西属。司徒王浑表‘馥理识清正,兼有才干,主定九品,检括精详’。”

    担任中正者,本人必须是二品。司徒左西属是司徒府的官吏,“主定九品”,有时还可兼中正,自然也应是二品。(6)我们看到,被中正定为二品的人往往可以任太子舍人、诸王文学,这些职务正是阎缵所提到的。因此,阎缵批评“豪族”垄断这些职务与刘毅、段灼批评他们垄断上品当是一回事。换言之,正是因为他们垄断了上品,所以才能位居上述职务。

    但是,“势族”、“公侯之子孙”、“当涂之昆弟”究竟是些什么人呢?按通常的解释,这不过是世家大族的代名词而已,世族垄断上品的结论就是由此得出的。但考察一下上述批评中正制度的人的家世,事情就会复杂起来。《晋书》卷四五《刘毅传》:“刘毅字仲雄,东莱掖人,汉阳城景王章之后,父喈,承相属。”《晋书》卷四六《刘颂传》:“刘颂字子雅,广陵人,汉广陵厉王胥之后也。世为名族。同郡有雷、蒋、谷、鲁四姓,皆出其下。时人为之语曰:‘雷、蒋、谷、鲁,刘最为祖。’”《晋书》卷四八《段灼传》:“段灼字休然。敦煌人也,世为西土著姓。”同卷《阎缵传》:“阎缵字续伯,巴西安汉人也。”《华阳国志》卷一《巴志》:“安汉县号出人士,大姓陈、范、阎、赵。”以上四人,刘毅为“汉阳城景王章之后”,其父曾任丞相属,究竟属于哪一阶层,难以确定。其他三人或曰“名族”,或称“著姓”,或为“大姓”,当是世族。

    所谓世族,通常是指累世做官的家族。由于在一个地区长久不衰地任官,即被当地人目之为“著姓”、“大姓”、“名族”,或者也可称作地方郡姓。汉代以来,有一些著姓、名族的政治势力及影响并未局限在本地区,如汝南袁氏、弘农杨氏,这些家族世代在中央居高位,在全国范围内都有影响,这样的世族,可以称之为高等世族,以别于地方世族、地方郡姓。

    身为世族的刘颂、段灼、阎缵为什么要攻击世族垄断上品呢?其实,“世族”并不等于“势族”。我们可以通过元康年间举寒素一事加以推断。

    《晋书》卷九四《范粲传》:“元康中,诏求廉让冲退履道寒素者,不计资。”何谓寒素?何谓不计资?据《晋书》卷四六《李重传》载,诏令下达后,“燕国中正刘沈举霍原为寒素”,但司徒府未通过。司徒左长史荀组认为,“寒素者,当谓门寒、身素、无世祚之资。原为列侯,显佩金紫,先为人间流通之事,晚乃务学……草野之誉未洽,德礼无闻。不应寒素之目。”与荀组不同,李重则积极为霍原辩护:“如诏书之旨,以二品系资,或失廉退之士,故开寒素,以明尚德之举……沈为中正,亲执铨衡,陈原隐居求志,笃古好学……如诏书所求之旨,应为二品。”据此,可以得出如下认识:一、此诏是为了解决九品中正制实施中所出现的问题而发的。具体说,就是要冲破某些人仅凭“资”独占二品这种局面,其措施就是举寒素。按此传先云举霍原为寒素,后又云“应为二品”,可知举寒素意即举寒素者为二品。(7)二、前引刘毅说,势族垄断了二品,此传又称“二品系资”,可知势族获得二品即是凭借“资”。因此,有资者即为势族,反之则是寒素,势族是与寒素相对而言的。三、按荀组的说法,寒素应包括两项内容:门寒、身素,又可概括地称之为“无世祚之资”。门寒一词较空洞,留待下面讨论。所谓身素当是指本人无官无爵。荀组正是从此出发反对举霍原为寒素的。其理由主要有二:第一,“原为列侯”,第二,德行不够。德行较抽象,很难说清,所以第一条理由才是重要的。霍原为列侯,不符合“身素”一项,此外,霍原家世虽不可考,但本人未出仕却有封爵,应该说是从祖先那里袭来的,因此,霍原属于“公侯之子孙”,也即是势族,自然也就不能算“门寒”了。可见,荀组虽然仅指出“原为列侯”,但实际意味着霍原二项条件均不符合,所以才反对举他为寒素。

    《晋书》中明言被举为寒素者还有二人。《晋书》卷六八《纪瞻传》:“祖亮,吴尚书令。父陟,光禄大夫……永(元?)康初,州又举(瞻)寒素,大司马辟东阁祭酒。”《晋书》卷九四《范粲传》:“元康中,诏求廉让冲退履道寒素者,不计资,以参选叙,尚书郎王琨乃荐(范)乔曰:‘乔禀德真粹,立操高洁……诚当今之寒素。著历俗之清彦。’时张华领司徒,天下所举凡十七人,于乔特发优论。”(8)据此,当时被举为寒素者共十七人,由于史料缺乏,已无法全部了解他们的情况。但《李重传》却为我们透露了一点消息。元康年间,李重任尚书吏部郎,“务抑华竞,不通私谒,特留心隐逸。由是群才毕举,拔用北海西郭汤、琅邪刘珩、燕国霍原、冯翊吉谋等为秘书郎及诸王文学”(9)。霍原被举为寒素后并未出仕,此处误记。但我们怀疑其他三人均系被举为寒素者,因为他们被“拔用”的时间也是在元康年间,且既称“拔用”,显然地位不高,又与霍原相提并论,最后又被任命为“诸王文学”之类。如前所述,这些职务往往是由二品人士担任的。

    至此,我们知道被举为寒素者除霍原外还有五人。其中西郭汤、刘珩事迹不详,范乔情况较为特殊。其父范粲在魏末官至侍中,但始终不与司马氏合作,“阳狂不言”三十六载。(10)范乔被举为寒素前未出仕。纪瞻父祖均为吴国高官,纪瞻本人为“江南之望”。(11)吉谋家世也略有可考。《三国志》卷二二《魏书·裴潜传》注引《魏略》云:“冯翊甲族桓、田、吉、郭。”同书卷二三《常林传》注引《魏略》云:“吉茂字叔畅,冯翊池阳人也,世为著姓。”

    由此可见,被举为寒素者中起码有两名世族,即纪瞻与吉谋,他们被推举没有引起争论,看来是符合“门寒、身素、无世祚之资”这些条件的。换言之,他们并非势族。所以,世族并不等于势族。势族垄断上品不意味着世族垄断上品。所谓势族,乃是指现实有势力的家族,即那些魏晋政权中的公侯与当涂者。这些人中固然也有两汉以来的著姓、大族,如琅琊王氏、太原王氏、河内司马氏、河东裴氏等等,但也有像石苞、邓艾、石鉴这样一些起自寒微者。(12)他们显然不能以世族目之。固然势族只要稳定地、一代一代地延续下去,终有一天会演变为世族,但那毕竟是以后的事。在魏晋时期,势族不等于世族。势族的地位也并不十分稳固。在瞬息万变的政治斗争中,一些势族衰落了,一些人又上升为势族,虽然势族垄断了上品,但他们当中具体的家族由于现实政治地位不稳定,品也不稳定。《晋书》卷三三《何曾传附子何劭传》:

    劭初亡,袁粲吊岐(何劭子),岐辞以疾。粲独哭而出曰:“今年决下婢子品!”王诠谓之曰:“知死吊死,何必见生!岐前多罪,尔时不下,何公新亡,便下岐品,人谓中正畏强易弱。”粲乃止。

    何岐虽最终未被降品,但可看出其品并不稳定。《晋书》卷四三《王戎传》:“(戎)自经典选,未尝进寒素,退虚名,但与时浮沉,户调门选而已。”按“户调门选”,须“与时浮沉”,说明门户地位常有浮沉。刘毅云:“今之中正……高下逐强弱,是非由爱憎,随世兴衰,不顾才实,衰则削下,兴则扶上,一人之身,旬日异状。”(13)这是对现实政治的真实描述。另一方面,原有的著姓大族只要未跻身于公侯、当涂者之列,就不能算作势族。所以纪瞻、吉谋可以被举为寒素,而安汉大姓阎缵在势族面前只能自称“臣素寒门”。(14)

    稍后的例子也可以证明此点。东晋初年,王敦叛乱中刁协被杀,事后左光禄大夫蔡谟为刁协争追赠官位,在致庾冰的信中说:“又闻谈者亦多谓宜赠。凡事不允当而得众助者,若以善柔得众,而刁令粗刚多怨;若以贵也,刁氏今贱;若以富也,刁氏今贫。人士何故反助寒门而为此言之,足下宜深察此意。”(15)渤海刁氏是很显赫的家族,刁协父刁攸“武帝时御史中丞”,但一旦官场失意却被称为寒门,因此,这一时期寒门一词的含义与宋齐以后不同。地方郡姓在本地虽然绝对不属于寒门,但与“势族”相比,却只能处于寒门的地位。

    西晋时期,人们批评九品中正制度的另一个方面是,九品评定全由中正,不遵乡里舆论。刘毅在论九品疏中一开始就指斥说:“今立中正,定九品,高下任意,荣辱在手”,在以后所论中正制度的“八损”中,他不厌其烦地屡次指出这一点,批评中正不听乡里舆论,“采誉于台府,纳毁于流言”,以私情定品。前引段灼上疏也指斥:“今九品访人,唯问中正。”所以,许多反对九品中正制度的人都主张废除中正制,在土断的基础上行乡举里选。

    综上所述,西晋一朝,人们对中正制度的批评主要集中在两点。第一,势族凭资垄断上品。第二,中正不遵乡论。晋武帝时,卫瓘与汝南王亮的上疏可以说是对中正制度弊端的总结:

    魏氏承颠覆之运,起丧乱之后,人士流移,考详无地,故立九品之制,粗且为一时选用之本耳。其始造也,乡邑清议,不拘爵位,褒贬所加,足为劝励,犹有乡论馀风。中间渐染,遂计资定品,使天下观望,唯以居位为贵。(16)

    按卫瓘的说法,中正制度两方面的弊端是有联系的。正是由于中正不遵乡论,才导致“计资定品”。值得注意的是,中正制度初建时并非如此,只是“中间渐染”。这说明九品中正制度在魏晋时期曾经有过重大变化。

    二、魏、西晋中正制度的演变

    《通典》卷一四选举二历代制中载:“晋依魏氏九品之制,内官吏部尚书,司徒左长史。外官州有大中正,郡国有小中正,皆掌选举。”按此则魏晋时期的九品中正制没有任何变化。这是不准确的。赵翼《廿二史劄记》卷八中正条:“魏文帝初定九品中正之法,郡邑设小中正,州设大中正,由小中正品第人才,以上大中正,大中正核实以上司徒,司徒再核,然后付尚书选用,此陈群所建白也。”这个说法虽然系统化,但比《通典》更不准确。魏晋时期的九品中正制是有变化的。郡中正与州中正之设置并非同时。对此,唐长孺已有精确的考证。按他的意见,中正制度刚建立时,只有郡中正,州中正的设立“至迟不出嘉平二年(250),至早不出正始元年(240),也即是说在曹芳时”(17)。唐先生的这一论断是完全正确的。但是《晋书》卷四四《郑袤传附郑默传》还有须要解释的史料:

    初,帝以贵公子当品,乡里莫敢与为辈。求之州内,于是十二郡中正佥共举默……及武帝出祀南郊,诏使默骖乘。因谓默曰:“卿知何以得骖乘乎?昔州里举卿相辈,常愧有累清谈。”

    晋武帝当品事发生于魏末,但究竟在哪一年,史无明文。《晋书》卷三《武帝纪》:“武皇帝……魏嘉平中(249—254),封北平亭侯,历给事中,奉车都尉。”既云“嘉平中”,则武帝出仕年代肯定在公元250年以后。一般来说,获得中正品第之后即可出仕,尤其是晋武帝这样的贵公子,不大可能已经得到中正品第无官做,也不大可能出仕后尚无中正品第。因此,他出仕与获得中正品第应该大致同时,即都是在“嘉平中”。按《郑默传》载,晋武帝与郑默是由“州内”推举的。但“求之州内”却没有州中正推举,反而由一州之内的全体郡中正“佥共举默”,(18)当时似乎并没有州中正。《晋书》的记载疑有错误。汤球所辑王隐《晋书》卷六亦载此事:“默为散骑常侍。世祖出祀南郊。侍中已陪乘,诏曰:‘使郑常侍参乘。’谓默曰:‘卿知何以得参乘?昔州内举卿,十二郡中正举以相辈,常愧有累清谈。’”汤球注明此段文字辑自《艺文类聚》卷四八、《初学纪》卷一二所引王隐《晋书》。查此二书,《艺文类聚》引作:“郑默为散骑常侍,世祖祠南郊,侍中已陪乘。诏曰:‘使郑常侍默。’曰:‘卿知何以得参乘?昔州内举卿相辈,常愧有累清谈。’”《初学纪》引作:“郑默,字思元,为散骑常侍,武帝出南郊,侍中以陪乘。诏曰:‘使郑常侍参乘。’”二书均无“十二郡中正举以”七字。汤球可能是从其他地方辑出而在注出处时疏忽了。如此推测无大错,则王隐《晋书》与唐修《晋书》记载此事有所不同。即王隐《晋书》在“十二郡中正”诸字之后无“佥共”二字。虽只差二字,但却是非常重要的。因为有时史籍中说若干郡中正只不过是某州中正的代名词。《世说新语·贤媛》篇注引王隐《晋书》云:“后(羊)晫为十郡中正,举陶侃为鄱阳小中正,始得上品也。”羊晫举陶侃在西晋后期。《晋书》卷一五《地理志》下:“惠帝元康元年……割扬州之豫章、鄱阳、庐陵、临川、南康、建安、晋安、荆州之武昌、桂阳、安成十郡,因江水之名而置江州。”羊晫所任“十郡中正”即指任此十郡的中正。其中包括鄱阳郡,所以羊晫可以推举鄱阳人陶侃为郡中正。“十郡中正”,实际就是江州大中正。《太平御览》卷二六五中正条引《晋书》云:“杨晫、陶侃共载诣顾荣。州大中正温雅责晫与小人共载。晫曰:‘江州名少风俗,卿己不能养进寒儁,且可不毁之。’杨晫代雅为州大中正,举侃为鄱阳小中正。”杨晫当为羊晫,此处明言为江州大中正。据此推论前述“十二郡中正”实际当是司州中正的异称。唐修《晋书》记载此事大概是参考了王隐《晋书》,又觉得“十二郡中正举以相辈”费解,故增“佥共”二字,但意思就大不相同了。由以上的分析可知,唐先生关于州中正建立时间的考证还是不可动摇的。

    下面讨论另一个问题。据前引杜佑语,似乎不仅州中正与郡中正是在制度初创时就已同时存在,而且司徒府参预九品评定工作也是从那时开始的。赵翼更明言“此陈群所建白也。”这一说法也是不正确的。首先,史料中从未发现曹魏时司徒府参预品评工作。魏明帝时,傅嘏在难刘劭考课法时说:“方今九州之民,爰及京城,未有六乡之举,其选才之职,专任吏部”。(19)可见,当时选举工作在中央是由吏部一手包办的。其次,杜佑自己在《通典》卷二○职官二中也说:西晋“太始三年……司徒加置左长史。掌差次九品,铨衡人伦”。既然说“加置”,时间又如此具体,在这之前当无左长史。杜氏自相矛盾。《晋书》卷二四《职官志》也有明确记载:“司徒加置左右长史各一人。”《艺文类聚》卷三一引潘尼《答傅咸诗序》:“司徒左长史傅长虞,会定九品,左长史宜得其才。屈为此职,此职执天下清议,宰割百国,而长虞性直而行,或有不堪。余与之亲,作诗从规焉。”诗中有句云:“悠悠群吏,非子不整,嗷嗷众议,非子不靖。”这是西晋司徒左长史参预评定九品的例子。

    综合上文,魏晋之际州中正的建立与司徒府参预九品评定工作是九品中正制的一大变化。这一变化的出现是有原因的。《太平御览》卷二六五中正条引晋宣帝除九品州置大中正议曰:“案九品之状,诸中正既未能料究人才,以为可除九制(品?),州置大中正。”同卷又引《曹羲集》九品议:“伏见明论欲除九品而置州中正,欲检虚实。一州阔远,略不相识,访不得知,会复转访本郡先达者耳,此为问中正而实决于郡人。”据此,置州中正的建议是由司马懿提出的,而曹羲则持不同意见。据同卷引应璩《新论》,应璩也反对建立州中正。他说:“百郡立中正,九州置都士,州闾与郡县希疏,如马齿不相识面,何缘别义理?”应璩的观点与曹羲的观点在某些方面是一致的。他们都认为不必设州中正,因为一州之地过于辽阔,州中正对郡县的情况不了解。所谓“略不相识”、“如马齿不相识面”都是这个意思。但应璩仅仅担心义理难辩,而曹羲所担心的是,由于州中正不清楚下属郡县的情况,结果还得回去访问“本郡先达”,名曰州中正负责,但“实决于郡人”,这样就失去了建立州中正的意义。曹羲的担心是有道理的。中正制初创时就规定“各使诸郡选置中正”(20)。既然中正的推举权在“诸郡”,推举出来的中正当然是最能体现“诸郡”意志的人。九品评定最终“决于郡人”,“决于本郡先达”就不可避免。所以,如果州中正建立后也落得同样下场就等于毫无意义了。由此可以看到,司马懿的本意原是想不理会“本郡先达”的意见,改变中正品评“决于郡人”的现状。曹羲所提出的问题在魏末究竟是如何解决的,由于史料缺乏,还不清楚。但西晋“诸郡”推举中正的权力终于被剥夺而转交给司徒府。中正品评人物必须由司徒府最终核实,“决于郡人”的局面一去不复返了。(21)

    在此,须着重指出,所谓“郡人”、“本郡先达”绝不包括一郡内的所有人,只能是那些地方上的郡姓、著姓、大族。司马懿所要打击的正是他们。明乎此,我们终于可以理解西晋时期一批地方郡姓为何要攻击中正制度了。但是,魏末作为皇权的实际执行者司马懿、曹爽兄弟等人为何要打击地方郡姓呢?由此为何又导致了势族垄断上品?

    如前所述,势族中有不少人就是两汉以来的著姓、大族,就此而论,他们与地方郡姓似乎并无区别。过去的研究往往将他们视为一体。这是不无道理的,但又不完全对。固然,自汉代以来,郡姓、大族一般都是在本地发展起来的,但是其中一部分郡姓并没有就此止步,而是跨出州郡,走向中央,累世公卿,如汝南袁氏“四世五公”,弘农杨氏“四世三公”。这些人的利益已经不仅仅是与地方州郡相联系了,更多的则是与中央政权联系在一起。没有统一的东汉帝国,“四世三公”就只能是一场空幻的梦。因此,董卓之乱以后,他们都企图重建统一国家。建安元年(196),曹操“挟天子”后,许多人纷纷归附到他的旗帜下,就是由于他们认为曹操“乃心王室”。(22)地方郡姓与中央政权联系并不密切,他们的力量在于州郡、在于宗族乡里。因此,董卓之乱爆发后,大量的地方郡姓并没有离开本土。这一方面使他们以后难以上升,另一方面又使他们能够有效地控制宗族乡里,并进而建立自己的武装。在各个地区,他们往往是不安定的因素。西晋时期,地方郡姓依然垄断着州郡僚佐的职务,操纵着乡里舆论。(23)虽然与势族相比,他们处于寒门的地位,但在本地仍不失为著姓、大族。他们的一切特权也就是来源于此。愈是依靠门第过活,便愈要排挤那些没有门第的人。因此,轻视寒人的风气在地方州郡中自汉末历魏晋而不衰。(24)

    总之,地方郡姓由于远离政治斗争中心,所以在汉末以来的历次动乱中都没有受到重大损失,这个阶层基本上没有什么变化。

    与此不同,汉末的高等世族既然寄生在东汉中央政权的躯体上,当统一帝国崩溃后,他们便四散逃亡了。虽然他们都希望重建统一国家,但究竟借助于哪一种力量、哪一派军阀来实现其目的,每个人的选择并不一样,有人投靠曹操,有人追随刘表,有人与孙氏父子共患难,也有人跟着刘备辗转他乡。尽管他们的主观动机一致,但客观行动却使本阶层陷入了分裂中,今天的史家虽然可以根据血统把他们集合在自己的笔下,但在现实斗争中,血统并没有使他们团结在一起。高等世族能否存在下去,也不在于他们的血统。袁绍凭借“四世三公”的地位当了讨伐董卓的盟主,但当大族一旦发现他并非救世主,便又纷纷离开了他。随着官渡之战的结束,这个家族终于迎来了自己的末日。在动乱的年代里,他们能否存在下去,关键在于自身的能力。荀彧帮助曹操艰苦创业,几度难关;司马懿战诸葛、平辽东,战功赫赫,因此他们的家族才能延续下去,成为魏晋政治舞台上的重要角色。也正是由于他们并非依靠门第过活,所以对于那些卑微之士也并不特别压抑。颍川戏志才、郭嘉先世无闻,有“负俗之讥”,但荀彧“取士不以一揆”(25),大胆拔用了他们。司马懿“知人拔善,显扬侧陋,王基、邓艾、周泰、贾越之徒皆起自寒门而著绩于朝”(26)。司马师为了任用石苞公开提倡曹操当年唯才是举的方针:“苞虽细行不足而有经国才略。夫贞廉之士,未必能经济世务,是以齐桓忘管仲之奢僭而录其匡合之大谋;汉高舍陈平之污行而取其六奇之妙算。苞虽未可以上俦二子,亦今日之选也。”(27)魏晋政权的势族基本就是由战火中锻炼出来的高等世族与这些有“经国才略”的卑微之士组成的。此时,他们的利益又与魏晋中央政权紧密相连了。

    由以上分析可以看到,汉末以来,地方郡姓与中央高等世族经历了不同的道路,不能把二者混为一谈。正始之初,司马懿与曹爽等人同受托孤之任,双方斗争尚未展开。此时,他们事实上行使的是皇权,加强中央对地方的控制是当务之急,而地方郡姓操纵选举显然是与之背道而驰的。因此必须予以打击。

    打击地方郡姓的措施是成功的,但由此导致势族垄断上品却是司马懿始料不及的。正如西晋刘毅所说:“置州都者,取州里清议,咸所归服。将以镇异同,一言议,不谓一人之身了一州之才,一人不审便坐之。”(28)州中正一人说了算是不符合司马懿本意的。司马懿反对地方郡姓操纵选举,但并不反对乡里清议,他所要做的正是要使乡里清议摆脱地方郡姓的控制。然而,这一时期势族正处于向上发展的阶段,加强中央集权的措施在很大程度上被他们改造成一项特权制度。西晋皇权无力根本扭转这一局面,只能在一定意义上加以限制,试图使中正制度不至于完全背离当初创建它的目的。

    与东晋相此,西晋中正主持清议的事例还是不少的。《廿二史劄记》卷八“九品中正”条所载中正清议事例,基本属于西晋时期。这反映出当时皇权还是比较强大的,仅仅根据势族地位而不顾才德定品,在理论上是不能成立的。正是在这样的背景下,才会有前述元康年间举寒素事发生。也是在元康年间,西晋王朝曾发动了一场清议活动。此事《晋书》失载,有幸《通典》保存了这段材料。《通典》卷六○礼二○嘉五周丧不可嫁女娶妇议:

    惠帝元康二年,司徒王浑奏云:“前以冒丧婚娶,伤化悖礼,下十六州推举,今本州中正各有言上。太子家令虞濬有弟丧,嫁女拜时;镇东司马陈湛有弟丧,嫁女拜时;上庸太守王崇有兄丧,嫁女拜时;夏侯俊有弟子丧,为息恒纳妇,恒无服;国子祭酒邹湛有弟妇丧,为息蒙娶妇拜时,蒙有周服;给事中王琛有兄丧,为息稜娶妇拜时;并州刺史羊暨有兄丧,为息明娶妇拜时;征西长史牵昌有弟丧,为息彦娶妇拜时。湛职儒官,身虽无服,据为婚主。按《礼》‘大功之末可以嫁子,小功之末可以娶妇’。无齐缞嫁娶之文,亏违典宪,宜加贬黜,以肃王法。请台免官,以正清议。”……诏曰:“下殇小功,可以嫁娶,俊等简忽丧纪,轻违《礼经》,皆宜如所正。”

    按清议工作,本应由中正主动进行,而此次大规模的清议活动却是在司徒“下十六州推举”的情况下才发生的。这说明中正对清议事不够负责,但也还不能违抗朝廷的命令。清议当否最终由皇帝审批,说明皇权还是有一定力量的。

    综上所述,西晋皇权对势族垄断上品的特权虽不得不认可,但另一方面,皇权还是企图对势族加以限制,这个目的在一定程度上实现了。中正制度在执行中所起的互相矛盾的作用反映出时代的矛盾性。西晋是以后高门世族形成的时期。势族的力量在发展,中正“计资定品”是发展趋势,但势族还不能彻底超越皇权的限制。皇权也还可以有限度地利用中正制度来维护统治秩序。

    三、九品中正制度的作用

    以往的研究者认为,此制度在客观上保证了世家大族的世袭特权,东晋南朝以后,流于形式。根据本文第一节所论述的观点,西晋时,它仅仅是保证了当时的高官显贵的世袭特权,从而在势族的形成以及势族向世族(或称士族)的演变过程中起了重要作用。但只是这样泛泛而论是不够的。因为,单从保障某些高级官吏的世袭特权这一点看,九品中正制并非创举,大家所熟知的汉代的任子制也具有同样的作用。过去,人们在研究九品中正制时,大都将其与汉代的察举制联系起来考虑,这对于探讨中正制度建立的原因无疑是有益的。但是,中正制度在实际运行中既然已经在相当大程度上转化成一种特权制度,它就不再是仅仅与察举制相联系了,而更多的则是与汉代的任子制存在某种继承关系。只有对这两个制度进行比较,才可以更清楚九品中正制的作用。

    任子制与九品中正制虽有相同之处,但也还存在某些差异。首先,在人数上,任子制有严格限制。西汉初年,二千石以上的官吏可以送弟或子到京师为郎官,这叫作任子为郎。《汉书》卷一一《哀帝纪》颜师古注引应劭曰:“任子令者,《汉仪注》:吏二千石以上视事满三年,得任同产若子一人为郎。”东汉安帝在建光元年(121)又下诏发展了西汉的任子制,申明“以公卿、校尉、尚书子弟一人为郎、舍人”(29)。不仅可以任子为郎,而且也可以任子为舍人,这是一个变化。但任子弟一人为官的规定还是一循西汉。在这种制度下,有任子特权的官吏不可能使其后代全部由任子一途入仕。东汉高门世族袁安位至司徒,其子袁敞“以父任为太子舍人”(30),但另一子袁赏直到袁安死尚未入仕。袁安本传称:袁安死后“数月,窦氏败,帝始亲万机,迫思前议者邪正之节,乃除安子赏为郎”。袁安孙袁汤“桓帝初为司空”,据袁安本传注引《风俗通》云:汤“有子十二人”,但见于记载的只有四人:“长子平,平弟成,左中郎将,并早卒。成弟逢,逢弟隗,皆为公。”(31)袁汤数子入仕,但并不能据此认为他们都是凭借着任子特权。弘农杨氏家族与袁氏家族情况相似,延光三年(124)杨震“因饮酖而卒,时年七十馀……岁馀,顺帝即位,樊丰、周广等诛死,震门生虞放、陈翼诣阙追讼震事,朝廷咸称其忠,乃下诏除二子为郎。”(32)由以上袁、杨家族任子情况看,任子有限额的规定还是执行得比较认真。袁安子袁赏、杨震二子都是在其父死后,按特殊情况授予郎官的。袁、杨家族尚且如此,一般官吏的任子数量也很难超过制度的规定。虽然高官子弟除去任子制度外,还可以从其他途径入仕,如察举、征辟等等,但这毕竟不属于特权制度,其他人士如一般的地方郡姓也可由此途上升。

    与任子制不同,九品中正制建立时并不是一项特权制度,因此也不可能规定高官子弟可以获得上品的人数。没有人数限制而在实际执行中又确实成为特权制度,这就构成了九品中正制度的一大特点。在此情况下,高官子弟大都可以获得上品,步入清途。说得明确些,高官子弟是以族的规模进入政治舞台的,官之为族终于实现了。这在汉代是缺乏保障的。汉代某些高官家族后来演化为累世相承地做官的世家大族,与其说是靠任子制,倒不如说是靠累世通经,察举入仕更为接近事实。魏晋时期,察举制依然存在,但正如严耕望所说:“晋世公卿另有捷径,故即在西晋,汉代经制之秀孝两途已渐不见重视,东晋以下更无论矣。”严氏更引日本学者宫崎市定所述王谢大族不应秀才之举以为佐证。(33)晋代高官子弟对秀、孝两途的不重视正是由于保障其世袭特权的九品中正制没有人数限制。他们不必再以察举制作为入仕的补充手段了。

    制度是对现实的反映,任子制与九品中正制的上述差异表明,汉代高门世族与魏晋以降的高门世族在保障整个宗族的世袭特权方面所具有的能力是不同的。汉代高门世族在皇权、外戚、宦官的限制下还不可能把任子制发展为九品中正制。宗族政治力量有限,在复杂激烈的斗争中要想壮大力量,就必须到本宗族以外寻求支持。史称袁绍能“折节下士”,其目的不过是为了争取“士多附之”而已。不仅袁绍如此,袁氏家族“自安以下,皆博爱宾客,无所拣择,宾客入其门,无贤愚皆得所欲,为天下所归”(34)。汉末袁绍被认为是最有力量的,但这并不是由于自身“四世五公”的空名,而是在于“树恩四世,门生故吏遍于天下”(35)。建安年间,在袁绍家乡汝南“拥兵拒守”,反抗曹操的并不是袁绍的宗族成员,而是“布在诸县”的“门生宾客”。(36)众所周知,汉代的门生故吏与其宗师举主存在着一种类似父子的关系,宗师举主有势,门生故吏可因此飞黄腾达;宗师举主被贬,他们亦同时被贬,宗师举主死后,他们要为之服丧。非血缘关系被罩上了一层宗法面纱。这表明,社会中宗法观念在发展,世族可以借此壮大自己的势力。但另一方面,宗法观念、宗族力量还不够十分发展,盘踞中央的高门世族还不可能使自己的整个家族都不受限制地进入政治舞台。

    魏晋南朝,门生、故吏、宾客依然存在,但他们参加政治活动的记载则不多见了,地位明显下降。(37)高门世族也并不以广召门生、宾客为重要任务,也从来没有人认为高门世族的政治力量是体现在他所控制的门生、故吏、宾客方面。这些变化说明世族自身的宗族力量大大加强了,因此,在政治斗争中,高门世族靠的是本宗族成员占据高官要职,靠的是世族与世族的政治联盟,而联盟的手段则是婚姻。

    以上讨论了任子制与九品中正制不同的一个方面,以及这种不同产生的历史原因。除此之外,任子制与九品中正制还存在另一个不同的方面。汉代的任子制不具有垄断性,除去任子为郎外,拥有赀产十万钱而又非商人者,也可凭赀产为郎,叫作赀选。在察举制下,被举为秀才、孝廉者也多除郎中。此外,还有献策为郎等多种途径。所以,汉代高官子弟不可能垄断郎官。而在九品中正制度下,“上品无寒门,下品无势族”,低等世族很难进入上品之列。高门世族在很大程度上切断了低等世族上升之路。垄断的特征,一方面造成了高低两等世族长期较为稳定的并存局面,另一方面,随着时间的推移,随着门阀政治理论的确立,又必然地出现了族之为官的转变,即某些家族的子弟理所当然地居高位。从依据现实的政治地位以培植本宗族的力量,到依靠族姓地位以巩固自己的力量——官之为族,族之为官,这就是魏晋南朝高门世族所走过的历程。

    综上所述,没有人数限制、封闭性是九品中正制度区别于任子制的关键所在。在此制度下,高门世族的宗族政治力量必然呈现出日益扩张的趋势。毫无疑问,在不断扩大基础上的世袭特权具有更稳固的特征,因为某一分支的衰落不会影响整个宗族政治权力的继续传袭。南朝一些高门世族的家世,往往可以追溯到晋代,其原因必定是复杂多样的,但九品中正制的实行显然是原因之一。

    本文转自《北京大学学报》1987年第1期

  • 刘屹:道荒宏雪岭——重识横跨葱岭的三条古道

    一、问题的提出

    尽管“丝绸之路”的概念,目前看来并非像人们一直以为的是由李希霍芬(Ferdinand von Richthofen, 1833—1905)首创,但李希霍芬仍是最早将“丝绸之路”所经的线路标识在地图上,从而给人以“丝绸之路”确实以某种交通路线状态存在的直观印象之人。李希霍芬主要根据《汉书》的记载,标画出公元前128年至公元150年间的中亚交通路线。在其中,西域南道和北道,分别对应了西越葱岭的南北两条道路:西域北道从疏勒向西,可沿阿赖山脉,进入费尔干纳盆地,再向西抵达撒马尔罕;西域南道则从莎车出发,向西南方向登葱岭,再横穿葱岭上的瓦罕走廊,西去昆都士(Kunduz)和巴尔赫(Balkh)。这很可能是第一张标绘了葱岭东西两侧交通路线的地图。但是,由于李希霍芬本人没有来中国的甘肃和新疆进行过实地考察,他在画这幅中亚彩图时,明显缺乏对葱岭地区实际道路交通状况的充分了解,以至于有的路段画得有些想当然。而李希霍芬这一最早的“丝绸之路”路线图,对后来的“丝绸之路”地图产生了不小的影响。很多由此衍生的“丝绸之路”地图,在涉及葱岭地区的交通路线时,基本上都沿用李希霍芬这一并不准确的描绘。换言之,迄今我们所能看到的“丝绸之路”路线图,在葱岭路段的线路都有很大改进的必要。

    李希霍芬的这幅《中亚地图》还用红线勾勒出一条从地中海东岸一路到中国内地的路线,这是依据托勒密(Claudius Ptolemaeus,约100—168)《地理志》(Geography)所转载的叙利亚商主马厄斯·提提阿努斯(Maes Titianus)所属商队一路东行所留下的记录。这个商队活动于公元前1世纪末或是公元2世纪初,堪称从西方角度关于“丝绸之路”实际道路情况的最早和最重要的记录。1941年,日本学者白鸟库吉(1865—1942)也专门分析了这条商队通行葱岭的道路。白鸟氏受限于当时的条件,对葱岭地区道路的考订也有需要订正的地方。马厄斯商队的记录,对研究“丝绸之路”具有重要的价值,至今仍然受到西方学者的关注。

    此后,关注东西交通、丝绸之路的学者日益增多,但对于葱岭地区道路的考察,仍然是整个“丝绸之路”地理交通研究方面最为欠缺的一环。以笔者有限的知见,只有日本学者桑山正进在研究迦毕试和犍陀罗的历史时,对中国史书记载的求法僧西行求法经行葱岭时的路线,做过一些有益的探索。但葱岭地区的道路并非其研究的重点,因而在整体上相较前人的研究突破性不大。

    虽然中国学者对“丝绸之路”的研究热情经久不衰,但受限于国境线,出国实地考察又极为不便,所以大多数关注葱岭古代交通的中国学者,主要依据的是传世文献记载,只有少数人能够实地考察葱岭地区,但通常也仅限于中国国境线以内的部分。由于人为地截断了葱岭古道的贯通性,对域外的道路交通情况缺乏必要的了解,所以借助这些成果,很难窥见整个葱岭交通道路的全豹。

    近年来,也有一些国内学者努力将视野扩展到国境线以外的地理交通状况,他们的成果极大地弥补了国内学者对葱岭地区境外地理状况和相关研究信息的缺憾。但由于这一领域对国内学者来说长期缺乏必要的前期积累,所以仍留下一些不太准确的描述,或是未能解决的关键性问题。近年来还有勇敢践行域外葱岭古道的中国学者,也为葱岭古道的研究提供了重要的实地考察经验。还有西方学者如傅鹤里(Harry Falk),虽然未曾亲履其境,但善于利用谷歌地图(Google Earth)等现代科技手段,也在探索葱岭古道方面做出了重要推进。本文在利用卫星地图,认定葱岭古道除了传统的南道、北道之外,还有更重要的“中道”等方面,都可说是直接得益于傅鹤里研究的启发。

    总之,对于葱岭这一“丝绸之路”上重要路段的研究,国内外学者一百多年间断断续续地一直在努力推进。但国内学者通常受阻于国境线,对葱岭古道的认识难窥全豹。国外学者往往对汉文史料的理解和掌握存在明显的不足。两方面的研究亟须互为补充,才有可能真正取得对葱岭古道研究的突破性进展。这种突破性一是要建立在对葱岭古道上个别重要地点的重新比定。如对“悬度”位置的重新确认如果可以成立,就会极大强化关于瓦罕走廊在古代葱岭东西两侧交通上重要地位的认识。二是要有对整个葱岭古道的全新认识。以往的研究受李希霍芬的影响很深,以至于似乎横越葱岭的道路只有南北两条,实际上还有一条“中道”更值得重视。而这条“中道”在李希霍芬以降直到今天的各种“丝绸之路”路线图中,却很少得到体现。

    当然,即便能够取得突破性进展,也只是阶段性的推进。毕竟关于葱岭地区道路的研究,将牵涉历史、地理、地质、民族、语言、宗教、国际关系等方方面面。真正综合性的研究仍然有待未来条件具备时才能展开。

    二、“葱岭”与“葱岭古道”

    关于“葱岭”的得名,郦道元《水经注》引佚名的《西河旧事》云:“葱岭在敦煌西八千里,其山高大,上生葱,故曰葱岭。”葱岭上生野葱之说,还见于《水经注》引郭义恭《广志》的记载。葱岭生葱的景象,已得到现代亲履其境者的证实。但葱岭上能够生长野葱的景象,与人们想象中葱岭是终年积雪和寒风凛冽之地,形成鲜明的反差。这不由得令人想到葱岭的地理范围究竟应该如何界定?文献中的记载来自玄奘《大唐西域记》云:

    葱岭者,据赡部洲中。南接大雪山,北至热海、千泉,西至活国,东至乌铩国。东西南北,各数千里。崖岭数百重,幽谷险峻。恒积冰雪,寒风劲烈。多出葱,故谓葱岭。又以山崖葱翠,遂以名焉。

    玄奘所说的葱岭“四至”相当于:北起今吉尔吉斯斯坦的伊塞克湖、塔拉斯一线,南至瓦罕走廊南端的兴都库什山,东起今新疆莎车,西至今阿富汗的昆都士一带。历来谈及古代葱岭的地理范围,都要引述玄奘这一说,并将古之“葱岭”与今之“帕米尔高原”相对应。然玄奘所说的“葱岭”范围,与现代地理概念上的“帕米尔高原”并不完全重合。玄奘之所以用乌铩、活国、热海、千泉、大雪山来界定葱岭的四至,是因为这些地方都是他经行过的。玄奘是历史记录中为数不多的,几乎绕着葱岭走过一圈的旅行者。但对于没有这样旅行经验的人来说,未必也能想象得到,或是都认同玄奘关于葱岭四至的说法。所以,虽然玄奘给我们留下了关于葱岭四至的宝贵记录,但这一记录具有他强烈的个人色彩,需要我们谨慎看待。

    例如,乌铩和活国这两个地点,一东一西,都在帕米尔高原以下的地势平缓、海拔较低地区,理论上就不应属于帕米尔高原。现代地理概念上的帕米尔高原,北部应以外阿赖山脉(Trans-Alay Range)为界,以北就进入费尔干纳盆地(Fergana Valley)了,属于另一个地理区域。东部一般以公格尔峰(Kongur Tagh)一带的西昆仑山脉为界。西部一般以喷赤河(Panj River)自南向北流的河段为界。这三个地理方位上的界线,都与玄奘所言不符。只有玄奘所谓“南接大雪山”,即葱岭的南界应在兴都库什山与喀喇昆仑山之间的连接山脉,与现代地理学概念上的帕米尔高原的南界是符合的。“大雪山”以南就是印度河流域的上印度河谷地带(即印巴争议的克什米尔地区,巴控的吉尔吉特—巴尔蒂斯坦地区,Gilgit-Baltistan),属于另一个地理区域。但现在无论是学界还是社会公众认知,往往把上印度河谷地带也算作葱岭或帕米尔高原的范围。这是需要澄清的。况且,“帕米尔高原”的得名,是由于高原上有所谓“八帕”。这“八帕”的地理范围也不包括上印度河谷地区。因此,如果把“葱岭”界定为今天的帕米尔高原,则其东缘为西昆仑山,西缘为南北流向的喷赤河,北缘是外阿赖山,南缘是兴都库什山。本文讨论的“葱岭”,也主要是指这个地理范围之内。

    所谓“葱岭古道”,本指所有跨越葱岭地区的道路。这些道路既有东西向,也有南北向,而且彼此间犬牙交错,并非呈规则性的直线分布。就“丝绸之路”研究的关注点而言,本文主要讨论东西方向上横跨葱岭的道路。最早李希霍芬标示出了南、北两条路线,现在则应该按照方位,进一步将葱岭古道分为“北、中、南”三条道路。

    葱岭北道,即从今新疆伊尔克什坦口岸西行,进入今塔吉克斯坦境内的阿赖山谷。这条道路早在《汉书·西域传》就有体现:

    休循国,王治鸟飞谷,在葱岭西,去长安万二百一十里。户三百五十八人,口千三十,胜兵四百八十人。东至都护治所三千一百二十里,至捐毒衍敦谷二百六十里,西北至大宛国九百二十里,西至大月氏千六百一十里。民俗衣服类乌孙,因畜随水草,本故塞种也。

    “休循”是从伊犁河流域迁来的塞人所建立的国家。“鸟飞谷”或是指阿赖山谷。如果要说个更具体的地点,应在阿赖山谷的萨雷塔什(Sary Tash),这里也是北上进入费尔干纳盆地的重要岔路口。“捐毒”也是见于《汉书·西域传》的塞人小国,位于与休循接壤的东边,应该在今新疆境内。可见,捐毒和休循就扼守了这条东西方向上横穿阿赖山谷的葱岭古道“北道”。阿赖山谷非常宽阔,水草也多。走这条路既可北上进入费尔干纳盆地的塔吉克斯坦奥什(Osh),也可西行至杜尚别(Dushanbe)。《汉书》既然说从休循“西至大月氏千六百一十里”,说明当时通过这条路是可以通往已经迁徙至阿姆河以北地区的大月氏,自然也包括中亚传统的粟特地区。因而这条“葱岭北道”,在古代主要是从西域北道向西的天然延伸,从西域经此路可去往费尔干纳盆地和阿姆河北岸的粟特地区、阿姆河南岸的巴克特里亚地区(吐火罗)。

    李希霍芬标示出的这条路线,此后也成为丝路交通路线图上关于葱岭地区道路最有代表性的一条。近代以来的外国探险家,如斯文赫定、斯坦因、伯希和等人,也都曾经由这条道路进出中国。但是傅鹤里对这条道路的实际利用率提出质疑,认为在古代很难见到有通行这条道路的记载,这是因为这条道路的降水(雪)量大,又盗匪横行,所以不应作为横穿葱岭的主要道路来看待。他这个意见是有偏颇之处的。

    葱岭中道,即从今塔什库尔干出发,向西南行,而非向南行,越过纳兹塔什山口(Nezatash Pass),进入今塔吉克斯坦的穆尔加布(Murghab)地区,西行至霍罗格(Khorog),再前往阿富汗的法扎巴德(Fayzabad)、昆都士一带。这条路古代主要是从西域通往古代的吐火罗地区,即今天阿富汗北部地区。因这条路的西段有衮特河(Gunt River),故又被称为“衮特路”。衮特河发源于雅什库里湖(Yashilkul,汉文史籍中葱岭上的“三池”之一),自东向西流,与喷赤河交汇处,即霍罗格。这一地带在历史上被称作“识匿”或“赤匿”,即今天的舒格楠(Shighan)地区。这条路以往几乎不被学界所重视,讨论到与这条路相关的历史记录,也大都没有意识到这是一条完全可以单独列出的重要通路。直到近年,傅鹤里才强调了这条路的重要性。在沙俄和苏联时期,从杜尚别经霍罗格到穆尔加布,最终到奥什,修筑了今天帕米尔高原上唯一一条连续贯通的高原公路(原M41)。这条路部分修建于19世纪末沙俄与英国对中亚展开争夺的“大博弈”时期,部分修建于1930年代,居然沿用至今,成为一条几乎横贯帕米尔高原的公路(不含中国境内的塔克敦巴什帕米尔)。通常情况下,现代公路往往就是沿着古代交通路线而修建的。由于这条公路并未连接到中国的边境线,所以国内学者一般对这条路没有给予充分重视。

    葱岭南道,也是李希霍芬根据《汉书》的记载大致勾勒而出的。或从塔什库尔干出发,或从于阗的皮山出发,皆可行至瓦罕走廊的东端入口,再自东向西,横穿大部分属于今天阿富汗境内的瓦罕走廊。到瓦罕走廊的西端,既可沿兴都库什山继续西行抵达阿富汗的喀布尔、巴米扬、贾拉拉巴德地区;也可从兴都库什山的几个山口南下,经巴基斯坦的奇特拉尔(Chitral),前往斯瓦特、白沙瓦一带。这条路古代主要是从西域通往巴米扬、迦毕试、犍陀罗等佛教圣地,因而在历史记录中出现的频率较高。也是以往学者们关注度最高的一条道路。

    古代的行旅不是今日的旅游,尤其是翻越葱岭这样的高寒高原地区,一定要充分准备,精选线路。除非有必须要绕远才能到达的特定目的地,否则一般不会选择绕远的道路。葱岭古道上这三条道路的选择,主要是根据旅行者的出发地和目的地来定。例如,从中亚粟特地区出发的商人和商队,大概率会选择“葱岭北道”进入西域。这对于他们是最便捷的道路。但中国的求法僧西行求法,却基本上不会选择这条“北道”。因为求法僧要去兴都库什山以南的犍陀罗和印度,选择“葱岭南道”或上印度河谷的道路,才是近便的道路。求法僧如果走“葱岭北道”去犍陀罗和印度,就要先到粟特和吐火罗地区,再南下兴都库什山,这样的选择与从“葱岭南道”西出瓦罕走廊后就从兴都库什山口南下相比,无疑是费时和绕远的。历史上只有个别的求法僧为了去被誉为“小王舍城”的巴尔赫去参礼,才会选择这条路。

    此外,民间商人和商队的活动一般是很难进入古代历史记录的。“葱岭北道”与“葱岭南道”相比,的确很少见到有经行此路的历史记录。求法僧主要选择“葱岭南道”西去东归,因而对于“南道”留下较多的记录。商人和商队则有强烈和明确的逐利意识,在安全有保证的前提下,他们不会选择需要绕远、增加运输和时间成本的道路。粟特商人当然不会只走“葱岭北道”,他们也曾在上印度河谷地区道路的岩刻中留下过踪迹。既然如此,就不能排除粟特商人也会经行过“葱岭中道”和“南道”的可能性。这完全要看他们商业活动的目的地是哪里。像葱岭这样特殊地理环境下的道路,自古至今一直都在那里存在,很多路段甚至千百年来也几乎没什么变化。不能因为没有,或很少见到某条道路的历史记录,就认为这条道路的利用率不如那些频繁见诸记载的道路要低。也不能因为某条道路的记载在某个特定时期明显多于另一条道路,就认为两条道路之间存在此消彼长的兴衰轮替。

    三、中国古人对“葱岭古道”的经行

    笔者已尝试按照朝代先后的顺序,梳理了中国古人经行葱岭古道所留下的历史记录。在此则按照葱岭上三条古道的地理方位,重新爬梳一下这些记录,以期加深对这三条葱岭古道在历史上分别被使用情况的认识。

    有记录的、最早通行“葱岭北道”的中国人,应是张骞。他在第一次出使时,被匈奴扣押十多年后逃脱,继续西行,就是经鸟飞谷至大宛。也就是从疏勒向西,进入阿赖山谷,从萨雷塔什转而向北,进入费尔干纳盆地。然后张骞应从盆地的西侧进入康居所在的索格底亚那地区,再南下到阿姆河北岸的大月氏王庭,进而渡河到阿姆河南岸的蓝市城(巴克特拉,Bactra)。当时大月氏已经征服“希腊—巴克特里亚王国”,但王庭尚未迁至蓝市城。在张骞返国后,大月氏王庭才南迁到巴克特拉。当张骞返国时,特意要避开匈奴在西域的势力范围,所以他不会再走经行鸟飞谷的来时路,既可能走“葱岭中道”也可能走“葱岭南道”。总之东归途中下了葱岭,就选择走经过于阗的西域南道,一直到羌中地区才又被匈奴捕获。

    此外,李广利伐大宛,史书虽未记载其具体的出征路线,但从西域进入费尔干纳盆地,十有八九是要从葱岭北道的衍敦谷、鸟飞谷进兵。这是中国历史上第一次派遣远征军经行葱岭北道,尽管只是走了半途,就转而北上费尔干纳盆地。陈汤攻伐郅支单于时,有“三校从南道逾葱岭径大宛”,也应走的是阿赖山谷这条道路。不过,这些军事行动都不能算是横穿“葱岭北道”。其他可能有大量的粟特商胡是通过“葱岭北道”进入西域乃至中原内地的,只是我们现在看不到直接的文献记录而已。

    2.葱岭中道

    至于“葱岭中道”,前述叙利亚商主马厄斯所属下属的商队,从巴克特拉出发,经葱岭的Komedoi地区,即汉文的“识匿”地区,抵达“石堡”,即塔什库尔干。如果是走“葱岭北道”就无需在“石堡”停留。所以应该是走的“巴克特拉—霍罗格—雅什库里”一线,再通过纳兹塔什山口,抵达塔什库尔干。这虽然不是古代中国人经行的记录,但可以证明这条“葱岭中道”在当时的确是商队经常会选择的一条道路。此外,《汉书·西域传》记载西汉末年时,从皮山出发,经“悬度”到罽宾的途中,将会经过葱岭上的“三池”。这“三池”就是帕米尔高原上六大湖泊中比较靠南的三个,即最南的切克马廷库里(Chaqmaqtin-kul)、中间的佐库里(Zorkul,又名萨雷库里,Sirikul,汉文史籍称“大龙池”)和靠北的雅什库里。雅什库里也是前述衮特河的发源地。可见早在西汉时,汉使已有经行雅什库里的经验。汉使走雅什库里这条路,不仅仅是为了就近水源,因为另两个淡水湖就在“葱岭南道”的途中,完全没必要为了取水而绕远走到雅什库里。而选择经过雅什库里的道路,就意味着前行是要去往霍罗格一带。从霍罗格可以选择向北去阿姆河北岸的粟特地区,还可以南下至伊什卡申,继而向西去往吐火罗的法扎巴德、昆都士;或向南越过兴都库什山,南下犍陀罗。因此,所谓“三池”的记录,实际上就暗示了葱岭的“中道”和“南道”都已有汉使经过。

    在公元1世纪末,贵霜新继位的君主因向东汉求娶公主,被拒,遂由“副王谢”率七万大军进攻西域,围攻疏勒未成而退兵。要动用7万大军穿行葱岭,需要尽可能在葱岭西部(霍罗格和伊什卡申一带都是从西向东横穿葱岭前必要休整、准备的据点)获得足够的给养,再选择相对比较适合大军通行的大路。考虑到当时贵霜都城不是在巴克特拉,就是在犍陀罗的弗楼沙(白沙瓦前身),贵霜军不太可能先北上到阿姆河,再通行阿赖山谷进入西域。他们应是先进入葱岭,到霍罗格和伊什卡申一带,再沿“葱岭中道”至塔什库尔干,这是最有可能的线路。至于“葱岭南道”虽然也可以通行,但要让7万大军鱼贯穿行瓦罕走廊的狭长地带,在军事上恐非明智之选。

    到6世纪初,宋云、惠生出使的去程中,葱岭一段的路程,走的是“汉盘陀—钵和—嚈哒王庭(昆都士)”。以往的研究,包括经常被引用的桑山正进所画的宋云使团的行程路线图,也没有体现出宋云等人的去程走的应该是“葱岭中道”。本文想强调的是:宋云使团很可能是经过“葱岭中道”,而非走“葱岭南道”的瓦罕走廊后,抵达嚈哒王庭所在的昆都士。首先,在宋云使团的记录中,也明确提到了“三池”。如果只走横穿葱岭的单程,这“三池”是没必要都要走到的。宋云很可能去程经过雅什库里,回程则经过佐库里。其次,“汉盘陀”即“渴槃陀”,亦即塔什库尔干。宋云等人从塔什库尔干出发,也是经过纳兹塔什山口,从塔克敦巴什帕米尔进入到小帕米尔。这时既可以向北走“中道”,也可以向南走“南道”。由于“宋云行记”中记载了“波知国,境土甚狭,七日行过。”这应是指瓦罕走廊的狭长地带,七天就可走完。而且波知国只有“二池”,应是指佐库里和切克马廷库里。如果“波知国”指的是瓦罕走廊,则“钵和国”就不可能还在瓦罕走廊上。所以,“钵和国”合理的位置应该在“葱岭中道”上。宋云使团出使的首要目的地是位于昆都士的嚈哒王庭,走“葱岭中道”不仅路途最短,而且路况也比较好走。

    此后,明确走“葱岭中道”的,还有8世纪中期至末期的车朝奉(730—812)。他于751—790年间也游历葱岭东西,并在“罽宾”出家,“悟空”是其法号。回国后,将其经历口述,由圆照于795年记录,作为贞元新译《十力经》《十地经》等经的序,收入大藏,亦名《悟空入竺记》。《悟空入竺记》记载其去程经过葱岭时的路线是:疏勒—葱山—杨兴岭—播蜜川—五赤匿国—护密。这其中,“葱山”应即唐朝在葱岭东部的重要据点——葱岭守捉,或曰“葱岭镇”。亦即说车朝奉一行是从疏勒西登葱岭,到达葱岭镇(塔什库尔干)。“杨兴岭”很可能是纳兹塔什一带的山口,因为“播蜜川”是佐库里湖所在的峡谷,从塔什库尔干到佐库里之间,相对有标识度的山岭,就是纳兹塔什山口。不只是车朝奉,玄奘和慧超也都是经过播蜜川后抵达塔什库尔干的。这说明经行佐库里的道路相对于经行切克马廷库里的道路要更经常被使用。其实这与“石山悬度”的位置有关。因为走切克马廷库里向西通行瓦罕走廊,就一定要经过“石山悬度”;反之,若选择走石山“悬度”东去塔什库尔干,也一定会通过切克马廷库里。最初汉使通罽宾时,之所以走石山“悬度”这条险路,是因为距离最近。后来随着对葱岭地区道路认识的加深,可以替代“悬度”的道路也会出现。但如果像玄奘那样由大象驮着经书,是肯定不会选择“石山悬度”,也就不可能走切克马廷库里之路。车朝奉一行在经过播蜜川后,经过“五赤匿国”。“五赤匿”就是“五识匿”,即是今塔吉克斯坦的舒格楠一带,属于“葱岭中道”的西段。然后从“五识匿”南下到“护密”,亦即“胡蜜”,这是瓦罕走廊西端,今伊什卡申一带。关于“五识匿”和“护密”的位置关系,还可通过慧超《往五天竺国传》得到清晰的理解(详见下文)。这也说明“葱岭中道”与“葱岭南道”之间并非截然分隔,车朝奉一行就是先走了“南道”的东段,然后又走“中道”的西段,再从“中道”回到“南道”的西段。因为他们的目的地是去罽宾犍陀罗地区,所以最终要从瓦罕走廊西端南下。

    至于车朝奉在返程经过葱岭时,他走的是“拘密支—若瑟知国—式匿国—疏勒”一线。其中“拘密支”,Komidai,玄奘记作“拘谜陀”,又作“居密”“俱蜜”,位于葱岭的西部,五识匿地区之北。可见车朝奉还是由葱岭西部向东,经过式匿国,抵达疏勒。其中省略了从式匿到葱岭镇的路段,应该是与去程相差不大,所以没什么特别可记的。车朝奉之所以来去都选择了“葱岭中道”,很可能是因为吐蕃势力已经浸染到上印度河谷的大、小勃律,乃至瓦罕走廊有时也被吐蕃所控制。这种情况下,走“中道”比走“南道”会安全一些。

    此后,清乾隆年间平定大小和卓之乱时,清军追击叛军在葱岭北部的喀拉湖、穆尔加布和雅什库里,与叛军激战,三战三捷。平定叛乱后,乾隆命人在雅什库里湖边树立《平定回部伊西洱库尔淖尔勒铭碑》。这也是最远的一座“乾隆纪功碑”。雅什库里一带可以作为战场,双方投入万人以上规模的部队作战,也说明这一地带相对瓦罕走廊更为开阔,更适合展开大规模的军事行动。

    3.葱岭南道

    以往的研究,有一种从整体上忽视葱岭古道在丝绸之路东西交通上的重要性的倾向。如桑山正进认为:原本上印度河谷道路是中印之间交通的主要通道;由于种种原因,上印度河谷道路被通行瓦罕走廊、走兴都库什山北麓的道路所取代,导致巴米扬地区开始建造大佛像。其实如果梳理历史记录就会发现,葱岭古道很可能较之上印度河谷道路更重要,持续发挥作用的时间也更长。见于历史记载的选择走“葱岭南道”的行者,似乎远多于上述“北道”和“中道”。因而“葱岭南道”一直是西域通往中亚和印度的主干道,甚至上印度河谷道路最兴盛之时,也无法与“葱岭南道”分庭抗礼。

    早在公元前130年左右,从伊犁河流域被大月氏赶出故地的塞人,在“塞王”的带领下,“南越悬度”“南君罽宾”。因为“悬度”已经可以比定为在瓦罕走廊上的一段石山险路,所以塞人就是从塔里木盆地西缘出发,通过瓦罕走廊,实现横穿葱岭,再南下去攻占犍陀罗地区。这也是从葱岭东侧的西域出发,去往葱岭西侧的犍陀罗地区最短的一条路径。因为塞人骑兵要对犍陀罗的希腊人政权发动突袭,所以不可能选择上印度河谷地区那种“悬絙而度”的绳索桥,也不可能在河谷山坳中绕来绕去浪费时间。石山“悬度”虽然凶险,但不是不可逾越。所以塞人进占罽宾,就是通过快速穿越“葱岭南道”的瓦罕走廊而实现的。

    塞人占领犍陀罗地区,建立起塞人的罽宾王国。到西汉末,大批的西汉国使和护送所谓“罽宾使者”回国的汉军将士,都是经历“悬度”险路完成使命的。这其中,只有文忠和赵德等极少数人在历史上留下了姓名。汉使和汉军的马匹不适合葱岭上的高原险路,通行“悬度”时损失较大。所以杜钦建议汉朝放任罽宾,不再参与其国政事;罽宾再有来使,汉朝只负责将其护送到皮山即止,不要再冒着危险将所谓的“罽宾使者”护送回罽宾。这样就避免了在通行“悬度”时的无谓牺牲。

    公元97年,甘英从龟兹出发,“逾悬度,乌弋山离”,去往大秦。既然“逾悬度”,显然也是走了“南道”的瓦罕走廊。因为这样走,出了瓦罕走廊,再沿着兴都库什山西行,就可到达乌弋山离。可以说是最近的道路。甘英无需去往兴都库什山以南的地区,所以南北朝的求法僧才说甘英不曾走过上印度河谷的绳索桥和傍梯险路。

    根据僧传的记载,公元4—5世纪,法显、智猛、昙无竭等大部分求法僧,都是从塔什库尔干南下,不去横穿瓦罕走廊,而是在瓦罕走廊东段的山口,就南下到上印度河谷地区。选择这样的路途,主要是为了去陀历国(Darel,达丽尔山谷)参拜陀历大像。而且通过口耳相传,使得这条路成为南北朝时期大多数求法僧都会选择的道路。但这条路并不能一直保持畅通,如果发生地震,形成堰塞湖,就会破坏道路交通,乃至有的路段会断路两三百年之久。这也就是为何还会有个别求法僧,如北魏的道荣,仍然会在去程和回程都选择走“葱岭南道”。

    大魏使者谷巍龙的题字出现在乌秅,而其出使的目的地是粟特地区的“迷密”(米国)。这并不意味着谷巍龙接下去会沿印度河谷道路一路到犍陀罗,之后北上兴都库什山,经过吐火罗地区,再到粟特地区。前述《汉书·西域传》就有这样的道路,即从乌秅西行会经过“石山悬度”。而要从乌秅西行到“悬度”,就要通过乌秅西北的山口进入到瓦罕走廊东端,再向西经过悬度,横穿瓦罕走廊。到走廊的西端,或者继续西行,就是当年甘英去往乌弋山离的路线,只不过谷巍龙还要继续从乌弋山离北上粟特地区。或者从瓦罕走廊西端沿喷赤河北上,再转西,都可以抵达粟特地区。谷巍龙之所以没选择“葱岭北道”,或是直接从西域北道或南道西上葱岭,大概是因为与北魏敌对的柔然势力控制着西域北道,所以谷巍龙走了西域南道,且从于阗南下到拉达克地区,再转向乌秅。

    520年左右,宋云完成了觐见嚈哒王的使命,带着北魏使团,携带170部佛经,回国复命。因为他是从乾陀罗,即罽宾犍陀罗之地返国,自然会走从犍陀罗去西域的传统道路,那就是“葱岭南道”。宋云带那么多佛经,驮畜行走“悬度”不易,故其返程很可能也是从帕米尔河与瓦罕河交汇处的Gaz Khun村就转而向北,绕开“悬度”,经行佐库里所在的波谜罗川,再抵达汉盘陀(塔什库尔干)。

    大约100年后,玄奘的回程,也是从瓦罕走廊西端开始横穿走廊,经过达摩悉铁帝国(瓦罕走廊西部,汉杜德)、波罗蜜川(播蜜川、大帕米尔)。即从帕米尔河与瓦罕河交汇处的Gaz Khun村以东,就选择相对好走一些的经行“大龙池”(佐库里)道路,大体上走的是“南道”。

    距玄奘经行葱岭差不多一百年,723—727年间,新罗僧慧超,也在从天竺返回唐朝的路途中,走了葱岭古道。他具体的路线是:胡蜜—识匿—葱岭镇。《往五天竺国传》云:

    又从吐火罗国东行七日,至胡蜜王住城。当来于吐火罗国。逢汉使入蕃。略题四韵取辞。五言:君恨西蕃远,余嗟东路长。道荒宏雪岭,险涧贼途倡。鸟飞惊峭嶷,人去难偏梁。平生不扪泪,今日洒千行。

    “胡蜜”又称“护密”或“休密”,本是贵霜时期的五翕侯之一,应该镇守的就是瓦罕走廊西端的伊什卡申一带。慧超到胡蜜时,恰逢“汉使”即唐朝的官使经行胡蜜去往“西蕃”。具体是谁,要出使哪国,都已不可知。就在这域外雪岭之地,两个从东土大唐来的旅人,一个西去,一个东归,意外相遇,而又都喜好汉语诗文,遂以诗相酬,共同抒发在域外偶遇知音、怀念故乡的悲情愁绪。此后,慧超记载了他没有亲履其地,而是听闻传说的“识匿国”:

    又胡蜜国北山里,有九个识匿国。九个王各领兵马而住。有一个王,属胡蜜王。自外各并自住,不属余国。近有两个王,来投于汉国,使命安西,往来〔不〕绝。……彼王常遣三二百人,于大播蜜川,劫彼兴胡,及于使命。纵劫得绢,积在库中,听从坏烂,亦不解作衣著也。此识匿等国,无有佛法也。

    通常认为这里的“九个识匿国”“九个王”应该是“五个识匿国”“五个王”之误。五识匿地区就是今天的舒格楠地区。五识匿中,有的归属胡蜜,有的归顺唐朝,与安西都护府来往频密。但当时唐朝最西境,就是下文提及的“葱岭镇”,亦即“葱岭守捉”,今天的塔什库尔干。从“葱岭守捉”向西,就是识匿地区。应该是比较靠东的两个识匿王更乐于与唐朝往来。“大播蜜川”即玄奘东归时经过葱岭的“波谜罗川”,亦即佐库里湖。这是说五识匿国经常派人劫掠来往的“兴胡”,即通过经商兴利的胡商,主要是指粟特商人。说明粟特商人显然也是经常通行佐库里所在的“葱岭南道”。不仅劫掠胡商,包括来往的国使,也不放过。故前文有诗云:“险涧贼途倡。”这种劫掠行为属于识匿国的“国家行为”,他们劫得大量的“绢”,也不会用来制作衣服,还是习惯穿他们传统的皮裘之衣。实际上在葱岭这样苦寒之地,丝绸、绫绢之类的原料不可能被用于制作当地人的衣服。由此可见,丝绸的确是胡商冒险经行此路运营的主要货品。而识匿国不信佛法,故慧超也不会选择“中道”。慧超选择的道路是:

    又从胡蜜国东行十五日,过播蜜川,即至葱岭镇。此即属汉。

    慧超从瓦罕走廊西端的胡蜜,一路东行,就是走瓦罕走廊,经播蜜川(佐库里),抵达葱岭守捉所在的塔什库尔干。这也是开元时期唐朝西境的极限了。

    公元747年,高仙芝征讨小勃律之役,其大军从龟兹出发,上葱岭后,《旧唐书》记云:

    又二十余日至葱岭守捉,又行二十余日至播密川,又二十余日至特勒满川,即五识匿国也。仙芝乃分为三军:使疏勒守捉使赵崇玭统三千骑趣吐蕃连云堡,自北谷入;使拨换守捉使贾崇瓘自赤佛堂路入;仙芝与中使边令诚自护密国入,约七月十三日辰时会于吐蕃连云堡。堡中有兵千人,又城南十五里,因山为栅,有兵八九千人。城下有婆勒川,水涨不可渡。

    小勃律即吉尔吉特。此前唐军曾三度征讨,都未获胜。天宝六载,高仙芝率一万大军从安西都护府(龟兹)一路西行百日,登上葱岭。在葱岭守捉休整后出发,并未直接从瓦罕走廊东端南下巴罗吉尔山口和达尔科特山口去进攻吉尔吉特,而是直接挥师西进到“葱岭中道”西段的五识匿国地区。“特勒满川”一般认为是帕米尔河。此前唐朝已使位于瓦罕走廊西段的护密国归降,故高仙芝此行并非去攻占五识匿和护密,当地应有亲唐势力接应唐军。他也无需带领一万大军全数西进五识匿地区,应该早在葱岭守捉休整时,就定好分进合击的战术:赵崇玭从“北谷”进军吐蕃占领的连云堡(即萨尔哈德)。所谓“北谷”应即从佐库里一带穿行山谷能够抵达萨尔哈德的道路。今天从萨尔哈德出发,如果不想走石山“悬度”之路,就要向北绕远穿行山谷,也可去往佐库里或切克马廷库里。贾崇瓘则走“赤佛堂路”,有说是在瓦罕走廊东段从帕米尔去往贾帕尔桑河谷的道路。“赤佛堂”的地名或许和《汉书·西域传》所记的“赤土身热之阪”有关。亦即说贾崇瓘这路唐军负责从切克马廷库里这一路夹击连云堡。无论“赤佛堂路”具体地点何在,都不影响学者们认为贾崇瓘这一路实际上是唐军攻击连云堡的“东路军”。赵崇玭和贾崇瓘这两路,不可能是唐军到了五识匿后再回过头去走“北谷”和“赤佛堂路”,应是高仙芝率军绕行到五识匿和护密去实施战略迂回,留下另外两军分别从北面和东面,约定日期,合击连云堡。连云堡南十五里还有吐蕃的一座城寨,下有“婆勒川”。姚大力认为“婆勒”就是Baroghil的音译。在萨尔哈德向南翻越巴罗吉尔山口时,当时吐蕃也派重兵把守。唐军攻下连云堡后继续南下吉尔吉特,就不在本文讨论的葱岭道路范围。总之,高仙芝打小勃律之前,先要拔掉从“葱岭南道”南下小勃律的必经之地连云堡。但如果直接走瓦罕走廊,从东向西进军连云堡,一旦被吐蕃扼守住石山“悬度”,大军就无法前进。高仙芝采取的是通过“葱岭中道”迂回到连云堡的北方和西方,再实现三面合击的战术安排。由此也可见“中道”与“南道”之间存在紧密的关联性。

    此后,随着“安史之乱”的爆发,吐蕃不仅反攻夺占了葱岭古道上的“中道”和“南道”,而且唐朝连西域、河西诸地也逐渐丧失。中原人出于各种政治、军事或是信仰的目的,艰难跋涉于雪岭葱外的时代,遂暂告一段落。

    四、结语

    以上通过将“葱岭古道”细分为“北道”“中道”和“南道”,并将历史上与葱岭有关的每个历史事件和每个具体的旅行者事迹,还原到“葱岭古道”具体的每一条道路上去。这样做希望可以加深我们对这些人物和事件的理解。

    例如,玄奘返程中经过的“大龙池”到底是佐库里,还是切克马廷库里?只要考虑到“石山悬度”的位置,就不难确认“大龙池”一定是指佐库里,因为这条路相对于经过石山“悬度”才能抵达的切克马廷库里之路,要好走得多。再如高仙芝征伐小勃律之战,按照以往的看法,唐军似乎是从瓦罕走廊东端直接进军连云堡,再南下坦驹岭的。但这样一来,唐军必须要经过石山“悬度”才能抵达连云堡。这对上万人的远征部队而言,肯定是危险的选择。高仙芝之所以能够成功,与此前夫蒙灵詧替他打通了护密道路有很大的关系。这使得高仙芝的军队可以得到瓦罕走廊西端护密国的支持,甚至五识匿地区也不会给唐军制造麻烦。所以高仙芝能够采取迂回到连云堡以西,从东、北、西三面合击连云堡的战术。这一点似乎是以往研究高仙芝征伐小勃律的学者都没有意识到的。

    此外,还可得出以下几点关于“葱岭古道”的全新认识:

    其一,从地理上说,葱岭的四至应以今帕米尔高原为界,玄奘的记录并不符合葱岭的实际情况。上印度河谷地区在地质板块上属于兴都库什山以南的印度板块,不属于帕米尔高原的范围,应排除在“葱岭古道”之外,单独作为一个研究对象。

    其二,“葱岭古道”进一步应划分出“北、中、南”三条道路。这其中,“北道”与“中道”和“南道”相比,具有一定的独立性。或者说从“中道”和“南道”较难在东西横向通道上与“北道”产生关联性。但“中道”和“南道”之间,则往往可以根据需要进行穿插经行。实际上,葱岭上的道路组合是多样化的,不是简单的三条线能够涵盖的。古人根据出发地和目的地的不同,可以灵活选择自己要走的道路。但基本的原则是会选择保证安全和距离短、耗时少的路程。玄奘之所以在回程中选择走葱岭而非去程时走天山以北再到中亚粟特地区的道路,就是因为正常情况下从西域到印度去的道路就应该走葱岭古道。

    其三,所谓“瓦罕走廊”,只是葱岭上的“南道”而已,不应被视作通行葱岭南部地区的唯一选择。与之相比,霍罗格与塔什库尔干之间的葱岭“中道”在历史上所起的作用,可能更值得我们关注。今后的“丝绸之路”路线图在经过葱岭地段时,至少应该画出三条东西横贯的路线,而不是只有两条。

    本文转自《中华民族共同体研究》2024年第4期

  • 杨联陞:传统中国对城市商人的统制

    本文主旨,在就传统中国政府对城市商人之统制(包括控制与利用),提出若干看法,以供讨论。所谓商人,系用广义,一切行商坐贾、铺户店号,乃至当铺钱业牙行,均在讨论之列。所谓城市,亦取广义,兼指城镇,不论大小。所谓传统中国,时限可长可短。在本文多指帝国时代末期,自清初至鸦片战争一段,但亦有时兼及前后。

    中国传统,远自二千余年以前,早已以农为本,视工商为末业,政府对四民之待遇,因有重轻。然就全帝国时代而言,亦不可一概而论。如《史记》、《汉书》所载,政府对商人之统制,包括贾人有市籍,不得为吏,不得名田,重其租税,乃至其车马服饰,亦受限制。此种政策,虽起于汉初(或更早),至武帝时,因财政关系,已有孔仅、桑弘羊等,由市井跃登朝列。其他限制,似亦渐成具文。此后在理论上,虽仍轻商,实则对于商人之控制与利用,力图兼顾。唐、宋以来,此种情形,更为显著,议论亦略有改变。读史者当就各时代分别观之,始能得其真象。如就清初至中叶一段论之,则对商人之控制,已不甚严,租税负担,亦非特重,政府且颇以恤商自许。利用则积前代之经验,特重“保”(如保商、保结、连环保)“包”(如包办、包额)诸术,颇有成效。

    在清代商人入仕,远较前代为易。在隋、唐与辽代,工商及其子弟,均不得应科举。但此限制至北宋已见宽弛。据《宋会要·选举》,庆历四年(1044年)定“诸科举人,每三人为一保,所保之事有七”,其七为“身是工商杂类及曾为僧道者”并不得取应。细玩“身是”与“曾为”字样,则不但工商子孙可以应举,即曾为工商而今已改儒业者,似亦可以应举。更早者为淳化三年(992年)所定,“如工商杂类人内有奇才异行卓然不群者,亦并解送”。虽属特例,已开商贾应举之门矣。

    金元时代,对商人应科举,似乎已无限制。明清更有所谓“商籍”,专为盐商子弟在本籍之外盐商营业之地报考生员,而且特为保留名额。据何炳棣教授之计数,盐商子弟,成进士者,明代近一百九十人,举人三百四十人。清代进士至乾隆之末,已达四百二十余人,举人八百二十余人,其中在18世纪,人数尤众。按明清商籍,盖仿元代河东之运学运籍。当异族入主之世,商人往往特受优待,亦可注意也。

    科举之外,尚有捐纳一途,为富商入仕之捷径。清代捐纳制度,近人已有专书详论。在清代主要自为财政关系,然如雍正上谕所言,捐纳进身,可救偏重科举之弊,则其中亦不无政治意味也。

    宋、元以降,商人入仕之途渐广,此与一般社会经济之发展,关联自极密切,在思想上,亦有反映。如宋元儒者,已不讳言治生,明末黄梨洲,已有工商皆本之论,清代沈垚(《落帆楼文集》)更谓“古者四民分,后世四民不分。古者士之子恒为士,后世商之子方能为士。此宋明以来变迁之大较也”。其言虽近于偏激,亦有相当根据。

    秦汉所谓市籍,至少延至唐代。中唐以后,政府对于市场之管制,大见松弛,对商人之特别注籍,似亦不及以前之注意。明代户籍,分军民匠灶四大类。商人似亦属于民户。清代《嘉庆会典》有“军民商灶”之别,然此所谓商,即上文商籍之商,专指盐商而言,不得误解为一般商人。惟以商人当行及纳税(如门摊、铺税等)之故,政府对于孰为商人,及各商资力之大小,亦当有相当了解。保甲调查,亦分住户铺户,此在19世纪之纪录特为显著,京师所在,固不待言,如《津门保甲图说》(1846年)所记天津各区人户,分类详细,数目似亦相当可信也。

    政府就商人收取关卡通过税及落地税等,几于无代无之。关卡之弊,记述议论,亦复多有。工商当行,在政府视为应尽之义务。然行户采买,名为给值,实多白取。所谓和买、坐办等,皆是此类,深为商民之患。就一般税役而论,明清虽有以货币代实物之趋势,实际负担,仍属不小。惟清代在未创设厘金之前,税额较之前代,似为稍轻。

    牙行中之官牙,领有牙帖(纳费),实只相当于唐代之市司,除介绍买卖外,并可评定物价,有时且可为商人之居停主人。在水路则有埠头,亦称船埠头,其作用与牙行同。牙行之作用,与同业商人自组之行,有时相辅,有时相竞,其关系殊为微妙。在政府用为统制之工具,则无甚异同。政府对物价与币值之控制,普通最重视米粮价格与银钱比价,对米粮与货币之流通,有时亦加管制。惟自宋元以后,亦不时有人论及过分统制之恶果,提倡自由流通,此亦经济发展之反映也。

    政府利用商人之一常法,为发商生息。此在若干情形之下,对商人可能有利。但商人须负责偿还本息,往往为难。至于盐商洋商等之捐输报效,名曰情愿,号为踊跃,实际则多出强迫,不过政府与商人分利之美名而已。

    一般言之,清政府对商人,尚属宽大。商人之苦于苛虐者,罢市、请愿,乃至短期暴动,虽有其例,大规模之变乱,则未有商人为领袖者。此中因素,虽甚复杂,与政府对都市商人统制之和缓,似不无关系也。

    一、导论

    这篇关于政府对城市商人之统制的文章并不是一篇研究论文,文中所提出的数点建议只是一个社会史学者所做的一般性的观察,希望或可作为进一步讨论的基础。文中“商人”一词是用的广义,包括各种商人与生意人,固定的与流动的,甚至牙人(经纪人),经营当铺、钱庄的人,以及投资于传统手工业的生意人。这样使用的理由是中国传统上把这些人都称做“商”。“铺户”一词,是登记职业用的,差不多包括所有从事各行生意的人。“店”这个字或指商店或指旅店。因此商人一词必须使用广义才能把一些有意味与相关的事实包括在内。“城市”一词也是用的广义,兼指城、镇与郊区,而不限于城墙以内的地区。事实上,通称为“镇”的市场中心,大抵是没有城墙的。商人只要是在城市做生意的都可称为城市商人,虽然他并不一定住在城里。“统制”这一词包括与商人的地位、活动以及税役等有关的规定与限制。

    本文的讨论集中于清初到鸦片战争(1644—1840年)这一段时期,换言之,即是传统中国开始受到西方势力的空前冲击以前的两个世纪。这段时期特别令人感觉兴趣的理由,其中之一是这段时期内,中国的统治者是几位相当开明而且非常能干的异族皇帝;这段时期中国正经验到社会与经济方面重要的变迁,即是中国大陆学者称为“资本主义萌芽”或初期成分者。[1]此外,中国在这段时期仍保留有许多传统的面貌。

    一般对传统中国只有初步了解的研究者,可能认为旧社会商人的地位是这样的:农人所从事的职业是“本业”,相对的,商人与工匠的职业被视为次等的、非基本性的“末业”。此外,商人多被视为奸狡、惟利是图,因而受到轻视。他们的投机、操纵物价、屯积货财,都被认为不但害及消费者(特别是无助的农民),也对整个经济有害。商人的这些活动有违于公正与安定的原则,因而各种规限与税役必须加在商人身上,对于他们的地位必须加以降抑。但是,像这种一般性的说法至多不过是粗略的说明罢了。

    这种一般性的说法所以流行的一个原因,是受到古代中国某些时期的史籍的影响。差不多三十年前,如果中国学生曾读过一点点中国的正史,很可能不是《史记》,便是《汉书》;前者的范围是从中国古代至西元前100年左右,后者则从西元前206年到西元23年。上述的说法大部分便取材自这两部史书中谈到食货与商人的篇章。[2]那时候大学里中国通史的课程仍然只着重于古代史方面。比如就制度史来说,教授们认为只要说明与讨论汉代的制度史就可以,因为后代差不多都是因袭汉代的模式,只有很少的修改与出入。

    当然,中国古代史与中国第一个官僚帝国确有许多值得研究之处。简单地说,在战国时代(西元前403—西元前221年),政治、社会与经济上巨大的动乱与变迁中,游士、游侠与行商坐贾这些人变得非常流动而活跃。他们成为各独立邦国以及后来帝国的政治资本。因此,他们可能是艾森斯塔教授(S.N.Eisenstadt)所称的“自由浮动资源”的最好的例子,对于他所谓“历史性官僚帝国”之成立,有过重要作用。[3]

    到西元前221年秦统一各国,这个中国史上第一个帝国要面对的问题是如何处理这些自由浮动分子。明显的办法是统制,包括操纵与利用——为了政府的利益,绝对不能让他们自由集附到另一个政治中心,或是自己形成一个有影响力的集团。秦朝只是短短的十几年(西元前221—西元前207年),未能完成这项工作。它的失败也许由于过分注重法家思想,过分独裁。汉朝从这里学到教训,成绩较好。当温驯的儒家学者(借用顾里雅教授H.G.Creel的定义:儒乃懦弱者也)成群地协助或加入汉朝的统治集团,中国官僚帝国的模式便开始形成了。

    汉代是否真正采用压制商人的政策是值得讨论的。支持这方面看法的人会说,商人得缴纳额外的重税,他们不准拥有土地,不准穿着丝绸,他们的子孙不得做官,他们的活动在政府有专卖权的一些基本货物上受到限制。事实上,上面这些说法,除了有关纳税那一项之外,大多数是不难修改的。一个富裕的商人可以很容易放弃他登录的商人身份,变成一个地主,而仍然做谷物、丝帛或其他生意。汉高祖命商人不得衣帛,这道命令恐怕当时并未认真执行过,以后更是完全被忽略了。雄心勃勃的汉武帝即位后,即打破政府不任用商人为官的规定,两个在盐铁买卖上非常成功的商人成为他的主要参谋。把盐铁收归国有的建议,就是他们提出来的。他们主管专卖事业之后,就引进更多的生意人担任政府官职以协助他们办事。桑弘羊,贾人之子,精明而有谋略,深得武帝信任,由侍中官升御史大夫(副相)。由此看来,中国第一个持久的帝制朝代——汉朝,对商人的态度就已经是模棱两可的,至少在一段相当时期内,政府是有意兼用一种对商人限制、征税而又加以利用的政策。

    在后来的朝代里,商人的命运也走着一条曲折的路途。为了解某一段时期商人的地位,一般历史背景的知识是需要的,因为只有与其他时期商人的地位相比较,才可能对某一时期的情形得到一个有意义的评价。

    二、政府对城市商人的统制

    如果回顾一下清代最初两百年间政府对城市商人的统制,很明显的是,这段时期我们见不到什么特别的障碍妨害商人改善他们的地位;政府对商业活动的控制是有限的,加于他们身上的课税与勒索,相对来说较轻(或至少不特别重),另外是,在统制的执行上,往往都离不开“保”与“包”这两个古老而特别重要的观念。我们可以先从最后一点谈起,以作为了解的背景。

    “保”与“包”这两个观念与“报”不可相混。关于“报”我已有另文谈及。这三个观念都是传统中国盛行的观念,而且还继续到现代。在“保”与“包”这两个观念中,“包”流行较晚,大致是自宋代以降,这点也许可以反映出中国从宋代以来就对有限而可确保的利益或结果越来越感到兴趣。

    保的观念几乎在政治、社会与经济生活的每一方面都可以发现。参加科举考试、进入官场、担保贷款、申请护照等等,都需要某种地位的人或某级以上的店铺担保。几个人或店铺联合起来担保的称为“连环保”,执行地方警卫与地方统制的保甲制度,是中国史上最为人熟知的制度之一。包的观念最常见的是包税(常与另一个字“额”连用)此外还用于包车、包船、包工乃至包饭等等。

    我们可以就商业活动范围之内举出更多的例子:政府核准的牙行的一个作用是保证某种程度内的公平交易。政府要求商人行会的领袖负责保证会员的行会,而且要供应清廷官方所需要的应用物品(这些往往牵制到所谓规费以及类似的勒索)。有引票经营盐运的商人首领称做“总商”,责任重大。经营出入口贸易的“公行”,有时称为“保商”,必须负责一个港口的对外贸易。大规模的商业组织,政府往往要他们成为多头制,以便维持制衡。这种预防办法,类似政治圈内所使用的,例如数名省级的高级官员并列。这是中国统治者从历史上得到的经验,知道倚重惟主管首领是问与联合负责的原则。

    (一)地位与登记

    在清朝统治下,阻止商人爬上政治阶梯的障碍,显然很少。中国帝制早期的几百年内,统治阶级经常妒忌地守住他们的政治权力,商人即使想占一席地位都极端困难。隋代(581—618年)所建立的进士制度,一直成为学者经由考试进入官场的最佳途径。但是这项考试,在隋唐(618—907年),以及辽代(907—1125年),对商人、工匠及其子孙是不开放的。[4]这种歧视政策到宋代(960—1279年)似乎减轻了不少。1444年颁布的规定要进士级的考生之间组成相互担保的团体,每一组三人(首都区开封府内五人)。担保的条例有一项是“身是工商杂类,及曾为僧道者”不得取应。条文中所用的“身是”与“曾为”两词似乎指出,出于商人家庭而自己不是商人,或甚至曾为商人而目下已非商人,都准许参加考试。如果我的解释正确,这点值得研究中国历史的人记在心里。同时要注意的是,在金(1115—1234年)、元(1206—1368年)两个异族入主的朝代,似乎没有禁止商人或工匠参加考试的规定。因此我们可以说,最近数百年中商人已经得到了政治解放。

    事实上,在明清两代,盐商还有一项特权,可以令其子弟注册入“商籍”,参加生员考试,以进入商人居住地与经商地的学府,而不必如一般人须返回本籍才能参加考试[5]。此外,学府中特别为商籍学生保留名额,这些生员以后多半在省城参加考试。这种特权无疑地为清代盐商的后代造就了几百位进士,与更多的举人。何炳棣教授在他的研究中,曾举有数字。[6]把这些资料大略地再检查一遍,可以发现这些举人进士大多数是在18世纪通过考试的。

    令人感兴趣的是,为盐商家庭子弟设置学校的制度,可以追溯到元代。1299年,一位蒙古籍的盐政在河东为盐商家子弟设立了一个学校,称为“运学”。注册的学生称为“运籍”,这名词是“商籍”的前身。这件事以后在16世纪末,被人提出来当作在别处成立类似设施的前例。[7]也许,就元朝来说,给予商人特权是很自然的事,因为蒙古的统治阶级十分依赖维吾尔商人与中国商人给他们带来的巨大利润。

    除了考试以外,商人获得荣耀乃至官位的另一途径是“捐纳”,这是一种花钱买头衔、职位的制度。卖官鬻爵自然不是新事,它甚至可以追溯到汉代,但清代的制度无疑地是最完备,而且是最被倚重的一项主要收入。在18世纪早期更是重要。这个制度显然也包含有政治动机。正如雍正皇帝曾公开承认,有才能的人不由正途,而借着捐纳等非正途出身,可以平衡由科举出身者造成的过分影响力。在理论上,正规的捐纳,虽然本身不是正途,却是让生员得官或小官取得晋升的主要台阶,当然也有例外的情形。实际上,所有的富人都能为他们的父母买一个荣衔,并有不少替自己捐买监生、荣衔甚至官职者。富有的商人任意利用这种机会不难想像得出,18世纪的盐商就可以举出很多例来。商人捐官这件事,在19世纪下半叶曾经遭到章奏强烈的反对,但是清政府不能也不肯放弃这笔每年给国库带来几百万两银子的财源。有人曾说,这一大笔收入使得清代早期统治者不必重视商税,结果是商人得利。此外让人感兴趣的一点是,大约从1851年开始,旧式银行称做“银号”者,为人办理捐纳而大赚其钱。[8]

    在结束我们对商人地位的讨论之前,我们需要注意到明清两代社会系统的流动性,这点何炳棣教授已有畅论。[9]其中很有趣的是,我们可以看到家庭分工的例子,父亲或兄弟经营家中的田产或生意,而让儿子或另一个兄弟去读书、参加考试。清代学者沈垚(1798—1840年)曾上溯到宋代,认为这种经济基础是帮助考生成功的重要因素。沈垚认为,从那时候起,所谓四民的士、农、工、商已有了结合与混合的现象。[10]另一位清代学者钱大昕(1728—1804年)也注意到,宋元时代的儒家学者已经鼓励学生首先应获得适当的生活方式(谋生方法),这样才可以使他们在进入官场前专心读书,日后在任位上才能维持正直与清廉。[11]农夫的职业当然是基本的,一个诚实的商人或制造有用而非奢侈品的工匠,他们的职业也可视为基本的,黄宗羲(1610—1695年)曾强调过这一点。[12]这种态度上的改变,无疑地反映出当时的社会环境。在一个较为流动的社会里,不只富商成为有威势、有影响力的人物,就是普通商人也发现他们的地位改善了。另一方面,我们也不能说,古老的轻商观念,此时已经归于消灭。举例来说,乾隆皇帝在1742年下诏免除米与豆在国内所有的通过税,诏令中他依然提出“重本抑末”的老调作为理由。[13]

    与商人地位密切关连的问题是他们在人民中如何登记。中国历史上,登记(著籍)一直是政府统制人民的一项重要手段。从帝制中国开始,正规商人就得登记在“市籍”项下。秦汉时代由于用兵频繁,有时那些名字登记在市籍下的人是第一批被征召入伍的,然后是那些以前曾入市籍的人,再其次是那些父亲或祖父入市籍的人。[14]

    市籍的登记至少继续到唐代,那时候由政府密切统制与监督的城内集中市场颇为繁荣。关于唐代的市场制度,杜希德教授(Denis Twitchett)曾有精辟的论述。[15]但是到了唐代后期,这种市场制度开始衰落,大多数城市市场的规定都被忽略或遗忘,很可能不久以后市籍登记便终止了。

    在明代,户口的登记主要分为四大项:军、民、匠、灶(制盐者)。[16]工匠有专籍,因为他们必须轮班应差。明中叶以降,班匠可以纳银代差,渐渐得到解放。

    军民工匠四种户籍在名义上延至清初。《嘉庆会典》列举“军、民、商、灶”[17],这一条很容易引致误解,因为此处之商即上述之“商籍”,单指盐商而言,而非指一般的商人。

    户口的登记从1772年正式成为保甲制度的一部分。然而,保甲制度起初并未认真执行,直到1813年冬天,国内发生一连串暴动事件,特别是这年秋天“天理教”的一次暴动,震动了北京皇城,以后保甲制度才比较认真。清代的保甲制度并不是划一的,大致来说是“门牌”的登录以及登记入籍。登记的事项包括户长的“生理”或“行业”。这分为“住户”或“民户”,与“铺户”两个主要项目。有趣的是,铺户的登记只包括那些不与家人同住的店家(我们可以称为离家商人)。店主与家人同住的则归入民户。我们需记住,在中国帝制时代,远离家乡的老百姓很可能引起别人的猜疑,他们得随身携带执照或护照之类的文件以证明他们的身份。

    根据1851年秋天的官方报告,北京的内城(西洋文献称之为“鞑靼城”,因为大多数居民均为旗人)住户七六四四三户,铺户一五三三三户。[18]在北京的外城或所谓“中国城”,铺户的数目可能更多些。另外从天津在1846年施行保甲制度下登记的民众,我们可以发现某些有趣的项目与细数。[19]生意人分成三个项目:“盐商”、“铺户”与“负贩”。在天津城围内登记的九九一四户中,盐商一五九户,铺户三一三二户,负贩一九三五户。在东郊,即东城门外,登记有七○七七户,其中一一○户为盐商,二九七五户为铺户,一三三○户为负贩。在北部的六六三五户中,盐商五二户,铺户三一九六户,负贩七九九户。其他西郊、南郊、东北郊与西北郊四个郊区,登记的户数较少。但在这些区中,生意人三项登记的总数仍超过总户数的三分之一或接近半数。这些显然相当可靠的数字,很可指出在我们所讨论的这段时期的末期,天津市的商业化程度。

    (二)限制、征税与利用

    唐代的各种民法与刑法包括许多关于市场的详细规定,但清代的《大清会典事例》与明代的会典相似,对于贸易与商业方面较少提及。会典中的“市廛”即市场统制一节,仅包括短短的五项:经纪业务、公平价格、市场的独占(把持行市)、度量衡,以及市场上出售的衣料与用具的品质标准。除了第一款内规定私营经纪业务为非法(私充牙行埠头),这点是从《明会典》中抄袭而来,其他各款都依照唐代标准而制定。[20]关于上述最后两项事务的规定,其起源最为古老,也可能最不受人重视。晚清的法律专家薛允升氏(1820—1901年)曾特别感慨这方面执行的松懈,他强调维持货物品质与统一度量衡的重要性,但并未引起作用。[21]

    根据禁止私充经纪的一款,在城镇乡村的各行业的经纪人(诸色牙行),以及类似泊船地方(船埠头)的经理人,应从殷实人中选出来担任。政府发给他们盖有官方印记的登记簿,让他们记录来往商人或船主的姓名、固定住址、通行证号码,以及货物的数量。登记簿每月要送交政府当局检查。那些未经官方核准而营经纪业务的人应受杖刑六十大板,他们所收取的佣金(牙钱)应予没收,如果官方认可的经纪人或埠头(官牙埠头)有掩饰藏匿,应受杖刑五十大板,然后免职。关于物价一款,将制定公平价格的责任给予经纪人(行人,即牙行),而非唐律上所规定的市场官员(市司)。[22]

    经纪人的作用是在买者与卖者中间协调商定一个合理的价格,除此之外,许多经纪人也充当店家,招待来往商人的食住与寄放货物,当然也照章收费。这些费用是在交易时所收的佣金(牙钱、用钱、或称行用)之外的。经纪人也可能充任商人买卖的代理人,为他们接洽贷款,安排他们的交通与货物运输问题。因此经纪人在贸易商业上能担任不少职务。[23]政府要借着经纪人以钳制商人是很自然的事。

    在理论上,只有有执照的经纪人才准许担任这些职务。根据规定,这种执照(称做“牙帖”)只有省级当局才能发给,并有固定的名额,这个执照每隔五年检查一遍,并重新发给(北京从1725年开始),同时,名额亦可能变更。[24]实际上,省区与地方官员常常不顾名额而自行发给执照,因为这项业务是州县政府收入相当可观的一个来源。对省府与清朝政府而言,从经纪人的执照所收取的费用只是非常小的数目,但是,自太平天国叛乱以来,情况有了重大改变,从那时起,特别捐也由经纪人收取,并与厘金合在一起。在湖北与湖南,从经纪人处收取的年度捐税估计有他们的牙帖费的一百倍之多。[25]

    这些经纪人,特别是那些私营的,带给商人的麻烦实多于帮助。当某一行业的商人组成一个行会后,通常都会被与他们这一行打交道的经纪人控制住。通常借着使官准牙人或为本行会员而达到目的。有关这类做法的例子我们在北京18世纪时组成的行会记录上可以看到。[26]

    在这里要强调的一点是,“行”这个字在中文里经常是表示“行业”而非“行会”,除非我们将行会的意思扩大到包括那些没有会馆或公所,甚至没有行规的原始行会。政府热衷于让商人按行业组织起来的主要理由是配合它对各种物资的需要,这种要求可能来自清廷当局或任何大小衙门。商人有义务应付这种要求,称之为“当行”,意思是“本行的当值”。理论上,政府需要的物品应该用“时价”或“实价”买进。事实上,真正照办的很少,即使政府付给相当的价钱,经办人在中间索取的陋规也成为当值商行的一个沉重的负担。1738年,清廷诏令全国各大小衙门纠正这种陋习。[27]在雍正皇帝名义下发布的《州县须知》,警告地方政府官员,不得向商人与百姓强索物品。[28]然而这些命令与警告实际上完全没效。举例来说,为了供应清廷光禄寺所需用的猪肉与鸡,北京城内宛平与大兴两县特别从这两行里挑选了殷实的商人来负责供给,结果害他们从1752年到1756年之间,每年都赔上两三千或三四千两银子,直到这两行在1756年被废除为止。[29]

    在明代末叶以后,这种“当行”制度照规定本可纳银替代。16世纪时,北京城的铺户分为九等,每户每年要付一钱至九钱的银子称做“行银”,以免当行。到1582年冬天,政府批准一项奏折,免除最下三等的铺户缴纳这笔行银。中间三等的铺户,其资金从三百两银到五百两以上的,以及上三等的铺户,其资金多至数千两银者,则需继续缴纳。同一年早期,政府也批准北京城内两县中一三二家官方认可的行业中,三二家小号得以免除缴纳这笔银钱。[30]

    到清代,北京城内的两县获准从内城以外的铺户收取这笔银钱。上等的铺户每年缴付五两银,中等每年二两五钱,下等的铺户则免缴。北京内城九门内的铺户得以免缴的理由是他们得负责整理街道,特别是填土、洒水的工作。

    大多数城市中对商店开设的地点都没有严格规定,只要不太靠近衙门损其尊严就行。但是暂时性的货摊与浮摊不准见于大街上。在皇都里的规定就比较严格,举例来说,北京的内城不准开设戏院与旅店。1756年所做的调查,显示城里有十五家旅店,其中有好几家“关东店”,显然是为在满洲做生意的商人开设的。[31]还有四四家店铺,夜间也经营旅馆业。所有这些店铺都得迁到外城去。另外七二家经营猪肉、酒、鸡、水果与烟草的店铺则准许留在内城。[32]叫卖的负贩有时不准喊出某些被认为是忌讳的字眼。在1648年与1649年,北京城内的负贩曾被禁止叫卖,因为多尔衮嫌他们的声音太吵。[33]

    有关这方面我们可以再加上一点是北京城内一般都实行宵禁,特别是在内城。为了便利警卫,许多较小的街道,特别是通往大道的傍道都树立起栅栏,夜晚关闭,禁止通行。根据《金吾事例》,1729年北京外城有四四○个官准的栅栏;1763年内城有一○九九个栅栏,皇城内有一九六个。这些栅栏似乎一直维持到19世纪初年。[34]栅栏与宵禁令人想起唐代首都长安城内坊门夜闭的严格规定。

    北京城内的九个城门的征收货物税都是在恶名昭著的崇文门税关管制之下。这从明代起就如此,一直继续到民国时。更早的朝代当然也有类似的税。记得南唐时代曾有官吏幽默地对皇帝说,首都不下雨的原因是雨恐怕在城门要缴税。结果,皇帝下令减轻这些税捐。[35]

    像清朝其他的税关,崇文门的税关也有年度的定额。在本文讨论的这段时期内一般定额是十万两银多一点,这笔数目不算大,留给税吏足够的余地去充实他们自己的腰包。[36]税关的主管者照规定都是旗人,他们在这位置做了几年后,大概都得到类似的下场:借某一个罪名免职,其大部分财产充公,但也罕见完全破产之例。清朝皇帝与这些权贵税吏之间的关系正像渔夫与他豢养的鱼鹰之间的关系。

    州县政府的一个重要收入来源称做“落地税”的,是对所有进入其管辖的地方市场的货品所征收的税。这些税通常都是包给衙门的衙役或牙子,自然有滥用职权与腐败的情事。1735年清廷曾下令废止所有乡、镇、近郊的落地税,仅保留县城与州城的。[37]这道命令是否曾广泛执行以及行之多久却是值得怀疑的事。

    总结来说,清代最初两百年内对地区间以及地方贸易的税收并不特别重,尤其当我们比较一下明代万历朝(1573—1619年)的下半期,朝廷的宦官在征收全国商业税那种无情的勒索时,或是比较一下从1850年代加之于各省的厘金,给朝廷从1869年到1908年每年都带来一千四百万至二千一百万两银子的收入时,就可明白。[38]

    在物价管制方面,政府关心的主要是谷价的稳定,以及铜钱与银两的兑换率。为了防止大量囤积铜钱与米谷,政府曾试用各种方式,下令禁止这种事情发生。当谷价太高的时候,最有效的办法显然就是抛售政府所存积的米谷。在北京,官方的米局特别用来供给旗人。由于北京城人口众多,因而有严格的规定管制米谷运出京城。原则上只有少量的米,村民买来供自己食用的才准许运出京城。此外,不论米或谷都不准运出城或甚至京畿地区。[39]清廷对未去壳的谷子管制更为严格,原因是谷子能保存得更长久。

    银与钱的兑换是钱铺的主要生意。通常,北京城的钱铺得五家一组连合互保。18世纪有一段时期清廷依靠官方认可的钱币经纪人(称做钱行)来稳定兑换率。[40]大体来说,雍正与乾隆两朝在北京的成效相当好。兑换率的波动幅度是从八○○到一一○○文铜钱对一两银,但大多数时间都维持在八五○或九五○上下。[41]谈到钱铺间的连保,可注意的是类似的要求初期并未应用到旧式的银行(称做银号)上面,直到1860年数家半官方的银行宣告破产以后,银号才需要连保。由此看出,尽管银本位经济已经继续了几个世纪,政府对银的控制总是落后一步。

    利用城市商人的一个主要方式,是托付给他们一笔公家资金作为投资之用。这种制度称做“发商生息”,在前几个朝代就有了。受到这种资金的商人绝大多数都是当铺与盐商。政府收取的利息是月息一分至二分。一般来说,这笔利息是指定作为特殊用途的。[42]雍正皇帝特别爱好这个制度,用所得的利息来资助八旗与绿营军。清廷的内务府也非常依赖发商的利息为其财源。乾隆皇帝时仍继续这个制度,后来他改变主意,1759年时宣告发商生息于政体有损,下令加以限制。1769年,他下令将已经发给长芦盐商的资金改称做“赏借项款”。[43]使用这个新名词的理由是政府所订的利率较法定准许的月息三分利率低得多。但是,旧的名词与制度仍被清廷、省府、州县政府以及半官方或非官方的组织继续使用下去。可注意的是信托资金对商人并不一定有好处。1783年长沙府的当铺为某种原因婉拒从省府接受更多的资金,托辞说他们手头已有足够的信托资金了。[44]

    另一种利用城市商人的方式是“自动捐献”,称做“捐输”或“报效”,这是城市商人资助政府的军备、公共建设、水患、饥荒的救济,皇帝出巡与皇帝生日等的开销。根据两淮地区盐政管理官方记录的数字显示,在1738年至1804年之间,这个地区的盐商在四十多个场合总共捐献了三千七百五十万两银子。[45]根据盐政的报告,盐商们都是“情愿”甚至“踊跃”认捐,恭请皇帝“赏收”。在另一方面,盐商们又不时请求以分期付款的方式来捐献。有几次,皇帝对商人的忠诚报效与急公好义表示嘉奖,而只赏收一半的捐款。商人在这种情形下所得到的直接回报不过是所谓“议叙”与名义好听而已。然而在其他场合,皇帝为显示对商人的仁慈宽大,准许他们免费取得额外的“余盐”,或是允许他们延期偿付滞纳的盐税与信托基金的利息。皇恩的殊荣,甚至免除盐商对政府的负债,1780年减免了一百二十万两银子,1782年与1784年大约是三百八十六万六千两。[46]另一批重要的自动捐款,是由广东的盐商与洋行(行商)所认捐的。从1773年至1832年间的捐款总数大约是四百万两银子,数目虽不是大得惊人,也是一笔巨款。[47]

    如果能比较清代各皇帝所采行的经济政策,特别是有关商业贸易的细节,甚至比较一个皇帝在不同时期的经济政策,将是一件极有趣的事。遗憾的是这样的比较已远超出本文的范围。然而我们可以强调的是康熙、雍正、乾隆三帝都绝不是蒙昧无知不肯用心的专制君主。康熙皇帝有一次在1717年曾夸称他对盐政方面深刻的了解。[48]雍正皇帝无疑地非常通晓一般的财经事务,但1728年有一次也承认他并不特别了解有关茶政上各种渎职情事,以及有关茶与马的贸易,因此不能给负责的官员特定的指示。[49]乾隆皇帝在1748年曾有很合理的意见,认为一般来说还是把市场方面的事交给人民,准许他们自由流通货物较好。政府的干涉,虽然出于好意,常常由于处理不当而产生扰民的障碍。[50]清代皇帝一般都可以称得上对商人宽大而同情的。但在另一方面,他们对商人有时也出诸操纵甚至有喜怒无常的态度。

    三、城市商人的反叛取向

    相对于政府统制,重要的一点是检讨商人是否曾抗议或反叛这种统制,和采用什么方式。有关这方面讨论,我们可以19世纪学者汪士铎(1802—1889年)所做的观察作为起点。他认为,商人与城市的文人一样,似乎是最不倾向反叛的,或者我们可以说,他们表现非常低度的反叛取向。汪士铎在1853—1856年间,因太平天国之乱曾躲藏在长江下游的南京与绩溪之间,这段时期所保存的日记中有如下一段:

    天下最愚,最不听教诲、不讲理者乡人。自守其所谓“理”而不改。教以正,则哗然动怒;导以为非为乱,则挺然称首。其间妇人又愚于男子。山民又愚于通涂之民。惟商贾则巧猾而不为乱,山民之读书者不及也。在外经商之人,又文弱于当地之商贾。知四民之中,最易作乱者农。工次之。武生次之。山中之士次之。商贾之士次之。城士之士,则硜硜然可以决其不为乱[51]。

    这种议论显然是概括而充满偏见的,但我们或可了解这不完全是处于一个大动乱暴力时代所发的愤激之言。无论如何汪士铎是个相当独立敢言的学者,他不受传统儒家思想的束缚,而且是热心于提倡改革、恢复秩序的人。至少他在这段话里提出一个启发性的见解,就是在传统的四种功能团体中,城市商人与城市文人的反叛取向最低。

    进一步说,根据汪士铎的推论做一初步检查,显示其中确有一些历史的真实性。[52]中国历史上曾记载无数次农民叛变,但几乎看不到任何城市商人领导的叛变。从唐宋时代以降,我们看到走私盐商与海盗商人的记载,然而他们行动的范围似限于山林、沼泽、海岛与外海上,有时在他们势力范围内,他们也会打劫城镇,因而可算是城市商人的敌人。在明清时代,关于矿工、伐木者与城市匠人的暴动与罢工事件,也有所闻。

    当然,一个社会中叛乱取向的问题,或广泛地说暴力取向的问题,其研讨不一定只限于功能团体。举例来说,这个问题可以就个人或团体从年龄、性别、地位、财富、角色、功能、教育、风俗、传统或是其他的角度来探讨。甚至汪士铎所作的粗略的推论也提到其中几方面。然而,对这个问题更深一步的方法论,却已远超出本文的范围,而且坦白地说,也不是作者能力所及的。为说明城市商人在清初时代抗议与叛变的性质与程度,我们可以看看下面四个例子,他们所谓的“商人与手工业者反抗清朝封建统治的斗争”。[53]这四个例子记述的事实均是“罢市”,就是商人与生意人拒绝做生意以示抗议。

    (一)1660年在山西潞安的罢市

    这次罢市的背景是源于明代生产御用丝织品称做“皇紬”的制度。在山西潞安做这一行生意的“机户”,必须以固定的官价供应这项货品,而官价显然是经常不足以抵付生产所需的开销。明末清初时代,皇紬年度配额是三千匹(一匹为六丈八尺)。1652年诏令将配额减去一千五百二十匹零四丈八尺,每匹的价格则从十两银子增至十三两。1658年,配额又由一千四百七十九匹零二丈减去一千一百七十九匹零二丈,因此实际上所需要的仅是三百匹。但是到1660年,机户发动一次罢市,据说将其织机焚毁,手里捧着账簿记载着他们的损失,准备向北京城进发,直接向皇帝请愿。

    据潞安一位朝廷官员王鼐的奏折,这些机户在明末时原有三千张以上的织机,但大多数都已破产,因为他们得依照政府命令按行服务,所谓“抱牌当行”,结果是他们生产的丝得不到适当的偿付而大受损失。从1644年到1660年,所留存的织机仅两三百张。据奏折所言,皇帝的削减配额,延长限期,先行付款,以及“合理实价”,使得机户争着愿为皇室服务。但是本省官吏的取用以及外省采购使者的要求勒索,却使他们遭受损失。理论上,机户们可以从他们出售的丝得到官价付款,但是经过层层勒索,特别是付差官差役的催紬费、验紬费及纳紬费,实际所余无几。

    我们在王鼐的奏折中可看到很生动的描写:“臣乡山西,织造潞紬,上供官府之用,下资小民之生。……为工颇细,获利最微。……今年(1660年)四月,臣乡人来言,各机户焚烧紬机,辞行碎牌,痛苦奔逃,携其赔累簿籍,欲赴京陈告,以艰于路费,中道而阻。天有簿籍,必有取用衙门,有衙门必有取用数目。小民含苦未伸,臣闻不胜骇异。”他接着建议严禁本省不得滥行取用,隔省不许擅差私造。从方志记载中,我们不清楚他的建议采行至何种程度,因为只说到山西巡抚下令立碑严禁。推想大概是,差役与差官不许继续强索,而机户也不许再度罢市。[54]

    (二)1660年安徽芜湖的罢市

    这次罢市是抗议芜湖内地税关过度的附加税与其他各种名目的勒索。根据阴历十月十三日御史李见龙弹劾户部郎中兼湖钞关监督郑秉衡的奏折,在郑秉衡的指使下,若干名不法的官吏征收额外的火耗与特别捐款用来充实其官邸的维持费用。郑秉衡还发明了“皇税”一词,对民船上装载的日用必需品甚至如薪柴与米都征以税。结果是,全部地区的商民发动罢市三天,以1660年阴历七月十四日为始。本地生员韦譞佩等向总督与巡抚请愿,结果总督命令知县接受商民所具甘结,同意地方人民发动罢市是因为征收薪柴与米的征税。据奏折上说,御史闻知这事是得自于从芜湖到北京来诉苦的商人,因而有关这事的消息传遍京城。[55]

    这项弹劾似乎并未发生多大效力,因为罢市的事件已经发生了一年,而且显然已不了了之。对我们来说,有关这次罢市最感兴趣的一点,是其行动的有秩序以及商人与士人间的合作。

    (三)1682年浙江杭州的罢市

    这次罢市是抗议土棍(地方流氓)与旗丁(八旗兵丁)的高利贷,他们对那些无力偿债的人捉去儿女以为抵偿,有时甚至牵连到负债人的亲戚与邻居。杭州北门的商民发动罢市抗议,这事传到一位同情人民的道台王梁那里。第二天,当王梁去与其他官吏会合调查这件事的途中,八旗兵王和尚等一共几百个人,拦住他的仪仗,辱骂他并打破他轿子的顶盖。这次不寻常的暴动,迫使总督与满洲将军连合上奏向朝廷陈明情况,结果皇帝下诏严厉处罚王和尚及其同谋者。这时候,总督则下令店铺恢复营业。这个例子中特殊的一点,是它说明了在一个征服王朝下政治与经济生活的复杂性。[56]

    (四)1698年福建浦城的罢市

    下面这段故事主要是根据直隶任邱人、出于书香门第的庞垲的墓志铭而来的。在戊寅年,即1698年(彭泽益误认为1758年),庞垲受命为福建建宁府知府。他到任后不久,传来报告说建宁府所辖的浦城县令,因为政令过于严苛,迫使人民反叛。城中愤怒的百姓趁着黑夜,攻击县府的“册局”,放火烧毁文件与记录,并杀死了一个当值的胥吏。县令害怕逃走,当地人民接着发动一次总罢市。庞垲得知这事,立刻赶到浦城,要求当地的教官与典史召集乡绅、生员与人民在明伦堂集合。在这些人面前,庞垲宣布县令的错误与罪状,并加以谴责,使士绅与人民气平下来。然后,他再提醒他们无法纪行为的不当。他让县府的财务与库房重新核对与收集未被焚的文件。他命令各行生意人恢复营业,城内秩序始告恢复。

    在这时,总督郭世隆不满省中百姓攻击县府(称为围城),发动罢市的事件日益增加,想借此用高压手段压制罢市,以为警戒。由于县令与地方士绅间的强烈不睦,总督欲借不法结党、阴谋叛变的罪名惩罚所有的士绅。庞垲反对这个做法,他强调县令残酷作风的不当。最后,只有一名变乱者被处死刑,另二人流放。浦城百姓为感谢庞垲的大力相助,建立一个书院来纪念他。他死于1735年。[57]

    显然地在福建省其他城市尚有类似的抗议与罢市的事件。当时的总督郭世隆(1643—1716年)出身山西的绿营。[58]上述故事中的县令是鲍鋐,沈阳人,以前曾任笔帖式(满文bitheshi,即书记官,七品、八品或九品),多半是个旗人。[59]从这件事也可以看出旗人与一般汉人的敌对。

    本文选编自《东汉的豪族》

  • 韩琦:安第斯文明的起源:卡拉尔一苏佩

    传统观点认为,南美安第斯文明的母文化是查文·德万塔尔文化(公元前1200—前200年)。但随着考古发掘取得新进展,卡拉尔—苏佩文明取代了前者地位,被认为是安第斯地区的第一个文明,其存在于公元前3000年至前1800年之间,清晰展现着秘鲁中北部地区第一个复杂社会的样貌。

    20世纪中期以来,不断有考古学家对卡拉尔—苏佩遗址进行考察和研究,但直到1994年秘鲁圣马尔克斯大学的考古学家露丝·沙迪团队对苏佩河谷进行调查,并随之进行系统考古发掘,学界才对它形成新的认知。随着考古挖掘的深入和新成果的出版发表,卡拉尔—苏佩文明的古老性和重要性最终得到证实。2009年,卡拉尔—苏佩圣城被联合国教科文组织列入《世界遗产名录》。

    卡拉尔—苏佩位于秘鲁海岸的中北部地区、利马以北约182公里。秘鲁中北部地区的面积为81497平方公里,包括圣塔、内佩纳、塞钦、库莱布拉斯、瓦尔梅、福塔雷萨等十几个沿海河谷。与其他世界文明中心相比,秘鲁海岸似乎不太可能成为文明发祥地,因为东部安第斯山脉和西部太平洋形成的反气旋作用导致这里极度干旱。然而,该地区有50多条从山脉到大海的河流穿过,利用这种水源发展的灌溉对卡拉尔—苏佩文明的出现发挥了决定性作用。

    在众多河谷中,苏佩河谷在文明起源时期脱颖而出,仅在这一小盆地就发现了20多个可以被归属于同一时期的城市定居点,它们几乎都有公共建筑、圆形广场、住宅等,都有用土坯、石头、树干和植物纤维建成的阶梯式金字塔,其中还有雕像、马黛茶杯器、石器、棉纺织品、烧焦的食品及其他用品。从建筑规模看,卡拉尔城最大,城市布局分布有序,纪念性建筑种类繁多。其距离大海23公里,处于苏佩河谷中段的初始部分,被认为是该地区居民点的首都,被称为“圣城”。

    早在公元前3000年之前,就有一些家族群体在苏佩河谷定居,他们建立集中居住区,疏干湿地,开辟农田,修建灌溉渠道。公元前3000年至公元前2600年,首都地区的城市定居点不断壮大,定居者们在空地上修建广场用于公共活动,并有了第一个金字塔。大约在公元前2600年至公元前2300年,人们对卡拉尔圣城进行整体设计,修建了金字塔和下沉式圆形广场。在公元前2300年至公元前2100年间,大型金字塔、广场等公共建筑的规模和体积都有所扩大。到公元前2100年至公元前1800年,由于劳动力的减少,定居者们用较小的石块改建公共建筑,最后掩埋了一些重要的建筑部分,卡拉尔圣城被废弃。

    总体来看,卡拉尔—苏佩文明的主要特征表现在以下几个方面:

    以农业生产、渔业生产和贸易交换为主要经济形式。苏佩河谷的居民发展出技术比较先进的集约化农业。他们使用简单的工具(如木棍和鹿角)来掘土,修建灌溉水渠以将河水引入农田。考古证据表明,他们已经懂得通过对各种植物品种的实验,来改善粮食和经济作物的种类、提高产量。他们种植的作物主要有:土豆、红薯、南瓜、豆类、花生、辣椒、玉米、葫芦、鳄梨、番石榴、马黛茶、烟草等,其中棉花是交易的主要产品。沿海居民则捕鱼并采集各种海洋生物,主要包括凤尾鱼、沙丁鱼、贻贝和蛤蜊等。农业和渔业形成一种长期的经济互补关系。

    居民们通过以物易物的方式交换产品。沿海居民提供海产品,如离太平洋仅有500米的居民点阿斯佩罗被认为是卡拉尔的渔镇,那里的居民开发了包括使用钩子、麻线、船等在内的捕鱼技术,特别是发明了棉纤维渔网。渔民负责将海产品分发到河谷中的定居点,而河谷居民会给渔民提供所需的渔网和衣物、用作钓线的棉纤维、用作漂浮物的葫芦、制造船桨的木材以及水果蔬菜等,高地居民会提供农产品(粮食)和畜产品(羊驼)。这样,该区域形成一个类似专业化生产的贸易网络,而卡拉尔圣城无疑是这一网络的中心。很显然,这个网络还延伸到更远的地方,因为在卡拉尔—苏佩地区发现了来自高原的洛克木棒、秃鹰羽毛,亚马逊丛林的陆生蜗牛、灵长类动物皮、各种鸟类羽毛以及厄瓜多尔赤道海岸的多刺牡蛎。

    灌溉技术的使用、渔网的发明以及活跃的贸易交换提高了生产力,促进了地区经济发展和生产剩余积累,从而使苏佩社会能够以地方政府的形式加强其政治一体化进程,这种政府形式的有效性可以从国家承担的大型纪念性建筑群建设中得到体现。

    先进的城市规划和建筑。卡拉尔圣城拥有复杂的城市布局。该城占地66公顷,包括一个核心区和一个外围区。核心区包括32座公共建筑和一些住宅建筑群,外围区有一些住宅建筑群。核心区又分为两大部分,北部为上城,南部为下城。北部的公共建筑分为A、B、C三组,每组都有两个金字塔、广场、官员住房。其中B组的金字塔最大,长160米,宽150米,高18米,坐北朝南,背靠河谷,面向下沉式圆形广场,是卡拉尔城的主建筑。下城建筑有下沉式露天剧场、露天剧场神庙、长桌神庙、圆形祭坛神庙,以及平民住宅区等。

    金字塔结构的墙壁上抹有泥土,被涂成白色或浅黄色,偶尔涂成红色。每座金字塔都有一个通向顶部的中央阶梯,其上有几个房间。在主房间都有一个圣火祭坛,祭坛中央有一个火炉,火炉下方配有导风的地下管道。圣火祭坛具有仪式功能,被用于火化各种祭品。

    卡拉尔位于地震活跃区,其建造者使用“希克拉斯”技术,即将石块装在芦苇纤维编织的网格袋中,尺寸和重量各不相同,但非常均匀,有一定的松散度,用它们来支撑挡土墙,填充金字塔。这样,当发生强烈地震时,“希克拉斯”会以有限的方式微动,发挥着柔性地基作用,由此实现建筑物的结构稳定。规模宏大的城市和坚固的建筑表明卡拉尔人已经具有先进的组织能力和工程技术。

    社会分层和阶级分化已经出现。卡拉尔—苏佩文明显示出复杂的社会结构,已经出现明显的社会分层。如从事体力劳动的生产者,包括渔民、农民、工匠;精英阶层,包括商人、定居点的领导者和祭司。精英们不再直接为自己的生计进行生产,而是致力于专门的活动,如加强远距离贸易;进行天文观测来测量时间和制定历法;在公共活动的建筑施工中试验和应用算术与几何知识;举行仪式和献祭活动。

    考古发现揭示出精英阶层和普通民众存在较为明显的区分。城市中心各区的公共建筑和住宅建筑在位置、大小和所用材料上都有区别;服装穿着方式和个人佩戴的饰品上,如男性权威人士的项链和大耳环,女性的项链和头巾,也体现了社会区别。一些装饰品、项链是用从遥远的地方(如厄瓜多尔海岸)所获材料制作的,专供少数社会上层人物使用。

    中央集权的国家雏形已经显露。苏佩河谷的人口分布在苏佩河两岸被称作“帕查卡”的城市定居点中,这些定居点的规模和建筑体量各不相同。每个“帕查卡”都由几个“艾柳”组成,这些“艾柳”是通过亲缘关系结合在一起的族群,拥有相同的祖先,通过祖先来确定身份,并由族长领导。族长中有一个主要首领——库拉卡,负责指挥全体居民。这种政府制度在苏佩河谷20多个城市定居点中运行,由于卡拉尔居于核心地位,它发挥领导和组织其他城市定居点的作用,形成一个广泛而有序的互惠、交流网络。

    卡拉尔是一座和平与和谐之城,考古发掘中没有发现战争的痕迹,没有防御城墙,没有武器,没有残缺不全的尸体,这与通过战争产生国家的理论解释有所不同。美国考古学家乔纳森?哈斯认为,卡拉尔人进行了人类建立政府的实验,他们将个人自由交给一个中央集权机构,由中央集权机构决定创建一个作为仪式中心的城市,并要求大家为共同或更大的利益努力工作。人们之所以选择成立“中央政府”,是因为意识到合作将使个人和整个社区受益。考古学家露丝?沙迪认为,对神的崇拜是凝聚力和社会平衡背后的驱动力。人们之所以接受中央集权政府的存在,是因为他们相信统治者可以在人与生者的社会和神与死者的社会之间进行调解,政府的管理对于保证生活是必要的。卡拉尔社会展现出一定的复杂性,种种迹象表明,卡拉尔不仅仅是一个简单的农业社会,而且是一个具有一定组织能力和复杂结构的社会实体,已经具备早期国家的基本要素。

    宗教作为意识形态与政治权力相结合。卡拉尔的金字塔、广场和祭坛等雄伟建筑不仅是宗教仪式的场所,也是社会和政治活动的中心。金字塔象征着与天界的联系,广场则是集体仪式和庆典的场所。卡拉尔人信奉多神教,崇拜多种神灵。这些神灵与自然现象、农业、天气和其他重要生活领域有关。祭祀活动在卡拉尔占据重要地位。人们通过圣火祭坛进行各种形式的献祭,包括毛发、珠子、石英碎片、骨器、木器、纺织品、鱼类、贝类等,这些被认为是向神灵表达敬意和请求庇护的方式。统治者和祭司被视为祖先和神灵的代表或中介,他们通过控制宗教仪式、祭祀活动和宗教建筑来巩固自己的权威。卡拉尔的宗教活动是在音乐伴奏中进行的,在这里出土了一套由秃鹰和鹈鹕翼骨制成并绘有鸟类和猴子图案的横笛(共32支),一套由骆马骨和鹿骨制成的号角(共38支),一套由芦苇和棉线制作的排笛。在没有军事力量的情况下,宗教成为卡拉尔统治者凝聚和控制社会的力量,它使卡拉尔—苏佩河谷的居民团结起来。

    科技知识在文明发展中发挥重要作用。卡拉尔人开发了先进的农业灌溉系统,修建水渠和水库,这对于他们在干旱环境中维持农业生产至关重要。在设计和建造大型纪念性建筑以及修建灌溉水渠时,显然运用了算术和几何知识。有证据表明,卡拉尔人已经具备天文学知识,并将其应用到与经济、宗教活动有关的历法制定中。在卡拉尔上城C组的公共广场中央竖立着一块巨石,是当时用来观测天文的。他们已经发明一种记录信息的工具系统,如在上城C组的画廊金字塔中,考古学家发现一件纺织品遗物,被认为是“基普”,即用作记录工具的一套打结绳线。同时,在上城B组小金字塔的三个石块上还发现了基普的图画。这说明卡拉尔人已经在使用基普,比印加人早数千年之久。考古学家还发现,一些药用植物多次出现在墓葬中,表明卡拉尔人已经了解一些植物的药用价值。在纺织技术方面,他们利用棉花纤维编织连衣裙,采用穿插和缠绕的方法,还制作了渔网、鞋类、包类、绳索等。圣火祭坛下方建造的地下通风系统,能够引导风力保持火焰燃烧,并将烟雾排到室外。需要指出的是,虽然早在公元前4000年厄瓜多尔的瓦尔迪维亚等地就已经开始生产陶器,但卡拉尔人并没有使用或自己生产陶器。他们用葫芦作为器皿,用木头雕刻勺子,用石头雕制盘子。因此,卡拉尔文明属于“前陶瓷”文明,这一点已被考古学家们认定。

    由于强烈地震和灾难性气候变化,卡拉尔—苏佩文明在公元前1800年左右被遗弃。虽然如此,它在农业、城市建筑、社会政治组织、宗教文化等方面对后来安第斯文明的发展产生深远影响。可以说,卡拉尔—苏佩文明是安第斯文明的摇篮。

    本文转自《光明日报》2024年11月25日

  • 冯裕强:集体化时期工分稀释化视域下乡村公共产品供给研究——以广西容县华六大队为例

    改革开放以来,不少学者对人民公社制度进行了批判,认为它是低效率的、平均主义的制度。例如,有学者认为由于集体经济产权不完整,影响社员的生产积极性,最终导致劳动质量降低。①但是,也有不少学者对此进行反思,认为导致平均主义的原因主要是国家进行工业建设,加上当时的国际环境等因素,不得不从农村抽取剩余产品,而且人民公社在20世纪60年代初“去工业化”后,大量劳力只能进行单一的农业生产,产出极为有限。即便如此,农村还进行了大量的农田水利建设,这对后来的发展起到重要的铺垫作用,也应算作当时的劳动效率。②争议难分高下。笔者不揣浅陋,试图从工分稀释化视角对乡村公共产品供给进行考究,以期对人民公社有更全面的了解,同时也为当下乡村振兴提供经验启示。

    “工分稀释化”,虽有学者提到相近的概念或现象③,但至今尚未有学者对其进行明确定义。笔者以为,工分被稀释主要包括两方面:一是工分的直接稀释,即把非农业生产的工分拿回农业之内进行分配,从而导致工分被稀释,分值下降;其次是物资的间接稀释,即国家、集体从生产队抽走大量物资,从而使队内可分配给社员部分总额减少,最终造成工分贬值。

    乡村公共产品是巩固农业基础地位、保障农村社会稳定、促进农村经济可持续发展的重要基础。国内学术界对农村公共产品的界定④大体一致,主要是指乡村中由集体或政府提供,为广大村民的生产、生活服务,具有一定非竞争性和非排他性的社会产品,具体包括农村基础设施、农田水利主干网络、基础教育、公共卫生、社会保障等。

    一、农田水利基础设施

    华六生产大队(以下简称“华六大队”)位于广西壮族自治区容县南部,隶属于石寨公社,距离县城20多公里,是汉族聚居地,面积约为19.33平方公里,共有十个生产队。⑤容县面积为2257平方公里,其中陆地占97.51%,水域占2.49%,⑥境内岭谷相间,丘陵广布,俗称“八山一水一田”。由于地处山区,为了更好发展农业,华六大队在集体化时期修建了大量农田水利设施。据统计,1963年—1966年间,华六大队修建了大陂、三蛤、枪刀山和长冲等水库,⑦大部分生产队都有受益的山塘或水库。

    为了修建这些水库,必然要耗费大量劳动力。华六大队除了平时抽调社员进行水利建设外,还组建了20人—30人的专业队从事农田水利基本建设。曾任记分员的陀某说:“专业队就是专门开田、开荒、种山,每个生产队抽出几个人。比如我们大队有几十个人,天天都在专业队干活,生产队一样要(给他们)记工分。”(TXL,四队记分员,2017年3月16日)⑧专业队的职责很多,包括水利建设、开荒、大队企业、护理林场等,劳动收入归大队所有。曾任林业员的庞某回忆说:“山上的林木就由专业队队员种植,以前(1958年“大炼钢铁”)烧得太光了,没有林木了。每个队要2—3个,都是年轻的男女民兵。”(PWQ,华六大队林业员、党支部书记,2017年3月20日)曾参加过专业队的肖某也说:“县有县的专业(队),乡有乡的专业(队)。像最大的石剑水库、小垌水库,还有乡的红田水库,每个队抽几个人去。那些水库都是那些人去做的,统一调动。”(XYH,六队专业队队员,2017年4月15日)

    生产队一年中要进行大量的农田水利基本建设,那么这些非农业生产用工究竟在总用工中占多大比例?以1975年为例,根据各级单位的统计数据,八队、华六大队、石寨公社(统计7个生产队)和容县(统计233个生产队)的农业生产用工占总劳动日的比重分别是82.63%、83.70%、85.95%和82.70%。⑨一般而言,统计的生产队越多,就越接近整个县的平均水平。总体上看,公社以下各级单位的生产用工占总劳动日的比值都在容县的生产用工占总劳动日的比值——82.7%上下浮动,也就是说整个县大约要用17%的劳动日去从事非农业生产。这并非特例,在山西省东北里生产队,1977年的非农业生产用工占比达7.7%,这还不包括高达18.98%的农田基建工。⑩可见,在集体化时期,大量非农业生产用工存在于全国各地。除了基建用工,还有各级专业队队员、生产队干部、集体抽调的社员都要回生产队记工分,这些人员的劳动对当年生产队收入的增加并未起直接作用,因此,在外面挣的大量工分拿回生产队进行分配,必然会稀释生产队的工分值。

    那么生产队的实际工分值在集体化时期有什么变化呢?本文从容县档案馆保存的历年分配统计表中整理出表111。

    通过表1可以看到各级单位从1963年到1981年社员分配收入和工分值的变化情况。在生产队一级,由于资料的缺失,我们只能比较完整地看到20世纪70年代的数据变化。总体上,八队从1971年至1981年分配给社员的金额、工分值和人均分配收入都呈波浪式上升,在1979年达到最高值; 华六大队与石寨公社在相同的项目上虽然也呈波浪式上升,但是振幅相对小得多,除了个别年份回落,大部分年份是逐年增长的。分配给社员的金额与工分值、人均分配收入总体上呈正相关。分配给社员的金额越大,工分值和人均分配收入越高,就意味着人民公社在增产的同时社员也实现了增收,集体经济运行良好。三个不同区域都在1979年达到最高值,人均分配收入分别达到98.9元、77.95元和84.44元。需要注意的是,这里的分配金额并不是真金白银,而是生产队把一年所有的劳动产品和收入都折算成货币,扣除所有费用和税金之后的纯收入,生产队实际拥有的现金并没有这么多。

    工分值的高低取决于两方面,一是生产队分配给社员的金额,二是工分的总量。分配给社员的金额是用总收入减去各项支出后得到的数据。而生产队的总收入是农业、林业、畜牧业、副业、渔业和其他收入相加的总和。虽然国家规定生产队应该以发展农业生产为主,12但是非农业生产对生产队的收入也有重要影响。那么生产队的农业生产和非农业生产收入占比各有多少呢?我们以1974年为例。

    本文发现,1974年,农业生产收入占总收入的比重,从生产队到公社再到容县是逐渐降低的,但容县比玉林地区的平均值低了近13个百分点,也就是说容县的非农业生产收入占总收入的比重比玉林地区高出约13个百分点(见表2)。通过对各年份数据进行比对,13%是容县非农业生产收入占比超过玉林地区的正常比值。那么是什么原因导致容县的非农业生产收入占比如此之高呢?要解决这一问题,必须了解林业、畜牧业、副业、渔业和其他收入的占比具体是多少,进而明了容县与玉林地区拉开差距的原因。

    经对比,在畜牧业、渔业和其他收入占总收入的比重方面,容县和玉林地区相差不大,差异产生的主要原因在于林业和副业的收入占总收入的比重,容县比玉林地区分别高出6.33个和4.82个百分点(见表3)。林业收入主要来源于山林,容县地处丘陵,全县有480438人,水田面积为29万亩,人均水田面积仅为0.6亩,山地总面积为225万亩,人均山地面积为4.67亩。13“全县179个大队,山区大队98个,占全县大队55%……一九七一年生产木材28234立方米,占全县木材生产31874立方米的90%。”14华六大队就是这98个山区大队其中之一。据1960年普查,华六大队总面积为24038亩(约16平方公里),其中林地面积为17189亩,151974年,华六大队有1778人和1813亩耕地(1683亩水田),16人均有9.67亩山林、0.95亩水田。如此丰富的森林资源,林业产品具体又有什么呢?1974年的统计年报表显示,石寨公社造林719.3亩,其中用材林(松木和杉木)483.4亩,油茶196亩,玉桂14亩;收获的林副产品有:油茶籽515.9担、油桐籽73.45担、松脂9215.95担;收获的水果为:沙田柚41.5担、龙眼65担和荔枝88.6担;另外还有茶叶96.87担、桑蚕茧129.16担等。这些产品收入是属于林业收入还是副业收入?此问题涉及容县林业与副业的收入来源问题。在八队分类账本中,林业收入主要来源于售卖原木,副业收入内容则更多,包括松脂、纸浆、茶叶、砖瓦、石灰等。这与1975年容县林业局统计分类相符。1975年容县产量较大的林副产品有:油桐籽812担、松脂238131担、木柴183541担、木炭2199担、土纸(纸浆)4220担、沙田柚142830担;木材产品35489立方米(原木30911立方米)17。因此,容县的林业收入主要来源于各类木材,副业收入则主要来源于松脂、木柴和沙田柚等,而就收入占比来说,松脂的收入无疑是最大的。早在1963年,容县就申请建立容县松脂基地,通过调配物资和劳动力有计划地造林和割松脂。181972年,十队割松脂收入达4720.05元,除去人工和材料,净收入3794.2元。19正是有了松脂和其他各类林木和林副产品,才使得容县的非农业生产收入占总收入的比例远高于其他县。

    明晰公社的各项收入后,可以发现,表2中分配给社员的部分占总收入的比重,八队与其他各级单位之间差别较大,除了八队的超过60%,其他各级单位都在55%以下。这意味着整个地区人民公社平均分配到社员的部分占比并不高。导致这样的原因与生产队的管理水平有着密切关系。八队与其他单位相比,税率(主要是农业税——公粮)和集体提留基本保持一致,相差不大;其缴纳的公粮基本保持不变,高产年份会稍提高,减产年份会稍减;集体提留主要包括公积金、公益金、储备粮基金、生产费基金和统筹金,这些不管如何都是要拿出来发展生产和上交集体的。关键是在费用支出占总收入比重方面,八队比玉林地区全部生产队的平均水平低5.66个百分点。根据八队的账本和收益分配统计表的金额,本文计算出八队在1977年和1979年分配给社员的部分占总收入的比重分别为66.9%和64.8%,20分配给社员部分占比很高,说明八队在支出控制和经济管理方面做得比较好。

    费用支出主要包括生产费用、管理费用和其他费用,支出越多,能分配给社员的收入就越少,工分值就越低,所以费用支出直接影响工分值的大小。那么,其他生产队的费用支出高的原因到底是什么?在玉林市档案局笔者发现一份1976年的档案——《关于人民公社收益分配的情况问题和意见》,其内容可以较好地说明这一问题。

    该份档案主要是对1975年玉林地区人民公社收益分配中的分配收入出现的一些问题进行总结并提出整改意见。1975年全地区粮食大增产,但是分配给社员的部分占比并不高,主要原因是费用开支大,全自治区费用支出占总收入的27%,但是玉林地区费用支出占总收入的比重高达33%。费用开支大的原因有八点。第一,有的地方发展生产不坚持“自力更生”原则,远途高价购买或调换化肥,费用开支大,生产成本高;第二,有的地方农田基建补助花样多,标准高,集体负担重;第三,有的地方扩建学校,增加民办教师,从而增大了集体费用的开支;第四,有的地方变相增加脱产人员,加重了集体负担;第五,有的地方社员上调家禽、生猪派购任务,要生产队补钱、补粮,增加集体负担;第六,有的地方的乱支乱补、大吃大喝、请客送礼、挥霍学杂费等不正之风还没有彻底刹住;第七,有的地方搞账外分配,或者高价(市场价)买入猪肉,然后按照牌价(较低价格)分配给社员;第八,有的地方存在贪污、挪用、超支欠款等问题。21从这些原因中,可以看到生产队在经营管理中存在的各种问题,虽然说这些现象并不必然存在于每个生产队,但是如果不严格控制支出,必然会严重影响社员的收入。

    在表1中,本文还注意到工分值的变化。八队的工分值从1965年的0.35元逐渐上升到1981年的0.53元,1979年和1981年都突破了0.5元。由于影响工分值的因素非常多,生产队能够保持增长已属不易。1963年,华六大队的工分值为0.19元,此后逐步增长到1981年的0.55元。与华六大队相比,石寨公社的工分值增势更为平缓,在20世纪70年代总体保持在0.4元左右。这三级单位的工分值虽然涨幅不大,总劳动日却大量增加。通过计算可知,八队在1979年的劳动日是1965年2.1倍;华六大队和石寨公社1979年的劳动日都是1965年的1.76倍。工分主要是靠劳动力挣的,劳动力越多意味着工分越多。1979年,八队的劳动力为70人,是1965年45人的1.5倍;华六大队1979年的劳动力为915人,是1965年719人的1.27倍;石寨公社1979年的劳动力为12643人,是1965年9118人的1.39倍。22可见劳动力的增加速度远没有工分的增长速度快,工分的快速增长必然导致工分被稀释。同时应注意到,人口增长特别是劳动力增长自然使劳动工分增加,但是过多的劳动投入,在单位土地上带来的产出,并不会均一地带来同等幅度的增产。以八队和石寨公社为例,经笔者计算,八队1979年亩产1126.93斤,是1965年亩产886.87斤的1.27倍,而同期八队工分总量增长了1.1倍;1979年石寨公社亩产为1146.15斤,是1965年亩产917.31斤的1.25倍,工分总量却增长了0.76倍。23即便扣除部分工分用于非农业生产,工分的增长速度仍高于每亩的增产速度。这便是黄宗智所讲的“过密化”或“内卷化”现象:“在人多地少和土地的自然生产力有限的现实下,单位土地面积上越来越多的人力投入只可能导致其边际报酬的递减。”24

    为避免农业生产上的过度内卷,充分利用劳动力巩固和发展集体经济,1959年年初中共中央农村工作部对当年全国农村人民公社的劳动力进行了分配规划,提出将51.4%的农村劳动力用于农业生产,剩余的48.6%用于国家工业交通、林牧渔副业、社办工业、交通运输、基本建设、生活服务等方面;在农业中,从事粮食生产的约为8000万个劳动力,占农村总劳动力的38.1%,从事其他作物生产的约有2793万个劳动力,占农村总劳动力的13.3%。25也就是说,从事农业生产的劳动力仅占总劳动力的一半,而真正种植粮食的劳动力不到4成。26所以十队的一位妇女说:“强的劳动力又抽出去了呀,就剩下二、三级的婆娘在家了,有的上山搞副业,没有多少劳动力的。” (XJA,十队社员,2017年3月25日)五队老队长补充道:“(种田)天天都是那帮人的。上调的人做不了,他不做这个就去做那个,做田就是做田的,我搞副业就是搞副业,分了工的。”(WGM,五队队长,2017年3月24日)

    笔者在各生产队的账册中,发现不少专业队和副业人员的回队账单。例如,十队“1971年5月10日,收许有昌交款回队12—3月48元”(修建广西金红铁路,简称“6927工程”),27八队“1972年1月26日,收其文11—12月回队款23.6元” (专业队修船坝),28“1977年3月 14日收世天泥水工入队8元”。29当时规定专业队队员和从事副业的人员必须按一定比例将收入交回生产队,生产队按同等劳动力记工分,这样才能参与生产队的分配,同时生产队还要按时给外出的专业队队员寄口粮。例如,1969年广西从玉林抽调民工18000人,参加金红铁路修建工程,其中容县被抽调3000人。工程文件规定,“民工的生活待遇,每人每月30元,其中40%交回生产队,参加生产队分配,60%由民工个人支配。民工的口粮供应,除从生产队带足本人的口粮外,按工种定量标准,不足部分由国家供应”。30由于路途遥远,口粮是无法送去的,生产队只能通过转账的方式给民工购买口粮,如八队“1970年9月20日,支成才转6927(工程)粮200斤,每百斤9.3元,金额18.6元”。31可见,除去各级专业队队员、副业人员、民办教师等精干劳动力,真正进行农业生产的劳动力是很有限的。在非常有限的劳动力从事农业生产的情况下,其产出自然不会太高。

    1974年,广西壮族自治区革命委员会水利电力局提出要大力组建专业队。“不但骨干水利工程要坚持常年施工,而且社社队队都要组织农田基建专业队,大搞常年施工。一个队、一个社、一个县如果抽出百分之十的劳动力,一年坚持施工十个月,就等于抽调百分之五十的劳动力每年突击两个月要完成的工作量。”32在容县,仅从1974年至1975年2月25日,全县动工大小水利工程727处,完工243处;完成造田、造地10896亩(其中造田5337亩,造地5559亩),另开茶山地9059亩;完成改土面积11.63万亩,共用去452.8万工日。33那么在集体化时期,容县在农田水利基本建设上大概用了多少工呢?

    图1显示,新中国成立后,容县在集体化时期的农田水利基本建设完成的劳动工日的变化。由于这是官方统计资料,所以其中的数据只统计较大的工程,如华六大队除了大陂水库,其他四个小水库均未统计在内,34即还有很多大队、生产队自主修建的小型水库、山塘、沟渠等都没有统计在内。即便如此,以上数据也在总体上体现了集体化时期劳动投入的规律。新中国成立初期,由于国力较弱,集体经济制度还未建全,人们只能对小型水利设施进行修缮,投入的材料和劳动都很少,只有23.5万工日。1953年至1959年间,容县从农业互助组过渡到人民公社,完成的工作量明显增加,完成劳动日35也随之剧增,特别是1958年前后,也就是在“大跃进”时期,劳动投入达到一个小高峰,共投入565万工日。在1970年到1978年间,无论是在工作量上,还是在完成劳动日上,都呈现梯度式剧增之势,特别是在1976年,达到历史的高峰,耗费了1007万工日36。1980年以后,农田水利基本建设基本处于停滞状态。另外,在所有完成劳动工日中,水利用工占了绝大部分,主要是用于兴修大小型水利工程。1980年,由于集体经济的解体,大量农田水利基本建设失去了生产队的人力和物力支持。

    综上可知,一方面,在集体化时期,容县乃至整个广西都抽调了大量劳力进行农田水利基本建设。采取的方法是,专业队常年施工与群众性突击相结合。专业队不仅有建设专项水利工程的,还有从事造田、造地等农田水利基本建设的,另外在级别上还分为大队级、公社级和县级的专业队。这样无论是在农忙时,还是在农闲时,大量劳力都被抽调出去进行各类农田水利基本建设。另一方面,这些农田水利基本建设属于共同生产条件的改进投入,对山区生产队的农业生产尤为重要。虽然短期内对农业生产的影响并不明显,但在灾荒之年,它在一定程度上可以避免或者降低灾害带来的减产程度,甚至可以保证部分农田旱涝保收。

    二、生活性公共产品

    人民公社除了为当地提供大量农田水利基础设施外,还为广大社员提供了各类生活性公共产品,包括文化教育、医疗保健和社会救济等。这些公共产品并不是完全由国家来提供,绝大部分是由当地人民群众自力更生、自筹解决的。这些公共产品的积累并不会在短期内提高农业生产率,只有经过较长时段后,才能显现它们的作用和影响力,所以卢晖临主张要“打开视野看效率”,特别是延后的效率。37而要实现这些积累,社员不得不从相对干瘪的腰包中再掏出一部分劳动产品,这样就会导致分配给社员的产品总量减少,体现在工分上就是工分贬值,进而影响社员的生产积极性。

    (一)以民办教师为主的基础教育

    1969年之前,华六大队有两所小学,共4名公办教师,当地整体文化水平较低。据1964年第二次全国人口普查,华六大队有1392人,具有初小(小学一年级至四年级)以上文化水平的只有664人,占总人口的47.7%;石寨公社有18130人,具有初小以上文化水平的有9425人,占总人口的52%,其中只读完初小,13岁—40岁的青壮年有2686人;读完高小(小学五年级至六年级)的有3348人;初中文化水平有606人;高中文化水平有90人;拥有大学文凭的只有9人。38为提高广大人民群众的科学文化水平,1969年广西要求各地将农村公办小学下放给大队、生产队办,农村公办中学下放给当地社、镇革命委员会直接领导和管理。经县、社统一调整后,仍缺教师的大队,根据实际需要,选拔民办教师充实教师队伍。选拔的要求是:家庭出身好,并有一定教学能力,如果是复退军人和知识青年,则优先录用。对于这些民办教师的工资待遇,补助多少由贫下中农讨论决定。39

    1970年,华六大队共有4所小学,1所小学附初中,公办教师7人,民办教师9人。40在集体化时期,公办教师的薪酬全部由国家支付,而民办教师的薪酬由生产队承担(统筹)。华六大队的年终统计表显示,1973年,十队上交了981斤统筹粮和161元统筹金,其中统筹金是为4名大队干部、4名民办教师以及1名兽医上交的。41然而,同年,华六大队共有13名民办教师,一般生产队原则上选派1名教师,十队由于和九队合开一所分校选派了2名。据当时的大队干部介绍,并不是所有的民办教师都可以统筹,只有教得比较好的才有资格统筹。至于没有得到统筹的教师则回各自的生产队记工分,大队再发给少量的补贴。42

    随着教育事业的发展,到1978年,容县有6161名教师,其中民办教师3626名,占教师总数的59%;43华六大队共有7名公办教师,16名民办教师,44民办教师占比约为69.6%。由于小学教师大部分是民办教师,业务水平低,课堂教学中出现差错屡见不鲜,再加上“半天学习、半天劳动”,“以劳代学”的教学安排,学生学习规律被打乱,知识基础较差,甚至出现大量留级现象。为提高教学质量,容县积极采取多项措施,通过举办轮训班,办函授学校、进修学校,开展巡回辅导等提高教师的业务水平。45

    教学质量不高,除了教师能力不足以外,民办教师的工资待遇没有得到很好的保障,使其不能安心教学也是重要原因。“我县民办教师(不包括自筹教师)的生活待遇有两种,一是国家补助加大队统筹,二是国家补助加生产队记工分,不足部分由学校学费或勤工俭学收入补足。不管是采用哪种办法的,都有较长期拖欠民办教师工资的问题。”46拖欠情况包括:一是教师工资统筹不上来。例如1978年,华六大队5个民办教师,总共被拖欠工资551元,人均被拖欠110.2元。二是教师工资未发齐。部分大队给民办教师一年只发十个月的工资,而且每月工资未达到初中教师30元、小学教师24元的标准。三是教师粮食收不齐。部分大队规定,民办教师的粮食要本人到各生产队收,然而,实际上有的粮食收不全,有的收到次等谷。47可见,当时民办教师待遇存在长期拖欠和粮食以次充好等问题,极大地影响了教师的正常生活。

    根据收益分配统计表的数据,华六大队在1980年已经从1979年的13个生产队分为18个生产队,不少生产队内部开始酝酿分田分地了。民办教师的工资和粮食主要由生产队提供,生产队的解体必然会引起民办教师群体的动荡。1981年,容县教育局在汇报普及教育工作时指出:“我县最难解决的问题有:我县民办教师比例大,群众负担较重,近年来,由于生产队体制的改变,民办教师的粮、款很难统筹解决,严重地影响着民办教师生活和工作的安定。”48十队的许某正是由于分队,导致报酬没有兑现,退出了教师队伍。“(19)80年分田到户,这里(十队)分成三个小队,我们没有统筹得上,我就不做了。”(XJA,十队民办教师,2017年3月25日)由于民办教师和其他上调人员的物资、工分很难从生产队进行统筹,教师队伍面临严峻挑战。从表1中1979年至1981年的数据变化便能推断出各级单位大量缩减支出。虽然华六大队和石寨公社的劳动日与分配给社员部分的金额都减少了,但是分配给社员部分的金额占总收入的比重增加了(华六大队增加了7.54个百分点、石寨公社增加了4.93个百分点)。

    为解决民办教师的教学质量和后勤保障问题,1981年,容县教育局和财政局开始整顿民办教师队伍,辞退了思想品质、业务水平和健康状况不能胜任教学工作的教师,业务能力强、业绩突出的民办骨干教师则被吸收为公办教师。49华六大队的民办教师除了部分因为工资低没有坚持下来,大部分后来都转为编制内教师,成为真正的骨干力量。

    容县在1950年至1981年间,小学生人数从13236人增加到78134人,教职工从641人扩大到3749人(含民办教师1910人);中学生人数从898人增加到30435人,教职工从98人增加到2317人(含民办教师1039人)。50小学生数量增长了近4.9倍,教职工人数增长4.8倍,适龄儿童的入学率高达93.4%。1981年,容县中小学民办教师人数仍占教师总数的48.6%。据统计,当年全国有民办教师近396.7万人51,占教师总数的47%。支撑这支庞大的民办教师队伍的是全国600多万个生产队52。保守估算,一位民办教师的月工资约为24元,国家和生产队各承担12元,生产队每年还要另外提供600斤口粮(100斤口粮折价为9.5元,600斤口粮折价为57元),因此每位民办教师需要生产队每年为其支付201元,全国396.7万名民办教师每年需要生产队支付79736.7万元,10年便接近80亿元,平均每个生产队10年共支付1333元支持基础教育。事实上还有相当一部分民办教师没有得到统筹,需要回生产队记工分参加分配。53当然,这些支出是值得的。据1982年第三次全国人口普查统计,华六大队有1720人,小学以上文化水平的人数为1398人,占总人口的81.28%,比1964年高出33个百分点;整个公社有24492人,小学以上文化水平的有20275人,占比为72.95%,比1964年高出20个百分点。54可以说,民办教师在广大农村地区,极大提高了社员的科学文化水平,这些学生在改革开放后,逐渐成长为社会主义建设的主力军。

    (二)以赤脚医生为主的公共卫生

    除了教育事业,农村的医疗卫生事业也主要由生产队负担。在毛泽东要求“把医疗卫生工作的重点放到农村去”的“六二六”指示的推动下,全国各地都把这项工作当作一项重要的政治任务,迅速组织医疗队,开展农村合作医疗。

    为积极响应中央号召,使广大群众看得上病,看得起病,吃得起药,1966年5月1日,容县人民委员会卫生科根据中央文件,制定《关于实行合作医疗的卫生所的有关意见》,这份文件成为容县后来开展合作医疗的重要纲领。“凡实行合作医疗的区,则在全区范围内看病不收诊费(门诊、出诊)、注射费、处置费;凡有条件的卫生所要开设中、西药柜,以利方便病者,减轻社员合作医疗负担,解决医生部分工资和卫生所办公费,还可以解决部分贫下中农的医药困难的减免;医生到生产队巡回要背下乡中西成药下去,以利方便病者,但要实行保本保值,收入归卫生所;诊费、药价要坚决贯彻执行国家规定的标准收费;为了减少病者负担,每个医生(接生员)都要学会针灸、使用针灸和使用中草药医疗疾病。”55从这些意见中可以知道,容县主张医生要通过各种手段,尽可能地减轻人民群众的负担,收入归集体,强调中西医结合,特别要充分利用中药和针灸为社员治病。

    要健全合作医疗制度,除了上述规定外,还要解决好医生的生活问题。1967年1月,容县发布《关于人民公社成立卫生所,医生、接生员实行合作医疗制度的通知》,规定每个公社成立卫生所,每个卫生所安排医生1—3名(逐步配备中、西医生1—2人),接生员1—2人。医生和接生员领取的粮食和工资全部由公社统筹解决,医生的月工资为15元至30元,接生员的月工资为15元至20元,另外,他们每月领取大米30斤;统筹粮由生产队统一送当地粮所,粮所则每月按量供应大米。56此文件对医生与接生员的待遇进行了相关规定,但是“粮食、工资全部由公社统筹解决”只是把问题抛给了公社,工资到底怎么解决并没有明确规定。统筹粮经粮所再转到医生手中虽然更有保障和方便管理,在现实中却很难实行,尤其像华六大队这样的山区大队,离县城路途遥远且崎岖不平,医生每月领粮既费时又费力,所以后来大部分大队都是让医生到生产队挑粮而不是到粮所领取。为进一步减轻人民群众负担,容县对药品、医疗器械的采购和零售价格作出规定:“今后凡已实行合作医疗大队的卫生室到所在供销社(县医药公司各门市部)采购中、西药品,医疗器械不论金额多少,一律按批发价作价供应。各卫生所一律按当地供销社零售价销售。”57这些规定从成本、服务等方面要求尽量以最低价格为广大人民群众提供服务。

    由于合作医疗制度是个新事物,具体怎么做只能不断探索,寻找适合本地的制度。容县采取树立典型、相互学习的办法让合作医疗尽快办起来。1970年石头公社的合作医疗办得较好,成为各公社学习的对象。该公社的卫生队伍包括:大队医生、采制药人员、接生员和生产队卫生员。大队级人员的报酬向生产队统筹,实行工分加补贴的办法,医生一般每月补助5—10元,其他工作人员每月补助3—4元,卫生员则回生产队记工分。对于合作医疗资金的筹集,由生产队统一计算按参加人数支付。每人交1元,其中个人交0.5元,生产队交0.4元,大队和公社各交0.05元。在收费制度方面,大队卫生所一般收挂号费0.05元,出诊费0.1元,注射费0.1元,接生费每个小儿0.5元,这些费用由病人负担,药费全部由合作医疗开支。如果是重病号到公社以上医院治病或住院,合作医疗支付60%,剩余的40%由病人负担。合作医疗主张自力更生、全民办医,贯彻“三土(土医、土法、土药)”“四自(自种、自采、自制、自用)”方针。石头公社各级单位均设有草药室,以草药为主(用量要求达到70%—80%),中药为辅,适量西药备急,其中草药的来源为:抽专人采集和群众献药相结合,三级有专人采药、制药,采药、制药人员报酬由大队负责。58石头公社根据本社的经济状况,各级单位分摊社员的部分医疗资金,同时大力采用中草药治疗疾病。因为容县山多,药材丰富,可就地取材,加上生产队种植草药,大大节省了药费开支。

    “合作医疗是收每个人的钱,那时没有收钱(看病),试过两年吃药不要钱,之后就不行了,反正像大队的企业那样。”(TFQ,三队赤脚医生,2017年3月17日)华六大队的佟某当时是一名赤脚医生,1947年出生,1965年在容县学医,1968年9月在大队开始行医。对于赤脚医生的报酬,他说:“最初几年就是吃工资,(19)68—(19)72年,24元每月,8毛钱一天。工资是从各生产队统筹,整个大队有副业人员、大队干部、医生,全部按照整个村有多少收入,再分配每个月多少钱,各个生产队抽多少上来,统一分配的。1972年以后就是吃工分,做医生就相当于搞副业一样,每天记12分。算起来就是三四毛1天,有些生产队只有两三毛,那时很穷的。以前我们容县村医大部分都是吃工分。一个月是50斤稻谷,一年600斤。”(TFQ,三队赤脚医生,2017年1月6日)但是,对于1972年以后一直是吃工分的说法,在曾任大队干部的陈某那里得到不一样的答案。“医生就是从利润那里支付工资,粮食就从村里统筹,老师的工资和粮食也是从村里统筹。”(CPY,华六大队会计辅导员,2017年7月6日)陈某1974年12月至1978年冬在大队任会计辅导员。59由于合作医疗制度在不断完善,华六大队根据上级相关政策,既实行过工分加补贴,也实行过工资制。

    1972年,广西制定了《农村合作医疗制度试行草案》,规定“凡是参加合作医疗者,按规定交纳合作医疗基金或以药代金。基金由个人和集体(公益金)负担,负担比例由社队根据情况自行确定。由生产队统一计算按参加人数支付”;要合理解决赤脚医生的报酬和口粮,其报酬要略高于同等劳动力的水平。60“合理解决”意味着赤脚医生的报酬既可以是工资的形式也可以是工分的形式,只要合情合理,并能够调动医护人员的积极性就行,所以1973年,容县各公社的赤脚医生报酬存在各式各样的形式,例如“实行工资制,开支从收入中解决……合作医疗变大队企业,收入归大队,赤脚医生实行工分加补贴,全部向生产队统筹”。61到1974年,石寨公社有23个医生,报酬都是以工资的形式发放,每月工资最低20元,最高30元。62到1977年,《广西壮族自治区农村合作医疗章程》规定赤脚医生的报酬为:“实行‘工分加补贴’的办法,每年由大队根据赤脚医生的政治思想、工作表现、技术水平、劳动态度等情况评定,一般应略高于同等劳动力的收入水平”。63那么“工分加补贴”具体是如何实行呢?这在1978年《关于加强合作医疗基金筹集和稳定赤脚医生报酬的请示报告》中有介绍:“每个赤脚医生每月在队记260分或300分,每天补助贰角生活费,每月补助六元,有的补九元,按该医生所在队分值计算工分所得部分,平均每月加生活补贴不达24—30元的,再从合作医疗收入中补足。”641979年,容县179个大队中,实行合作医疗的有155个,共有627名赤脚医生。在本大队报销的比例,大部分在30%—50%之间,上送报销比例在20%—40%之间,其中华六大队的合作医疗报销额度是30%。65

    在广大赤脚医生的努力下,1982年,容县60岁—90岁的人口从1964的26517人增长到42699人,占当年总人口的比重由7.07%提高到7.69%。661982年全国人口已超10亿人,60岁以上人口比重达到7.62%,比1964年的6.13%高出近1.5个百分点,67这在一定程度上说明我国医疗水平和卫生保健系统更加完善,而这离不开无数赤脚医生和基层医护工作者的默默奉献。1980年全国农村赤脚医生总人数达146.3万人,其中女赤脚医生48.9万人,农村生产队卫生员235.7万人,农村接生员63.5万人。68而这些不脱产医护人员的工资、口粮主要靠生产队解决。仅就工资方面,医生的月工资为24元,一年为288元,146.3万人一年工资共为42134.4万元,10年便是42亿元。事实上生产队所付出的要远远高于这一数字。国家只支付了少量的管理费和药费,以非常低的成本构建了完善的农村医疗卫生系统,保障了社员的身心健康,提高了出勤率,促进了集体经济的健康发展。

    (三)保障困难群众的基本生活

    在大部分人的回忆中,似乎并没有什么困难户,因为大家都很穷。然而,贫富只是相对的。在各生产队的账本中,笔者发现不少困难户领取国家救济金的凭证。例如,笔者在八队的账本中看到1972年3月7日,“大队拨来仕华救济金10元,交丽梅领”,69后面还有刘丽梅的印章。大队保存的阶级档案显示,陆仕华生于1932年9月,1972年已40岁,一家6口人,育有两儿两女,均不满10岁。70从这些情况来看,陆仕华一家的生活非常艰难。

    生产队用来救助军烈属、五保户和困难户的资金、粮食,一般是用公益金。公益金“要根据每一年度的需要和可能,由社员大会认真讨论决定,不能超过可分配的总收入的百分之二至三……生产大队对于生活没有依靠的老、弱、孤、寡、残疾的社员,遭到不幸事故、生活发生困难的社员,经过社员大会讨论和同意,实行供给或者给以补助”。71

    除了上述困难户外,还有一类困难户往往被人们所忽视,那就是“超支户”,顾名思义,即一年的收入不足以抵扣一年开支的农户。社员一年的劳动收入是通过工分来兑现的,生产队通过工分把各种生产、生活资料分配给社员。如果他们一年的工分收入不足以抵扣其一年的开支,那么这一年不仅没有盈余,反而欠生产队的钱粮。本文以八队的陆仕忠一户为例展开说明。

    1976年,陆仕忠一户共有7人,夫妻二人加五个子女,大女儿1962年生,14岁,属于半劳力;第二个是儿子,1964年生,12岁,其他均为10岁以下儿童。72从表4的支出中,可以看到,陆仕忠一家支出金额最高的是口粮,全年消耗口粮3548.1斤,平均每人消耗506.87斤,需支付335.17元,占总支出的91%;当年挣得工分8599.3分,每个工分值为0.38元,全年总收入为326.77元,不足以抵扣总支出(367.93元),超支了41.07元。

    八队在1976年共有6户超支,11户有盈余,4户平收,总户数为21户,超支户约占29%。这个比例在华六大队应该说是非常低的。1976年,华六大队超支户高达186户,占比55.3%,欠款共计11287元,73不管是占比还是欠款数额都在集体化时期达到最高值。由于欠款数额不断累积,到人民公社后期,生产队处于入不敷出的艰难境地。

    为何会产生如此多的超支户?这是一个不得不探讨的问题。

    超支户的存在,表面上看是农户挣的工分不够多,不足以抵扣从生产队获得的生活物资,本质上是因为生产队的物资不足导致工分含金量不高,以至于农户的工分不够支付其生活开销。如果物资充足,每一个工分所含的物资就更多,大部分农户的工分是足以支付其生活开销的。而物资短缺又与农业的产出密切相关。那么农业产出为何不高呢?当笔者把这一问题抛给村里的老人时,往往得到的答案是:没有肥料和农药。

    农谚说“有收无收在于水,收多收少在于肥”。“那个时候由于生产条件落后,种子也很落后,肥料在市面上也很少有卖。一般都没有肥料来卖,到后期才有这个碳铵和这个氨水。(19)80、(19)79年以前都是没有肥料供应的,基本上是山上的草皮泥,也就是这些人上山铲这个草皮泥来烧,烧了以后再撒到水田里面去,过去都是这样耕种的,也没有什么杂交种子,都是落后的种子,一般是(收获)200—300斤每亩,现在(每亩)都有1000—1200斤。”(CPY,华六大队会计辅导员,2017年1月6日)“过去主要是没有肥料,没有这个良种,现在则有良种、有农药,所以生产好,过去喝粥也难有喝。”(HZN,六队队长,2017年1月6日)

    在八队1977年的分类账中,“农业支出”记录了一整年的所有支出项目。经笔者统计,八队当年共购买了复合肥2斤,尿素415.1斤;碳铵10950斤,包括一级碳铵和次级碳铵(肥力较低,价格较便宜);农药品种有“乐果”“毒杀芬”“六六粉”“敌百虫”等;早稻浸谷种2270斤,晚稻谷种2884斤,共5154斤。74八队当年有130.5亩耕地,其中水田117亩,旱地13.5亩(4.2亩自留地),75除去自留地,集体实际拥有耕地126.3亩,两季共252.6亩,平均每亩施1.64斤尿素和43.35斤碳铵,每亩水田要22斤谷种,农药以“六六粉”为主。投入这些生产要素后,当年八队共收获109523斤稻谷,亩产468斤。76

    此外,农业产出低还受到生态环境的制约。正如黄宗智对新自由主义经济学理论批判的那样,农业不同于工业,不是投入的生产要素越多,单位产出就越多,甚至总量和产出几乎可以无限制扩大。把农业等同于工业,本身就是对农业的误解。农业说到底是人在土地上种植植物的有机问题,而不是一个机器生产的无机问题。因为农业生产受地力和生态环境的限制,土地不可能无限产出。77很可能一场洪涝或者干旱就能把农民辛苦劳作一年的成果化为乌有。

    从表5可知,容县在1969年—1982年的14年间,影响早稻的各类自然灾害频繁发生,发生率从高到低依次排列是:病虫害、龙舟水、倒春寒和夏涝。需要注意的是,表5并未统计对晚稻影响较大的寒露风。当这些灾害组合性地发生时,会给农业造成致命打击。例如1976年,由于倒春寒的发生,当地烂秧严重,既损失了大量稻种,又推迟了播种季节。不巧的是,当年不仅出现龙舟水,病虫害也大发生,由于预防及时和经营管理得较好,早稻损失不大。但是,由于早稻种植推迟,导致晚稻插播也推迟,这样就使晚稻在扬花灌浆期遭遇寒露风。“抽穗扬花期遇到寒露风天气,直接影响抽穗开花的速度,使空秕粒增多,降低千粒重,造成减产。”78当年水稻产量八队比1975年减收5874斤,人均分配口粮减少20斤;华六大队减产110075斤,人均分配口粮减少54.9斤;石寨公社减产1178295斤,人均分配口粮减少56斤。79这最终导致华六大队的超支户数量由1975年144户增加到186户,占比为55.3%。同年,容县减产3423万斤,人均分配口粮减少70.6斤,超支户由35005户增加到36779户,增加了1774户。80这些数据说明,农业生产深受生态环境的制约,尤其是自然灾害对农作物的影响。然而,经济学家们往往有意或无意地忽视了这一重要因素。生产队有超支户、平收户和盈余户,其中最容易由不欠生产队转变成欠生产队的农户是平收户。自然灾害对平收户的影响,就像“一个处身于水深没颈的人,即使是一阵轻波细浪,也可能把它淹没”。81可以说,生产经营中的任何一个环节出现异常,都有可能使平收户变为超支户。这也是为什么在集体化时期,人民公社要进行大量的农田水利基本建设。有了完善的农田水利设施,可较好地降低自然灾害对农作物的损害程度,使得农民在面对寒露风时,并不是无能为力。由于容县历年出现寒露风概率最多的时间是从每年10月11日至11月10日82,所以较好的办法是种植早熟和中熟的稻种,这样就可以让水稻在抽穗扬花期避开寒露风,但这需要优良的稻种。此外,根据广大人民群众长期的耕作经验:“有水不怕寒露风”,在寒露风到来之前往田里灌水,就可以保存地温和增加稻田小环境的温度,从而减轻寒露风对水稻的危害。83而要有大量水源,就需要水库贮存水,以及通过相应的沟渠和设施把水引入田中。

    当然,生态环境并不是造成农户超支的主要原因,它只能在一定程度上限制生产队农业产出的总量。造成农户超支的主要原因是国家与集体从生产队中提取了过多物资。国家之所以提取大量物资,是为了满足工业化的需要。陈云在1950年6月说:“中国是个农业国,工业化的投资不能不从农业上打主意。搞工业要投资,必须拿出一批资金来,不从农业打主意,这批资金转不过来。”84刘少奇也认为:“发展中国经济,使中国工业化,是需要巨大的资金的……但是从哪里并且怎样来筹集这些资金呢?……只有由中国人民自己节约……而要人民节省出大量的资金,就不能不影响人民生活水平提高的速度,就是说,在最近一二十年内人民生活水平提高的速度不能不受到一些限制。这并不是为了别的,只是为了创造劳动人民将来更好的生活”。851955年7月31日,毛泽东强调:“为了完成国家工业化和农业技术改造所需要的大量资金,其中有一个相当大的部分是要从农业方面积累起来的。这除了直接的农业税以外,就是发展为农民所需要的大量生活资料的轻工业的生产,拿这些东西去同农民的商品粮食和轻工业原粮相交换,既满足了农民和国家两方面的物资需要,又为国家积累了资金。”86可见,在集体化时期,人民生活水平的提高和加快工业化进程是矛盾的。国家从长远考虑,只能牺牲人民生活水平的快速提高。

    1960年,《中共中央关于农村人民公社分配工作的指示》指出:中央原来规定的总扣留占40%左右,分配给社员的部分占60%左右。如果当地收入水平较高,如每人分配在100元以上的,扣留可以多于40%;如果收入水平较低,如每人分配在50元以下的,扣留可以少于40%。87也就是说,正常情况下,人民公社要向国家和集体贡献大约四成左右的劳动成果。虽然人民公社制度在不断调整,但这一核心规定一直贯穿于集体化时期。1974年玉林地区分配给社员的部分占总收入的比重只有53.94%,该地区当年分配给社员的部分占比最高的是平南县,为55.77%,最低的是陆川县,为48.54%。88当“上下左右向生产队伸手,四面八方挖生产队墙角”89时,社员辛苦劳作一年,分配总量甚至不足一半,超支户怎能不多?

    除了生产水平低、生态环境制约和国家、集体抽取过多物资,还有一个重要原因直接影响超支户的数量,即人民公社的分配制度。分配制度是生产关系的一部分,采用什么样的分配制度取决于生产发展的水平。1962年通过的《农村人民公社工作条例修正草案》指出,粮食分配应根据本队的情况和大多数社员的意见,分别采取各种不同的办法,可以采取基本口粮和按劳动工分分配粮食相结合的办法,也可以采取按劳动工分分配加照顾的办法等。不管采取何种办法,都应该做到既要调动大多数社员的劳动积极性,又要确保困难户能够吃到一般标准的口粮。90虽然国家要求生产队要遵循按劳分配、多劳多得的原则,避免分配上的平均主义,但是在实际分配中,基本口粮占比往往较大,很难进行真正意义上的按劳分配。

    “在目前口粮不高的情况下,必须首先保证各等人口留粮放在安全线上,过分强调多劳多吃,是不符合粮食分配原则,是不正视当前粮食状况,是没有全面了解社员的要求,其后果,必然引起今后粮食安排的被动,亦不能达到发挥全体社员的劳动积极性。”91所以,华六大队在集体化时期粮食分配的70%按人口定量分配,30%按劳动工分分配。在农业生产水平较低的情况下,生产队首先要保证每一位社员都有口饭吃,也就是学者们所说的生存伦理92,当社员的基本生活都难以保障时,生产队就会面临解体的风险。如果国家政策允许生产队切实贯彻按劳分配,多劳多得,不劳动者不得食的社会主义分配原则,社员的生产积极性可能会大大增加,超支户的数量也可能会减少,但是也可能会导致部分农户的生活非常困难,甚至饿死人。这样的结果不仅国家政策不允许,熟人社会中的道德规范也是不允许的。虽然按三七开的比例分配物资具有一定的平均主义倾向,但它在保证大部分人的基本生活和激励劳动力积极出工参加生产活动上较好地进行了平衡。

    三、小结

    第一,人民公社为广大乡村提供了丰富的公共产品,内容涉及社员生产、生活的方方面面。与当下的政策不同,集体化时期的公共产品均由生产队或生产大队自我供给,生产、运输、管理、消费等各个环节都在本地进行,并没有获得足够的财政和物资支持。然而,这恰恰表明集体经济具有社会经济的属性,即经济活动和参与经济活动中的人及其所在的社会网络是紧密地结合在一起的,它们是相互嵌入的关系,集体经济的效益最终是让所有社员都能够受益,而不是像资本主义经济那样,脱离地方社会和文化,以攫取地方社会资源为目的进行经济活动,虽然经济效益非常可观,但是将所有的问题和矛盾都遗留给当地,以竭泽而渔的方式破坏当地的可持续发展。潘毅认为,社会经济的要旨,就是以人为本,立足社区而不是让资本剥削社区,互助合作,民主参与,人类与土地和谐共生。生产不是为了消费,而是为了解决民生,追求共同富裕,是一种多元化的社会所有制。在本质上,社会经济不是服务于资本累积,而是将社会重新嵌入社会关系中的一种新形态的经济模式。93

    正如毛泽东在《中国农村的社会主义高潮》编者按中所言:“人民群众有无限的创造力。他们可以组织起来,向一切可以发挥自己力量的地方和部门进军,向生产的深度和广度进军,替自己创造日益增多的福利事业。”94作为社会经济重要组成部分的集体经济,在生产力发展水平较低的条件下,在农村修建了大量水利设施,尽可能地提高了土地生产效率,同时增强了生产队抗灾、救灾能力。此外,人民公社还广泛组织群众发展基础教育事业和医疗卫生事业。这些福利事业不仅价格低廉,而且在广度和深度上都动员了社员进行自我教育、自我成长和自我保健,满足了社员自身发展的需要。事实上,农民在集体化过程当中所受到的洗礼要远远高于笔者所看到的,包括管理水平、纪律教育和科技创新等,所有的这些都在塑造着“新型农民”,为改革开放后国家的飞速发展,提供了优质劳动力。所以,笔者以为,要实现乡村的再次振兴,必须把广大人民群众重新组织起来,使经济回归社会,尤其是作为社会经济的集体经济,这是一条可供选择的路径。

    第二,通过研究发现,人民公社时期的农业生产效率客观上的确存在效率低下的问题,例如人们的收入水平较低,生活条件改善缓慢等。但是,在这些事实背后蕴含着错综复杂的原因及逻辑,当本文剥离这些原因后再度审视集体经济制度时,发现导致社员收入不高的原因是工分被稀释了。农户总收入计算公式能很好地对此进行说明。

    由于农户的劳动力在一年或者数年内,基本保持不变或者变化不大,所以,农户总工分事实上是在相对平稳的区间内浮动。因此,影响农户总收入的因素主要是生产队的工分值。而导致生产队工分值变化的因素主要有两个,即生产队的纯收入(总收入-生产成本)与生产队总工分数。当纯收入保持不变时,生产队的总工分越多,即分母越大,工分值越小;当总工分数保持不变时,纯收入越少,工分值也会随之变小。所以,工分稀释化主要包括两个方面,一方面是工分的直接稀释,即把非农业生产的工分拿回农业之内进行分配,从而导致工分被稀释,分值下降;另一方面是实物和现金等物质上的间接稀释,即从生产队中抽走、消耗大量物资,减少生产队的纯收入,进而降低了生产队的工分值。如果把各级单位强加在生产队身上的各种“包袱”给抛弃掉,工分值和社员所得将会大大提高。

    第三,在学界,对人民公社批判最多的就是平均主义和“大锅饭”,其中“大锅饭”几乎成了人民公社的代名词,污名化非常严重。笔者以为把造成平均主义的原因归结为人民公社制度本身是值得商榷的。因为“人民公社低效率的原因是综合的,既有公社自身的原因,也有公社自身之外的原因,但公社自身之外的原因是主要原因,而不是相反”。95当国家和集体从生产队拿走过多的剩余产品时,可供分配的产品自然不足,人均占有量也就无法提高,如此才导致所谓的平均主义。经研究,本文发现,在生产力、人力和物资都非常有限的条件下,人民公社的农业生产仍能保持较平稳的增长,实属不易。同时,人民公社为支援国家工业化建设,提供了大量公购粮和农副产品;为满足人们的生产生活需要,在农村地区提供了丰富的基建、教育、医疗和社会保障等社会公共品。可以说,它的效果是多元的。因此,对人民公社的评价,不能仅局限于某一方面或某一时段,而应放大到整个国家层面和历史的脉络中进行考究,才能得出较为客观的结论。

    本文转自《开放时代》2024年第6期

  • 黄波粼 钟子善:上海农村集体托幼实践的考察(1958—1962)

    从思想史的脉络来看,关于托儿所与幼儿园的构想无疑具有相当长之历史。从柏拉图的《理想国》①,到启蒙运动时期众多的空想社会主义者②,至恩格斯③,后至康有为的《大同书》④、青年毛泽东⑤等都提出过“幼儿公育”的想法。从实践层面而言,清末以降,许多政治、社会力量都认识到了公共育儿的必要性,这使得公育思想在本土化建构中与实体建设并举⑥,托幼事业逐渐成为各种现代性设计不可或缺的一项重要内容。新中国成立后,公共托幼的必要性和重要性更加突出,因为恩格斯曾提出随着生产资料转归社会所有,“孩子的抚养和教育成为公共的事业”⑦,列宁也曾强调托儿所及幼儿园是共产主义“幼芽的标本”⑧。新中国托幼实践的大规模开展,大体发生在1958年至1962年,学界在这方面成果较丰,大多从妇女史的视角来回应马克思主义理论下的“妇女解放”问题。⑨有学者认为,大力推广集体托幼有着培育“共产主义新人”的意义。⑩有学者通过分析20世纪50年代末的农村集体托幼进一步指出,兴办托幼并非只为培育“共产主义新人”,它更是一个塑造“共产主义新农民”的过程。11尽管现有成果已经对新中国集体托幼有了比较深刻的认识,但仍有一些问题需要继续追问。例如,回到具体的历史进程和情境之中,国家诠释的“共产主义”具有哪些意涵?它们又是如何被农民接受的?本文拟以地方档案为主要史料,考察1958年—1962年的上海农村12集体托幼实践,着力展现其围绕各个阶段中心工作而曲折发展的轨迹,通过回溯若干具体措施深入农村的过程,呈现一段塑造共产主义新农民的历史。

    一、 塑造农民对于共产主义精神的政治认同(1958年9月—12月)

    延安时期,毛泽东给延安第一保育院题词:“儿童万岁”13,又强调一定要为教育后代而努力。新中国成立初期,“社会主义老大哥”苏联的集体托幼模式引发国人极大兴趣,14集体托幼在当时看来是一种与共产主义生活相适应的教养模式,被视为“共产主义萌芽”,直接关乎共产主义新一代的培养,“为将来的共产主义社会准备了‘人’的条件”,因而是“一万年都要做的工作”。15

    1958年北戴河会议后,毛泽东就指出人民公社办托儿所的重要性:“是搞钢铁,搞棉花、小麦重要?还是孩子重要?这是涉及下一代的问题。托儿所一定要比家里好些,才能看到人民公社的优越性”。16当年9月,国务院下发的《关于教育工作的指示》明确提出:全国应在3年—5年内,完成“使学龄前儿童大多数都能入托儿所和幼儿园”的任务。17上海农村托幼组织的大幅增长也是从1958年9月开始的。与此同时,上海农村确立将“家务劳动社会化”作为向共产主义过渡的重要内容。其中,“儿童教养集体化”是“家务劳动社会化”的首要目标18,即开办托儿所和幼儿园,集中教养7岁以下的社员子女19。除房屋外,摇篮、凳子、床铺、被子等都是开办园所必须具备的,全托还需食具、毛巾、水瓶、浴室、脚盆等。仅凭公社或生产大队积累下来的少量物资与资金很难满足办所办园所必要的物质条件。如何在“少花钱”乃至“不花钱”的情况下快速搭好托幼机构的架子,将儿童“迎”进来,成为摆在基层干部面前的首要难题。考虑到添置新的设备、物资需要花一大笔钱,且在短期内还不易购买到,因此不仅要坚持“因陋就简,勤俭节约,自给自足”的原则,还要发动群众通过借、调、征用等方式凑起必需物品。宝山县红旗人民公社第五生产大队全托幼儿园的建立就是一个典型例子。首先,大队向农民宣传“儿童集体化”的伟大意义,解释什么是“我为人人、人人为我”20的共产主义精神,并深入浅出地说明全托可以解放劳动力投入生产,能够更好地教养儿童,以及为何须自力更生,即如何遵循“勤俭办园”的原则。接着,动员有空房的或房子较大的社员,紧缩一部分住房,或移居到其他社员家中。最后,腾出一幢房子共八间,四间做宿舍,三间做教室,一间做炊事房,天井做小活动场,场地上扎竹篱做运动场地和花园。此外,要求入园幼儿的家长自带床及其他日常品,公共用具则是发动妈妈们有什么带什么,发扬集体互助精神。对实在困难、拿不出钱的家庭,就与其他孩子的家长协商合用,不够的部分,由干部发动其他社员适当添一些。最终,办园所需物品都是妈妈们自己送来的,共计24张床(包括床板)、50条被头,每个小孩1只矮凳、2只碗、1只匙。连没有小孩的金大妹也借出了长凳、马桶等。21典型事例的示范,鼓舞各地以共济互助精神大力兴办集体托幼。安乐生产队幼儿园的物资筹备过程亦是如此。该园于1958年11月7日建立,是由大队直接领导,社员在“不花钱”的原则下办起来的。22上海农村之所以在1958年秋季出现集体托幼的高潮,很大程度上是因为广泛推行此法。

    无论是房屋还是日常用具,筹备托幼,“物”的基本设施自然是题中之义,而将“人”和“物”两者结合起来考虑也是对建立集体托幼机构的基本要求。“人”的要素首先是要解决部分干部和多数家长“思想不通”的问题。对干部群体而言,并非所有的基层干部都支持开办园所,其原因在于他们认为托幼事业对农业生产不但没什么帮助反而会拖生产的后腿,因而“不划算”。另外,在“热心”办园所的干部眼中,集体托幼对于家长无疑是一件天大的好事,但事实上,多数家长,尤其妇女并不这样认为。尽管她们对于基层传达的集体托幼与自身解放的关系已是耳熟能详,却因“人在田里,心在家里”的切身体验,生出不少顾虑:孩子交给别人看不放心,怕别人照管不好得了病,怕保育员偏心眼等。23

    为了“打通思想”,大队干部通常会先在干部会议上通过算细账——“孩子在田里农作物损失,劳动力不能发挥等赔账”——让干部群体在兴办园所的必要性上达成共识。后要求干部召开妈妈或社员会议,设身处地地以妇女的实际家庭经济利益算家庭帐。如一家六口人,夫妻二人,一个老人带三个孩子,若三个孩子都送托儿所或幼儿园的话,老人就能去挣工分了。按一个老人一天最少挣5分计算,一个月可得150分。此外,针对妈妈们心理上的不安,以及小孩放在家里容易发生危险和事故等,进一步打消妈妈的顾虑。24不过,做通家长的思想工作并非易事,在农村工作“全面开花”的形势下需要耗费一定的时间与精力。

    “打通思想”之余,还须确定由谁来照管园所的幼儿。由于以农业生产为中心任务,当时的保教人员往往由大队干部指定女性半劳动力或辅助劳动力来担任,由此形成“青壮年上前方,老弱做后勤”的人员配备模式。上海县马桥大队、奉贤县南桥大队及松江县张朴生产队53个托儿所和13个幼儿园的保育员绝大多数是老妈妈,年龄最大的72岁,最小的46岁,平均年龄在50岁左右。不少身体残疾,无法参加劳动生产的妇女也当起了保育员。有个托儿所的盲人阿姨王修金,一个人同时带三个孩子。25还有部分园所则是“小囡带小囡”。宝山县红旗人民公社第五生产大队的全托幼儿园由5个教养员负责,年龄最大的21岁,最小的才13岁。26一旦孩子在户外活动,有些保教人员在体力上难免力有不逮。在“物”与“人”的准备环节,两者通常是同步进行的。由于“边组织、边教育、边行动”27,很多园所在短短几天就办了起来。值得注意的是,早在1956年教育部、卫生部、内务部三个部门就曾联合发文,“收3周岁以下的儿童者为托儿所,收3至6周岁的儿童者为幼儿园”28。因此,尽管因陋就简是一贯方针,但这一时期上海农村在开办园所的过程中还是严格遵循了将幼儿园与托儿所分开等相关要求。托儿所以生产队(即一个自然村)为单位开办,便于妈妈接送,幼儿园则以两三个生产队为单位联合开办,或以生产大队为单位开办。

    由此可见,人民公社化初期,兴办集体托幼除了具有基本的公共育儿功能,还有塑造农民对共产主义精神的政治认同的任务。农民群体的政治认同之所以重要,在于他们是党和国家确定的阶级柱石之一。需要明确的是,这里的农民实际指的是村民、农村基层干部、园所保育员及幼儿。尽管这些群体有各自的角色,但实质上仍是农民。1958年12月,中共中央高度肯定湖北省委《关于做好当前人民生活的几项工作的规定》,这份文件指出,办好园所“适用于农村,原则上也适用于城市”29,明确了托幼工作先面向农村的取向,更加凸显了这一时期塑造农民对共产主义精神政治认同的重要性。

    和多数群众运动一样,上海农村在推行集体托幼时因为急于求成造成了不少问题。特别是为了“赶、学、比、超”与应付上级检查,很多公社不管孩子是否有老人带,家长有无需要、有无意愿,大讲“托儿化”“包下来”,以“强迫命令”的形式组织儿童进园进所过集体生活。30从1958年9月30日实现公社化,到10月下旬,不到一个月的时间里上海农村成立了1400多个幼儿园,4300多个托儿所,480个托儿组,收托儿童10万多人。31当年年底,江苏省苏州专区所辖六县与南通专区崇明县先后划入上海,这时,上海农村地区辖有11个县。32由于所辖区域的扩大以及农村福利工作的持续推进,托幼机构数量及入园入所的幼儿人数就更多了。据上海市妇联统计,这一时期共办幼儿园、托儿所29603个,收托孩子 582762名,收托孩子占上海农村学龄前儿童总数的80%。33

    人民公社化初期,上海农村在推行集体托幼时虽在“物”“人”等问题上遇到诸多困难,但在动员及组织农民的过程中完成了塑造具有共产主义精神的“新农民”的第一步。尽管,因推广时急于求成而问题渐显,但上海农村的集体托幼并没有停止,反而在“全民托幼”的大潮中真正步入“实践期”,进入一个崭新阶段。这是因为它始终配合农业生产发展34和各个阶段的政策调整而进行,中心工作起起伏伏,农村集体托幼实践便随之波浪式地向前发展。35

    二、 共产主义议题凸显与农民集体托幼需求(1959年1月—8月)

    国家要求在农村大力推行集体托幼,并不意味着所有农民都会自觉参与。一些家长担心孩子在托儿所可能会“吃不饱”,或被大孩子“欺辱”,36上海市委妇女工作委员会发现“儿童实到数往往少于报名数,有时仅及一半”37。多数社员对生产大队负担全部托费不满意,有人发牢骚说:“领这两个囡,工分弄光”38,认为有孩子入托特别是有多个孩子入托的家庭占尽便宜39。之所以出现此类声音,是因为虽然新中国成立前后的土地改革重组了农村权力关系,使农民感受到了国家权威,但尚未改变其劳作和生活秩序,仍然如传统乡土社会时一样生活,没有产生公共育儿的需求。40随着20世纪50年代后期党和国家在农村的中心工作——人民公社化运动的到来,这种秩序才被彻底改变。自此,参加集体劳动与做好分配成为农民的基本任务和利益所在。为了保障个人在人民公社中的利益并维持其运作发展,他们较为普遍地“自动”产生了集体托幼的需求。

    站在历史的比较视野来看这一问题,会更加清晰。不独中国共产党,20世纪二三十年代进行乡村幼稚园试验的陶行知和国民政府也曾在推行托幼的同时着力推进集体合作,却都没能将二者结构性地联系起来。

    1926年,在关于创设乡村幼稚园问题的文章中,陶行知将平民化视作建立乡村幼稚园的关键之一。如其所言,农民贫且忙,幼稚园应济“农村需要”。41因此,他试图把建设乡村幼稚园与改善农民生计结合起来:通过就地取材、物尽其用解决房屋、用具等设备,以农民生产和生活时间为准安排幼儿活动,并将幼儿的康健放在第一位,以此实现幼稚园“下乡”。42陶行知建设乡村幼稚园的初衷在于通过解决农村幼儿集中教养问题纾解农民的“穷愚”困境,带有造福农民的公益性和福利性。但由于时局动荡与经费短缺,以及农村生产方式43等诸多因素,陶行知的乡村幼稚园试验没有也不可能促生农民内在的托幼需求。在此情况下,他力图通过建设乡村幼稚园为国育儿的愿望也只能止于零星试验。

    20世纪30年代国民政府主导的托幼事业,其政策体系包括宗旨、课程、经费、管理及师资等,无疑为托幼的发展提供了政策保障,这套政策体系的建构是“自上而下”与“自下而上”相结合,既有中央政府为主导的取向,也有专家学术研究成果的推进,如陶行知等的幼稚园试验对中央政策的制定助益良多。44因而,在相当程度上,国民政府认可了陶行知等人乡村幼稚园建设的理论及实践,只不过注重为推行托幼提供政策保障的做法仅在表面上加深了乡村幼稚园建设的“国家化”程度,并没有改变民间“自治”的格局。45诚如时人所批评的,在乡村,大部分的合作都被豪绅所把持,外界无法跳过他们去直接组织农民。46国民政府虽曾试图将政权下沉至乡村,但因轻视乡村又缺乏动员能力,以失败告终,47即国家权力难以“下乡”。概言之,虽然国民政府加大了政策层面的介入力度,但仍属民间“自治”的乡村幼稚园注定很难与农民的集体托幼需求结构性地联系起来。九一八事变后,国民政府的托幼事业虽有发展,但极不平衡。1932年,即便在托幼机构较为发达的上海,其幼稚园的幼儿总数也只有1045人,48而上海县、青浦县、南汇县、松江县、金山县、川沙县保姆所幼儿数合计仅190人,49乡村托幼严重落后。此外,当局更将扩大托幼规模与“培养教化国民”联系起来,50在未能创造出农民内在的集体托幼需求的情况下,此等流于空泛、无所着落的说教51预示着乡村托幼只能停留在专家的实践层面。

    反观20世纪50年代后期,中国共产党在农村推行集体托幼时,在国家强力主导下,首先将分散的小农全部组织到共产主义的人民公社之内。实践中,开始时大办集体托幼的热潮和随后的整顿总体上还算稳步、健康地发展。521959年3月以后迅猛发展,全国形成集体托幼高潮,这使“共产主义”成为农民不得不面对的严肃议题。对于一些无子女农民的不满,干部教育他们要基于集体利益,且要有长远眼光,认识到“办托儿所、幼儿园是人民公社的优越性,现在没有囡,将来有囡,现在没有囡,下代有囡”53。一些保育员认为自己工分低,还被家长看不起,情愿去田里生产,干部就开展“我为人人、人人为我”的辩论,讲明带孩子比生产更重要,使她们明了保育事业的意义,树立托幼工作的光荣感。54此种情形非上海独有,全国各地屡见不鲜。如河北省徐水县就“小孩子要不要由公社来抚养”展开辩论,没有小孩的社员认为自己“吃亏了”,不同意开办,有小孩的社员当即反驳:“你现在养活俺小孩,将来你老了还不是由俺小孩养活你吗?”结果,那些怕吃亏的人最终被“辩倒了”。55所谓“辩论”,事实上就是毛泽东批评的“动不动‘辩你一家伙’”56,实际上已容不得落后分子。上海市嘉定县要求办幼托的大字报就占了50%,奉贤县的家长一定要把未满3岁的幼儿送入全托,为解决孩子穿衣服的后顾之忧,还把布票也交给了幼儿园。57无论抱怨还是从众,对于农民来说,传统的劳作和生活秩序发生了彻底改变。既然进了共产主义的人民公社,就要参加集体劳动并做好分配。这意味着在家带孩子就少了参加集体生产的劳动力,影响全家拿工分及年底收入,于是,农民在传统乡土社会所没有的集体托幼需求被激发出来。

    概言之,与陶行知和国民政府推行的乡村幼稚园相比,中国共产党主导的人民公社化运动在凸显共产主义议题的同时,结构性地激发出农民集体托幼的需求。此种需求虽然源于国家这一外部性动力,却因为农民难以选择而成为其内在需要。毛泽东认为,小孩进托儿所,教育、食宿等都由社会负担,不是破灭家庭,而是废除家长制。58这也回应了费孝通对传统乡土社会孩子由家庭抚育的思考。费孝通曾明言,若“以家庭和保育院来比较的话,大体上家庭里所生长出来的孩子比较健全些”59。他还认为,乡土社会的农民只有在偶然或临时的非常态中才需要伙伴和团体60,除非中国社会乡土性的基层发生了变化61。如果说20世纪50年代中期的农业合作化运动所带来的正是这样一种根本性变化的话,那么50年代末的人民公社化运动所造成的农村集体托幼则是这种根本性变化的更高表现形式。

    关于人民公社化之后农民迫切需要集体托幼的原因,上海市幼儿保健教育委员会的调查报告极具代表性:

    对于有孩子入托特别是有多个孩子入托的家庭而言,孩子越多,用在孩子身上的补贴就越多。日托尚且如此,贴粮贴钱的全托对孩子的补贴则更多,生产大队除补贴25斤左右粮食外,每年用于一个全托儿童的费用更是多达30—40元。62

    类似的情况还发生在七一公社联明生产大队。由于是棉、粮、菜夹种地区,该大队较为富裕,一个劳动力全年平均收入为272.28元,63如果以此为基数,补贴一个全托儿童的30元—40元相当于一个劳动力一年收入的11%—14.9%。也就是说,一个家庭如果有一个孩子进全托,其所耗补贴相当于一个劳动力一个多月的收入。事实上,有些家庭不止一个孩子进全托。加之,托儿所、幼儿园的日常开支由大队公益金担负,在家长负担一定工分后,大队全年托幼经费的支出占公益金的65.6%,远高于困难户补助、工伤等其他福利性开支。64由于集体托幼实行包下来的政策,特别是“吃饭不要钱”65,在上海农村,甚至出现这样的情形:

    不少夫妻一方或两人从事非农业生产的职工家庭以及有亲戚在农村的家庭也将孩子送入托儿所幼儿园中,甚至有少数人代人领养,自己却“拿了领养费”。对于这些未参加集体生产劳动的家庭而言,无疑享受了与社员一样的福利。66

    农民内在的集体托幼需求正是在这样的情境下被激发了出来。换言之,人民公社化初期的集体托幼成为农村干部群众接轨共产主义的重要工具。

    国家不仅激发了农民集体托幼的需求,还通过兴办更完善的托幼组织充分保障这种需求的实现。1959年3月,全国妇联提出“在具有基本条件的地方”必须“积极办好全托”之后,上海市妇联要求配合人民公社化运动和农业生产发展需要,切实将办好全托纳入全面规划。67不仅将原有的临时性、季节性的托儿所全部转为日托,还兴办了大量新的日托与全托。大量园所的兴办确实解决了不少农村妇女生产牵累与孩子照管的难题,使女性安心投入生产。至此,上海农村的集体托幼真正成为一项“运动”。4月,仅嘉定、奉贤、松江三个县,共办起5539个托儿所,11个县共办15635个托儿所,入托幼儿达到233999名。68

    然而,1958年年底至1959年年初麻疹的流行,打乱了工作步调。由于卫生知识、传染病预防及隔离条件缺乏,致麻疹传染面扩大,造成不少幼儿死亡。69家长们非常惊慌,纷纷把孩子抱回家,致使托儿所、幼儿园缩减。不久,上海召开五级干部会议贯彻第二次郑州会议精神,“精简生活服务人员到7%左右”以补充、加强农业生产战线。在此形势下,奉贤县一生产队队长认为劳动力如此紧张,却让十几个人带孩子“不合算”,急欲把幼儿园“砍掉”,将省下来的保教人员充实到大田上去,70部分托幼机构形成了“无人照管孩子”的局面。这些言行不免偏颇,但由此也可以看出,生活还是要让位于生产。这种影响在1959年夏季全面体现出来,上海农村托儿所和幼儿园数量出现下降。如金山县新农公社,原有109个幼儿园,收托 1000 多名孩子,在五级干部会议后仅留下13个幼儿园,收50多名孩子,下降90%。71

    三、 在革命口号中促使农民奔向共产主义(1959年9月—1962年)

    1959年庐山会议后,中央层面开始“反右倾”斗争,这为处于低迷的农村托幼事业带来了转机。在“反右倾”的总形势下,农村福利工作的“倒退”往往被视为“右倾”的表现。1959年9月,上海开始着手恢复、提高农村福利方面的工作,再次确立“一手抓生产,一手抓生活”的工作方针。为了强调政治挂帅,各级党委书记都亲自抓托幼工作。72在干部群众中间,针对错误观点或行为进行了思想教育。73最为常见的教育方式是“调查”。例如,川沙县对一些公社进行调查后,发现不少家长“有需要而未送托”,在深入了解原因的基础上,不仅教育他们应关心儿童的安全,还设法帮助解决实际问题。74据说这个办法很灵验,通过调查及时发现并解决各种问题,使很多家长、保教员及基层干部都期盼将日托转为全托。75

    “反右倾、鼓干劲”开始后,上海市委在基层公社紧锣密鼓地宣传八届八中全会精神,要求各项工作“鼓足干劲”76,提出了不少脱离实际的园所建设任务和办园目标,农村再次掀起“全面跃进”的高潮,加强对托幼的领导成为基层干部的重要工作。如南汇县惠明公社明六生产队周水连听了会议精神传达后,回去立即办了4个托儿所和4个幼儿园。77

    在“大跃进”的氛围下,为了不断开办新幼儿园以完成高指标,1959年12月,上海市教育局制定《农村幼儿园民办公助办法(草案)》(以下简称《办法》),要求继续在做好师资培养,提供教材,充实公社幼教干部,发动“公带民、老带新”等工作的基础上,对一些经济困难的幼儿园给予一定的补助,并对办得好的幼儿园给予一定的奖励,以促进农村幼儿园的繁荣和发展。如补助新建幼儿园3元—5元,补助困难幼儿园每班每季度不超过6元,每季度被评为先进的幼儿园奖励不超过10元。此外,还规定补助及奖励应作充实教育设备之用,如教养员用的参考资料、图书、、教具,或简单的卫生医药箱、毛巾、脸盆、肥皂等。78该《办法》的出台是自1958年以来,上海市财政第一次大规模地对农村人民公社开办的园所给予资金补助。在当时财政极为有限的情况下,这项补助极为可贵,充分表露了政府对托幼工作的期待,在一定程度上也有助于解决实际的资金困难。随着《办法》的逐步落实,上海的农村托幼事业迎来了1960年的大发展。

    1960年4月,为了掀起集体托幼的新高潮,上海市委周密部署,各部门高度重视并做了大量工作。9日,时任上海市委第一书记的柯庆施提出上海必须“逐步分批实现公社化”79;中旬,上海市卫生局与教育局向上海农村派驻“幼托事业工作队”80,宣传托幼的意义,培训保育人员,组织示范教学,制定规章制度等81。该工作队抓住薄弱环节,帮助兴办托幼,同时也起到了“督促”公社及大队干部的作用。如奉贤县肖塘公社原来只有7所幼儿园,在工作队的帮助下办起了82所幼儿园,托儿所也从97所增加到172所。82当月,上海成立市幼儿保健教育委员会,旨在加强对托幼工作的统一领导。83不久,该委员会向上海市委提交了《关于幼儿园、托儿所发展情况和今后打算的报告》,在肯定前期依靠“穷办法、土办法”兴办托幼事业做法的基础上提出,今后必须坚持“边发展、边整顿、边巩固、边提高”的原则,才能促进托幼事业“多、快、好、省”地发展。此外,它还对农村托幼作出系统性规划:“县、公社、生产队各级的幼托工作组织,层层要有专人负责,以加强对这项工作的领导”,要求农村入园入托儿童国庆前达到85%以上。为了完成指标以“出色的成绩迎接国庆”,须掀起三个高潮:结合“六一”评比表扬先进儿童工作者和先进儿童工作集体,造声势、树标兵;7月,对幼儿园、托儿所,组织一次夏令卫生工作大检查,以提高卫生保健水平;9月,再组织一次托幼工作的全面性对口检查。84这些部署不可谓不细致周到。

    为了完成上述指标,上海农村各县首先指定专人负责托幼工作的领导。金山、青浦、松江等县设立生活福利委员会85,嘉定、上海、川沙、浦东、奉贤等县成立了生活福利办公室。通过“六一”评选工作,南汇、崇明两县又在生活福利办公室下设托幼小组或托幼办公室领导托幼工作,宝山县则专门建立了托幼委员会。这些职能部门或小组的建立,使得托幼工作经常被提到议事日程并做统一布署。基层公社也专门配备了负责托幼工作的干部。如泥城公社的党委书记就对托幼工作做到“五抓”(一抓干部群众的思想教育;二抓规划,做到心中有数;三抓统一安排,安排生产的同时安排托幼工;四抓具体问题,如粮食、房屋、设备、工分等;五抓专线领导,层层有人领导,副书记挂帅)。86其次,掀起检查评比、树立标兵的浪潮。公社频繁组织各类检查评比活动,在检查评比后,将检查的情况与各生产队发展托幼的进度表,分发至各生产队,激起“落后”生产队的赶超想法。如金山县紧紧抓住兴塔公社红旗幼儿园这一标兵,开现场会交流经验,全县掀起了“学兴塔、赶兴塔、超兴塔”的高潮。87此外,在浦东、上海、川沙、宝山、松江、崇明、嘉定等县的25个公社和7个镇的妇联联合倡议“积极发展幼儿园,做到凡是无人照管的儿童全部入园入所”之下,大办托幼的友谊竞赛在这些区域不断涌现。88

    在上下贯通的组织领导下,至1960年6月,上海农村掀起了一股大办托儿所、幼儿园的热潮。据《文汇报》称,仅嘉定一个县,一个多月内入园入托幼儿就增加了18000多名,当月,全县入托入园幼儿占学前儿童人数的70%以上。其中,势头较好的如城西、封浜等公社这一比例更是达到90%。89又据上海市妇联农村工作部1960年4月统计,农村入托入园人数上升到 40 万。90另据统计,1960年6月中旬,上海农村共有托儿所20201所,收托幼儿251338人,共有幼儿园8354所,收托幼儿26216人,托儿所的收托比例提高到80%,幼儿园的收托比例提高到72.6%。91在以指标为先的“跃进”氛围中,这些数据可能有浮夸成分,但也从侧面呈现出农民在革命口号下奔向共产主义的历史情境。

    “大跃进”期间,高指标、浮夸风并非农村集体托幼所独有,但这项工作似乎又有其独特价值,当时的革命口号精炼地体现了这种价值—— “一夜托儿化”,“实行寄宿制,消灭三大差别”92。从某种意义上讲,彼时的农村集体托幼在这种夸张的“革命”氛围中,已然浮现毛泽东所期待的“六亿神州尽舜尧”93的美好图景。

    实际上,“大跃进”期间,上海农村的园所大多是匆匆上马,存在诸多问题,比如保育员的卫生知识、业务能力、托儿所设备、环境卫生、管理水平等跟不上,加之其他条件限制,前面描绘的集体托幼成效恐怕与真实情况存在不小落差。当时就有人质疑1958年的集体托幼,比如,“囡多占便宜,我们负担领囡费,做来做去担几个共囡,啥叫按劳取酬”94,引起了有子女入托家庭和无子女入托家庭之间的矛盾95;有的因托儿所“路远不便”,认为没必要再办96;有的在孩子入托后不久就要接回家,态度还十分强硬97。出现这些现象的原因或许是托幼工作不够扎实而使农民心生怨言,但也从侧面说明上海农村此时仍未实现以集体托幼形式塑造共产主义新农民的目标。

    尽管“大跃进”时期的集体托幼成果存在一定的虚报浮夸,98但上海农村的集体托幼实践还是取得了一定成效。以上海农村某生产大队为例,自1958年人民公社建立的三年里,该大队由原来1个农忙托儿所发展为3个常年托儿所。幼儿在托儿所里生活得很健康,也未发生过重大事故,家长说“有了托儿所孩子高兴,妈妈也可安心做生活”99。通过兴办集体托幼,上海农村妇女不仅摆脱了孩子的拖累,全心搞生产,还有时间学习文化并脱盲。其中,有的人当上了保育员、教养员和妇女干部;100有的人以往毫无卫生知识,现在能当保育员;有的人过去一字不识,如今能当教养员;有的人以往从不关心政治,现在当起了妇女干部。这不仅大大解放了妇女,还提高了人民公社托幼事业的工作质量和业务水平。101仅1958年下半年,上海市妇联与卫生、教育等部门联合训练公社托幼工作干部就达 250 余人,102这些人能够在人民公社中胜任各自的工作,客观上展现了农村集体托幼实践的效果。

    1961年,中央提出“调整、巩固、充实、提高”的方针之后,人民公社迎来了大调整,生产工作成为农村的中心任务,托幼工程自然退居“次要”。此后,农村集体托幼进入常态化阶段。随着工作重心的转移,1962年8月,上海市幼儿保健教育委员会撤销103,农村托幼工作恢复到由上海市妇联农村工作部主管,该部将办园办所的决定权下放给社员群众,托幼机构“办不办,怎么办,办什么样子的”成为群众自己决定的一项事务。104不难发现,上海农村托幼实践进行到此时,已经因为中心工作的变化而承载起新的政治话语。“大跃进”时期培育“共产主义接班人”的宏大历史进程也进入尾声。

    四、融入托幼日常的具体措施:培育“共产主义接班人”

    1959年六一儿童节,《人民日报》发表社论,号召将托儿所和幼儿园办成“培养共产主义事业接班人的基地”105。上海在推动农村集体托幼实践落地生根的过程中,既要有切合受教育对象特点的动员技术,又要根据“因陋就简”的现实条件做出周密安排,在此基础上,再为具体的国家任务服务。上海实施若干措施,将共产主义从方方面面点滴渗入农民的日常生活,对“接班人”的共产主义塑造愈发深入。

    (一)注重卫生保健

    在对农民进行集体托幼的有效动员之后,还需培训具有一定业务能力的保育员,这是农村集体托幼能够顺利开展的必备条件。1958年年底以前,由于多种原因,园所的保育员难堪重任,尤其缺乏卫生保健知识。对于实质上仍是农民,业余充当保育员的群体,需要经常性地开展培训工作。1959年春,上海农村开始建构由文教、妇联及卫生部门三者相互协作、配合的培训体系,在编写保健知识丛书的基础上,由各级医务系统如县医院、护士学校、妇幼保健所及公社医院主导,分层分批对保育员进行脱产或不脱产、定期或不定期、长期或短期的卫生保健知识培训,106如培训保育员必须学会和做好除“七害”107、讲卫生,晨间检查,预防传染病,孩子有病会隔离和报告,培养孩子的卫生习惯,孩子的饮食和卫生,安排孩子的生活,各种消毒工作,保护孩子的安全,教养孩子等十件事,使其逐步达到初级保育护士水平。108

    事实上,要做好幼儿疾病预防及应急处理,仅凭培训保育员这一项措施是远远不够的。因此,在“预防为主、防治结合”的要求下,公社还依托地段与区域的专业医务力量,搭建幼儿疾病预防与治疗平台,通过预防接种,建立上下贯通、层层负责的卫生保健网,并以此作为示范向全县推广。如川沙县蔡路公社幼儿园与卫生院取得联系,通过卫生院妇幼科医生或保健员经常来园做卫生保健的业务指导,建立定期检查制度,并按时进行预防接种。109自1959年卫生保健网建立后,对保教人员及专业医务人员执行卫生保健措施起到了监督、引导与帮助的作用。同时,该卫生保健网在预防幼儿常见传染病上也产生了良好效果110,一旦出现病孩也能及时治疗111,幼儿因病致死的情况很少发生。1960年,园所的麻疹发病率较1958年同期成倍下降,很多园所甚至一年来都没有发生过麻疹。112

    此外,上海市妇联农村工作部于1959年3月制订了《关于农村托儿所、幼儿园工作暂行条例(草稿)》,其中,不少详尽的规定为幼儿的卫生保健提供了制度保障。比如,在园所选址方面,必须选择兼顾幼儿安全和方便家长接送的地方,应注意平坦宽敞、清洁卫生、空气流通、阳光充足,水塘、河沟、畜圈、马路及医院等旁边不宜设园所;在食具方面,幼儿的开水壶、碗筷须自备一套,并设自来水冲洗脸、手,避免传染疾病;在预防保健方面,定期为幼儿预防接种和健康检查,有病须立即隔离;在生活制度方面,吃饭、睡眠、游戏、洗脸要有秩序。每日晨间检查,食具、玩具每周须消毒1至2次,饭前便后要洗手。113据上海市妇联农村工作部检查,有1/4的园所落实较好114,这些规定促使幼儿养成了清洁卫生的习惯。115一些模范幼儿园如宝山县吴淞公社卫星幼儿园的日常保健常态化,每日写生活记录,随时掌握幼儿的吃睡、大小便情况,还设有隔离室。116以上举措可谓具体而微。

    应该说,通过卫生保健的宣传、人员培训、体系建构及制度落实等各个环节,农民对于以“新农民”之姿投入托幼卫生保健事业的认知还是有所提高,学习保健知识及养成卫生习惯的积极性也随之被激发出来。农民与集体、国家之间的联结被强化的同时,对共产主义的认同也会显著加深。

    (二) 优先供应饮食

    在构建卫生保健体系的同时,还需优先供应幼儿的饮食。“身体是革命的本钱”,幼儿茁壮成长、体魄强健是推行农村集体托幼的必然要求。正是出于这种考虑,基层干部对幼儿的膳食给予了极大关照,在饮食供应方面,托幼组织在同期的农村福利组织中处于被优先供给的地位。

    上海市妇联农村工作部要求幼儿饮食必须由专人负责,单独做适合幼儿年龄的饭菜,并按50∶1的比例配备炊事员。117幼儿的一日三餐要与成人饮食有所区别,且专门烧各式小菜,以换口味。就连幼儿平日喝的开水,洗脸洗脚用的热水,也都由食堂供应,以减少疾病的发生。118并且,根据幼儿年龄定粮,实行“专人管理、计划用粮”。如奉贤县三官公社胡村生产队的全托幼儿园每人每月定粮,大的孩子(虚岁7岁—8岁)每天12两左右,小的孩子(4岁—6岁)9两左右。119“吃得饱”这一要求基本能得到保障,甚至还略有积余。

    在“吃得饱”的基础上,还讲究营养均衡、荤素搭配,即“吃得好”。一些生产队特意为全托幼儿园配置了一定面积的自留地,供保教人员耕种以提高幼儿的伙食水平。如南汇县大团公社沙庙生产队的全托幼儿园自种高粱、黄豆、玉米、芋艿、卷心菜、红萝卜等,做到了生产队不再贴粮食,蔬菜也可基本自给。120这些粮蔬专供幼儿园使用,不用上交集体。为了保证蛋白质的供应,人民公社还通过各种手段尽量予以满足。不少时候,由生产大队专为幼儿购买含有蛋白质成分较高、易于消化吸收的鱼、蛋、肉类等食物。121园所自养的家禽家畜也可稍作补充,改善幼儿伙食。如宝山县新生生产队幼儿园养了鸡、鸭、猪、羊和兔子,每逢节日都可以吃到荤菜122,有些幼儿园甚至隔一天就能吃到荤菜123。此外,不少公社的供销部专为幼儿提供一定量的糕点、点心、糖果、饼干及线粉124,在夏季,还为幼儿供给特定的食物或饮料以防暑降温125。至于经费,一般由大队公益金担负。126公益金不足时主要靠农民自己解决,保教人员、食堂等工作人员也主要来源于农民,这使得农村集体托幼看似颇有群众“自主办园”的味道。但很显然,这场实践的主导力量、决定性因素还是党和政府。

    由于公社对托幼饮食及营养方面的重视,园所的幼儿一般比散养在家的幼儿待遇更好,有生产队队长称“小囡粮食够吃,荤菜、红枣、饼干样样优先供应,比家里养得壮多了”127。在缺粮少食的困难时期,这些共产主义“幼苗”无疑享受着优先待遇。一个显著的事实就是,送进全托的孩子除本人口粮外,生产队给每个孩子每月平均补贴2斤左右的粮食,散养幼儿则没有。也难怪一些没有子女入托的社员自认为“吃亏”。128应该指出的是,对托幼“优先供应饮食”是符合实际的合理安排。广大农民在回报很少的情况下兢兢业业投入集体托幼实践,其历史作用不应被低估。即便有不足,主要也源于难以逾越的历史条件限制,不应过于苛责。

    (三)强调全面教育

    集体托幼实践的基本诉求在于“教养结合”以培育共产主义接班人。所谓教养结合,即仅关注幼儿的卫生保健、饮食营养是远远不够的,还必须加入“教”的因素。上海市教育局明确要求从幼儿园的性质和“两大任务”129出发,强调幼儿园既是福利机构又是教育机构,特别批评了对“教育机构”性质认识不足的问题。130为此,在幼教人员的配备上,上海市妇联农村工作部要求个人成分、身体状况、工作态度等基本条件满足外,还特别强调“最好是具有一定的文化水平的青壮年”担任。131总的来看,这一时期农村托幼在培养德育和智育方面的“接班人”这一问题上做出了许多尝试性探索。

    为了培育“德才兼备”的共产主义接班人,园所十分注重幼儿的德育。在德育方面,主要包括集体主义教育、人民公社的认同教育及热爱国家与领袖方面的教育。中国福利会幼儿园不仅编写出版书籍,还利用游戏及表演让幼儿明白集体主义的好处与意义,如“集体劳动生产出来的农作物,比个人劳动生产出来的农作物既多又好”,同时将集体主义意识落实在幼儿日常行为中,要求各班互助浇水施肥,“共享”劳动成果,提醒孩子“长出来的菜是大家的,不分你的我的”。132此外,教养员时常带领幼儿观察公社出现的各种新兴事业和群众福利事业,如工厂、食堂、敬老院、俱乐部等,使孩子们懂得“有了共产党和毛主席,成立了人民公社,人们的生活将越过越好”133,教幼儿学唱《打夯歌》《人民公社真正好 》《国旗歌 》《爱毛主席 》等儿歌134,要求中班孩子学会写“毛主席”三个字135。

    在智育方面,要求逐步培养幼儿的感官、语言、思维、动手等诸多能力。1960年前后,上海市教育局出版了大量幼儿教材与教辅资料,要求幼儿学习拼音、认识汉字及学会计算,并针对幼儿年龄,提出了不同层次的要求。如小班学会1—5的数的概念,中班学会10以内的加减法,大班学会20以内不进位、不退位的加减法,学会口编应用题等。136其中,南汇县惠南幼儿园在计算教学方面被列为先进,该幼儿园在教学思想上实现了智育与德育两方面的紧密结合,联系政治形势,生活实际以及生产实际进行计算教学。例如,给幼儿讲“人民公社好”时,把平时使用的教具和增添的新教具结合起来反映农村全面发展,表现农民生活水平的提高,并采取多样化、针对性的教学形式,用蜡光纸剪成钢铁元帅、棉花姑娘、麦公公之类等进行计算教学,用实物和玩具、卡片进行计算,用计算木架数数、计算等。137凡此种种或许可以说明,上海农村集体托幼实践在贯彻落实各项国家任务方面发挥了积极作用。

    无论是幼儿,还是从事托幼事业的工作人员在承接以上三项具体措施的过程中,感受到的不再是宏大高远的共产主义意象,而是融入日常的共产主义。由此,农村集体托幼实践对农民的共产主义塑造润物无声地走向具体深入。

    五、结语

    从全国范围看,人民公社化时期的农村集体托幼实践成绩斐然,帮助大量农民,尤其妇女,有更多精力投入农业生产。但这场集体托幼实践并非只为实现家务劳动社会化以解放妇女,更有着力塑造共产主义新农民之意图。通过考察1958年至1962年的上海集体托幼实践可以发现,由于这场实践始终跟随党和国家各个时期的中心工作,而且实行了注重卫生保健等具体措施,其对农民的共产主义塑造体现为一系列的革命性实践。

    人民公社化初期,无论是推行“儿童集体化”还是倡导“我为人人、人人为我”,都将农村集体托幼与塑造农民对共产主义精神的政治认同结合起来。人民公社化运动在凸显共产主义这一严肃议题的同时,结构性地激发出农民集体托幼的内在需求,集体托幼实践由此真正成为一项“运动”,集体托幼成为农民接轨共产主义的重要工具。“大跃进”及其后的常态化集体托幼促使农民在革命口号中奔向共产主义。而培训保育员,构建卫生保健网,优先供应幼儿饮食,以及强调全面教育,则是推行农村集体托幼的具体措施,共产主义由此融入农民的日常。这些革命性实践为农民诠释出集体主义、人民公社、爱国、爱领袖等诸多意涵,促使他们形成对共产主义的政治认同。农村集体托幼实践塑造共产主义新农民的丰富历史图景也由此展开。

    最后,似有必要对农村集体托幼实践塑造出的共产主义新农民的内涵作进一步讨论。前已述及,新农民不仅包括有孩子的农民、无孩子的农民,也包括农村基层干部、园所的保教人员,还包括园所的幼儿。对这些看似不同群体的农民而言,集体托幼都有一个从最初的诸多顾虑发展成为其内在需求的过程,且这种需求在“大跃进”的情境中达到最高潮。站在国家的角度来看,无论有孩子的农民还是无孩子的农民,都是为了更好地担负起他们作为”国家的农民”的责任,农村的基层干部与园所的保教人员为的是更好地完成“国家的托幼工作”,园所的幼儿则是为了更好地成为“国家的接班人”。因此,虽然陶行知和国民政府的乡村幼稚园实践与人民公社化初期中国共产党主导的农村集体托幼实践都担负着“为国”的重任,但只有后者才能有效完成这一任务。

    本文转自《开放时代》2024年第6期

  • 韩昇:武则天时代的官僚阶层与科举

    本文载于《学术月刊》2024年第11期

    武则天登基以来,内部大狱频兴,朝政空转;外部烽火四起,挫折连连。国势日蹙,完全无法同唐太宗“贞观之治”同日而语,和唐高宗在位时期相比也颇为不如。从人事的角度观察,没有治国统兵的人才是一个重要的原因。要真实反映武则天的用人状况,必须进行全面考察,不可以偏概全。这里从两条线、三个层面切入,观其全貌。

    所谓的两条线,第一条线是理应掌管国政的朝官,第二条线是武则天真正委以重任的近幸宠臣。第二条线还可以细分为武家子弟、宠幸嬖臣;以及酷吏等两个层面。结合第一条线,构成了任用官吏的三个层面。

    一、朝官

    第一条线。朝廷最高执政者为一般所称的宰相,亦即唐朝的“同中书门下三品”,或称“同中书门下平章事”,武则天改“中书”和“门下”为“凤阁”“鸾台”,故中书门下称作“凤阁鸾台”。从嗣圣元年(684)武则天废中宗、垂帘听政以来,直到她被政变推翻的神龙元年(705)的二十一年间,任用了五十三位“凤阁鸾台三品(平章事)”头衔的宰相:

    刘祎之,武承嗣,魏玄同,苏良嗣,韦思谦,韦待价,张光辅,王本立,范履冰,邢文伟,周允元,岑长倩,裴居道,傅游艺,格辅元,乐思晦,崔神基,狄仁杰,杨执柔,崔元琮,李昭德,姚璹,李元素,韦巨源,陆元方,苏味道,王孝杰,杨再思,杜景俭,王方庆,李道广,娄师德,武三思,武攸宁,姚元崇,李峤,魏元忠,吉顼,王及善,豆卢钦望,张锡,韦安石,李怀远,顾琮,李廻秀,唐休璟,韦承庆,朱敬则,韦嗣立,宗楚客,崔玄𬀩,张柬之,苏瓌。

    鸾台(门下省)和凤阁(中书省)的首长亦是宰相。这两个机构掌管皇帝诏敕和军国政令,在皇城内办公,最能接近大内里面的武则天,宛如皇帝左右的鸾凤。

    鸾台纳言:王德真,苏良嗣,韦思谦,裴居道,魏玄同,武承嗣,武攸宁,史务滋,欧阳通,姚璹,娄师德,狄仁杰,李峤,韦安石。

    凤阁内史:裴居道,岑长倩,张光辅,邢文伟,宗秦客,豆卢钦望,王及善,武三思,狄仁杰,李峤,杨再思。

    鸾台凤阁的首长人数亦多,经常变更,受酷吏政治迫害者约三分之一上下。

    宰相是朝廷最高首长,中流砥柱,安危所系,本应最为稳定。唐朝建立以后,高祖任用的裴寂,太宗任用房玄龄、杜如晦等宰相,任职时间都很长,对于安定社稷、保持政策的连续性起到重要的作用。然而,到了武则天时代,这种局面骤然巨变,宰相更迭极为频繁,没有任何一个朝廷部门堪与相比。而且,这个席不暇暖的群体,即使把政争中遭到贬黜的情况排除在外,也至少有四分之一以上受到酷吏的迫害乃至屠戮。宰相被呼来唤去,弃之如同敝屣,则所有官吏的处境可想而知,武则天时代政情的高度不稳和内斗的极端残酷,实态毕露。

    为什么宰相群体更替最频繁呢?因为武则天对他们把控最严也最直接。武则天身处大内,既无政绩也无功绩,无以服人;同时自然没有共创事业的部属,堪以寄任。而且,她作为高宗内眷的妇女身份,不方便经常和朝廷大臣聚乐宴饮,了解外请,增进感情。所以,她只能紧紧控制权力中枢的宰相群体,通过他们掌控全局。宰相作为政令下达、沟通内外最重要的渠道,必须盯紧看牢。由于朝廷乃至社会民情、官吏所思所想,只能通过文件和密报等间接途径获取,又要应对篡唐立周的改朝换代剧变,随时有被颠覆的危险,这些都会极大加剧生性多疑的武则天的猜忌。所以,她采取频繁更替宰相乃至施以毒手的苛酷手段,势所必然。这里是她控制全局的关键,亦是命门所在。

    安危系于此地,宰相的治国能力并不重要,竭尽忠诚才是关键。所以,武则天时代的宰相群体有两个特点:第一,实务政绩型官员很少,大多出自政务官员。第二,武氏子弟实际掌权。武氏子弟是武则天政权最稳定的人事,无论他们是否身处宰相位置,宰相都要听命于他们。推而广之,武则天宠幸的汉子,宰相也要接受其统辖。例如征伐契丹时,武三思为主帅,宰相姚璹为副;征伐突厥时,薛怀义为主帅,宰相李昭德为副等等,乃至造天枢、进颂词之类事务,也是武氏子弟统领宰相实施。

    与此形成鲜明对照的是中央最高行政部门的尚书省,其首长在武则天时代最为稳定,二十一年间仅有六位,分别是左仆射:苏良嗣,武承嗣,王及善;右仆射:韦待价,岑长倩,豆卢钦望。除了岑长倩一人被迫害致死外,其余五人基本平安。左右仆射为尚书省主官,武则天时代曾经改称“左相”“右相”,实际上有名无实,和宰相沾不上边。武承嗣作为武氏子弟,不管担任什么职务都大权在握。尚书省长官之所以相对稳定且平安,根本原因就是没有实权。武则天通过宰相直接指挥六部、九卿,作为六部上级主管部门的尚书省形同摆设,主官在位唯唯诺诺,乏善可陈,故各人本传事迹记载寥寥,滥竽亦可充数。韦待价以军功起家,武则天用他担任天官(吏部)尚书、文昌右相,“素无藻鉴之才,自武职而起,居选部,既铨综无叙,甚为当时所嗤”。韦待价自知非治国之才,“既累登非据,颇不自安,频上表辞职,则天每降优制不许之”。武则天为什么坚持把不懂行政的人放在行政主管的位置上呢?其实就是为了将其虚化为承旨画押的华丽道具,便于她直接掌控朝廷。

    尚书省上层的人事,如表1所示(分为武则天垂帘听政与称帝两个时段):

    表1

    尚书省长官被弱化乃至虚化,但尚书省的职能不可完全废弃,因而出现上权下移的情况,亦即尚书省的左丞(正四品上)和右丞(正四品下)实际处理都省事务。尚书省主官左、右相(从二品)位高权虚,人少稳定,但左、右丞官员颇多,频有更迭,表明他们才是真正主事者。以下级官员主持事务,是独裁者常用的集权手段。由于官位卑下,受到超常重用时感恩戴德,听话卖力。而且,还因为官位卑下,制度上无权参预重大国务,所以让他们参预何种事务,以及参预到什么程度等等,君主皆可随心所欲,权力收放自如。武则天以此手段控制尚书省。

    外朝机构主要是六部,其人事任用情况如表2:

    表2

    人事变更的频度,依次为吏部、兵部、刑部、礼部、户部、工部。用这个指标观察武则天时代各个官署的情况,可以发现它们在朝廷权力结构上的重要性同人事变更频度成正比,越是重要,掌控越严,人事更迭越发频繁。由此归纳出武则天朝的权力秩序及其结构如图1。

    图1

    这明显是一个以军政为中心的朝廷:一切以皇帝集权独裁为最高目标,由吏部担纲彻底更换官吏队伍,兵部作为权力支柱,刑部作为整肃工具,礼部制造改朝换代的理论与合法性。皇权笼罩于全社会,生产、技术、民生等皆处于从属地位。武则天彻底改变了唐太宗建立的社会发展国策与朝廷架构。

    朝廷中最受重视的吏部和兵部,副职的变动异常的频繁,还多次出现其他部难以见到的官员再任的情况。这明显是武则天直接插手,安插委任亲信;同时表明在至关重要的权力部门,武则天倚重副职,越级操控部务,使之完全听命于皇帝。

    朝官这条线高级官员的选任情况,根据《旧唐书》和《新唐书》的不完全记载,列示如表3:

    表3

    两《唐书》官员传记固然不能覆盖官员全体,然而,达到一定的量亦足以反映用人原则和基本面貌。根据上表所示,至少可以确认以下两点:

    第一,官员大都出自官宦之家。

    唐朝建立后,功臣和高官后裔,特别是军功子弟在仕宦上获得优待。唐高宗仪凤年间,魏元忠上封事指出:

    当今朝廷用人,类取将门子弟,亦有死事之家而蒙抽擢者。

    北魏孝文帝迁都洛阳推行新官制,按照官职高低分为甲乙丙丁“四姓”等级,确立了优先录用官宦子弟的制度规定,北齐、北周、隋朝和唐朝都沿袭这一原则,武则天亦是如此,故官宦出身者出仕比例甚高,功臣子弟更受重用。太宗、高宗朝名将薛仁贵,儿子薛讷,“则天以讷将门,使摄左武威卫将军、安东道经略”。

    从唐朝建立到武则天全面掌权,经过了大约半个世纪,许多功臣业已凋零,功勋门第逐渐变味为官宦之家。官宦出身既是政治可靠的凭证,在入仕升迁上受到重视,也是官场的护身符,在仕途挫折罹难时,能够起到从轻处罚或者事过境迁后东山再起的佑庇作用。开国初期的重视功勋,逐渐蜕变为建政后常规铨选时讲究家世亲缘,武则天对此颇为坚持,有所发挥。岑文本是唐太宗任用的宰辅重臣,其侄子岑长倩因此得到重用,高宗时出任宰相,支持武则天夺权,故长年身居权力中枢,直到武则天欲立武承嗣为皇位继承人之际,因为主张维持亲子继承而得罪武则天,下狱处死。此后在朝廷举荐人才的时候,凤阁侍郎韦嗣立推荐岑长倩族子岑羲入朝任职,并说明其为朝廷罪犯亲属,武则天不但批准了岑羲的任用,而且还为受牵连的高管亲属的任用开了绿灯,“由是缘坐近亲,相次入省”。对落难或者受牵连的官宦子弟网开一面予以任用,显然不是个例,而成为规则,维护着优待官宦子弟入仕的一贯方针。

    第二,注重名门家世,尤其是亲缘关系。武氏子弟不循正常途径入仕,应置于第二条人事线论述。武则天的母亲自称出自天下名门之弘农杨氏,实为隋朝皇族之杨氏。隋室杨氏因为是武则天外家的缘故,一直受到重用。武周“时武承嗣、攸宁相次知政事”,武则天对地官尚书杨执柔说:“‘我令当宗及外家,常一人为宰相。’由是执柔同中书门下三品。”武氏和杨氏联合坐庄朝政,成为一条规则。

    李唐与隋杨乃姻亲,政治上虽为敌手,亲情却深。李渊的母亲和隋文帝独孤皇后为亲姊妹,隋朝灭亡后,李渊对隋杨皇族给予照顾,亲自做媒将隋朝纳言杨达女儿嫁给武士彟,让这位河东木材商人粘上皇亲国戚的边,成为武则天日后飞黄腾达不可或缺的门槛。武则天显然领悟到王朝政治的奥秘,深知金字塔权力结构的顶端是少数门阀士族垄断权力,运用朝廷强力部门作为工具,实现对整个官僚体系的控制。在她的理解中,管理社会的核心不是遵守规则,而是追求权力的无限扩大,笼罩一切。权力需要人来掌握,掌权的人越少则权力集中,越有利于皇权。因此,等级森严的寡头政治成为她的营造蓝图。武氏家族(包括赐予“武”姓的皇子)居于金字塔尖,被选中的士族与近宠佞幸组成朝廷上层。有所不同的是被选中的士族相对稳定,而近宠佞幸与酷吏则频频变动,道理在于这些人作为工具固然必不可少,但落到具体的走狗却需要经常更换。近宠佞幸与酷吏属于第二条人事线研究的对象,留待后述。被选中的少数门阀士族颇受重用,飞黄腾达,纷纷跻身于权力上层,与武氏家族共同构成核心统治集团。例如杨氏家族在“则天时,又以外戚崇宠。一家之内,驸马三人,王妃五人,赠皇后一人,三品以上官二十余人,遂为盛族”;韦氏家族之“巨源与安石及则天时文昌右相待价,并是五服之亲,自余近属至大官者数十人”。

    唐朝是贵族建立的王朝,高祖李渊以此为荣,建政初期曾经对宰臣裴寂说道:

    我李氏昔在陇西,富有龟玉,降及祖祢,姻娅帝王,及举义兵,四海云集,才涉数月,升为天子。至如前代皇王,多起微贱,劬劳行阵,下不聊生。公复世胄名家,历职清要,岂若萧何、曹参起自刀笔吏也。惟我与公,千载之后,无愧前修矣。

    得意之情溢于言表。倚重士族和功勋家族成为唐朝人事的重要原则,唐太宗修《氏族志》和武则天重用士族皆为此原则的一脉相传,除了武氏因武则天而破格崛起之外,老牌士族左右高层政治的局面一仍其旧,未有改观。武则天重用士族,寄任之深甚至扭曲制度。唐朝制度规定,近亲不得同时担任高官要职,以防止某一家族权力过大。对此项规定,武则天采取变通的办法规避,李峤担任宰相,两年后其舅张锡也升任宰相,武则天让李峤转任成均祭酒,“舅甥相继在相位,时人荣之”。士族对于权位的诉求也直言不讳。垂拱年间的宰臣韦思谦把两个儿子韦嗣立和韦承庆径直托付给武则天,说:“臣有两男忠孝,堪事陛下。”武则天欣然接受,对韦嗣立明言:“今授卿凤阁舍人,令卿兄弟自相替代。”果如其言,先是韦嗣立接替韦承庆担任凤阁舍人,然后由韦承庆轮替韦嗣立出任天官侍郎,不久又接下韦嗣立的宰辅要职,等到韦承庆去世,又让韦嗣立接任黄门侍郎,前后四度轮替,宛如左右手传接一般。

    优待功臣后人,讲究官宦家世,倚重名门士族这三条铨选的基本原则,武则天无不坚持贯彻,比起唐太宗时代逐步开放用人的家世条件,有所倒退。陈寅恪未对武则天用人的实际情况进行整体考察,断言武则天破格用人,培养出新兴阶级攘夺替代西魏、北周、杨隋及唐初将相旧家之政权尊位,“故武周之代李唐,不仅为政治之变迁,实亦社会之革命。”此番议论完全得不到事实的支持。武则天称帝充其量只是僭主篡政,酷吏政治绝非社会革命,新兴阶级亦非权力所能制造,只能是社会生产形态所决定的客观存在。

    一朝有一朝的组织原则。武则天朝对于太宗朝组织原则的最大改变,是把对唐朝的忠诚演变为对她个人的效忠。她遴选并重用的官宦士族都遵循这条最高原则。

    从小生活在权贵圈子里成长的功臣高官子弟,对于政治人事嗅觉最为敏感,察言观色得风向之先,其中想飞黄腾达的人跟风最紧。丘和、丘行恭父子建唐时立有大功,皆获陪葬皇陵的殊荣。丘行恭之子丘神勣属于最早投靠武则天的功臣子弟,充当鹰犬,出手害死章怀太子,与酷吏周兴、来俊臣齐名;岑文本侄子岑长倩等一批功臣子弟因为支持武则天取代李唐而得到重用,俱见前述。李大亮的族孙李廻秀,在武则天晚年当上宰相,“颇托附权幸,倾心以事张易之、昌宗兄弟,由是深为谠正之士所讥”。

    在逢迎武则天近幸方面,王朝体制内的士族亦不遑多让。崔义玄精通儒经,以学干禄,为唐高宗立武则天为皇后出谋卖力,主持审判长孙无忌。因为这份功劳,两个儿子崔神基和崔神庆都得到武则天的重用。武则天晚年,朝中大臣拼死控告武则天的男宠张昌宗犯罪,崔神庆受命审理此案,竟然为其开脱。张昌宗、张易之兄弟为武则天晚年之最爱,士族官员趋势附炎,卑躬攀附,父子三人皆为宰相的韦氏,韦承庆讨好张氏兄弟;几度进谏武则天的宰相李峤,其实和张氏兄弟交情甚深,以至于武则天倒台后,他们都为此遭到贬黜。宰相杨再思历仕三朝,主持政务十余年,地道的官油子。他善于体察上意,皇上喜欢的,他吹捧得天花乱坠,皇上讨厌的,他诋毁得丑陋无比。有人私下问他身居高位何苦如此呢?他道出为官数十载的心得:正直的官员招灾惹祸,唯有望风顺旨才能保全性命。原来赞美颂圣的合唱队充斥着虚情矫饰的歌手,声嘶力竭的领唱者往往最洞悉内里幽暗。杨再思年轻就通过科举,腹有经纶,黠于应对。张昌宗遭诉,群情汹汹。武则天询问杨再思意见,杨再思说张昌宗炼仙丹给皇上服用,皇上身强体健便是国家万幸,所以张昌宗功劳莫大。避开犯罪事实,只谈皇上重于社稷,利君则利国,情郎瞬间成为英雄,迎合了武则天万难割舍的感情。张易之兄弟大宴朝官,饮酒互捧,张昌宗容貌粉嫩而得武则天欢心,一众官员赞美张昌宗貌似莲花,杨再思挺身纠正道:“人言六郎面似莲花;再思以为莲花似六郎,非六郎似莲花也。”这等话术浸染弥漫成为武周王朝的官风。

    各路出身的王朝官员汇聚在一起,国家正事做不了,真话说不得,有失品格的种种表演,未必都是他们猥琐卑劣,而是那个时代的政治生态所致。当然,他们的所作所为反过来也强化了那种环境,互为因果,最终无人幸免。于是,官场晋升的秘径变成通途,“时朝廷谀佞者多获进用,故幸恩者,事无大小,但近谄谀,皆获进见”。

    拍马溜须而不做事,即使身居高位也不敢有所作为。在朝不为恶,偶尔说些合乎道理的建言,这在正常的社会属于常识底线,但在武周却足以振聋发聩,勇气有加,难能可贵。武周时代朝官的水平,后人颇有评论:

    豆卢钦望、张光辅、史务滋、崔元综、周允元等,或有片言,非无小善,登于大用,可谓具臣。

    苏味道、李峤等,俱为辅相,各处穹崇。观其章疏之能,非无奥赡;验以弼谐之道,罔有贞纯。

    崔融、卢藏用、徐彦伯等,文学之功,不让苏、李,止有守常之道,而无应变之机。

    崔(融)与卢(藏用)、徐(彦伯),皆攻翰墨。文虽堪尚,义无可则。备位守常,斯言罔忒。

    这些评价并非贬低之辞。武则天晚年请狄仁杰举荐宰辅高官,狄仁杰当面询问武则天是否觉得当朝主官乃“文吏”之流,不堪大任?武则天深以为然。一朝皆凡庸,是谁之过?然而,到此地步,不想崩溃只能举贤任能,转机因此萌生,历史总要做出选择。

    二、近幸宠臣

    武周政权的朝官,在大清洗的肃杀氛围中,实际上已经沦为摆设,把朝廷门面装潢得煞有介事,敷衍日常事务,跑腿当差。真正掌握权力的是第二条线,亦即武则天委以重任的近幸宠臣。同第一条朝官线的重要区别,在于他们基本不经过吏部铨选正途入仕。这条线上的人物可以分为两个层面,首先是中心层面,有处于权力中枢、出将入相的武氏子弟,以及武则天信赖有加的男宠团队。其次是前台层面,有刮起血雨腥风、致令人人自危的酷吏集团。这两拨人的权力都来源于武则天。

    首先来看中心层面的武氏子弟。武则天时代构成政治权力的亲属基础者,有下面这些人。在亲属关系上,他们分别是武则天的侄子和侄孙两代人;在政治秩序上,他们分别被封为亲王和郡王。

    亲王

    梁王  武三思  武则天长兄武元庆之子。

    魏王  武承嗣  武则天次兄武元爽之子。

    陈王  武承业  武承嗣弟,追封。

    定王  武攸暨  武则天伯父武士让之孙,始封千乘王,尚太平公主后进封。

    亲王四人:武三思和武承嗣为武则天异母侄子,武承业为追封,三人皆为侄子辈;武攸暨因为尚太平公主而进封亲王,为侄孙辈,乃特例。

    郡王

    武崇训  武三思子,尚安乐公主,封高阳王。

    武崇烈  武崇训弟,封新安王。

    武延基  武承嗣子,始封南阳王,后袭父封,坐私议张昌宗,被杀。

    武延义  武延基弟,袭父封,继魏王。

    武延秀  武延义弟,封淮阳王。

    武延晖  武承业子,袭父封,嗣陈王。

    武延祚  武延晖弟,封咸安王。

    武攸宜  武则天堂兄武惟良之子,封建安王。

    武攸绪  武攸宜弟,封安平王。

    武攸宁  武则天堂兄武怀运之子,武攸暨之兄,封建昌王。

    武攸归  武攸宁弟,封九江王。

    武攸止  武攸归弟,封恒安王。

    武攸望  武攸止弟,封会稽王。

    武懿宗  武则天堂兄武志元之子,封河内王。

    武嗣宗  武懿宗弟,封临川王。

    武尚宾  武则天堂兄武仁范之子,封河间王。

    武重规  武尚宾弟,封高平王。

    武载德  武重规弟,封颍川王。

    作为武氏子弟集团的附庸,可以加上宗秦客、宗楚客、宗晋卿和纪处讷四人。前三人为武则天外甥,纪处讷则是武三思的连襟。

    武氏子弟集团最醒目的特色,是完全未见科举出身者。且不论唐朝高度重视文化,自开国以来就建立起文化程度甚高的官吏队伍,从社会发展而言,以武力开国的王朝到了和平年代,其军功集团的后代也在时代潮流的推动下转而向学,子弟通过科举途径入仕晋升,继续仰仗家世门荫者日渐稀少,受人轻视。武士彟作为唐朝开国功臣,其家族子弟这等学历,透露出武氏家族对于文化的态度,落伍于时代。这批武氏权贵中,最有文化,以至于史家给予记载的是武三思,“略涉文史”,仅此而已。他留下诗歌创作的记录是赞颂张昌宗才高貌美,乃神仙王子晋转世。

    武氏姻亲子弟,宗秦客、宗楚客、宗晋卿和纪处讷四人同样未见学业与科举记载。如果把视野扩大到整个第二条人事线,亦即将武则天男宠团队也一并考察,情况如下:

    薛怀义原名韦小宝,街头摆摊出身,以魁梧雄壮获得宠幸。武则天为了掩盖这段少年劣迹,令其出家为僧,编入女婿薛氏的士族谱中,主持朝廷宗教事业,找人编撰《大云经》,陈说符命,发现武则天是弥勒下凡。

    张易之、张昌宗兄弟,出自贞观名臣张行成家族。张行成少时追随大师刘炫,勤学不倦,应科举及第,历仕太宗、高宗两朝,为一代名臣。张易之兄弟是张行成的族孙,不可思议的是文化家族的子弟竟然不循科举正道,张易之是依靠门荫入仕的,因为白皙美貌,擅长音声。其弟张昌宗首先被太平公主发掘出来,用得称心,转而推荐给武则天,同样表现不俗,大得欢心。张昌宗推荐兄长张易之说:“臣兄易之器用过臣,兼工合炼。”原来这对兄弟兼具炼丹才能。由此可知,他们自小研修道家房中阴阳之术,耽于学业,故难应科举,只好走门荫之路。张易之、张昌宗兄弟几乎专宠,武氏权贵争相为他们牵马前导,招摇过市,加上以权贪赃,惹来妒忌非议,沸沸扬扬。武则天为了遮掩丑闻,让他们主持朝廷文化事业,集中天下美少年和宰辅大臣们,济济一堂,组建文化机构“控鹤监”,更美其名称“奉宸府”,编撰《三教珠英》等大型文集,煌煌千余卷。

    薛怀义的宗教事业,张易之兄弟的文化事业,再往前追溯到北门学士的巨著编撰,有人称之为武则天大力推动的文化盛世。

    做出如此不凡成就的张氏兄弟,虽然没有科举出身,亦非胸无点墨,史书记载张氏兄弟勉强能写成文章,至于和武则天酬唱应对的诗文,自有宋之问、阎朝隐等文学工匠代笔。

    武氏子弟与男宠团队,以及他们同武则天的关系如何呢?在政治风头上,男宠团队风光无限。早先得宠的薛怀义,乃至后来的新欢张易之兄弟,进出内外,武承嗣、武三思一帮武氏子弟争先恐后为其牵马执辔,献诗赞颂,卑辞厚礼,媚态可掬。作为武周皇族却要竭力逢迎男宠,武氏子弟心有不甘,武承嗣的儿子武延基与妻子永泰郡主,以及懿德太子等人私下聚集议论,谈到张易之兄弟任意出入宫中,无不愤恨难耐,摩拳擦掌。这些议论竟然不翼而飞传入武则天耳朵,武则天大怒,逼令武延基自尽。私下非议竟然要付出生命的代价,武则天心中的情感天平清晰可见。然而,这只是表面现象,在政治利益的天平上,武氏子弟才是根本,是武周政权的根基和血脉,武周政权总归要传给姓武的,以至于武则天的亲生子女都要改姓武,试图将他们塞进武氏血脉。武氏子弟充当男宠的马前卒,武则天当然知道,且乐见所为,如果企图反抗则铁腕镇压,绝不留情。这是什么道理呢?并不是男宠金贵,而是武则天将他们当作自己的化身和试金石,测试属下是否绝对驯服而已。服从男宠就是服从武则天,男宠不为人齿,却能够做到诚心悦服,证明对于武则天的驯服臻于精纯,绝对到肝脑涂地,万死不辞。

    武延基是未经风浪的权贵子弟,自命不凡,这恰是心生二志的萌芽,咎由自取。其父辈武承嗣和武三思则迥然不同。武承嗣写不了诗文,却将马牵得十分安稳,让薛怀义和张易之兄弟享尽荣耀。武三思粗通文墨,双眼如炬看出张昌宗乃神仙转世,亲自写诗,还组织编排大型音乐舞蹈表现仙人下凡的绚丽场面,让崔融动情绝唱:“昔遇浮丘伯,今同丁令威。中郎才貌是,藏史姓名非”,把自己感动得涕泗俱下。为什么父子两代差距如此巨大呢?道理就在于武则天同兄弟的关系。武承嗣的父亲武元爽、武三思的父亲武元庆,以及其他诸武的父辈如武惟良、武怀运等等,武则天幼年饱受他们的欺负,尤其是武则天的母亲对他们恨之入骨绝不宽恕,让武则天掌权后给予摧残泄恨,武元庆、武元爽遭黜,配流岭外而死;武惟良、武怀运被诬陷下毒害死外甥女韩国夫人,被处死。武则天的兄弟,自己不死,就只能等待处死。武承嗣和武三思早年都曾随父亲配流边荒,武则天决意篡唐建周以后,出于政治需要才把他们召回京城。骤落暴起,亲尝政治炎凉与绝情,武承嗣和武三思对于姑妈早已胆战心惊,变得十分乖巧,虽然身居高官,却十分清楚权力来自何方,对此顶礼膜拜。这种出格的表现有违自然,看似尽忠,实为恐惧。捆绑到篡唐立周的战船上,构成吴越同舟的共同命运,捍卫武则天就是保卫自身的政治特权,背后的驱动力不是绝对忠诚的感情,而是荣辱与共的利益。

    利益为本,必定得陇望蜀。武承嗣欲望和野心膨胀起来,想独占权力,便策动武则天尽诛李唐子孙,同时组织宵小请愿,试图成为太子,吞下武周的果实。武则天未遂其愿,致令武承嗣怏怏而死。作为政治精算师的武则天,是信任有父仇的侄儿,还是相信亲生的儿子呢?武承嗣越界了,利令智昏,自取灭亡。从他儿子武延基非议张易之兄弟一事,武则天难道看不出来武承嗣不为人知的家庭内部只讲利益不尽忠诚的真情吗?武承嗣和武延基父子之死,显现出武则天的底线:皇位传给姓武的亲生儿子,武氏子弟掌控朝廷,成为武周政权的核心。所以,武则天花费更多的心血培育武氏第三代,几乎都封为郡王,出将入相,以保武周江山长远稳固。武则天的政治算盘在内心早已权衡清楚,决不是晚年在大臣的谏言下幡然醒悟,立子继承。大臣们的谏言因为契合武则天的心意而被采纳,同时也给了跃跃欲试的武氏子弟一个无法扭转的交代。通过和朝中大臣讨论继承人问题,武则天也摸清了大臣们的政治态度。她这个决定是明智的,武氏第三代在内政外交上的庸劣表现,根本不可能作为皇帝撑起大局,与其被推翻,不如回归政治合法性。之所以成为糊不上墙的烂泥,武氏几代人皆无学业与科举,已经有了答案。

    其次来看前台层面的酷吏集团。在唐朝,武则天时代首次出现酷吏,完全改变了政治规则和社会风气,影响深远。唐朝的出现不仅是一次成功的改朝换代,而且是一场重要的政治革新。五胡十六国南北朝分裂时代,恃力使诈成为政治常态,社会上层失德,下层失信,导致国家数百年难以真正统一。唐太宗总结历史教训,致力于重建法律与制度,取信于民。唐朝建立到武周时代将近七十年,垂拱而治,依靠的就是官民互信,制度公平。到唐太宗晚年,“天下刑几措,是时州县有良吏,无酷吏”。武则天僭主当政,威望不足,忧惧群臣不服,便重用一批酷吏大规模整肃异己,构陷告密,开启酷吏政治时代。酷吏政治与武则天执政相始终,甚至长于武周政权的存在时间。武则天倒台之后,酷吏政治随之而去。但是,它没有消亡,而是潜伏在帝制体内,不时兴风作浪。

    酷吏作为僭主独裁的主要工具,威慑并实际控制整个官僚阶层,因此,他们无疑处于政治权利结构的顶层。另一方面,酷吏的所作所为,乃秉承上意,因此,他们常常被轻视为君权行使的道具,而非具有独立意志和利益的集团。事实并不尽然,当工具坐大的时候,便逐渐膨胀起欲望,从狐假虎威,假公济私,直至奴大欺主。武则天对薛怀义隐忍再三,唐朝多少皇帝死于宦官之手,说明任何政治集团一旦成形便有了主张和利益诉求。所以,酷吏集团不可仅仅当作皇权的影子简单处理。当告密和清洗全面铺开之后,海量的案件并非君主所能掌控,检举何人,镇压什么,都与发起的酷吏的感情、学识、见地和利益息息相关。他们的指向性变成强有力的鞭子和精神指挥棒,逼迫并规定着官僚队伍的思想观念、施政行为和价值取向,进而深深地影响文化程度不高的芸芸众生,形成弥漫世间的社会风气。最终出现的结果往往和君主最初的政治蓝图不尽吻合,甚至相去甚远,原因就在于君主和酷吏文化水平和利益见识的落差。君主用工具剪裁世界,酷吏则以其品行见识塑造世界。大千世界从来不是单方面所能制造的,而是各方面合力的产物。

    酷吏的身世塑造其品行和情感,文化见识规定其眼光和行为。这两者又极大地左右着官僚队伍乃至整个社会的文明水平。吏治庸劣从来都是社会堕落的驱动力。

    武则天时代,告密成风,酷吏成群。然而,能够得到武则天重视,挑选出来兴风作浪,成为酷吏代表的主要有以下这些人:

    来俊臣,乡间地痞;左台御史中丞。

    周兴,少习法律;秋官侍郎,尚书左丞。

    傅游艺,吏员;同凤阁鸾台平章事。

    丘神勣,官宦子弟;左金吾卫大将军。

    索元礼,胡人;游击将军。

    侯思止,家奴无赖,文盲;朝散大夫,左台侍御史。

    万国俊,乡间地痞;朝散大夫,肃正台侍御史。

    来子珣,无学,告密入仕;左台监察御史。

    王弘义,告密入仕;左台侍御史。

    郭霸,吏员,革命举;左台监察御史。

    吉顼,进士;天官侍郎,同凤阁鸾台平章事。

    让一个时代陷入血腥恐怖的酷吏,只有吉顼一人是进士出身。少时读过书的仅见周兴,曾经学习法律,为日后翻弄法条打下基础,属于刀笔吏。上述11人中,9人出自乡间地痞无赖,甚至侯思止还是个文盲,却官至左台侍御史,主持监察炼狱。这批人的行迹与文化程度,显然无法通过朝廷正规的仕进考察,所以都由武则天直接提拔重用。武则天用的人,再荒唐也不容议论。侯思止言行举行粗野愚蛮,成为官场笑柄。武则天知道后,怒斥嘲笑者:“我已用之,卿何笑也?”当听说了侯思止那些惊动四座的话语,自己也忍不住喷笑。侯思止丑态百出,在武则天看来却是愚忠可靠,故其官位坐得十分牢靠。11人中,有文化学业者2人,占18%。另一方面,升任宰相的也是2人,同样占18%。文化低同官职高形成鲜明的对照。

    武则天时代用人的两条线、三个层面,第一条朝官线基本遵循入仕正常规则考察录用。在武则天酷吏大清洗的恐怖气氛下,动辄犯咎下狱,故上上下下明哲保身,敷衍了事。他们整体文化水平最高,权力却最小,得过且过,形同摆设。第二条线的中心层面,有武氏子弟和武则天男宠团队,文化程度颇低,职位最高,握有大权,构成武周政权的政治人事基础;前台层面的酷吏集团,基本由地痞无赖出身者组成,通过诬告或者兼进谀词而获重用,飞速蹿升,权势熏天。和中心层面相比,前台层面的酷吏集团是必须的存在,至于具体的个人则需要经常更换,败亡亦在瞬间。他们得意之时极尽残忍,破灭之际人剐其肉,遗臭万年。他们刮起互害之风,自己无一幸免,“既为祸始,必以凶终”。

    从人事结构来看,武则天时代是武氏子弟、男宠团队和酷吏集团联合管控朝官,进而掌控全社会;同时也是无知对文化的压制,权力对于法律制度的践踏。

    三、士族政治与科举

    武则天基本遵循唐朝官员入仕与晋升的铨选原则,另一方面则在权力的上层重用武氏子弟、男宠团队和酷吏,掌控百官的黜骘乃至生杀大权,主宰政局。她重用之人学历低,非贵族名门出身,格外引人注目,以至于有研究者把武则天作为唐朝政局的分水岭,认为武则天大量提拔庶族寒门,改变了门阀士族对于政治的垄断。陈寅恪进一步把视野扩大到北周,认为当年宇文泰组建关陇地区胡汉各族实力人物组成的“关陇集团”,垄断政治直到武则天方才打破。武则天大批提拔科举出身的人入仕,形成“新兴阶级”,如此则武则天不仅在唐朝,乃至在中国古代历史上都是改变历史进程的领袖。以一人之力改变三代王朝的历史方向,这样的功业恐怕空前绝后。

    陈寅恪对于南北朝隋唐史研究的贡献,在于提出了宏大的问题,启发历史学家去思考和论证。学说的成立,首先要通过证伪的检验,其次才是不同视角的分析论辩,在思想碰撞中发展。

    陈寅恪对武则天历史定位的基点是魏晋南北朝以来的士族政治。首先需要厘清的概念是这个历史阶段的士族与士族政治。士族指的是社会的统治阶层。士族与皇帝为主导的政治、军事势力结合,相互依靠,掌控并长期把持中央王朝到地方的政治权力。曹魏建立“九品官人之法”,表面高举“唯才是举”大旗,很快转为重视家世,到了西晋则日益强调家世礼法,从铨选制度上极大强化了官僚士族的特权地位,世袭垄断政治权力,形成固化的士族政治形态。魏晋南北朝的士族,大多起自东汉崩溃以后一再出现的大动乱,在兵荒马乱中聚集亲族乡党据险自保,组成自立武装,割据乡村,概称为“坞壁”。几百年的战乱和外族入侵,使得坞壁得以长期维持,遂演变为世家大族,将地方社会碎片化,以至于重新建立的各个王朝都必须得到他们的支持才能控制地方。世家大族大小不等,大者跨郡连州,千家万户;小者数百家一族,武断乡曲。他们通过联姻构成亲族网络,跻身于王朝官僚之中,凭借在乡势力支持政权,利用国家权力垄断地方。婚和宦是支撑士族长久不衰的两大法宝。士族内部有高下等级之分,这种区分不仅凭借在乡实力和官位高低,还根据文化和声誉,虽然不像确定官品那样清晰严格,但也有必备的条件:连续几代人中出现公卿宰辅一级的高官,属于政治条件;颇有文化学养,遵循礼法家教,属于文化条件。政治和文化两方面条件都具备的世家大族,受到社会普遍的承认与重视,例如北朝隋唐的崔、卢、李、郑、王等山东士族,韦、裴、柳、薛、杨、杜等关中士族,被视为最高的门第。其下还有各个州郡级别的士族等级,构成从朝廷到地方的世家大族等级结构。王朝在此基础上,结合在当朝官职的高低,编撰氏族谱,作为铨选的家庭条件和分配政治权利的依据。北魏孝文帝开其端,划分甲乙丙丁等第;后续王朝全都跟进。唐太宗修《氏族志》,唐高宗和武则天重修《姓氏录》,表明对于士族等级秩序的高度重视。据此可知,说武则天力图打破士族政治,不知从何说起。兼具实力、官品、文化三者优势的士族,得到各大政治势力的积极拉拢,成为其政权的支柱。他们在朝身居高位,在地雄踞一方,并且根据各自的身份地位形成比较固定的通婚圈,备受瞩目,演变成社会上重视的“门阀”。这种政治生态称为“士族门阀政治”。在确定士族身份等第的时候,文化条件颇为重要,品行与学术决定家族的声誉和社会影响。官职高却没有文化被视为权势豪门,地方上有实力缺少文化的家族被称作豪强,总之同具有文化色彩的“士”难以沾边。所以,士族研究从这个角度区分兼具文化学养者为士族,仅凭官职或者强宗势力者为世家大族。当然,这一区分并不是那么严格。作为统治阶层,常见笼统使用士族一词。

    在世家大族或者士族等级秩序的框架之内,其下层被称作“庶族”“寒门”等。以往的研究对于士庶之分并不清晰,如果以五品以上官职划线,那么庶族就是下层官吏直至小地主之家,缺乏权势的中小地主自然被归为“寒门”。他们也被称作“庶族地主”等。然而,无论士族、庶族,他们都属于统治阶层。即使武则天时代出现大量提拔庶族寒门的现象,既不构成“新兴阶级”,也完全称不上“社会革命”,充其量只是统治阶层内部的成分调整。何况武则天任用的官员,如前面列示的三个层面,酷吏多为无业的地痞游民,连“寒门”都构不上;武氏与男宠固然文化水平低,但其家族在唐朝已经上升为功臣权贵,甚至是皇族,无法再用“庶族”指称他们;而朝官的选任与唐朝开国以来的状况没有大的变化。综合三个层面所展示的真实状况,无法支持陈寅恪所谓武则天缔造庶族寒门“新兴阶级”的假说。陈寅恪并未提供实证分析的根据,不知所本,故只能对其结论提出商榷。

    其次,陈寅恪提出的“新兴阶级”,最重要的特点是科举进士出身,工于为文。亦即武则天之前,唐朝铨选重视门第家世,用的是“西魏、北周、杨隋及唐初将相旧家”,而武则天破格录用科举出身者,形成与所谓“关陇集团”对立的“新兴阶级”。

    这里涉及两个问题:1.支撑起北周、隋、唐政权的旧家,亦即所谓的“关陇集团”的存续状况。宇文泰以后来所封的八柱国、十二大将军等二十余家创业家族为核心建立西魏、北周政权,所言甚是。但是,这一创业功勋集团从北周宇文护专政时起就遭受猜忌和镇压;北周武帝辉煌的功业昙花一现,人亡政毁;杨坚政变建隋,抑制并清洗宇文泰组建的关陇集团主要家族,隋炀帝则重用江南士族。李渊建唐,依靠的是河东士族与大姓,唐太宗则强调用人上的五湖四海。这一历史进程呈现了走出关陇的清晰脚印。政权长治久安的人事基础在于用人区域和社会阶层的广泛性,统治者只要不失心智,自然深谙个中道理。

    2.政治史所讲的地域政治集团,是指集中任用某地人的政策与原则。西魏、北周的统治地域仅仅局限于关陇地区,只能任用关陇人事,别无他选,并不是拥有广阔的统治区域而有意识地专门任用关陇人事。所以,所谓“关陇本位政策”或者“关陇集团”,说了等于没说。更何况严酷的政治现实,生死攸关,且政治目标与利益各不相同,从来都是一朝天子一朝臣,甚至是一朝天子数朝臣,哪有一朝大臣数朝皇帝,更加不可思议的竟然是一朝大臣三代王朝,从理论到现实都不成立。从宇文护到隋文帝,执政者仅有关陇地区的从政经历,故人事基础局限在这里。即便如此,他们也在扩大用人的面,压制宇文泰的创业“旧家”。明白无误的变化出现在隋炀帝时代。隋朝成为全国性政权之后,用人的区域日渐扩大。隋炀帝曾经指挥统一江南的战争,皇后又出自南朝皇族萧氏,故他重视南方,拔擢江南士人,委以重任,甚至主导朝政,极大改变了关陇官僚居多的成色。唐朝自创业时起,就以太原组建的班底构成核心人事圈,笼络山东士族。武士彟就在此时进入政治核心圈,崛起于政坛;武则天也是因为功臣之女才选入宫中,日后执掌权柄。武氏是李唐政权下的既得利益者,和其他创业家族命运与共,构成唐朝人事的基本盘。武则天出于一己之私,打压李唐政权的忠实支持者,但她主要用没有社会根基的酷吏集团作为打手整肃官僚,并没有从根本上改变官僚队伍的成分和用人路线。其道理显而易见,武则天要的是至尊皇权,而不是摧毁自己赖以生存的政权根基;她要在最高权贵阶层中长期占有武氏一席之地,并不为酷吏之流痞子政客谋求利益,改变权贵阶层的结构;她处心积虑推进李、武联姻,就是为了补武氏合法性短板从而获得长远安定;她深知根深蒂固的士族阶层的重要性,所以对韦氏、杨氏、崔氏等老牌士族笼络重用,甚至让他们父子兄弟同时身居要职,宽容他们对于男宠团队乃至武氏子弟的轻蔑;她扮演官僚、“旧家”敌对者的角色以煽动下层,却没有改变李唐依靠官宦士族的组织路线。所以,武则天表面上看似泼辣凌厉,其实内心极其精明,她走在极端政策的边缘,却在最关键之处未越雷池一步。从本质上看,她是士族政治的坚定维护者,而非掘墓人。

    北周隋唐的相关性在于三代王朝的建立者同出一源,此偶然现象的关键在于北周、杨隋皆短祚,事起仓促,只要不是被其他政治势力所征服,剩下的便是同一平台脱颖而出的新秀。新的创业者都是受到当政者压迫而心生异志的雄才,而非同一事业的前仆后继者。理念、目标和利益各不相同,如何构成同一体质的政治集团呢?所以,所谓的“关陇集团”把持北周、隋、唐三朝政治的议论,属于想象的建构。

    不存在垄断三朝政治的所谓“关陇集团”,却出现一个确定不移的现象,那就是官员铨选与晋升中,科举出身者日益增多,反映出对于文化的要求越来越高,成为大势所趋。为什么会出现这样的变化呢?这一趋势究竟是个人意志的产物,还是国家社会发展的必然?

    自从东汉末年董卓被杀时起,朝廷就失去了对全国的统制,内战爆发,一步步沦为彻底的分裂割据,直至唐朝建立为止,中国在战乱和分裂中度过了将近四个半世纪的漫长岁月,其间虽然有过西晋和隋朝短暂的统一,却都以失败告终。分裂战乱的时代,真理由思辨的洞彻发现沦落为暴力的胜负角逐所决定,乱世的最高道理就是胜利。所以,这个时期过眼云烟般的繁多政权无不把实力和功绩作为用人的根本标准。曹操一再发布《求贤令》,公开倡导重用反道德能取胜的人,开启其端。魏文帝时代创立“九品官人之法”,任命中央到地方各级中正官来评选人才。这个制度存在根本性的内在冲突,亦即选用士族来贯彻“唯才是举”,不啻缘木求鱼,随着时间推移越来越走向反面。士族出身的中正用“家世”条件评定人才品级,结果“九品中正制”成为加强并固化士族门阀的强有力机器。另一方面,频仍的战争涌现出许多勇武的将领,在军事化的国家机器中占据主流。“九品官人之法”制造门阀士族,军国体制制造军功阶层,源源不断,在王朝政权内混杂合流,形成门阀和军功两大特色,在权斗中共存。权斗源于军功阶层对于文化和士人的蔑视,痛下杀手,必欲将其奴仆化。北魏崔浩事件等等,层出不穷的文化大狱莫不因此而生。共存则是对现实的屈服。攀援上权力宝座的各色人物,无不企图固化既得利益,军功和权势皆不可长久,丛林互噬注定没有胜者,欲求长在,最有效的途径就是转变为门阀,故不可一世的军功阶层不得不向现实低头,与士族合流,借其金字招牌悬挂在列戟的大门之上。北魏孝文帝确定胡汉姓族等第,令其通婚联姻,这样的事例屡见不鲜,道理如出一辙。皇帝亲自做媒,不是开婚姻介绍所的业余爱好,而是营造铁打江山的专业操作。

    军功士族门阀政治,是东汉灭亡以来中国长期不能统一、政权无法稳固和不断发生社会动乱的根源之一。因此,想要建设稳固富强国家的统治者都必须改变这种局面,任何根本性的社会变革,一定依靠法律、制度乃至文化价值观的改造重塑。人治最不可靠,凌驾于法律制度之上的人治,既可行善,亦可为恶,方向上飘忽不定,则易于颠覆。隋文帝建国之后,断然拆除士族门阀政治的制度台柱,“九品及中正至开皇中方罢”。自曹魏创立以来沿用数百年的“九品官人之法”终于被废除。此举有利于扩大政权的社会基础,故为后面的王朝所遵循。

    军功士族门阀政治是战乱时代军国体制的产物,打破门阀政治不仅是制度的变革,更是治国理念的转变。古人说马上得天下,王朝是靠武力打出来的。可是,政权建立之后,国家能否继续采用军国体制管理呢?唐太宗对此有深刻的认识,他还是秦王、天策上将的时候就积极延揽四方文学之士,皆为一时之选,其佼佼者号称“十八学士”。戎马倥偬之际,唐太宗仍然和文士一起深入研讨如何治理国家,从根本上认识到治国不能采用军事命令式的行政强制,更不能听任权力恶性膨胀,凌驾于一切之上,必须讲道理,重规则,建立完善的法律与制度,提升社会文化道德水平,才能实现国家繁荣强大、长治久安的目标。政治路线须要人去落实,什么样的人做什么样的事,所以官吏铨选至关重要。隋文帝废除“九品官人之法”,代之以科举考试,隋炀帝进一步确立进士科的主流地位。唐朝建立之后,强化了科举在铨选中的比重,特别是唐太宗以军事统帅的威望率领创业的军功部属转变崇尚武力的思想观念,积极倡导文治,大力办学,拓展科举入仕的途径,坚持不懈,推动社会形成尊重文化、推重科举的风气。唐朝科举设秀才、明经、进士、明法、明书、明算六科,秀才科后来停止,明法、明书、明算三科为专门科目,故常设科目为明经和进士。盛唐以后进士科越来越显赫,压过明经科,求仕进者趋之若鹜。唐五代时人王定保撰述唐代科举状况,说道:“进士科始于隋大业中,盛于贞观、永徽之际。搢绅虽位极人臣,不由进士者,终不为美,以至岁贡常不减八九百人。”显而易见,唐朝甫建即大力推进科举制,发展迅速,到唐太宗贞观年代已经被世人视为仕进正道,很受尊崇,以至于权贵子弟通过门荫或者军功起家者都以不能由科举入仕而深感不足,一生抱憾。唐太宗以广收天下英才为己任,当年见到新进士缀行而出的场面,欣然说道:“天下英雄入吾彀中矣!”偃武修文打下唐朝将近三百年的根基。文化的盛大,不是用读书人的多少所能表现,最重要的是社会各个阶层都崇尚文化,以此为荣,蔚然成风,这就是王定保盛赞贞观时代的立论所在。读书人虽多却甘当鹰犬,重用近乎文盲的酷吏镇压士人,哪怕编撰出颂扬的诗文,王定保并不以为是文化盛世。把科举作为入仕正道是唐朝既定国策,坚持推动,不待武则天方才肇始。这个重要转变是军功立国后走向长治久安的必由之路,具有客观的必要性与必然性,从这个意义上看,唐太宗并无首创之功,却是及早的觉悟者,避免了有害无益的弯路和折腾。

    科举制同九品官人之法相比,颇具公平性。后者注重家世出身,造成士族高门几乎垄断官场的僵化局面。科举则允许士子报名投考,凭借个人成绩录用,打开了社会下层之人上升的通道。侯君集、孙伏伽等都是自寒素举进士入仕、初唐位居朝廷大臣的著名例子。唐高祖武德五年(622),居住在邺城的陇西人李义琛、李义琰兄弟,及其堂弟李上德三人同年考上进士,成为佳话,载入史册。投名报考的科举制一旦取代九品官人之法,下层士子入仕的比例必然越来越高,毋庸置疑。然而这是一个发展的进程,积累数十年的科考,到武则天时代寒门出身增多,只是结果的呈现。社会的进步必定是人身及身份性限制的日益解除。科举制代表的正是这个方向。

    需要特别指出,论述科举制时往往把录用人数的增多作为制度推进的直接有力证据,实则南辕北辙。科举制不是一般的入学考试,而是入仕当官的铨选,所以不可能大量录取,其名额由每年需要补充的官吏员数来决定。唐太宗励行小朝廷,精兵简政,其组建的朝廷人数有各种记载,这里选取较多的一种,《新唐书·百官一》记载:“初,太宗省内外官,定制为七百三十员。”乱世的社会平均年龄颇低,故初唐朝廷需要世代更新的人数很少,决定了科举录取人数必定较少。依照唐朝“壮室而仕,耳顺而退”的三十年仕宦期,到唐高宗年代,科举录用人数呈现梯度增长,并随时代推移构成阶梯式上升,都是自然而然之势,绝非个人一己托天之功。

    依据官吏世代更新的需要决定科举登科人数的原则,唐高宗显庆二年(657),主持人事的黄门侍郎、知吏部选事刘祥道上疏,核算当时内外文武官,九品以上者13465人,取大数放宽至14000人,每年补充500人都要多出不少,而当年补充了1400人,超过需要2倍多。亦即唐高宗时代,科举登科加上依靠门荫等入仕者早已供大于求,不能再扩大科举登科人数了。由此可知,唐太宗贞观时代科举录取人数较少,反映当时严格执行职官的编制。高宗时代已经在10∶1的求仕压力下增加了很多登科名额,人浮于事。到了武则天时代,为了夺权乃至篡唐建周,武则天“务收人心”,做了重要改变,一是取消考试糊名,致使贿赂公行。例如来俊臣握生杀大权之时,大肆收受请托,每次铨选都要违法安排数百人入仕,至于王公权贵的插手科考,难以尽述。二是不按成绩,任意扩大录取人数,天授二年(691),十道举人,大批拔擢官吏;长寿元年(692)一月,武则天接见各地举人,“无问贤愚,悉加擢用,高者试凤阁舍人、给事中,次试员外郎、侍御史、补阙、拾遗、校书郎”,数以百计。而且还开启了试官制度,大批未能通过考试和品行考察的人,先行任职,把政务和民生当作儿戏。新录用的官吏如此之多,致使各个部门冗官泛滥,社会流传歌谣称曰:“补阙连车载,拾遗平斗量;欋推侍御史,碗脱校书郎。”

    官多至滥,并不会给下层寒士带来普遍的机会。武则天任用士族主持铨选,李峤录用权势之家的亲戚二千余人,以员外郎身份到各部门掌管事务,同在编的主官发生激烈争执,甚至互相殴击。此类官场乱象,是士族权门内部利益之争,和平民有什么关系呢?在古代史上,冗员滥官从来是权力泛滥的表现,带来的是更大的不公平。从武则天时代到中宗、睿宗朝急剧膨胀的“墨敕官”“斜封官”,请托贿赂充斥官场,便是其结果,而庶族寒门更无升迁的希望,如何形成与士族“旧家”对抗的“新兴阶级”呢?冗员滥官是对法制的破坏,绝不是科举制的进步,更不是所谓的“社会革命”。只有一律平等的公平制度,才是下层士子的上升通道。

    武则天时代的官僚阶层,呈现出非制度性越级提拔的武氏子弟、男宠团队、酷吏集团真正掌握权力,控制朝官的状态。朝官则基本遵循铨选途径入仕,没有改变唐初以来士族与官宦子弟为主的基本面貌。魏晋南北朝隋唐时代最重要的社会变革是科举制取代九品官人之法,拆除士族门阀政治的制度性支柱。这场变革肇始于隋朝,成为主流而蔚然大观于唐太宗时代,武则天时代未见制度上的进步,冗员滥官却对制度造成重大伤害,反而阻碍了寒门士子的正常上升。

  •  刘永华《程允亨的十九世纪:危机》

    文章节选自《程允亨的十九世纪:一个徽州乡民的生活世界及其变迁》( 刘永华 著 三联书店2024-11)

    危机(节选)

    光绪九年程氏兄弟分家之后的最初几年里,无论是清王朝还是程家自身,似乎都没有发生太大的变化。不过分家十几年后,这个世界发生了几次令人震惊的事件。甲午一役,大清海陆军败北,朝廷不仅面临巨额赔款问题,国内改革的呼声也越来越高。维新运动接踵而至,但不久即告失败。随后是庚子年的义和团运动爆发、八国联军侵华和辛丑年的巨额赔款。程家自身的变化发生得要早些。光绪十六年、光绪十八年,允亨的双亲先后去世。光绪十九年,同仓成亲。一年后,新一代出生。程家完成了新一轮的代际继替周期。此后,八国联军攻占北京那年,程家发生了家计危机。这些发生在一个王朝和一个农户层面的国事与家事,并非没有丝毫关联。这两个层面发生的事件,以及其他一些因素,都在程家家计危机的发生中扮演了或大或小的角色。

    国事与家事

    为理解这一时期程家的生计环境,我们先来梳理一下此期对程家生计影响最大的两种商品——大米与茶叶——的价格。太平天国后期,江南、安徽、江西一带米价大幅上涨。

    太平天国结束后,各地米价普遍下跌。从 19世纪70年代中叶至80年代中叶,米价基本保持稳定。此后价格逐渐上涨,1895年的米价比1875年上涨了50%。至清朝覆亡时,米价比 1875年上涨了1.5倍。可以想见, 1895年前,米价上涨相对缓慢,而此后15年的时间里,价格涨幅较大。回到婺北米市, 19世纪后期价格运动的总体方向与其他地区相似,不过 19世纪末以前的涨幅不甚突出。如表 7.3所示,太平天国后,婺北地区的米价大致回落至19世纪40年代的水平(但略低于道光十九年、二十年),这个价位基本维持至90年代中期。至 19世纪末20世纪初,在全国米价攀升的影响下,婺北地区的米价也迅速上涨。光绪二十二年米价是每石2.5元,光绪二十六年攀升至3.06元,比光绪二十二年上涨了22%。那么茶价呢?根据第六章的讨论,太平天国运动结束后,茶价为0.19元/斤左右,较太平天国运动开始后的价格(0.13—0.15元/斤)稍有回升,但远低于运动爆发前的水平( 0.29元/斤)。分家后,茶价一度有所下跌( 0.155元/斤),光绪十八年后稍有回升( 0.166元/斤),但仍较分家前低了将近13%。与此同时,跟分家前相比,程家生产的茶叶总量也有所下降。分家前,每年产茶 2担左右,分家前几年甚至达到年产 3担的峰值。分家后因茶园分割,产量回落至年产1.5担至2担余的规模。因此,分家后的十余年时间里,米价和茶价/茶叶年产量之间的剪刀差有所缩小,但收缩幅度不算大。至 20世纪之交,随着米价的攀升,这个剪刀差才进一步收缩,开始对程家的生计构成威胁。

    除了茶叶收入稍有回落外,这一时期程家的其他现金收入也有一定缩水,其中最重要的是山货。山货在程家现金收入中的地位,在相当长的时间里仅次于茶叶,最高时全年收入可达近19元(分家前)。

    程家历年收入一览表 (单位:元)

    但分家后,仅光绪二十一年、光绪二十二年超过10元(分别是13.20元和11元),其余年份都在9元以下。这一时期投入收购、加工黄精和挖掘葛根、制作葛粉的时间,都出现了大幅下降的情形。截至太平天国前期,在这两种山货的生产与贸易方面,程家共投入253日,占所有生计行事投入天数的8.42%;太平天国结束后至分家前,劳动投入增加至767.5日,在生计投入时间中的占比上升至 13.05%;分家后,劳动投入下降至99.5日,占比降至仅 2.65%,两者的时间投入,无论是绝对数量还是相对比例都大幅下降。细读排日账,山货收入的下降,跟葛粉产量的下降有直接关系。分家后,程家投入葛根挖掘的时间越来越少。这一方面跟分家后程家劳力的减少有一定关系,但更重要的原因,或许是经过数十年的密集挖掘后,葛根资源逐渐减少(同期制作葛巾的时间也减少了,两者应该是有内在关联的)。其结果是,分家后,程家从山货获取的现金收入逐渐下降,这对 19世纪 90年代以后的程家生计来说,无疑是一个不好的消息。

    程家历年粮食产量估算表 (单位:市斤)

    不过,对程家生计带来影响的,并不限于米价、茶价的波动和山货收入下降的问题,借贷在其中也扮演了重要角色。根据托尼( RichardH. Tawney)的说法,借贷是历史上乡民社会的基本问题之一,他曾经指出:“在所有小农经营耕作的国家里,乡村社会的根本问题并不是工资收入问题,而是借贷问题。”在困扰20世纪二三十年代中国农户生计的各种因素中,他将债务视为其中很重要的一项。他的看法得到了其他研究的证实。据陈翰笙30年代的调查,广东番禺调查的67个村子中,有50个村子的负债农户占70%以上。他估计,整个广东有三分之二的农户负有某种债务。他指出,广东农户的借债,十分之三是因为疾病、婚丧或其他临时的费用,而十分之七只是为了购买粮食养家糊口。由于本书开头谈到的那场光绪二十六年十月发生的危机是由债务引起的,我们有必要梳理一下此前十年(1891—1900)程家的债务状况。

    从排日账看,程家在 19世纪七八十年代并非完全不举债,但这些债务数量不大,在程家的偿还能力范围内,这种状况一直延续至分家后最初几年。光绪十七年,程家仍无数额较大的举债记录。不过此年发开过世。次年,发开的妻子也亡故。当年出现了两笔举债记录。第一笔发生于三月初十日,通过抵押田皮一秤,向廷远祠借入5.5银元。第二笔发生于同月廿五日,从余味山祠借来英洋22元。这两次举债原因不详,不过主要原因估计有二:其一,支付前一年与本年为发开夫妇办理小规模丧葬仪式的开销;其二,支付同仓娶亲的聘金。光绪十八年四月二日,也就是允亨母亲过世不到三个月后,程家举行了订亲仪式,聘金46元,这是一笔不小的开销,已经超出了当时程家一年茶叶销售的毛收入。加上公堂礼、谢媒人钱及举办婚礼酒席等各种费用,这场婚礼的开销当不在60元以下。如计入排日账记录的其他相关开销,此年的仪式与礼物开销高达73元余,为全年总开支的68%。

    程家历年开支结构表(光绪十八年—二十一年) (单位:元)

    允亨的儿媳是在次年正月二十五日进门的。在此前后,发生了一系列借贷行为。第一笔发生于进门十天前,程家以田皮字一张为抵押,向一位村民借入英洋5元。第二笔发生于此次借贷一个月后,也以田皮字一张为押,从一个会社借入英洋 10元。这两次举债很可能是为了支付同仓成亲酒席的开销。这一年的第三笔借贷发生于八月十四日,当天允亨从兄长和一位村民处借来11元,当天归还给余氏云青祠,取回契字(总共花销 24元,另 13元由允亨自筹)。七天后,程家再次以田皮字为押,从余味山祠借入英洋 20元。这几次借贷应该也是为了处理娶亲的费用,而第三次借贷显示,程家期望通过资金的周转,保住自己的一块耕地。

    光绪二十年三月初二日,程家支付了2.3元,赎回一处茶坦的契字,这是当年发生的唯一与借贷有关的行为,而且这次还是取赎而非举债。光绪二十一年发生两次借贷。第一笔发生于正月十五日,程家以庄下田契为押,从一位村民手上借入英洋13元。第二笔发生于六月初七日,这次以牛栏田契为押,从一位村民那里借入英洋 17元。光绪二十二年五月,程家再次以顿底田皮字为押,从一位邻居处借入英洋 10元。这三次举债的用途不详,很可能是为了分拆前两年所借债款的利息及支付光绪二十一年十二月十六日允亨孙子“做三朝”的开销。自光绪二十三年至二十五年,程家的排日账已佚。不过从光绪二十六年程家的债务清单看,这几年程家共借入 6笔款子,其中光绪二十四年(1898)借入4笔,光绪二十五年借入 2笔,总计 65元(详下),占清单所列债务总额的一半余。由于这几年的排日账没有保存下来,这几笔债务的用途已无从知晓。

    那么,这些债务对程家带来多大的经济压力呢?我们来看看沱川的借贷利息问题。综合排日账记录的的借贷案例,沱川借贷利息大概有三种情况。其一,无利。这种情况很少见。前面提到,道光二十年二月十九日,发开从母亲手上借到8两余银子,没有还款记录,应该是无利的。光绪二十七年四月二十日,允亨归还有兴2元,排日账记录“无利”,查借入时间是三月十六日,可能因时间较短,有兴没有收利息。其二,10%左右。这种情况也比较少见。咸丰五年七月七日,发开向彦兄借钱,“言定加一”,也即年息率10%。光绪十八年十二月二日,允亨向春元借入5元,次年五月二日归还,刚好满半年,利息为240文,可求得年息率为9.6%。光绪十九年八月十四日,允亨从兄长允兴处借入6元,光绪二十一年七月初六日支付利息1元,外加铜钱100文,可推得年息率为 9.2%左右。不过光绪二十二年七月十七日支付利息1元,年息率升至 16.7%。这个案例说明,就算关系很近的亲属,也会收取不低的利息(下面余熊能借贷例也是如此)。其三,20%左右。这种情况最为常见。道光二十五年二月十七日,发开向社会借入400文,次年二月二十二日归还本息共480文,可求得年息率为20%。光绪十九年八月十四日,允亨从钦五祠借入5元,光绪二十年八月十四日还支付利息1元,年息率为20%。光绪十八年四月初十日,允亨从外甥余熊能处借入1元,六月十九日还,付利息30文,可求得利息率为 18%。光绪十九年八月九日,允亨向灶子母借入5元,光绪二十年八月八日支付利息1元,年息率为20%。前两例是向会社、祠堂借贷的事例,后两例是向个体借贷的事例,除余熊能事例可能因有亲属关系利息稍低外,其他均为 20%的年息率。此外,排日账中还记录了以田地、房屋为抵押,利息以租谷形式交付的事例,也不多见,兹不赘述。

    参照光绪二十六年程家债务清单,从历年借贷数额看,光绪二十三年以前,程家的借贷总数累计54元;光绪二十四年、光绪二十五年两年累计70元。可见光绪二十三年之前,程家借贷问题还不算严重,光绪二十二年、二十三年甚至没有借入大笔款项(同时,光绪二十一年、二十二年程家的收入不错),如以20%的年息率计算,每年需偿付利息10.8元,其数额尚在基本可控范围内。相比之下,光绪二十四年后,借贷数量明显增加,光绪二十四年、二十五年,共借入70元,特别是光绪二十四年借入了50元,程家的财务状况急转直下。如以20%的年息率计算,每年需偿付利息24.8元,如以光绪二十六年程家的年收入计算,程家每年需支付的借贷利息,就高达年收入的64%,这还没计入米价上涨造成的经济压力及其他小笔借贷的利息。因此可以断定,随着债务的大幅增加,程家仅仅靠生计收入已无力偿清债务。使情况变得更糟的是,田地的抵押,意味着程家每年必须缴纳更多的地租,程家自身的口粮供给能力也受到影响。

    程家历年收入一览表 (单位:元)

    光绪二十六年发生的一笔不成功的交易,直接影响到程家资金的周转,也有必要稍做讨论。程家生产的茶叶,一般是由茶商前来沱川收购。这一年华北爆发义和团运动,茶叶市场似乎不太顺畅。根据当年的海关报告,截至 1900年上半年,中国多数地区贸易正常进行,华北地区只是到了 6月局势才开始变得严峻,但其他地区贸易照常进行,长江流域的局势风平浪静。在上海茶市方面,跟1899年相比, 1900年红茶出口英、德、美、俄四国的数量有相当程度的提高。报告还提到,此年徽州茶(Hyson)的交易数量跟上一年相似。不过报告也显示,1900年中国的绿茶出口量,比上一年少了13300多担(但较之 1898年增加 15100多担)。报告还提到,“绿茶市场于 6月8日开启,开始出售的是少量平水茶,其价格比前一季度开市低了大约10%。茶叶质量与 1899年不相上下;但由于对主要消费市场 —美国—的预期很糟,一开始成交量很小。但是,后来需求增长,7月中旬前,价格已回升了 5%—10%”。国际贸易的波动,尽管对总出口量的影响不大,但可能造成地方茶市的震荡。

    据排日账记载,光绪二十六年五月四日(1900年5月31日),“己早晨挑茶乙头上小沱,遇汪顺意兄家卖,未卖,转回家”。五月十一日( 6月7日),将茶叶售予休宁大连的一位茶商,总计茶叶177斤余,售价英洋29元余。不幸的是,由于某种原因,这位茶商一直没有支付购茶款。于是从此年六月至次年十二月底,允亨频频前往大连催账,但每次至多讨得一、二元,有时甚至空手而回。上海绿茶市场开市的日期,晚于程家出售春茶的时间,因此不能说开市初期茶市的行情,会直接影响到徽州地方茶市。不过上海茶商对市场的基本判断,会辗转影响到徽州茶市,则不无可能。毕竟,茶叶在一段时间内找不到买主的情形,是程家此前从未遇见过的问题。而且茶叶出口量的下降,也可能给茶市带来震荡。最后买入程家茶叶的吴发祥,是大连人,程家此前对其为人应有一定了解。如果他是一个经常赖账的人,程家应会有所耳闻。因此,此人可能受到茶市波动的影响,本身也折了本,因而无力偿付购茶款。这笔茶款的金额看似不大,不过对当时负债累累的程家来说,却事关自身的资金周转和借贷信用。无论如何,最终悲剧还是发生了。

    此外,允亨自身的消费习惯,也给家计带来一定的压力。对比允亨与发开的排日账,允亨似乎不如发开节俭。他不时请朋友打平伙。他还有饮酒的嗜好,平日经常到食杂店买酒买菜。笔者观察到,分家后允亨买酒的次数似有变化,特别是到了光绪后期,经常买酒喝(参见第八章)。在生计逐渐恶化的时期,这种嗜好无疑会增加开支压力。

    总体而言,程家家计危机的出现,主要原因不在于茶款没有着落导致的资金紧缺问题,而是经过数年的累积,程家举债的数额已经达到难以偿还的危险境地,即使在正常的年份,他们也丧失了偿清债务的能力。而这些债务的产生,并非由于国际的、全国性或区域性的政经变动,而是由于两三场人生礼仪,尤其是娶亲的昂贵开支。假如程家将娶亲时间推迟几年,他们还会借入这么大笔的债款吗?未必。但是我们能说,这场悲剧纯粹是因为允亨个人决策的错误?也许不能这么说,毕竟影响程家生计的米价、茶价波动,是受到区域性乃至全国性的市场影响的。因此,在这场灾难中,包括米价上涨、茶价稍有下降、山货逐渐枯竭在内的经济局势,加上义和团运动带来的短时段的政经局势,以及允亨的个人嗜好及作为家长做出的决策,都在这种灾难的发生过程中扮演了一定角色。

    危机的应对

    光绪二十六年十月的危机,似乎来得有些突然。事发七天前,允亨还在家中筹办一场酒席,并请人前来“做伙头办碗”。次日,接女婿,请来几位亲友吃酒。这似乎是允亨长女的出嫁酒。十九日至二十三日,允亨如常砍柴、休息。然后到了二十四日,便发生了债主带人抬走他家中猪的事。但继续往回看,我们发现,九月十五日,允亨就以 10元的价格,当出了一处田产(参见附录六)。那位债主很可能是了解到程家债台高筑、屡次讨债未果后,才带人抬走他的猪的。

    危机发生后,允亨似乎有些震惊,接下来的两天内,他没有采取任何行动,似乎不知如何应对。二十四日,排日账只交代“己在家嬉”,又记录“欠少云先生娘来取账,旺成经手,带鸟人(鲸)〔掠〕玉猪去”。后来他在一张纸条上交代,带人前来讨债的债主是巧娇嫂,而抬走猪的是一位“烟鬼人”。次日写道,“己在家里事,欠账难身”。终于,十月廿六日,也即危机发生后的第三天,程氏父子委托本族的程敬敷和好友余添丁前来清理债务。当日,他们俩“到余架家、余竹孙家二家账项,了通无阻”。后面这两位是程家的债主,允亨大概请敬敷、添丁去商讨债务事宜。他们还拟了一份程家债务清单,这份清单夹在光绪二十六年排日账内,保存至今:

    借来账项人员述后:
    启架兄家:
    癸巳八月廿乙日借来英洋贰拾元。有顿底田皮约乙纸。
    乙未正月十五日借来英洋拾元。有庄下田皮约乙纸,又加拾贰员。
    六月初七借来亦洋拾柒元。有牛栏田契乙纸。
    祝孙兄家:
    戊戌五月廿九日借来亦洋拾伍元。有顿底田皮约乙纸。
    己亥五月廿八日借来英洋叁元,又利洋贰元。三共贰十元正。
    兴良兄家:
    戊戌七月十七日借来亦洋拾伍元。有顿底田皮约乙纸,中见胞兄。
    素从祠:
    己亥六月六日借来亦洋拾元。有庄下田皮约乙张。
    培掘祠:
    戊戌五月初八日借来亦洋拾伍元。有顿底田皮约乙纸。
    万青兄:
    戊戌二月初乙日借来英洋伍元。有牛栏田契乙纸。
    成林祠:
    甲午三月十六日借来英洋拾贰元。有牛栏田契乙纸,中见胞兄。

    根据这份清单,程家借贷的重要账款共10笔,最早的是光绪十九年(1893)的一笔债款,最晚的是光绪二十五年(1899)的债款,其中光绪十九年借入20元,光绪二十年借入 12元,光绪二十一年借入 22元,光绪二十四年借入50元,光绪二十五年借入 20元,所涉债务共 124元,约当这一年程家茶叶销售毛收入的4倍多。

    为偿清债务,程家采取了一系列措施。首先,十月二十七日,“出当青(布)三丈零七寸,又白布三丈八尺零八寸,又青布三丈五尺零贰寸,托兴娥嫂出当英洋贰元正”。同时,“又去英洋二员上素从祠利,掉字乙纸,(伏)〔复〕写一纸,写屋契字一张,付素从祠”。素从祠是清单所列债权人之一,程家借入 10元,此次除支付利息外,还重新立契,以房屋抵押,估计通过这个办法,取回了此前抵押的庄下田皮契。其次,十月三十日,“己同儿托余添灯兄、敬敷弟卖池鱼卅六斤,每洋四斤,计英洋八员,(低)〔抵?〕账”。将鱼塘养的鱼出售,得价8元抵债。再次,十一月初一日,出售顿底、庄下田皮二处,筹得英洋80元。初五日,又支银 5元还培拙祠(应即账单中的培掘祠),将顿底田皮契赎回,同时将菜园一处抵押给该祠,计价10元。初十日,大概账目基本处理完毕,请余添丁吃酒。

    排日账中夹了一张纸条,上面交代了程家出售田皮等物业、财产的详情,很可能是允亨在料理账目的过程中写下的:

    光绪二十六年十一月初乙日,巧娇嫂倩烟鬼人抢去猪乙口,因身该欠账项甚多,只得向家兄及瑞弟商情,将顿底併庄下贰处田皮共八秤,卖与余慰农兄家,计英洋捌拾员,支洋陆拾员还慰农兄,账项清讫。支洋拾贰元还兴良兄,帐目清讫。支洋伍元还培拙祠,下欠拾员,将门口前菜园押在祠内生殖。支洋柒元还巧娇婶,将猪乙口抵英洋陆元五角。又将塘鱼叁拾乙斤抵英洋柒元五角,三共还贰拾乙元,清讫。支洋贰元还素从祠利钱,下欠英洋拾元正,将身住屋当与祠内,长年加贰行息。

    这份文件交代的信息,远不止于出售田皮,还包括前面提到的卖鱼等信息。出售田皮得到的 80元中, 60元是用于向买主还债,实际仅收到20元现金。然后偿还兴良 12元(上面的清单欠 15元)。程家共欠巧娇21元,猪估价 6.5元,鱼售价得 7.5元,另付 7元,偿清了债务。此外就是需要偿还几个祠堂的欠款,培拙祠欠款是15元,付还 5元,另欠 10元以一块菜园做抵押;素从祠欠款是10元,以房屋做抵押,这一点前面已谈到。对照前面的清单,程家还需偿还启架47元,万青 5元,成林祠 12元,共计64元,仍是一笔不小的欠款。

    经过这场危机,程家无疑已经元气大伤,经济状况濒临破产。允亨自身似乎深受打击。十月二十九日,他在账中写到:“己在家事体多端。”十一月阴雨天气多,他常在家中休息。十二月,他接连生了八天病。手头拮据,他没有找医生诊治。十二月二十六日,他再进大连找吴发祥讨债,仍是一无所获。尽管如此,他也试图恢复正常生活。他继续参与劳动,上山砍柴、帮人扛木材。十一月二十三日,他托敬敷出燕山买来小猪一头,要价 2.8元,他手头没钱,买猪的钱只能暂时先欠着。

  • 拱玉书:楔形文字文明的特点

    就字面意义而言,两河流域文明或美索不达米亚文明就是发生在两河流域的文明。这个定义只指出了文明发生的地点,只回答了“在哪”的问题,没有涉及这个文明的突出特点。这个文明的突出特点是什么?我认为是文字,即楔形文字。如果根据一个文明的特点来给这个文明下个定义,那么,我现在谈及的这个文明应该叫楔形文字文明,即用楔形文字记录语言以储存和传递信息的文明。这个定义可以摆脱地域束缚,把地理上不属于两河流域、却使用楔形文字记录自己的民族语言、因而属于楔形文字文化圈的古代西亚地区的文明都囊括在内。“书同文”是这个文明的最显著的特点,也是最大“公约数”。因此,我首先从文字谈起。

    一、“书同文”。“书同文”就是用同一种文字书写,上古时代的整个西亚地区几乎都用或曾用楔形文字书写,因此可以说,他们“书同文”。但他们的“书同文”只是一种表象,与中华文明中的“书同文”貌合神离。貌合是说,从表面上看,无论是对以古代两河流域为中的西亚地区而言,还是对中华文明而言,“书同文”都意味着在一个跨行政区、甚至跨国界的广大地区使用同一种文字,西亚上古时代的大部分族群都曾使用楔形文字,中华文明使用汉字,此所谓二者貌合。神离是说,楔形文字书写的语言非止一种,而汉字书写的语言只是汉语一种(指在中国境内)。

    两河流域(底格里斯河和幼发拉底河)南部是楔形文字的发祥地。早在公元前3200年前后,苏美尔人就发明了楔形文字,并用它来记录自己的民族语言苏美尔语(苏美尔人把自己的语言叫作eme─gi7“土著语”)。早在公元前2700年前后的早王朝时期,苏美尔人在用楔形文字书写苏美尔语文献的同时,时而也用楔形文字书写阿卡德语文献。阿卡德王朝时期(公元前2334—前2154年),阿卡德语成为官方语言。在此后的一个多世纪里,除一些文学作品外,几乎所有文献都用阿卡德语书写。由于楔形文字是为苏美尔语发明的,所有独体字(从发生的角度观察)都在形式上是象形字,功能上是表意字,有时兼用来表音(节),所以,用这种文字体系表达(或记载)苏美尔语不成问题,但表达阿卡德语时却显得蹩脚。于是,这时的书吏对楔形文字的使用方式进行了改革:一、多数表意字不再用来表意,而是用来表音,即表音节;二、弃用大部分表意字,只保留一部分表意字的表意用法。这种改革改变了楔形文字的性质,使楔形文字从表意文字(logographic writing)变成了音节文字(syllabic writing)。不论是作为表意文字的楔形文字,还是作为音节文字的楔形文字,其中的任何单字,不论是独体字,还是复合字,都不能只表辅音,不表元音,而必须是表达音节,或元音—辅音式音节,如in、ap等,或辅音—元音式音节,如ba、ti等,抑或辅音—元音—辅音式音节,如tam、?ul等。公元前14世纪,地中海沿岸的乌迦里特出现了楔形字母文字,30个符号分别代表30个辅音,如b、d、?、t等,其中的27个字母是基本字母,3个字母属于附加字母,只用于一些特殊场合,例如用来表达外来借词。到了公元前6世纪的古波斯时期,在国家权力的干预和组织下,在传统埃兰楔文的基础上,波斯人治下的埃兰书吏创造了一个由36个音节符号、5个表意符号组成的文字体系,这个文字体系是在很短的时间内,专门为古波斯语量身打造的。在形式上和功能上,这套楔形符号体系与“字母文字”几乎没有区别,绝大多数学者认为,这36个符号中的任何符号,都不代表语音的最小单位语素(phoneme),而代表音节(syllable)。我的看法不同,我认为这套符号体系是字母+表意的混合文字体系(下面将说明理由)。这套符号体系与此前的阿卡德(包括巴比伦和亚述)音节文字和埃兰音节文字都有很大区别。最大的区别在于用字量,阿卡德—巴比伦—亚述音节文字体系用字数量约600个符号,书写中埃兰语和新埃兰语的音节文字体系用字量约120个符号,而用来书写古波斯语的符号体系只有36个“音节”(实为字母)符号,加上5个表意符号,加起来不过41个符号。不论古波斯时期创造的这套文字体系属于字母文字,还是属于音节文字,这套文字体系在人类文明史上都是划时代的创新。

    楔形文字的使用范围不限于两河流域,埃兰和古波斯帝国的统治中心都不在两河流域,曾借用楔形文字的赫梯人所处的位置更是与楔形文字发祥地的苏美尔相去甚远。公元前2500—前2400年间,楔形文字西传到了叙利亚地区,那里的埃布拉(Ebla)古国接受了楔形文字,开始用楔形文字记录自己的民族语言——埃布拉语(Eblaite)。至于埃布拉语属于西塞姆语还是东塞姆语,在学术界仍有争议;但确定无疑的是,它更接近古阿卡德语。在埃布拉语中,双音节或三音节词汇居多,不适合用表意文字表达,于是,埃布拉人把以表意为主的苏美尔楔形文字改造成为以表音(节)为主的音节文字,这与稍后的阿卡德帝国的做法是一样的。不过,目前还不能确定,究竟是阿卡德人效法埃布拉人,把苏美尔人的表意文字体系变成了音节文字体系,还是恰恰相反。两个族群所操的语言十分接近,在政治舞台上活跃的时间也大致相同,二者在文字方面的创新应该不是平行而独立的,更不应该是巧合,而是二者之中一个是创新者,一个是借鉴者。在阿卡德人统治时期,两河流域东边的埃兰人也接受了楔形文字,用来书写与达罗毗荼语(Dravidian)有关联的埃兰语。公元前1500年前后,小亚细亚的赫梯人也开始借用楔形文字来书写自己的民族语言——属于印欧语系的赫梯语。地中海沿岸的乌迦里特人于公元前14世纪甚至发明了楔形字母来书写属于西塞姆语的乌迦里特语。这套字母包括30个辅音字母和一个隔字符。

    可见,古代西亚地区的“书同文”是真实的,但这种“书同文”只流于表面,背后的实际情况是:在“书同文”过程中,楔形文字经历了三次脱胎换骨的根本变化,第一次变化发生于公元前2400年前后,从表意文字体系发展出音节文字体系(或音节—表意体系);第二次变化发生于公元前14世纪,在音节文字的基础上,地中海沿岸产生楔形字母,即乌迦里特字母(30个辅音符号);第三次变化发生于公元前6世纪的古波斯帝国,在埃兰音节文字的基础上产生古波斯楔形字母+表意字的混合文字体系,36个字母+5个表意字。第一个在波斯波利斯(Persepolis)完整而准确地临摹古波斯语铭文的尼布尔(Karsten Niebuhr,1733—1815)在完全读不懂铭文的情况下,仅凭直觉判断,认为书写古波斯语的楔形文字是字母(Buchstaben)文字。德国的格罗特芬(G. F. Grotefend,1775─1853)是第一个成功解读古波斯语铭文的人,而他是把这种文字当作字母文字来解读的,因而获得成功,例如,他把书写“大流士”的7个符号解读为d─a─r─h─e─u─sh,显然,在格罗特芬看来,这七个符号就是七个字母,代表语音中的最小单位。从20世纪50年代起,学术著作中的古波斯字母表都成了音节表,a、i、u、ka、ku、ga、gu等等。专门研究古波斯语语法的美国宾大教授肯特(R. G. Kent)认为,每个辅音都自带一个“固有”(inherent)的元音。他一边这样认为,一边又将(仅举一例)“我是大流士”音译为adam:Drayavau?,而不是adama:Drayavau?a,这令人费解。依我浅见,古波斯的这套文字体系属于字母+表意字的混合文字体系,36个字母+5个表意字。在36个字母中,除三个元音(a、i、u)字母外,其余都是辅音字母,不自带“固有”的元音,元音需由阅读者根据语言中的正确形式自行添加。很多(如果不是全部的)文字体系,包括这套古波斯文字体系,都是为某种特定语言发明的,更是为以那种特定语言为母语的人发明的。就古波斯的这套字母而言,只要波斯人掌握了这套辅音字母的发音,就能正确地书写和阅读,也就是说,这套字母文字体系具有与生俱来的助记性质,不完全表达语言。

    楔文的上述变化代表了人类历史上出现的三种主要的文字类型:表意文字、音节文字和字母文字。这三种类型产生的先后顺序是先有表意文字(公元前3200年前后),若干世纪后产生音节文字(公元前2400前后),再过千年后产生字母文字(公元前14世纪),但这不代表文字由低级向高级的发展,更不是文字发展的三阶段。这三种文字类型没有高低之分和优劣之别,它们都是为适应各自所表达的语言的需要而产生的,都是原配语言的完美的可视符号。它们有各自的产生途径和发展规律,它们之间的关系不是取代关系,也不是晋级关系,而是互不干扰、平行发展、各走各路的关系。音节楔形文字产生后,作为表意的楔形文字并未退出历史舞台,而是继续使用。乌迦里特楔形字母产生后,很快就消失了,这也不是字母文字本身的错。古波斯时期的楔形字母+表意字的混合文字体系也很快走完了自己的生命历程。这也不是说这种文字体系本身多么不好而一定短命。某种文字体系的终结往往不是文字本身的原因,而是另有原因。

    楔形文字的种种变化都发生在公元前。从楔文产生的公元前3200年前后,到公元前1世纪,公元前的这最后三千年见证了楔形文字本身的种种变化,包括楔形文字被多个古代民族借用来书写自己的民族语言。上古时代的整个西亚地区族群复杂,政治风云变幻莫测,文明周期相对较短,究其原因,其中有地理原因,这里是欧亚非的交汇点,也是各文明的汇聚点,民族交融和交锋从古到今一直在上演。除这个原因外,可能还存在一个重要原因,那就是,在这个地区,始终没有出现一个在人口数量上具有绝对优势、在文化上足够优秀、文化认同感足够强烈,以至于可以由此产生巨大的文化凝聚力、长期立于不败之地的主体民族(或族群)。

    “书同文”本来可以带来文化上的凝聚力,但由于古代西亚的情况是同文不同语,同文不同种,所以,这种“同文”没有给这里的文化带来凝聚力,也没有给这里的人带来文化认同感。中华文明中的“书同文”是国家推行的政策,具有明确目的,那就是维护大一统,本身自带凝聚力和向心力。古代西亚地区楔形文字文化圈的“书同文”,是后进文化为保持自身文化的延续和发展而采取的拿来而后进行改造的措施,目的是为了在一种强势文化中保留自己的语言和文化,本身自带离心性,即脱离先进文化或至少与先进文化保持平行而不被完全融合或同化的离心性。

    二、这个文明的另一个特点是尊同神。苏美尔人创造的或尊崇的各种神灵也被后来的不同族群所崇拜。苏美尔人尊崇的天神安(An)、“风”神恩利尔(Enlil)、智慧者恩基(Enki)、月神楠纳(Nanna)、战神和爱神伊楠娜(Inanna)、太阳神乌图(Utu)等等,也都是后来的阿卡德人、埃布拉人、巴比伦人和亚述人尊崇的神。多神崇拜始终是楔形文字文明的唯一宗教形式,这个文明的意识形态深深植根于多神崇拜。中巴比伦后期,即公元前1200年前后,开始出现独尊一神的倾向,但一神教始终没有能够打破多神崇拜的传统。很显然,楔形文字文明在宗教方面缺乏创新,或可谓守成有余、创新不足。

    楔形文字文明中各族群崇拜的神绝不限于上面提到的几个或多个自然神,戴梅尔在1914年发表的《巴比伦万神殿》里罗列了3300个神的具体名称,在1950年的第2版中,神的数量增加到5580个,去掉重复的,仍有5367个,这还是仅限于巴比伦尼亚地区,不包括其他地区。舒鲁帕克遗址出土了很多早王朝时期(约公元前2500年)的神表,其中最大的一块神表泥版记载了560个神的名字,这些神都是苏美尔人崇拜的神,至少神的名字是苏美尔语,不包括名字属于非苏美尔语的神。一般说来,每个城市都有一到两个保护神,国王有自己的个人保护神,大概普通百姓也有自己的保护神,至少官员或社会名流如此。拉迦什出土的早王朝时期的文献常提到与邻邦发生冲突,也常提到冲突一方的主神对冲突另一方国王的某种行为不满,于是发动战争,为神而战,胜利也属于神。虽然国王们常常打着神的旗号发动战争,但针对的都不是对方的神,而是人。

    神有等级,有大神,有小神,大神中还有等级,上面提到的神都是大神中的大神。不论是大神还是小神,神之间不存在仇恨,也不存在神之间的相互杀戮,《创世神话》中的神间大战发生在造人之前,与人间没有关系。人间的城市(国家)都有保护神,保护神的地位有高有低,但每个城市(国家)的政治、经济以及宗教地位并非取决于保护神的地位。尼普尔是例外,这里是众神之父(ab─ba─dingir─dingir─ré─ne─ke4)恩利尔的崇拜地,是苏美尔人的宗教中心,取得霸权的国王通常要到这里为恩利尔建立神庙或修缮神庙,为自己的统治或霸权营造合法性。这个所谓的宗教中心是个政权更迭的见证地,是君王政治表演的舞台,与普通百姓的信仰没有关系。在历史文献中也不乏某国之神奉恩利尔之命向另一国开战的例子,如拉迦什向温玛宣战被视为“宁吉苏神,恩利尔的战士,遵(恩利尔)正义之命,与吉萨(温玛)开战”。可见,一个神对某一城市(国家)而言是保护神,而对其他城市(国家)而言可能是威胁和灾难。多神崇拜的宗教信仰和一城一神(有的城市不止一神)的实际操作把历史上、文化上以及宗教等方面都高度认同的同一族群从精神上和物理上分割开来,在精神上和物理上都给这样的族群赋予了潜在的离心力,带来了分裂隐患。多神崇拜应该是楔形文字文明逐渐衰败而最终走向消亡的原因之一。

    三、求一统也是这个文明的特点之一。大一统始终是有抱负的统治者的追求目标。乌鲁克早期文明(即公元前3200年前后)时期的政治大势目前尚无从知晓,早王朝时期(约公元前2800—2350年)的天下大势趋于明朗,这个时期城邦林立,战争频繁,城邦间常常相互攻伐,争夺地区霸权。公元前2330年前后,萨尔贡(Sargon)征服各邦,以阿卡德为都建立统一帝国,统治范围包括西至地中海、南到波斯湾的广大地区。这种统一局面仅仅维持了一个多世纪,之后很多传统的独立城邦就纷纷独立,这时又遭到古提(Gutium)人入侵,以两河为中心的广大西亚地区进入古提人统治时期。由于古提人留下的历史铭文极少,现代学者对这个时期的了解十分有限。根据《苏美尔王表》的记载,古提人的统治历经21王,享国91年零40天,而后遭到乌鲁克人图黑伽尔(Utuhegal)领导的苏美尔联军的驱逐,乌鲁克恢复独立,其他地区的传统城市(国家)也都恢复独立。乌尔娜玛(Urnamma,公元前2111—前2094年)很快把这些城市(国家)又统一在他的治下,建立了中央集权制国家,现代学者名之曰乌尔第三王朝,盛极一时。但仅仅历经五王便亡国,末王被俘往埃兰,两河流域再度陷入分裂,这种局面持续大约两个世纪。此后,汉穆拉比(Hammurapi,公元前1792—前1750年)建立统一帝国,享国约一个半世纪,于公元前1600年前后,灭于赫梯王穆尔什里一世(Mur?iliI)之手。赫梯人没有统治巴比伦尼亚的意图,班师回国。凯喜特人(Kassites)趁虚而入,取得巴比伦尼亚的统治权。凯喜特人既不是塞姆人,也不是苏美尔人,其语言归属问题至今悬而未解。凯喜特人不但接管了前朝天下,还继承和发扬了巴比伦人的文化传统,建立了稳固的政权,历经36王,享国近400年,从公元前1530年到前1155年。凯喜特王朝灭亡后,经海国第一王朝和伊辛第二王朝,西亚地区再次统一,这次是统一在亚述人的统治下,现代学者称这个时期为新亚述时期(约公元前1000—前625年)。公元前7世纪,权力中心又南移到巴比伦尼亚的迦勒底王朝(公元前625—前539年)。公元前539年,波斯人占领巴比伦,两河流域的历史进入波斯人统治时期,即古波斯时期(公元前539—前331年)。之后是亚历山大大帝(公元前336—前323年)的短暂统治。亚历山大去世后,西亚地区再次陷入分裂,在塞琉古统治时期,苏美尔书写传统一度在两河流域南部的文明发祥地乌鲁克复兴。目前发现的最后一块楔文泥版属于公元74年。至此,楔形文字文明彻底成为历史。

    纵观楔形文字文明的整个发展、衰亡的历程可以发现,统一可以实现,但不可持续,原因很多,其中一个重要原因是参与这个文明的族群众多,但没有一个主体族群,即没有一个人数足够多,文化足够强,任何人也打不倒,即使一时倒下,也能再度复兴的主体族群。这是这个地区不断出现统一、分裂、再统一、再分裂,朝代不断更替、权力频频易主、传统逐渐丧失、文化一再受到冲击而最终彻底消亡的重要原因。如果说在楔形文字文化圈中哪个族群在一定程度上可称得上主体族群,那一定是苏美尔人,他们最接近“主体民族”的标准,他们发明了文字,创造了一套宗教体系,在文学艺术和科学技术方面也取得了卓越成就。他们的文明延续千余年,可谓千年不倒(从公元前3200—前1800年),在倒下后的近两千年里影响仍在。到了纪元前后,这个文明才彻底消失。不可思议的是,这个曾经引领世界千余年的文明消失得如此彻底,以至于“苏美尔”和“苏美尔人”在希伯来《旧约圣经》和西方古典时期的著作中没有留下一点痕迹。没有近现代的考古发掘和文献学家的努力,就没有苏美尔文明的再现和复活。

    四、最后谈谈宽容性。时代的变迁和朝代的更替往往都是在血雨腥风中实现的,即使是邻邦之间争夺土地或水源也会杀得尸横遍野。在历史文献中,很多君王极力鼓吹他们杀敌、洗城的功绩,到了新亚述时期,这种鼓吹更是达到登峰造极的程度。文献中的鼓吹也许就是现实中的真实。毋庸置疑,残酷性和血腥性是战争的常态。但也有少数例外,从这些例外中可以看到一些人性的光芒,值得了解,也值得借鉴。

    早在公元前2800年前后,巴比伦尼亚北部的基什(Ki?)国王阿伽曾率军南下,包围了两河流域南部的乌鲁克。乌鲁克国王吉尔伽美什率众应敌,不但战胜强敌,还俘获敌军的亲征国王。然而,吉尔伽美什没有加害于这位来犯国王,而是让他安全地重返家园。不论出于什么理由和目的,这都是人性善良一面的体现,都是一种包容和宽容。自身强大,战胜敌人,然后原谅敌人,宽容敌人,化敌为友,这是强者的自信,也是强者的智慧和善良。吉尔伽美什被视为古代君王的典范,一定与他的强大、智慧、善良和宽容有关。《吉尔伽美什与阿伽》歌颂的正是他的这样品质。

    古波斯时期的居鲁士(公元前559—前530年)更是把强者和宽容演绎到了极致。公元前539年(一说前538年),居鲁士的军队占领巴比伦。对巴比伦人而言,波斯人是外族,历史上的外族入侵都是血腥的,阿卡德帝国、乌尔第三王朝建立的帝国以及古巴比伦帝国都是在外族入侵中灭亡的,他们遭到的打击是毁灭性的。然而,居鲁士对巴比伦人却采取了怀柔政策,尤其在宗教方面,居鲁士展现了包容和宽容,这让巴比伦人感激不已。于是,巴比伦书吏撰文赞美居鲁士的功德,他们把铭文写在一个腰鼓形的泥质载体上,这就是“居鲁士圆柱铭文”。铭文不但讲到居鲁士允许尼布甲尼撒统治时期的“巴比伦之囚”返回自己的家园,还讲到居鲁士采取的其他宗教包容政策:把以前被运到苏萨的属于“苏美尔和阿卡德”的神像都毫发无损地送回原神庙。按照苏美尔、巴比伦以及亚述的传统,毁掉一座城市,一定要毁掉神庙,毁灭神像,或把神像作为战利品掠走。居鲁士不但没有这样做,还使那些以前被运到苏萨的神像物归原主,这对巴比伦人而言是莫大的恩惠和宽容,所以,巴比伦人感恩戴德,作文盛赞恩主。居鲁士是一代枭雄,是大征服者,占领巴比伦后不久就去征服马萨盖特人,并战死沙场。可以说,居鲁士对巴比伦人采取的怀柔和宽容超乎寻常。居鲁士为什么唯独对巴比伦人采取了怀柔和宽容政策?也许是出于对先进文化的尊重或敬畏!巴比伦人的悠久历史以及文化、科技(尤其是天文学)、文学等方面的优势世人有目共睹。从《居鲁士圆柱铭文》可知,居鲁士自称马尔都克(Markuk)神是“我的主人”(EN─ia)。马尔都克是巴比伦人的主神,征服者信奉被征服者的主神,这是信仰认同,也是文化认同。征服者认同被征服者的文化和宗教,说明征服者有接受先进文化的意愿和情怀,更说明先进文化自带一种威力,一种同化后进文化的威力。

    本文转自《世界历史》2023年第5期,有节略

  • 欧阳晓莉:两河流域文化元素在古埃及前王朝时期的发现

    古埃及文明在发展之初就受到了西亚的影响。公元前6500—前6000年间,地中海东岸黎凡特地区连年干旱,致使部分居民迁徙到埃及。他们把早已驯化的大麦、小麦、绵羊和山羊带到埃及,从此揭开了当地农业革命的序幕。前王朝时期(对应涅迦达文化,约公元前4000—前3000年),在上埃及河谷地区从希拉康波利斯经涅迦达到阿拜多斯这段不足250千米的尼罗河两岸,古埃及文明的火种得以点燃并最终以燎原之势扩散到上下埃及全境。正是在涅迦达文化的中晚期,来自古代两河流域的文化元素在古埃及崭露头角。

    一、图案、滚印与青金石

    古代两河流域对古埃及文明影响的讨论始于1923年的一篇新闻报道:著名考古学家皮特里(Flinders Petrie,1853-1942)认为卢浮宫博物馆收购的一件文物——戈贝尔?艾尔—阿拉克刀柄(Gebel el-Arak Knife Handle)——证实了埃及王朝的创立者,即所谓的王朝人种,来自两河流域南部的苏美尔地区和伊朗西南部的苏萨。该刀柄象牙材质,长约25.5厘米,宽约4.5厘米,可能属涅迦达文化III期(约公元前3200—前3100年)。皮特里基于这一刀柄对古埃及历史起源的阐释早已过时,但刀柄正面上方图案中一名成年男子双臂分别搏击两头狮子的主题毋庸置疑来自两河流域,男子连面蓄须、头系宽边发带、上身赤裸、下身着过膝长袍的形象,同样具有显著的两河流域苏美尔文明的特色。此图像的两河流域风格是如此之明显,以至于有学者提出刀柄乃两河流域的工匠在埃及所制。

    同样的驯兽者主题还出现于希拉孔波利斯第100号墓的彩绘壁画。虽然墓室的建筑特点指向涅迦达文化II期(约公元前3500—前3200年),但壁画风格属于III期。其中一幅画面有一位通体红褐色、腰系白带的男性用双臂分别与两头站立的狮子做搏击状。这被认为是古埃及艺术借用外来元素的最早案例。埃及同时期的本土图像艺术更具自然主义的风格,这类外来主题与之相比具有一定独特性。

    除搏击猛兽的驯兽者外,其他来自两河流域的图像主题还包括:长颈猫科动物、带翅膀的狮身鹰首兽、盘绕花朵的蛇以及行进中的动物行列。在那尔迈调色板这一埃及前王朝时期最著名的文物上,就出现了一对长颈猫科动物的形象:它们的长脖互相交缠,其间的凹槽形成一个调色碟,颈部靠头的位置各系着一根绳,都由一位男性拉住。一对高度相似的长颈缠绕的动物形象同样出现在两河流域乌鲁克时期的一枚碧玉滚印(cylinder seal)之上。那尔迈调色板也出土于希拉孔波利斯,在一处神庙遗址掩埋宝藏的地方被发现。传统解释认为它表现了上埃及国王那尔迈征服下埃及并最终统一埃及全境的进程,但更新的学说强调浮雕反映的并非上下埃及统一的特定历史事件,而是象征着国王率军打败敌人的一般化战斗过程。

    上述传播至埃及的图案在两河流域的重要载体是滚印,它是两河流域独创的印章形制,目的在于使印章图案及铭文在泥球或泥板表面的面积最大化。在埃及迄今为止已发现了20枚左右两河流域风格的滚印,其中部分可能是出自埃及工匠之手的仿制品。涅迦达遗址有两处墓葬,一处同时出土了滚印和青金石,滚印图案类似于两河流域南部拉格什和伊朗西南部苏萨所发现的滚印的图案;另一处墓葬中的滚印,其图案类似于两河流域南部的乌尔和北部的高拉(Tepe Gawra,摩苏尔东北20余公里)以及叙利亚境内布拉克遗址(Tell Brak)所出土滚印的图案。上述墓葬中的滚印年代都约为涅迦达文化II期的中晚阶段。

    青金石质地的印章是两河流域滚印中最昂贵的种类之一。在公元前4千纪的西亚和北非,青金石最可能的来源是阿富汗东部的巴达赫尚省(Badkhshan)。在古埃及前王朝15000处左右墓葬中,约167处出土了青金石(比例略高于1%)。考虑盗墓以及早期发掘报告欠完备的因素,以青金石为陪葬品的墓葬比例应该更高。但到了古埃及第一王朝时期(约公元前3000—前2890年),青金石的分布范围缩减,仅出现在最顶级的社会精英成员的墓葬中。在随后几个世纪,青金石甚至从古埃及墓葬中完全消失。它再度出现是在第四王朝法老斯奈夫鲁(约公元前2613—前2589年在位)的王后墓中。在本文涉及的时段内,阿富汗东部是唯一已知的青金石产地。因此,追踪考古发现中的青金石有助于重构中亚、伊朗、两河流域和埃及之间的贸易路线。

    在整个埃及前王朝时期,在阿拉伯半岛都未发现青金石的考古遗迹。因此现有模型推断,青金石首先从阿富汗经伊朗高原运抵两河流域,再转运至两河南部居民在叙利亚建立的殖民地(详见下文),最后经海路从黎凡特北部(如叙利亚遗址杰贝勒?阿鲁达(Jebel Aruda))到达埃及。两河流域最早的青金石实物则回溯至公元前6千纪晚期,是一些发现于北部亚明遗址(Tepe Yarim)的念珠。在公元前5千纪至前4千纪中期之间,两河流域北部垄断了上述陆上青金石之路,仅在高拉一处遗址就发现了500余件青金石的念珠、印章和镶嵌物。虽然青金石原料并非两河流域的特产,青金石文化却首先绽放于该地区并传播到古代近东其他区域。在两河流域,青金石被赋予了非同一般的象征意义,并与神祇和王权密切联系在一起。

    二、“乌鲁克扩张”

    古埃及前王朝对应于两河流域的乌鲁克时期(约公元前3900/3800—前3200/3100年)。此时的两河流域以南部城市乌鲁克为中心,经历了一个社会突变和飞速发展的阶段,学术界称之为“乌鲁克扩张”(Uruk Expansion)。在此之前,两河流域南部与北部、伊朗西南部以及地中海东岸的黎凡特地区,在定居点的绝对规模和定居点相互间的差异上并没有显著不同。但到了公元前4千纪下半期,两河流域南部冲积平原上的政治组织(polity)在整体规模、内部分化程度以及定居点的等级结构上都远超古代近东乃至世界其他地区。进入公元前4千纪晚期,两河流域南部已发展出相互竞争的若干城邦,它们政治上分裂但文化上彼此相近,同时还向外扩张。两河流域南部最早的苏美尔文明从此腾飞,在城市化、社会政治复杂化和经济差异化等方面均领先于世界。

    两河流域南部的经济增长始于公元前5—前4千纪早期,主要贸易品是地方性特产,如羊毛及其纺织品、皮革制品、奶制品、谷物、蔬菜瓜果、亚麻纺织品、各种熏鱼或咸鱼、禽类以及芦苇制品,这些物产分别来自游牧部落、农业定居人群以及生活在底格里斯河和幼发拉底河入海口沼泽地带的居民。第二阶段始于公元前4千纪中期,此时精英阶层的社会意识增强,贸易品生产的专业化程度降低,各群体都利用前一阶段积累的剩余产品和人力资源进行生产,以取代从周边乃至两河流域以外地区的进口。这一使用当地产品替代进口物品的机制促进了经济发展。第三阶段则是公元前4千纪下半期,特点是对外贸易的大幅度增长。此时两河流域的羊毛织物在周边地区大受欢迎,需求强劲。加之驴被驯化为驮兽,其负重至少是人的两倍,大幅提升了长途运输能力。这两个刺激因素在后来公元前2千纪早期两河流域与小亚细亚的古亚述贸易中都有明确证据。

    随着地方贸易和对外贸易的发展,南部乌鲁克的居民开始迁入两河流域周边地区。他们最初组成小规模的移民社群,生活在当地的资源开发或调运中心。他们进而控制了当地的这类中心,将其建设为跨地区的贸易枢纽。还有一种情况就是乌鲁克殖民者白手起家,在一片处女地上建立定居点并沿袭两河流域的社会和城市习俗。判断这些定居点与两河流域南部有关的主要依据是物质文化材料,包括建筑、陶器和雕刻作品的风格,以及陶筹和滚印的使用等。

    最后一类乌鲁克居民白手起家建立的定居点,在考古遗迹中最易辨认,主要坐落于土耳其东南部和叙利亚北部的幼发拉底河河畔,周围环绕着小规模的乌鲁克村落群,为其提供农业和畜牧业产品。最具代表性的遗址是叙利亚境内的哈布巴?卡比拉(Habuba Kabira-süd)和附近规模更小的杰贝勒?阿鲁达,两地距幼发拉底河的传统渡河点迈斯凯内(Meskene)都不远。杰贝勒?阿鲁达是一处乌鲁克晚期新建的定居点,占地略大于3公顷,所在的小山包俯瞰幼发拉底河河谷。它的主要建筑是规模较大的民居,显然是精英人士的住宅,说明该定居点可能是哈布巴?卡比拉的行政中心。杰贝勒?阿鲁达南面约8公里处就是同期大得多的定居点哈布巴?卡比拉。它同样是一处乌鲁克晚期新建的定居点,初期面积约为6公顷,后来扩张加倍,建有防御工事且规划整齐,居住区、产业区及行政区界限分明,显然是人为规划的成果。防御工事外还延伸出一大片居住区,面积最大时达22公顷。

    上述三类遗址——有乌鲁克居民居住的当地定居点、乌鲁克居民控制的当地中心、完全由乌鲁克居民建立的定居点——的功能引发了诸多讨论。它们可能是出于各种原因离开两河流域南部的居民所建立的住所,也可能位于两河流域南部与周边地区进出口产品的商业要道附近,同时还是各种信息和情报的汇聚点。前两类规模较小的定居点在个人或团体的投资范围内,但像杰贝勒?阿鲁达和哈布巴?卡比拉这类新建定居点应该得到了两河流域母邦的财力和人力资助。

    乌鲁克扩张过后,接踵而来的捷姆迭特?那色时期(Jemdet Nasr,约公元前3100—前2900年)是两河流域发展相对缓慢的年代。自公元前2900左右开始,两河流域进入了城邦争霸的早王朝时期。

    三、黎凡特地区的走廊作用

    近几十年间,研究两河流域与埃及早期文明交流的重点在于探讨“乌鲁克扩张”期间两河流域对埃及的影响,以及居间的叙利亚和土耳其的定居点、村落、市镇乃至城邦在两地间的物资流动和文化传播中所发挥的作用。阿拉伯半岛的角色还有待深入探讨,但也不容忽视。

    考古人员在南黎凡特考察或发掘了约40处关乎古埃及历史初期的遗址,它们基本分布在后世古埃及人称之为“荷鲁斯之路”的东地中海沿岸的狭长地带。埃及风格的建筑遗迹和来自埃及的陶器(那尔迈的名字在陶片上最常见)都有发现,还有类似堡垒的设施,其目的可能就是保障通往埃及的贸易路线畅通。位于尼罗河三角洲东部的遗址泰尔—法卡(Tell el-Farkha)被认为是上埃及权贵建立的物品中转站和管理中心,以保证和促进与西亚的贸易。这里出土了大量来自巴勒斯坦和两河流域的器物,还有作为驮兽的驴的遗骸。在阿拜多斯的代表性墓葬U—J墓中(约公元前3200—前3150年)发现了约2000件陶罐,其中仅少数产自埃及本地,大部分则来自今天的巴勒斯坦地区,用于盛装那里出产的葡萄酒;还有用黎巴嫩松木制作的冥器,以及可能来自埃塞俄比亚的黑曜石等坚硬宝石。

    两河流域对埃及的影响也表现在建筑材料和装饰风格上。在公元前3千纪的早王朝和古王朝时期,埃及盛行一种长方形的马斯塔巴大墓(mastaba),因其梯形体的地上建筑酷似阿拉伯板凳而得名。第一王朝的创建者阿哈(Aha)就在涅迦达为其母建造了巨大的马斯塔巴墓。这类王室大墓往往建有附属的祭庙,祭庙外墙由泥砖砌成且呈现出壁凹式的装饰(niched facade)。带有这类装饰的建筑通常被称为“宫殿正门”,因为它与王宫的出现相关且与王权的关系密切。作为建筑材料的泥砖和壁凹式的装饰风格都类似于两河流域乌鲁克遗址的神庙外墙。这类外墙先后发现于两河流域南部的乌尔和乌鲁克以及北部的高拉,后来又发现于叙利亚境内的乌鲁克扩张时代遗址哈布巴?卡比拉和杰贝勒?阿鲁达(见上文),其空间分布佐证了乌鲁克的扩张现象和叙利亚在埃及与两河之间的桥梁作用。

    四、两大文明交相辉映

    总体而言,两河流域对早期埃及的影响在物质文化上的表现主要包括青金石、滚印、雕刻艺术中的特定图案主题和建筑装饰上的壁凹式外墙,这些因素在前王朝时期下半段(公元前4千纪下半期)已经出现在埃及,在希拉孔波利斯、涅迦达和阿比多斯三地的墓葬遗存中均有发现,其背后的推动力可能与两河流域南部的“乌鲁克扩张”密切相关。这一时期乌鲁克文化正处在扩张的高潮阶段,两河流域南部的长途贸易发达,进出口产品丰富,居民们或私人筹资,或得到所在城市资助,得以远赴两河流域北部和黎凡特地区建立规模不等的定居点乃至商业殖民地,两河流域的文化也随之得以传播。通过黎凡特这一地理走廊以及从黎凡特到埃及的海路运输,上述特定文化元素到达了埃及。与此相反,在两河流域并未发现来自埃及的文化元素。

    但笔者以为,这一反差并没有强烈到足以宣称两河文明影响了埃及早期文明的进程。无论青金石、滚印还是泥砖,抑或雕刻图案和壁凹式装饰,其绝对数量和空间分布都相当有限,基本局限在精英阶层的墓葬中。与其说它们来自两河流域这点吸引了埃及受众,毋宁说它们的异域风情被埃及的社会上层所借用以传达王权至高的意识形态。此时埃及的社会精英或许在摸索建立权威、彰显等级秩序的不同路径,因而借用了这些来自两河流域的文化要素。

    随着上下埃及的统一和第一王朝的建立,来自两河流域的文化元素在公元前3千纪初从埃及本土一度消失了。埃及与西亚的贸易明显减少,原来派驻在加沙、以色列南部以及努比亚的人员撤回本土,尼罗河第一瀑布和尼罗河三角洲东北部分别成为埃及与努比亚以及西亚之间的界限。埃及文明从此步入自我形塑的时代,以象形文字、金字塔和木乃伊为基本特征的埃及文化其本土特色日益鲜明。同期的两河流域则在“乌鲁克扩张”后进入了发展相对缓慢和地方化倾向愈加突出的阶段,似乎丧失了文化输出的动力和能力。

    纵观古代埃及和两河流域的史前时代,两大文明既各有千秋,又交相辉映。在埃及,当农业和畜牧业发展后,一定规模的定居区域在公元前4000年后才逐步形成。埃及定居点的出现不仅比两河流域晚得多,而且过程缓慢,其城市化也没有后者那样普遍和彻底。它在史前的政治格局起初也朝着两河流域南部众多城邦共生并存的方向发展,但这一趋势不久后便中断,转而向上下埃及统一的国家迈进。而在两河流域,史前的多城邦共存竞争局面一直延续到长达五六百年的早王朝时期(约公元前2900—前2350年),之后才迎来首个统一南北两部的阿卡德王朝。正因为统治阶层建构权力的模式不同,尽管两个文明之间存在诸多相似之处,但埃及发展成了统一的、以王权为特征的领土国家,两河流域则保持了众多城邦竞争和并存的传统。

    本文转自《世界历史》2023年第1期

  • 许宏:考古学视角下的中国诞生史[辑编]

    从司马迁的记载开始,三代王朝夏、商、周是华夏族的成丁礼,再之前是悠长的婴儿和少年时期,从这个时候开始成熟起来,然后有了一个比较大的王朝国家。但是究竟是夏还是商,现在还有争议,我们看这个表就比较清楚。我们一直以来就存在着历史文献学和考古学两大话语系统,这两大话语系统最初是边界明显的:一边是历史文献上的伏羲、女娲、三皇五帝、夏商周王朝;一边是考古学上的前仰韶、仰韶、龙山、二里头、二里岗时代。这两大话语系统的合流是在殷墟。为什么是在殷墟?有一个绝对不可逾越的条件就是,当时有可以证明自己族属和王朝归属的文字材料出现,这才可以把这两大话语系统整合,以后的西周、东周、秦汉魏晋都可以证明,但在那之前没有文字材料,没有史证。在前殷墟时代,如果我们把考古学遗存跟它的族属、王朝归属相对应的话,都只能是推论和假说。就是因为它没有直接性的文字材料,所以在大的历史分期上,我们习惯于把它分成历史时期(history)——有明确文字记载的时期;原史时期(proto-history)——文字开始出现,但还不足以解决狭义的历史问题;史前时期(pre-history),基本上就是这样一个脉络。

    史前、原史、历史阶段划分与对应史料

    前中国时代与“中国”的初兴

    许宏:考古学视角下的中国诞生史
    华夏文明腹心地区的五颗明珠——五大都邑遗址,都背靠邙山,面向古洛河

    任何事物都有其从无到有,从小到大,发生发展的过程,国家起源以及中国文明的形成也不例外。考古学揭示出的距今五六千年以来的东亚大陆展现了这样的图景。大约距今六千年以前,广袤的东亚大陆上的史前人群,还都居住在不大的聚落中,以原始农业和渔猎为主,过着大体平等、自给自足的生活。各区域文化独立发展,同时又显现出一定的跨地域的共性。到了距今5500~3800年间,也就是考古学上的仰韶时代后期至龙山时代,被称为东亚“大两河流域”的黄河流域和长江流域的许多地区,进入了一个发生着深刻的社会变革的时期。随着人口的增长,这一时期开始出现了阶层分化和社会复杂化现象,区域之间的文化交流和摩擦冲突都日趋频繁。许多前所未见的文化现象集中出现,聚落形态上发生着根本的变化。如大型中心聚落及以其为核心形成的一个个大群落,城墙与壕沟、大型台基和殿堂建筑、大型祭坛、大型墓葬等耗工费时的工程,随葬品丰厚的大墓和一贫如洗的小墓所反映出的社会严重分化等等,都十分令人瞩目。

    众多相对独立的部族或古国并存且相互竞争。如中原及周边的仰韶文化、石峁文化、陶寺文化、王湾三期文化,西北地区的大地湾文化、齐家文化,辽西和内蒙东部的红山文化,山东地区的大汶口文化、龙山文化,江淮地区的薛家岗文化,长江下游的凌家滩文化、崧泽文化、良渚文化,长江中游的屈家岭文化、石家河文化,长江上游的宝墩文化等,在文化面貌上各具特色,异彩纷呈。

    红点是当时邦国中心所在地

    那是一个“满天星斗”的时代,邦国林立是那个时代最显著的特征。有的学者将其称为“古国时代”或“邦国时代”,有的则借用欧美学界的话语系统,将其称之为“酋邦时代”。无论如何,那是一个小国寡民的时代。整个东亚大陆的面积,与现在的欧洲差不多,而当时的这些星罗棋布的古国或部族,也和现在欧洲的样态差不多。那么,问题来了:它们都属于“中国”吗?

    要说清这件事,得先捋一捋相关的概念。关于“文明”的解说五花八门,这里无法详细展开,但说古代文明是人类文化发展的较高阶段或形态,而其标志是“国家”的出现,应会得到大多数人的认可。[……]

    显然,中国有5000年文明史的提法,是把这些都当成了中华文明史也即“中国”诞生史的一部分。其认知脉络是,这些人类群团在相互交流、碰撞的文化互动中,逐渐形成了一个松散的交互作用圈,这也就奠定了后世中华文明的基础。随着1970年代末期以来一系列重要发现的公布,中国在三代王朝文明之前即已出现了城市和国家,它们是探索中国文明起源的重要线索的观点得到了普遍认同。源远流长,单线进化,从未间断,成为中国学术界在中国文明起源问题上的主流看法。

    这当然是有道理的。[……]说中华文明可以上溯到新石器时代甚至旧石器时代的认识,显然出于这样的考虑。但这样无限制地追溯,意义何在?同时,其认知前提是百川归海的单线进化论,而事实果真如此吗?甚而,在不少人心目中,一个默认的前提是,现中华人民共和国境内的古代遗存,理所当然就是中华文明的源头。这样的认识,可以成立吗?

    首先,考古学家观察到的上述许多古国或部族,大都经历了发生、发展乃至最后消亡的全过程,也即它们各自谱写了完整的生命史的篇章,而只是给后起的中原王朝文明以程度不同的文化给养或影响。到公元前2000年前后,它们先后退出历史舞台,在这些人类共同体和后来崛起的中原文明之间,有一个“连续”中的“断裂”。这种断裂究竟是出于天灾还是人祸,原因想必多种多样,学术界还在探索之中。在某些区域,“大禹治水”传说中的大洪水,或许就是原因之一。考古学的研究对象是支离破碎的古代遗存,所以知其然不知其所以然的事,所在多有。

    如前所述,我们知道在现在的中国境内,上古时期曾有众多相互独立的国家并存。而顾名思义,在“国”前冠以“中”字,“中国”也就有了“中央之城”或“中央之邦”的意蕴。这同时也说明“中国”已并非初始阶段的国家,显然,它一定是一个在当时具有相当的影响力、具有排他性的核心。因而,我们也就不能说最初有多个“中国”,作为发达、复杂的政治实体的“中国”也是不能无限制地上溯的。

    许宏:考古学视角下的中国诞生史
    史前时代东亚城址的三大系统

    说到“中国”,还要捋捋这一概念的源起和演化。在出土文物中,“中国”一词最早见于西周初年的青铜器“何尊”的铭文。而在传世文献中,“中国”一词最早出现于东周时期成书的《尚书》和《诗经》等书中。“中国”一词出现后,仅在古代中国就衍生出多种含义,如王国都城及京畿地区、中原地区、国内或内地、诸夏族居地乃至华夏国家等。“中国”成为具有近代国家概念的正式名称,始于“中华民国”,是它的简称;现在也是“中华人民共和国”的简称。其中,最接近“中国”一词本来意义的是“王国都城及京畿地区”,那里是王权国家的权力中心之所在,已形成具有向心力和辐射性的强势文化“磁场”。其地理位置居中,有地利之便,因此又称为“国中”、“土中”或“中原”。

    那么,究竟是什么时候,后世“中国”的雏形或者说“最早的中国”崛起于世呢?

    按古代文献的说法,夏王朝是中国最早的王朝,是破坏了原始民主制的世袭“家天下”的开端。一般认为,夏王朝始建于公元前二十一世纪,国家级重大科研项目“夏商周断代工程”,把夏王朝建立的年代定为公元前2070年左右。在考古学上,那时仍属于龙山时代,在其后约200多年的时间里,中原地区仍然处于邦国林立,战乱频仍的时代,各人类群团不相统属,筑城以自守,外来文化因素明显。显然,“逐鹿中原”的战争正处于白热化的阶段,看不出跨地域的社会整合的迹象。也就是说,至少在所谓的夏王朝前期,考古学上看不到与文献相对应的“王朝气象”。

    与此同时,兴盛一时的中原周边地区的各支考古学文化先后走向衰落;到了公元前1800年前后,中原龙山文化系统的城址和大型中心聚落也纷纷退出历史舞台。代之而起的是,地处中原腹地嵩(山)洛(阳)地区的二里头文化在极短的时间内吸收了各区域的文明因素,以中原文化为依托最终崛起。二里头文化的分布范围首次突破了地理单元的制约,几乎遍布于整个黄河中游地区。二里头文化的因素向四围辐射的范围更远大于此。

    伴随着区域性文明中心的衰落,此期出现了超大型的都邑——二里头遗址。地处中原腹地洛阳盆地的二里头遗址,其现存面积达300万平方米。经半个多世纪的田野工作,在这里发现了中国最早的城市主干道网,最早的宫城,最早的多进院落大型宫殿建筑,最早的中轴线布局的宫殿建筑群,最早的封闭式官营手工业作坊区,最早的青铜礼乐器群、兵器群以及青铜器铸造作坊、最早的绿松石器作坊、最早的使用双轮车的证据,等等。这样的规模和内涵在当时的东亚大陆都是独一无二的,可以说,这里是中国乃至东亚地区最早的具有明确城市规划的大型都邑。

    二里头文化与二里头都邑的出现,表明当时的社会由若干相互竞争的政治实体并存的局面,进入到广域王权国家阶段。黄河和长江流域这一东亚文明的腹心地区开始由多元化的邦国文明走向一体化的王朝文明。作为广域王权国家概念的“中国”,在前一阶段还没有形成。

    要之,我们倾向于以公元前1700年前后东亚地区最早的核心文化——二里头文化,最早的广域王权国家——二里头国家的出现为界,把东亚大陆的早期文明史划分为两个大的阶段,即以中原为中心的“中原(中国)王朝时代”,和此前政治实体林立的“前中国时代”和“前王朝时代”。

    许宏:考古学视角下的中国诞生史
    郑洛地区龙山时代聚落分布(赵春青 2001)

    值得注意的是,这两大阶段也恰是东亚大陆青铜时代和前青铜时代的分野。

    在二里头时代之前的数百年时间里,东亚大陆的多数区域,早期铜器的使用呈现出红铜、砷铜、青铜并存的状况。铜制品多为器形简单的小件工具和装饰品等生活用具,锻、铸均有,制造工艺处于初级阶段,尚未熟练掌握合金比例。如多位学者已分析指出的那样,东亚大陆用铜遗存的出现,应与接受外来影响关系密切。至于东亚大陆部分区域进入青铜时代的时间,依据最新的年代学研究,要晚到公元前1700年前后了。

    考古学观察到的现象是,出土最早的青铜礼容器的中原地区,也是东亚大陆最早出现广域王权国家的地区。青铜礼器的出现和当时的中原社会,都经历了文化交流中的碰撞与裂变的历程。其同步性引人遐思。二者相互作用刺激,导致中原地区自公元前二千纪上半叶,进入了史上空前的大提速时代。早期中国,由此起步。那么,是青铜礼器及其铸造术,催生了最早的“中国”?

    随着二里头文化在中原的崛起,这支唯一使用复杂的合范技术生产青铜容器(礼器)的先进文化成为跃入中国青铜时代的一匹黑马。值得注意的是,这些青铜礼器只随葬于二里头都邑社会上层的墓葬中,在这个金字塔式的等级社会中,青铜礼器的使用成为处于塔尖的统治阶层身份地位的标志。这些最新问世的祭祀与宫廷礼仪用青铜酒器、乐器,仪仗用青铜武器,以及传统的玉礼器,构成独具中国特色的青铜礼乐文明。“国之大事,在祀与戎”(《左传•成公十三年》)。保有祭祀特权与强大的军力,自古以来就是一个国家立于不败之地的根本。从早期王朝流传下来的祭天崇祖的传统,几千年来一直是中国人宗教信仰和实践的主要内容。二里头都城规划中祭祀区的存在,以及以青铜为主的祭祀用礼仪用器,都与大型礼制建筑一样,是用来昭示早期王朝礼制传统的重要标志物。由于军事力量在立国上的重要性,青铜与玉石兵器也成为祭祀礼器和表现身份地位的仪仗用器的有机组成部分。二里头文化青铜礼器产品的使用范围主要限于二里头都邑的贵族。也就是说,二里头都邑不仅垄断了青铜礼器的生产,也独占了青铜礼器的“消费”即使用权。

    其中,酒器是具有中国特色的酒文化乃至它背后的礼仪制度的重要载体。作为统治阶层身份地位的象征,以酒器为中心的礼器群,成为中国最早的青铜礼器群。从这里,我们可以看出中国古代文明主要是建立在社会关系的巨变(在等级秩序下人际关系的大调整)而非人与自然关系巨变的基础上的。而铸造铜爵等造型复杂的酒器,至少需要精确地组合起内模和3件以上的外范,即当时已采用了先进的复合范工艺。克服其中的种种困难,最终铸造出青铜礼器的内在动力,应当就是这一时期新兴王权对宫廷礼仪的整饬。

    二里头遗址发现的青铜钺,是迄今所知中国最早的青铜钺。钺作为象征军事权威的仪仗用器,也是一种用于“大辟之刑”的刑具。甲骨文金文中“王”字的字形,像横置的钺,在最初应指代秉持斧钺之人即有军事统帅权的首领,随着早期国家的出现,逐渐成为握有最高权力的统治者的称号。早于甲骨文时代数百年的二里头都城中出土的玉石钺,和迄今所知中国最早的青铜钺,就应是已出现的“王权”的又一个重要象征。换言之,钺的礼仪化是中国王朝文明形成与早期发展的一个缩影。

    在早期王朝的礼器群中,爵、钺等器种持续兴盛于三代逾千年,甚至成为后世中国社会政治文化的重要符号,个中原因,颇具深意。

    二里头的聚落变迁

    另一个可资观察的角度是都邑的城郭形态。这一问题上的权威观点是,城墙是构成都城的基本政治要素,不存在没有城墙的都城。通过对以先秦至秦汉时期为中心的都城发展历程的初步考察,笔者认为整个中国古代都城史可以依城郭形态的不同,划分为两个大的阶段,即防御性城郭阶段和礼仪性城郭阶段。在自最早的广域王权国家都邑二里头至曹魏邺城前近两千年的时间里,庞大的都邑不设防,有宫城而无外郭城,是都城空间构造的主流,这一现象可以概括为“大都无城”。在二里头、殷墟、周原、丰镐、洛邑、秦咸阳、西汉长安和东汉洛阳等一系列都邑中有清晰的显现。这与广域王权国家强盛的国势及军事、外交优势,作为“移民城市”的居民成分复杂化,对都城所处自然条件的充分利用等,都有一定的关联。处于都城发展史早期阶段的防御性城郭的实用性,导致城郭的有无取决于政治、军事、地理等诸多因素,“大都无城”的聚落形态应即这一历史背景的产物;而后起的带有贯穿全城的大中轴线、实施里坊制的礼仪性城郭,因同时具有权力层级的象征意义,才开启了汉代以后城、郭兼备的都城发展的新纪元。

    在这一早期中国都邑布局的演变过程中,最令人瞩目的是二里头时代的到来,这是“大都无城”传统的肇始。如上所述,二里头遗址是迄今可以确认的中国最早的具有明确规划的都邑,其布局开中国古代都城规划制度的先河。但在逾半世纪的田野工作中,却一直没有发现圈围起整个二里头都邑聚落的防御设施,仅知在边缘地带分布着不相连属的沟状遗迹,应具有区划的作用。

    二里头遗址地理位置

    如果将二里头时代的聚落形态与更早的龙山时代作比较,可知前者最大的变化,一是中心聚落面积的大幅度提升,由龙山时代的10余至数十余万平方米,扩大至300万平方米;二是基本上摒弃了龙山时代普遍筑城的传统,代之而起的环壕成为这一时代的主流防御设施。

    由对考古材料的分析可知,进入二里头时代,聚落内部社会层级间的区隔得到强化,而与此同时,对外防御设施则相对弱化。从聚落形态的角度看,二里头都邑是“大都无城”的一个最早的典范。究其原因,不能不考虑到都邑内的居民。二里头可能是最早集聚了周边人口的中心城市,其人口由众多小规模的、彼此不相关连的血亲集团所组成,这种特征又与其后的殷墟和西周时代的都邑颇为相近。而广域王权国家则是从二里头时代至西周时代社会结构上的共性。以“大都无城”为主要特征的都邑聚落形态与早期王朝阶段社会结构上的关联性,值得进一步探究。显然,“大都无城”,是前中国时代终结、最早的“中国”初兴的一个重要的标志。

    要之,以二里头时代为界,东亚大陆的国家起源进程呈现出非连续性和多歧性。以良渚、陶寺、石峁文明为代表的龙山时代众多区域性邦国文明,各领风骚数百年,最终退出了历史舞台。它们走完了其生命史的全过程,而与后起的中原青铜文明仅有或多或少的间接关系,这就使东亚大陆的国家起源进程呈现出“连续”中的“断裂”的态势。这是我们把东亚大陆国家起源进程划分为两大阶段的重要依据。

    通观东南良渚的水城、中原陶寺的土城、西北石峁的石城,都是因地制宜、适应环境的产物,它们也的确都是区域性文明;这与“大都无城”的二里头形成了鲜明的对比。它们所拥有的“前铜礼器群”还看不到像以二里头为先导的中原王朝礼器群那样严格的礼仪规制尤其是重酒的礼器组合。而以软实力见长的二里头,显然通过社会与文化的整合具有了“普世”的魅力,在众多族群的膜拜与模仿中扩大了自身的影响,其范围远远超出了中原地区。更为重要的是,它的文明底蕴通过二里岗时代、殷墟时代乃至西周时代王朝间的传承扬弃,成为中国古代文明的主流。

  • 葛剑雄:九州的传说和现实

    虽然把“中国”确定为我们整个国家的名称是到19世纪后期才出现的事情,但中国统一的概念却已经存在了三千多年。甚至在中原的统一国家形成之前,政治家和学者已经纷纷推出了各自的统一蓝图。虽然当时还没有一个君主真正能够统治这片广袤的土地,但“溥(普)天之下,莫非王土”的颂歌却在西周时就已经普遍流传,并且被视为真理而接受。

    不过,这首颂歌的作者(或许不止一个)大概不会想到,这种统一观居然统治了中国二千多年,并且到今天还没有消除它的潜在影响。

    在中国儒家的经典著作《尚书》中有一篇《禹贡》,一开始就写道:“禹铺土,随山刊木,奠高山、大川。”意思是说,在洪水横流以后,大禹一面规划治水,一面根据名山大川的分布重新划定区域。接着列出的九个单位是:冀州、兖州、青州、徐州、扬州、荆州、豫州、梁州、雍州,这就是九州。

    葛剑雄 | 九州的传说和现实
    《禹贡》所描述的九州区域图

    在另一篇《舜典》中,又提到在尧、舜时,“肇十有二州”。“肇”是开始的意思。对这句话,西汉的学者谷永和东汉初的学者班固解释为:在尧的时候遭到洪水,全国被大水分割为十二部分。但东汉末年的马融的说法是:舜在大禹治水之后,从禹所划分的九州中又分出幽州、并州、和营州三个单位,因而总共有了十二个州。这一说法获得后世多数学者的赞同。

    从未实行过的九州制

    由于这些记载都出于儒家经典,又得到后世众多学者的肯定,所以从西汉以来就成为不可动摇的定论,几乎没有人表示怀疑。人们一般都认为,从大禹治水开始就有了九州这样的政区,以后又演变为十二州。直到现在,一些在叙述一个地方行政区域的历史时,往往还要从九州讲起,似乎这是历史事实。

    由于全国就分为九州,所以九州又一直被当作全国、“天下”的代名词。如南宋诗人陆游《示儿》诗中的名句“死去原知万事空,但悲不见九州同”,就是取这样的用意;晚清诗人龚自珍“九州生气恃风雷”一句也是如此。

    五四运动以后,学者们向儒家经典提出了挑战。经过反复的争论和研究,历史学界已经把这传统的九州说推翻了。原来,《禹贡》中的记载并不是历史事实,九州也不是中国最早的行政区划。

    《禹贡》虽然托名为大禹所作,其实却是战国后期人的作品。具体的证据很多,最主要的理由是《禹贡》中所记的不少地理状况都是战国时的现象,有的地名和水名甚至要到战国后期才出现,如果真是大禹所作,他岂能未卜先知?而且在《尚书》各篇中,《禹贡》的语言照理应比出现在它以后的《盘庚》(记录商朝中期的君主盘庚迁都事)等篇难懂,事实恰恰相反;这也只能说明《禹贡》问世的时间较晚。

    《禹贡》所讲的内容不符合历史事实,至多只有传说的价值。到目前为止的考古发掘和研究的成果,还只能证实商朝的历史。近年来在河南等地发现的一些文化址,一些学者认为就是属于夏朝。如果这一观点得到进一步的证明和普遍的承认,那末夏朝的主要统治区应该在今河南一带,与文献记载传说中的夏都不超出今山西南部、山东西部和河南的范围是一致的。而《禹贡》所叙述的九州的范围,北至燕山山脉和渤海湾,南至南岭一带,西至陇东高原;至于具体涉及的内容更广;当然不可能是夏朝的事实。

    现有的研究成果足以证明,不仅传说中的大禹时代还不可能有什么行政区划,就是商朝和更后的西周时代也还没有出现行政区划。既然《禹贡》是战国后期的产物,那么九州制是不是当时的制度呢?也不是。大家知道,到战国后期,周天子的权力早已荡然无存,而秦始皇还没有统一六国,七个主要的诸侯国各自为政,又有谁有这样的权威能制定并且实行包括各国的疆域在内的行政区划呢?

    可见,九州制只是当时学者对未来统一国家的一种规划,反映了他们一种政治理想。

    秦始皇在全国推行了郡县制,却没有在郡以上设立州。到了公元前二世末,也就是在《禹贡》问世的一二百年以后的西汉元封五年(前106年),汉武帝将全国除首都附近的七个郡级单位以外政区分属于十三部,即豫州、兖州、青州、徐州、冀州、幽州、并州、凉州、益州、荆州、扬州、交趾、朔方;每部设刺史一人,负责巡察境内的地方官和豪强地主;称为十三刺史部, 简称十三部或十三州。但那时的州还是一种监察区,而且这十一个以州命名的单位中没有《禹贡》九州中的梁州和雍州,增加了凉州、益州、并州和幽州。在公元1世纪后的东汉,州才成为最高一级的行政区域。朔方并入了并州,加上管辖首都一带的司隶校尉部,总数仍为十三。由于交趾改称交州,以州命名的单位就有了十二个,也不是九个。东汉末年曹操曾想按九州来重划政区,却没有成功;从此再也没有人作过这样的尝试。从这一角度来讲,九州从来没有成为中国的现实。

    胎死腹中的五服制

    在《禹贡》中还记载了一种“五服”制:五百里甸服,五百里侯服,五百里绥服,五百里要服,五百里荒服。

    根据这样一种国家模式,在王居住的京城往外,第一等是甸服(以农业为主的直接统治区),第二等是侯服(诸侯统治区),第三等是绥服(必须加以绥抚的地区),第四等是要服(边远地区),第五等是荒服(蛮荒地区)。

    葛剑雄 | 九州的传说和现实
    五服图

    如果说,九州制因为是以名山大川为主要界限,所以还能使人相信为实际行政区域的话,五服制这样四四方方二千五百里的划分就难以自圆其说了。连宋代的儒家学者蔡沈在给《尚书》作注释时也不得不指出:“尧的都城在冀州,冀州的北界在今河北北部和内蒙古南部,恐怕不会有二千五百里。即使算到这么远,也都是沙漠不毛之地了。而东南最富庶的地区反而被列入要服和荒服(离冀州一千五百至二千五百里),根据地势来考察,简直弄不明白是怎么回事!”

    但是五服制中有一点却反映了这样一个事实:在生产力低下、运输相当困难的情况下,王(天子)对臣民的贡品的征收不得不随距离的远近而改变。例如在天子直属区“五百里甸服”的范围内就规定了五种不同的纳贡标准:一百里内割下来的作物连穗带秆起交,二百里内只交谷穗,三百里内交谷子,四百里内交粗米,五百里内交精米。实际实行的制度虽不可能如此刻板,但运输能力显然是必须考虑的因素。

    九州制是对未来的设想,五服制却是对过去的理想化。因为在西周和以前虽然采用类似的分等级统治体制,却并没把每一等级固定为五百里,实际上也不存在这样的可能。所以五服制虽见于《禹贡》,却从来没有哪一个君主或政治家有意实行过,只能胎死腹中。

    大九州说

    正因为九州制仅仅是一种理想,所以在《禹贡》问世以后,还出现了另外几种九州的方案,如《周礼》(也是托名周朝制度的著作)中的《职方》、《尔雅》中的《释地》和《吕氏春秋》中的《有始览》都提出了自己的九州规划,各州名称与《禹贡》不尽相同,划分的范围也有所差异。

    战国时齐国学者邹衍又提出了他的大九州学说,大意是这样的(今译):儒家所谓的中国,不过只有天下的八十一分之一。中国的名称叫赤县神州,内部有九个州,就是大禹划定的,但这还不能算是真正的州。在中国之外像赤县神州这样的单位共有九个,这才是九州。在九州的周围有大海包围,人类和动物都无法来往。这样的九州合起来又是一个州,像这样的单位也有九个,在它们的周围有更大的海洋包围着,这就到了天地的边缘。

    这种学说与其说是对外部世界的了解,还不如说是出于臆想和推理。比起那种中国就等于天下,除了中国(实际上只是中原)之外就没有文明社会的观点来,大九州学说高明地承认了还存在着不止一个同样发达的人类社会。但恰恰在这一点上又作了实际上的自我否定:由于各州之间都由无边无际的大海阻隔,人民禽兽是无法来往的。所以这种存在只具有理论和思辨上的意义,而不是对中国有影响的现实。

    中原和华夏

    无论是九州的设想,还是大九州的学说,出现在战国后期都不是偶然的。

    《禹贡》所描述的地理范围已经相当广大,涉及今天中国内地的绝大部分。要具备这样丰富的地理知识,活动范围只限于黄河中下游的夏人、商人和西周人是办不到的。而在战国后期,秦、楚、齐、燕、韩、赵、魏这七个主要诸侯国的疆域已经达到了这样的范围,在互相的交流中,各国的学者就可能掌握这些地理知识。《禹贡》中还记录了各地的农业生产条件,如土壤的类型、土地的等级、水文状况等;应纳贡赋的等级和物产等;都是经济发展达到一定水准的反映。例如梁州的贡物中有铁和镂,镂就是钢。如果没有冶金技术的进步,学者的想像力再丰富,也不可能把这种品种载入著作中。

    在七国的竞争中,尽管鹿死谁手还没有最终明朗,但统一已是大势所趋。秦国变得越来越强大,在错综复杂的形势中明显处于主导地位。一些有远见的知识分子纷纷投向秦国,并为秦国战胜其他六国,完成统一事业出谋划策,也为统一后的未来规划蓝图。多数研究者认为《禹贡》是秦国学者的作品,就考虑到这个因素。

    在经过战争、吞并和融合之后,华夏族已经成为黄河流域乃至东亚大陆人数最多、经济文化最发达、实力最强的民族,占据了当时地理条件最优越的地区。而非华夏民族则被迫迁出了黄河流域,或者逐步融入了华夏族,或者接受了华夏文化并以华夏的一支自居。在蒙古高原、青藏高原、长江流域及其以南和大陆附近的茫茫海洋上,还不存在在总体上能与之匹敌的其他民族和政权,而对此范围之外的情况,虽然人们不至于一无所知(例如穿越河西走廊至中亚的陆上交通线和通向东南亚的海上交通线可能已经存在),但肯定相当有限。

    然而随着境外玉石、珠宝、香料等珍奇异物的流入和亲历者见闻的传播,以中原为中心的观念不能不有所动摇。根据九州的理论,中原是文明的中心,九州是文明的范围,但这些珍异并不产在九州,而是来自“非我族类”的夷狄之邦;莫非那里存在着比中原更高的文明?国君、贵族和上层人士享用着来自境外的珍奇,却从不承认会有文明程度超过自己的社会,于是西方的昆仑山、西王母、瑶池和东方的海上神山一类神话便合适地弥补了这一漏洞——原来在中国之外的确存在着一个可望而不可及的神灵世界。但这丝毫不会动摇中国的中心地位,因为西王母尽管伟大,昆仑山尽管崇高,蓬莱尽管奇妙,却都属于神仙的体系,而除了神仙之外,境外就只是一片早期愚昧落后的混沌世界。

    可以认为:在战国时期形成的统一观,是以华夏族(汉族的前身)为主干、以黄河中下游平原地区为中心的,是一种封闭的观念。

    本文摘自《昔日的天下观》《统一与分裂:中国历史的启示》商务印书馆2013年版

  • 钱穆:中国文化之地理背景

    中国是一个文化发展很早的同家,他与埃及、巴比仑、印度,在世界史上上古部分里,同应占到很重要的篇幅。但中国因其环境关系,他的文化,自始即走上独自发展的路径。在有史以前,更渺茫的时代里,中国是否与西方文化有所接触,及其相互间影响何如,现在尚无从深论。但就大体言,中国文化开始,较之埃及、巴比仑、印度诸国,特别见为是一种孤立的,则已成为一种明显的事实。

    中国文化不仅比较孤立,而且亦比较特殊,这里面有些可从地理背景上来说明。埃及、巴比仑、印度的文化,比较上皆在一个小地面上产生。独有中国文化,产生在特别大的地面上。这是双方最相异的一点。人类文化的最先开始,他们的居地,均赖有河水灌溉,好使农业易于产生。而此灌溉区域,又须不很广大,四围有天然的屏障,好让这区域里的居民,一则易于集中而到达相当的密度,一则易于安居乐业而不受外围敌人之侵扰。在此环境下,人类文化始易萌芽。埃及尼罗河流域,巴比仑美索不达米亚平原,印度印度河流域,莫不如此。印度文化进展到恒河流域,较为扩大,但仍不能与中国相比。中国的地理背景,显然与上述诸国不同。

    普通都说,中国文化发生在黄河流域。其实黄河本身并不适于灌溉与交通。中国文化发生,精密言之,并不赖藉于黄河本身,他所依凭的是黄河的各条支流。每一支流之两岸和其流进黄河时雨水相交的那一个角里,却是古代中国文化之摇篮。那一种两水相交而形成的三角地带,这是一个水桠杈,中国古书里称之曰“汭”,汭是在两水环抱之内的意思。中国古书里常称渭汭、泾汭、洛汭,即指此等三角地带而言。我们若把中国古史上各个朝代的发源地和根据地分配在上述的地理形势上,则大略可作如下之推测。唐、虞文化是发生在现在山西省之西南部,黄河大曲的东岸及北岸,汾水两岸及其流入黄河的桠杈地带。夏文化则发生在现在河南省之西部,黄河大曲之南岸,伊水、洛水两岸,及其流入黄河的桠杈地带。

    周文化则发生在现在陕西省之东部,黄河大曲之西岸,渭水两岸,及其流入黄河的桠杈地带。这一个黄河的大隈曲,两岸流着泾、渭、伊、洛、汾、涑几条支流,每一条支流的两岸,及其流进黄河的三角桠杈地带里面,都合宜于古代农业之发展。而这一些支流之上游,又莫不有高山叠岭为其天然的屏蔽,故每一支流实自成为一小区域,宛如埃及、巴比仑般,合宜于人类文化之生长。而黄河的几个渡口,在今山西省河津、临晋、平陆诸县的,则为他们当时相互交通的孔道。

    据中国古史传说,虞、夏文化极相密接,大概夏部族便从洛水流域向北渡过黄河,而与汾水流域的虞部族相接触。其主要的渡口为平陆的茅津渡,稍东的有孟津。周部族之原始居地,据旧说乃自今陕西渭河上流逐步东移。但据本书作者之意见,颇似有从山西汾河下流西渡黄河转到陕西渭河下流之可能。无论如何,周部族在其定居渭河下游之后,常与黄河东岸汾水流域居民交通接触,则为断无可疑之事。因此上述虞夏周三氏族的文化,很早便能融成一体,很难再分辨的了。这可以说是中国古代较为西部的一个文化系统。

    中国古代的黄河,流到今河南省东部,一到郑县境,即折向北,经今河南浚县大伾山下,直向北流,靠近太行山麓,到今天津附近之渤海湾入海。在今安阳县(旧彰德府)附近,便有漳水、洹水流入黄河,这里是古代殷、商氏族的政府所在地。他们本由黄河南岸迁来,在此建都,达二百八十年之久。最近五十年内,在那里发掘到许多牛胛骨与龟版,上刻贞卜文字,正为此时代殷商王室之遗物,因此我们对于此一时期中在此地域的商文化,增多了不少新智识。

    原来的商族,则在今河南省归德附近,那里并非黄河流经之地,但在古代则此一带地面保存很多的湖泽,最有名的如孟诸泽、蒙泽之类。也有许多水流,如睢水、濊水(即涣水)之类。自此(归德)稍向北,到河南中部,则有荥泽、圃田泽等。自此稍东北,山东西部,则有菏泽、雷夏、大野等泽。大抵商部族的文化,即在此等沼泽地带产生。那一带正是古代淮水、济水包裹下的大平原,商代文化由此渐渐渡河向北伸展而至今河南之安阳,此即所谓殷墟的,这可以说是中国古代较为东部的一个文化系统。这一个文化系统,再溯上去,或可发生在中国之极东,燕、齐滨海一带,现在也无从详说了。

    但在有史以前很早时期,似乎上述的中国东西两大系统的文化,早已有不断的接触与往来,因此也就很难分辨说他们是两个系统。更难说这两大系统的文化,孰先孰后。

    现在再从古代商族的文化地域说起。因为有新出土的甲骨文为证,比较更可信据。那时商王室的政治势力,似乎向西直达渭水流域,早与周部族相接触,而向东则达今山东、河北两省沿海,中间包有济水流域的低洼地带。向东北则直至辽河流域,向南则到淮水流域,向西南则到汉水流域之中游,说不定古代商族的文化势力尚可跨越淮、汉以南,而抵达长江北岸。这些地带,严格言之,早已在黄河流域外,而远在商代早已在中国文化区域里。及到周代兴起,则长江流域、汉水、淮水、济水、辽河诸流域,都成为中国文化区域之一部分,其事更属显明。

    我们只根据上文约略所谈,便可见古代中国文化环境,实与埃及、巴比仑、印度诸邦绝然不同。埃及、巴比仑、印度诸邦,有的只籍一个河流和一个水系,如埃及的尼罗河。有的是两条小水合成一流,如巴比仑之底格里斯与阿付腊底河,但其实仍只好算一个水系,而且又都是很小的。只有印度算有印度河与恒河两流域,但两河均不算甚大,其水系亦甚简单,没有许多支流。只有中国,同时有许多河流与许多水系,而且都是极大和极复杂的。那些水系,可照大小分成许多等级。如黄河、长江为第一级,汉水、淮水、济水、辽河等可为第二级,渭水、泾水、洛水、汾水、漳水等则为第三级,此下还有第四级第五级等诸水系,如汾水相近冇涑水,漳水相近有淇水、濮水,入洛水者有伊水,入渭水者有沣水、滈水等。此等小水,在中国古代史上皆极著名。中国古代的农业文化,似乎先在此诸小水系上开始发展,渐渐扩大蔓延,弥漫及于整个大水系。我们只要把埃及、巴比仑、印度及中国的地图仔细对看,便知其间的不同。

    埃及和巴比仑的地形,是单一性的一个水系与单一性的一个平原。印度地形较复杂,但其最早发展,亦只在印度北部的印度河流域与恒河流域,他的地形仍是比较单纯。只有中国文化,开始便在一个复杂而广大的地面上展开。有复杂的大水系,到处有堪作农耕凭藉的灌溉区域,诸区域相互间都可隔离独立,使在这一个区域里面的居民,一面密集到理想适合的浓度,再一面又得四围的天然屏障而满足其安全要求。如此则极适合于古代社会文化之酝酿与成长。但一到其小区域内的文化发展到相当限度,又可藉着小水系进到大水系,而相互间有亲密频繁的接触。因此中国文化开始便易走进一个大局面,与埃及、巴比仑、印度,始终限制在小面积里的情形大大不同。若把家庭作譬喻,埃及、巴比仑、印度是一个小家庭,他们只备一个摇篮,只能长育一个孩子。中国是一个大家庭,他能具备好几个摇篮,同时抚养好几个孩子。这些孩子成长起来,其性情习惯自与小家庭中的独养子不同。这是中国文化与埃及、巴比仑、印度相异原于地理背景之最大的一点。

    其次再有一点,则关于气候方面。埃及、巴比仑、印度全都近在热带,全在北纬三十度左右,物产比较丰足,衣食易给,他们的文化,大抵从多量的闲暇时间里产生。只有中国已在北温带的较北地带,在北纬三十五度左右。黄河流域的气候,是不能和埃及、印度相比的,论其雨量,也远不如埃及、印度诸地之丰富。古代中国北部应该和现在的情形相差不远,我们只看周初时代《豳风·七月》诗里所描写那时的节令物产以及一般农民生活,便知那时情形实与现在山西、陕西一带黄河、渭水附近甚相类似。因此中国人开始便在一种勤奋耐劳的情况下创造他的文化,较之埃及、巴比仑、印度之闲暇与富足的社会,又是绝不相似了。

    根据上述,古代中国因其天然环境之特殊,影响其文化之形成,因有许多独特之点,自亦不难想像而知。兹再约举其大者言之。

    第一:古代文化发展,皆在小环境里开始,其缺点在于不易形成伟大的国家组织。独有中国文化,自始即在一大环境下展开,因此易于养成并促进其对于政治、社会凡属人事方面的种种团结与处理之方法与才能。遂使中国人能迅速完成为一内部统一的大国家,为世界同时任何民族所不及。

    第二:在小环境里产生的文化社会,每易遭受外围文化较低的异族之侵凌,而打断或阻碍其发展。独有中国文化,因在大环境下展开,又能迅速完成同家内部之团结与统一,因此对于外来异族之抵抗力量特别强大,得以不受摧残,而保持其文化进展之前程,逐渐发展。直至现在成为世界上文化绵历最悠久的国家,又为世界任何民族所不及。

    第三:古代文明多在小地面的肥沃区域里产生,因此易于到达其顶点,很早便失却另一新鲜向前的刺激,使其活力无地使用,易于趋向过度的奢侈生活,而招致社会内部之安逸与退化。独有中国文化,因在较苦瘠而较广大的地面产生,因此不断有新刺激与新发展的前途。而在其文化生长过程下,社会内部亦始终能保持一种勤奋与朴素的美德,使其文化常有新精力,不易腐化。直到现在,只有中国民族在世界史上仍见其有虽若陷于老朽,而仍有其内在尚新之气概,此又为并世诸民族所不逮。

    因于上述三点,所以中国文化经过二三千年的发展,完成了他的上古史之后,一到秦、汉统一时代,正为中国文化开始走上新环境、新气象之另一进程,渐渐由黄河流域扩展至长江流域的时代。而与他同时的几个文明古国,如埃及、巴比仑、印度等,皆已在世界文化史上开始退出他们重要的地位,而让给其他的新兴民族来扮演另一幕的主角了。

    若照全世界人类文化已往成绩而论,便只有西方欧洲文化和东方中国文化两大系统,算得源远流长,直到现在,成为人类文化之两大主干。我们不妨乘便再将此两大文化约略作一简单的比较。

    欧洲文化的远祖是希腊,希腊文化灿烂时期,正和中国西周乃至春秋、战国时代相平行。但双方有一极大的不同。希腊诸邦,虽则有他们共同的文化,却从没有他们共同的政治组织。希腊永远是一种互相独立的市府政治,每一市府,各成一单位。中国西周乃至春秋时代,虽亦同样有许多国家,每一国家虽则几乎亦同样以一个城市,即中国古书中称为“国”的为中心,但这些国家,论其创始,大体都由一个中央政府,即西周王室所分封,或经西周王室之正式承认。因此西周时代的中国,理论上已是一个统一国家,不过只是一种“封建式的统一”,而非后代郡县式的统一而已。

    中国此时之所谓“封建”,亦和欧洲中世纪的封建不同。惟其如此,所以一到春秋时代,虽则西周王室东迁,他为中原诸侯共主的尊严早已失去,但还可以有齐桓公、晋文公一辈在列国诸侯中称霸为盟主的起来,代替王室,继续联合和好与统一的工作。这是西方希腊政治所不能完成的。因此西方希腊诸市府,一到中国秦、汉时代,便不免完全为罗马所吞灭,从此西方文化又要走入一新境界。但中国秦、汉时代,却并非如西方般,由外面来了一个新势力,把旧有的中国吞灭,中国秦、汉时代,只是在旧中国的内部,自身有一种改进,由封建式的统一,转变而成“郡县式的统一”,使其统一之性质与功能,益增完密与强固而已。

    我们继此可以说到西方罗马与汉代之不同。罗马政府的性质,论其原始也和希腊市府一般。后来逐步向外伸张,始造成一个伟大的帝国。这一个帝国之组织,有他的中心即罗马城,与其四围之征服地。这是在帝国内部显然对立的两个部分。至于中国汉代,其开始并没有一个像希腊市府般的基本中心,汉代的中国,大体上依然承袭春秋、战国时代来,只在其内部组织上,起了一种新变化。这一种变化,即如上节所说,由封建式的统一转变成为郡县式的统一。

    因此汉代中国,我们只可说他有了一种新组织,却不能说他遇到一个新的征服者。罗马帝国由征服而完成,汉代中国则不然。那时的中国,早已有他二三千年以上的历史,在商、周时代,国家体制早已逐渐完成了。一到汉代,在他内部,另有一番新的政治组织之酝酿与转化。因此在罗马帝国里面,显然有“征服者”与“被征服者”两部分之对立,而在汉代中国,则浑然整然,只是一体相承,并没有征服者与被征服者之区分。西方习惯称罗马为帝国(Empire),汉代中国决不然,只可称为一国家(Nation)。照西方历史讲,由希腊到罗马,不仅当时的政治形态变了,由市府到帝国,而且整个的国家和人民的大传统也全都变了,由希腊人及希腊诸市府变到罗马人与罗马帝国。而那时的中国,则人民和国家的大传统,一些也没有变,依然是中国人和中国,只变了他内部的政治形态,由封建到郡县。

    我们再由此说到罗马覆亡后的西方中古时期,和中国汉代覆亡后之魏晋南北朝时期,两者中间仍有显著的不同。罗马覆亡,依然和希腊覆亡一样,是遇到了一个新的征服者,北方蛮族。此后的欧洲史,不仅政治形态上发生变动,由帝国到封建,而且在整个的人民和国家的大传统上也一样的发生变动,由南方罗马人转变到北方日耳曼人,又由罗马帝国转变到中世纪封建诸王国。中国汉代的覆灭,并不是在中国以外,另来了一个新的征服者,而仍然是在中国内部起了一种政治形态之动荡。东汉以后,魏、蜀、吴三国分裂,下及西晋统一,依然可以说是一种政治变动,而非整个民族和国家传统之转移。此后五胡乱华,虽有不少当时称为胡人的乘机起乱,但此等胡人,早已归化中国,多数居在中国内地,已经同样受到中国的教育。他们的动乱,严格言之,仍可看作当时中国内部的一种政治问题和社会问题,而非在中国人民与中国国家之外,另来一个新的征服者。

    若依当时人口比数论,不仅南方中国,全以中国汉人为主体,即在北方中国,除却少数胡族外,百分之八九十以上的主要户口依然是中国的汉人。当时南方政治系统,固然沿着汉代以来的旧传统与旧规模,即在北朝,除却王室由胡族为之,其一部分主要的军队由胡人充任以外,全个政府,还是胡、汉合作。中国许多故家大族,没有南迁而留在北方的,依然形成当时政治上的中坚势力,而社会下层农、工、商、贾各色人等,则全以汉人为主干。因此当时北朝的政治传统,社会生活,文化信仰,可以说一样承袭着汉代而仍然为中国式的旧传统。虽不免有少许变动,但这种变动,乃历史上任何一个时代所不免。若单论到民族和国家的大传统,文化上的大趋向,则根本并无摇移。

    因此西方的中古时代,北方蛮族完全以一种新的民族出现而为此下西方历史之主干,旧的罗马人则在数量上已成被压倒的劣势而逐渐消失。反之,在中国史上,魏晋南北朝时代,依然以旧的中国人为当时政治、社会、文化各部门各方面之主干与中坚。至于新的胡人,只以比较的少数加入活动,如以许多小支流浸灌入一条大河中,当时虽有一些激动,不久即全部混化而失其存在了。这一层是中国魏晋南北朝时代和欧洲中古时期的绝大不同处。

    因此西方的中古时期,可以说是一个转变,亦可说是一个脱节,那时的事物,主要的全是新兴的。北方日耳曼民族成为将来历史和文化之主干,这是新兴的。当时所行的封建制度,亦是新兴的。西方的封建,乃罗马政治崩溃后,自然形成的一种社会现象,根本与中国史上西周时代所谓的封建不同。中国的封建制度,乃古代中国统一政治进展中之一步骤、一动象;西方封建,则为罗马政治解消以后一种暂时脱节的现象。那时在西方主持联合与统一工作的,主要者并非封建制度,而为基督教的教会组织。这种教会组织又是新兴的。

    希腊、罗马和基督教会之三者,成为近代西方文化之三主源。在中国魏晋南北朝时代,虽同样有印度佛教之流入,并亦一时称盛,但在历史影响上,复与西方中古时期的基督教绝然不同。基督教是在罗马文化烂熟腐败以后,完全以新的姿态出现而完成其感化北方蛮族的功能的。但魏晋南北朝时代的中国,则以往传统文化并未全部衰歇。孔子的教训,依然为社会人生之最大信仰与最大归趋,只在那时又新增了一个由印度传来的佛教,而一到唐代以后,佛教也到底与儒教思想相合流相混化。因此我们可以说,在欧洲中古时期,论其民族,是旧的罗马民族衰歇而新的日耳曼民族兴起。在中国则只在旧的中国汉民族里面增加了一些新民族新分子,胡人。

    论政治,在欧洲中古时期,是旧的罗马统治崩溃,而新的封建社会兴起。在中国则依然是秦、汉的政治制度之沿续,根本上并无多少转换。论文化与信仰,在欧洲中古时期,则由旧的罗马文化转变到新的基督教文化。在中国,则依然是一个孔子传统,只另外又加进一些佛教的成分。却不能说那时的中国,由旧的孔教而变成为新的佛教了。

    由此言之,西方的中古时期,全是一个新的转变,而魏晋南北朝时代的中国,则大体还是一个旧的沿袭。那些王朝的起灭和政权之转移,只是上面说的一种政治形态之动荡。若论民族和国家的大传统,中国依然还是一个承续,根本没有摇移。

    根据上述,来看近代西方新兴的民族国家,他们在两洋史上,又都是以全新的姿态而出现的。论其民族和国家的大传统,他们复和古代的希腊、罗马不同。但中国史则以一贯的民族传统与国家传统而绵延着,可说从商、周以来,四千年没有变动。所有中国史上的变动,伤害不到民族和同家的大传统。因此中国历史只有层层团结和步步扩展的一种绵延,很少彻底推翻与重新建立的像近代两方人所谓的革命。这是中西两方历史形态一个大不同处,因此而影响到双方对于历史观念之分歧。

    西方人看历史,根本是一个“变动”,常由这一阶段变动到那一阶段。若再从这个变动观念上加进时间观念,则谓历史是“进步”的,人类历史常由这一时代的这一阶段,进展到另一时代的另一阶段。但中国人看历史,则永远在一个“根本”上,与其说是变动,不如说是“转化”。与其说是进步,不如说是“绵延”。中国人的看法,人类历史的运行,不是一种变动,而是一种转化。不是一种进步,而是一种绵延,并不是从这一阶段变动、进步而达另一阶段,只是依然在这一阶段上逐渐转化、绵延。

    变动、进步是“异体的”,转化、绵延则是“同体的”。变动、进步则由这个变成了那个。转化、绵延则永远还是这一个。因此两方人看历史,常偏向于“空间”的与“权力”的“向外伸展”;中网人看历史,常偏向于“时间”的与“生长”的“自我绵延”。西方人的看法,常是“我”与“非我”两个对立。中国人的看法,只有自我一体浑然存在。双方历史形态之不同,以及双方对于历史观念之不同,其后面便透露出双方文化意识上之不同。这一种不同,若推寻根柢,我们依然可以说中西双方全都受着一些地理背景的影响。中国在很早时期,便已凝成一个统一的大国家。在西方则直到近代,由中国人眼光看来,依然如在我们的春秋、战国时代,列国纷争,还没有走上统一的路。

    中国历史正因为数千年来常在一个大一统的和平局面之下,因此他的对外问题常没有像他对内问题那般的重要。中国人的态度,常常是反身向着内看的。所谓向内看,是指看一切东西都在他向己的里面。这样便成为自我一体浑然存在。西方历史则永远在列国纷争、此起彼仆的斗争状态之下,因此他们的对内问题常没有像他们对外问题那般的重要,西方人的态度,则常常是向外看的。所谓向外看,是指看一切东西都在他自己的外面,所以成为我与非我屹然对立。惟其常向外看,认为有两体对立,所以特別注意在空间的“扩张”,以及“权力”和“征服”上。惟其常向内看,认为只有一体浑然,所以特别注意到时间的“绵延”以及“生长”和“根本”上。

    其次说到双方经济形态,中国文化是自始到今建筑在农业上面的,西方则自希腊、罗马以来,大体上可以说是建筑在商业上面。一个是彻头彻尾的农业文化,一个是彻头彻尾的商业文化,这是双方很显著的不同点。

    依西方人看法,人类文化的进展,必然由农业文化进一步变成商业文化。但中国人看法,则并不如此。中国人认为人类生活,永远仰赖农业为基础,因此人类文化也永远应该不脱离农业文化的境界,只有在农业文化的根本上再加绵延展扩而附上一个工业,更加绵延展扩而又附上一个商业,但文化还是一线相承,他的根本却依然是一个农业。

    照西方人看,文化是变动的,进步的,由农到商截然不同。照中国人看,则文化还是根本的与生长的,一切以农为主。这里自然也有地理背景的影响。因为西方文化开始如埃及、巴比仑等,他们本只有一个狹小的农业区,他们的农业文化不久便要达到饱和点,使他们不得不转换方向改进到商业经济的路上去。希腊、罗马乃至近代西方国家莫不如此。在中国则有无限的农耕区域可资发展,因此全世界人类的农业文化,只有在中国得到一个继长增荣不断发展的机会。

    中国历史,在很早时期里,便已有很繁荣的商业了。但因中国开始便成为一个统一的大国,因此他的商业常是对内之重要性超过了对外。若西方各国,则常是对外通商的重要性超过了对内。因此双方对商业的看法,也便有异。西方常常运用国家力量来保护和推进其国外商业。中国则常常以政府法令来裁制国内商业势力之过分旺盛,使其不能远驾于农、工之上。因此在西方国家很早便带有一种近代所谓“资本帝国主义”的姿态,在中国则自始到今常采用一种近代所谓“民主社会主义”的政策。

    再换辞言之,农业文化是自给自足的,商业文化是内外依存的。他是要吸收外面来营养自己的。因此农业文化常觉得内外一体,只求安足。商业文化则常觉彼我对立,惟求富强。结果富而不足,强而不安,因此常要变动,常望进步。农业文化是不求富强但求安足的,因此能自本自根一线绵延。

    我们继此讲到科学和工业,科学知识和机械工业在现世界的中国是远为落后的。但中国已往历史上,也不断有科学思想与机械创作之发现,只因中国人常采用的是民主社会主义的经济政策,“不患寡而患不均”。对于机械生产,不仅不加奖励,抑且时时加以禁止与阻抑,因此中国在机械工业一方面,得不到一个活泼的发展。在中国的机械和工业,是专走上精美的艺术和灵巧的玩具方面去了。科学思想在中国之不发达,当然不止此一因,但科学没有实际应用的机会,自为中国科学不发达的最要原因之一。

    其次我们再说到中西双方对于人生观念和人生理想的异同。“自由”(Liberty & Freedom)一词是西方人向来最重视的。西方全部历史,他们说,即是一部人类自由的发展史。西方全部文化,他们说,即是一部人类发展自由的文化。“人生”、“历史”和“文化”,本来只是一事,在西方只要说到“自由”,便把这三方面都提纲挈领的总会在一处了。在中国则似乎始终并不注重“自由”这个字。西方用来和自由针对的,还有“组织”和“联合”(Organization & Unity)。希腊代表着自由,罗马和基督教会则代表着组织和联合。这是西方历史和西方文化的两大流,亦是西方人生之两大干。我们只把握这两个概念来看两方史,便可一一看出隐藏在两方历史后面的一切意义和价值。

    但中国人向来既不注重自由,因此也便不注重组织和联合,因为自由和联合的后面,还有一个概念存在的,这便是“两体对立”。因有两体对立,所以要求自由,同时又要求联合。但两体对立,是西方人注重向外看,注重在空间方面看的结果。是由西方商业文化内不足的经济状态下产生的现象。中国人一向在农业文化中生长,自我安定,不须向外寻求,因此中国人一向注重向内看,注重在时间方面看,便不见有严重的两体对立,因此中国人也不很重视自由,又不重视联合了。中国人因为常偏于向内看的缘故,看人生和社会只是浑然整然的一体。

    这个浑然整然的一体之根本,大言之是自然、是天;小言之,则是各自的小我。“小我”与“大自然”混然一体,这便是中国人所谓的“天人合一”。小我并不和此大自然体对立,只成为此体之一种根荄,渐渐生长扩大而圆成,则此小我便与大自然融和而浑化了。此即到达天人合一的境界。中国《大学》一书上所说的修身、齐家、治国、平天下,一层一层的扩大,即是一层一层的生长,又是一层一层的圆成,最后融和而化,此身与家、国、天下并不成为对立。这是中国人的人生观。

    我们若把希腊的自由观念和罗马帝国以及基督教会的一种组织和联合的力量来看中国史,便得不到隐藏在中国史内面深处的意义与价值。我们必先了解中国人的人生观念和其文化精神,再来看中国历史,自可认识和评判其特殊的意义和价值了。但反过来说,我们也正要在中国的文化大流里来认识中同人的人生观念和其文化精神。

    继此我们再讲到中两双方的宗教信仰。西方人常看世界是两体对立的,在宗教上也有一个“天国”和“人世”的对立。在中国人观念里,则世界只有一个。中国人不看重并亦不信有另外的一个天国,因此中国人要求永生,也只想永生在这个世界上。中国人要求不朽,也只想不朽在这个[让界上。中同古代所传诵的立德、立功、立言三不朽,便从这种观念下产生。中国人只想把他的德行、事业、教训永远留存在这个世界这个社会上。中国人不想超世界超社会之外,还有一个天国。因此在西方发展为宗教的,在中国只发展成“伦理”。中国人对世界对人生的“义务”观念,反更重于“自由”观念。在西方常以义务与权利相对立,在中国则常以义务与白由相融和。义务与自由之融和,在中国便是“性”(自由)与“命”(义务)之合一,也便是“天人合一”。

    西方人不仅看世界常是两体对立,即其看自己个人,亦常是两体对立的。西方古代观念,认人有“灵魂”“肉体”两部分,灵魂部分接触的是理性的“精神世界”,肉体部分接触的是感官的“物质世界”。从此推衍,便有西方传统的“二元论”的哲学思想。而同时因为西方人认为物质世界是超然独立的,因此他们才能用纯客观的态度来探究宇宙而走上科学思想的大园地。中国人则较为倾向“身心一致”的观念,并不信有灵肉对立。他看世界,亦不认为对我而超然独立,他依然不是向外看,而是向内看。他认为我与世界还是息息相通,融为一体。

    儒家思想完全以“伦理观”来融化了“宇宙观”,这种态度是最为明显了。即在道家,他们是要摆脱儒家的人本主义,而从宇宙万物的更广大的立场来观察真理的,但他们也依然保留中国人天人合一的观点,他们并不曾从纯客观的心情上来考察宇宙。因此在中国道家思想里,虽有许多接近西方科学精神的端倪,但到底还发展不出严格的西方科学来。

    以上所述,只在指出中西双方的人生观念、文化精神和历史大流,有些处是完全各走了一条不同的路。我们要想了解中国文化和中国历史,我们先应该习得中国人的观点,再循之推寻。否则若从另一观点来观察和批评中国史和中国文化,则终必有搔不着痛痒之苦。

    本文原载《中国文化史导论》,商务印书馆,2023年版

  • 何立波:迦太基的兴衰及其多元文明特征

    迦太基是腓尼基城邦的推罗人在非洲建立的一个殖民地,后成为古代地中海世界一个著名的商业民族。迦太基据说是推罗人在柏萨(Byrsa)向非洲土著借来的一块“牛皮之地”,经过不断扩张拓展,成为和希腊并列的西地中海两殖民帝国,也是与罗马并列的西地中海世界的强国。迦太基在商业领域和希腊人有激烈竞争,也和新兴的罗马在西西里出现了冲突,与希腊人和罗马人均兵戎相见。迦太基在公元前146年被罗马所灭,作为一个国家不复存在。但是迦太基文明的混合型特征,以及带来的文明交流和传播的意义却不容忽视。对于迦太基的兴衰及其文明特征,学界已经取得了一些成果,但还有很大的提升空间。①

    一、迦太基海上商业帝国的建立与早期西地中海世界的文明交流

    从民族上说,迦太基人属于古代地中海东岸腓尼基人的一支。迦太基人代表了古代东方民族殖民、商业和航海的高峰,在某种意义上进行了古代国家“重商主义”文明的最早探索。

    (一)迦太基的建立和对外贸易扩张

    一般认为,腓尼基人中的推罗人于公元前814年在非洲建立了迦太基。“迦太基”在腓尼基语中为“”,在希腊语中为“Karchēdon”,在拉丁语中为“Carthago”,意思是“新城”。②

    关于迦太基的建城史,一直有“一张牛皮”的传说。古希腊史学家提迈欧(Timaeus,约前352-前256)最早提出迦太基由推罗妇女狄多(Dido,亦称Elissa)在第一次奥林匹克运动会前的第38年(前814年)所建之说。③罗马帝国史学家阿庇安(Appian,约95-165)提供了更详细的记载,称狄多带领族人来到迦太基所在地,求土著酋长赐一块牛皮之地。在征得土著酋长的同意后,狄多将一张牛皮裁剪成条,圈出一块城镇大小的地皮,即后来迦太基的卫城柏萨。④“柏萨”的腓尼基语为“Bozra”,意思是围城、堡垒;而在希腊语中为“Byrsa”,意思是“藏牛之处”。⑤柏萨位于迦太基城的中央,是一个险峻之地。阿庇安在叙述公元前146年迦太基毁灭时,提到迦太基已繁荣了700年⑥,显然指的是她建立于公元前9世纪晚期的说法。到公元前l世纪末希腊地理学家斯特拉波(Strabo,前64-公元23)到访非洲时,迦太基城仍有方圆360斯塔德(stades)的规模。⑦

    古典学家迈尔斯(Richard Miles)认为,目前迦太基发现的最早的考古文化层的回溯,仅仅能追溯到公元前760年左右。⑧考古学家辛塔斯(Cintas)试图通过对迦太基遗址出土的陶器进行分析,建立迦太基早期历史的时间表,但是罗马人在毁灭迦太基的时候造成较大损毁。1922年,辛塔斯终于在13个陶罐中确认有9个属于希腊陶罐,认定迦太基建城不太可能早于公元前725年。⑨推罗人建立迦太基可能是希腊罗马人的一种想象,斯特拉波、阿庇安等都持这种观点。而实际上,迦太基的早期居民还包括腓尼基各城邦及众多非洲居民。关于早期迦太基,目前发现的最重要的古典档案是“闪米特铭文集”(Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum)第1卷第5684—5号,一般被认为是出现在公元前7世纪,仍保留着明显的推罗语言的特点。⑩

    目前看来,腓尼基人在西地中海的扩张,不会早于公元前750年。(11)在公元前8世纪之前,迦太基在西地中海世界的主要活动是建立殖民地。韦尔(Benjamin W.Wells)认为,殖民地是迦太基国家的支柱,迦太基殖民体系是古典时代的殖民典范。(12)青铜时代晚期的殖民地有两种模式:一种是腓尼基的贸易殖民,专注于奢侈品贸易和经济利益,在地中海西部沿海建立了稳定的定居点;另一种模式是希腊人的殖民运动,在海外建立城邦,带有政治目的。(13)早期迦太基人的贸易和希腊人有所不同,他们更多是以贸易者的身份在海外殖民和经商。他们在迦太基以外的定居地与其说是城市,不如说是“贸易港口”更为合适。

    迦太基从希腊世界和东方输入油、酒等食物及纺织品、陶器、青铜器等手工业品,满足本国居民和殖民地居民需要。目前考古材料证实的迦太基从国外进口商品,最早可以追溯到公元前650年。(14)西西里岛的阿克拉加斯城(Acragas)、意大利的坎佩尼亚,以及爱琴海的罗德斯岛,都是迦太基酒类来源地。油是从阿克拉加斯城运来的。迦太基从希腊大陆、意大利的坎佩尼亚、西西里得到了青铜器物、宝石制品和花瓶。考古学家在一座献给迦太基女神塔妮特(Tanit)的神庙中发现了东方化时代(前720-前580)的6个科林斯式希腊陶罐,时间在公元前740年到前710年间。(15)在迦太基人墓地还发现了从塞浦路斯运来的陶俑和青铜水瓶。埃及也提供了受迦太基人欢迎的装饰品。法国史学家杜丹(Jules Toutain)认为,迦太基的非洲领土及其殖民帝国能出口的商品有限,只有奴隶、矿砂和金属,尤其是西班牙南部的铅和银。(16)迦太基沉船的船骸提供了重要的物质信息,如铜锭、锡锭、玻璃、金银首饰、彩陶、酒和油等。(17)作为一个以商业贸易闻名的古典民族,迦太基人缺乏具有自己民族特色的手工业品,经常仿制和改造从希腊和埃及进口的商品,如他们仿制的希腊陶器就几乎达到了以假乱真的地步。

    (二)迦太基地中海贸易航线的建立和大西洋航海的探索

    迦太基在地中海参与和拓展的贸易航线,大体可分为东西航线和南北航线。东西航线亦称“黎凡特—西班牙线路”,是从希腊、小亚、西亚到西班牙、直布罗陀海峡的航线。伊比利亚半岛和萨丁尼亚岛,是地中海世界主要的铜、锡、银的产地。推罗人首先开辟了从西班牙南部的加底斯(Gades)到推罗的“金属航线”。西西里的希腊史学家狄奥多鲁斯(Diodorus of Sicily,前80-前21)称,迦太基海疆西达直布罗陀的“赫拉克勒斯(Heracles)之柱”、加底斯和大西洋,而加底斯位于有人居住的世界的最远边界。(18)有利的地理位置、肥沃的内陆土地和更优良的港口,让迦太基人很快控制了这条航线,成为地中海最大的铜、锡、银的贸易商。(19)

    南北航线对迦太基来说尤为重要,它将迦太基与西西里、科西嘉、撒丁岛、意大利联系起来,成为第勒尼安海贸易圈的重要坐标。迦太基还位于非洲通往希腊、爱琴海地区的海上航线的通道,有利于它从海外获得粮食、原材料和手工艺品。迦太基早期的粮食依赖进口,主要来自西班牙、意大利、西西里、希腊、黎凡特等地。在迦太基早期居民的陪葬品中,发现了大量希腊陶器(包括爱奥尼亚式和科林斯式陶器)。公元前6世纪初,银价暴跌,金属航线随之衰落,南北航线变得愈加重要起来。迦太基位于东西航线和南北航线的交会点,很快发展成为地中海世界贸易中心。在迦太基国家收入的来源中,关税占主要地位。(20)迦太基在希腊化时期成为地中海世界的一座国际都市,吸引了大量移民。

    迦太基人的贸易具有居间商的性质,航线广泛分布在欧洲、非洲的大西洋沿岸和西地中海地区,形成一个地中海世界贸易网络,迦太基货币也成为地中海西部地区的硬通货币。为保护贸易航线和商业利益,迦太基建立起一支强大的海军舰队,使用先进的三桨座战舰。在内陆殖民地农业的支持、海上贸易的商业支撑和海军舰队的保护下,迦太基建立了一个商业殖民帝国。杜丹强调,迦太基商业的真正范围是海洋,尤其是西部。他们从撒哈拉、苏丹获得了黑奴、象牙、兽皮、黄金、鸵鸟,从高卢获得锡、铅,其买卖都是在沿海或交通要道进行的。杜丹指出,迦太基人在地中海世界贸易中所起的作用,很像17世纪的荷兰人。(21)

    迦太基能够发展成为一个海上商业殖民帝国,是和他们高超的造船技术和航海水平分不开的。古罗马学者老普林尼(Pliny the Elder,23—79)告诉我们,腓尼基人是一个擅长航海、通晓天文并发明字母文字的民族。(22)早在公元前3000年左右,腓尼基人城市比布鲁斯(Byblos)就已制造出拥有弧形船体、能够经受大海考验的船只。古希腊史学家波里比乌斯(Polybius,前204-前122)在谈到迦太基和罗马军队的对比时指出,航海技术长期以来是迦太基人的一种特殊技能,他们比其他任何民族都熟悉大海。(23)迦太基商队以拥有大船而著名,用帆航行。迦太基水手不仅能够沿岸航行,而且能够进行深海航行,在航行中依靠太阳和星辰的位置、熟悉的海岸地形和地貌来辨别航行的方向。

    古希腊罗马作家提到了迦太基人在公元前5世纪的两次大西洋航行,比希腊航海家皮西亚斯(Pytheas of Massalia,前320-前285)在公元前4世纪晚期的首次大西洋航行早了1个世纪。公元4世纪的罗马学者阿维努斯(Avienus)提到,迦太基将军希米尔科(Himilco,前460-前410)船队向北沿着伊比利亚半岛和高卢的西海岸航行数月,在西欧寻找矿石,可能到达了不列颠。(24)老普林尼记录了迦太基将军汉诺(Hanno)的《航行记》,称汉诺船队沿非洲西海岸进行了探险。(25)汉诺船队大致在公元前520年进行远航(26),远达摩洛哥、毛里塔尼亚、冈比亚等地,并在摩洛哥建立了殖民地。据说最远达几内亚湾,接近了赤道。大西洋航行探索将迦太基人的贸易圈扩展到了大西洋海域。公元前460年,迦太基人开始将摩洛哥的咸鱼运往希腊的科林斯(Corinth)。位于摩洛哥大西洋沿岸的殖民地的建立,与迦太基殖民活动的扩展路径是一致的。迦太基人拥有当时最好的船长和水手,他们能够安全地航行在地中海西部海域和大西洋沿岸。(27)

    二、迦太基人与希腊人、罗马人在海上商业贸易中的冲突和结果

    在迦太基人所开展的对外殖民和贸易活动中,他们和古希腊人、罗马人发生了碰撞和交流。迦太基人在对希腊人、罗马人的战争中失败,奠定了古代西方叙述中迦太基人的失败者形象。

    (一)迦太基和希腊人在西西里的争夺和较量

    在迦太基的对外殖民活动中,西西里是联系地中海东西航道和南北航道的重要交通要冲,地位举足轻重。希腊史学家修昔底德(Thucydides,前460-前400/396)说腓尼基人在希腊之前就来到西西里殖民,居住在沿海,占据岬角和沿海的岛屿。(28)但实际情况可能并非如此。希腊人在东方化时代开始大殖民,在西西里和意大利南部(希腊人称为“大希腊”地区)建立殖民地。希腊人在南意大利的库玛(Cumae)建立殖民地是公元前750年,到达西西里是在公元前8世纪。(29)腓尼基人在西西里建立殖民地不会早于公元前8世纪。(30)在地中海西部,迦太基充当了腓尼基人保护者的角色。迦太基人在西西里西部、科西嘉和撒丁岛建立了很多殖民地,在西西里建立的殖民地有摩提亚(Motya)、帕诺慕斯(Panormus)、索罗伊斯(Soloeis)等。在科西嘉,为对抗共同的敌人希腊人,迦太基人和意大利北部的伊特鲁里亚人(Etruscans)建立了同盟关系。

    狄奥多鲁斯认为,财富是引起人类竞争的主要因素。(31)迦太基人征服一个地方后,通常会征收一大笔贡金。(32)迦太基人坚持要控制通向西班牙的航线,与公元前5世纪的雅典坚持垄断通往黑海的航线颇为相似,二者争夺的对象分别是金属和谷物。迦太基人和希腊人的西西里战争虽有商业和贸易的动机,但无法与17世纪欧洲的商业战争相提并论。

    西西里是迦太基通向西班牙的交通要冲和中转站。从公元前580年开始,腓尼基人和希腊人在西西里西部发生了冲突。希腊人试图进入西西里最西端的利利俾(Lilybaeum),遭到迦太基人的驱赶。在公元前535年的阿拉里亚(Alalia)战役中,迦太基人和伊特鲁里亚人联合起来击败了希腊人,将第勒尼安海毗邻的海域变为了迦太基的水域。从公元前5世纪开始,迦太基在西西里的主要竞争者是希腊城邦阿克拉伽斯和叙拉古。公元前580年开始的一个多世纪里,为与希腊人争夺西西里岛,迦太基、希腊之间发生了三次战争(布匿—希腊战争)。迦太基在公元前5世纪才有20多万人口,无法建立像其他国家那种公民兵体制,只能是从被征服者和商人中征募雇佣兵,由迦太基人充任将军。(33)也有人认为,精明的迦太基人不肯亲自参加战争,宁愿花钱来雇所谓的“蛮族人”来当兵。(34)

    随着公元前525年波斯帝国征服推罗,日益强大的迦太基与母邦推罗间的联系仅剩下向腓尼基神灵献祭和坚守推罗宗教传统了。公元前4世纪初,伯罗奔尼撒战争后的希腊人停止在西西里殖民,迦太基与希腊双方殖民争霸告一段落。迦太基控制西西里岛的西部,希腊科林斯人在西西里所建立的城邦叙拉古占据了西西里岛东部。西西里的殖民者带来了外来的文化,从多利亚人的农业文化到希腊的陶器和迦太基人的布匿文字都在西西里长期存在。在西西里的外来文化中,希腊文化的影响最大。在人类历史上,最早的洲际划分的理念是由希腊人提出的。波里比乌斯指出,希腊人把“有人居住的世界”()分为欧罗巴、亚细亚和利比亚三大洲。(35)老普林尼说,非洲被希腊人称为“利比亚”,它不包括埃及。(36)斯特拉波强调利比亚疆域很小,那里只有沙漠和野兽;(37)有人居住的世界只有希腊人和野蛮人两种人。(38)狄奥多鲁斯在叙述西西里的历史时,将西西里岛上叙拉古之外的居民称为“蛮族人”,称“除了叙拉古以外的蛮族人拥有了整个西西里”。在书写希腊人和迦太基人在西西里的冲突的时候,狄奥多鲁斯时而使用“迦太基人”的称呼,时而使用“蛮族人”的说法(39),表达了希腊世界对于迦太基人的看法。

    西西里的外来文化包括布匿文化、希腊文化等,二者分别分布在西部和东部。在迦太基占主导的西西里西部,土著的伊利米人(Elymians)和外来的迦太基人都没有建立起政治组织,更多地表现为一种文化上的传播和交流。在公元前6世纪的西西里西部,迦太基人更注重加强对其他腓尼基人城市的控制,他们在两个世纪后彻底控制腓尼基城邦的货币发行权。到公元前6世纪末,迦太基加强了对西西里西部的统治,在岛屿南部的势力也有了明显提升。迦太基宗教在西西里和撒丁岛的传播有了明显的加强,如献祭和葬仪及托非特(tophet)祭坛。(40)

    与迦太基人相比,希腊人在西西里政治上的存在感更强,建立了叙拉古等城邦国家。叙拉古实行僭主政治,以文化发达而著称。狄奥多鲁斯认为,在公元前5世纪早期的希波战争中,迦太基曾经和波斯帝国结盟,从西部和东部同时对希腊人开战,其中迦太基人负责对西西里和意大利的希腊人作战,波斯人对希腊本土作战。(41)发生在西西里的希梅拉(Himera)战役和希腊大陆的萨拉美斯(Salamis)海战,是在公元前480年的同一天发生的。希罗多德(Herodotus,约前480-前425)、亚里士多德均认为,这有可能只是时间上的巧合而已,波斯人和迦太基人并未在战前协商一致。(42)迦太基对和波斯人结盟未必有兴趣,因为母邦推罗人被迫成为波斯人的仆从国。雅典曾试图联合迦太基人,对抗与他们有矛盾的叙拉古,遭到迦太基的拒绝。在与阿克拉伽斯—叙拉古联军的希梅拉战役中,迦太基的30万军队损失了15万人。(43)迦太基在战后70年间逐渐将注意力转向非洲,还不断向内陆地区推进,试图将利比亚腓尼基化,并将自身非洲化,以巩固其非洲帝国。(44)

    在希波战争后,希腊人加强了对西西里的控制,希腊文化在西西里的影响超过了迦太基。从公元前4世纪起,迦太基人、坎佩尼亚人(Campanians)、奥斯其人(Oscans)和罗马人都活跃在西西里,使得西西里成为一个地中海世界不同文明交汇的大熔炉。公元前2世纪以来,随着罗马人在西西里统治的开始,西西里的政治日益罗马化。但新的政治秩序并未带来立竿见影的效果,希腊文化仍是西西里的强势文化。在西西里,迦太基人的布匿文化并未在第一次布匿战争结束后消失。在公元前1世纪的西西里,布匿文化的影响仍无处不在,陶罐、花瓶等物品上大量出现了布匿语和希腊语的双语铭文。(45)布匿铭文在西西里至少存在到了公元1世纪,布匿口语存在的时间更长。(46)在西部西西里,希腊人和“蛮族人”之间有密切的来往,存在着语言的融合。希腊化时期利利俾出土的铭文记载的两个人的名字,就是集希腊语、拉丁语、布匿语于一身的混合式名字。

    (二)迦太基人和罗马人商业霸权的争夺以及最终的失败

    迦太基在其统治区域内实行贸易垄断制度,达到控制商贸航线和征收关税的目的。据波里比乌斯记载,迦太基与罗马在公元前509年签订了一个条约,对罗马人及其盟邦船只航行到“菲尔角”(Fair Promontory,亦译“美丽岬角”)以西海域进行了严格限制(47),保持了他们对地中海西部的海上商业霸权。但学者卡列(M.Cary)认为,波里比乌斯所说的签订条约的时间是错误的,正确的时间应是公元前308年。(48)这个条约表明,迦太基在公元前6世纪或4世纪末已有能力对所有外国商船封锁直布罗陀海峡。没有迦太基人的同意,希腊航海家皮西亚斯从加底斯出发经过直布罗陀海峡的大西洋航行就不可能发生。(49)从马耳他(Malta)到西西里、撒丁岛、巴利阿里(Balearics)岛、西班牙的航线,是由迦太基人严密控制的。从公元前6世纪起,希腊人不能直接从西班牙南部获得锡、铜和银。公元前540年,迦太基人联合伊特鲁里亚人将希腊人赶出了科西嘉。(50)

    到公元前6世纪晚期,迦太基的领土从昔兰尼(Cyrene)延伸到了大西洋。(51)在迦太基人看来,撒丁岛和利比亚是自己的领土,而西西里只涉及他们所统治的一部分区域。波里比乌斯告诉我们,迦太基人和罗马人在公元前306年又签订了一个条约,迦太基人明确将利比亚和撒丁岛视为自己的私有财产,将推罗和乌提卡(Utica)也纳入了自己的领土范围,不许罗马人涉足。(52)迦太基人严厉打击海盗,成为古代文明早期和平贸易协约的倡导者。

    迦太基并不缺乏金银,他们从中非得到黄金,从西班牙获取白银。公元前6世纪,钱币在希腊世界已经普及。到公元前6世纪最后25年,希腊人主要居住区都已使用了金属货币。(53)迦太基人重视商业,他们教育青年的指导思想就是要证明商业在迦太基公私生活中的优越地位。迦太基人早期采取的是物物交换或使用希腊等外币。希罗多德记述了迦太基商人同利比亚土著居民“无声的贸易”的交易细节,迦太基人以商品换取土著(可能是摩洛哥土著)的黄金。(54)公元前5世纪末,为了给西西里的雇佣兵开支薪酬,迦太基人用西班牙的银锭来铸造自己的银币。

    公元前3世纪早期是迦太基商业帝国的黄金时期。希腊人海上的势力日益衰落,亚历山大帝国一分为三,罗马人忙于征服中部和北部的意大利人,迦太基人几乎垄断了整个地中海的商业贸易。在罗马人发起挑战之前,迦太基人保持了他们对海洋的控制权,而且把注意力转向通过侵略建立一个陆上帝国,采取了一种更有侵略性的帝国主义政策。随着罗马在公元前3世纪介入西西里事务,迦太基和罗马人的矛盾逐渐激化。从公元前264年争夺西西里开始,罗马和迦太基先后发生了三次战争(布匿战争)。布匿战争揭开了整个地中海世界国家间关系转型的序幕,标志着一个新时代的开始。罗马人开始从陆地向海洋拓展,对迦太基人在西地中海世界的利益构成了严重的挑战。

    罗马是一个传统的陆军强国,早期并未设置海军。第一次布匿战争爆发后,罗马迅速组建一支由公民兵组成的海军,军队士气高。迦太基海军强大但是公民兵不足,主要依靠西班牙人、柏柏尔人(Berbers)及后来的努米底亚人(Numidians)等外族人所组成的雇佣军,军队缺乏凝聚力和爱国精神。波里比乌斯清楚地看到了这一点,认为迦太基军队使用的是外国人和雇佣军,而罗马军队士兵都是本国的公民和土著人,罗马人是在为自己的国家和儿女而战。(55)公元前242年,在第一次布匿战争中战败的迦太基人退出西西里,罗马人获得了除了叙拉古之外的整个岛屿(56),西西里由此在公元前227年成为罗马的第一个行省。迦太基在第二次布匿战争中在本土战败,被迫和罗马人签订了几乎交出一切的苛刻条约。在反贵族寡头的选民的支持下,汉尼拔于公元前196年当选为迦太基的首席行政长官苏菲特(sufetes),推行民主改革,重整军队,迦太基逐渐从战败的阴影中走出,元气得以恢复。

    迦太基的复兴让罗马人产生了一种恐惧之情,贵族加图(Marcus Cato,前234-前149)提出:“迦太基必须被毁灭。”(57)罗马在公元前149年发起第三次布匿战争。阿庇安、狄奥多鲁斯等希腊罗马史学家提供了公元前146年迦太基战败被毁的画面,称罗马军队纵火烧毁迦太基城。(58)这次战争让迦太基的人口丧失了三分之一,一个世纪以后也未能得到完全的恢复。(59)罗马人为了抹去迦太基的历史记忆,几乎将迦太基图书馆的所有藏书都转赠给了他们在非洲的盟友努米底亚,企图只留下罗马人的历史书写。阿庇安告诉我们,罗马元老院派往迦太基的10名元老组成的代表团下令将迦太基夷为平地,任何人不得在迦太基居住,否则会受到诅咒。(60)与迦太基人斗争的这段波澜壮阔的经历,成为罗马神话不可或缺的一页。第二次布匿战争激发了罗马人的民族意识和爱国热情,罗马人开始首次书写罗马和迦太基的历史,建构了失败的迦太基和胜利的罗马的民族形象。

    斯特拉波告诉我们,迦太基于公元前146年的最后时刻在利比亚本土仍然拥有300座城市和70万城市人口的实力。(61)古代知识精英有夸大数字的习惯,斯特拉波这个数字可能有些夸张了。《剑桥古代史》提出,此时迦太基城约有20万—30万人。(62)韦尔认为,迦太基城在公元前146年毁灭之际的人口不会超过13万人,因为该城没有那么多人口的居住空间。(63)毁灭迦太基,让罗马商人和意大利商人填补了远距离贸易的空白。他们取代了迦太基商人,来到努米底亚从事贸易活动,获利颇丰。

    (三)古希腊罗马作家对迦太基人的负面形象建构

    在古希腊罗马作家的眼中,迦太基人是一群好斗的恶毒的东方入侵者,是暴虐的、虚伪的和贪婪的。波里比乌斯指出:在迦太基,任何能产生利益的东西都不会被视为可耻的,竞选官职可进行公开的贿赂;而罗马人会谴责不择手段赚钱的方式,竞选行贿是死罪。(64)狄奥多鲁斯对迦太基人和罗马人的文明冲突有详细的报道,他说迦太基人只要失败就会导致精神和意志的崩溃,这在别的民族是很难想象的。(65)他意味深长地说了一句话:“我认为有的民族对人类社会危害甚烈是理所当然的事情,如严霜和冰雪会摧毁刚刚生长的作物。”(66)狄奥多鲁斯的言外之意,迦太基人是一个有害的民族。他批评迦太基当局在国家危机之际提拔新将领,危机过后却又让他们身败名裂的做法。(67)但狄奥多鲁斯也客观地指出了罗马人的残酷、失信和傲慢,指出了罗马人在毁灭迦太基后的问题,如忧患意识的缺乏、行政官员的贪婪和对法律的无视、民意煽动家所造成的危险、内战延长带来的恐惧等问题(68),这成为罗马共和晚期诸多矛盾之源。

    地中海西部的希腊人和迦太基人之间,存在着一道不可逾越的鸿沟。希腊人表现出一种与生俱来的优越性和激烈的排外情绪,对希腊人与其他民族在政治、文化、宗教等领域日益增强的融合趋势表现出一种对抗的态度。古希腊作家对迦太基人的态度,直接影响了罗马的知识精英。罗马人从未将自己看作希腊人,但他们已经认识到自己在民族文化的分水岭中与希腊文化同属一个阵营。这个分水岭将文明的希腊世界与野蛮人的世界区分开了,而迦太基人显然属于野蛮人世界。罗马史学家李维在关于布匿战争的记载中,一直在将罗马人的美德与迦太基人的恶习进行对比,认为汉尼拔的背信弃义超过了任何一位迦太基人。西里乌斯·伊塔利库斯(Silius Italicus,28—103)是一位罗马元老,写下以第二次布匿战争为主题的史诗《布匿战记》(Punica),使用了“迦太基人是残忍的”这样的表述。(69)希腊罗马人对迦太基人的“他者”想象——胡言乱语的、贪婪的、不守信用的、残忍的、傲慢的、不敬神的迦太基人,成为古典史学叙述的主流。“迦太基式的信用”(fides Punica),亦成为背信弃义的同义语。(70)

    在希腊罗马人看来,迦太基的失败与他们对待盟邦的态度有直接的关系。狄奥多鲁斯指出,迦太基人“过于残酷和苛刻”(71),对待被征服地区经常采取掠夺、索取和高压的政策,因而盟邦痛恨迦太基的高压统治。(72)狄奥多鲁斯还说,迦太基军队在占领西西里阿克拉伽斯城之后,将神庙财产和城市的雕像、物品都运到迦太基,然后焚烧了寺庙,洗劫了全城。在占领另一座城市杰拉(Gela)之后,官兵都发了财。(73)狄奥多鲁斯强调,长期以来,迦太基的利比亚盟邦憎恨迦太基人的压榨和索取,他们一有机会就发起叛乱。(74)在叙述和希腊人争夺西西里挫败原因的时候,狄奥多鲁斯指出这是迦太基人不尊重推罗神灵的结果,认为迦太基人一开始对在推罗受到顶礼膜拜的赫拉克勒斯是尊重的,向其奉献年收入的十分之一。而在后来,他们疏忽了,所以神的恩泽就减少了。狄奥多鲁斯还强调了神对迦太基贵族用别人的孩子冒充自己的孩子献给神灵的愤怒之情。(75)

    古希腊作家普鲁塔克(Plutarchus,约46-120)和狄奥多鲁斯都提到迦太基人用儿童献祭,后者还说迦太基贵族曾用200位贵族儿童作为牺牲品献给神灵。(76)威尔·杜兰(Will Durant)赞同古典作家的这种说法,认为直到2世纪仍存在献给麦勒卡特(Melkart,推罗主神)的活童祭品。(77)《牛津古典辞书》认为从公元前8世纪晚期到公元前146年,童祭在迦太基一直存在,但在实践中一开始就用动物代替了儿童。(78)泽内达·A.拉戈金(Zenaide A.Ragozin)提出,是在与耶稣同时期的罗马皇帝提比略(Tiberius,37-41年在位)时期才彻底废除了迦太基的这个习俗。(79)《剑桥古代史》指出迦太基托非特祭坛的骨灰瓮中发现了儿童烧焦的骨头,还有两篇提到杀婴的铭文。(80)但奥贝特(M.Aubet)不同意这种杀婴献祭的观点,他认为考古学家对托非特祭坛中的人类骨殖和灰烬的分析表明,他们大多属于死婴和新生儿的,这明显带有自然死亡的味道(81),并非来自儿童献祭所产生的非正常死亡。撒里贝姆特(Andrea Salimbeti)提出,目前的证据无法证实迦太基存在火焚活童的祭祀。(82)本文亦认为,古希腊罗马作家的记载经常存在夸大的成分和道听途说的习惯。根据目前的史料和考古材料,我们对普鲁塔克和狄奥多鲁斯关于迦太基存在活童祭观点的可靠性还无法确认,还有待于进一步的材料和研究。

    三、迦太基的文明特征和文明贡献

    作为东方闪米特人的一支,迦太基人创建了一个庞大的海上殖民和商业帝国,将文明扩展到了地中海西部广大区域甚至是大西洋沿岸,同时带动了北部非洲本土的开发,推动了东西方文明、非洲文明和外来文明的交流和融合。

    (一)迦太基对非洲的开发和文明传播

    迦太基海上商业帝国的辉煌,很容易掩盖其农业的成就。当推罗人和西顿人在非洲沿岸的巴巴里(Barbara)建立最初的停靠港时,当地居民还处于新石器时代,金属器具是从外国输入的。古代非洲(不包括希腊罗马人所说的不属于利比亚的埃及)居民也栽种过某些作物和饲养过某些牲畜,但只有到了迦太基成立和崛起以后,非洲才在迦太基的引领下有了真正的农业。从某种意义上说,迦太基也是非洲的首都。迦太基人的农业开发是成功的,他们大量使用奴隶劳动,对土著的示范和对非洲的物质繁荣都做出了贡献。它把文明传播到它所兼并的国家,超出自己的领土,传播到其附属国和同盟国中去。(83)迦太基人从西亚带来了葡萄、橄榄、无花果、石榴等,在土质和气候适宜的非洲广泛种植,迦太基的石榴被罗马人称为“迦太基苹果”。

    公元前5世纪在西西里的殖民活动受挫后,迦太基加快了开发非洲本土农业的步伐,将撒哈拉最肥沃的土地和大流沙区纳入其领土,变为农业区。从公元前3世纪末开始,谷物和葡萄园的收入就已经成为迦太基统治阶层的主要收入来源了。(84)古希腊罗马作家共66次提及迦太基著名农学家马戈(Mago)的耕作法。(85)柏柏尔人同迦太基人的接触比其他非洲民族都早,受迦太基人的影响也最大。柏柏尔人向迦太基人学会了农业,迈入了农耕文明。菲利普C.内勒(Phillip C.Naylor)认为,迦太基人懂得欣赏不同民族的文化,其复杂的文化是通过万神殿和语言来表达的,给善于接受文化的柏柏尔人留下深刻印象。(86)迦太基文化对柏柏尔人的思想和习俗的影响,成为跨文化交往的典范。努米底亚人在公元前3世纪向迦太基人学会了建设城市,引入了马戈农书所介绍的耕作方法,还吸取了迦太基的文化及宗教。(87)柏柏尔人在公元前202年建立了努米底亚王国,他们所建的城市科塔(Cirta)也出现了迦太基式的托非特祭坛。(88)努米底亚贵族热衷于同迦太基上层通婚,给子女取布匿人的名字。(89)努米底亚和迦太基的铜币设计都是一样的,二者出现了文化同化的现象。

    20世纪以来的考古挖掘表明,迦太基人对北部非洲内陆进行了深度渗透,建立了很多殖民地和临时性商业居留地,创建了一系列城市,使得迦太基文明得以在非洲广泛传播。1970年代,考古学家在非洲卡本半岛(Cap Bon Peninsula,今突尼斯东北)发现了迦太基人所建的殖民地盖赫库阿勒(Kerkouane)的遗迹。该城可能建于公元前6世纪,提供了迦太基人和利比亚土著人交往的线索。盖赫库阿勒居民敬拜的神是腓尼基人和迦太基人的神灵麦勒卡特和其子锡德(Sid)、塔尼特等。该城大部分房屋都有中央庭院,院中建有迦太基人用作洁净仪式的浴室。盖赫库阿勒居民使用迦太基语,但利比亚的元素随处可见,如利比亚土著居民的殡葬仪式。盖赫库阿勒城还发现了描写希腊英雄奥德修斯形象的雅典式黑彩陶制酒壶和爱奥尼亚式杯子,以及具有希腊风格的建筑,反映了该城多元文化的特点。(90)

    斯特拉波告诉我们,迦太基被毁后在很长一段时期内和希腊的科林斯一样,一直处于荒无人烟的状态。(91)罗马有识之士试图推出重建迦太基的计划。据阿庇安记载,在迦太基荒芜了30年后,罗马保民官盖约·格拉古(Gaius Gracchus,前154-前121)在公元前123年提出移民6000人到迦太基的计划,而不顾西庇阿在毁灭迦太基的时候诅咒迦太基将永作牧场的事实。(92)恺撒(Gaius Julius Caesar,前100-前44)曾在公元前44年重提移民迦太基的计划,以解决贫民的土地问题,但未来得及实施便遇刺身亡。奥古斯都(Augustus,前63-公元14)在公元前29年派遣移民重建迦太基,并将非洲行省(亦称阿非利加行省)的首府从乌提卡迁到迦太基。(93)罗马退役军人、殖民者、商人和工程人员接踵而来,将新迦太基建设成为罗马帝国西部最大的城市,也是罗马帝国著名的文化、教育和学术中心。斯特拉波指出,和利比亚境内的其他人和城市一样,迦太基是一座繁荣兴旺的城市。(94)在迦太基以东的港口大莱普提斯(Leptis Magna),诞生了罗马帝国首位出身非洲的元首塞普提米乌斯·塞维鲁(Septimius Severus,146-211),塞维鲁王朝也成为罗马帝国历史上的第一个非洲王朝。

    (二)迦太基文明与希腊文明、埃及文明和罗马文明的交流和交融

    迦太基文化受到希腊文明、埃及文明的明显影响,表现出混合性或者折中主义的特点,体现在艺术、宗教和物质文化等方面。至少从公元前6世纪起,迦太基人就将希腊和埃及的建筑风格与迦太基的建筑风格结合起来,形成了混合式的迦太基建筑艺术。

    迦太基与西西里希腊人的战争带来了文化宗教的交流,导致了二者文化融合的范围远远超出了西西里海岸地区而深入内陆,这是西西里殖民化以来的显著特征之一。从公元前4世纪起,希腊文化对迦太基的影响越来越明显,但是迦太基的文化并未失去自身传统,尤其是在语言和宗教方面。公元前4世纪早期,迦太基当局禁止迦太基人学希腊语,但却未见成效,希腊语在北部非洲成了仅次于布匿语的第二语言。(95)大量证据显示,迦太基人会说希腊语,阅读希腊著作,着希腊服饰,崇拜希腊神祇。在西西里,出现了很多具有希腊文化和腓尼基文化特色的器具和艺术品,如西西里出现的铸有六头金牛肖像的酒杯。迦太基人的墓葬中出现了大量希腊钱币,主要是希腊铜币,这可能是对外贸易的需要。斯特拉波说,在迦太基卫城柏萨的高处,有一座阿斯克勒庇俄斯(Asclepius)神庙。(96)阿斯克勒庇俄斯是希腊的医神,它在迦太基出现说明迦太基人对于希腊医神的崇拜和对祛除疾病、战胜瘟疫的渴求,亦反映希腊宗教对迦太基人的影响。

    另外,迦太基人对希腊神赫拉克勒斯的崇拜,亦反映了希腊文化对迦太基文化的影响。从某种意义上说,赫拉克勒斯崇拜具有文化的多样性与跨文化的相互关联性,比其他任何一位神都更适合古代地中海居民。从公元前6世纪起,在地中海中西部,赫拉克勒斯开始越来越多地被与迦太基的麦勒卡特联系在一起。当汉尼拔试图寻找一位天国的精神领袖以将西方的人们联合起来抗衡罗马之际,他选中的就是赫拉克勒斯-麦勒卡特。(97)泽内达·A.拉戈金强调腓尼基宗教亦对希腊(尤其是希腊大陆的东海岸)的宗教有影响(98),但未提供有力的证据。

    在希腊人的影响下,迦太基人的丧葬方式也发生了改变,从土葬转为了火葬。在奥古斯都重建迦太基城之后,这里到处都有希腊风格的雕像。20世纪以来蓬勃发展的考古学,让我们重构古代迦太基的文化成为可能。考古学家在突尼斯圣路易山丘的斜坡上,挖掘出了为罗马人纵火毁城的灰烬层所覆盖的房屋以及迦太基的一个街区,都反映出这里具有希腊化时代的特点,如迦太基街区的房屋规格较小、由各个房间所环绕着的中央庭院作为建筑物的光源,等等。

    埃及人的宗教和来世观也对迦太基人产生了影响。迦太基人崇拜埃及的奥里西斯(Osiris)神,将迦太基主神巴尔-哈蒙(Baal Hammon)和埃及的阿蒙神相提并论。受埃及人的影响,迦太基人认为人死后会有两个灵魂。迦太基人还向埃及人学会了制作木乃伊的技术。公元前4世纪的迦太基墓葬出土的剃刀上的宗教主题图案,集中反映了埃及和迦太基的神灵和神圣符号。在迦太基人的护身符上,出现了埃及的神灵、动物形象和神圣符号。从埃及进口的圣甲虫和首饰(99),在迦太基大受欢迎。在迦太基人的陪葬品中,出现了描绘埃及神祇和法老形象的祭品,这被认为有助于驱邪。

    迦太基公元前146年亡国后的这段历史,被称为晚期布匿或新布匿时期。虽然罗马文化成为官方文化,但迦太基人的文化并没有中断,在语言、建筑、绘画、雕刻、美术、教育等领域都有体现。迦太基艺术有其自身的特点,表现为对细节和对称的过度关注。非洲很多地方官员都使用了迦太基式的“苏菲特”的名称。迦太基神庙保留了下来,但祭司取罗马的名字,着罗马的托袈。(100)迦太基的神名改成了罗马的神名,巴尔-哈蒙变成了罗马农神萨图尔(Saturn),塔尼特变成为了罗马天后朱诺(Juno)。巴尔-萨图尔被视为罗马的丰收之神,成为罗马非洲行省农业发展在宗教文化领域的反映。(101)罗马人将腓尼基人语言称为布匿语,迦太基战争被罗马人称为布匿战争。迦太基被罗马征服之后,拉丁语的重要性超过希腊语,成为迦太基人从小必须学习的语言,城市中受教育者两种语言都会。但在整个罗马帝国的非洲行省,布匿语仍是官方通行语言。公元前8年,非洲大莱普提斯城的迦太基籍城市长官捐助了一座纪念碑,使用了拉丁语和迦太基语的双语铭文。捐助者的名字“汉尼拔·塔帕皮乌斯·鲁福斯”,就是罗马姓氏和迦太基本名的结合。(102)在罗马帝国基督教神学家圣奥古斯丁(St.Aurelius Augustinus,354-430)写作的时代,布匿语仍出现在非洲的拉丁书信和铭文中,并一直使用到了5世纪早期,显示了语言传统强大的惯性和生命力。439年,汪达尔首领盖萨里克(Geiseric,389-477)占领了迦太基,建立了汪达尔王国,罗马-迦太基的时代结束了。(103)

    结语

    迦太基研究专家沃明顿指出:“作为城邦国家的迦太基试图统治一个帝国,并能够维持3个世纪之久的统治,比雅典人的统治还长了三分之一。”(104)在古代世界,迦太基的成功之处不仅体现在拥有的巨额财富,而且包括它统治的长久的稳定和持久,这甚至赢得了其对手的尊敬。西塞罗强调,迦太基如果没有使用智慧和政治谋略的话,就不可能维持一个帝国达600年之久。(105)亚里士多德将迦太基的政体和斯巴达、克里特的政体归为一类,认为它们是最接近理想的混合政体,高度评价迦太基设施优良、政治稳定和制度修明。(106)迦太基也是亚里士多德所研究的唯一非希腊国家。古希腊作家伊索克拉底(Isocrates,前436-前338)也称赞迦太基和斯巴达是世界上治理最好的两个民族。(107)

    财富和政体具有密切的关系。迦太基是世界历史上第一个有组织的商业国家(108),进行了地中海商业帝国建设的第一次尝试。迦太基的财富来自它在非洲和西地中海的区域性帝国,它在海上力量保护下的海外贸易,为其维持一支强大的海军提供了财政支持。迦太基商业的成功使之把政治权力给了财富寡头,在公民人口不足的情况下供养了一支雇佣军,维护了迦太基政权的稳定。迦太基在公元前6世纪成为一个强大的国家。到公元前5世纪,随着迦太基人在西西里的布匿—希腊战争中遇挫,迦太基人在西地中海的贸易活动暂时走向了衰落。到公元前4世纪中叶,随着非洲的开发和对非洲属国资源的掠夺,迦太基的商业再次繁荣起来。在丧失西班牙的海外领地之后,迦太基仍被波里比乌斯称为世界上最富有的城市。(109)迦太基对外来文化采取了开放的态度,越来越多地受到了希腊文化的影响。

    迦太基建构了一个地中海世界商贸殖民网,也为各殖民地之间的政治、经济、社会文化的交流和非洲的开发做出了积极的贡献。在杜丹看来,迦太基的历史表现出了一种文明的肤浅和虚弱,其主要推动力是获取财富和扩展商业,其诸多胜利转瞬即逝。迦太基没有依靠经济优势去争取政治和文化的进步,未能在文化领域取得辉煌的成果。这也是迦太基在和罗马的文明较量中失败的重要原因。但我们必须看到,作为西方文明源头的古典世界从来不是希腊—罗马文明的特有成果,而是包括迦太基文明在内的不同文化与民族之间互动、交流和融合的结果。

    注释:

    ①迦太基研究先驱彻什的《非洲帝国之迦太基》(Alfre John Church,Carthage of the Empire of Africa,New York:G.P.Putnam’s Sons,1899),论述了迦太基发展成为非洲帝国的过程。斯密斯的《迦太基和迦太基人》(R.Bosworth Smith,Carthage and the Carthaginians,London:Longmans,Green and Co.,1913)考察了迦太基、迦太基人的发展历程及其对古代世界的影响。沃明顿的《迦太基》(B.H.Warmington,Carthage,London:Robert Hale Limited,1960)从汉诺的非洲航行来追溯迦太基历史。莫斯卡蒂的《迦太基艺术与文明》(Sabatino Moscati,Carthage:Art et Civilization,Milan:Jaca Book,1983)重点介绍了迦太基的文化。皮卡德的《迦太基:从诞生到终结悲剧的布匿历史与文化研究》(Gilbert Charles Picard,Carthage:A Survey of Punic History and Culture from Its Birth to Final Tragedy,London:Sidgwick & Jackson,1987)是一部涉及政治、经济、文化和外交等内容的综合性著作。霍约斯的《迦太基人》(Dexter Hoyos,The Carthaginians,London and New York:Taylor and Francis Group Press,2010)考察了迦太基崛起的进程及商业帝国的建立。迈尔斯的《迦太基必须毁灭:古文明的兴衰》(Richard Miles,Carthage Must Be Destroyed:The Rise and Fall of An Ancient Mediterranean Civilization,London:Allen Lane,2010)借鉴了近现代研究成果,学术价值较高。特里布拉图编的《古代西西里的语言联系》(Olga Tribulato,ed.,Language and Linguistic Contact in Ancient Sicily,Cambridge,U.K.:Cambridge University Press,2012)考察了布匿语等古代西西里语言和文化。国内研究论文有数篇。陈恒的《迦太基建城日期小考》,《常熟高专学报》2001年第1期,对迦太基建城进行了考察;杜建军、刘自强的《论布匿战争爆发的原因》(2002)从政治经济文化进行了探讨。总的来说,关于迦太基的崛起等问题还有进一步研究的较大空间。

    ②Alfred J.Church,Carthage of the Empire of Africa,p.11.

    ③Dionysius of Halicarnassus,The Roman Antiquities,Loeb Classical Library,trans.Earnest Cary,Vol.1,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1937,p.245.本文所引古希腊罗马文献,出自“罗布古典丛书”(Loeb Classical Library)。

    ④Appian,The Punic Wars,I.1,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.1,trans.Horace White,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1912,p.403.

    ⑤Andrea Salimbeti,Raffaele D’ Amato,The Carthaginians,6th-2nd Century BC,Oxford:Osprey Publishing,1991,p.4.

    ⑥Appian,The Punic Wars,XIX 132,Vol.1,p.637.

    ⑦Strabo,Geography,XVII.3.14,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.8,trans.Horace Leonard Jones,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1928,p.183.注:斯塔德(Stadium,复数为Stadia),古希腊长度单位。1斯塔德合625英尺约等于184.97米。

    ⑧理查德·迈尔斯:《迦太基必须灭亡:古文明的兴衰》,孟驰译,北京:社科文献出版社,2016年,第85页。

    ⑨B.H.Warmington,Carthage,London:Robert Hale Limited,1960,p.23.陈恒采用了辛塔斯所提出的公元前725年的说法,参见陈恒:《迦太基建城日期考》,《常熟高专学报》2001年第1期。

    ⑩Maria Giulia Amadasi Guzzo,”Phoenician and Punic in Sicily,” in Olga Tribulato,ed.,Language and Linguistic Contact in Ancient Sicily,Cambridge,U.K.:Cambridge University Press,2012,p.130.

    (11)B.H.Warmington,Carthage,p.22.

    (12)Benjamin W.Wells,”Business and Politics at Carthage,” The Sewanee Review,Vol.28,No.4(Oct 1920),p.507.

    (13)Olga Tribulato,”So Many Siciliies,” in Olga Tribulato,ed.,Language and Linguistic Contact in Ancient Sicily,pp.15-16.

    (14)B.H.Warmington,Carthage,p.23.

    (15)J.N.Coldstream,Geometric Greece,London:Routledge,1977,p.240.

    (16)杜丹:《古代世界经济生活》,志扬译,北京:商务印书馆,1963年,第187页。

    (17)理查德·迈尔斯:《迦太基必须灭亡:古文明的兴衰》,第37页。

    (18)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XXV.10,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.11,trans.Francis R.Walton,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1957,p.155.

    (19)Simon Hornblower,Antony Spawforth & Esther Eidinow,eds.,The Ox ford Classical Dictionary,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2012,p.284.

    (20)Benjamin W.Wells,”Business and Politics at Carthage,” p.505.

    (21)杜丹:《古代世界经济生活》,第188页。

    (22)Pliny the Elder,Natural History,V.67,Vol.2,p.271.

    (23)Polybius,The Histories,VI.52,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.3,trans.W.R.Paton,Cambridge,Mass:Harvard University Press,1923,p.385.

    (24)Alfred J.Church,Carthage of the Empire of Africa,p.100.

    (25)Pliny the Elder,Natural History,V.8,Vol.2,p.223.

    (26)Alfred J.Church,Carthage of the Empire of Africa,p.95.

    (27)Benjamin W.Wells,”Business and Politics at Carthage,” p.503.

    (28)Thucydides,History of the Peloponnesian War,VI.2,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.3,trans.C.Forster Smith,London:W.Heinemann; New York:G.Putnam’s Sons,1919,p.183.

    (29)B.H.Warmington,Carthage,p.34.

    (30)Olga Tribulato,”So Many Siciliies,” p.14.

    (31)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XXXVI.3,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.12,trans.Francis R.Walton,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1967,p.237.

    (32)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XIV.65,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.6,trans.C.H.Oldfather,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1954,p.190.

    (33)B.H.Warmington,Carthage,pp.40-55.

    (34)R.Bosworth Smith,Carthage and the Carthaginians,London:Longmans,Green and Co.,1913,p.57.

    (35)Polybius,The Histories,III.37,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.2,trans.W.R.Paton,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1923,p.87.

    (36)Pliny the Elder,Natural History,V.1,Vol.2,p.219.

    (37)Strabo,Geography,XVII.3.1,Vol.8,p.155.

    (38)Strabo,Geography,XVI.2.38,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.7,trans.Horace Leonard Jones,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1930,p.287.

    (39)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XX 3-6,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.10,trans.Russel M.Geer,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1954,pp.150-157.

    (40)Maria Eugenia Aubet,The Phoenicians and the West:Politics,Colonies and Trade,Cambridge U.K.:Cambridge University Press,2001,p.284.

    (41)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XI.1,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.4,trans.C.H.Oldfather,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1946,p.123.

    (42)B.H.Warmington,Carthage,p.46.

    (43)R.Bosworth Smith,Carthage and the Carthaginians,p.21.

    (44)J.博德曼、N.G.L.哈蒙德等编:《剑桥古代史》,第四卷,张强等译,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2020年,第848页。

    (45)Maria Giulia Amadasi Guzzo,”Phoenician and Punic in Sicily,” p.126.

    (46)Olga Tribulato,”So Many Siciliies,” pp.17-29.

    (47)Polybius,The Histories,III.22-23,Vol.2,pp.53-55.按照波里比乌斯的说法,菲尔角在迦太基的前端,方向朝北,可能是今天的伯恩角,但是也可能是法里纳角(C.Farina)。

    (48)M.Cary,”A Forgotten Treaty between Rome and Carthage,” The Journal of Roman Studies,Vol.9,1919,p.76.

    (49)A.E.阿斯汀等编:《剑桥古代史》,第八卷,陈恒等译,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2020年,第21页。

    (50)J.博德曼、N.G.L.哈蒙德等编:《剑桥古代史》,第四卷,第492页。

    (51)A.E.阿斯汀等编:《剑桥古代史》,第八卷,第20—22页。

    (52)Polybius,The Histories,III.24,Vol.2,p.57.

    (53)J.博德曼、N.G.L.哈蒙德等编:《剑桥古代史》,第四卷,第486页。

    (54)Herodotus,Histories,IV.196,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.2,trans.A.D.Godley,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1926,p.399.

    (55)Polybius,The Histories,VI.52,Vol.3,p.387.

    (56)Polybius,The Histories,II.1,Vol.2,p.241.

    (57)Plutarch,Lives,”Marcus Cato,” LXX 1,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.2,trans.Bernadotte Perrin,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1914,p.383.

    (58)Appian,The Punic Wars,XIX.127-135,Vol.1,pp.627—637; Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XXXIII.24,Vol.11,p.435.

    (59)Benjamin W.Wells,”Business and Politics at Carthage,” p.518.

    (60)Appian,The Punic Wars,XX 135,Vol.1,p.643.

    (61)Strabo,Geography,XVII.3.15,Vol.8,p.185.

    (62)A.E.阿斯汀等编:《剑桥古代史》,第八卷,第172页。

    (63)Benjamin W.Wells,”Business and Politics at Carthage,” p.506.

    (64)Polybius,The Histories,VI.56,Vol.3,p.393.

    (65)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XXIII.11,Vol.11,p.95.

    (66)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XXVI.1,Vol.11,p.179.

    (67)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XX 10,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.10,trans.Russel M.Geer,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1954,p.169.

    (68)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XXXIV/XXXV.33,Vol.12,pp.131-133.

    (69)Silius Italicus,Punica,I,171-172,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.1,trans.J.D.Duff,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1927,p.17.

    (70)J.Starks,”Fides Aeneia:The Transference of Punic Stereotypes in the Aeneid,” Classical Journal,Vol.94,No.3(Feb.-Mar.1999),pp.250-260.

    (71)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XIV.46,Vol.6,p.141.

    (72)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XIV.76,Vol.6,p.217.

    (73)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XIII.96; XⅢ,108,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.5,trans.C.H.Oldfather,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1956,pp.395—397; 429.

    (74)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XX.3,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.10,trans.Russel M.Geer,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1954,p.150.

    (75)Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XX.14,Vol.10,p.179.

    (76)Plutarch,Moralia,171C-D,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.2,trans.F.C.Babbitt,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1928,p.493; Diodorus of Sicily,Library of History,XX.14,Vol.10,p.179.

    (77)威尔·杜兰:《凯撒与基督》下册,周杰译,幼狮文化公司译,北京:东方出版社,2003年,第601页。麦勒卡特是推罗人的主神,但在迦太基宗教体系中的地位却有了明显的下降,并非主神。

    (78)Simon Hornblower,Antony Spawforth & Esther Eidinow,eds.,The Ox ford Classical Dictionary,p.284.

    (79)泽内达·A.拉戈金:《亚述:从帝国的崛起到尼尼微的陷落》,吴晓真译,北京:商务印书馆,2020年,第137页。

    (80)F.W.沃克班克等编:《剑桥古代史》,第七卷第二分册,胡玉娟等译,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2020年,第567页。

    (81)María Eugenia Aubet,The Phoenicians and the West:Politics,Colonies and Trade,pp.251-252.

    (82)Andrea Salimbeti,Raffaele D’ Amato,The Carthaginians,6th-2nd Century BC,p.10.

    (83)杜丹:《古代世界经济生活》,第181—183页。

    (84)Benjamin W.Wells,”Business and Politics at Carthage,” p.514.

    (85)理查德·迈尔斯:《迦太基必须灭亡:古文明的兴衰》,第132页。

    (86)菲利普C.内勒:《北非史》,韩志斌等译,北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2013年,第25页。

    (87)Simon Hornblower,Antony Spawforth & Esther Eidinow.eds.,The Ox ford Classical Dictionary,p.284.

    (88)B.H.Warmington,Carthage,p.209.

    (89)夏尔·安德烈·朱利安:《北非史》,第一卷上册,上海新闻出版系统“五七干校”翻译组译,上海:上海人民出版社,1974年,第167页。

    (90)理查德·迈尔斯:《迦太基必须灭亡:古文明的兴衰》,第105—107页。

    (91)Strabo,Geography,XVII.3.15,Vol.8,p.185.

    (92)Appian,The Civil Wars,I.24,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.3,trans.Horace White,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1913,p.49.

    (93)Appian,The Punic Wars,XX.136,Vol.1,p.645.

    (94)Strabo,Geography,XVII.3.15,Vol.8,p.185.

    (95)徐晓旭:《“罗马和平”下不同文化的相遇》,《光明日报》2020年9月21日,第14版。

    (96)Strabo,Geography,XVII.3.14,Vol.8,p.185.

    (97)理查德·迈尔斯:《迦太基必须灭亡:古文明的兴衰》,第27页。

    (98)泽内达·A.拉戈金:《亚述:从帝国的崛起到尼尼微的陷落》,第144页。

    (99)F.W.沃克班克等编:《剑桥古代史》第七卷第二分册,第564页。

    (100)夏尔·安德烈·朱利安:《北非史》,第129页。

    (101)B.H.Warmington,Carthage,p.42.

    (102)理查德·迈尔斯:《迦太基必须灭亡:古文明的兴衰》,第370页。

    (103)Mattew Bunson.ed.,A Dictionary of the Roman Empire,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1995,p.98.

    (104)B.H.Warmington,Carthage,p.42.

    (105)Cicero,De Re Publica,I,”Fragments,” 3,Loeb Classical Library,trans.C.W.Keyes,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1928,p.109.

    (106)亚里士多德:《政治学》,吴寿彭译,北京:商务印书馆,1965年,第106页。

    (107)F.W.沃克班克等编:《剑桥古代史》,第七卷第二分册,第537页。

    (108)Benjamin W.Wells,”Business and Politics at Carthage,” p.499.

    (109)Polybius,The Histories,XVIII.35,Loeb Classical Library,Vol.5,trans.W.R.Paton,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1926,p.163.

    本文转自《外国问题研究》2023年第2期

  • Yuval Noah Harari 《Nexus》

    Contents
    PROLOGUE
    PART I: Human Networks
    CHAPTER 1: What Is Information?
    CHAPTER 2: Stories: Unlimited Connections
    CHAPTER 3: Documents: The Bite of the Paper Tigers
    CHAPTER 4: Errors: The Fantasy of Infallibility
    CHAPTER 5: Decisions: A Brief History of Democracy and Totalitarianism
    PART II: The Inorganic Network
    CHAPTER 6: The New Members: How Computers Are Different from Printing Presses
    CHAPTER 7: Relentless: The Network Is Always On
    CHAPTER 8: Fallible: The Network Is Often Wrong
    PART III: Computer Politics
    CHAPTER 9: Democracies: Can We Still Hold a Conversation?
    CHAPTER 10: Totalitarianism: All Power to the Algorithms?
    CHAPTER 11: The Silicon Curtain: Global Empire or Global Split?
    EPILOGUE

    Prologue

    We have named our species Homo sapiens—the wise human. But it is debatable how well we have lived up to the name.
    Over the last 100,000 years, we Sapiens have certainly accumulated enormous power. Just listing all our discoveries, inventions, and conquests would fill volumes. But power isn’t wisdom, and after 100,000 years of discoveries, inventions, and conquests humanity has pushed itself into an existential crisis. We are on the verge of ecological collapse, caused by the misuse of our own power. We are also busy creating new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) that have the potential to escape our control and enslave or annihilate us. Yet instead of our species uniting to deal with these existential challenges, international tensions are rising, global cooperation is becoming more difficult, countries are stockpiling doomsday weapons, and a new world war does not seem impossible.
    If we Sapiens are so wise, why are we so self-destructive?
    At a deeper level, although we have accumulated so much information about everything from DNA molecules to distant galaxies, it doesn’t seem that all this information has given us an answer to the big questions of life: Who are we? What should we aspire to? What is a good life, and how should we live it? Despite the stupendous amounts of information at our disposal, we are as susceptible as our ancient ancestors to fantasy and delusion. Nazism and Stalinism are but two recent examples of the mass insanity that occasionally engulfs even modern societies. Nobody disputes that humans today have a lot more information and power than in the Stone Age, but it is far from certain that we understand ourselves and our role in the universe much better.

    Why are we so good at accumulating more information and power, but far less successful at acquiring wisdom? Throughout history many traditions have believed that some fatal flaw in our nature tempts us to pursue powers we don’t know how to handle. The Greek myth of Phaethon told of a boy who discovers that he is the son of Helios, the sun god. Wishing to prove his divine origin, Phaethon demands the privilege of driving the chariot of the sun. Helios warns Phaethon that no human can control the celestial horses that pull the solar chariot. But Phaethon insists, until the sun god relents. After rising proudly in the sky, Phaethon indeed loses control of the chariot. The sun veers off course, scorching all vegetation, killing numerous beings, and threatening to burn the earth itself. Zeus intervenes and strikes Phaethon with a thunderbolt. The conceited human drops from the sky like a falling star, himself on fire. The gods reassert control of the sky and save the world.

    Two thousand years later, when the Industrial Revolution was making its first steps and machines began replacing humans in numerous tasks, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe published a similar cautionary tale titled “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice.” Goethe’s poem (later popularized as a Walt Disney animation starring Mickey Mouse) tells how an old sorcerer leaves a young apprentice in charge of his workshop and gives him some chores to tend to while he is gone, like fetching water from the river. The apprentice decides to make things easier for himself and, using one of the sorcerer’s spells, enchants a broom to fetch the water for him. But the apprentice doesn’t know how to stop the broom, which relentlessly fetches more and more water, threatening to flood the workshop. In panic, the apprentice cuts the enchanted broom in two with an ax, only to see each half become another broom. Now two enchanted brooms are inundating the workshop with water. When the old sorcerer returns, the apprentice pleads for help: “The spirits that I summoned, I now cannot rid myself of again.” The sorcerer immediately breaks the spell and stops the flood. The lesson to the apprentice—and to humanity—is clear: never summon powers you cannot control.

    What do the cautionary fables of the apprentice and of Phaethon tell us in the twenty-first century? We humans have obviously refused to heed their warnings. We have already driven the earth’s climate out of balance and have summoned billions of enchanted brooms, drones, chatbots, and other algorithmic spirits that may escape our control and unleash a flood of unintended consequences.

    What should we do, then? The fables offer no answers, other than to wait for some god or sorcerer to save us. This, of course, is an extremely dangerous message. It encourages people to abdicate responsibility and put their faith in gods and sorcerers instead. Even worse, it fails to appreciate that gods and sorcerers are themselves a human invention—just like chariots, brooms, and algorithms. The tendency to create powerful things with unintended consequences started not with the invention of the steam engine or AI but with the invention of religion. Prophets and theologians have repeatedly summoned powerful spirits that were supposed to bring love and joy but ended up flooding the world with blood.

    The Phaethon myth and Goethe’s poem fail to provide useful advice because they misconstrue the way humans gain power. In both fables, a single human acquires enormous power, but is then corrupted by hubris and greed. The conclusion is that our flawed individual psychology makes us abuse power. What this crude analysis misses is that human power is never the outcome of individual initiative. Power always stems from cooperation between large numbers of humans.

    Accordingly, it isn’t our individual psychology that causes us to abuse power. After all, alongside greed, hubris, and cruelty, humans are also capable of love, compassion, humility, and joy. True, among the worst members of our species, greed and cruelty reign supreme and lead bad actors to abuse power. But why would human societies choose to entrust power to their worst members? Most Germans in 1933, for example, were not psychopaths. So why did they vote for Hitler?

    Our tendency to summon powers we cannot control stems not from individual psychology but from the unique way our species cooperates in large numbers. The main argument of this book is that humankind gains enormous power by building large networks of cooperation, but the way these networks are built predisposes them to use power unwisely. Our problem, then, is a network problem.

    Even more specifically, it is an information problem. Information is the glue that holds networks together. But for tens of thousands of years, Sapiens built and maintained large networks by inventing and spreading fictions, fantasies, and mass delusions—about gods, about enchanted broomsticks, about AI, and about a great many other things. While each individual human is typically interested in knowing the truth about themselves and the world, large networks bind members and create order by relying on fictions and fantasies. That’s how we got, for example, to Nazism and Stalinism. These were exceptionally powerful networks, held together by exceptionally deluded ideas. As George Orwell famously put it, ignorance is strength.

    The fact that the Nazi and Stalinist regimes were founded on cruel fantasies and shameless lies did not make them historically exceptional, nor did it preordain them to collapse. Nazism and Stalinism were two of the strongest networks humans ever created. In late 1941 and early 1942, the Axis powers came within reach of winning World War II. Stalin eventually emerged as the victor of that war,1 and in the 1950s and 1960s he and his heirs also had a reasonable chance of winning the Cold War. By the 1990s liberal democracies had gained the upper hand, but this now seems like a temporary victory. In the twenty-first century, some new totalitarian regime may well succeed where Hitler and Stalin failed, creating an all-powerful network that could prevent future generations from even attempting to expose its lies and fictions. We should not assume that delusional networks are doomed to failure. If we want to prevent their triumph, we will have to do the hard work ourselves.

    THE NAIVE VIEW OF INFORMATION

    It is difficult to appreciate the strength of delusional networks because of a broader misunderstanding about how big information networks—whether delusional or not—operate. This misunderstanding is encapsulated in something I call “the naive view of information.” While fables like the myth of Phaethon and “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” present an overly pessimistic view of individual human psychology, the naive view of information disseminates an overly optimistic view of large-scale human networks.

    The naive view argues that by gathering and processing much more information than individuals can, big networks achieve a better understanding of medicine, physics, economics, and numerous other fields, which makes the network not only powerful but also wise. For example, by gathering information on pathogens, pharmaceutical companies and health-care services can determine the true causes of many diseases, which enables them to develop more effective medicines and to make wiser decisions about their usage. This view posits that in sufficient quantities information leads to truth, and truth in turn leads to both power and wisdom. Ignorance, in contrast, seems to lead nowhere. While delusional or deceitful networks might occasionally arise in moments of historical crisis, in the long term they are bound to lose to more clear-sighted and honest rivals. A health-care service that ignores information about pathogens, or a pharmaceutical giant that deliberately spreads disinformation, will ultimately lose out to competitors that make wiser use of information. The naive view thus implies that delusional networks must be aberrations and that big networks can usually be trusted to handle power wisely.

    The naive view of information

    Of course, the naive view acknowledges that many things can go wrong on the path from information to truth. We might make honest mistakes in gathering and processing the information. Malicious actors motivated by greed or hate might hide important facts or try to deceive us. As a result, information sometimes leads to error rather than truth. For example, partial information, faulty analysis, or a disinformation campaign might lead even experts to misidentify the true cause of a particular disease.

    However, the naive view assumes that the antidote to most problems we encounter in gathering and processing information is gathering and processing even more information. While we are never completely safe from error, in most cases more information means greater accuracy. A single doctor wishing to identify the cause of an epidemic by examining a single patient is less likely to succeed than thousands of doctors gathering data on millions of patients. And if the doctors themselves conspire to hide the truth, making medical information more freely available to the public and to investigative journalists will eventually reveal the scam. According to this view, the bigger the information network, the closer it must be to the truth.

    Naturally, even if we analyze information accurately and discover important truths, this does not guarantee we will use the resulting capabilities wisely. Wisdom is commonly understood to mean “making right decisions,” but what “right” means depends on value judgments that differ between diverse people, cultures, or ideologies. Scientists who discover a new pathogen may develop a vaccine to protect people. But if the scientists—or their political overlords—believe in a racist ideology that advocates that some races are inferior and should be exterminated, the new medical knowledge might be used to develop a biological weapon that kills millions.

    In this case too, the naive view of information holds that additional information offers at least a partial remedy. The naive view thinks that disagreements about values turn out on closer inspection to be the fault of either the lack of information or deliberate disinformation. According to this view, racists are ill-informed people who just don’t know the facts of biology and history. They think that “race” is a valid biological category, and they have been brainwashed by bogus conspiracy theories. The remedy to racism is therefore to provide people with more biological and historical facts. It may take time, but in a free market of information sooner or later truth will prevail.

    The naive view is of course more nuanced and thoughtful than can be explained in a few paragraphs, but its core tenet is that information is an essentially good thing, and the more we have of it, the better. Given enough information and enough time, we are bound to discover the truth about things ranging from viral infections to racist biases, thereby developing not only our power but also the wisdom necessary to use that power well.

    This naive view justifies the pursuit of ever more powerful information technologies and has been the semiofficial ideology of the computer age and the internet. In June 1989, a few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the Iron Curtain, Ronald Reagan declared that “the Goliath of totalitarian control will rapidly be brought down by the David of the microchip” and that “the biggest of Big Brothers is increasingly helpless against communications technology.… Information is the oxygen of the modern age.… It seeps through the walls topped with barbed wire. It wafts across the electrified, booby-trapped borders. Breezes of electronic beams blow through the Iron Curtain as if it was lace.”2 In November 2009, Barack Obama spoke in the same spirit on a visit to Shanghai, telling his Chinese hosts, “I am a big believer in technology and I’m a big believer in openness when it comes to the flow of information. I think that the more freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes.”3

    Entrepreneurs and corporations have often expressed similarly rosy views of information technology. Already in 1858 an editorial in The New Englander about the invention of the telegraph stated, “It is impossible that old prejudices and hostilities should longer exist, while such an instrument has been created for an exchange of thought between all the nations of the earth.”4 Nearly two centuries and two world wars later, Mark Zuckerberg said that Facebook’s goal “is to help people to share more in order to make the world more open and to help promote understanding between people.”5

    In his 2024 book, The Singularity Is Nearer, the eminent futurologist and entrepreneur Ray Kurzweil surveys the history of information technology and concludes that “the reality is that nearly every aspect of life is getting progressively better as a result of exponentially improving technology.” Looking back at the grand sweep of human history, he cites examples like the invention of the printing press to argue that by its very nature information technology tends to spawn “a virtuous circle advancing nearly every aspect of human well-being, including literacy, education, wealth, sanitation, health, democratization and reduction in violence.”6

    The naive view of information is perhaps most succinctly captured in Google’s mission statement “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.” Google’s answer to Goethe’s warnings is that while a single apprentice pilfering his master’s secret spell book is likely to cause disaster, when a lot of apprentices are given free access to all the world’s information, they will not only create useful enchanted brooms but also learn to handle them wisely.

    GOOGLE VERSUS GOETHE

    It must be stressed that there are numerous cases when having more information has indeed enabled humans to understand the world better and to make wiser use of their power. Consider, for example, the dramatic reduction in child mortality. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was the eldest of seven siblings, but only he and his sister Cornelia got to celebrate their seventh birthday. Disease carried off their brother Hermann Jacob at age six, their sister Catharina Elisabeth at age four, their sister Johanna Maria at age two, their brother Georg Adolf at age eight months, and a fifth, unnamed brother was stillborn. Cornelia then died from disease aged twenty-six, leaving Johann Wolfgang as the sole survivor from their family.7

    Johann Wolfgang von Goethe went on to have five children of his own, of whom all but the eldest son—August—died within two weeks of their birth. In all probability the cause was incompatibility between the blood groups of Goethe and his wife, Christiane, which after the first successful pregnancy led the mother to develop antibodies to the fetal blood. This condition, known as rhesus disease, is nowadays treated so effectively that the mortality rate is less than 2 percent, but in the 1790s it had an average mortality rate of 50 percent, and for Goethe’s four younger children it was a death sentence.8

    Altogether in the Goethe family—a well-to-do German family in the late eighteenth century—the child survival rate was an abysmal 25 percent. Only three out of twelve children reached adulthood. This horrendous statistic was not exceptional. Around the time Goethe wrote “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” in 1797, it is estimated that only about 50 percent of German children reached age fifteen,9 and the same was probably true in most other parts of the world.10 By 2020, 95.6 percent of children worldwide lived beyond their fifteenth birthday,11 and in Germany that figure was 99.5 percent.12 This momentous achievement would not have been possible without collecting, analyzing, and sharing massive amounts of medical data about things like blood groups. In this case, then, the naive view of information proved to be correct.

    However, the naive view of information sees only part of the picture, and the history of the modern age was not just about reducing child mortality. In recent generations humanity has experienced the greatest increase ever in both the amount and the speed of our information production. Every smartphone contains more information than the ancient Library of Alexandria13 and enables its owner to instantaneously connect to billions of other people throughout the world. Yet with all this information circulating at breathtaking speeds, humanity is closer than ever to annihilating itself.

    Despite—or perhaps because of—our hoard of data, we are continuing to spew greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, pollute rivers and oceans, cut down forests, destroy entire habitats, drive countless species to extinction, and jeopardize the ecological foundations of our own species. We are also producing ever more powerful weapons of mass destruction, from thermonuclear bombs to doomsday viruses. Our leaders don’t lack information about these dangers, yet instead of collaborating to find solutions, they are edging closer to a global war.

    Would having even more information make things better—or worse? We will soon find out. Numerous corporations and governments are in a race to develop the most powerful information technology in history—AI. Some leading entrepreneurs, like the American investor Marc Andreessen, believe that AI will finally solve all of humanity’s problems. On June 6, 2023, Andreessen published an essay titled “Why AI Will Save the World,” peppered with bold statements like “I am here to bring the good news: AI will not destroy the world, and in fact may save it” and “AI can make everything we care about better.” He concluded, “The development and proliferation of AI—far from a risk that we should fear—is a moral obligation that we have to ourselves, to our children, and to our future.”14

    Ray Kurzweil concurs, arguing in The Singularity Is Nearer that “AI is the pivotal technology that will allow us to meet the pressing challenges that confront us, including overcoming disease, poverty, environmental degradation, and all of our human frailties. We have a moral imperative to realize this promise of new technologies.” Kurzweil is keenly aware of the technology’s potential perils, and analyzes them at length, but believes they could be mitigated successfully.15

    Others are more skeptical. Not only philosophers and social scientists but also many leading AI experts and entrepreneurs like Yoshua Bengio, Geoffrey Hinton, Sam Altman, Elon Musk, and Mustafa Suleyman have warned the public that AI could destroy our civilization.16 A 2024 article co-authored by Bengio, Hinton, and numerous other experts noted that “unchecked AI advancement could culminate in a large-scale loss of life and the biosphere, and the marginalization or even extinction of humanity.”17 In a 2023 survey of 2,778 AI researchers, more than a third gave at least a 10 percent chance to advanced AI leading to outcomes as bad as human extinction.18 In 2023 close to thirty governments—including those of China, the United States, and the U.K.—signed the Bletchley Declaration on AI, which acknowledged that “there is potential for serious, even catastrophic, harm, either deliberate or unintentional, stemming from the most significant capabilities of these AI models.”19 By using such apocalyptic terms, experts and governments have no wish to conjure a Hollywood image of killer robots running in the streets and shooting people. Such a scenario is unlikely, and it merely distracts people from the real dangers. Rather, experts warn about two other scenarios.

    First, the power of AI could supercharge existing human conflicts, dividing humanity against itself. Just as in the twentieth century the Iron Curtain divided the rival powers in the Cold War, so in the twenty-first century the Silicon Curtain—made of silicon chips and computer codes rather than barbed wire—might come to divide rival powers in a new global conflict. Because the AI arms race will produce ever more destructive weapons, even a small spark might ignite a cataclysmic conflagration.

    Second, the Silicon Curtain might come to divide not one group of humans from another but rather all humans from our new AI overlords. No matter where we live, we might find ourselves cocooned by a web of unfathomable algorithms that manage our lives, reshape our politics and culture, and even reengineer our bodies and minds—while we can no longer comprehend the forces that control us, let alone stop them. If a twenty-first-century totalitarian network succeeds in conquering the world, it may be run by nonhuman intelligence, rather than by a human dictator. People who single out China, Russia, or a post-democratic United States as their main source for totalitarian nightmares misunderstand the danger. In fact, Chinese, Russians, Americans, and all other humans are together threatened by the totalitarian potential of nonhuman intelligence.

    Given the magnitude of the danger, AI should be of interest to all human beings. While not everyone can become an AI expert, we should all keep in mind that AI is the first technology in history that can make decisions and create new ideas by itself. All previous human inventions have empowered humans, because no matter how powerful the new tool was, the decisions about its usage always remained in our hands. Knives and bombs do not themselves decide whom to kill. They are dumb tools, lacking the intelligence necessary to process information and make independent decisions. In contrast, AI has the required intelligence to process information by itself, and therefore replace humans in decision making.

    Its mastery of information also enables AI to independently generate new ideas, in fields ranging from music to medicine. Gramophones played our music, and microscopes revealed the secrets of our cells, but gramophones couldn’t compose new symphonies, and microscopes couldn’t synthesize new drugs. AI is already capable of producing art and making scientific discoveries by itself. In the next few decades, it will likely gain the ability even to create new life-forms, either by writing genetic code or by inventing an inorganic code animating inorganic entities.

    Even at the present moment, in the embryonic stage of the AI revolution, computers already make decisions about us—whether to give us a mortgage, to hire us for a job, to send us to prison. This trend will only increase and accelerate, making it more difficult to understand our own lives. Can we trust computer algorithms to make wise decisions and create a better world? That’s a much bigger gamble than trusting an enchanted broom to fetch water. And it is more than just human lives we are gambling on. AI could alter the course not just of our species’ history but of the evolution of all life-forms.

    WEAPONIZING INFORMATION

    In 2016, I published Homo Deus, a book that highlighted some of the dangers posed to humanity by the new information technologies. That book argued that the real hero of history has always been information, rather than Homo sapiens, and that scientists increasingly understand not just history but also biology, politics, and economics in terms of information flows. Animals, states, and markets are all information networks, absorbing data from the environment, making decisions, and releasing data back. The book warned that while we hope better information technology will give us health, happiness, and power, it may actually take power away from us and destroy both our physical and our mental health. Homo Deus hypothesized that if humans aren’t careful, we might dissolve within the torrent of information like a clump of earth within a gushing river, and that in the grand scheme of things humanity will turn out to have been just a ripple within the cosmic dataflow.

    In the years since Homo Deus was published, the pace of change has only accelerated, and power has indeed been shifting from humans to algorithms. Many of the scenarios that sounded like science fiction in 2016—such as algorithms that can create art, masquerade as human beings, make crucial life decisions about us, and know more about us than we know about ourselves—are everyday realities in 2024.

    Many other things have changed since 2016. The ecological crisis has intensified, international tensions have escalated, and a populist wave has undermined the cohesion of even the most robust democracies. Populism has also mounted a radical challenge to the naive view of information. Populist leaders such as Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, and populist movements and conspiracy theories such as QAnon and the anti-vaxxers, have argued that all traditional institutions that gain authority by claiming to gather information and discover truth are simply lying. Bureaucrats, judges, doctors, mainstream journalists, and academic experts are elite cabals that have no interest in the truth and are deliberately spreading disinformation to gain power and privileges for themselves at the expense of “the people.” The rise of politicians like Trump and movements like QAnon has a specific political context, unique to the conditions of the United States in the late 2010s. But populism as an antiestablishment worldview long predated Trump and is relevant to numerous other historical contexts now and in the future. In a nutshell, populism views information as a weapon.20

    The populist view of information

    In its more extreme versions, populism posits that there is no objective truth at all and that everyone has “their own truth,” which they wield to vanquish rivals. According to this worldview, power is the only reality. All social interactions are power struggles, because humans are interested only in power. The claim to be interested in something else—like truth or justice—is nothing more than a ploy to gain power. Whenever and wherever populism succeeds in disseminating the view of information as a weapon, language itself is undermined. Nouns like “facts” and adjectives like “accurate” and “truthful” become elusive. Such words are not taken as pointing to a common objective reality. Rather, any talk of “facts” or “truth” is bound to prompt at least some people to ask, “Whose facts and whose truth are you referring to?”

    It should be stressed that this power-focused and deeply skeptical view of information isn’t a new phenomenon and it wasn’t invented by anti-vaxxers, flat-earthers, Bolsonaristas, or Trump supporters. Similar views have been propagated long before 2016, including by some of humanity’s brightest minds.21 In the late twentieth century, for example, intellectuals from the radical left like Michel Foucault and Edward Said claimed that scientific institutions like clinics and universities are not pursuing timeless and objective truths but are instead using power to determine what counts as truth, in the service of capitalist and colonialist elites. These radical critiques occasionally went as far as arguing that “scientific facts” are nothing more than a capitalist or colonialist “discourse” and that people in power can never be really interested in truth and can never be trusted to recognize and correct their own mistakes.22

    This particular line of radical leftist thinking goes back to Karl Marx, who argued in the mid-nineteenth century that power is the only reality, that information is a weapon, and that elites who claim to be serving truth and justice are in fact pursuing narrow class privileges. In the words of the 1848 Communist Manifesto, “The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open, fight.” This binary interpretation of history implies that every human interaction is a power struggle between oppressors and oppressed. Accordingly, whenever anyone says anything, the question to ask isn’t, “What is being said? Is it true?” but rather, “Who is saying this? Whose privileges does it serve?”

    Of course, right-wing populists such as Trump and Bolsonaro are unlikely to have read Foucault or Marx, and indeed present themselves as fiercely anti-Marxist. They also greatly differ from Marxists in their suggested policies in fields like taxation and welfare. But their basic view of society and of information is surprisingly Marxist, seeing all human interactions as a power struggle between oppressors and oppressed. For example, in his inaugural address in 2017 Trump announced that “a small group in our nation’s capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost.”23 Such rhetoric is a staple of populism, which the political scientist Cas Mudde has described as an “ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite.’ ”24 Just as Marxists claimed that the media functions as a mouthpiece for the capitalist class, and that scientific institutions like universities spread disinformation in order to perpetuate capitalist control, populists accuse these same institutions of working to advance the interests of the “corrupt elites” at the expense of “the people.”

    Present-day populists also suffer from the same incoherency that plagued radical antiestablishment movements in previous generations. If power is the only reality, and if information is just a weapon, what does it imply about the populists themselves? Are they too interested only in power, and are they too lying to us to gain power?

    Populists have sought to extricate themselves from this conundrum in two different ways. Some populist movements claim adherence to the ideals of modern science and to the traditions of skeptical empiricism. They tell people that indeed you should never trust any institutions or figures of authority—including self-proclaimed populist parties and politicians. Instead, you should “do your own research” and trust only what you can directly observe by yourself.25 This radical empiricist position implies that while large-scale institutions like political parties, courts, newspapers, and universities can never be trusted, individuals who make the effort can still find the truth by themselves.

    This approach may sound scientific and may appeal to free-spirited individuals, but it leaves open the question of how human communities can cooperate to build health-care systems or pass environmental regulations, which demand large-scale institutional organization. Is a single individual capable of doing all the necessary research to decide whether the earth’s climate is heating up and what should be done about it? How would a single person go about collecting climate data from throughout the world, not to mention obtaining reliable records from past centuries? Trusting only “my own research” may sound scientific, but in practice it amounts to believing that there is no objective truth. As we shall see in chapter 4, science is a collaborative institutional effort rather than a personal quest.

    An alternative populist solution is to abandon the modern scientific ideal of finding the truth via “research” and instead go back to relying on divine revelation or mysticism. Traditional religions like Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism have typically characterized humans as untrustworthy power-hungry creatures who can access the truth only thanks to the intervention of a divine intelligence. In the 2010s and early 2020s populist parties from Brazil to Turkey and from the United States to India have aligned themselves with such traditional religions. They have expressed radical doubt about modern institutions while declaring complete faith in ancient scriptures. The populists claim that the articles you read in The New York Times or in Science are just an elitist ploy to gain power, but what you read in the Bible, the Quran, or the Vedas is absolute truth.26

    A variation on this theme calls on people to put their trust in charismatic leaders like Trump and Bolsonaro, who are depicted by their supporters either as the messengers of God27 or as possessing a mystical bond with “the people.” While ordinary politicians lie to the people in order to gain power for themselves, the charismatic leader is the infallible mouthpiece of the people who exposes all the lies.28 One of the recurrent paradoxes of populism is that it starts by warning us that all human elites are driven by a dangerous hunger for power, but often ends by entrusting all power to a single ambitious human.

    We will explore populism at greater depth in chapter 5, but at this point it is important to note that populists are eroding trust in large-scale institutions and international cooperation just when humanity confronts the existential challenges of ecological collapse, global war, and out-of-control technology. Instead of trusting complex human institutions, populists give us the same advice as the Phaethon myth and “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice”: “Trust God or the great sorcerer to intervene and make everything right again.” If we take this advice, we’ll likely find ourselves in the short term under the thumb of the worst kind of power-hungry humans, and in the long term under the thumb of new AI overlords. Or we might find ourselves nowhere at all, as Earth becomes inhospitable for human life.

    If we wish to avoid relinquishing power to a charismatic leader or an inscrutable AI, we must first gain a better understanding of what information is, how it helps to build human networks, and how it relates to truth and power. Populists are right to be suspicious of the naive view of information, but they are wrong to think that power is the only reality and that information is always a weapon. Information isn’t the raw material of truth, but it isn’t a mere weapon, either. There is enough space between these extremes for a more nuanced and hopeful view of human information networks and of our ability to handle power wisely. This book is dedicated to exploring that middle ground.

    THE ROAD AHEAD

    The first part of this book surveys the historical development of human information networks. It doesn’t attempt to present a comprehensive century-by-century account of information technologies like script, printing presses, and radio. Instead, by studying a few examples, it explores key dilemmas that people in all eras faced when trying to construct information networks, and it examines how different answers to these dilemmas shaped contrasting human societies. What we usually think of as ideological and political conflicts often turn out to be clashes between opposing types of information networks.

    Part 1 begins by examining two principles that have been essential for large-scale human information networks: mythology and bureaucracy. Chapters 2 and 3 describe how large-scale information networks—from ancient kingdoms to present-day states—have relied on both mythmakers and bureaucrats. The stories of the Bible, for example, were essential for the Christian Church, but there would have been no Bible if church bureaucrats hadn’t curated, edited, and disseminated these stories. A difficult dilemma for every human network is that mythmakers and bureaucrats tend to pull in different directions. Institutions and societies are often defined by the balance they manage to find between the conflicting needs of their mythmakers and their bureaucrats. The Christian Church itself split into rival churches, like the Catholic and Protestant churches, which struck different balances between mythology and bureaucracy.

    Chapter 4 then focuses on the problem of erroneous information and on the benefits and drawbacks of maintaining self-correcting mechanisms, such as independent courts or peer-reviewed journals. The chapter contrasts institutions that relied on weak self-correcting mechanisms, like the Catholic Church, with institutions that developed strong self-correcting mechanisms, like scientific disciplines. Weak self-correcting mechanisms sometimes result in historical calamities like the early modern European witch hunts, while strong self-correcting mechanisms sometimes destabilize the network from within. Judged in terms of longevity, spread, and power, the Catholic Church has been perhaps the most successful institution in human history, despite—or perhaps because of—the relative weakness of its self-correcting mechanisms.

    After part 1 surveys the roles of mythology and bureaucracy, and the contrast between strong and weak self-correcting mechanisms, chapter 5 concludes the historical discussion by focusing on another contrast—between distributed and centralized information networks. Democratic systems allow information to flow freely along many independent channels, whereas totalitarian systems strive to concentrate information in one hub. Each choice has both advantages and shortcomings. Understanding political systems like the United States and the U.S.S.R. in terms of information flows can explain much about their differing trajectories.

    This historical part of the book is crucial for understanding present-day developments and future scenarios. The rise of AI is arguably the biggest information revolution in history. But we cannot understand it unless we compare it with its predecessors. History isn’t the study of the past; it is the study of change. History teaches us what remains the same, what changes, and how things change. This is as relevant to information revolutions as to every other kind of historical transformation. Thus, understanding the process through which the allegedly infallible Bible was canonized provides valuable insight about present-day claims for AI infallibility. Similarly, studying the early modern witch hunts and Stalin’s collectivization offers stark warnings about what might go wrong as we give AIs greater control over twenty-first-century societies. A deep knowledge of history is also vital to understand what is new about AI, how it is fundamentally different from printing presses and radio sets, and in what specific ways future AI dictatorship could be very unlike anything we have seen before.

    The book doesn’t argue that studying the past enables us to predict the future. As emphasized repeatedly in the following pages, history is not deterministic, and the future will be shaped by the choices we all make in coming years. The whole point of writing this book is that by making informed choices, we can prevent the worst outcomes. If we cannot change the future, why waste time discussing it?

    Building upon the historical survey in part 1, the book’s second part—“The Inorganic Network”—examines the new information network we are creating today, focusing on the political implications of the rise of AI. Chapters 6–8 discuss recent examples from throughout the world—such as the role of social media algorithms in instigating ethnic violence in Myanmar in 2016–17—to explain in what ways AI is different from all previous information technologies. Examples are taken mostly from the 2010s rather than the 2020s, because we have gained a modicum of historical perspective on events of the 2010s.

    Part 2 argues that we are creating an entirely new kind of information network, without pausing to reckon with its implications. It emphasizes the shift from organic to inorganic information networks. The Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, and the U.S.S.R. all relied on carbon-based brains to process information and make decisions. The silicon-based computers that dominate the new information network function in radically different ways. For better or worse, silicon chips are free from many of the limitations that organic biochemistry imposes on carbon neurons. Silicon chips can create spies that never sleep, financiers that never forget, and despots that never die. How will this change society, economics, and politics?

    The third and final part of the book—“Computer Politics”—examines how different kinds of societies might deal with the threats and promises of the inorganic information network. Will carbon-based life-forms like us have a chance of understanding and controlling the new information network? As noted above, history isn’t deterministic, and for at least a few more years we Sapiens still have the power to shape our future.

    Accordingly, chapter 9 explores how democracies might deal with the inorganic network. How, for example, can flesh-and-blood politicians make financial decisions if the financial system is increasingly controlled by AI and the very meaning of money comes to depend on inscrutable algorithms? How can democracies maintain a public conversation about anything—be it finance or gender—if we can no longer know whether we are talking with another human or with a chatbot masquerading as a human?

    Chapter 10 explores the potential impact of the inorganic network on totalitarianism. While dictators would be happy to get rid of all public conversations, they have their own fears of AI. Autocracies are based on terrorizing and censoring their own agents. But how can a human dictator terrorize an AI, censor its unfathomable processes, or prevent it from seizing power to itself?

    Finally, chapter 11 explores how the new information network could influence the balance of power between democratic and totalitarian societies on the global level. Will AI tilt the balance decisively in favor of one camp? Will the world split into hostile blocs whose rivalry makes all of us easy prey for an out-of-control AI? Or can we unite in defense of our common interests?

    But before we explore the past, present, and possible futures of information networks, we need to start with a deceptively simple question. What exactly is information?

    PART I  Human Networks

    CHAPTER 1 What Is Information?

    It is always tricky to define fundamental concepts. Since they are the basis for everything that follows, they themselves seem to lack any basis of their own. Physicists have a hard time defining matter and energy, biologists have a hard time defining life, and philosophers have a hard time defining reality.

    Information is increasingly seen by many philosophers and biologists, and even by some physicists, as the most basic building block of reality, more elementary than matter and energy.1 No wonder that there are many disputes about how to define information, and how it is related to the evolution of life or to basic ideas in physics such as entropy, the laws of thermodynamics, and the quantum uncertainty principle.2 This book will make no attempt to resolve—or even explain—these disputes, nor will it offer a universal definition of information applicable to physics, biology, and all other fields of knowledge. Since it is a work of history, which studies the past and future development of human societies, it will focus on the definition and role of information in history.

    In everyday usage, information is associated with human-made symbols like spoken or written words. Consider, for example, the story of Cher Ami and the Lost Battalion. In October 1918, when the American Expeditionary Forces was fighting to liberate northern France from the Germans, a battalion of more than five hundred American soldiers was trapped behind enemy lines. American artillery, which was trying to provide them with cover fire, misidentified their location and dropped the barrage directly on them. The battalion’s commander, Major Charles Whittlesey, urgently needed to inform headquarters of his true location, but no runner could break through the German line. According to several accounts, as a last resort Whittlesey turned to Cher Ami, an army carrier pigeon. On a tiny piece of paper, Whittlesey wrote, “We are along the road paralell [sic] 276.4. Our artillery is dropping a barrage directly on us. For heaven’s sake stop it.” The paper was inserted into a canister on Cher Ami’s right leg, and the bird was released into the air. One of the battalion’s soldiers, Private John Nell, recalled years later, “We knew without a doubt this was our last chance. If that one lonely, scared pigeon failed to find its loft, our fate was sealed.”

    Witnesses later described how Cher Ami flew into heavy German fire. A shell exploded directly below the bird, killing five men and severely injuring the pigeon. A splinter tore through Cher Ami’s chest, and his right leg was left hanging by a tendon. But he got through. The wounded pigeon flew the forty kilometers to division headquarters in about forty-five minutes, with the canister containing the crucial message attached to the remnant of his right leg. Though there is some controversy about the exact details, it is clear that the American artillery adjusted its barrage, and an American counterattack rescued the Lost Battalion. Cher Ami was tended by army medics, sent to the United States as a hero, and became the subject of numerous articles, short stories, children’s books, poems, and even movies. The pigeon had no idea what information he was conveying, but the symbols inked on the piece of paper he carried helped save hundreds of men from death and captivity.3

    Information, however, does not have to consist of human-made symbols. According to the biblical myth of the Flood, Noah learned that the water had finally receded because the pigeon he sent out from the ark returned with an olive branch in her mouth. Then God set a rainbow in the clouds as a heavenly record of his promise never to flood the earth again. Pigeons, olive branches, and rainbows have since become iconic symbols of peace and tolerance. Objects that are even more remote than rainbows can also be information. For astronomers the shape and movement of galaxies constitute crucial information about the history of the universe. For navigators the North Star indicates which way is north. For astrologers the stars are a cosmic script, conveying information about the future of individual humans and entire societies.

    Of course, defining something as “information” is a matter of perspective. An astronomer or astrologer might view the Libra constellation as “information,” but these distant stars are far more than just a notice board for human observers. There might be an alien civilization up there, totally oblivious to the information we glean from their home and to the stories we tell about it. Similarly, a piece of paper marked with ink splotches can be crucial information for an army unit, or dinner for a family of termites. Any object can be information—or not. This makes it difficult to define what information is.

    The ambivalence of information has played an important role in the annals of military espionage, when spies needed to communicate information surreptitiously. During World War I, northern France was not the only major battleground. From 1915 to 1918 the British and Ottoman Empires fought for control of the Middle East. After repulsing an Ottoman attack on the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal, the British in turn invaded the Ottoman Empire, but were held at bay until October 1917 by a fortified Ottoman line stretching from Beersheba to Gaza. British attempts to break through were repulsed at the First Battle of Gaza (March 26, 1917) and the Second Battle of Gaza (April 17–19, 1917). Meanwhile, pro-British Jews living in Palestine set up a spy network code-named NILI to inform the British about Ottoman troop movements. One method they developed to communicate with their British operators involved window shutters. Sarah Aaronsohn, a NILI commander, had a house overlooking the Mediterranean. She signaled British ships by closing or opening a particular shutter, according to a predetermined code. Numerous people, including Ottoman soldiers, could obviously see the shutter, but nobody other than NILI agents and their British operators understood it was vital military information.4 So, when is a shutter just a shutter, and when is it information?

    The Ottomans eventually caught the NILI spy ring due in part to a strange mishap. In addition to shutters, NILI used carrier pigeons to convey coded messages. On September 3, 1917, one of the pigeons diverted off course and landed in—of all places—the house of an Ottoman officer. The officer found the coded message but couldn’t decipher it. Nevertheless, the pigeon itself was crucial information. Its existence indicated to the Ottomans that a spy ring was operating under their noses. As Marshall McLuhan might have put it, the pigeon was the message. NILI agents learned about the capture of the pigeon and immediately killed and buried all the remaining birds they had, because the mere possession of carrier pigeons was now incriminating information. But the massacre of the pigeons did not save NILI. Within a month the spy network was uncovered, several of its members were executed, and Sarah Aaronsohn committed suicide to avoid divulging NILI’s secrets under torture.5 When is a pigeon just a pigeon, and when is it information?

    Clearly, then, information cannot be defined as specific types of material objects. Any object—a star, a shutter, a pigeon—can be information in the right context. So exactly what context defines such objects as “information”? The naive view of information argues that objects are defined as information in the context of truth seeking. Something is information if people use it to try to discover the truth. This view links the concept of information with the concept of truth and assumes that the main role of information is to represent reality. There is a reality “out there,” and information is something that represents that reality and that we can therefore use to learn about reality. For example, the information NILI provided the British was meant to represent the reality of Ottoman troop movements. If the Ottomans massed ten thousand soldiers in Gaza—the centerpiece of their defenses—a piece of paper with symbols representing “ten thousand” and “Gaza” was important information that could help the British win the battle. If, on the other hand, there were actually twenty thousand Ottoman troops in Gaza, that piece of paper did not represent reality accurately, and could lead the British to make a disastrous military mistake.

    Put another way, the naive view argues that information is an attempt to represent reality, and when this attempt succeeds, we call it truth. While this book takes many issues with the naive view, it agrees that truth is an accurate representation of reality. But this book also holds that most information is not an attempt to represent reality and that what defines information is something entirely different. Most information in human society, and indeed in other biological and physical systems, does not represent anything.

    I want to spend a little longer on this complex and crucial argument, because it constitutes the theoretical basis of the book.

    WHAT IS TRUTH?

    Throughout this book, “truth” is understood as something that accurately represents certain aspects of reality. Underlying the notion of truth is the premise that there exists one universal reality. Anything that has ever existed or will ever exist in the universe—from the North Star, to the NILI pigeon, to web pages on astrology—is part of this single reality. This is why the search for truth is a universal project. While different people, nations, or cultures may have competing beliefs and feelings, they cannot possess contradictory truths, because they all share a universal reality. Anyone who rejects universalism rejects truth.

    Truth and reality are nevertheless different things, because no matter how truthful an account is, it can never represent reality in all its aspects. If a NILI agent wrote that there are ten thousand Ottoman soldiers in Gaza, and there were indeed ten thousand soldiers there, this accurately pointed to a certain aspect of reality, but it neglected many other aspects. The very act of counting entities—whether apples, oranges, or soldiers—necessarily focuses attention on the similarities between these entities while discounting differences.6 For example, saying only that there were ten thousand Ottoman soldiers in Gaza neglected to specify whether some were experienced veterans and others were green recruits. If there were a thousand recruits and nine thousand old hands, the military reality was quite different from if there were nine thousand rookies and a thousand battle-hardened veterans.

    There were many other differences between the soldiers. Some were healthy; others were sick. Some Ottoman troops were ethnically Turkish, while others were Arabs, Kurds, or Jews. Some were brave, others cowardly. Indeed, each soldier was a unique human being, with different parents and friends and individual fears and hopes. World War I poets like Wilfred Owen famously attempted to represent these latter aspects of military reality, which mere statistics never conveyed accurately. Does this imply that writing “ten thousand soldiers” is always a misrepresentation of reality, and that to describe the military situation around Gaza in 1917, we must specify the unique history and personality of every soldier?

    Another problem with any attempt to represent reality is that reality contains many viewpoints. For example, present-day Israelis, Palestinians, Turks, and Britons have different perspectives on the British invasion of the Ottoman Empire, the NILI underground, and the activities of Sarah Aaronsohn. That does not mean, of course, that there are several entirely separate realities, or that there are no historical facts. There is just one reality, but it is complex.

    Reality includes an objective level with objective facts that don’t depend on people’s beliefs; for example, it is an objective fact that Sarah Aaronsohn died on October 9, 1917, from self-inflicted gunshot wounds. Saying that “Sarah Aaronsohn died in an airplane crash on May 15, 1919,” is an error.

    Reality also includes a subjective level with subjective facts like the beliefs and feelings of various people, but in this case too facts can be separated from errors. For example, it is a fact that Israelis tend to regard Aaronsohn as a patriotic hero. Three weeks after her suicide, the information NILI supplied helped the British finally break the Ottoman line at the Battle of Beersheba (October 31, 1917) and the Third Battle of Gaza (November 1–2, 1917). On November 2, 1917, the British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, issued the Balfour Declaration, announcing that the British government “view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Israelis credit this in part to NILI and Sarah Aaronsohn, whom they admire for her sacrifice. It is another fact that Palestinians evaluate things very differently. Rather than admiring Aaronsohn, they regard her—if they’ve heard about her at all—as an imperialist agent. Even though we are dealing here with subjective views and feelings, we can still distinguish truth from falsehood. For views and feelings—just like stars and pigeons—are a part of the universal reality. Saying that “Sarah Aaronsohn is admired by everyone for her role in defeating the Ottoman Empire” is an error, not in line with reality.

    Nationality is not the only thing that affects people’s viewpoint. Israeli men and Israeli women may see Aaronsohn differently, and so do left-wingers and right-wingers, or Orthodox and secular Jews. Since suicide is forbidden by Jewish religious law, Orthodox Jews have difficulty seeing Aaronsohn’s suicide as a heroic act (she was actually denied burial in the hallowed ground of a Jewish cemetery). Ultimately, each individual has a different perspective on the world, shaped by the intersection of different personalities and life histories. Does this imply that when we wish to describe reality, we must always list all the different viewpoints it contains and that a truthful biography of Sarah Aaronsohn, for example, must specify how every single Israeli and Palestinian has felt about her?

    Taken to extremes, such a pursuit of accuracy may lead us to try to represent the world on a one-to-one scale, as in the famous Jorge Luis Borges story “On Exactitude in Science” (1946). In this story Borges tells of a fictitious ancient empire that became obsessed with producing ever more accurate maps of its territory, until eventually it produced a map with a one-to-one scale. The entire empire was covered with a map of the empire. So many resources were wasted on this ambitious representational project that the empire collapsed. Then the map too began to disintegrate, and Borges tells us that only “in the western Deserts, tattered fragments of the map are still to be found, sheltering an occasional beast or beggar.”7 A one-to-one map may look like the ultimate representation of reality, but tellingly it is no longer a representation at all; it is the reality.

    The point is that even the most truthful accounts of reality can never represent it in full. There are always some aspects of reality that are neglected or distorted in every representation. Truth, then, isn’t a one-to-one representation of reality. Rather, truth is something that brings our attention to certain aspects of reality while inevitably ignoring other aspects. No account of reality is 100 percent accurate, but some accounts are nevertheless more truthful than others.

    WHAT INFORMATION DOES

    As noted above, the naive view sees information as an attempt to represent reality. It is aware that some information doesn’t represent reality well, but it dismisses this as unfortunate cases of “misinformation” or “disinformation.” Misinformation is an honest mistake, occurring when someone tries to represent reality but gets it wrong. Disinformation is a deliberate lie, occurring when someone consciously intends to distort our view of reality.

    The naive view further believes that the solution to the problems caused by misinformation and disinformation is more information. This idea, sometimes called the counterspeech doctrine, is associated with the U.S. Supreme Court justice Louis D. Brandeis, who wrote in Whitney v. California (1927) that the remedy to false speech is more speech and that in the long term free discussion is bound to expose falsehoods and fallacies. If all information is an attempt to represent reality, then as the amount of information in the world grows, we can expect the flood of information to expose the occasional lies and errors and to ultimately provide us with a more truthful understanding of the world.

    On this crucial point, this book strongly disagrees with the naive view. There certainly are instances of information that attempt to represent reality and succeed in doing so, but this is not the defining characteristic of information. A few pages ago I referred to stars as information and casually mentioned astrologers alongside astronomers. Adherents of the naive view of information probably squirmed in their chairs when they read it. According to the naive view, astronomers derive “real information” from the stars, while the information that astrologers imagine to read in constellations is either “misinformation” or “disinformation.” If only people were given more information about the universe, surely they would abandon astrology altogether. But the fact is that for thousands of years astrology has had a huge impact on history, and today millions of people still check their star signs before making the most important decisions of their lives, like what to study and whom to marry. As of 2021, the global astrology market was valued at $12.8 billion.8

    No matter what we think about the accuracy of astrological information, we should acknowledge its important role in history. It has connected lovers, and even entire empires. Roman emperors routinely consulted astrologers before making decisions. Indeed, astrology was held in such high esteem that casting the horoscope of a reigning emperor was a capital offense. Presumably, anyone casting such a horoscope could foretell when and how the emperor would die.9 Rulers in some countries still take astrology very seriously. In 2005 the junta of Myanmar allegedly moved the country’s capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw based on astrological advice.10 A theory of information that cannot account for the historical significance of astrology is clearly inadequate.

    What the example of astrology illustrates is that errors, lies, fantasies, and fictions are information, too. Contrary to what the naive view of information says, information has no essential link to truth, and its role in history isn’t to represent a preexisting reality. Rather, what information does is to create new realities by tying together disparate things—whether couples or empires. Its defining feature is connection rather than representation, and information is whatever connects different points into a network. Information doesn’t necessarily inform us about things. Rather, it puts things in formation. Horoscopes put lovers in astrological formations, propaganda broadcasts put voters in political formations, and marching songs put soldiers in military formations.

    As a paradigmatic case, consider music. Most symphonies, melodies, and tunes don’t represent anything, which is why it makes no sense to ask whether they are true or false. Over the years people have created a lot of bad music, but not fake music. Without representing anything, music nevertheless does a remarkable job in connecting large numbers of people and synchronizing their emotions and movements. Music can make soldiers march in formation, clubbers sway together, church congregations clap in rhythm, and sports fans chant in unison.11

    The role of information in connecting things is of course not unique to human history. A case can be made that this is the chief role of information in biology too.12 Consider DNA, the molecular information that makes organic life possible. Like music, DNA doesn’t represent reality. Though generations of zebras have been fleeing lions, you cannot find in the zebra DNA a string of nucleobases representing “lion” nor another string representing “flight.” Similarly, zebra DNA contains no representation of the sun, wind, rain, or any other external phenomena that zebras encounter during their lives. Nor does DNA represent internal phenomena like body organs or emotions. There is no combination of nucleobases that represents a heart, or fear.

    Instead of trying to represent preexisting things, DNA helps to produce entirely new things. For instance, various strings of DNA nucleobases initiate cellular chemical processes that result in the production of adrenaline. Adrenaline too doesn’t represent reality in any way. Rather, adrenaline circulates through the body, initiating additional chemical processes that increase the heart rate and direct more blood to the muscles.13 DNA and adrenaline thereby help to connect cells in the heart, cells in the leg muscles, and trillions of other cells throughout the body to form a functioning network that can do remarkable things, like run away from a lion.

    If DNA represented reality, we could have asked questions like “Does zebra DNA represent reality more accurately than lion DNA?” or “Is the DNA of one zebra telling the truth about the world, while another zebra is misled by her fake DNA?” These, of course, are nonsensical questions. We might evaluate DNA by the fitness of the organism it produces, but not by truthfulness. While it is common to talk about DNA “errors,” this refers only to mutations in the process of copying DNA—not to a failure to represent reality accurately. A genetic mutation that inhibits the production of adrenaline reduces the fitness of a particular zebra, ultimately causing the network of cells to disintegrate, as when the zebra is killed by a lion and its trillions of cells lose connection with one another and decompose. But this kind of network failure means disintegration, not disinformation. That’s true of countries, political parties, and news networks as much as of zebras.

    Crucially, errors in the copying of DNA don’t always reduce fitness. Once in a blue moon, they increase fitness. Without such mutations, there would be no process of evolution. All life-forms exist thanks to genetic “errors.” The wonders of evolution are possible because DNA doesn’t represent any preexisting realities; it creates new realities.

    Let us pause to digest the implications of this. Information is something that creates new realities by connecting different points into a network. This still includes the view of information as representation. Sometimes, a truthful representation of reality can connect humans, as when 600 million people sat glued to their television sets in July 1969, watching Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin walking on the moon.14 The images on the screens accurately represented what was happening 384,000 kilometers away, and seeing them gave rise to feelings of awe, pride, and human brotherliness that helped connect people.

    However, such fraternal feelings can be produced in other ways, too. The emphasis on connection leaves ample room for other types of information that do not represent reality well. Sometimes erroneous representations of reality might also serve as a social nexus, as when millions of followers of a conspiracy theory watch a YouTube video claiming that the moon landing never happened. These images convey an erroneous representation of reality, but they might nevertheless give rise to feelings of anger against the establishment or pride in one’s own wisdom that help create a cohesive new group.

    Sometimes networks can be connected without any attempt to represent reality, neither accurate nor erroneous, as when genetic information connects trillions of cells or when a stirring musical piece connects thousands of humans.

    As a final example, consider Mark Zuckerberg’s vision of the Metaverse. The Metaverse is a virtual universe made entirely of information. Unlike the one-to-one map built by Jorge Luis Borges’s imaginary empire, the Metaverse isn’t an attempt to represent our world, but rather an attempt to augment or even replace our world. It doesn’t offer us a digital replica of Buenos Aires or Salt Lake City; it invites people to build new virtual communities with novel landscapes and rules. As of 2024 the Metaverse seems like an overblown pipe dream, but within a couple of decades billions of people might migrate to live much of their lives in an augmented virtual reality, holding there most of their social and professional activities. People might come to build relationships, join movements, hold jobs, and experience emotional ups and downs in environments made of bits rather than atoms. Perhaps only in some remote deserts, tattered fragments of the old reality could still be found, sheltering an occasional beast or beggar.

    INFORMATION IN HUMAN HISTORY

    Viewing information as a social nexus helps us understand many aspects of human history that confound the naive view of information as representation. It explains the historical success not only of astrology but of much more important things, like the Bible. While some may dismiss astrology as a quaint sideshow in human history, nobody can deny the central role the Bible has played. If the main job of information had been to represent reality accurately, it would have been hard to explain why the Bible became one of the most influential texts in history.

    The Bible makes many serious errors in its description of both human affairs and natural processes. The book of Genesis claims that all human groups—including, for example, the San people of the Kalahari Desert and the Aborigines of Australia—descend from a single family that lived in the Middle East about four thousand years ago.15 According to Genesis, after the Flood all Noah’s descendants lived together in Mesopotamia, but following the destruction of the Tower of Babel they spread to the four corners of the earth and became the ancestors of all living humans. In fact, the ancestors of the San people lived in Africa for hundreds of thousands of years without ever leaving the continent, and the ancestors of the Aborigines settled Australia more than fifty thousand years ago.16 Both genetic and archaeological evidence rule out the idea that the entire ancient populations of South Africa and Australia were annihilated about four thousand years ago by a flood and that these areas were subsequently repopulated by Middle Eastern immigrants.

    An even graver distortion involves our understanding of infectious diseases. The Bible routinely depicts epidemics as divine punishment for human sins17 and claims they can be stopped or prevented by prayers and religious rituals.18 However, epidemics are of course caused by pathogens and can be stopped or prevented by following hygiene rules and using medicines and vaccines. This is today widely accepted even by religious leaders like the pope, who during the COVID-19 pandemic advised people to self-isolate, instead of congregating to pray together.19

    Yet while the Bible has done a poor job in representing the reality of human origins, migrations, and epidemics, it has nevertheless been very effective in connecting billions of people and creating the Jewish and Christian religions. Like DNA initiating chemical processes that bind billions of cells into organic networks, the Bible initiated social processes that bonded billions of people into religious networks. And just as a network of cells can do things that single cells cannot, so a religious network can do things that individual humans cannot, like building temples, maintaining legal systems, celebrating holidays, and waging holy wars.

    To conclude, information sometimes represents reality, and sometimes doesn’t. But it always connects. This is its fundamental characteristic. Therefore, when examining the role of information in history, although it sometimes makes sense to ask “How well does it represent reality? Is it true or false?” often the more crucial questions are “How well does it connect people? What new network does it create?”

    It should be emphasized that rejecting the naive view of information as representation does not force us to reject the notion of truth, nor does it force us to embrace the populist view of information as a weapon. While information always connects, some types of information—from scientific books to political speeches—may strive to connect people by accurately representing certain aspects of reality. But this requires a special effort, which most information does not make. This is why the naive view is wrong to believe that creating more powerful information technology will necessarily result in a more truthful understanding of the world. If no additional steps are taken to tilt the balance in favor of truth, an increase in the amount and speed of information is likely to swamp the relatively rare and expensive truthful accounts by much more common and cheap types of information.

    When we look at the history of information from the Stone Age to the Silicon Age, we therefore see a constant rise in connectivity, without a concomitant rise in truthfulness or wisdom. Contrary to what the naive view believes, Homo sapiens didn’t conquer the world because we are talented at turning information into an accurate map of reality. Rather, the secret of our success is that we are talented at using information to connect lots of individuals. Unfortunately, this ability often goes hand in hand with believing in lies, errors, and fantasies. This is why even technologically advanced societies like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union have been prone to hold delusional ideas, without their delusions necessarily weakening them. Indeed, the mass delusions of Nazi and Stalinist ideologies about things like race and class actually helped them make tens of millions of people march together in lockstep.

    In chapters 2–5 we’ll take a closer look at the history of information networks. We’ll discuss how, over tens of thousands of years, humans invented various information technologies that greatly improved connectivity and cooperation without necessarily resulting in a more truthful representation of the world. These information technologies—invented centuries and millennia ago—still shape our world even in the era of the internet and AI. The first information technology we’ll examine, which is also the first information technology developed by humans, is the story.

    CHAPTER 2 Stories: Unlimited Connections

    We Sapiens rule the world not because we are so wise but because we are the only animals that can cooperate flexibly in large numbers. I have explored this idea in my previous books Sapiens and Homo Deus, but a brief recap is inescapable.

    The Sapiens’ ability to cooperate flexibly in large numbers has precursors among other animals. Some social mammals like chimpanzees display significant flexibility in the way they cooperate, while some social insects like ants cooperate in very large numbers. But neither chimps nor ants establish empires, religions, or trade networks. Sapiens are capable of doing such things because we are far more flexible than chimps and can simultaneously cooperate in even larger numbers than ants. In fact, there is no upper limit to the number of Sapiens who can cooperate with one another. The Catholic Church has about 1.4 billion members. China has a population of about 1.4 billion. The global trade network connects about 8 billion Sapiens.

    This is surprising given that humans cannot form long-term intimate bonds with more than a few hundred individuals.1 It takes many years and common experiences to get to know someone’s unique character and history and to cultivate ties of mutual trust and affection. Consequently, if Sapiens networks were connected only by personal human-to-human bonds, our networks would have remained very small. This is the situation among our chimpanzee cousins, for example. Their typical community numbers 20–60 members, and on rare occasions the number might increase to 150–200.2 This appears to have been the situation also among ancient human species like Neanderthals and archaic Homo sapiens. Each of their bands numbered a few dozen individuals, and different bands rarely cooperated.3

    About seventy thousand years ago, Homo sapiens bands began displaying an unprecedented capacity to cooperate with one another, as evidenced by the emergence of inter-band trade and artistic traditions and by the rapid spread of our species from our African homeland to the entire globe. What enabled different bands to cooperate is that evolutionary changes in brain structure and linguistic abilities apparently gave Sapiens the aptitude to tell and believe fictional stories and to be deeply moved by them. Instead of building a network from human-to-human chains alone—as the Neanderthals, for example, did—stories provided Homo sapiens with a new type of chain: human-to-story chains. In order to cooperate, Sapiens no longer had to know each other personally; they just had to know the same story. And the same story can be familiar to billions of individuals. A story can thereby serve like a central connector, with an unlimited number of outlets into which an unlimited number of people can plug. For example, the 1.4 billion members of the Catholic Church are connected by the Bible and other key Christian stories; the 1.4 billion citizens of China are connected by the stories of communist ideology and Chinese nationalism; and the 8 billion members of the global trade network are connected by stories about currencies, corporations, and brands.

    Even charismatic leaders who have millions of followers are an example of this rule rather than an exception. It may seem that in the case of ancient Chinese emperors, medieval Catholic popes, or modern corporate titans it has been a single flesh-and-blood human—rather than a story—that has served as a nexus linking millions of followers. But, of course, in all these cases almost none of the followers has had a personal bond with the leader. Instead, what they have connected to has been a carefully crafted story about the leader, and it is in this story that they have put their faith.

    Joseph Stalin, who stood at the nexus of one of the biggest personality cults in history, understood this well. When his troublesome son Vasily exploited his famous name to frighten and awe people, Stalin berated him. “But I’m a Stalin too,” protested Vasily. “No, you’re not,” replied Stalin. “You’re not Stalin and I’m not Stalin. Stalin is Soviet power. Stalin is what he is in the newspapers and the portraits, not you, no—not even me!”4

    Present-day influencers and celebrities would concur. Some have hundreds of millions of online followers, with whom they communicate daily through social media. But there is very little authentic personal connection there. The social media accounts are usually run by a team of experts, and every image and word is professionally crafted and curated to manufacture what is nowadays called a brand.5

    A “brand” is a specific type of story. To brand a product means to tell a story about that product, which may have little to do with the product’s actual qualities but which consumers nevertheless learn to associate with the product. For example, over the decades the Coca-Cola corporation has invested tens of billions of dollars in advertisements that tell and retell the story of the Coca-Cola drink.6 People have seen and heard the story so often that many have come to associate a certain concoction of flavored water with fun, happiness, and youth (as opposed to tooth decay, obesity, and plastic waste). That’s branding.7

    As Stalin knew, it is possible to brand not only products but also individuals. A corrupt billionaire can be branded as the champion of the poor; a bungling imbecile can be branded as an infallible genius; and a guru who sexually abuses his followers can be branded as a chaste saint. People think they connect to the person, but in fact they connect to the story told about the person, and there is often a huge gulf between the two.

    Even the story of Cher Ami, the heroic pigeon, was partly the product of a branding campaign aimed at enhancing the public image of the U.S. Army’s Pigeon Service. A 2021 revisionist study by the historian Frank Blazich found that though there is no doubt Cher Ami sustained severe injuries while transporting a message somewhere in Northern France, several key features of the story are doubtful or inaccurate. First, relying on contemporary military records, Blazich demonstrated that headquarters learned about the exact location of the Lost Battalion about twenty minutes prior to the pigeon’s arrival. It was not the pigeon that put a stop to the barrage of friendly fire decimating the Lost Battalion. Even more crucially, there is simply no proof that the pigeon carrying Major Whittlesey’s message was Cher Ami. It might well have been another bird, while Cher Ami might have sustained his wounds a couple of weeks later, during an altogether different battle.

    According to Blazich, the doubts and inconsistencies in Cher Ami’s story were overshadowed by its propaganda value to the army and its appeal to the public. Over the years the story was retold so many times that facts became hopelessly enmeshed with fiction. Journalists, poets, and filmmakers added fanciful details to it, for example that the pigeon lost an eye as well as a leg and that it was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. In the 1920s and 1930s Cher Ami became the most famous bird in the world. When he died, his carefully preserved corpse was placed on display at the Smithsonian Museum, where it became a pilgrimage site for American patriots and World War I veterans. As the story grew in the telling, it took over even the recollections of survivors of the Lost Battalion, who came to accept the popular narrative at face value. Blazich recounts the case of Sherman Eager, an officer in the Lost Battalion, who decades after the war brought his children to see Cher Ami at the Smithsonian and told them, “You all owe your lives to that pigeon.” Whatever the facts may be, the story of the self-sacrificing winged saviour proved irresistible.8

    As a much more extreme example, consider Jesus. Two millennia of storytelling have encased Jesus within such a thick cocoon of stories that it is impossible to recover the historical person. Indeed, for millions of devout Christians merely raising the possibility that the real person was different from the story is blasphemy. As far as we can tell, the real Jesus was a typical Jewish preacher who built a small following by giving sermons and healing the sick. After his death, however, Jesus became the subject of one of the most remarkable branding campaigns in history. This little-known provincial guru, who during his short career gathered just a handful of disciples and who was executed as a common criminal, was rebranded after death as the incarnation of the cosmic god who created the universe.9 Though no contemporary portrait of Jesus has survived, and though the Bible never describes what he looked like, imaginary renderings of him have become some of the most recognizable icons in the world.

    It should be stressed that the creation of the Jesus story was not a deliberate lie. People like Saint Paul, Tertullian, Saint Augustine, and Martin Luther didn’t set out to deceive anyone. They projected their deeply felt hopes and feelings on the figure of Jesus, in the same way that all of us routinely project our feelings on our parents, lovers, and leaders. While branding campaigns are occasionally a cynical exercise of disinformation, most of the really big stories of history have been the result of emotional projections and wishful thinking. True believers play a key role in the rise of every major religion and ideology, and the Jesus story changed history because it gained an immense number of true believers.

    By gaining all those believers, the story of Jesus managed to have a much bigger impact on history than the person of Jesus. The person of Jesus walked from village to village on his two feet, talking with people, eating and drinking with them, placing his hands on their sick bodies. He made a difference to the lives of perhaps several thousand individuals, all living in one minor Roman province. In contrast, the story of Jesus flew around the whole world, first on the wings of gossip, anecdote, and rumor; then via parchment texts, paintings, and statues; and eventually as blockbuster movies and internet memes. Billions of people not only heard the Jesus story but came to believe in it too, which created one of the biggest and most influential networks in the world.

    Stories like the one about Jesus can be seen as a way of stretching preexisting biological bonds. Family is the strongest bond known to humans. One way that stories build trust between strangers is by making these strangers reimagine each other as family. The Jesus story presented Jesus as the heavenly father of all humans, encouraged hundreds of millions of Christians to see each other as brothers and sisters, and created a shared pool of family memories. While most Christians were not physically present at the Last Supper, they have heard the story so many times, and they have seen so many images of the event, that they “remember” it more vividly than they remember most of the family dinners in which they actually participated.

    Interestingly, Jesus’s last supper was the Jewish Passover meal, which according to the Gospel accounts Jesus shared with his disciples just before his crucifixion. In Jewish tradition, the whole purpose of the Passover meal is to create and reenact artificial memories. Every year Jewish families sit together on the eve of Passover to eat and reminisce about “their” exodus from Egypt. They are supposed not only to tell the story of how the descendants of Jacob escaped slavery in Egypt but to remember how they personally suffered at the hands of the Egyptians, how they personally saw the sea part, and how they personally received the Ten Commandments from Jehovah at Mount Sinai.

    The Jewish tradition doesn’t mince words here. The text of the Passover ritual (the Haggadah) insists that “in every generation a person is obligated to regard himself as if he personally had come out of Egypt.” If anyone objects that this is a fiction, and that they didn’t personally come out of Egypt, Jewish sages have a ready answer. They claim that the souls of all Jews throughout history were created by Jehovah long before they were born and all these souls were present at Mount Sinai.10 As Salvador Litvak, a Jewish social media influencer, explained to his online followers in 2018, “You and I were there together.… When we fulfill the obligation to see ourselves as if we personally left Egypt, it’s not a metaphor. We don’t imagine the Exodus, we remember it.”11

    So every year, in the most important celebration of the Jewish calendar, millions of Jews put on a show that they remember things that they didn’t witness and that in all probability never happened at all. As numerous modern studies show, repeatedly retelling a fake memory eventually causes the person to adopt it as a genuine recollection.12 When two Jews encounter each other for the first time, they can immediately feel that they both belong to the same family, that they were together slaves in Egypt, and that they were together at Mount Sinai. That’s a powerful bond that sustained the Jewish network over many centuries and continents.

    INTERSUBJECTIVE ENTITIES

    The Jewish Passover story builds a large network by taking existing biological kin bonds and stretching them way beyond their biological limits. But there is an even more revolutionary way for stories to build networks. Like DNA, stories can create entirely new entities. Indeed, stories can even create an entirely new level of reality. As far as we know, prior to the emergence of stories the universe contained just two levels of reality. Stories added a third.

    The two levels of reality that preceded storytelling are objective reality and subjective reality. Objective reality consists of things like stones, mountains, and asteroids—things that exist whether we are aware of them or not. An asteroid hurtling toward planet Earth, for example, exists even if nobody knows it’s out there. Then there is subjective reality: things like pain, pleasure, and love that aren’t “out there” but rather “in here.” Subjective things exist in our awareness of them. An unfelt ache is an oxymoron.

    But some stories are able to create a third level of reality: intersubjective reality. Whereas subjective things like pain exist in a single mind, intersubjective things like laws, gods, nations, corporations, and currencies exist in the nexus between large numbers of minds. More specifically, they exist in the stories people tell one another. The information humans exchange about intersubjective things doesn’t represent anything that had already existed prior to the exchange of information; rather, the exchange of information creates these things.

    When I tell you that I am in pain, telling you about it doesn’t create the pain. And if I stop talking about the pain, it doesn’t make the pain go away. Similarly, when I tell you that I saw an asteroid, this doesn’t create the asteroid. The asteroid exists whether people talk about it or not. But when lots of people tell one another stories about laws, gods, or currencies, this is what creates these laws, gods, or currencies. If people stop talking about them, they disappear. Intersubjective things exist in the exchange of information.

    Let’s take a closer look. The calorific value of pizza doesn’t depend on our beliefs. A typical pizza contains between fifteen hundred and twenty-five hundred calories.13 In contrast, the financial value of money—and pizzas—depends entirely on our beliefs. How many pizzas can you purchase for a dollar, or for a bitcoin? In 2010, Laszlo Hanyecz bought two pizzas for 10,000 bitcoins. It was the first known commercial transaction involving bitcoin—and with hindsight, also the most expensive pizza ever. By November 2021, a single bitcoin was valued at more than $69,000, so the bitcoins Hanyecz paid for his two pizzas were worth $690 million, enough to purchase millions of pizzas.14 While the calorific value of pizza is an objective reality that remained the same between 2010 and 2021, the financial value of bitcoin is an intersubjective reality that changed dramatically during the same period, depending on the stories people told and believed about bitcoin.

    Another example. Suppose I ask, “Does the Loch Ness Monster exist?” This is a question about the objective level of reality. Some people believe that dinosaur-like animals really do inhabit Loch Ness. Others dismiss the idea as a fantasy or a hoax. Over the years, many attempts have been made to resolve the disagreement once and for all, using scientific methods such as sonar scans and DNA surveys. If huge animals live in the lake, they should appear on sonar, and they should leave DNA traces. Based on the available evidence, the scientific consensus is that the Loch Ness Monster does not exist. (A DNA survey conducted in 2019 found genetic material from three thousand species, but no monster. At most, Loch Ness may contain some five-kilo eels.15) Many people may nevertheless continue to believe that the Loch Ness Monster exists, but believing it doesn’t change objective reality.

    In contrast to animals, whose existence can be verified or disproved through objective tests, states are intersubjective entities. We normally don’t notice it, because everybody takes the existence of the United States, China, Russia, or Brazil for granted. But there are cases when people disagree about the existence of certain states, and then their intersubjective status emerges. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, revolves around this matter, because some people and governments refuse to acknowledge the existence of Israel and others refuse to acknowledge the existence of Palestine. As of 2024, the governments of Brazil and China, for example, say that both Israel and Palestine exist; the governments of the United States and Cameroon recognize only Israel’s existence; whereas the governments of Algeria and Iran recognize only Palestine. Other cases range from Kosovo, which as of 2024 is recognized as a state by around half of the 193 UN members,16 to Abkhazia, which almost all governments see as a sovereign territory of Georgia, but which is recognized as a state by Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, and Syria.17

    Indeed, almost all states pass at least temporarily through a phase during which their existence is contested, when struggling for independence. Did the United States come into existence on July 4, 1776, or only when other states like France and finally the U.K. recognized it? Between the declaration of U.S. independence on July 4, 1776, and the signing of the Treaty of Paris on September 3, 1783, some people like George Washington believed the United States existed, while other people like King George III vehemently rejected this idea.

    Disagreements about the existence of states cannot be resolved by an objective test, such as a DNA survey or a sonar scan. Unlike animals, states are not an objective reality. When we ask whether a particular state exists, we are raising a question about intersubjective reality. If enough people agree that a particular state exists, then it does. It can then do things like sign legally binding treaties with other governments as well as NGOs and private corporations.

    Of all genres of stories, those that create intersubjective realities have been the most crucial for the development of large-scale human networks. Implanting fake family memories is certainly helpful, but no religions or empires managed to survive for long without a strong belief in the existence of a god, a nation, a law code, or a currency. For the formation of the Christian Church, for example, it was important that people recollect what Jesus said at the Last Supper, but the crucial step was making people believe that Jesus was a god rather than just an inspiring rabbi. For the formation of the Jewish religion, it was helpful that Jews “remembered” how they together escaped slavery in Egypt, but the really decisive step was making all Jews adhere to the same religious law code, the Halakha.

    Intersubjective things like laws, gods, and currencies are extremely powerful within a particular information network and utterly meaningless outside it. Suppose a billionaire crashes his private jet on a deserted island and finds himself alone with a suitcase full of banknotes and bonds. When he was in São Paulo or Mumbai, he could use these papers to make people feed him, clothe him, protect him, and build him a private jet. But once he is cut off from other members of our information network, his banknotes and bonds immediately become worthless. He cannot use them to get the island’s monkeys to provide him with food or to build him a raft.

    THE POWER OF STORIES

    Whether through implanting fake memories, forming fictional relationships, or creating intersubjective realities, stories produced large-scale human networks. These networks in turn completely changed the balance of power in the world. Story-based networks made Homo sapiens the most powerful of all animals, giving it a crucial edge not only over lions and mammoths but also over other ancient human species like Neanderthals.

    Neanderthals lived in small isolated bands, and to the best of our knowledge different bands cooperated with one another only rarely and weakly, if at all.18 Stone Age Sapiens too lived in small bands of a few dozen individuals. But following the emergence of storytelling, Sapiens bands no longer lived in isolation. Bands were connected by stories about things like revered ancestors, totem animals, and guardian spirits. Bands that shared stories and intersubjective realities constituted a tribe. Each tribe was a network connecting hundreds or even thousands of individuals.19

    Belonging to a large tribe had an obvious advantage in times of conflict. Five hundred Sapiens could easily defeat fifty Neanderthals.20 But tribal networks had many additional advantages. If we live in an isolated band of fifty people and a severe drought hits our home territory, many of us might starve to death. If we try to migrate elsewhere, we are likely to encounter hostile groups, and we might also find it difficult to forage for food, water, and flint (to make tools) in unfamiliar territory. However, if our band is part of a tribal network, in times of need at least some of us could go live with our distant friends. If our shared tribal identity is strong enough, they would welcome us and teach us about the local dangers and opportunities. A decade or two later, we might reciprocate. The tribal network, then, acted like an insurance policy. It minimized risk by spreading it across a lot more people.21

    Even in quiet times Sapiens could benefit enormously from exchanging information not just with a few dozen members of a small band but with an entire tribal network. If one of the tribe’s bands discovered a better way to make spear points, learned how to heal wounds with some rare medicinal herb, or invented a needle to sew clothes, that knowledge could be quickly passed to the other bands. Even though individually Sapiens might not have been more intelligent than Neanderthals, five hundred Sapiens together were far more intelligent than fifty Neanderthals.22

    All this was made possible by stories. The power of stories is often missed or denied by materialist interpretations of history. In particular, Marxists tend to view stories as merely a smoke screen for underlying power relations and material interests. According to Marxist theories, people are always motivated by objective material interests and use stories only to camouflage these interests and confound their rivals. For example, in this reading the Crusades, World War I, and the Iraq War were all fought for the economic interests of powerful elites rather than for religious, nationalist, or liberal ideals. Understanding these wars means setting aside all the mythological fig leaves—about God, patriotism, or democracy—and observing power relations in their nakedness.

    This Marxist view, however, is not only cynical but wrong. While materialist interests certainly played a role in the Crusades, World War I, the Iraq War, and most other human conflicts, that does not mean that religious, national, and liberal ideals played no role at all. Moreover, materialist interests by themselves cannot explain the identities of the rival camps. Why is it that in the twelfth century landowners and merchants from France, Germany, and Italy united to conquer territories and trade routes in the Levant—instead of landowners and merchants from France and North Africa uniting to conquer Italy? And why is it that in 2003, the United States and Britain sought to conquer the oil fields of Iraq, rather than the gas fields of Norway? Can this really be explained by purely materialist considerations, without any recourse to people’s religious and ideological beliefs?

    In fact, all relations between large-scale human groups are shaped by stories, because the identities of these groups are themselves defined by stories. There are no objective definitions for who is British, American, Norwegian, or Iraqi; all these identities are shaped by national and religious myths that are constantly challenged and revised. Marxists may claim that large-scale groups have objective identities and interests, independent of stories. If that is so, how can we explain that only humans have large-scale groups like tribes, nations, and religions, whereas chimpanzees lack them? After all, chimpanzees share with humans all our objective material interests; they too need to drink, eat, and protect themselves from diseases. They too want sex and social power. But chimpanzees cannot maintain large-scale groups, because they are unable to create the stories that connect such groups and define their identities and interests. Contrary to Marxist thinking, large-scale identities and interests in history are always intersubjective; they are never objective.

    This is good news. If history had been shaped solely by material interests and power struggles, there would be no point talking to people who disagree with us. Any conflict would ultimately be the result of objective power relations, which cannot be changed merely by talking. In particular, if privileged people can see and believe only those things that enshrine their privileges, how can anything except violence persuade them to renounce those privileges and alter their beliefs? Luckily, since history is shaped by intersubjective stories, sometimes we can avert conflict and make peace by talking with people, changing the stories in which they and we believe, or coming up with a new story that everyone can accept.

    Take, for example, the rise of Nazism. There certainly were material interests that drove millions of Germans to support Hitler. The Nazis would probably never have come to power if it wasn’t for the economic crisis of the early 1930s. However, it is wrong to think that the Third Reich was the inevitable outcome of underlying power relations and material interests. Hitler won the 1933 elections because during the economic crisis millions of Germans came to believe the Nazi story rather than one of the alternative stories on offer. This wasn’t the inevitable result of Germans pursuing their material interests and protecting their privileges; it was a tragic mistake. We can confidently say that it was a mistake, and that Germans could have chosen better stories, because we know what happened next. Twelve years of Nazi rule didn’t foster the Germans’ material interests. Nazism led to the destruction of Germany and the deaths of millions. Later, when Germans adopted liberal democracy, this did lead to a lasting improvement in their lives. Couldn’t the Germans have skipped the failed Nazi experiment and put their faith in liberal democracy already in the early 1930s? The position of this book is that they could have. History is often shaped not by deterministic power relations, but rather by tragic mistakes that result from believing in mesmerizing but harmful stories.

    THE NOBLE LIE

    The centrality of stories reveals something fundamental about the power of our species, and it explains why power doesn’t always go hand in hand with wisdom. The naive view of information says that information leads to truth, and knowing the truth helps people to gain both power and wisdom. This sounds reassuring. It implies that people who ignore the truth are unlikely to have much power, whereas people who respect the truth can gain much power, but that power would be tempered by wisdom. For example, people who ignore the truth about human biology might believe racist myths but will not be able to produce powerful medicines and bioweapons, whereas people who understand biology will have that kind of power but will not use it in the service of racist ideologies. If this had indeed been the case, we could sleep calmly, trusting our presidents, high priests, and CEOs to be wise and honest. A politician, a movement, or a country might conceivably get ahead here and there with the help of lies and deceptions, but in the long term that would be a self-defeating strategy.

    Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. In history, power stems only partially from knowing the truth. It also stems from the ability to maintain social order among a large number of people. Suppose you want to make an atom bomb. To succeed, you obviously need some accurate knowledge of physics. But you also need lots of people to mine uranium ore, build nuclear reactors, and provide food for the construction workers, miners, and physicists. The Manhattan Project directly employed about 130,000 people, with millions more working to sustain them.23 Robert Oppenheimer could devote himself to his equations because he relied on thousands of miners to extract uranium at the Eldorado mine in northern Canada and the Shinkolobwe mine in the Belgian Congo24—not to mention the farmers who grew potatoes for his lunch. If you want to make an atom bomb, you must find a way to make millions of people cooperate.

    It is the same with all ambitious projects that humans undertake. A Stone Age band going to hunt a mammoth obviously needed to know some true facts about mammoths. If they believed they could kill a mammoth by casting spells, their hunting expedition would have failed. But just knowing facts about mammoths wasn’t enough, either. The hunters also needed to make sure all of them agreed on the same plan and bravely did their bit even in the face of mortal danger. If they believed that by pronouncing a spell they could guarantee a good afterlife for dead hunters, their hunting expeditions had a much higher chance of success. Even if objectively the spell was powerless and did not benefit dead hunters in any way, by fortifying the courage and solidarity of living hunters, it nevertheless made a crucial contribution to the hunt’s success.25

    While power depends on both truth and order, in most cases it is the people who know how to maintain order who call the shots, giving instructions to the people who merely know the truth about things like mammoths or nuclear physics. Robert Oppenheimer obeyed Franklin Delano Roosevelt rather than the other way around. Similarly, Werner Heisenberg obeyed Adolf Hitler, Igor Kurchatov deferred to Joseph Stalin, and in contemporary Iran experts in nuclear physics follow the orders of experts in Shiite theology.

    What the people at the top know, which nuclear physicists don’t always realize, is that telling the truth about the universe is hardly the most efficient way to produce order among large numbers of humans. It is true that E = mc², and it explains a lot of what happens in the universe, but knowing that E = mc² usually doesn’t resolve political disagreements or inspire people to make sacrifices for a common cause. Instead, what holds human networks together tends to be fictional stories, especially stories about intersubjective things like gods, money, and nations. When it comes to uniting people, fiction enjoys two inherent advantages over the truth. First, fiction can be made as simple as we like, whereas the truth tends to be complicated, because the reality it is supposed to represent is complicated. Take, for example, the truth about nations. It is difficult to grasp that the nation to which one belongs is an intersubjective entity that exists only in our collective imagination. You rarely hear politicians say such things in their political speeches. It is far easier to believe that our nation is God’s chosen people, entrusted by the Creator with some special mission. This simple story has been repeatedly told by countless politicians from Israel to Iran and from the United States to Russia.

    Second, the truth is often painful and disturbing, and if we try to make it more comforting and flattering, it will no longer be the truth. In contrast, fiction is highly malleable. The history of every nation contains some dark episodes that citizens don’t like to acknowledge and remember. An Israeli politician who in her election speeches details the miseries inflicted on Palestinian civilians by the Israeli occupation is unlikely to get many votes. In contrast, a politician who builds a national myth by ignoring uncomfortable facts, focusing on glorious moments in the Jewish past, and embellishing reality wherever necessary may well sweep to power. That’s the case not just in Israel but in all countries. How many Italians or Indians want to hear the unblemished truth about their nations? An uncompromising adherence to the truth is essential for scientific progress, and it is also an admirable spiritual practice, but it is not a winning political strategy.

    Already in his Republic, Plato imagined that the constitution of his utopian state would be based on “the noble lie”—a fictional story about the origin of the social order, one that secures the citizens’ loyalty and prevents them from questioning the constitution. Citizens should be told, Plato wrote, that they were all born out of the earth, that the land is their mother, and that they therefore owe filial loyalty to the motherland. They should further be told that when they were conceived, the gods intermingled different metals—gold, silver, bronze, and iron—into them, which justifies a natural hierarchy between golden rulers and bronze servants. While Plato’s utopia was never realized in practice, numerous polities through the ages told their inhabitants variations of this noble lie.

    Plato’s noble lie notwithstanding, we should not conclude that all politicians are liars or that all national histories are deceptions. The choice isn’t simply between telling the truth and lying. There is a third option. Telling a fictional story is lying only when you pretend that the story is a true representation of reality. Telling a fictional story isn’t lying when you avoid such pretense and acknowledge that you are trying to create a new intersubjective reality rather than represent a preexisting objective reality.

    For example, on September 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention signed the U.S. Constitution, which came into force in 1789. The Constitution didn’t reveal any preexisting truth about the world, but crucially it wasn’t a lie, either. Rejecting Plato’s recommendation, the authors of the text didn’t deceive anyone about the text’s origins. They didn’t pretend that the text came down from heaven or that it had been inspired by some god. Rather, they acknowledged that it was an extremely creative legal fiction generated by fallible human beings.

    “We the People of the United States,” says the Constitution about its own origins, “in Order to form a more perfect Union … do ordain and establish this Constitution.” Despite the acknowledgment that it is a human-made legal fiction, the U.S. Constitution indeed managed to form a powerful union. It maintained for more than two centuries a surprising degree of order among many millions of people who belonged to a wide range of religious, ethnic, and cultural groups. The U.S. Constitution has thus functioned like a tune that without claiming to represent anything has nevertheless made numerous people act together in order.

    It is crucial to note that “order” should not be confused with fairness or justice. The order created and maintained by the U.S. Constitution condoned slavery, the subordination of women, the expropriation of indigenous people, and extreme economic inequality. The genius of the U.S. Constitution is that by acknowledging that it is a legal fiction created by human beings, it was able to provide mechanisms to reach agreement on amending itself and remedying its own injustices (as chapter 5 explores in greater depth). The Constitution’s Article V details how people can propose and ratify such amendments, which “shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution.” Less than a century after the Constitution was written, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery.

    In this, the U.S. Constitution was fundamentally different from stories that denied their fictive nature and claimed divine origin, such as the Ten Commandments. Like the U.S. Constitution, the Ten Commandments endorsed slavery. The Tenth Commandment says, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house. You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife, or his male slave or female slave” (Exodus 20:17). This implies that God is perfectly okay with people holding slaves, and objects only to the coveting of slaves belonging to someone else. But unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Ten Commandments failed to provide any amendment mechanism. There is no Eleventh Commandment that says, “You can amend commandments by a two-thirds majority vote.”

    This crucial difference between the two texts is clear from their opening gambits. The U.S. Constitution opens with “We the People.” By acknowledging its human origin, it invests humans with the power to amend it. The Ten Commandments open with “I am the Lord your God.” By claiming divine origin, it precludes humans from changing it. As a result, the biblical text still endorses slavery even today.

    All human political systems are based on fictions, but some admit it, and some do not. Being truthful about the origins of our social order makes it easier to make changes in it. If humans like us invented it, we can amend it. But such truthfulness comes at a price. Acknowledging the human origins of the social order makes it harder to persuade everyone to agree on it. If humans like us invented it, why should we accept it? As we shall see in chapter 5, until the late eighteenth century the lack of mass communication technology made it extremely difficult to conduct open debates between millions of people about the rules of the social order. To maintain order, Russian tsars, Muslim caliphs, and Chinese sons of heaven therefore claimed that the fundamental rules of society came down from heaven and were not open to human amendment. In the early twenty-first century, many political systems still claim superhuman authority and oppose open debates that may result in unwelcome changes.

    THE PERENNIAL DILEMMA

    After we understand the key role of fiction in history, it is finally possible to present a more complete model of information networks, which goes beyond both the naive view of information and the populist critique of that view. Contrary to the naive view, information isn’t the raw material of truth, and human information networks aren’t geared only to discover the truth. But contrary to the populist view, information isn’t just a weapon, either. Rather, to survive and flourish, every human information network needs to do two things simultaneously: discover truth and create order. Accordingly, as history unfolded, human information networks have been developing two distinct sets of skills. On the one hand, as the naive view expects, the networks have learned how to process information to gain a more accurate understanding of things like medicine, mammoths, and nuclear physics. At the same time, the networks have also learned how to use information to maintain stronger social order among larger populations, by using not just truthful accounts but also fictions, fantasies, propaganda, and—occasionally—downright lies.

    The naive view of information
    A more complete historical view of information

    Having a lot of information doesn’t in and of itself guarantee either truth or order. It is a difficult process to use information to discover the truth and simultaneously use it to maintain order. What makes things worse is that these two processes are often contradictory, because it is frequently easier to maintain order through fictions. Sometimes—as in the case of the U.S. Constitution—fictional stories may acknowledge their fictionality, but more often they disavow it. Religions, for example, always claim to be an objective and eternal truth rather than a fictional story invented by humans. In such cases, the search for truth threatens the foundations of the social order. Many societies require their populations not to know their true origins: ignorance is strength. What happens, then, when people get uncomfortably close to the truth? What happens when the same bit of information reveals an important fact about the world, and also undermines the noble lie that holds society together? In such cases society may seek to preserve order by placing limits on the search for truth.

    One obvious example is Darwin’s theory of evolution. Understanding evolution greatly advances our understanding of the origins and biology of species, including Homo sapiens, but it also undermines the central myths that maintain order in numerous societies. No wonder that various governments and churches have banned or limited the teaching of evolution, preferring to sacrifice truth for the sake of order.26

    A related problem is that an information network may allow and even encourage people to search for truth, but only in specific fields that help generate power without threatening the social order. The result can be a very powerful network that is singularly lacking in wisdom. Nazi Germany, for example, cultivated many of the world’s leading experts in chemistry, optics, engineering, and rocket science. It was largely Nazi rocket science that later brought the Americans to the moon.27 This scientific prowess helped the Nazis build an extremely powerful war machine, which was then deployed in the service of a deranged and murderous mythology. Under Nazi rule Germans were encouraged to develop rocket science, but they were not free to question racist theories about biology and history.

    That’s a major reason why the history of human information networks isn’t a triumphant march of progress. While over the generations human networks have grown increasingly powerful, they have not necessarily grown increasingly wise. If a network privileges order over truth, it can become very powerful but use that power unwisely.

    Instead of a march of progress, the history of human information networks is a tightrope walk trying to balance truth with order. In the twenty-first century we aren’t much better at finding the right balance than our ancestors were in the Stone Age. Contrary to what the mission statements of corporations like Google and Facebook imply, simply increasing the speed and efficiency of our information technology doesn’t necessarily make the world a better place. It only makes the need to balance truth and order more urgent. The invention of the story taught us this lesson already tens of thousands of years ago. And the same lesson would be taught again, when humans came up with their second great information technology: the written document.

    CHAPTER 3 Documents: The Bite of the Paper Tigers

    Stories were the first crucial information technology developed by humans. They laid the foundation for all large-scale human cooperation and made humans the most powerful animals on earth. But as an information technology, stories have their limitations.

    To appreciate this, consider the role storytelling plays in the formation of nations. Many nations have first been conceived in the imagination of poets. Sarah Aaronsohn and the NILI underground are remembered by present-day Israelis as some of the first Zionists who risked their lives in the 1910s to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, but from where did NILI members get this idea in the first place? They were inspired by an earlier generation of poets, thinkers, and visionaries such as Theodor Herzl and Hayim Nahman Bialik.

    In the 1890s and first decade of the twentieth century, Bialik, a Ukrainian Jew, published numerous poems and stories bewailing the persecution and weakness of European Jews and calling on them to take their fate in their hands—to defend themselves by force of arms, immigrate to Palestine, and there establish their own state. One of his most stirring poems was written following the Kishinev Pogrom of 1903, in which forty-nine Jews were murdered and dozens more were injured.1 “In the City of Slaughter” condemned the murderous antisemitic mob who perpetrated the atrocities, but it also criticized the Jews themselves for their pacifism and helplessness.

    In one heart-wrenching scene, Bialik described how Jewish women were gang-raped, while their husbands and brothers hid nearby, afraid to intervene. The poem compares the Jewish men to terrified mice and imagines how they quietly prayed to God to perform some miracle, which failed to materialize. The poem then tells how even after the pogrom was over, the survivors had no thought of arming themselves and instead entered Talmudic disputations about whether the raped women were now ritualistically “defiled” or whether they were still “pure.” This poem is mandatory reading in many Israeli schools today. It is also mandatory reading for anyone wishing to understand how after two millennia of being one of the most pacifist groups in history, Jews built one of the most formidable armies in the world. Not for nothing was Bialik named Israel’s national poet.2

    The fact that Bialik lived in Ukraine, and was intimately familiar with the persecution of Ashkenazi Jews in eastern Europe but had little understanding of conditions in Palestine, contributed to the subsequent conflict there between Jews and Arabs. Bialik’s poems inspired Jews to see themselves as victims in dire need of developing their military might and building their own country, but hardly considered the catastrophic consequences for the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, or indeed for the Mizrahi Jewish communities native to the Middle East. When the Arab-Israeli conflict exploded in the late 1940s, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and hundreds of thousands of Mizrahi Jews were driven out of their ancestral homes in the Middle East, partly as a result of poems composed half a century earlier in Ukraine.3

    While Bialik was writing in Ukraine, the Hungarian Jew Theodor Herzl was busy organizing the Zionist movement in the 1890s and early years of the twentieth century. As a central part of his political activism, Herzl published two books. The Jewish State (1896) was a manifesto outlining Herzl’s idea of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, and The Old New Land (1902) was a utopian novel set in the year 1923 describing the prosperous Jewish state that Herzl envisioned. The two books—which fatefully also tended to ignore realities on the ground in Palestine—were immensely influential in shaping the Zionist movement. The Old New Land appeared in Hebrew under the title Tel Aviv (a loose Hebrew translation of “Old New Land”). The city of Tel Aviv, established seven years after the book’s publication, took its name from the book. While Bialik is Israel’s national poet, Herzl is known as the visionary of the state.

    The yarns Bialik and Herzl wove ignored many crucial facts about contemporary reality, most notably that around 1900 the Jews of Palestine comprised only 6–9 percent of the region’s total population of about 600,000 people.4 While disregarding such demographic facts, Bialik and Herzl accorded great importance to mythology, most notably the stories of the Bible, without which modern Zionism is unimaginable. Bialik and Herzl were also influenced by the nationalist myths that were created in the nineteenth century by almost every other ethnic group in Europe. The Ukrainian Jew Bialik and the Hungarian Jew Herzl did for Zionism what was earlier done by the poets Taras Shevchenko for Ukrainian nationalism,5 Sándor Petőfi for Hungarian nationalism,6 and Adam Mickiewicz for Polish nationalism.7 Observing the growth of other national movements all around, Herzl wrote that nations arise “out of dreams, songs, fantasies.”8

    But dreams, songs, and fantasies, however inspiring, are not enough to create a functioning nation-state. Bialik inspired generations of Jewish fighters, but to equip and maintain an army, it is also necessary to raise taxes and buy guns. Herzl’s utopian book laid the foundations for the city of Tel Aviv, but to keep the city going, it was also necessary to dig a sewage system. When all is said and done, the essence of patriotism isn’t reciting stirring poems about the beauty of the motherland, and it certainly isn’t making hate-filled speeches against foreigners and minorities. Rather, patriotism means paying your taxes so that people on the other side of the country also enjoy the benefit of a sewage system, as well as security, education, and health care.

    To manage all these services and raise the necessary taxes, enormous amounts of information need to be collected, stored, and processed: information about properties, payments, exemptions, discounts, debts, inventories, shipments, budgets, bills, and salaries. This, however, is not the kind of information that can be turned into a memorable poem or a captivating myth. Instead, tax records come in the shape of various types of lists, ranging from a simple item-by-item record to more elaborate tables and spreadsheets. No matter how intricate these data sets may become, they eschew narrative in favor of dryly listing amounts owed and amounts paid. Poets can afford to ignore such mundane facts, but tax collectors cannot.

    Lists are crucial not only for national taxation systems but also for almost all other complex financial institutions. Corporations, banks, and stock markets cannot exist without them. A church, a university, or a library that wants to balance its budget soon realizes that in addition to priests and poets who can mesmerize people with stories, it needs accountants who know their way around the various types of lists.

    Lists and stories are complementary. National myths legitimize the tax records, while the tax records help transform aspirational stories into concrete schools and hospitals. Something analogous happens in the field of finance. The dollar, the pound sterling, and the bitcoin all come into being by persuading people to believe a story, and tales told by bankers, finance ministers, and investment gurus raise or lower their value. When the chairperson of the Federal Reserve wants to curb inflation, when a finance minister wants to pass a new budget, and when a tech entrepreneur wants to draw investors, they all turn to storytelling. But to actually manage a bank, a budget, or a start-up, lists are essential.

    The big problem with lists, and the crucial difference between lists and stories, is that lists tend to be far more boring than stories, which means that while we easily remember stories, we find it difficult to remember lists. This is an important fact about how the human brain processes information. Evolution has adapted our brains to be good at absorbing, retaining, and processing even very large quantities of information when they are shaped into a story. The Ramayana, one of the foundational tales of Hindu mythology, is twenty-four thousand verses long and runs to about seventeen hundred pages in modern editions, yet despite its enormous length generations of Hindus succeeded in remembering and reciting it by heart.9

    In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the Ramayana was repeatedly adapted for film and television. In 1987–88, a seventy-eight-episode version (running to about 2,730 hours) was the most watched television series in the world, with more than 650 million viewers. According to a BBC report, when episodes were aired, “streets would be deserted, shops would be closed, and people would bathe and garland their TV sets.” During the 2020 COVID-19 lockdown the series was re-aired and again became the most watched show in the world.10 While modern TV audiences need not memorize any texts by heart, it is noteworthy how easy they find it to follow the intricate plots of epic dramas, detective thrillers, and soap operas, recalling who each character is and how they are related to numerous others. We are so accustomed to performing such feats of memory that we seldom consider how extraordinary they are.

    What makes us so good at remembering epic poems and long-running TV series is that long-term human memory is particularly adapted to retaining stories. As Kendall Haven writes in his 2007 book Story Proof: The Science Behind the Startling Power of Story, “Human minds … rely on stories and on story architecture as the primary roadmap for understanding, making sense of, remembering, and planning our lives.… Lives are like stories because we think in story terms.” Haven references more than 120 academic studies, concluding that “research overwhelmingly, convincingly, and without opposition provides the evidence” that stories are a highly efficient “vehicle for communicating factual, conceptual, emotional, and tacit information.”11

    In contrast, most people find it hard to remember lists by heart, and few people would be interested in watching a TV recitation of India’s tax records or annual budget. Mnemonic methods used to memorize lists of items often work by weaving the items into a plot, thereby turning the list into a story.12 But even with the help of such mnemonic devices, who could remember their country’s tax records or budget? The information may be vital—determining what quality of health care, education, and welfare services citizens enjoy—but our brains are not adapted to remembering such things. Unlike national poems and myths, which can be stored in our brains, complex national taxation and administration systems have required a unique nonorganic information technology in order to function. This technology is the written document.

    TO KILL A LOAN

    The written document was invented many times in many places. Some of the earliest examples come from ancient Mesopotamia. A cuneiform clay tablet dated to the twenty-eighth day of the tenth month of the forty-first year of the reign of King Shulgi of Ur (ca. 2053/4 BCE) recorded the monthly deliveries of sheep and goats. Fifteen sheep were delivered on the second day of the month, 7 sheep on the third day, 11 sheep on the fourth, 219 on the fifth, 47 on the sixth, and so on until 3 sheep were delivered on the twenty-eighth. In total, says the clay tablet, 896 animals were received that month. Remembering all these deliveries was important for the royal administration, to monitor people’s obedience and to keep track of available resources. While doing so in one’s head was a formidable challenge, it was easy for a learned scribe to write them down on a clay tablet.13

    Like stories and like all other information technologies in history, written documents didn’t necessarily represent reality accurately. The Ur tablet, for example, contained a mistake. The document says that a total of 896 animals were received during that month, but when modern scholars added up all the individual entries they reached a total of 898. The scribe who wrote the document apparently made a mistake when he calculated the overall tally, and the tablet preserved this mistake for posterity.

    But whether true or false, written documents created new realities. By recording lists of properties, taxes, and payments, they made it far easier to create administrative systems, kingdoms, religious organizations, and trade networks. More specifically, documents changed the method used for creating intersubjective realities. In oral cultures, intersubjective realities were created by telling a story that many people repeated with their mouths and remembered in their brains. Brain capacity consequently placed a limit on the kinds of intersubjective realities that humans created. Humans couldn’t forge an intersubjective reality that their brains couldn’t remember.

    This limit could be transcended, however, by writing documents. The documents didn’t represent an objective empirical reality; the reality was the documents themselves. As we shall see in later chapters, written documents thereby provided precedents and models that would eventually be used by computers. The ability of computers to create intersubjective realities is an extension of the power of clay tablets and pieces of paper.

    As a key example, consider ownership. In oral communities that lacked written documents, ownership was an intersubjective reality created through the words and behaviors of the community members. To own a field meant that your neighbors agreed that this field was yours and behaved accordingly. They didn’t build a hut on that field, graze their livestock there, or pick fruits there without first asking your permission. Ownership was created and maintained by people continuously saying or signaling things to one another. This made ownership the affair of a local community and placed a limit on the ability of a distant central authority to control all landownership. No king, minister, or priest could remember who owned each field in hundreds of distant villages. This also placed a limit on the ability of individuals to claim and exercise absolute property rights, and instead favored various forms of communal property rights. For example, your neighbors might acknowledge your right to cultivate a field but not your right to sell it to foreigners.14

    In a literate state, to own a field increasingly came to mean that it is written on some clay tablet, bamboo strip, piece of paper, or silicon chip that you own that field. If your neighbors have been grazing their sheep for years on a piece of land, and none of them ever said that you own it, but you can somehow produce an official document that says it is yours, you have a good chance of enforcing your claim. Conversely, if all the neighbors agree that it is your field but you don’t have any official document that proves it, tough luck. Ownership is still an intersubjective reality created by exchanging information, but the information now takes the form of a written document (or a computer file) rather than of people talking and gesturing to each other. This means that ownership can now be determined by a central authority that produces and holds the relevant documents. It also means that you can sell your field without asking your neighbors’ permission, simply by transferring the crucial document to someone else.

    The power of documents to create intersubjective realities was beautifully manifested in the Old Assyrian dialect, which treated documents as living things that could also be killed. Loan contracts were “killed” (duākum) when the debt was repaid. This was done by destroying the tablet, adding some mark to it, or breaking its seal. The loan contract didn’t represent reality; it was the reality. If somebody repaid the loan but failed to “kill the document,” the debt was still owed. Conversely, if somebody didn’t repay the loan but the document “died” in some other way—perhaps the dog ate it—the debt was no more.15 The same happens with money. If your dog eats a hundred-dollar bill, those hundred dollars cease to exist.

    In Shulgi’s Ur, in ancient Assyria, and in numerous subsequent polities, social, economic, and political relations relied on documents that create reality instead of merely representing it. When writing constitutions, peace treaties, and commercial contracts, lawyers, politicians, and businesspeople wrangle for weeks and even months over each word—because they know that these pieces of paper can wield enormous power.

    BUREAUCRACY

    Every new information technology has its unexpected bottlenecks. It solves some old problems but creates new ones. In the early 1730s BCE, Narâmtani, a priestess in the Mesopotamian city of Sippar, wrote a letter (on a clay tablet) to a relative, asking him to send her a few clay tablets he kept in his house. She explained that her claim to an inheritance was being contested and she couldn’t prove her case in court without those documents. She ended her message with a plea: “Now, do not neglect me!”16

    We don’t know what happened next, but just imagine the situation if the relative searched his house but could not find the missing tablets. As people produced more and more documents, finding them turned out to be far from easy. This was a particular challenge for kings, priests, merchants, and anyone else who accumulated thousands of documents in their archives. How do you find the right tax record, payment receipt, or business contract when you need it? Written documents were much better than human brains in recording certain types of information. But they created a new and very thorny problem: retrieval.17

    The brain is remarkably efficient in retrieving whatever information is stored in its network of tens of billions of neurons and trillions of synapses. Though our brain archives countless complex stories about our personal life, our national history, and our religious mythology, healthy people can retrieve information about any of them in less than a second. What did you eat for breakfast? Who was your first crush? When did your country gain its independence? What’s the first verse in the Bible?

    How did you retrieve all these pieces of information? What mechanism activates the right neurons and synapses to rapidly call up the necessary information? Though neuroscientists have made some progress in the study of memory, nobody yet understands what memories are, or how exactly they are stored and retrieved.18 What we do know is that millions of years of evolution streamlined the brain’s retrieval processes. However, once humans have outsourced memories from organic brains to inorganic documents, retrieval could no longer rely on that streamlined biological system. Nor could it rely on the foraging abilities that humans evolved over millions of years. Evolution has adapted humans for finding fruits and mushrooms in a forest, but not for finding documents in an archive.

    Foragers locate fruits and mushrooms in a forest, because evolution has organized forests according to a discernible organic order. Fruit trees photosynthesize, so they require sunlight. Mushrooms feed on dead organic matter, which can usually be found in the ground. So mushrooms are usually down at soil level, whereas fruits grow further up. Another common rule is that apples grow on apple trees, whereas figs grow on figs trees. So if you are looking for an apple, you first need to locate an apple tree, and then look up. When living in a forest, humans learn this organic order.

    It is very different with archives. Since documents aren’t organisms, they don’t obey any biological laws, and evolution didn’t organize them for us. Tax reports don’t grow on a tax-report shelf. They need to be placed there. For that, somebody first needs to come up with the idea of categorizing information by shelves, and to decide which documents should go on which shelf. Unlike foragers, who need merely to discover the preexisting order of the forest, archivists need to devise a new order for the world. That order is called bureaucracy.

    Bureaucracy is the way people in large organizations solved the retrieval problem and thereby created bigger and more powerful information networks. But like mythology, bureaucracy too tends to sacrifice truth for order. By inventing a new order and imposing it on the world, bureaucracy distorted people’s understanding of the world in unique ways. Many of the problems of our twenty-first-century information networks—like biased algorithms that mislabel people, or rigid protocols that ignore human needs and feelings—are not new problems of the computer age. They are quintessential bureaucratic problems that have existed long before anyone even dreamed of computers.

    BUREAUCRACY AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH

    Bureaucracy literally means “rule by writing desk.” The term was invented in eighteenth-century France, when the typical official sat next to a writing desk with drawers—a bureau.19 At the heart of the bureaucratic order, then, is the drawer. Bureaucracy seeks to solve the retrieval problem by dividing the world into drawers, and knowing which document goes into which drawer.

    The principle remains the same regardless of whether the document is placed into a drawer, a shelf, a basket, a jar, a computer folder, or any other receptacle: divide and rule. Divide the world into containers, and keep the containers separate so the documents don’t get mixed up. This principle, however, comes with a price. Instead of focusing on understanding the world as it is, bureaucracy is often busy imposing a new and artificial order on the world. Bureaucrats begin by inventing various drawers, which are intersubjective realities that don’t necessarily correspond to any objective divisions in the world. The bureaucrats then try to force the world to fit into these drawers, and if the fit isn’t very good, the bureaucrats push harder. Anyone who ever filled out an official form knows this only too well. When you fill out the form, and none of the listed options fits your circumstances, you must adapt yourself to the form, rather than the form adapting to you. Reducing the messiness of reality to a limited number of fixed drawers helps bureaucrats keep order, but it comes at the expense of truth. Because they are fixated on their drawers—even when reality is far more complex—bureaucrats often develop a distorted understanding of the world.

    The urge to divide reality into rigid drawers also leads bureaucrats to pursue narrow goals irrespective of the wider impact of their actions. A bureaucrat tasked with increasing industrial production is likely to ignore environmental considerations that fall outside her purview, and perhaps dump toxic waste into a nearby river, leading to an ecological disaster downstream. If the government then establishes a new department to combat pollution, its bureaucrats are likely to push for ever more stringent regulations, even if this results in economic ruin for communities upstream. Ideally, someone should be able to take into account all the different considerations and aspects, but such a holistic approach requires transcending or abolishing the bureaucratic division.

    The distortions created by bureaucracy affect not only government agencies and private corporations but also scientific disciplines. Consider, for example, how universities are divided into different faculties and departments. History is separate from biology and from mathematics. Why? Certainly this division doesn’t reflect objective reality. It is the intersubjective invention of academic bureaucrats. The COVID-19 pandemic, for example, was at one and the same time a historical, biological, and mathematical event. But the academic study of pandemics is divided between the separate departments of history, biology, and mathematics (among others). Students pursuing an academic degree must usually decide to which of these departments they belong. Their decision limits their choice of courses, which in turn shapes their understanding of the world. Mathematics students learn how to predict future morbidity levels from present rates of infection; biology students learn how viruses mutate over time; and history students learn how religious and political beliefs affect people’s willingness to follow government instructions. To fully understand COVID-19 requires taking into account mathematical, biological, and historical phenomena, but academic bureaucracy doesn’t encourage such a holistic approach.

    As you climb the academic ladder, the pressure to specialize only increases. The academic world is ruled by the law of publish or perish. If you want a job, you must publish in peer-reviewed journals. But journals are divided by discipline, and publishing an article on virus mutations in a biology journal demands following different conventions from publishing an article on the politics of pandemics in a history journal. There are different jargons, different citation rules, and different expectations. Historians should have a deep understanding of culture and know how to read and interpret historical documents. Biologists should have a deep understanding of evolution and know how to read and interpret DNA molecules. Things that fall in between categories—like the interplay between human political ideologies and virus evolution—are often left unaddressed.20

    To appreciate how academics force a messy and fluid world into rigid bureaucratic categories, let’s dig a little deeper in the specific discipline of biology. Before Darwin could explain the origin of species, earlier scholars like Carl Linnaeus first had to define what a species is and classify all living organisms into species. To argue that lions and tigers evolved from a common feline ancestor, you first have to define “lions” and “tigers.”21 This turned out to be a difficult and never-ending job, because animals, plants, and other organisms often trespass the boundaries of their allotted drawers.

    Evolution cannot be easily contained in any bureaucratic schema. The whole point of evolution is that species continually change, which means that putting each species in one unchanging drawer distorts biological reality. For example, it is an open question when Homo erectus ended and Homo sapiens began. Were there once two Erectus parents whose child was the first Sapiens?22 Species also keep intermingling, with animals belonging to seemingly separate species not only having sex but even siring fertile offspring. Most Sapiens living today have about 1–3 percent Neanderthal DNA,23 indicating that there once was a child whose father was a Neanderthal and whose mother was a Sapiens (or vice versa). So are Sapiens and Neanderthals the same species or different species? And is “species” an objective reality that biologists discover, or is it an intersubjective reality that biologists impose?24

    There are numerous other examples of animals breaking out of their drawers, so the neat bureaucratic division fails to accurately categorize ring species, fusion species, and hybrids.25 Grizzly bears and polar bears sometimes produce pizzly bears and grolar bears.26 Lions and tigers produce ligers and tigons.27

    When we shift our attention from mammals and other multicellular organisms to the world of single-cell bacteria and archaea, we discover that anarchy reigns. In a process known as horizontal gene transfer, single-cell organisms routinely exchange genetic material not only with organisms from related species but also with organisms from entirely different genera, kingdoms, orders, and even domains. Bacteriologists have a very difficult job keeping tabs on these chimeras.28

    And when we reach the very edge of life and consider viruses like SARS-CoV-2 (responsible for COVID-19), things become even more complicated. Viruses straddle the supposed rigid boundary between living beings and lifeless matter—between biology and chemistry. Unlike bacteria, viruses aren’t single-cell organisms. They aren’t cells at all, and don’t possess any cellular machinery of their own. Viruses don’t eat or metabolize, and cannot reproduce by themselves. They are tiny packets of genetic code, which are able to penetrate cells, hijack their cellular machinery, and instruct them to produce more copies of that alien genetic code. The new copies burst out of the cell to infect and hijack more cells, which is how the alien code turns viral. Scientists argue endlessly about whether viruses should count as life-forms or whether they fall outside the boundary of life.29 But this boundary isn’t an objective reality; it is an intersubjective convention. Even if biologists reach a consensus that viruses are life-forms, it wouldn’t change anything about how viruses behave; it will only change how humans think about them.

    Of course, intersubjective conventions are themselves part of reality. As we humans become more powerful, so our intersubjective beliefs become more consequential for the world outside our information networks. For example, scientists and legislators have categorized species according to the threat of extinction they face, on a scale ranging from “least concern” through “vulnerable” and “endangered” to “extinct.” Defining a particular population of animals as an “endangered species” is an intersubjective human convention, but it can have far-reaching consequences, for instance by imposing legal restrictions on hunting those animals or destroying their habitat. A bureaucratic decision about whether a certain animal belongs in the “endangered species” drawer or in the “vulnerable species” drawer could make the difference between life and death. As we shall see time and again in subsequent chapters, when a bureaucracy puts a label on you, even though the label might be pure convention, it can still determine your fate. That’s true whether the bureaucrat is a flesh-and-blood expert on animals; a flesh-and-blood expert on humans; or an inorganic AI.

    THE DEEP STATE

    In defense of bureaucracy it should be noted that while it sometimes sacrifices truth and distorts our understanding of the world, it often does so for the sake of order, without which it would be hard to maintain any large-scale human network. While bureaucracies are never perfect, is there a better way to manage big networks? For example, if we decided to abolish all conventional divisions in the academic world, all departments and faculties and specialized journals, would every prospective doctor be expected to devote several years to the study of history, and would people who studied the impact of the Black Death on Christian theology be considered expert virologists? Would it lead to better health-care systems?

    Anyone who fantasizes about abolishing all bureaucracies in favor of a more holistic approach to the world should reflect on the fact that hospitals too are bureaucratic institutions. They are divided into different departments, with hierarchies, protocols, and lots of forms to fill out. They suffer from many bureaucratic illnesses, but they still manage to cure us of many of our biological illnesses. The same goes for almost all the other services that make our life better, from our schools to our sewage system.

    When you flush the toilet, where does the waste go? It goes into the deep state. There is an intricate subterranean web of pipes, pumps, and tunnels that runs under our houses and collects our waste, separates it from the supply of drinking water, and either treats or safely disposes of it. Somebody needs to design, construct, and maintain that deep web, plug holes in it, monitor pollution levels, and pay the workers. That too is bureaucratic work, and we would face a lot of discomfort and even death if we abolished that particular department. Sewage water and drinking water are always in danger of mixing, but luckily for us there are bureaucrats who keep them separate.

    Prior to the establishment of modern sewage systems, waterborne infectious diseases like dysentery and cholera killed millions of people around the world.30 In 1854 hundreds of London residents began dying of cholera. It was a relatively small outbreak, but it proved to be a turning point in the history of cholera, of epidemics more generally, and of sewage. The leading medical theory of the day argued that cholera epidemics were caused by “bad air.” But the physician John Snow suspected that the cause was the water supply. He painstakingly tracked and listed all known cholera patients, their place of residence, and their source of water. The resulting data led him to identify the water pump on Broad Street in Soho as the epicenter of the outbreak.

    This was tedious bureaucratic work—collecting data, categorizing it, and mapping it—but it saved lives. Snow explained his findings to local officials, persuading them to disable the Broad Street pump, which effectively ended the outbreak. Subsequent research discovered that the well providing water to the Broad Street pump was dug less than a meter from a cholera-infected cesspit.31

    Snow’s discovery, and the work of many subsequent scientists, engineers, lawyers, and officials, resulted in a sprawling bureaucracy regulating cesspits, water pumps, and sewage lines. In today’s England, digging wells and constructing cesspits require filling out forms and getting licenses, which ensure that drinking water doesn’t come from a well someone dug next to a cesspit.32

    It is easy to forget about this system when it works well, but since 1854 it has saved millions of lives, and it is one of the most important services provided by modern states. In 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India identified the lack of toilets as one of India’s biggest problems. Open defecation is a major cause for spreading diseases like cholera, dysentery, and diarrhea, as well as exposing women and girls to sexual assaults. As part of his flagship Clean India Mission, Modi promised to provide all Indian citizens with access to toilets, and between 2014 and 2020 the Indian state invested around ten billion dollars in the project, building more than 100 million new latrines.33 Sewage isn’t the stuff of epic poems, but it is a test of a well-functioning state.

    THE BIOLOGICAL DRAMAS

    Mythology and bureaucracy are the twin pillars of every large-scale society. Yet while mythology tends to inspire fascination, bureaucracy tends to inspire suspicion. Despite the services they provide, even beneficial bureaucracies often fail to win the public’s trust. For many people, the very word “bureaucracy” carries negative connotations. This is because it is inherently difficult to know whether a bureaucratic system is beneficial or malicious. For all bureaucracies—good or bad—share one key characteristic: it is hard for humans to understand them.

    Any kid can tell the difference between a friend and a bully. You know if someone shares their lunch with you or instead takes yours. But when the tax collector comes to take a cut from your earnings, how can you tell whether it goes to build a new public sewage system or a new private dacha for the president? It is hard to get all the relevant information, and even harder to interpret it. It is similarly difficult for citizens to understand the bureaucratic procedures determining how pupils are admitted to schools, how patients are treated in hospitals, or how garbage is collected and recycled. It takes a minute to tweet allegations of bias, fraud, or corruption, and many weeks of arduous work to prove or disprove them.

    Documents, archives, forms, licenses, regulations, and other bureaucratic procedures have changed the way information flows in society, and with it the way power works. This made it far more difficult to understand power. What is happening behind the closed doors of offices and archives, where anonymous officials analyze and organize piles of documents and determine our fate with a stroke of a pen or a click of a mouse?

    In tribal societies that lack written documents and bureaucracies, the human network is composed of only human-to-human and human-to-story chains. Authority belongs to the people who control the junctions that link the various chains. These junctions are the tribe’s foundational myths. Charismatic leaders, orators, and mythmakers know how to use these stories in order to shape identities, build alliances, and sway emotions.34

    In human networks connected by written documents and bureaucratic procedures—from ancient Ur to modern India—society relies in part on the interaction between humans and documents. In addition to human-to-human and human-to-story chains, such societies are held together by human-to-document chains. When we observe a bureaucratic society at work, we still see humans telling stories to other humans, as when millions of Indians watch the Ramayana series, but we also see humans passing documents to other humans, as when TV networks are required to apply for broadcasting licenses and fill out tax reports. Looked at from a different perspective, what we see is documents compelling humans to engage with other documents.

    This led to shifts in authority. As documents became a crucial nexus linking many social chains, considerable power came to be invested in these documents, and experts in the arcane logic of documents emerged as new authority figures. Administrators, accountants, and lawyers mastered not just reading and writing but also the skills of composing forms, separating drawers, and managing archives. In bureaucratic systems, power often comes from understanding how to manipulate obscure budgetary loopholes and from knowing your way around the labyrinths of offices, committees, and subcommittees.

    This shift in authority changed the balance of power in the world. For better or worse, literate bureaucracies tended to strengthen the central authority at the expense of ordinary citizens. It’s not just that documents and archives made it easier for the center to tax, judge, and conscript everybody. The difficulty of understanding bureaucratic power simultaneously made it harder for the masses to influence, resist, or evade the central authority. Even when bureaucracy was a benign force, providing people with sewage systems, education, and security, it still tended to increase the gap between rulers and ruled. The system enabled the center to collect and record a lot more information about the people it governed, while the latter found it much more difficult to understand how the system itself worked.

    Art, which helps us understand many other aspects of life, offered only limited assistance in this case. Poets, playwrights, and moviemakers have occasionally focused on the dynamics of bureaucratic power. However, this has proven to be a very difficult story to communicate. Artists usually work with a limited set of story lines that are rooted in our biology, but none of these biological dramas sheds much light on the workings of bureaucracy, because they have all been scripted by evolution millions of years before the emergence of documents and archives. To understand what “biological dramas” are, and why they are a poor guide for understanding bureaucracy, let’s consider in detail the plot of one of humanity’s greatest artistic masterpieces—the Ramayana.

    One important plotline of the Ramayana concerns the relations between the eponymous prince, Rama, his father, King Dasharatha, and his stepmother, Queen Kaikeyi. Though Rama, being the eldest son, is the rightful heir to the kingdom, Kaikeyi persuades the king to banish Rama to the wilderness and bestow the succession instead on her son Bharata. Underlying this plotline are several biological dramas that go back hundreds of millions of years in mammalian and avian evolution.

    All mammal and bird offspring depend on their parents in the first stage of life, seek parental care, and fear parental neglect or hostility. Life and death hang in the balance. A cub or chick pushed out of the nest too soon is in danger of death from starvation or predation. Among humans, the fear of being neglected or abandoned by one’s parents is a template not just for children’s stories like Snow White, Cinderella, and Harry Potter but also for some of our most influential national and religious myths. The Ramayana is far from being the sole example. In Christian theology damnation is conceived as losing all contact with the mother church and the heavenly father. Hell is a lost child crying for his or her missing parents.

    A related biological drama, which is also familiar to human children, mammalian cubs, and avian chicks, is “Father loves me more than he loves you.” Biologists and geneticists have identified sibling rivalry as one of the key processes of evolution.35 Siblings routinely compete for food and parental attention, and in some species the killing of one sibling by another is commonplace. About a quarter of spotted hyena cubs are killed by their siblings, who typically enjoy greater parental care as a result.36 Among sand tiger sharks, females hold numerous embryos in their uterus. The first embryo that reaches about ten centimeters in length then eats all the others.37 The dynamics of sibling rivalry are manifested in numerous myths in addition to the Ramayana, for instance in the stories of Cain and Abel, King Lear, and the TV series Succession. Entire nations—like the Jewish people—may base their identity on the claim that “we are Father’s favorite children.”

    The second major plotline of the Ramayana focuses on the romantic triangle formed by Prince Rama, his lover, Sita, and the demon-king Ravana, who kidnaps Sita. “Boy meets girl” and “boy fights boy over girl” are also biological dramas that have been enacted by countless mammals, birds, reptiles, and fish for hundreds of millions of years. We are mesmerized by these stories because understanding them has been essential for our ancestors’ survival. Human storytellers like Homer, Shakespeare, and Valmiki—the purported author of the Ramayana—have displayed an amazing capacity to elaborate on the biological dramas, but even the greatest poetical narratives usually copy their basic plotline from the handbook of evolution.

    A third theme recurring in the Ramayana is the tension between purity and impurity, with Sita being the paragon of purity in Hindu culture. The cultural obsession with purity originates in the evolutionary struggle to avoid pollution. All animals are torn between the need to try new food and the fear of being poisoned. Evolution therefore equipped animals with both curiosity and the capacity to feel disgust on coming into contact with something toxic or otherwise dangerous.38 Politicians and prophets have learned how to manipulate these disgust mechanisms. In nationalist and religious myths, countries or churches are depicted as a biological body in danger of being polluted by impure intruders. For centuries bigots have often said that ethnic and religious minorities spread diseases,39 that LGBTQ people are a source of pollution,40 or that women are impure.41 During the Rwanda genocide of 1994, Hutu propaganda referred to the Tutsis as cockroaches. The Nazis compared Jews to rats. Experiments have shown that chimpanzees, too, react with disgust to images of unfamiliar chimpanzees from another band.42

    Perhaps in no other culture was the biological drama of “purity versus impurity” carried to greater extremes than in traditional Hinduism. It constructed an intersubjective system of castes ranked by their supposed level of purity, with the pure Brahmins at the top and the allegedly impure Dalit (formerly known as untouchables) at the bottom. Professions, tools, and everyday activities have also been classified by their level of purity, and strict rules have forbidden “impure” persons to marry “pure” people, touch them, prepare food for them, or even come near them.

    The modern state of India still struggles with this legacy, which influences almost all aspects of life. For example, fears of impurity created various complications for the aforementioned Clean India Mission, because allegedly “pure” people were reluctant to get involved in “impure” activities such as building, maintaining, and cleaning toilets, or to share public latrines with allegedly “impure” persons.43 On September 25, 2019, two Dalit children—twelve-year-old Roshni Valmiki and her ten-year-old nephew Avinash—were lynched in the Indian village of Bhakhedi for defecating near the house of a family from the higher Yadav caste. They were forced to defecate in public because their houses lacked functioning toilets. A local official later explained that their household—while being among the poorest in the village—was nevertheless excluded from the list of families eligible for government aid to build toilets. The children routinely suffered from other caste-based discrimination, for example being forced to bring separate mats and utensils to school and to sit apart from the other pupils, so as not to “pollute” them.44

    The list of biological dramas that press our emotional buttons includes several additional classics, such as “Who will be alpha?” “Us versus them,” and “Good versus evil.” These dramas, too, feature prominently in the Ramayana, and all of them are well known to wolf packs and chimpanzee bands as well as to human societies. Together, these biological dramas form the backbone of almost all human art and mythology. But art’s dependence on the biological dramas have made it difficult for artists to explain the mechanisms of bureaucracy. The Ramayana is set within the context of large agrarian kingdoms, but it shows little interest in how such kingdoms register property, collect taxes, catalog archives, or finance wars. Sibling rivalry and romantic triangles aren’t a good guide for the dynamics of documents, which have no siblings and no romantic life.

    Storytellers like Franz Kafka, who focused on the often surreal ways that bureaucracy shapes human lives, pioneered new nonbiological plotlines. In Kafka’s Trial, the bank clerk K. is arrested by unidentified officials of an unfathomable agency for an unnamed crime. Despite his best efforts, he never understands what is happening to him or uncovers the aims of the agency that is crushing him. While sometimes taken as an existential or theological reference to the human condition in the universe and to the unfathomability of God, on a more mundane level the story highlights the potentially nightmarish character of bureaucracies, which as an insurance lawyer Kafka knew all too well.

    In bureaucratic societies, the lives of ordinary people are often upended by unidentified officials of an unfathomable agency for incomprehensible reasons. Whereas stories about heroes who confront monsters—from the Ramayana to Spider-Man—repackage the biological dramas of confronting predators and romantic rivals, the unique horror of Kafkaesque stories comes from the unfathomability of the threat. Evolution has primed our minds to understand death by a tiger. Our mind finds it much more difficult to understand death by a document.

    Some portrayals of bureaucracy are satirical. Joseph Heller’s iconic 1961 novel, Catch-22, illustrated the central role bureaucracy plays in war. The ex–private first class Wintergreen in the mail room—who decides which letters to forward—is a more powerful figure than any general.45 The 1980s British sitcoms Yes Minister and Yes, Prime Minister showed the ways that civil servants use arcane regulations, obscure subcommittees, and piles of documents to manipulate and control their political bosses. The 2015 comedy-drama The Big Short (based on a 2010 book by Michael Lewis) explored the bureaucratic roots of the 2007–8 financial crisis. The movie’s arch-villains are not humans but collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which are financial devices invented by investment bankers and understood by nobody else in the world. These bureaucratic Godzillas slumbered unnoticed in the depths of bank portfolios, until they suddenly emerged in 2007 to wreak havoc on the lives of billions of people by instigating a major financial crisis.

    Artworks like these have had some success in shaping perceptions of how bureaucratic power works, but this is an uphill battle, because since the Stone Age our minds have been primed to focus on biological dramas rather than bureaucratic ones. Most Hollywood and Bollywood blockbusters are not about CDOs. Rather, even in the twenty-first century, most blockbusters are essentially Stone Age stories about the hero who fights the monster to win the girl. Similarly, when depicting the dynamics of political power, TV series like Game of Thrones, The Crown, and Succession focus on the family intrigues of the dynastic court rather than on the bureaucratic labyrinth that sustains—and sometimes curbs—the dynasty’s power.

    LET’S KILL ALL THE LAWYERS

    The difficulty of depicting and understanding bureaucratic realities has had unfortunate results. On the one hand, it leaves people feeling helpless in the face of harmful powers they do not understand, like the hero of Kafka’s Trial. On the other hand, it also leaves people with the impression that bureaucracy is a malign conspiracy, even in cases when it is in fact a benign force providing us with health care, security, and justice.

    In the sixteenth century, Ludovico Ariosto described the allegorical figure of Discord as a woman who walks around in a cloud of “sheaves of summonses and writs, cross-examinations and powers of attorney, and great piles of glosses, counsel’s opinions and precedents—all of which tended to the greater insecurity of impoverished folk. In front and behind her and on either side she was hemmed in by notaries, attorneys and barristers.”46

    In his description of Jack Cade’s Rebellion (1450) in Henry VI, Part 2, Shakespeare has a commoner rebel called Dick the Butcher take the antipathy to bureaucracy to its logical conclusion. Dick has a plan to establish a better social order. “The first thing we do,” advises Dick, “let’s kill all the lawyers.” The rebel leader, Jack Cade, runs with Dick’s proposal in a forceful attack on bureaucracy and in particular on written documents: “Is not this a lamentable thing, that of the skin of an innocent lamb should be made parchment? That parchment, being scribbled o’er, should undo a man? Some say the bee stings: but I say, ’tis the bee’s wax; for I did but seal once to a thing, and I was never mine own man since.” Just then the rebels capture a clerk and accuse him of being able to write and read. After a short interrogation that establishes his “crime,” Cade orders his men, “Hang him with his pen and inkhorn about his neck.”47

    Seventy years prior to Jack Cade’s Rebellion, during the even bigger 1381 Peasants’ Revolt, the rebels focused their ire not only on flesh-and-blood bureaucrats but also on their documents, destroying numerous archives, burning court rolls, charters, and administrative and legal records. In one incident, they made a bonfire of the archives of the University of Cambridge. An old woman named Margery Starr scattered the ashes to the winds while crying, “Away with the learning of the clerks, away with it!” Thomas Walsingham, a monk in St. Albans Abbey who witnessed the destruction of the abbey’s archive firsthand, described how the rebels “set fire to all court rolls and muniments, so that after they had got rid of these records of their ancient service their lords would not be able to claim any right at all against them at some future time.”48 Killing the documents erased the debts.

    Similar attacks on archives characterized numerous other insurgencies throughout history. For example, during the Great Jewish Revolt in 66 CE, one of the first things the rebels did upon capturing Jerusalem was to set fire to the central archive in order to destroy records of debts, thereby wining the support of the populace.49 During the French Revolution in 1789, numerous local and regional archives were destroyed for comparable reasons.50 Many rebels might have been illiterate, but they knew that without the documents the bureaucratic machine couldn’t function.

    I can sympathize with the suspicion of government bureaucracies and of the power of official documents, because they have played an important role in my own family. My maternal grandfather had his life upended by a government census and by the inability to find a crucial document. My grandfather Bruno Luttinger was born in 1913 in Chernivtsi. Today this town is in Ukraine, but in 1913 it was part of the Habsburg Empire. Bruno’s father disappeared in World War I, and he was raised by his mother, Chaya-Pearl. When the war was over, Chernivtsi was annexed to Romania. In the late 1930s, as Romania became a fascist dictatorship, an important plank of its new antisemitic policy was to conduct a Jewish census.

    In 1936 official statistics said that 758,000 Jews lived in Romania, constituting 4.2 percent of the population. The same official statistics said that the total number of refugees from the U.S.S.R., Jews and non-Jews, was about 11,000. In 1937 a new fascist government came to power, headed by Prime Minister Octavian Goga. Goga was a renowned poet as well as a politician, but he quickly graduated from patriotic poetry to fake statistics and oppressive bureaucracy. He and his colleagues ignored the official statistics and claimed that hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees were flooding into Romania. In several interviews Goga claimed that half a million Jews had entered Romania illegally and that the total number of Jews in the country was 1.5 million. Government organs, far-right statisticians, and popular newspapers regularly cited even higher figures. The Romanian embassy in Paris, for example, claimed there were a million Jewish refugees in Romania. Christian Romanians were gripped by mass hysteria that they would soon be replaced or become a minority in a Jewish-led country.

    Goga’s government stepped in to offer a solution to the imaginary problem invented by its own propaganda. On January 22, 1938, the government issued a law ordering all Jews in Romania to provide documented proof that they were born in Romanian territory and were entitled to Romanian citizenship. Jews who failed to provide proof would lose their citizenship, along with all rights to residence and employment.

    Suddenly Romania’s Jews found themselves in a bureaucratic hell. Many had to travel to their birthplace to look for the relevant documents, only to discover that the municipal archives were destroyed during World War I. Jews born in territories annexed to Romania only after 1918—like Chernivtsi—faced special difficulties, because they lacked Romanian birth certificates and because many other documents about their families were archived in the former Habsburg capitals of Vienna and Budapest instead of in Bucharest. Jews often didn’t even know which documents they were supposed to be looking for, because the census law didn’t specify which documents were considered sufficient “proof.”

    Clerks and archivists gained a new and lucrative source of income as frantic Jews offered to pay large bribes to get their hands on the right document. Even if no bribes were involved, the process was extremely costly: any request for documentation, as well as filing the citizenship request with the authorities, involved paying fees. Finding and filing the right document did not guarantee success. A difference of a single letter between how a name was spelled on the birth certificate and on the citizenship papers was enough for the authorities to revoke the citizenship.

    Many Jews could not clear these bureaucratic hurdles and didn’t even file a citizenship request. Of those who did, only 63 percent got their citizenship approved. Altogether, out of 758,000 Romanian Jews, 367,000 lost their citizenship.51 My grandfather Bruno was among them. When the new census law was passed in Bucharest, Bruno did not think much about it. He was born in Chernivtsi and lived there all his life. The thought that he needed to prove to some bureaucrat that he was not an alien struck him as ridiculous. Moreover, in early 1938 his mother fell ill and died, and Bruno felt he had much bigger things to worry about than chasing documents.

    In December 1938 an official letter arrived from Bucharest canceling Bruno’s citizenship, and as an alien he was promptly fired from his job in a Chernivtsi radio shop. Bruno was now not only alone and jobless but also stateless and without much prospect for alternative employment. Nine months later World War II erupted, and the danger for paperless Jews was mounting. Of the Romanian Jews who lost their citizenship in 1938, the vast majority would be murdered over the next few years by the Romanian fascists and their Nazi allies (Jews who retained their citizenship had a much higher survival rate).52

    My grandfather repeatedly tried to escape the tightening noose, but it was difficult without the right papers. Several times he smuggled himself onto trains and ships, only to be caught and arrested. In 1940 he finally managed to board one of the last ships bound for Palestine before the gates of hell slammed shut. When he arrived in Palestine, he was immediately imprisoned by the British as an illegal immigrant. After two months in prison, the British offered a deal: stay in jail and risk deportation, or enlist in the British army and get Palestinian citizenship. My grandfather grabbed the offer with both hands and from 1941 to 1945 served in the British army in the North African and Italian campaigns. In exchange, he got his papers.

    In our family it became a sacred duty to preserve documents. Bank statements, electricity bills, expired student cards, letters from the municipality—if it had an official-looking stamp on it, it would be filed in one of the many folders in our cupboard. You never knew which of these documents might one day save your life.

    THE MIRACLE DOCUMENT

    Should we love the bureaucratic information network or hate it? Stories like that of my grandfather indicate the dangers inherent in bureaucratic power. Stories like that of the London cholera epidemic indicate its potential benevolence. All powerful information networks can do both good and ill, depending on how they are designed and used. Merely increasing the quantity of information in a network doesn’t guarantee its benevolence, nor make it any easier to find the right balance between truth and order. That is a key historical lesson for the designers and users of the new information networks of the twenty-first century.

    Future information networks, particularly those based on AI, will be different from previous networks in many ways. While in part 1 we are examining how mythology and bureaucracy have been essential for large-scale information networks, in part 2 we will see how AI is taking up the role of both bureaucrats and mythmakers. AI tools know how to find and process data better than flesh-and-blood bureaucrats, and AI is also acquiring the ability to compose stories better than most humans.

    But before we explore the new AI-based information networks of the twenty-first century, and before we examine the threats and promises of AI mythmakers and AI bureaucrats, there is one more thing we need to understand about the long-term history of information networks. We have now seen that information networks don’t maximize truth, but rather seek to find a balance between truth and order. Bureaucracy and mythology are both essential for maintaining order, and both are happy to sacrifice truth for the sake of order. What mechanisms, then, ensure that bureaucracy and mythology don’t lose touch with truth altogether, and what mechanisms enable information networks to identify and correct their own mistakes, even at the price of some disorder?

    The way human information networks have dealt with the problem of errors will be the main subject of the next two chapters. We’ll start by considering the invention of another information technology: the holy book. Holy books like the Bible and the Quran are an information technology that is meant to both include all the vital information society needs and be free from all possibility of error. What happens when an information network believes itself to be utterly incapable of any error? The history of allegedly infallible holy books highlights some of the limitations of all information networks and holds important lessons for the attempt to create infallible AIs in the twenty-first century.

    CHAPTER 4 Errors: The Fantasy of Infallibility

    As Saint Augustine famously said, “To err is human; to persist in error is diabolical.”1 The fallibility of human beings, and the need to correct human errors, have played key roles in every mythology. According to Christian mythology, the whole of history is an attempt to correct Adam and Eve’s original sin. According to Marxist-Leninist thinking, even the working class is likely to be fooled by its oppressors and misidentify its own interests, which is why it requires the leadership of a wise party vanguard. Bureaucracy, too, is constantly on the lookout for errors, from misplaced documents to inefficient procedures. Complex bureaucratic systems usually contain self-disciplinary bodies, and when a major catastrophe occurs—like a military defeat or a financial meltdown—commissions of inquiry are set up to understand what went wrong and make sure the same mistake is not repeated.

    In order to function, self-correcting mechanisms need legitimacy. If humans are prone to error, how can we trust the self-correcting mechanisms to be free from error? To escape this seemingly endless loop, humans have often fantasized about some superhuman mechanism, free from all error, that they can rely upon to identify and correct their own mistakes. Today one might hope that AI could provide such a mechanism, as when in April 2023 Elon Musk announced, “I’m going to start something, which I call TruthGPT or a maximum truth-seeking AI that tries to understand the nature of the universe.”2 We will see in later chapters why this is a dangerous fantasy. In previous eras, such fantasies took a different form—religion.

    In our personal lives, religion can fulfill many different functions, like providing solace or explaining the mysteries of life. But historically, the most important function of religion has been to provide superhuman legitimacy for the social order. Religions like Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism propose that their ideas and rules were established by an infallible superhuman authority, and are therefore free from all possibility of error, and should never be questioned or changed by fallible humans.

    TAKING HUMANS OUT OF THE LOOP

    At the heart of every religion lies the fantasy of connecting to a superhuman and infallible intelligence. This is why, as we shall explore in chapter 8, studying the history of religion is highly relevant to present-day debates about AI. In the history of religion, a recurrent problem is how to convince people that a certain dogma indeed originated from an infallible superhuman source. Even if in principle I am eager to submit to the gods’ will, how do I know what the gods really want?

    Throughout history many humans claimed to convey messages from the gods, but the messages often contradicted each other. One person said a god appeared to her in a dream; another person said she was visited by an angel; a third recounted how he met a spirit in a forest—and each preached a different message. The anthropologist Harvey Whitehouse recounts how when he was doing fieldwork among the Baining people of New Britain in the late 1980s, a young man called Tanotka fell sick, and in his feverish delirium began making cryptic statements like “I am Wutka” and “I am a post.” Most of these statements were heard only by Tanotka’s older brother, Baninge, who began telling about them to other people and interpreting them in a creative way. Baninge said that his brother was possessed by an ancestral spirit called Wutka and that he was divinely chosen to be the main support of the community, just as local houses were supported by a central post.

    After Tanotka recovered, he continued to deliver cryptic messages from Wutka, which were interpreted by Baninge in ever more elaborate ways. Baninge also began having dreams of his own, which allegedly revealed additional divine messages. He claimed that the end of the world was imminent, and convinced many of the locals to grant him dictatorial powers so that he could prepare the community for the coming apocalypse. Baninge proceeded to waste almost all the community’s resources on extravagant feasts and rituals. When the apocalypse didn’t materialize and the community almost starved, Baninge’s power collapsed. Though some locals continued to believe that he and Tanotka were divine messengers, many others concluded that the two were charlatans—or perhaps the servants of the Devil.3

    How could people distinguish the true will of the gods from the inventions or imaginations of fallible humans? Unless you had a personal divine revelation, knowing what the gods said meant trusting what fallible humans like Tanotka and Baninge claimed the gods said. But how can you trust these humans, especially if you don’t know them personally? Religion wants to take fallible humans out of the loop and give people access to infallible superhuman laws, but religion repeatedly boiled down to trusting this or that human.

    One way around this problem was to create religious institutions that vetted the purported divine messengers. Already in tribal societies communication with superhuman entities like tribal spirits was often the domain of religious experts. Among the Baining people, specialized spirit mediums known as agungaraga were traditionally responsible for communicating with the spirits and thereby learning the hidden causes of misfortunes ranging from illness to crop failure. Their membership in an established institution made the agungaraga more trustworthy than Tanotka and Baninge, and made their authority more stable and widely acknowledged.4 Among the Kalapalo tribe of Brazil religious rituals were organized by hereditary ritual officers known as the anetaū. In ancient Celtic and Hindu societies similar duties were the preserve of druids and Brahmins.5 As human societies grew and became more complex, so did their religious institutions. Priests and oracles had to train long and hard for the important task of representing the gods, so people no longer needed to trust just any layperson who claimed to have met an angel or to carry a divine message.6 In ancient Greece, for example, if you wanted to know what the gods said, you went to an accredited expert like the Pythia—the high priestess at the temple of Apollo in Delphi.

    But as long as religious institutions like oracular temples were staffed by fallible humans, they too were open to error and corruption. Herodotus recounts that when Athens was ruled by the tyrant Hippias, the pro-democracy faction bribed the Pythia to help them. Whenever any Spartan came to the Pythia to consult the gods on either official or private matters, the Pythia invariably replied that the Spartans must first free Athens from the tyrant. The Spartans, who were Hippias’s allies, eventually submitted to the alleged will of the gods and sent an army to Athens that deposed Hippias in 510 BCE, leading to the establishment of Athenian democracy.7

    If a human prophet could falsify the words of a god, then the key problem of religion wasn’t solved by creating religious institutions like temples and priestly orders. People still needed to trust fallible humans in order to access the supposedly infallible gods. Was it possible to somehow bypass the humans altogether?

    THE INFALLIBLE TECHNOLOGY

    Holy books like the Bible and the Quran are a technology to bypass human fallibility, and religions of the book—like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—have been built around that technological artifact. To appreciate how this technology is meant to work, we should begin by explaining what a book is and what makes books different from other kinds of written texts. A book is a fixed block of texts—such as chapters, stories, recipes, or epistles—that always go together and have many identical copies. This makes a book something different from oral tales, from bureaucratic documents, and from archives. When telling a story orally, every time we tell the story it might be a little different, and if many people tell the story over a long time, significant variations are bound to creep in. In contrast, all copies of a book are supposed to be identical. As for bureaucratic documents, they tend to be relatively short, and often exist only as a single copy in one archive. If a long document has many copies placed in numerous archives, we would normally call it a book. Finally, a book that contains many texts is also different from an archive, because each archive contains a different collection of texts, whereas all copies of a book contain the same chapters, the same stories, or the same recipes. The book thereby ensures that many people in many times and places can access the same database.

    The book became an important religious technology in the first millennium BCE. After tens of thousands of years in which gods spoke to humans via shamans, priests, prophets, oracles, and other human messengers, religious movements like Judaism began arguing that the gods speak through this novel technology of the book. There is one specific book whose many chapters allegedly contain all the divine words about everything from the creation of the universe to food regulations. Crucially, no priest, prophet, or human institution can forget or change these divine words, because you can always compare what the fallible humans are telling you with what the infallible book records.

    But religions of the book had their own set of problems. Most obviously, who decides what to include in the holy book? The first copy didn’t come down from heaven. It had to be compiled by humans. Still, the faithful hoped that this thorny problem could be solved by a once-and-for-all supreme effort. If we could get together the wisest and most trustworthy humans, and they could all agree on the contents of the holy book, from that moment onward we could excise humans from the loop, and the divine words would forever be safe from human interference.

    Many objections can be raised against this procedure: Who selects the wisest humans? On the basis of what criteria? What if they cannot reach a consensus? What if they later change their minds? Nevertheless, this was the procedure used to compile holy books like the Hebrew Bible.

    THE MAKING OF THE HEBREW BIBLE

    During the first millennium BCE, Jewish prophets, priests, and scholars produced an extensive collection of stories, documents, prophecies, poems, prayers, and chronicles. The Bible as a single holy book didn’t exist in biblical times. King David or the prophet Isaiah never saw a copy of the Bible.

    It is sometimes claimed, erroneously, that the oldest surviving copy of the Bible comes from the Dead Sea Scrolls. These scrolls are a collection of about nine hundred different documents, written mostly in the last two centuries BCE and found in various caves around Qumran, a village near the Dead Sea.8 Most scholars believe they constituted the archive of a Jewish sect that lived nearby.9

    Significantly, none of the scrolls contains a copy of the Bible, and no scroll indicates that the twenty-four books of the Old Testament were considered a single and complete database. Some of the scrolls certainly record texts that are today part of the canonical Bible. For example, nineteen scrolls and fragmentary manuscripts preserve parts of the book of Genesis.10 But many scrolls record texts that were later excluded from the Bible. For example, more than twenty scrolls and fragments preserve parts of the book of Enoch—a book allegedly written by the patriarch Enoch, the great-grandfather of Noah, and containing the history of the angels and demons as well as a prophecy about the coming of the Messiah.11 The Jews of Qumran apparently gave great importance to both Genesis and Enoch, and did not think that Genesis was canonical while Enoch was apocryphal.12 Indeed, to this day some Ethiopian Jewish and Christian sects consider Enoch part of their canon.13

    Even the scrolls that record future canonical texts sometimes differ from the present-day canonical version. For example, the canonical text of Deuteronomy 32:8 says that God divided the nations of the earth according to “the number of the sons of Israel.” The version recorded in the Dead Sea Scrolls has “the number of the sons of God” instead, implying a rather startling notion that God has multiple sons.14 In Deuteronomy 8:6 the canonical text requires the faithful to fear God, whereas the Dead Sea version asks them to love God.15 Some variations are much more substantial than just a single word here or there. The Psalms scrolls contain several entire psalms that are missing from the canonical Bible (most notably Psalms 151, 154, 155).16

    Similarly, the oldest translation of the Bible—the Greek Septuagint—completed between the third and the first centuries BCE, is different in many ways from the later canonical version.17 It includes, for example, the books of Tobit, Judith, Sirach, Maccabees, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Psalms of Solomon, and Psalm 151.18 It also has longer versions of Daniel and Esther.19 Its book of Jeremiah is 15 percent shorter than the canonical version.20 Finally, in Deuteronomy 32:8 most Septuagint manuscripts have either “sons of God” or “angels of God” rather than “sons of Israel.”21

    It took centuries of hairsplitting debates among learned Jewish sages—known as rabbis—to streamline the canonical database and to decide which of the many texts in circulation would get into the Bible as the official word of Jehovah and which would be excluded. By the time of Jesus agreement was probably reached on most of the texts, but even a century later rabbis were still arguing whether the Song of Songs should be part of the canon or not. Some rabbis condemned that text as secular love poetry, while Rabbi Akiva (d. 135 CE) defended it as the divinely inspired creation of King Solomon. Akiva famously said that “the Song of Songs is the Holy of Holies.”22 By the end of the second century CE widespread consensus was apparently reached among Jewish rabbis about which texts were part of the biblical canon and which were not, but debates about this matter, and about the precise wordings, spelling, and pronunciation of each text, were not finally resolved until the Masoretic era (seventh to tenth centuries CE).23

    This process of canonization decided that Genesis was the word of Jehovah, but the book of Enoch, the Life of Adam and Eve, and the Testament of Abraham were human fabrications.24 The Psalms of King David were canonized (minus psalms 151–55), but the Psalms of King Solomon were not. The book of Malachi got the seal of approval; the book of Baruch did not. Chronicles, yes; Maccabees, no.

    Interestingly, some books mentioned in the Bible itself failed to get into the canon. For example, the books of Joshua and Samuel both refer to a very ancient sacred text known as the book of Jasher (Joshua 10:13, 2 Samuel 1:18). The book of Numbers refers to “the Book of the Wars of the Lord” (Numbers 21:14). And when 2 Chronicles surveys the reign of King Solomon, it concludes by saying that “the rest of the acts of Solomon, first and last, are written in the chronicles of Nathan the prophet, and in the prophecy of Ahijah the Shilonite, and in the visions of Iddo the seer” (2 Chronicles 9:29). The books of Iddo, Ahijah, and Nathan, as well as the books of Jasher and the Wars of the Lord, aren’t in the canonical Bible. Apparently, they were not excluded on purpose; they just got lost.25

    After the canon was sealed, most Jews gradually forgot the role of human institutions in the messy process of compiling the Bible. Jewish Orthodoxy maintained that God personally handed down to Moses at Mount Sinai the entire first part of the Bible, the Torah. Many rabbis further argued that God created the Torah at the very dawn of time so that even biblical characters who lived before Moses—like Noah and Adam—read and studied it.26 The other parts of the Bible also came to be seen as a divinely created or divinely inspired text, totally different from ordinary human compilations. Once the holy book was sealed, it was hoped that Jews now had direct access to Jehovah’s exact words, which no fallible human or corrupt institution could erase or alter.

    Anticipating the blockchain idea by two thousand years, Jews began making numerous copies of the holy code, and every Jewish community was supposed to have at least one in its synagogue or its bet midrash (house of study).27 This was meant to achieve two things. First, disseminating many copies of the holy book promised to democratize religion and place strict limits on the power of would-be human autocrats. Whereas the archives of Egyptian pharaohs and Assyrian kings empowered the unfathomable kingly bureaucracy at the expense of the masses, the Jewish holy book seemed to give power to the masses, who could now hold even the most brazen leader accountable to God’s laws.

    Second, and more important, having numerous copies of the same book prevented any meddling with the text. If there were thousands of identical copies in numerous locations, any attempt to change even a single letter in the holy code could easily be exposed as a fraud. With numerous Bibles available in far-flung locations, Jews replaced human despotism with divine sovereignty. The social order was now guaranteed by the infallible technology of the book. Or so it seemed.

    THE INSTITUTION STRIKES BACK

    Even before the process of canonizing the Bible was completed, the biblical project had run into further difficulties. Agreeing on the precise contents of the holy book was not the only problem with this supposedly infallible technology. Another obvious problem concerned copying the text. For the holy book to work its magic, Jews needed to have many copies wherever they lived. With Jewish centers emerging not only in Palestine but also in Mesopotamia and Egypt, and with new Jewish communities extending from central Asia to the Atlantic, how to make sure that copyists working thousands of kilometers apart would not change the holy book either on purpose or by mistake?

    To forestall such problems, the rabbis who canonized the Bible devised painstaking regulations for copying the holy book. For example, a scribe was not allowed to pause at certain critical moments in the copying process. When writing the name of God, the scribe “may not respond even if the king greets him. If he was about to write two or three divine names successively, he may pause between them and respond.”28 Rabbi Yishmael (second century CE) told one copyist, “You are doing Heaven’s work, and if you delete one letter or add one letter—you destroy the entire world.”29 In truth, copying errors crept in without destroying the entire world, and no two ancient Bibles were identical.30

    A second and much bigger problem concerned interpretation. Even when people agree on the sanctity of a book and on its exact wording, they can still interpret the same words in different ways. The Bible says that you should not work on the Sabbath. But it doesn’t clarify what counts as “work.” Is it okay to water your field on the Sabbath? What about watering your flowerpot or herd of goats? Is it okay to read a book on the Sabbath? How about writing a book? How about tearing a piece of paper? The rabbis ruled that reading a book isn’t work, but tearing paper is work, which is why nowadays Orthodox Jews prepare a stack of already ripped toilet paper to use on the Sabbath.

    The holy book also says that you should not cook a young goat in its mother’s milk (Exodus 23:19). Some people interpreted this quite literally: if you slaughter a young goat, don’t cook it in the milk of its own mother. But it’s fine to cook it in the milk of an unrelated goat, or in the milk of a cow. Other people interpreted this prohibition much more broadly to mean that meat and dairy products should never be mixed, so you are not allowed to have a milkshake after fried chicken. As unlikely as this may sound, most rabbis ruled that the second interpretation is the correct one, even though chickens don’t lactate.

    More problems resulted from the fact that even if the technology of the book succeeded in limiting changes to the holy words, the world beyond the book continued to spin, and it was unclear how to relate old rules to new situations. Most biblical texts focused on the lives of Jewish shepherds and farmers in the hill country of Palestine and in the sacred city of Jerusalem. But by the second century CE, most Jews lived elsewhere. A particularly large Jewish community grew in the port of Alexandria, one of the richest metropolises of the Roman Empire. A Jewish shipping magnate living in Alexandria would have found that many of the biblical laws were irrelevant to his life while many of his pressing questions had no clear answers in the holy text. He couldn’t obey the commandments about worshipping in the Jerusalem temple, because not only did he not live near Jerusalem, but the temple didn’t even exist anymore. In contrast, when he contemplated whether it was kosher for him to sail his Rome-bound grain ships on the Sabbath, it turned out that long sea voyages were not considered by the authors of Leviticus and Deuteronomy.31

    Inevitably, the holy book spawned numerous interpretations, which were far more consequential than the book itself. As Jews increasingly argued over the interpretation of the Bible, rabbis gained more power and prestige. Writing down the word of Jehovah was supposed to limit the authority of the old priestly institution, but it gave rise to the authority of a new rabbinical institution. Rabbis became the Jewish technocratic elite, developing their rational and rhetorical skills through years of philosophical debates and legal disputations. The attempt to bypass fallible human institutions by relying on a new information technology backfired, because of the need for a human institution to interpret the holy book.

    When the rabbis eventually reached some consensus about how to interpret the Bible, Jews saw another chance to get rid of the fallible human institution. They imagined that if they wrote the agreed interpretation in a new holy book, and made numerous copies of it, that would eliminate the need for any further human intercession between them and the divine code. So after much back-and-forth about which rabbinical opinions should be included and which should be ignored, a new holy book was canonized in the third century CE: the Mishnah.32

    As the Mishnah became more authoritative than the plain text of the Bible, Jews began to believe that the Mishnah could not possibly have been created by humans. It too must have been inspired by Jehovah, or perhaps even composed by the infallible deity in person. Today many Orthodox Jews firmly believe that the Mishnah was handed to Moses by Jehovah on Mount Sinai, passed orally from generation to generation, until it was written down in the third century CE.33

    Alas, no sooner had the Mishnah been canonized and copied than Jews began arguing about the correct interpretation of the Mishnah. And when a consensus was reached about the interpretation of the Mishnah and canonized in the fifth to sixth centuries as a third holy book—the Talmud—Jews began disagreeing about the interpretation of the Talmud.34

    The dream of bypassing fallible human institutions through the technology of the holy book never materialized. With each iteration, the power of the rabbinical institution only increased. “Trust the infallible book” turned into “trust the humans who interpret the book.” Judaism was shaped by the Talmud far more than by the Bible, and rabbinical arguments about the interpretation of the Talmud became even more important than the Talmud itself.35

    This is inevitable, because the world keeps changing. The Mishnah and Talmud dealt with questions raised by second-century Jewish shipping magnates that had no clear answer in the Bible. Modernity too raised many new questions that have no straightforward answers in the Mishnah and Talmud. For example, when electrical appliances developed in the twentieth century, Jews struggled with numerous unprecedented questions such as whether it is okay to press the electrical buttons of an elevator on the Sabbath?

    The Orthodox answer is no. As noted earlier, the Bible forbids working on the Sabbath, and rabbis argued that pressing an electrical button is “work,” because electricity is akin to fire, and it has long been established that kindling a fire is “work.” Does this mean that elderly Jews living in a Brooklyn high-rise must climb a hundred steps to their apartment in order to avoid working on the Sabbath? Well, Orthodox Jews invented a “Sabbath elevator,” which continually goes up and down buildings, stopping on every floor, without you having to perform any “work” by pressing an electrical button.36 The invention of AI gives another twist to this old story. By relying on facial recognition, an AI can quickly direct the elevator to your floor, without making you desecrate the Sabbath.37

    This profusion of texts and interpretations has, over time, caused a profound change in Judaism. Originally, it was a religion of priests and temples, focused on rituals and sacrifices. In biblical times, the quintessential Jewish scene was a priest in blood-splattered robes sacrificing a lamb on the altar of Jehovah. Over the centuries, however, Judaism became an “information religion,” obsessed with texts and interpretations. From second-century Alexandria to twenty-first-century Brooklyn, the quintessential Jewish scene became a group of rabbis arguing about the interpretation of a text.

    This change was extremely surprising given that almost nowhere in the Bible itself do you find anyone arguing about the interpretation of any text. Such debates were not part of biblical culture itself. For example, when Korah and his followers challenged the right of Moses to lead the people of Israel, and demanded a more equitable division of power, Moses reacted not by entering a learned discussion or by quoting some scriptural passage. Rather, Moses called upon God to perform a miracle, and the moment he finished speaking, the ground split, “and the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and their households” (Numbers 16:31–32). When Elijah was challenged by 450 prophets of Baal and 400 prophets of Asherah to a public test in front of the people of Israel, he proved the superiority of Jehovah over Baal and Asherah first by miraculously summoning fire from the sky and then by slaughtering the pagan prophets. Nobody read any text, and nobody engaged in any rational debate (1 Kings 18).

    As Judaism replaced sacrifices with texts, it gravitated toward a view of information as the most fundamental building block of reality, anticipating current ideas in physics and computer science. The flood of texts generated by rabbis was increasingly seen as more important, and even more real, than plowing a field, baking a loaf of bread, or sacrificing a lamb in a temple. After the temple in Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans and all temple rituals ceased, rabbis nevertheless devoted enormous efforts to writing texts about the proper way to conduct temple rituals and then arguing about the correct interpretation of these texts. Centuries after the temple was no more, the amount of information concerning these virtual rituals only continued to increase. The rabbis weren’t oblivious to this seeming gap between text and reality. Rather, they maintained that writing texts about the rituals and arguing about these texts were far more important than actually performing the rituals.38
    This eventually led the rabbis to believe that the entire universe was an information sphere—a realm composed of words and running on the alphabetical code of the Hebrew letters. They further maintained that this informational universe was created so that Jews could read texts and argue about their interpretation, and that if Jews ever stop reading these texts and arguing about them, the universe will cease to exist.39 In everyday life, this view meant that for the rabbis words in texts were often more important than facts in the world. Or more accurately, which words appeared in sacred texts became some of the most important facts about the world, shaping the lives of individuals and entire communities.

    THE SPLIT BIBLE

    The above description of the canonization of the Bible, and the creation of the Mishnah and Talmud, ignores one very important fact. The process of canonizing the word of Jehovah created not one chain of texts but several competing chains. There were people who believed in Jehovah, but not in the rabbis. Most of these dissenters did accept the first block in the biblical chain—which they called the Old Testament. But already before the rabbis sealed this block, the dissenters rejected the authority of the entire rabbinical institution, which led them to subsequently reject the Mishnah and Talmud, too. These dissenters were the Christians.

    When Christianity emerged in the first century CE, it was not a unified religion, but rather a variety of Jewish movements that didn’t agree on much, except that they all regarded Jesus Christ—rather than the rabbinical institution—as the ultimate authority on Jehovah’s words.40 Christians accepted the divinity of texts like Genesis, Samuel, and Isaiah, but they argued that the rabbis misunderstood these texts, and only Jesus and his disciples knew the true meaning of passages like “the Lord himself will give you a sign: the almah will conceive and give birth to a son, and will call him Immanuel” (Isaiah 7:14). The rabbis said almah meant “young woman,” Immanuel meant “God with us” (in Hebrew immanu means “with us” and el means “God”), and the entire passage was interpreted as a divine promise to help the Jewish people in their struggle against oppressive foreign empires. In contrast, the Christians argued that almah meant “virgin,” that Immanuel meant that God will literally be born among humans, and that this was a prophecy about the divine Jesus being born on earth to the Virgin Mary.41

    However, by rejecting the rabbinical institution while simultaneously accepting the possibility of new divine revelations, the Christians opened the door to chaos. In the first century CE, and even more so in the second and third centuries CE, different Christians came up with radically new interpretations for books like Genesis and Isaiah, as well as with a plethora of new messages from God. Since they rejected the authority of the rabbis, since Jesus was dead and couldn’t adjudicate between them, and since a unified Christian church didn’t yet exist, who could decide which of all these interpretations and messages was divinely inspired?

    Thus, it was not just John who described the end of the world in his Apocalypse (the book of Revelation). We have many additional apocalypses from that era, for example the Apocalypse of Peter, the Apocalypse of James, and even the Apocalypse of Abraham.42 As for the life and teachings of Jesus, in addition to the four Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, early Christians had the Gospel of Peter, the Gospel of Mary, the Gospel of Truth, the Gospel of the Savior, and numerous others.43 Similarly, aside from the Acts of the Apostles, there were at least a dozen other Acts such as the Acts of Peter and the Acts of Andrew.44 Letters were even more prolific. Most present-day Christian Bibles contain fourteen epistles attributed to Paul, three attributed to John, two to Peter, and one each to James and Jude. Ancient Christians were familiar not only with additional Pauline letters (such as the Epistle to the Laodiceans) but with numerous other epistles supposedly written by other disciples and saints.45

    As Christians composed more and more gospels, epistles, prophecies, parables, prayers, and other texts, it became harder to know which ones to pay attention to. Christians needed a curation institution. That’s how the New Testament was created. At roughly the same time that debates among Jewish rabbis were producing the Mishnah and Talmud, debates between Christian priests, bishops, and theologians were producing the New Testament.
    In a letter from 367 CE, Bishop Athanasius of Alexandria recommended twenty-seven texts that faithful Christians should read—a rather eclectic collection of stories, letters, and prophecies written by different people in different times and places. Athanasius recommended the Apocalypse of John, but not that of Peter or Abraham. He approved of Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, but not of Paul’s Epistle to the Laodiceans. He endorsed the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, but rejected the Gospel of Thomas and the Gospel of Truth.46

    A generation later, in the Councils of Hippo (393) and Carthage (397), gatherings of bishops and theologians formally canonized this list of recommendations, which became known as the New Testament.47 When Christians talk about “the Bible,” they mean the Old Testament together with the New Testament. In contrast, Judaism never accepted the New Testament, and when Jews talk about “the Bible,” they mean only the Old Testament, which is supplemented by the Mishnah and Talmud. Interestingly, Hebrew to this day lacks a word to describe the Christian holy book, which contains both the Old Testament and the New Testament. Jewish thought sees them as two utterly unrelated books and simply refuses to acknowledge that there might be a single book encompassing both, even though it is probably the most common book in the world.

    It is crucial to note that the people who created the New Testament weren’t the authors of the twenty-seven texts it contains; they were the curators. Due to the paucity of evidence from the period, we do not know if Athanasius’s list of texts reflected his personal judgment, or whether it originated with earlier Christian thinkers. What we do know is that prior to the Councils of Hippo and Carthage there were rival recommendation lists for Christians. The earliest such list was codified by Marcion of Sinope in the middle of the second century. The Marcion canon included only the Gospel of Luke and ten epistles of Paul. Even these eleven texts were somewhat different from the versions later canonized at Hippo and Carthage. Either Marcion was unaware of other texts like the Gospel of John and the book of Revelation, or he did not think highly of them.48

    The church father Saint John Chrysostom, a contemporary of Bishop Athanasius’s, recommended only twenty-two books, leaving 2 Peter, 2 John, 3 John, Jude, and Revelation out of his list.49 Some Christian churches in the Middle East to this day follow Chrysostom’s shorter list.50 The Armenian Church took about a thousand years to make up its mind about the book of Revelation, while it included in its canon the Third Epistle to the Corinthians, which other churches—like the Catholic and Protestant churches—consider a forgery.51 The Ethiopian Church endorsed Athanasius’s list in full, but added four other books: Sinodos, the book of Clement, the book of the Covenant, and the Didascalia.52 Other lists endorsed the two epistles of Clement, the visions of the Shepherd of Hermas, the Epistle of Barnabas, the Apocalypse of Peter, and various other texts that didn’t make it into Athanasius’s selection.53

    We do not know the precise reasons why specific texts were endorsed or rejected by different churches, church councils, and church fathers. But the consequences were far-reaching. While churches made decisions about texts, the texts themselves shaped the churches. As a key example, consider the role of women in the church. Some early Christian leaders saw women as intellectually and ethically inferior to men, and argued that women should be restricted to subordinate roles in society and in the Christian community. These views were reflected in texts like the First Epistle to Timothy.

    In one of its passages, this text, attributed to Saint Paul, says, “A woman should learn in quietness and full submission. I do not permit a woman to teach or to assume authority over a man; she must be quiet. For Adam was formed first, then Eve. And Adam was not the one deceived; it was the woman who was deceived and became a sinner. But women will be saved through childbearing—if they continue in faith, love and holiness with propriety” (2:11–15). But modern scholars as well as some ancient Christian leaders like Marcion have considered this letter a second-century forgery, ascribed to Saint Paul but actually written by someone else.54

    In opposition to 1 Timothy, during the second, third, and fourth centuries CE there were important Christian texts that saw women as equal to men, and even authorized women to occupy leadership roles, like the Gospel of Mary55 or the Acts of Paul and Thecla. The latter text was written at about the same time as 1 Timothy, and for a time was extremely popular.56 It narrates the adventures of Saint Paul and his female disciple Thecla, describing how Thecla not only performed numerous miracles but also baptized herself with her own hands and often preached. For centuries, Thecla was one of the most revered Christian saints and was seen as evidence that women could baptize, preach, and lead Christian communities.57

    Before the Councils of Hippo and Carthage, it wasn’t clear that 1 Timothy was more authoritative than the Acts of Paul and Thecla. By choosing to include 1 Timothy in their recommendation list while rejecting the Acts of Paul and Thecla, the assembled bishops and theologians shaped Christian attitudes toward women down to the present day. We can only hypothesize what Christianity might have looked like if the New Testament had included the Acts of Paul and Thecla instead of 1 Timothy. Perhaps in addition to church fathers like Athanasius, the church would have had mothers, while misogyny would have been labeled a dangerous heresy perverting Jesus’s message of universal love.

    Just as most Jews forgot that rabbis curated the Old Testament, so most Christians forgot that church councils curated the New Testament, and came to view it simply as the infallible word of God. But while the holy book was seen as the ultimate source of authority, the process of curating the book placed real power in the hands of the curating institution. In Judaism the canonization of the Old Testament and Mishnah went hand in hand with creating the institution of the rabbinate. In Christianity the canonization of the New Testament went hand in hand with the creation of a unified Christian church. Christians trusted church officials—like Bishop Athanasius—because of what they read in the New Testament, but they had faith in the New Testament because this is what the bishops told them to read. The attempt to invest all authority in an infallible superhuman technology led to the rise of a new and extremely powerful human institution—the church.

    THE ECHO CHAMBER

    As time passed, problems of interpretation increasingly tilted the balance of power between the holy book and the church in favor of the institution. Just as the need to interpret Jewish holy books empowered the rabbinate, so the need to interpret Christian holy books empowered the church. The same saying of Jesus or the same Pauline epistle could be understood in various ways, and it was the institution that decided which reading was correct. The institution in turn was repeatedly shaken by struggles over the authority to interpret the holy book, which resulted in institutional schisms such as that between the Western Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church.

    All Christians read the Sermon on the Mount in the Gospel of Matthew and learned that we should love our enemies, that we should turn the other cheek, and that the meek shall inherit the earth. But what did that actually mean? Christians could read this as a call to reject all use of military force,58 or to reject all social hierarchies.59 The Catholic Church, however, viewed such pacifists and egalitarian readings as heresies. It interpreted Jesus’s words in a way that allowed the church to become the richest landowner in Europe, to launch violent crusades, and to establish murderous inquisitions. Catholic theology accepted that Jesus told us to love our enemies, but explained that burning heretics was an act of love, because it deterred additional people from adopting heretical views, thereby saving them from the flames of hell. The French inquisitor Jacques Fournier wrote in the early fourteenth century an entire treatise on the Sermon on the Mount that explained how the text provided justification for hunting heretics.60 Fournier’s view was not a fringe notion. He went on to become Pope Benedict XII (1334–42).

    Fournier’s task as inquisitor, and later as pope, was to ensure that the Catholic Church’s interpretation of the holy book would prevail. In this, Fournier and his fellow churchmen used not only violent coercion but also their control of book production. Prior to the advent of letterpress printing in Europe in the fifteenth century, making many copies of a book was a prohibitive enterprise for all but the most wealthy individuals and institutions. The Catholic Church used its power and wealth to disseminate copies of its favored texts while prohibiting the production and spread of what it considered erroneous ones.

    Of course, the church couldn’t prevent the occasional freethinker from formulating heretical ideas. But because it controlled key nodes in the medieval information network—such as copying workshops, archives, and libraries—it could prevent such a heretic from making and distributing a hundred copies of her book. To get an idea of the difficulties faced by a heretical author seeking to disseminate her views, consider that when Leofric was made bishop of Exeter in 1050, he found just five books in the cathedral’s library. He immediately established a copying workshop in the cathedral, but in the twenty-two years before he died in 1072, his copyists produced only sixty-six additional volumes.61 In the thirteenth century the library of Oxford University consisted of a few books kept in a chest under St. Mary’s Church. In 1424 the library of Cambridge University boasted a grand total of only 122 books.62 An Oxford University decree from 1409 stipulated that “all recent texts” studied at the university must be unanimously approved “by a panel of twelve theologians appointed by the archbishop.”63

    The church sought to lock society inside an echo chamber, allowing the spread only of those books that supported it, and people trusted the church because almost all the books supported it. Even illiterate laypersons who didn’t read books were still awed by recitations of these precious texts or expositions on their content. That’s how the belief in a supposedly infallible superhuman technology like the New Testament led to the rise of an extremely powerful but fallible human institution like the Catholic Church that crushed all opposing views as “erroneous” while allowing no one to question its own views.

    Catholic information experts such as Jacques Fournier spent their days reading Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation of Augustine’s interpretation of Saint Paul’s epistles and composing additional interpretations of their own. All those interrelated texts didn’t represent reality; they created a new information sphere even bigger and more powerful than that created by the Jewish rabbis. Medieval Europeans were cocooned inside that information sphere, their daily activities, thoughts, and emotions shaped by texts about texts about texts.

    PRINT, SCIENCE, AND WITCHES

    The attempt to bypass human fallibility by investing authority in an infallible text never succeeded. If anyone thought this was due to some unique flaw of the Jewish rabbis or the Catholic priests, the Protestant Reformation repeated the experiment again and again—always getting the same results. Luther, Calvin, and their successors argued that there was no need for any fallible human institution to interpose itself between ordinary people and the holy book. Christians should abandon all the parasitical bureaucracies that grew around the Bible and reconnect to the original word of God. But the word of God never interpreted itself, which is why not only Lutherans and Calvinists but numerous other Protestant sects eventually established their own church institutions and invested them with the authority to interpret the text and persecute heretics.64

    If infallible texts merely lead to the rise of fallible and oppressive churches, how then to deal with the problem of human error? The naive view of information posits that the problem can be solved by creating the opposite of a church—namely, a free market of information. The naive view expects that if all restrictions on the free flow of information are removed, error will inevitably be exposed and displaced by truth. As noted in the prologue, this is wishful thinking. Let’s delve a little deeper to understand why. As a test case, consider what happened during one of the most celebrated epochs in the history of information networks: the European print revolution. The introduction of the printing press to Europe in the mid-fifteenth century made it possible to mass-produce texts relatively quickly, cheaply, and secretly, even if the Catholic Church disapproved of them. It is estimated that in the forty-six years from 1454 to 1500 more than twelve million volumes were printed in Europe. By contrast, in the previous thousand years only about eleven million volumes were hand copied.65 By 1600, all kinds of fringe people—heretics, revolutionaries, proto-scientists—could disseminate their writings much more rapidly, widely, and easily than ever before.

    In the history of information networks, the print revolution of early modern Europe is usually hailed as a moment of triumph, breaking the stranglehold that the Catholic Church had maintained over the European information network. Allegedly, by allowing people to exchange information much more freely than before, it led to the scientific revolution. There is a grain of truth in this. Without print, it would certainly have been much harder for Copernicus, Galileo, and their colleagues to develop and spread their ideas.

    But print wasn’t the root cause of the scientific revolution. The only thing the printing press did was to faithfully reproduce texts. The machine had no ability to come up with any new ideas of its own. Those who connect print to science assume that the mere act of producing and spreading more information inevitably leads people to the truth. In fact, print allowed the rapid spread not only of scientific facts but also of religious fantasies, fake news, and conspiracy theories. Perhaps the most notorious example of the latter was the belief in a worldwide conspiracy of satanic witches, which led to the witch-hunt craze that engulfed early modern Europe.66

    Belief in magic and in witches has characterized human societies in all continents and eras, but different societies imagined witches and reacted to them in very different ways. Some societies believed that witches controlled spirits, talked with the dead, and predicted the future; others imagined that witches stole cattle and located hidden treasure. In one community witches were thought to cause disease, blight cornfields, and concoct love potions, while in another community they supposedly entered houses at night, performed household chores, and stole milk. In some locales witches were thought to be mostly female, while in others they were generally imagined to be male. Some cultures were terrified of witches and persecuted them violently, but others tolerated or even honored them. Finally, there were societies in every continent and era that gave witches little importance.67

    For most of the Middle Ages, most European societies belonged to the latter category and were not overly concerned about witches. The medieval Catholic Church didn’t see them as a major threat to humanity, and some churchmen actively discouraged witch-hunting. According to the influential tenth-century text Canon Episcopi—which defined medieval church doctrine on the matter—witchcraft was mostly illusion, and belief in the reality of witchcraft was an unchristian superstition.68 The European witch-hunt craze was a modern rather than a medieval phenomenon.

    In the 1420s and 1430s churchmen and scholars operating mainly in the Alps region took elements from Christian religion, local folklore, and Greco-Roman heritage and amalgamated them into a new theory of witchcraft.69 Previously, even when witches were dreaded, they were considered a strictly local problem—isolated criminals who, inspired by personal malevolence, used magical means to commit theft and murder. In contrast, the new scholarly model argued that witches were a far more formidable threat to society. There was allegedly a global conspiracy of witches, led by Satan, which constituted an institutionalized anti-Christian religion. Its purpose was nothing less than the complete destruction of the social order and of humankind. Witches were said to gather at night in huge demonic assemblies, where they worshipped Satan, killed children, ate human flesh, engaged in orgies, and cast spells that caused storms, epidemics, and other catastrophes.

    Inspired by such ideas, the first mass witch hunts and witch trials were led by local churchmen and noblemen in the Valais region of the western Alps between 1428 and 1436, leading to the execution of more than two hundred supposed male and female witches. From this Alpine heartland, rumors about the global witch conspiracy trickled to other parts of Europe, but the belief was still far from mainstream, the Catholic establishment did not embrace it, and other regions didn’t launch large-scale witch hunts like those in the Valais.

    In 1485, a Dominican friar and inquisitor called Heinrich Kramer embarked on a witch-hunting expedition in another Alpine region—the Austrian Tyrol. Kramer was a fervent convert to the new belief in a global satanic conspiracy.70 He also seems to have been mentally unhinged, and his accusations of satanic witchcraft were colored by rabid misogyny and odd sexual fixations. Local church authorities, led by the bishop of Brixen, were skeptical of Kramer’s accusations and alarmed by his activities. They stopped his inquisition, released the suspects he arrested, and expelled him from the area.71

    Kramer hit back through the printing press. Within two years of his banishment, he compiled and published the Malleus MaleficarumThe Hammer of the Witches. This was a do-it-yourself guidebook to exposing and killing witches in which Kramer described in detail the worldwide conspiracy and the means by which honest Christians could uncover and foil the witches. In particular, he recommended the use of horrific methods of torture in order to extract confessions from people suspected of witchcraft, and was adamant that the only punishment for the guilty was execution.

    Kramer organized and codified previous ideas and stories and added many details from his own fertile and hate-filled imagination. Relying on ancient Christian misogynist teachings like those of 1 Timothy, Kramer sexualized witchcraft. He argued that witches were typically female, because witchcraft originated in lust, which was supposedly stronger in women. He warned readers that sex could cause a pious woman to become a witch and her husband to become bewitched.72

    An entire chapter of the Hammer is dedicated to the ability of witches to steal men’s penises. Kramer discusses at length whether the witches are really able to take away the male member from its owner, or whether they are only able to create an illusion of castration in men’s minds. Kramer asks, “What is to be thought of those witches who in this way sometimes collect male organs in great numbers, as many as twenty or thirty members together, and put them in a bird’s nest, or shut them up in a box, where they move themselves like living members, and eat oats and corn, as has been seen by many?” He then relates a story he heard from one man: “When he had lost his member, he approached a known witch to ask her to restore it to him. She told the afflicted man to climb a certain tree, and that he might take which he liked out of the nest in which there were several members. And when he tried to take a big one, the witch said: You must not take that one; adding, because it belongs to a parish priest.”73 Numerous notions about witches that are still popular today—for instance, that witches are predominantly women, that witches engage in wild sexual activities, and that witches kill and mutilate children—were given their canonical form by Kramer’s book.

    Like the bishop of Brixen, other churchmen were initially skeptical of Kramer’s wild ideas, and there was some resistance to the book among church experts.74 But The Hammer of the Witches became one of the biggest best sellers of early modern Europe. It catered to people’s deepest fears, as well as to their lurid interest in hearing about orgies, cannibalism, child murders, and satanic conspiracies. The book had gone through eight editions by 1500, another five by 1520, and sixteen more by 1670, with many vernacular translations.75 It became the definitive work on witchcraft and witch-hunting and inspired a host of imitations and elaborations. As Kramer’s fame grew, his work was embraced by the church experts. Kramer was appointed papal representative and made inquisitor of Bohemia and Moravia in 1500. Even today his ideas continue to shape the world, and many current theories about a global satanic conspiracy—like QAnon—draw upon and perpetuate his fantasies.

    While it would be an exaggeration to argue that the invention of print caused the European witch-hunt craze, the printing press played a pivotal role in the rapid dissemination of the belief in a global satanic conspiracy. As Kramer’s ideas gained popularity, printing presses produced not only many additional copies of The Hammer of the Witches and copycat books but also a torrent of cheap one-page pamphlets, whose sensational texts were often accompanied by illustrations depicting people attacked by demons or witches burned at the stake.76 These publications also gave fantastic statistics about the size of the witches’ conspiracy. For example, the Burgundian judge and witch-hunter Henri Boguet (1550–1619) speculated that there were 300,000 witches in France alone and 1.8 million in all of Europe.77 Such claims fueled mass hysteria, which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led to the torture and execution of between 40,000 and 50,000 innocent people who were accused of witchcraft.78 The victims included individuals from all walks of life and ages, including children as young as five.79

    People began denouncing one another for witchcraft on the flimsiest evidence, often to avenge personal slights or to gain economic and political advantage. Once an official investigation began, the accused were often doomed. The inquisitorial methods recommended by The Hammer of the Witches were truly diabolical. If the accused confessed to being a witch, they were executed and their property divided between the accuser, the executioner, and the inquisitors. If the accused refused to confess, this was taken as evidence of their demonic obstinacy, and they were then tortured in horrendous ways, their fingers broken, their flesh cut with hot pincers, their bodies stretched to the breaking point or submerged in boiling water. Sooner or later they could stand it no longer and confessed—and were duly executed.80

    To take one example, in 1600 authorities in Munich arrested on suspicion of witchcraft the Pappenheimer family—father Paulus, mother Anna, two grown sons, and a ten-year-old boy, Hansel. The inquisitors began by torturing little Hansel. The protocol of the interrogation, which can still be read in the Munich archives, has a note from one of the interrogators regarding the ten-year-old boy: “May be tortured to the limit so that he incriminates his mother.”81 After being tortured in unspeakable ways, the Pappenheimers confessed to numerous crimes including killing 265 people by sorcery and causing fourteen destructive storms. They were all condemned to death.

    The bodies of each of the four adult family members were torn with red-hot pincers, the men’s limbs were broken on the wheel, the father was impaled on a stake, the mother’s breasts were cut off, and all were then burned alive. The ten-year-old Hansel was forced to watch all this. Four months later, he too was executed.82 The witch-hunters were extremely thorough in their search for the devil and his accomplices. But if the witch-hunters really wanted to find diabolical evil, they just had to look in the mirror.

    THE SPANISH INQUISITION TO THE RESCUE

    Witch hunts seldom ended by killing just one person or one family. Since the underlying model postulated a global conspiracy, people accused of witchcraft were tortured to name accomplices. This was then used as evidence to imprison, torture, and execute others. If any officials, scholars, or churchmen voiced objections to these absurd methods, this could be seen as proof that they too must be witches—which led to their own arrest and torture.

    For example, in 1453—when belief in the satanic conspiracy was just beginning to take hold—a French doctor of theology called Guillaume Edelin bravely sought to quash it before it spread. He repeated the claims of the medieval Canon Episcopi that witchcraft was an illusion and that witches couldn’t really fly at night to meet Satan and make a pact with him. Edelin was then himself accused of being a witch and arrested. Under torture he confessed that he personally had flown on a broomstick and signed a pact with the devil and that it was Satan who commissioned him to preach that witchcraft was an illusion. His judges were lenient with him; he was spared execution and got life imprisonment instead.83

    The witch hunts illustrate the dark side of creating an information sphere. As with rabbinical discussions of the Talmud and scholastic discussions of Christian scriptures, the witch hunts were fueled by an expanding ocean of information that instead of representing reality created a new reality. Witches were not an objective reality. Nobody in early modern Europe had sex with Satan or was capable of flying on broomsticks and creating hailstorms. But witches became an intersubjective reality. Like money, witches were made real by exchanging information about witches.

    An entire witch-hunting bureaucracy dedicated itself to such exchanges. Theologians, lawyers, inquisitors, and the owners of printing presses made a living by collecting and producing information about witches, cataloging different species of witches, investigating how witches behaved, and recommending how they could be exposed and defeated. Professional witch-hunters offered their services to governments and municipalities, charging large sums of money. Archives were filled by detailed reports of witch-hunting expeditions, protocols of witch trials, and lengthy confessions extracted from the alleged witches.

    Expert witch-hunters used all that data to refine their theories further. Like scholars arguing about the correct interpretation of scripture, the witch-hunters debated the correct interpretation of The Hammer of the Witches and other influential books. The witch-hunting bureaucracy did what bureaucracy often does: it invented the intersubjective category of “witches” and imposed it on reality. It even printed forms, with standard accusations and confessions of witchcraft and blank spaces left for dates, names, and the signature of the accused. All that information produced a lot of order and power; it was a means for certain people to gain authority and for society as a whole to discipline its members. But it produced zero truth and zero wisdom.

    As the witch-hunting bureaucracy generated more and more information, it became harder to dismiss all that information as pure fantasy. Could it be that the entire silo of witch-hunting data did not contain a single grain of truth in it? What about all the books written by learned churchmen? What about all the protocols of trials conducted by esteemed judges? What about the tens of thousands of documented confessions?

    The new intersubjective reality was so convincing that even some people accused of witchcraft came to believe that they were indeed part of a worldwide satanic conspiracy. If everybody said so, it must be true. As discussed in chapter 2, humans are susceptible to adopting fake memories. At least some early modern Europeans dreamed or fantasized about summoning devils, having sex with Satan, and practicing witchcraft, and when accused of being witches, they confused their dreams and fantasies with reality.84

    Consequently, even as the witch hunts reached their ghastly crescendo in the early seventeenth century, and many people suspected that something was clearly wrong, it was difficult to reject the whole thing as pure fantasy. One of the worst witch-hunting episodes in early modern Europe occurred in the towns of Bamberg and Würzburg in southern Germany in the late 1620s. In Bamberg, a city of fewer than 12,000 at the time,85 up to 900 innocent people were executed from 1625 to 1631.86 In Würzburg another 1,200 people were tortured and killed, out of a population of around 11,500.87 In August 1629, the chancellor of the prince-bishop of Würzburg wrote a letter to a friend about the ongoing witch hunt, in which he confessed his doubts about the matter. The letter is worth quoting at length:

    As to the affair of the witches … it has started up afresh, and no words can do justice to it. Ah, the woe and the misery of it—there are still four hundred in the city, high and low, of every rank and sex, nay, even clerics, so strongly accused that they may be arrested at any hour.… The Prince-Bishop has over forty students who are soon to be pastors; among them thirteen or fourteen are said to be witches. A few days ago a Dean was arrested; two others who were summoned have fled. The notary of our Church consistory, a very learned man, was yesterday arrested and put to the torture. In a word, a third part of the city is surely involved. The richest, most attractive, most prominent, of the clergy are already executed. A week ago a maiden of nineteen was executed, of whom it is everywhere said that she was the fairest in the whole city, and was held by everybody a girl of singular modesty and purity. She will be followed by seven or eight others of the best and most attractive persons.… And thus many are put to death for renouncing God and being at the witch-dances, against whom nobody has ever else spoken a word.

    To conclude this wretched matter, there are children of three and four years, to the number of three hundred, who are said to have had intercourse with the Devil. I have seen put to death children of seven, promising students of ten, twelve, fourteen, and fifteen.… [B]ut I cannot and must not write more of this misery.

    The chancellor then added this interesting postscript to the letter:

    Though there are many wonderful and terrible things happening, it is beyond doubt that, at a place called the Fraw-Rengberg, the Devil in person, with eight thousand of his followers, held an assembly and celebrated mass before them all, administering to his audience (that is, the witches) turnip-rinds and parings in place of the Holy Eucharist. There took place not only foul but most horrible and hideous blasphemies, whereof I shudder to write.88

    Even after expressing his horror at the insanity of the witch hunt in Würzburg, the chancellor nevertheless expressed his firm belief in the satanic conspiracy of witches. He didn’t witness any witchcraft firsthand, but so much information about witches was circulating that it was difficult for him to doubt all of it. Witch hunts were a catastrophe caused by the spread of toxic information. They are a prime example of a problem that was created by information, and was made worse by more information.

    This was a conclusion reached not just by modern scholars but also by some perceptive observers at the time. Alonso de Salazar Frías, a Spanish inquisitor, made a thorough investigation of witch hunts and witch trials in the early seventeenth century. He concluded that “I have not found one single proof nor even the slightest indication from which to infer that one act of witchcraft has actually taken place,” and that “there were neither witches nor bewitched until they were talked and written about.”89 Salazar Frías well understood the meaning of intersubjective realities and correctly identified the entire witch-hunting industry as an intersubjective information sphere.

    The history of the early modern European witch craze demonstrates that releasing barriers to the flow of information doesn’t necessarily lead to the discovery and spread of truth. It can just as easily lead to the spread of lies and fantasies and to the creation of toxic information spheres. More specifically, a completely free market of ideas may incentivize the dissemination of outrage and sensationalism at the expense of truth. It is not difficult to understand why. Printers and booksellers made a lot more money from the lurid tales of The Hammer of the Witches than they did from the dull mathematics of Copernicus’s On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres. The latter was one of the founding texts of the modern scientific tradition. It is credited with earth-shattering discoveries that displaced our planet from the center of the universe and thereby initiated the Copernican revolution. But when it was first published in 1543, its initial print run of four hundred failed to sell out, and it took until 1566 for a second edition to be published in a similar-sized print run. The third edition did not appear until 1617. As Arthur Koestler quipped, it was an all-time worst seller.90 What really got the scientific revolution going was neither the printing press nor a completely free market of information, but rather a novel approach to the problem of human fallibility.

    THE DISCOVERY OF IGNORANCE

    The history of print and witch-hunting indicates that an unregulated information market doesn’t necessarily lead people to identify and correct their errors, because it may well prioritize outrage over truth. For truth to win, it is necessary to establish curation institutions that have the power to tilt the balance in favor of the facts. However, as the history of the Catholic Church indicates, such institutions might use their curation power to quash any criticism of themselves, labeling all alternative views erroneous and preventing the institution’s own errors from being exposed and corrected. Is it possible to establish better curation institutions that use their power to further the pursuit of truth rather than to accumulate more power for themselves?

    Early modern Europe saw the foundation of exactly such curation institutions, and it was these institutions—rather than the printing press or specific books like On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres—that constituted the bedrock of the scientific revolution. These key curation institutions were not the universities. Many of the most important leaders of the scientific revolution were not university professors. Nicolaus Copernicus, Robert Boyle, Tycho Brahe, and René Descartes, for example, held no academic positions. Nor did Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Voltaire, Diderot, or Rousseau.

    The curation institutions that played a central role in the scientific revolution connected scholars and researchers both in and out of universities, forging an information network that spanned the whole of Europe and eventually the world. For the scientific revolution to gather pace, scientists had to trust information published by colleagues in distant lands. This kind of trust in the work of people whom one had never met was evident in scientific associations like the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge, founded in 1660, and the French Académie des Sciences (1666); scientific journals like the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society (1665) and the Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences (1699); and scientific publishers like the architects of the Encyclopédie (1751–72). These institutions curated information on the basis of empirical evidence, bringing attention to the discoveries of Copernicus rather than to the fantasies of Kramer. When a paper was submitted to the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, the lead question the editors asked was not, “How many people would pay to read this?” but, “What proof is there that it is true?”

    At first, these new institutions seemed as flimsy as cobwebs, lacking the power necessary to reshape human society. Unlike the witch-hunting experts, the editors of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society could not torture and execute anyone. And unlike the Catholic Church, the Académie des Sciences did not command huge territories and budgets. But scientific institutions did accrue influence thanks to a very original claim to trust. A church typically told people to trust it because it possessed the absolute truth, in the form of an infallible holy book. A scientific institution, in contrast, gained authority because it had strong self-correcting mechanisms that exposed and rectified the errors of the institution itself. It was these self-correcting mechanisms, not the technology of printing, that were the engine of the scientific revolution.

    In other words, the scientific revolution was launched by the discovery of ignorance.91 Religions of the book assumed that they had access to an infallible source of knowledge. The Christians had the Bible, the Muslims had the Quran, the Hindus had the Vedas, and the Buddhists had the Tipitaka. Scientific culture has no comparable holy book, nor does it claim that any of its heroes are infallible prophets, saints, or geniuses. The scientific project starts by rejecting the fantasy of infallibility and proceeding to construct an information network that takes error to be inescapable. Sure, there is much talk about the genius of Copernicus, Darwin, and Einstein, but none of them is considered faultless. They all made mistakes, and even the most celebrated scientific tracts are sure to contain errors and lacunae.

    Since even geniuses suffer from confirmation bias, you cannot trust them to correct their own errors. Science is a team effort, relying on institutional collaboration rather than on individual scientists or, say, a single infallible book. Of course, institutions too are prone to error. Scientific institutions are nevertheless different from religious institutions, inasmuch as they reward skepticism and innovation rather than conformity. Scientific institutions are also different from conspiracy theories, inasmuch as they reward self-skepticism. Conspiracy theorists tend to be extremely skeptical regarding the existing consensus, but when it comes to their own beliefs, they lose all their skepticism and fall prey to confirmation bias.92 The trademark of science is not merely skepticism but self-skepticism, and at the heart of every scientific institution we find a strong self-correcting mechanism. Scientific institutions do reach a broad consensus about the accuracy of certain theories—such as quantum mechanics or the theory of evolution—but only because these theories have managed to survive intense efforts to disprove them, launched not only by outsiders but by members of the institution itself.

    SELF-CORRECTING MECHANISMS

    As an information technology, the self-correcting mechanism is the polar opposite of the holy book. The holy book is supposed to be infallible. The self-correcting mechanism embraces fallibility. By self-correcting, I refer to mechanisms that an entity uses to correct itself. A teacher correcting a student’s essay is not a self-correcting mechanism; the student isn’t correcting their own essay. A judge sending a criminal to prison is not a self-correcting mechanism; the criminal isn’t exposing their own crime. When the Allies defeated and dismantled the Nazi regime, this was not a self-correcting mechanism; left to its own devices, Germany would not have denazified itself. But when a scientific journal publishes a paper correcting a mistake that appeared in a previous paper, that’s an example of an institution self-correcting its own errors.

    Self-correcting mechanisms are ubiquitous in nature. Children learn how to walk thanks to them. You make a wrong move, you fall, you learn from your mistake, you try doing it a little differently. Sure, sometimes parents and teachers give the child a hand or offer advice, but a child who relies entirely on such external corrections or keeps excusing mistakes instead of learning from them will find it very difficult to walk. Indeed, even as adults, every time we walk, our body engages in an intricate process of self-correction. As our body navigates through space, internal feedback loops between brain, limbs, and sensory organs keep our legs and hands in their proper place and our balance just right.93

    Many other bodily processes require constant self-correction. Our blood pressure, temperature, sugar levels, and numerous other parameters must be given some leeway to change in accordance with varying circumstances, but they should never go above or below certain critical thresholds. Our blood pressure needs to increase when we run, to decrease when we sleep, but must always keep within certain bounds.94 Our body manages this delicate biochemical dance through a host of homeostatic self-correcting mechanisms. If our blood pressure goes too high, the self-correcting mechanisms lower it. If our blood pressure is dangerously low, the self-correcting mechanisms raise it. If the self-correcting mechanisms go out of order, we could die.95

    Institutions, too, die without self-correcting mechanisms. These mechanisms start with the realization that humans are fallible and corruptible. But instead of despairing of humans and looking for a way to bypass them, the institution actively seeks its own errors and corrects them. All institutions that manage to endure beyond a handful of years possess such mechanisms, but institutions differ greatly in the strength and visibility of their self-correcting mechanisms.

    For example, the Catholic Church is an institution with relatively weak self-correcting mechanisms. Since it claims infallibility, it cannot admit institutional mistakes. It is occasionally willing to acknowledge that some of its members have erred or sinned, but the institution itself allegedly remains perfect. For example, in the Second Vatican Council in 1964, the Catholic Church acknowledged that “Christ summons the Church to continual reformation as she sojourns here on earth. The Church is always in need of this, insofar as she is an institution of men here on earth. Thus if, in various times and circumstances, there have been deficiencies in moral conduct or in church discipline, or even in the way that church teaching has been formulated—to be carefully distinguished from the deposit of faith itself—these can and should be set right at the opportune moment.”96

    This admission sounds promising, but the devil is in the details, specifically in the refusal to countenance the possibility of any deficiency in “the deposit of faith.” In Catholic dogma “the deposit of faith” refers to the body of revealed truth that the church has received from scriptures and from its sacred tradition of interpreting scripture. The Catholic Church acknowledges that priests are fallible humans who can sin and can also make mistakes in the way they formulate church teachings. However, the holy book itself can never err. What does this imply about the entire church as an institution that combines fallible humans with an infallible text?

    According to Catholic dogma, biblical infallibility and divine guidance trump human corruption, so even though individual members of the church may err and sin, the Catholic Church as an institution is never wrong. Allegedly, never in history did God allow the majority of church leaders to make a serious mistake in their interpretation of the holy book. This principle is common to many religions. Jewish Orthodoxy accepted the possibility that the rabbis who composed the Mishnah and Talmud might have erred in personal matters, but when they came to decree religious doctrine, God ensured that they would make no mistake.97 In Islam there is an analogous principle known as Ijma. According to one important Hadith, Muhammad said that “Allah will ensure my community will never agree on error.”98

    In Catholicism, alleged institutional perfection is enshrined most clearly in the doctrine of papal infallibility, which says that while in personal matters popes may err, in their institutional role they are infallible.99 For example, Pope Alexander VI erred in breaking his vow of celibacy, having a mistress and siring several children, yet when defining official church teachings on matters of ethics or theology, he was incapable of mistake.

    In line with these views, the Catholic Church has always employed a self-correcting mechanism to supervise its human members in their personal affairs, but it never developed a mechanism for amending the Bible or for amending its “deposit of faith.” This attitude is manifest in the few formal apologies the Catholic Church issued for its past conduct. In recent decades, several popes apologized for the mistreatment of Jews, women, non-Catholic Christians, and indigenous cultures, as well as for more specific events such as the sacking of Constantinople in 1204 and the abuse of children in Catholic schools. It is commendable that the Catholic Church made such apologies at all; religious institutions rarely do so. Nevertheless, in all these cases, the popes were careful to shift responsibility away from scriptures and from the church as an institution. Instead, the blame was laid on the shoulders of individual churchmen who misinterpreted scriptures and deviated from the true teachings of the church.

    For example, in March 2000, Pope John Paul II conducted a special ceremony in which he asked forgiveness for a long list of historical crimes against Jews, heretics, women, and indigenous people. He apologized “for the use of violence that some have committed in the service of truth.” This terminology implied that the violence was the fault of “some” misguided individuals who didn’t understand the truth taught by the church. The pope didn’t accept the possibility that perhaps these individuals understood exactly what the church was teaching and that these teachings just were not the truth.100

    Similarly, when Pope Francis apologized in 2022 for the abuses against indigenous people in Canada’s church-run residential schools, he said, “I ask for forgiveness, in particular, for the ways in which many members of the church … cooperated … in projects of cultural destruction and forced assimilation.”101 Note his careful shifting of responsibility. The fault lay with “many members of the church,” not with the church and its teachings. As if it were never official church doctrine to destroy indigenous cultures and forcefully convert people.

    In fact, it wasn’t a few wayward priests who launched the Crusades, imposed laws that discriminated against Jews and women, or orchestrated the systematic annihilation of indigenous religions throughout the world.102 The writings of many revered church fathers, and the official decrees of many popes and church councils, are full of passages disparaging “pagan” and “heretical” religions, calling for their destruction, discriminating against their members, and legitimizing the use of violence to convert people to Christianity.103 For example, in 1452 Pope Nicholas V issued the Dum Diversas bull, addressed to King Afonso V of Portugal and other Catholic monarchs. The bull said, “We grant you by these present documents, with our Apostolic Authority, full and free permission to invade, search out, capture, and subjugate the Saracens and pagans and any other unbelievers and enemies of Christ wherever they may be, as well as their kingdoms, duchies, counties, principalities, and other property … and to reduce their persons into perpetual servitude.”104 This official proclamation, repeated numerous times by subsequent popes, laid the theological basis for European imperialism and the destruction of native cultures across the world. Of course, though the church doesn’t acknowledge it officially, over time it has changed its institutional structures, its core teachings, and its interpretation of scripture. The Catholic Church of today is far less antisemitic and misogynist than it was in medieval and early modern times. Pope Francis is far more tolerant of indigenous cultures than Pope Nicholas V. There is an institutional self-correcting mechanism at work here, which reacts both to external pressures and to internal soul-searching. But what characterizes self-correcting in institutions like the Catholic Church is that even when it happens, it is denied rather than celebrated. The first rule of changing church teachings is that you never admit changing church teachings.

    You would never hear a pope announcing to the world, “Our experts have just discovered a really big error in the Bible. We’ll soon issue an updated edition.” Instead, when asked about the church’s more generous attitude to Jews or women, popes imply that this was always what the church really taught, even if some individual churchmen previously failed to understand the message correctly. Denying the existence of self-correction doesn’t entirely stop it from happening, but it does weaken and slow it. Because the correction of past mistakes is not acknowledged, let alone celebrated, when the faithful encounter another serious problem in the institution and its teachings, they are paralyzed by fear of changing something that is supposedly eternal and infallible. They cannot benefit from the example of previous changes.

    For instance, when Catholics like Pope Francis himself are now reconsidering the church’s teachings on homosexuality,105 they find it difficult to simply acknowledge past mistakes and change the teachings. If eventually a future pope would issue an apology for the mistreatment of LGBTQ people, the way to do it would be to again shift the blame to the shoulders of some overzealous individuals who misunderstood the gospel. To maintain its religious authority the Catholic Church has had no choice but to deny the existence of institutional self-correction. For the church fell into the infallibility trap. Once it based its religious authority on a claim to infallibility, any public admission of institutional error—even on relatively minor issues—could completely destroy its authority.

    THE DSM AND THE BIBLE

    In contrast to the Catholic Church, the scientific institutions that emerged in early modern Europe have been built around strong self-correcting mechanisms. Scientific institutions maintain that even if most scientists in a particular period believe something to be true, it may yet turn out to be inaccurate or incomplete. In the nineteenth century most physicists accepted Newtonian physics as a comprehensive account of the universe, but in the twentieth century the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics exposed the inaccuracies and limitations of Newton’s model.106 The most celebrated moments in the history of science are precisely those moments when accepted wisdom is overturned and new theories are born.

    Crucially, scientific institutions are willing to admit their institutional responsibility for major mistakes and crimes. For example, present-day universities routinely give courses, and professional journals routinely publish articles, that expose the institutional racism and sexism that characterized the scientific study of subjects like biology, anthropology, and history in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries. Research on individual test cases such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, and on governmental policies ranging from the White Australia policy to the Holocaust, have repeatedly and extensively studied how flawed biological, anthropological, and historical theories developed in leading scientific institutions were used to justify and facilitate discrimination, imperialism, and even genocide. These crimes and errors are not blamed on a few misguided scholars. They are seen as an institutional failure of entire academic disciplines.107

    The willingness to admit major institutional errors contributes to the relatively fast pace at which science is developing. When the available evidence justifies it, dominant theories are often discarded within a few generations, to be replaced by new theories. What students of biology, anthropology, and history learn at university in the early twenty-first century is very different from what they learned there a century previously.

    Psychiatry offers numerous similar examples for strong self-correcting mechanisms. On the shelf of most psychiatrists you can find the DSM—the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. It is occasionally nicknamed the psychiatrists’ bible. But there is a crucial difference between the DSM and the Bible. First published in 1952, the DSM is revised every decade or two, with the fifth edition appearing in 2013. Over the years, the definition of many disorders has changed, new ones have been added, while others have been deleted. Homosexuality, for example, was listed in 1952 as a sociopathic personality disturbance, but removed from the DSM in 1974. It took just twenty-two years to correct this error in the DSM. That’s not a holy book. That’s a scientific text.

    Today the discipline of psychiatry doesn’t try to reinterpret the 1952 definition of homosexuality in a more benign spirit. Rather, it views the 1952 definition as a downright error. More important, the error is not attributed to the shortcomings of a few homophobic professors. Rather, it is acknowledged to be the result of deep institutional biases in the discipline of psychiatry.108 Confessing the past institutional errors of their discipline makes psychiatrists today more careful not to commit new such errors, as evidenced in the heated debate regarding transgender people and people on the autistic spectrum. Of course, no matter how careful they are, psychiatrists are still likely to make institutional mistakes. But they are also likely to acknowledge and correct them.109

    PUBLISH OR PERISH

    What makes scientific self-correcting mechanisms particularly strong is that scientific institutions are not just willing to admit institutional error and ignorance; they are actively seeking to expose them. This is evident in the institutions’ incentive structure. In religious institutions, members are incentivized to conform to existing doctrine and be suspicious of novelty. You become a rabbi, imam, or priest by professing doctrinal loyalty, and you can advance up the ranks to become pope, chief rabbi, or grand ayatollah without criticizing your predecessors or advancing any radical new notions. Indeed, many of the most powerful and admired religious leaders of recent times—such as Pope Benedict XVI, Chief Rabbi of Israel David Lau, and Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran—have won fame and supporters by strict resistance to new ideas and trends like feminism.110

    In science it works the other way around. Hiring and promotions in scientific institutions are based on the principle of “publish or perish,” and to publish in prestigious journals, you must expose some mistake in existing theories or discover something your predecessors and teachers didn’t know. Nobody wins a Nobel Prize for faithfully repeating what previous scholars said and opposing every new scientific theory.

    Of course, just as religion has room for self-correcting, so science has ample room for conformism, too. Science is an institutional enterprise, and scientists rely on the institution for almost everything they know. For example, how do I know what medieval and early modern Europeans thought about witchcraft? I have not visited all the relevant archives myself, nor have I read all the relevant primary sources. In fact, I am incapable of reading many of these sources directly, because I do not know all the necessary languages, nor am I skilled in deciphering medieval and early modern handwriting. Instead, I have relied on books and articles published by other scholars, such as Ronald Hutton’s book The Witch: A History of Fear, which was published by Yale University Press in 2017.

    I haven’t met Ronald Hutton, who is a professor of history at the University of Bristol, nor do I personally know the Bristol officials who hired him or the Yale editorial team who published his book. I nevertheless trust what I read in Hutton’s book, because I understand how institutions like the University of Bristol and Yale University Press operate. Their self-correcting mechanisms have two crucial features: First, the self-correcting mechanisms are built into the core of the institutions rather than being a peripheral add-on. Second, these institutions publicly celebrate self-correcting instead of denying it. It is of course possible that some of the information I gained from Hutton’s book may be incorrect, or I myself may misinterpret it. But experts on the history of witchcraft who have read Hutton’s book and who might be reading the present book will hopefully spot any such errors and expose them.

    Populist critics of scientific institutions may counter that, in fact, these institutions use their power to stifle unorthodox views and launch their own witch hunts against dissenters. It is certainly true that if a scholar opposes the current orthodox view of their discipline, it might sometimes have negative consequences: articles rejected, research grants denied, nasty ad hominem attacks, and in rare cases even getting fired from their job.111 I do not wish to belittle the suffering such things cause, but it is still a far cry from being physically tortured and burned at the stake.

    Consider, for example, the story of the chemist Dan Shechtman. In April 1982, while observing through an electron microscope, Shechtman saw something that all contemporary theories in chemistry claimed simply could not exist: the atoms in a mixed sample of aluminum and manganese were crystallized in a pattern with a five-fold rotational symmetry. At the time, scientists knew of various possible symmetrical structures in solid crystals, but five-fold symmetry was considered against the very laws of nature. Shechtman’s discovery of what came to be called quasicrystals sounded so outlandish that it was difficult to find a peer-reviewed journal willing to publish it. It didn’t help that Shechtman was at the time a junior scientist. He didn’t even have his own laboratory; he was working in someone’s else facility. But the editors of the journal Physical Review Letters, after reviewing the evidence, eventually published Shechtman’s article in 1984.112 And then, as he describes it, “all hell broke loose.”

    Shechtman’s claims were dismissed by most of his colleagues, and he was blamed for mismanaging his experiments. The head of his laboratory also turned on Shechtman. In a dramatic gesture, he placed a chemistry textbook on Shechtman’s desk and told him, “Danny, please read this book and you will understand that what you are saying cannot be.” Shechtman boldly replied that he saw the quasicrystals in the microscope—not in the book. As a result, he was kicked out of the lab. Worse was to come. Linus Pauling, a two-time Nobel laureate and one of the most eminent scientists of the twentieth century, led a brutal personal attack on Shechtman. In a conference attended by hundreds of scientists, Pauling proclaimed, “Danny Shechtman is talking nonsense, there are no quasicrystals, just quasi-scientists.”

    But Shechtman was not imprisoned or killed. He got a place in another lab. The evidence he presented turned out to be more convincing than the existing chemistry textbooks and the views of Linus Pauling. Several colleagues repeated Shechtman’s experiments and replicated his findings. A mere ten years after Shechtman saw the quasicrystals through his microscope, the International Union of Crystallography—the leading scientific association in the field—altered its definition of what a crystal is. Chemistry textbooks were changed accordingly, and an entire new scientific field emerged—the study of quasicrystals. In 2011, Shechtman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his discovery.113 The Nobel Committee said that “his discovery was extremely controversial [but] eventually forced scientists to reconsider their conception of the very nature of matter.”114

    Shechtman’s story is hardly exceptional. The annals of science are full of similar cases. Before the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics became the cornerstones of twentieth-century physics, they initially provoked bitter controversies, including personal assaults by the old guard on the proponents of the new theories. Similarly, when Georg Cantor developed in the late nineteenth century his theory of infinite numbers, which became the basis for much of twentieth-century mathematics, he was personally attacked by some of the leading mathematicians of his day like Henri Poincaré and Leopold Kronecker. Populists are right to think that scientists suffer from the same human biases as everyone else. However, thanks to institutional self-correcting mechanisms these biases can be overcome. If enough empirical evidence is provided, it often takes just a few decades for an unorthodox theory to upend established wisdom and become the new consensus.

    As we shall see in the next chapter, there were times and places where scientific self-correcting mechanisms ceased functioning and academic dissent could lead to physical torture, imprisonment, and death. In the Soviet Union, for example, questioning official dogma on any matter—economics, genetics, or history—could lead not only to dismissal but even to a couple of years in the gulag or an executioner’s bullet.115 A famous case involved the bogus theories of the agronomist Trofim Lysenko. He rejected mainstream genetics and the theory of evolution by natural selection and advanced his own pet theory, which said that “re-education” could change the traits of plants and animals, and even transform one species into another. Lysenkoism greatly appealed to Stalin, who had ideological and political reasons for believing in the almost limitless potential of “re-education.” Thousands of scientists who opposed Lysenko and continued to uphold the theory of evolution by natural selection were dismissed from their jobs, and some were imprisoned or executed. Nikolai Vavilov, a botanist and geneticist who was Lysenko’s former mentor turned critic, was tried in July 1941 along with the botanist Leonid Govorov, the geneticist Georgii Karpechenko, and the agronomist Aleksandr Bondarenko. The latter three were shot, while Vavilov died in a camp in Saratov in 1943.116 Under pressure from the dictator, the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences eventually announced in August 1948 that henceforth Soviet institutions would teach Lysenkoism as the only correct theory.117

    But for precisely this reason, the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences ceased being a scientific institution, and Soviet dogma on genetics was an ideology rather than a science. An institution can call itself by whatever name it wants, but if it lacks a strong self-correcting mechanism, it is not a scientific institution.

    THE LIMITS OF SELF-CORRECTION

    Does all this mean that in self-correcting mechanisms we have found the magic bullet that protects human information networks from error and bias? Unfortunately, things are far more complicated. There is a reason why institutions like the Catholic Church and the Soviet Communist Party eschewed strong self-correcting mechanisms. While such mechanisms are vital for the pursuit of truth, they are costly in terms of maintaining order. Strong self-correcting mechanisms tend to create doubts, disagreements, conflicts, and rifts and to undermine the myths that hold the social order together.

    Of course, order by itself isn’t necessarily good. For example, the social order of early modern Europe endorsed, among other things, not only witch hunts but also the exploitation of millions of peasants by a handful of aristocrats, the systematic mistreatment of women, and widespread discrimination against Jews, Muslims, and other minorities. But even when the social order is highly oppressive, undermining it doesn’t necessarily lead to a better place. It could just lead to chaos and worse oppression. The history of information networks has always involved maintaining a balance between truth and order. Just as sacrificing truth for the sake of order comes with a cost, so does sacrificing order for truth.

    Scientific institutions have been able to afford their strong self-correcting mechanisms because they leave the difficult job of preserving the social order to other institutions. If a thief breaks into a chemistry lab, or a psychiatrist receives death threats, they don’t complain to a peer-reviewed journal; they call the police. Is it possible, then, to maintain strong self-correcting mechanisms in institutions other than academic disciplines? In particular, can such mechanisms exist in institutions like police forces, armies, political parties, and governments that are charged with maintaining the social order?

    We’ll explore this question in the next chapter, which focuses on the political aspects of information flows and examines the long-term history of democracies and dictatorships. As we shall see, democracies believe that it is possible to maintain strong self-correcting mechanisms even in politics. Dictatorships disavow such mechanisms. Thus, at the height of the Cold War, newspapers and universities in the democratic United States openly exposed and criticized American war crimes in Vietnam. Newspapers and universities in the totalitarian Soviet Union were also happy to criticize American crimes, but they remained silent about Soviet crimes in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Soviet silence was scientifically unjustifiable, but it made political sense. American self-flagellation about the Vietnam War continues even today to divide the American public and to undermine America’s reputation throughout the world, whereas Soviet and Russian silence about the Afghanistan War has helped dim its memory and limit its reputational costs.

    Only after understanding the politics of information in historical systems like ancient Athens, the Roman Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union will we be ready to explore the revolutionary implications of the rise of AI. For one of the biggest questions about AI is whether it will favor or undermine democratic self-correcting mechanisms.

    CHAPTER 5 Decisions: A Brief History of Democracy and Totalitarianism

    Democracy and dictatorship are typically discussed as contrasting political and ethical systems. This chapter seeks to shift the terms of the discussion, by surveying the history of democracy and dictatorship as contrasting types of information networks. It examines how information in democracies flows differently than in dictatorial systems and how inventing new information technologies helps different kinds of regimes flourish.

    Dictatorial information networks are highly centralized.1 This means two things. First, the center enjoys unlimited authority, hence information tends to flow to the central hub, where the most important decisions are made. In the Roman Empire all roads led to Rome, in Nazi Germany information flowed to Berlin, and in the Soviet Union it streamed to Moscow. Sometimes the central government attempts to concentrate all information in its hands and to dictate all decisions by itself, controlling the totality of people’s lives. This totalizing form of dictatorship, practiced by the likes of Hitler and Stalin, is known as totalitarianism. As we shall see, technical difficulties often prevent dictators from becoming totalitarian. The Roman emperor Nero, for example, didn’t have the technology necessary to micromanage the lives of millions of peasants in remote provincial villages. In many dictatorial regimes considerable autonomy is therefore left to individuals, corporations, and communities. However, the dictators always retain the authority to intervene in people’s lives. In Nero’s Rome freedom was not an ideal but a by-product of the government’s inability to exert totalitarian control.

    The second characteristic of dictatorial networks is that they assume the center is infallible. They therefore dislike any challenge to the center’s decisions. Soviet propaganda depicted Stalin as an infallible genius, and Roman propaganda treated emperors as divine beings. Even when Stalin or Nero made a patently disastrous decision, there were no robust self-correcting mechanisms in the Soviet Union or the Roman Empire that could expose the mistake and push for a better course of action.

    In theory, a highly centralized information network could try to maintain strong self-correcting mechanisms, like independent courts and elected legislative bodies. But if they functioned well, these would challenge the central authority and thereby decentralize the information network. Dictators always see such independent power hubs as threats and seek to neutralize them. This is what happened to the Roman Senate, whose power was whittled away by successive Caesars until it became little more than a rubber stamp for imperial whims.2 The same fate befell the Soviet judicial system, which never dared resist the will of the Communist Party. Stalinist show trials, as their name indicates, were theater with preordained results.3

    To summarize, a dictatorship is a centralized information network, lacking strong self-correcting mechanisms. A democracy, in contrast, is a distributed information network, possessing strong self-correcting mechanisms. When we look at a democratic information network, we do see a central hub. The government is the most important executive power in a democracy, and government agencies therefore gather and store vast quantities of information. But there are many additional information channels that connect lots of independent nodes. Legislative bodies, political parties, courts, the press, corporations, local communities, NGOs, and individual citizens communicate freely and directly with one another so that most information never passes through any government agency and many important decisions are made elsewhere. Individuals choose for themselves where to live, where to work, and whom to marry. Corporations make their own choices about where to open a branch, how much to invest in certain projects, and how much to charge for goods and services. Communities decide for themselves about organizing charities, sporting events, and religious festivals. Autonomy is not a consequence of the government’s ineffectiveness; it is the democratic ideal.

    Even if it possesses the technology necessary to micromanage people’s lives, a democratic government leaves as much room as possible for people to make their own choices. A common misconception is that in a democracy everything is decided by majority vote. In fact, in a democracy as little as possible is decided centrally, and only the relatively few decisions that must be made centrally should reflect the will of the majority. In a democracy, if 99 percent of people want to dress in a particular way and worship a particular god, the remaining 1 percent should still be free to dress and worship differently.

    Of course, if the central government doesn’t intervene at all in people’s lives, and doesn’t provide them with basic services like security, it isn’t a democracy; it is anarchy. In all democracies the center raises taxes and maintains an army, and in most modern democracies it also provides at least some level of health care, education, and welfare. But any intervention in people’s lives demands an explanation. In the absence of a compelling reason, a democratic government should leave people to their own devices.

    Another crucial characteristic of democracies is that they assume everyone is fallible. Therefore, while democracies give the center the authority to make some vital decisions, they also maintain strong mechanisms that can challenge the central authority. To paraphrase President James Madison, since humans are fallible, a government is necessary, but since government too is fallible, it needs mechanisms to expose and correct its errors, such as holding regular elections, protecting the freedom of the press, and separating the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.

    Consequently, while a dictatorship is about one central information hub dictating everything, a democracy is an ongoing conversation between diverse information nodes. The nodes often influence each other, but in most matters they are not obliged to reach a consensus. Individuals, corporations, and communities can continue to think and behave in different ways. There are, of course, cases when everyone must behave the same, and diversity cannot be tolerated. For example, when in 2002–3 Americans disagreed about whether to invade Iraq, everyone ultimately had to abide by a single decision. It was unacceptable that some Americans would maintain a private peace with Saddam Hussein while others declared war. Whether good or bad, the decision to invade Iraq committed every American citizen. So also when initiating national infrastructure projects or defining criminal offenses. No country can function well if every person is allowed to lay a separate rail network or to have their own definition of murder.

    In order to make decisions on such collective matters, a countrywide public conversation must first be held, following which the people’s representatives—elected in free and fair elections—make a choice. But even after that choice has been made, it should remain open to reexamination and correction. While the network cannot change its previous choices, it can elect a different government next time.

    MAJORITY DICTATORSHIP

    The definition of democracy as a distributed information network with strong self-correcting mechanisms stands in sharp contrast to a common misconception that equates democracy only with elections. Elections are a central part of the democratic tool kit, but they are not democracy. In the absence of additional self-correcting mechanisms, elections can easily be rigged. Even if the elections are completely free and fair, by itself this too doesn’t guarantee democracy. For democracy is not the same thing as majority dictatorship.

    Suppose that in a free and fair election 51 percent of voters choose a government that subsequently sends 1 percent of voters to be exterminated in death camps, because they belong to some hated religious minority. Is this democratic? Clearly it is not. The problem isn’t that genocide demands a special majority of more than 51 percent. It’s not that if the government gets the backing of 60 percent, 75 percent, or even 99 percent of voters, then its death camps finally become democratic. A democracy is not a system in which a majority of any size can decide to exterminate unpopular minorities; it is a system in which there are clear limits on the power of the center.

    Suppose 51 percent of voters choose a government that then takes away the voting rights of the other 49 percent of voters, or perhaps of just 1 percent of them. Is that democratic? Again the answer is no, and it has nothing to do with the numbers. Disenfranchising political rivals dismantles one of the vital self-correcting mechanisms of democratic networks. Elections are a mechanism for the network to say, “We made a mistake; let’s try something else.” But if the center can disenfranchise people at will, that self-correcting mechanism is neutered.

    These two examples may sound outlandish, but they are unfortunately within the realm of the possible. Hitler began sending Jews and communists to concentration camps within months of rising to power through democratic elections, and in the United States numerous democratically elected governments have disenfranchised African Americans, Native Americans, and other oppressed populations. Of course, most assaults on democracy are more subtle. The careers of strongmen like Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orbán, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Rodrigo Duterte, Jair Bolsonaro, and Benjamin Netanyahu demonstrate how a leader who uses democracy to rise to power can then use his power to undermine democracy. As Erdoğan once put it, “Democracy is like a tram. You ride it until you arrive at your destination, then you step off.”4

    The most common method strongmen use to undermine democracy is to attack its self-correcting mechanisms one by one, often beginning with the courts and the media. The typical strongman either deprives courts of their powers or packs them with his loyalists and seeks to close all independent media outlets while building his own omnipresent propaganda machine.5

    Once the courts are no longer able to check the government’s power by legal means, and once the media obediently parrots the government line, all other institutions or persons who dare oppose the government can be smeared and persecuted as traitors, criminals, or foreign agents. Academic institutions, municipalities, NGOs, and private businesses are either dismantled or brought under government control. At that stage, the government can also rig the elections at will, for example by jailing popular opposition leaders, preventing opposition parties from participating in the elections, gerrymandering election districts, or disenfranchising voters. Appeals against these antidemocratic measures are dismissed by the government’s handpicked judges. Journalists and academics who criticize these measures are fired. The remaining media outlets, academic institutions, and judicial authorities all praise these measures as necessary steps to protect the nation and its allegedly democratic system from traitors and foreign agents. The strongmen don’t usually take the final step of abolishing the elections outright. Instead, they keep them as a ritual that serves to provide legitimacy and maintain a democratic facade, as happens, for example, in Putin’s Russia.

    Supporters of strongmen often don’t see this process as antidemocratic. They are genuinely baffled when told that electoral victory doesn’t grant them unlimited power. Instead, they see any check on the power of an elected government as undemocratic. However, democracy doesn’t mean majority rule; rather, it means freedom and equality for all. Democracy is a system that guarantees everyone certain liberties, which even the majority cannot take away.

    Nobody disputes that in a democracy the representatives of the majority are entitled to form the government and to advance their preferred policies in myriad fields. If the majority wants war, the country goes to war. If the majority wants peace, the country makes peace. If the majority wants to raise taxes, taxes are raised. If the majority wants to lower taxes, taxes are lowered. Major decisions about foreign affairs, defense, education, taxation, and numerous other policies are all in the hands of the majority.

    But in a democracy, there are two baskets of rights that are protected from the majority’s grasp. One contains human rights. Even if 99 percent of the population wants to exterminate the remaining 1 percent, in a democracy this is forbidden, because it violates the most basic human right—the right to life. The basket of human rights contains many additional rights, such as the right to work, the right to privacy, freedom of movement, and freedom of religion. These rights enshrine the decentralized nature of democracy, making sure that as long as people don’t harm anyone, they can live their lives as they see fit.

    The second crucial basket of rights contains civil rights. These are the basic rules of the democratic game, which enshrine its self-correcting mechanisms. An obvious example is the right to vote. If the majority were permitted to disenfranchise the minority, then democracy would be over after a single election. Other civil rights include freedom of the press, academic freedom, and freedom of assembly, which enable independent media outlets, universities, and opposition movements to challenge the government. These are the key rights that strongmen seek to violate. While sometimes it is necessary to make changes to a country’s self-correcting mechanisms—for example, by expanding the franchise, regulating the media, or reforming the judicial system—such changes should be made only on the basis of a broad consensus including both majority and minority groups. If a small majority could unilaterally change civil rights, it could easily rig elections and get rid of all other checks on its power.

    An important thing to note about both human rights and civil rights is that they don’t just limit the power of the central government; they also impose on it many active duties. It is not enough for a democratic government to abstain from infringing on human and civil rights. It must take actions to ensure them. For example, the right to life imposes on a democratic government the duty to protect citizens from criminal violence. If a government doesn’t kill anyone, but also makes no effort to protect citizens from murder, this is anarchy rather than democracy.

    THE PEOPLE VERSUS THE TRUTH

    Of course, in every democracy, there are lengthy discussions concerning the exact limits of human and civil rights. Even the right to life has limits. There are democratic countries like the United States that impose the death penalty, thereby denying some criminals the right to life. And every country allows itself the prerogative to declare war, thereby sending people to kill and be killed. So where exactly does the right to life end? There are also complicated and ongoing discussions concerning the list of rights that should be included in the two baskets. Who determined that freedom of religion is a basic human right? Should internet access be defined as a civil right? And what about animal rights? Or the rights of AI?

    We cannot resolve these matters here. Both human and civil rights are intersubjective conventions that humans invent rather than discover, and they are determined by historical contingencies rather than universal reason. Different democracies can adopt somewhat different lists of rights. At least from the viewpoint of information flows, what defines a system as “democratic” is only that its center doesn’t have unlimited authority and that the system possesses robust mechanisms to correct the center’s mistakes. Democratic networks assume that everyone is fallible, and that includes even the winners of elections and the majority of voters.

    It is particularly crucial to remember that elections are not a method for discovering truth. Rather, they are a method for maintaining order by adjudicating between people’s conflicting desires. Elections establish what the majority of people desire, rather than what the truth is. And people often desire the truth to be other than what it is. Democratic networks therefore maintain some self-correcting mechanisms to protect the truth even from the will of the majority.

    For example, during the 2002–3 debate over whether to invade Iraq in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration claimed that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction and that the Iraqi people were eager to establish an American-style democracy and would welcome the Americans as liberators. These arguments carried the day. In October 2002 the elected representatives of the American people in Congress voted overwhelmingly to authorize the invasion. The resolution passed with a 296 to 133 majority (69 percent) in the House of Representatives and a 77 to 23 majority (77 percent) in the Senate.6 In the early days of the war in March 2003, polls found that the elected representatives were indeed in tune with the mass of voters and that 72 percent of American citizens supported the invasion.7 The will of the American people was clear.

    But the truth turned out to be different from what the government said and what the majority believed. As the war progressed, it became evident that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and that many Iraqis had no wish to be “liberated” by the Americans or to establish a democracy. By August 2004 another poll found that 67 percent of Americans believed that the invasion was based on incorrect assumptions. As the years went by, most Americans acknowledged that the decision to invade was a catastrophic mistake.8

    In a democracy the majority has every right to make momentous decisions like starting wars, and that includes the right to make momentous errors. But the majority should at least acknowledge its own fallibility and protect the freedom of minorities to hold and publicize unpopular views, which might turn out to be correct.

    As another example, consider the case of a charismatic leader who is accused of corruption. His loyal supporters obviously wish these accusations to be false. But even if most voters support the leader, their desires should not prevent judges from investigating the accusations and getting to the truth. As with the justice system, so also with science. A majority of voters might deny the reality of climate change, but they should not have the power to dictate scientific truth or to prevent scientists from exploring and publishing inconvenient facts. Unlike parliaments, departments of environmental studies should not reflect the will of the majority.

    Of course, when it comes to making policy decisions about climate change, in a democracy the will of the voters should reign supreme. Acknowledging the reality of climate change does not tell us what to do about it. We always have options, and choosing between them is a question of desire, not truth. One option might be to immediately cut greenhouse gas emissions, even at the cost of slowing economic growth. This means incurring some difficulties today but saving people in 2050 from more severe hardship, saving the island nation of Kiribati from drowning, and saving the polar bears from extinction. A second option might be to continue with business as usual. This means having an easier life today, but making life harder for the next generation, flooding Kiribati, and driving the polar bears—as well as numerous other species—to extinction. Choosing between these two options is a question of desire, and should therefore be done by all voters rather than by a limited group of experts.

    But the one option that should not be on offer in elections is hiding or distorting the truth. If the majority prefers to consume whatever amount of fossil fuels it wishes with no regard to future generations or other environmental considerations, it is entitled to vote for that. But the majority should not be entitled to pass a law stating that climate change is a hoax and that all professors who believe in climate change must be fired from their academic posts. We can choose what we want, but we shouldn’t deny the true meaning of our choice.

    Naturally, academic institutions, the media, and the judiciary may themselves be compromised by corruption, bias, or error. But subordinating them to a governmental Ministry of Truth is likely to make things worse. The government is already the most powerful institution in developed societies, and it often has the greatest interest in distorting or hiding inconvenient facts. Allowing the government to supervise the search for truth is like appointing the fox to guard the chicken coop.

    To discover the truth, it is better to rely on two other methods. First, academic institutions, the media, and the judiciary have their own internal self-correcting mechanisms for fighting corruption, correcting bias, and exposing error. In academia, peer-reviewed publication is a far better check on error than supervision by government officials, because academic promotion often depends on uncovering past mistakes and discovering unknown facts. In the media, free competition means that if one outlet decides not to break a scandal, perhaps for self-serving reasons, others are likely to jump at the scoop. In the judiciary, a judge that takes bribes may be tried and punished just like any other citizen.

    Second, the existence of several independent institutions that seek the truth in different ways allows these institutions to check and correct one another. For example, if powerful corporations manage to break down the peer-review mechanism by bribing a sufficiently large number of scientists, investigative journalists and courts can expose and punish the perpetrators. If the media or the courts are afflicted by systematic racist biases, it is the job of sociologists, historians, and philosophers to expose these biases. None of these mechanisms are completely fail-safe, but no human institution is. Government certainly isn’t.

    THE POPULIST ASSAULT

    If all this sounds complicated, it is because democracy should be complicated. Simplicity is a characteristic of dictatorial information networks in which the center dictates everything and everybody silently obeys. It’s easy to follow this dictatorial monologue. In contrast, democracy is a conversation with numerous participants, many of them talking at the same time. It can be hard to follow such a conversation.

    Moreover, the most important democratic institutions tend to be bureaucratic behemoths. Whereas citizens avidly follow the biological dramas of the princely court and the presidential palace, they often find it difficult to understand how parliaments, courts, newspapers, and universities function. This is what helps strongmen mount populist attacks on institutions, dismantle all self-correcting mechanisms, and concentrate power in their hands. We discussed populism briefly in the prologue, to help explain the populist challenge to the naive view of information. Here we need to revisit populism, get a broader understanding of its worldview, and explain its appeal to antidemocratic strongmen.

    The term “populism” derives from the Latin populus, which means “the people.” In democracies, “the people” is considered the sole legitimate source of political authority. Only representatives of the people should have the authority to declare wars, pass laws, and raise taxes. Populists cherish this basic democratic principle, but somehow conclude from it that a single party or a single leader should monopolize all power. In a curious political alchemy, populists manage to base a totalitarian pursuit of unlimited power on a seemingly impeccable democratic principle. How does it happen?

    The most novel claim populists make is that they alone truly represent the people. Since in democracies only the people should have political power, and since allegedly only the populists represent the people, it follows that the populist party should have all political power to itself. If some party other than the populists wins elections, it does not mean that this rival party won the people’s trust and is entitled to form a government. Rather, it means that the elections were stolen or that the people were deceived to vote in a way that doesn’t express their true will.

    It should be stressed that for many populists, this is a genuinely held belief rather than a propaganda gambit. Even if they win just a small share of votes, populists may still believe they alone represent the people. An analogous case are communist parties. In the U.K., for example, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) never won more than 0.4 percent of votes in a general election,9 but was nevertheless adamant that it alone truly represented the working class. Millions of British workers, they claimed, were voting for the Labour Party or even for the Conservative Party rather than for the CPGB because of “false consciousness.” Allegedly, through their control of the media, universities, and other institutions, the capitalists managed to deceive the working class into voting against its true interests, and only the CPGB could see through this deception. In like fashion, populists can believe that the enemies of the people have deceived the people to vote against its true will, which the populists alone represent.

    A fundamental part of this populist credo is the belief that “the people” is not a collection of flesh-and-blood individuals with various interests and opinions, but rather a unified mystical body that possesses a single will—“the will of the people.” Perhaps the most notorious and extreme manifestation of this semireligious belief was the Nazi motto “Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer,” which means “One People, One Country, One Leader.” Nazi ideology posited that the Volk (people) had a single will, whose sole authentic representative was the Führer (leader). The leader allegedly had an infallible intuition for how the people felt and what the people wanted. If some German citizens disagreed with the leader, it didn’t mean that the leader might be in the wrong. Rather, it meant that the dissenters belonged to some treasonous outsider group—Jews, communists, liberals—instead of to the people.

    The Nazi case is of course extreme, and it is grossly unfair to accuse all populists of being crypto-Nazis with genocidal inclinations. However, many populist parties and politicians deny that “the people” might contain a diversity of opinions and interest groups. They insist that the real people has only one will and that they alone represent this will. In contrast, their political rivals—even when the latter enjoy substantial popular support—are depicted as “alien elites.” Thus, Hugo Chávez ran for the presidency in Venezuela with the slogan “Chávez is the people!”10 President Erdoğan of Turkey once railed against his domestic critics, saying, “We are the people. Who are you?”—as if his critics weren’t Turks, too.11

    How can you tell, then, whether someone is part of the people or not? Easy. If they support the leader, they are part of the people. This, according to the German political philosopher Jan-Werner Müller, is the defining feature of populism. What turns someone into a populist is claiming that they alone represent the people and that anyone who disagrees with them—whether state bureaucrats, minority groups, or even the majority of voters—either suffers from false consciousness or isn’t really part of the people.12

    This is why populism poses a deadly threat to democracy. While democracy agrees that the people is the only legitimate source of power, democracy is based on the understanding that the people is never a unitary entity and, therefore, cannot possess a single will. Every people—whether Germans, Venezuelans, or Turks—is composed of many different groups, with a plurality of opinions, wills, and representatives. No group, including the majority group, is entitled to exclude other groups from membership in the people. This is what makes democracy a conversation. Holding a conversation presupposes the existence of several legitimate voices. If, however, the people has only one legitimate voice, there can be no conversation. Rather, the single voice dictates everything. Populism may therefore claim adherence to the democratic principle of “people’s power,” but it effectively empties democracy of meaning and seeks to establish a dictatorship.

    Populism undermines democracy in another, more subtle, but equally dangerous way. Having claimed that they alone represent the people, populists argue that the people is not just the sole legitimate source of political authority but the sole legitimate source of all authority. Any institution that derives its authority from something other than the will of the people is antidemocratic. As the self-proclaimed representatives of the people, populists consequently seek to monopolize not just political authority but all types of authority and to take control of institutions such as media outlets, courts, and universities. By taking the democratic principle of “people’s power” to its extreme, populists turn totalitarian.

    In fact, while democracy means that authority in the political sphere comes from the people, it doesn’t deny the validity of alternative sources of authority in other spheres. As discussed above, in a democracy independent media outlets, courts, and universities are essential self-correcting mechanisms that protect the truth even from the will of the majority. Biology professors claim that humans evolved from apes because the evidence supports this, even if the majority wills it to be otherwise. Journalists can reveal that a popular politician took a bribe, and if compelling evidence is presented in court, a judge may send that politician to jail, even if most people don’t want to believe these accusations.

    Populists are suspicious of institutions that in the name of objective truths override the supposed will of the people. They tend to see this as a smoke screen for elites grabbing illegitimate power. This drives populists to be skeptical of the pursuit of truth, and to argue—as we saw in the prologue—that “power is the only reality.” They thereby seek to undercut or appropriate the authority of any independent institutions that might oppose them. The result is a dark and cynical view of the world as a jungle and of human beings as creatures obsessed with power alone. All social interactions are seen as power struggles, and all institutions are depicted as cliques promoting the interests of their own members. In the populist imagination, courts don’t really care about justice; they only protect the privileges of the judges. Yes, the judges talk a lot about justice, but this is a ploy to grab power for themselves. Newspapers don’t care about facts; they spread fake news to mislead the people and benefit the journalists and the cabals that finance them. Even scientific institutions aren’t committed to the truth. Biologists, climatologists, epidemiologists, economists, historians, and mathematicians are just another interest group feathering its own nest—at the expense of the people.

    In all, it’s a rather sordid view of humanity, but two things nevertheless make it appealing to many. First, since it reduces all interactions to power struggles, it simplifies reality and makes events like wars, economic crises, and natural disasters easy to understand. Anything that happens—even a pandemic—is about elites pursuing power. Second, the populist view is attractive because it is sometimes correct. Every human institution is indeed fallible and suffers from some level of corruption. Some judges do take bribes. Some journalists do intentionally mislead the public. Academic disciplines are occasionally plagued by bias and nepotism. That is why every institution needs self-correcting mechanisms. But since populists are convinced that power is the only reality, they cannot accept that a court, a media outlet, or an academic discipline would ever be inspired by the value of truth or justice to correct itself.

    While many people embrace populism because they see it as an honest account of human reality, strongmen are attracted to it for a different reason. Populism offers strongmen an ideological basis for making themselves dictators while pretending to be democrats. It is particularly useful when strongmen seek to neutralize or appropriate the self-correcting mechanisms of democracy. Since judges, journalists, and professors allegedly pursue political interests rather than truth, the people’s champion—the strongman—should control these positions instead of allowing them to fall into the hands of the people’s enemies. Similarly, since even the officials in charge of arranging elections and publicizing their results may be part of a nefarious conspiracy, they too should be replaced by the strongman’s loyalists.

    In a well-functioning democracy, citizens trust the results of elections, the decisions of courts, the reports of media outlets, and the findings of scientific disciplines because citizens believe these institutions are committed to the truth. Once people think that power is the only reality, they lose trust in all these institutions, democracy collapses, and the strongmen can seize total power.
    Of course, populism could lead to anarchy rather than totalitarianism, if it undermines trust in the strongmen themselves. If no human is interested in truth or justice, doesn’t this apply to Mussolini or Putin too? And if no human institution can have effective self-correcting mechanisms, doesn’t this include Mussolini’s National Fascist Party or Putin’s United Russia party? How can a deep-seated distrust of all elites and institutions be squared with unwavering admiration for one leader and party? This is why populists ultimately depend on the mystical notion that the strongman embodies the people. When trust in bureaucratic institutions like election boards, courts, and newspapers is particularly low, an enhanced reliance on mythology is the only way to preserve order.

    MEASURING THE STRENGTH OF DEMOCRACIES

    Strongmen who claim to represent the people may well rise to power through democratic means, and often rule behind a democratic facade. Rigged elections in which they win overwhelming majorities serve as proof of the mystical bond between the leader and the people. Consequently, to measure how democratic an information network is, we cannot use a simple yardstick like whether elections are being held regularly. In Putin’s Russia, in Iran, and even in North Korea elections are held like clockwork. Rather, we need to ask much more complex questions like “What mechanisms prevent the central government from rigging the elections?” “How safe is it for leading media outlets to criticize the government?” and “How much authority does the center appropriate to itself?” Democracy and dictatorship aren’t binary opposites, but rather a continuum. To decide whether a network is closer to the democratic or the dictatorial end of the continuum, we need to understand how information flows in the network and what shapes the political conversation.

    If one person dictates all the decisions, and even their closest advisers are terrified to voice a dissenting view, no conversation is taking place. Such a network is situated at the extreme dictatorial end of the spectrum. If nobody can voice unorthodox opinions publicly, but behind closed doors a small circle of party bosses or senior officials are able to freely express their views, then this is still a dictatorship, but it has taken a baby step in the direction of democracy. If 10 percent of the population participate in the political conversation by airing their opinions, voting in fair elections, and running for office, that may be considered a limited democracy, as was the case in many ancient city-states like Athens, or in the early days of the United States, when only wealthy white men had such political rights. As the percentage of people taking part in the conversation rises, so the network becomes more democratic.

    The focus on conversations rather than elections raises a host of interesting questions. For example, where does that conversation take place? North Korea, for example, has the Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang, where the 687 members of the Supreme People’s Assembly meet and talk. However, while this Assembly is officially known as North Korea’s legislature, and while elections to the Assembly are held every five years, this body is widely considered a rubber stamp, executing decisions taken elsewhere. The anodyne discussions follow a predetermined script, and they aren’t geared to change anyone’s mind about anything.13

    Is there perhaps another, more private hall in Pyongyang where the crucial conversations take place? Do Politburo members ever dare criticize Kim Jong Un’s policies during formal meetings? Perhaps it can be done in unofficial dinner parties or in unofficial think tanks? Information in North Korea is so concentrated and so tightly controlled that we cannot provide clear answers to these questions.14
    Similar questions can be asked about the United States. In the United States, unlike in North Korea, people are free to say almost anything they want. Scathing public attacks on the government are a daily occurrence. But where is the room where the crucial conversations happen, and who sits there? The U.S. Congress was designed to fulfill this function, with the people’s representatives meeting to converse and try to convince one another. But when was the last time that an eloquent speech in Congress by a member of one party persuaded members of the other party to change their minds about anything? Wherever the conversations that shape American politics now take place, it is definitely not in Congress. Democracies die not only when people are not free to talk but also when people are not willing or able to listen.

    STONE AGE DEMOCRACIES

    Based on the above definition of democracy, we can now turn to the historical record and examine how changes in information technology and information flows have shaped the history of democracy. To judge by the archaeological and anthropological evidence, democracy was the most typical political system among archaic hunter-gatherers. Stone Age bands obviously didn’t have formal institutions like elections, courts, and media outlets, but their information networks were usually distributed and gave ample opportunities for self-correction. In bands numbering just a few dozen people information could easily be shared among all group members, and when the band decided where to pitch camp, where to go hunting, or how to handle a conflict with another band, everyone could take part in the conversation and dispute each other. Bands usually belonged to a larger tribe that included hundreds or even thousands of people. But when important choices affecting the whole tribe had to be made, such as whether to go to war, tribes were usually still small enough for a large percentage of their members to gather in one place and converse.15

    While bands and tribes sometimes had dominant leaders, these tended to exercise only limited authority. Leaders had no standing armies, police forces, or governmental bureaucracies at their disposal, so they couldn’t just impose their will by force.16 Leaders also found it difficult to control the economic basis of people’s lives. In modern times, dictators like Vladimir Putin and Saddam Hussein have often based their political power on monopolizing economic assets like oil wells.17 In medieval and classical antiquity, Chinese emperors, Greek tyrants, and Egyptian pharaohs dominated society by controlling granaries, silver mines, and irrigation canals. In contrast, in a hunter-gatherer economy such centralized economic control was possible only under special circumstances. For example, along the northwestern coast of North America some hunter-gatherer economies relied on catching and preserving large numbers of salmon. Since salmon runs peaked for a few weeks in specific creeks and rivers, a powerful chief could monopolize this asset.18

    But this was exceptional. Most hunter-gatherer economies were far more diversified. One leader, even supported by a few allies, could not corral the savanna and prevent people from gathering plants and hunting animals there. If all else failed, hunter-gatherers could therefore vote with their feet. They had few possessions, and their most important assets were their personal skills and personal friends. If a chief turned dictatorial, people could just walk away.19

    Even when hunter-gatherers did end up ruled by a domineering chief, as happened among the salmon-fishing people of northwestern America, at least that chief was accessible. He didn’t live in a faraway fortress surrounded by an unfathomable bureaucracy and a cordon of armed guards. If you wanted to voice a complaint or a suggestion, you could usually get within earshot of him. The chief couldn’t control public opinion, nor could he shut himself off from it. In other words, there was no way for a chief to force all information to flow through the center, or to prevent people from talking with one another, criticizing him, or organizing against him.20

    In the millennia following the agricultural revolution, and especially after writing helped create large bureaucratic polities, it became easier to centralize the flow of information and harder to maintain the democratic conversation. In small city-states like those of ancient Mesopotamia and Greece, autocrats like Lugal-Zagesi of Umma and Pisistratus of Athens relied on bureaucrats, archives, and a standing army to monopolize key economic assets and information about ownership, taxation, diplomacy, and politics. It simultaneously became harder for the mass of citizens to keep in direct touch with one another. There was no mass communication technology like newspapers or radio, and it was not easy to squeeze tens of thousands of citizens into the main city square to hold a communal discussion.

    Democracy was still an option for these small city-states, as the history of both early Sumer and classical Greece clearly indicates.21 However, the democracy of ancient city-states tended to be less inclusive than the democracy of archaic hunter-gatherer bands. Probably the most famous example of ancient city-state democracy is Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. All adult male citizens could participate in the Athenian assembly, vote on public policy, and be elected to public offices. But women, slaves, and noncitizen residents of the city did not enjoy these privileges. Only about 25–30 percent of the adult population of Athens enjoyed full political rights.22

    As the size of polities continued to increase, and city-states were superseded by larger kingdoms and empires, even Athenian-style partial democracy disappeared. All the famous examples of ancient democracies are city-states such as Athens and Rome. In contrast, we don’t know of any large-scale kingdom or empire that operated along democratic lines.

    For example, when in the fifth century BCE Athens expanded from a city-state into an empire, it did not grant citizenship and political rights to those it conquered. The city of Athens remained a limited democracy, but the much bigger Athenian Empire was ruled autocratically from the center. All the important decisions about taxes, diplomatic alliances, and military expeditions were taken in Athens. Subject lands like the islands of Naxos and Thasos had to obey the orders of the Athenian popular assembly and elected officials, without the Naxians and Thasians being able to vote in that assembly or be elected to office. It was also difficult for Naxos, Thasos, and other subject lands to coordinate a united opposition to the decisions taken in the Athenian center, and if they tried to do so, it would have brought ruthless Athenian reprisals. Information in the Athenian Empire flowed to and from Athens.23

    When the Roman Republic built its empire, conquering first the Italian Peninsula and eventually the entire Mediterranean basin, the Romans took a somewhat different course. Rome gradually did extend citizenship to the conquered people. It began by granting citizenship to the inhabitants of Latium, then to the inhabitants of other Italian regions, and finally to inhabitants of even distant provinces like Gallia and Syria. However, as citizenship was extended to more people, the political rights of citizens were simultaneously restricted.

    The ancient Romans had a clear understanding of what democracy means, and they were originally fiercely committed to the democratic ideal. After expelling the last king of Rome in 509 BCE, the Romans developed a deep dislike for monarchy and a fear of giving unlimited power to any single individual or institution. Supreme executive power was therefore shared by two consuls who balanced each other. These consuls were chosen by citizens in free elections, held office for a single year, and were additionally checked by the powers of the popular assembly, of the Senate, and of other elected officials like the tribunes.

    But when Rome extended citizenship to Latins, Italians, and finally to Gauls and Syrians, the power of the popular assembly, the tribunes, the Senate, and even the two consuls was gradually reduced, until in the late first century BCE the Caesar family established its autocratic rule. Anticipating present-day strongmen like Putin, Augustus didn’t crown himself king, and pretended that Rome was still a republic. The Senate and the popular assembly continued to convene, and every year citizens continued to choose consuls and tribunes. But these institutions were emptied of real power.24

    In 212 CE, the emperor Caracalla—the offspring of a Phoenician family from North Africa—took a seemingly momentous step and granted automatic Roman citizenship to all free adult males throughout the vast empire. Rome in the third century CE accordingly had tens of millions of citizens.25 But by that time, all the important decisions were made by a single unelected emperor. While consuls were still ceremonially chosen every year, Caracalla inherited power from his father Septimius Severus, who became emperor by winning a civil war. To cement his rule, the most important step Caracalla took was murdering his brother and rival Geta.

    When Caracalla ordered the murder of Geta, decided to devalue the Roman currency, or declared war on the Parthian Empire, he had no need to ask permission from the Roman people. All of Rome’s self-correcting mechanisms had been neutralized long before. If Caracalla made some error in foreign or domestic policy, neither the Senate nor any officials like the consuls or tribunes could intervene to correct it, except by rising in rebellion or assassinating him. And when Caracalla was indeed assassinated in 217, it only led to a new round of civil wars culminating in the rise of new autocrats. Rome in the third century CE, like Russia in the eighteenth century, was, in the words of Madame de Staël, “autocracy tempered by strangulation.”

    By the third century CE, not only the Roman Empire but all other major human societies on earth were centralized information networks lacking strong self-correcting mechanisms. This was true of the Parthian and Sassanian Empires in Persia, of the Kushan and Gupta Empires in India, and of China’s Han Empire and its successor Three Kingdoms.26 Thousands of more small-scale societies continued to function democratically in the third century CE and beyond, but it seemed that distributed democratic networks were simply incompatible with large-scale societies.

    CAESAR FOR PRESIDENT!

    Were large-scale democracies really unworkable in the ancient world? Or did autocrats like Augustus and Caracalla deliberately sabotage them? This question is important not only for our understanding of ancient history but also for our view of democracy’s future in the age of AI. How do we know whether democracies fail because they are undermined by strongmen or because of much deeper structural and technological reasons?

    To answer that question, let’s take a closer look at the Roman Empire. The Romans were clearly familiar with the democratic ideal, and it continued to be important to them even after the Caesar family rose to power. Otherwise, Augustus and his heirs would not have bothered to maintain seemingly democratic institutions like the Senate or annual elections to the consulate and other offices. So why did power end up in the hands of an unelected emperor?

    In theory, even after Roman citizenship was expanded to tens of millions of people throughout the Mediterranean basin, wasn’t it possible to hold empire-wide elections for the position of emperor? This would surely have required very complicated logistics, and it would have taken several months to learn the results of the elections. But was that really a deal breaker?

    The key misconception here is equating democracy with elections. If the Roman Empire wanted to, it could technically have held empire-wide elections for emperor. But the real question we should ask is whether the Roman Empire could have held an ongoing empire-wide political conversation. In present-day North Korea no democratic conversation takes place because people aren’t free to talk, yet we could well imagine a situation when this freedom is guaranteed—as it is in South Korea. In the present-day United States the democratic conversation is endangered by people’s inability to listen to and respect their political rivals, yet this can presumably still be fixed. By contrast, in the Roman Empire there was simply no way to conduct or sustain a democratic conversation, because the technological means to hold such a conversation did not exist.

    To hold a conversation, it is not enough to have the freedom to talk and the ability to listen. There are also two technical preconditions. First, people need to be within hearing range of each other. This means that the only way to hold a political conversation in a territory the size of the United States or the Roman Empire is with the help of some kind of information technology that can swiftly convey what people say over long distances.

    Second, people need at least a rudimentary understanding of what they are talking about. Otherwise, they are just making noise, not holding a meaningful conversation. People usually have a good understanding of political issues of which they have direct experience. Poor people have many insights about poverty that escape economics professors, and ethnic minorities understand racism in a much more profound way than people who never suffered from it, for example. However, if lived experience were the only way to understand crucial political issues, large-scale political conversations would be impossible. For then every group of people could talk meaningfully only about its own experiences. Even worse, nobody else could understand what they were saying. If lived experience is the sole possible source of knowledge, then merely listening to the insights gained from someone else’s lived experience cannot impart these insights to me.

    The only way to have a large-scale political conversation among diverse groups of people is if people can gain some understanding of issues that they have never experienced firsthand. In a large polity, it is a crucial role of the education system and the media to inform people about things they have never faced themselves. If there is no education system or media platforms to perform this role, no meaningful large-scale conversations can take place.

    In a small Neolithic town of a few thousand inhabitants people might sometimes have been afraid to say what they thought, or might have refused to listen to their rivals, but it was relatively easy to satisfy the more fundamental technical preconditions for meaningful discourse. First, people lived in proximity to one another, so they could easily meet most other community members and hear their voices. Second, everybody had intimate knowledge of the dangers and opportunities that the town faced. If an enemy war party approached, everyone could see it. If the river flooded the fields, everyone witnessed the economic effects. When people talked about war and hunger, they knew what they were saying.

    In the fourth century BCE, the city-state of Rome was still small enough to allow a large percentage of its citizens to congregate in the Forum in times of emergency, listen to respected leaders, and voice their personal views on the matter at hand. When in 390 BCE Gallic invaders attacked Rome, almost everyone lost a relative in the defeat at the Battle of the Allia and lost property when the victorious Gauls then sacked Rome. The desperate Romans appointed Marcus Camillus as dictator. In Rome, the dictator was a public official appointed in times of emergency who had unlimited powers but only for a short predetermined period, following which he was held accountable for his actions. After Camillus led the Romans to victory, everybody could see that the emergency was over, and Camillus stepped down.27

    In contrast, by the third century CE, the Roman Empire had a population of between sixty and seventy-five million people,28 spread over five million square kilometers.29 Rome lacked mass communication technology like radio or daily newspapers. Only 10–20 percent of adults had reading skills,30 and there was no organized education system that could inform them about the geography, history, and economy of the empire. True, many people across the empire did share some cultural ideas, such as a strong belief in the superiority of Roman civilization over the barbarians. These shared cultural beliefs were crucial in preserving order and holding the empire together. But their political implications were far from clear, and in times of crisis there was no possibility to hold a public conversation about what should be done.

    How could Syrian merchants, British shepherds, and Egyptian villagers converse about the ongoing wars in the Middle East or about the immigration crisis brewing along the Danube? The lack of a meaningful public conversation was not the fault of Augustus, Nero, Caracalla, or any of the other emperors. They didn’t sabotage Roman democracy. Given the size of the empire and the available information technology, democracy was simply unworkable. This was acknowledged already by ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who argued that democracy can work only in small-scale city-states.31

    If the absence of Roman democracy had merely been the fault of particular autocrats, we should have at least seen large-scale democracies flourishing in other places, like in Sassanian Persia, Gupta India, or Han China. But prior to the development of modern information technology, there are no examples of large-scale democracies anywhere.

    It should be stressed that in many large-scale autocracies local affairs were often managed democratically. The Roman emperor didn’t have the information needed to micromanage hundreds of cities across the empire, whereas local citizens in each city could continue to hold a meaningful conversation about municipal politics. Consequently, long after the Roman Empire became an autocracy, many of its cities continued to be governed by local assemblies and elected officials. At a time when elections to the consulship in Rome became ceremonial affairs, elections to municipal offices in small cities like Pompeii were hotly contested.

    Pompeii was destroyed in the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 CE, during the reign of the emperor Titus. Archaeologists uncovered about fifteen hundred graffiti concerned with various local election campaigns. One coveted office was that of the city’s aedile—the magistrate in charge of maintaining the city’s infrastructure and public buildings.32 Lucretius Fronto’s supporters drew the graffiti “If honest living is thought to be any recommendation, then Lucretius Fronto is worthy of being elected.” One of his opponents, Gaius Julius Polybius, ran with the slogan “Elect Gaius Julius Polybius to the office of aedile. He provides good bread.”

    There were also endorsements by religious groups and professional associations, such as “The worshippers of Isis demand the election of Gnaeus Helvius Sabinus” and “All the mule drivers request that you elect Gaius Julius Polybius.” There was dirty work, too. Someone who clearly wasn’t Marcus Cerrinius Vatia drew the graffiti “All the drunkards ask you to elect Marcus Cerrinius Vatia” and “The petty thieves ask you to elect Vatia.”33 Such electioneering indicates that the position of aedile had power in Pompeii and that the aedile was chosen in relatively free and fair elections, rather than appointed by the imperial autocrat in Rome.

    Even in empires whose rulers never had any democratic pretensions, democracy could still flourish in local settings. In the Tsarist Empire, for example, the daily lives of millions of villagers were managed by rural communes. Going back at least to the eleventh century, each commune usually included fewer than a thousand people. They were subject to a landlord and bore many obligations to their lord and to the central Tsarist state, but they had considerable autonomy in managing their internal affairs and in deciding how to discharge their external obligations, such as paying taxes and providing military recruits. The commune mediated local disputes, provided emergency relief, enforced social norms, oversaw the distribution of land to individual households, and regulated access to shared resources like forests and pastures. Decisions on important matters were made in communal meetings in which the heads of local households expressed their views and chose the commune’s elder. Resolutions at least tried to reflect the majority’s will.34

    In Tsarist villages and Roman cities a form of democracy was possible because a meaningful public conversation was possible. Pompeii was a city of about eleven thousand people in 79 CE,35 so everybody could supposedly judge for themselves whether Lucretius Fronto was an honest man and whether Marcus Cerrinius Vatia was a drunken thief. But democracy at a scale of millions became possible only in the modern age, when mass media changed the nature of large-scale information networks.

    MASS MEDIA MAKES MASS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE

    Mass media can be defined as the ability to quickly connect millions of people even when they are separated by large distances. The printing press was a crucial step in that direction. Print made it possible to cheaply and quickly produce large numbers of books and pamphlets, which enabled more people to voice their opinions and be heard over a large territory, even if the process still took time. This sustained some of the first experiments in large-scale democracy, such as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth established in 1569 and the Dutch Republic established in 1579.

    Some may contest the characterization of these polities as “democratic,” since only a minority of relatively wealthy citizens enjoyed full political rights. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, political rights were reserved for adult male members of the szlachta—the nobility. These numbered up to 300,000 individuals, or about 5 percent of the total adult population.36 One of the szlachta’s prerogatives was to elect the king, but since voting required traveling long distances to a national convention, few exercised their right. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries participation in royal elections usually ranged between 3,000 and 7,000 voters, except for the 1669 elections in which 11,271 participated.37 While this hardly sounds democratic in the twenty-first century, it should be remembered that all large-scale democracies until the twentieth century limited political rights to a small circle of relatively wealthy men. Democracy is never a matter of all or nothing. It is a continuum, and late sixteenth-century Poles and Lithuanians explored previously unknown regions of that continuum.

    Aside from electing its king, Poland-Lithuania had an elected parliament (the Sejm) that approved or blocked new legislation and had the power to veto royal decisions on taxation and foreign affairs. Moreover, citizens enjoyed a list of inviolable rights such as freedom of assembly and freedom of religion. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when most of Europe suffered from bitter religious conflicts and persecutions, Poland-Lithuania was a tolerant haven, where Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Lutherans, Calvinists, Jews, and even Muslims coexisted in relative harmony.38 In 1616, more than a hundred mosques functioned in the commonwealth.39

    In the end, however, the Polish-Lithuanian experiment in decentralization proved to be impractical. The country was Europe’s second-largest state (after Russia), covering almost a million square kilometers and including most of the territory of today’s Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. It lacked the information, communication, and education systems necessary to hold a meaningful political conversation between Polish aristocrats, Lithuanian noblemen, Ukrainian Cossacks, and Jewish rabbis spread from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Its self-correcting mechanisms were also too costly, paralyzing the power of the central government. In particular, every single Sejm deputy was given the right to veto all parliamentary legislation, which led to political deadlock. The combination of a large and diverse polity with a weak center proved fatal. The commonwealth was torn apart by centrifugal forces, and its pieces were then divided between the centralized autocracies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

    The Dutch experiment fared better. In some ways the Dutch United Provinces were even less centralized than the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, since they lacked a monarch, and were a union of seven autonomous provinces, which were in turn made up of self-governing towns and cities.40 This decentralized nature is reflected in the plural form of how the country was known abroad—the Netherlands in English, Les Pays-Bas in French, Los Países Bajos in Spanish, and so on.

    However, taken together the United Provinces were twenty-five times smaller in landmass than Poland-Lithuania and possessed a much better information, communication, and education system that tied its constituent parts closely together.41 The United Provinces also pioneered a new information technology with a big future. In June 1618 a pamphlet titled Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt &c. appeared in Amsterdam. As its title indicated, it carried news from the Italian Peninsula, the German lands, and other places. There was nothing remarkable about this particular pamphlet, except that new issues were published in the following weeks, too. They appeared regularly until 1670, when the Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt &c. merged with other serial pamphlets into the Amsterdamsche Courant, which appeared until 1903, when it was merged into De Telegraaf—the Netherlands’ largest newspaper to this day.42

    The newspaper is a periodic pamphlet, and it was different from earlier one-off pamphlets because it had a much stronger self-correcting mechanism. Unlike one-off publications, a weekly or daily newspaper has a chance to correct its mistakes and an incentive to do so in order to win the public’s trust. Shortly after the Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt &c. appeared, a competing newspaper titled Tijdinghen uyt Verscheyde Quartieren (Tidings from Various Quarters) made its debut. The Courante was generally considered more reliable, because it tried to check its stories before publishing them, and because the Tijdinghen was accused of being overly patriotic and reporting only news favorable to the Netherlands. Nevertheless, both newspapers survived, because, as one reader explained, “one can always find something in one newspaper that is not available in the other.” In the following decades dozens of additional newspapers were published in the Netherlands, which became Europe’s journalistic hub.43

    Newspapers that succeeded in gaining widespread trust became the architects and mouthpieces of public opinion. They created a far more informed and engaged public, which changed the nature of politics, first in the Netherlands and later around the world.44 The political influence of newspapers was so crucial that newspaper editors often became political leaders. Jean-Paul Marat rose to power in revolutionary France by founding and editing L’Ami du People; Eduard Bernstein helped create Germany’s Social Democratic Party by editing Der Sozialdemokrat; Vladimir Lenin’s most important position before becoming Soviet dictator was editor of Iskra; and Benito Mussolini rose to fame first as a socialist journalist in Avanti! and later as founder and editor of the firebrand right-wing paper Il Popolo d’Italia.

    Newspapers played a crucial role in the formation of early modern democracies like the United Provinces in the Low Countries, the United Kingdom in the British Isles, and the United States in North America. As the names themselves indicate, these were not city-states like ancient Athens and Rome but amalgams of different regions glued together in part by this new information technology. For example, when on December 6, 1825, President John Quincy Adams gave his First Annual Message to the U.S. Congress, the text of the address and summaries of the main points were published over the next weeks by newspapers from Boston to New Orleans (at the time, hundreds of newspapers and magazines were being published in the United States45).

    Adams declared his administration’s intentions of initiating numerous federal projects ranging from the construction of roads to the founding of an astronomical observatory, which he poetically named “light-house of the skies.” His speech ignited a fierce public debate, much of it conducted in print between those who supported such “big government” plans as essential for the development of the United States and many who preferred a “small government” approach and saw Adams’s plans as federal overreach and an encroachment on states’ rights.

    Northern supporters of the “small government” camp complained that it was unconstitutional for the federal government to tax the citizens of richer states in order to build roads in poorer states. Southerners feared that a federal government that claims the power to build a lighthouse of the sky in their backyard may one day claim the power to free their slaves, too. Adams was accused of harboring dictatorial ambitions, while the erudition and sophistication of his speech were criticized as elitist and disconnected from ordinary Americans. The public debates over the 1825 message to Congress dealt a severe blow to the reputation of the Adams administration and helped pave the way to Adams’s subsequent electoral defeat. In the 1828 presidential elections, Adams lost to Andrew Jackson—a rich slaveholding planter from Tennessee who was successfully rebranded in numerous newspaper columns as “the man of the people” and who claimed that the previous elections were in fact stolen by Adams and by the corrupt Washington elites.46

    Newspapers of the time were of course still slow and limited compared with the mass media of today. Newspapers traveled at the pace of a horse or sailboat, and relatively few people read them regularly. There were no newsstands or street vendors, so people had to buy subscriptions, which were expensive; average annual subscriptions cost around one week’s wages for a skilled journeyman. As a result, the total number of subscribers to all U.S. newspapers in 1830 is estimated at just seventy-eight thousand. Since some subscribers were associations or businesses rather than individuals, and since every copy was probably read by several people, it seems reasonable to assume that regular newspaper readership numbered in the hundreds of thousands. But millions more rarely, if ever, read newspapers.47

    No wonder that American democracy in those days was a limited affair—and the domain of wealthy white men. In the 1824 elections that brought Adams to power, 1.3 million Americans were theoretically eligible to vote, out of an adult population of about 5 million (or around 25 percent). Only 352,780 people—7 percent of the total adult population—actually made use of their right. Adams didn’t even win a majority of those who voted. Owing to the quirks of the U.S. electoral system, he became president thanks to the support of just 113,122 voters, or not much more than 2 percent of adults, and 1 percent of the total population.48 In Britain at the same time, only about 400,000 people were eligible to vote for Parliament, or around 6 percent of the adult population. Moreover, 30 percent of parliamentary seats were not even contested.49

    You may wonder whether we are talking about democracies at all. At a time when the United States had more slaves than voters (more than 1.5 million Americans were enslaved in the early 1820s),50 was the United States really a democracy? This is a question of definitions. As with the late sixteenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, so also with the early nineteenth-century United States, “democracy” is a relative term. As noted earlier, democracy and autocracy aren’t absolutes; they are part of a continuum. In the early nineteenth century, out of all large-scale human societies, the United States was probably the closest to the democratic end of the continuum. Giving 25 percent of adults the right to vote doesn’t sound like much today, but in 1824 that was a far higher percentage than in the Tsarist, Ottoman, or Chinese Empires, in which nobody had the right to vote.51

    Besides, as emphasized throughout this chapter, voting is not the only thing that counts. An even more important reason to consider the United States in 1824 a democracy is that compared with most other polities of its day, the new country possessed much stronger self-correcting mechanisms. The Founding Fathers were inspired by ancient Rome—witness the Senate and the Capitol in Washington—and they were well aware that the Roman Republic eventually turned into an autocratic empire. They feared that some American Caesar would do something similar to their republic, and constructed multiple overlapping self-correcting mechanisms, known as the system of checks and balances. One of these was a free press. In ancient Rome, the self-correcting mechanisms stopped functioning as the republic enlarged its territory and population. In the United States, modern information technology combined with freedom of the press helped the self-correcting mechanisms survive even as the country extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

    It was these self-correcting mechanisms that gradually enabled the United States to expand the franchise, abolish slavery, and turn itself into a more inclusive democracy. As noted in chapter 3, the Founding Fathers committed enormous mistakes—such as endorsing slavery and denying women the vote—but they also provided the tools for their descendants to correct these mistakes. That was their greatest legacy.

    THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: MASS DEMOCRACY, BUT ALSO MASS TOTALITARIANISM

    Printed newspapers were just the first harbinger of the mass media age. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a long list of new communication and transportation technologies such as the telegraph, telephone, television, radio, trains, steamships, and airplanes supercharged the power of mass media.

    When Demosthenes gave a public speech in Athens around 350 BCE, it was aimed primarily at the limited audience actually present in the Athenian agora. When John Quincy Adams gave his First Annual Message in 1825, his words spread at the pace of a horse. When Abraham Lincoln gave his Gettysburg Address on November 19, 1863, telegraphs, locomotives, and steamships conveyed his words much faster throughout the Union and beyond. The very next day The New York Times had already reprinted the speech in full,52 as had numerous other newspapers from The Portland Daily Press in Maine to the Ottumwa Courier in Iowa.53

    As befitting a democracy with strong self-correcting mechanisms in place, the president’s speech sparked a lively conversation rather than universal applause. Most newspapers lauded it, but some expressed their doubts. The Chicago Times wrote on November 20 that “the cheek of every American must tingle with shame as he reads the silly, flat and dishwatery utterances” of President Lincoln.54 The Patriot & Union, a local newspaper in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, also blasted “the silly remarks of the President” and hoped that “the veil of oblivion shall be dropped over them and that they shall be no more repeated or thought of.”55 Though the country was in the midst of a civil war, journalists were free to publicly criticize—and even ridicule—the president.

    Fast-forward a century, and things really picked up speed. For the first time in history, new technologies allowed masses of people, spread over vast swaths of territory, to connect in real time. In 1960, about seventy million Americans (39 percent of the total population), dispersed over the North American continent and beyond, watched the Nixon-Kennedy presidential debates live on television, with millions more listening on the radio.56 The only effort viewers and listeners had to make was to press a button while sitting in their homes. Large-scale democracy had now become feasible. Millions of people separated by thousands of kilometers could conduct informed and meaningful public debates about the rapidly evolving issues of the day. By 1960, all adult Americans were theoretically eligible to vote, and close to seventy million (about 64 percent of the electorate) actually did so—though millions of Blacks and other disenfranchised groups were prevented from voting through various voter-suppression schemes.57

    As always, we should beware of technological determinism and of concluding that the rise of mass media led to the rise of large-scale democracy. Mass media made large-scale democracy possible, rather than inevitable. And it also made possible other types of regimes. In particular, the new information technologies of the modern age opened the door for large-scale totalitarian regimes. Like Nixon and Kennedy, Stalin and Khrushchev could say something over the radio and be heard instantaneously by hundreds of millions of people from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad. They could also receive daily reports by phone and telegraph from millions of secret police agents and informers. If a newspaper in Vladivostok or Kaliningrad wrote that the supreme leader’s latest speech was silly (as happened to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address), then everyone involved—from the editor in chief to the typesetters—would likely have received a visit from the KGB.

    A BRIEF HISTORY OF TOTALITARIANISM

    Totalitarian systems assume their own infallibility, and seek total control over the totality of people’s lives. Before the invention of the telegraph, radio, and other modern information technology, large-scale totalitarian regimes were impossible. Roman emperors, Abbasid caliphs, and Mongol khans were often ruthless autocrats who believed they were infallible, but they did not have the apparatus necessary to impose totalitarian control over large societies. To understand this, we should first clarify the difference between totalitarian regimes and less extreme autocratic regimes. In an autocratic network, there are no legal limits on the will of the ruler, but there are nevertheless a lot of technical limits. In a totalitarian network, many of these technical limits are absent.58

    For example, in autocratic regimes like the Roman Empire, the Abbasid Empire, and the Mongol Empire, rulers could usually execute any person who displeased them, and if some law got in their way, they could ignore or change the law. The emperor Nero arranged the murder of his mother, Agrippina, and his wife, Octavia, and forced his mentor Seneca to commit suicide. Nero also executed or exiled some of the most respected and powerful Roman aristocrats merely for voicing dissent or telling jokes about him.59

    While autocratic rulers like Nero could execute anyone who did or said something that displeased them, they couldn’t know what most people in their empire were doing or saying. Theoretically, Nero could issue an order that any person in the Roman Empire who criticized or insulted the emperor must be severely punished. Yet there were no technical means for implementing such an order. Roman historians like Tacitus portray Nero as a bloodthirsty tyrant who instigated an unprecedented reign of terror. But this was a very limited type of terror. Although he executed or exiled a number of family members, aristocrats, and senators within his orbit, ordinary Romans in the city’s slums and provincials in distant towns like Jerusalem and Londinium could speak their mind much more freely.60

    Modern totalitarian regimes like the Stalinist U.S.S.R. instigated terror on an altogether different scale. Totalitarianism is the attempt to control what every person throughout the country is doing and saying every moment of the day, and potentially even what every person is thinking and feeling. Nero might have dreamed about such powers, but he lacked the means to realize them. Given the limited tax base of the agrarian Roman economy, Nero couldn’t employ many people in his service. He could place informers at the dinner parties of Roman senators, but he had only about 10,000 imperial administrators61 and 350,000 soldiers62 to control the rest of the empire, and he lacked the technology to communicate with them swiftly.

    Nero and his fellow emperors had an even bigger problem ensuring the loyalty of the administrators and soldiers they did have on their payroll. No Roman emperor was ever toppled by a democratic revolution like the ones that deposed Louis XVI, Nicolae Ceauşescu, or Hosni Mubarak. Instead, dozens of emperors were assassinated or deposed by their own generals, officials, bodyguards, or family members.63 Nero himself was overthrown by a revolt of the governor of Hispania, Galba. Six months later Galba was ousted by Otho, the governor of Lusitania. Within three months, Otho was deposed by Vittelius, commander of the Rhine army. Vitellius lasted about eight months before he was defeated and killed by Vespasian, commander of the army in Judaea. Being killed by a rebellious subordinate was the biggest occupational hazard not just for Roman emperors but for almost all premodern autocrats.

    Emperors, caliphs, shahs, and kings found it a huge challenge to keep their subordinates in check. Rulers consequently focused their attention on controlling the military and the taxation system. Roman emperors had the authority to interfere in the local affairs of any province or city, and they sometimes exercised that authority, but this was usually done in response to a specific petition sent by a local community or official,64 rather than as part of some empire-wide totalitarian Five-Year Plan. If you were a mule driver in Pompeii or a shepherd in Roman Britain, Nero didn’t want to control your daily routines or to police the jokes you told. As long as you paid your taxes and didn’t resist the legions, that was good enough for Nero.

    SPARTA AND QIN

    Some scholars claim that despite the technological difficulties there were attempts to establish totalitarian regimes in ancient times. The most common example cited is Sparta. According to this interpretation, Spartans were ruled by a totalitarian regime that micromanaged every aspect of their lives—from whom they married to what they ate. However, while the Spartan regime was certainly draconian, it actually included several self-correcting mechanisms that prevented power from being monopolized by a single person or faction. Political authority was divided between two kings, five ephors (senior magistrates), twenty-eight members of the Gerousia council, and the popular assembly. Important decisions—such as whether to go to war—often involved fierce public debates.

    Moreover, irrespective of how we evaluate the nature of Sparta’s regime, it is clear that the same technological limitations that confined ancient Athenian democracy to a single city also limited the scope of the Spartan political experiment. After winning the Peloponnesian War, Sparta installed military garrisons and pro-Spartan governments in numerous Greek cities, requiring them to follow its lead in foreign policy and sometimes also pay tribute. But unlike the U.S.S.R. after World War II, Sparta after the Peloponnesian War did not try to expand or export its system. Sparta couldn’t construct an information network big and dense enough to control the lives of ordinary people in every Greek town and village.65

    A much more ambitious totalitarian project might have been launched by the Qin dynasty in ancient China (221–206 BCE). After defeating all the other Warring States, the Qin ruler Qin Shi Huang controlled a huge empire with tens of millions of subjects, who belonged to numerous different ethnic groups, spoke diverse languages, and were loyal to various local traditions and elites. To cement its power, the victorious Qin regime tried to dismantle any regional powers that might challenge its authority. It confiscated the lands and wealth of local aristocrats and forced regional elites to move to the imperial capital of Xiangyang, thereby separating them from their power base and monitoring them more easily.

    The Qin regime also embarked on a ruthless campaign of centralization and homogenization. It created a new simplified script to be used throughout the empire and standardized coinage, weights, and measurements. It built a road network radiating out of Xiangyang, with standardized rest houses, relay stations, and military checkpoints. People needed written permits in order to enter or leave the capital region or frontier zones. Even the width of axles was standardized to ensure that carts and chariots could run in the same ruts.

    Every action, from tilling fields to getting married, was supposed to serve some military need, and the type of military discipline that Rome reserved for the legions was imposed by the Qin on the entire population. The envisioned reach of this system can be exemplified by one Qin law that specified the punishment an official faced if he neglected a granary under his supervision. The law discusses the number of rat holes in the granary that would warrant fining or berating the official. “For three or more rat holes the fine is [the purchase of] one shield [for the army] and for two or fewer [the responsible official] is berated. Three mouse holes are equal to one rat hole.”66

    To facilitate this totalitarian system, the Qin attempted to create a militarized social order. Every male subject had to belong to a five-man unit. These units were aggregated into larger formations, from local hamlets (li), through cantons (xiang) and counties (xian), all the way to the large imperial commanderies (jun). People were forbidden to change their residence without permit, to the extent that guests could not even stay overnight at a friend’s house without proper identification and authorization.

    Every Qin male subject was also given a rank, just as every soldier in an army has a rank. Obedience to the state resulted in promotion to higher ranks, which brought with it economic and legal privileges, while disobedience could result in demotion or punishment. People in each formation were supposed to supervise one another, and if any individual committed some misdeed, all could be punished for it. Anyone who failed to report a criminal—even their own relatives—would be killed. Those who reported crimes were rewarded with higher ranks and other perks.

    It is highly questionable to what extent the regime managed to implement all these totalitarian measures. Bureaucrats writing documents in a government office often invent elaborate rules and regulations, which then turn out to be impractical. Did conscientious government officials really go around the entire Qin Empire counting rat holes in every granary? Were peasants in every remote mountain hamlet really organized into five-man squads? Probably not. Nevertheless, the Qin Empire outdid other ancient empires in its totalitarian ambitions.

    The Qin regime even tried to control what its subjects were thinking and feeling. During the Warring States period Chinese thinkers were relatively free to develop myriad ideologies and philosophies, but the Qin adopted the doctrine of Legalism as the official state ideology. Legalism posited that humans were naturally greedy, cruel, and egotistical. It emphasized the need for strict control, argued that punishments and rewards were the most effective means of control, and insisted that state power not be curtailed by any moral consideration. Might was right, and the good of the state was the supreme good.67 The Qin proscribed other philosophies, such as Confucianism and Daoism, which believed humans were more altruistic and which emphasized the importance of virtue rather than violence.68 Books espousing such soft views were banned, as well as books that contradicted the official Qin version of history.

    When one scholar argued that Qin Shi Huang should emulate the founder of the ancient Zhou dynasty and decentralize state power, the Qin chief minister, Li Si, countered that scholars should stop criticizing present-day institutions by idealizing the past. The regime ordered the confiscation of all books that romanticized antiquity or otherwise criticized the Qin. Such problematic texts were stored in the imperial library and could be studied only by official scholars.69

    The Qin Empire was probably the most ambitious totalitarian experiment in human history prior to the modern age, and its scale and intensity would prove to be its ruin. The attempt to regiment tens of millions of people along military lines, and to monopolize all resources for military purposes, led to severe economic problems, wastefulness, and popular resentment. The regime’s draconian laws, along with its hostility to regional elites and its voracious appetite for taxes and recruits, fanned the flames of this resentment even further. Meanwhile, the limited resources of an ancient agrarian society couldn’t support all the bureaucrats and soldiers that the Qin needed to contain this resentment, and the low efficiency of their information technology made it impossible to control every town and village from distant Xiangyang. Not surprisingly, in 209 BCE a series of revolts broke out, led by regional elites, disgruntled commoners, and even some of the empire’s own newly minted officials.

    According to one account, the first serious revolt started when a group of conscripted peasants sent to work in a frontier zone were delayed by rain and flooding. They feared they would be executed for this dereliction of duty, and felt they had nothing to lose. They were quickly joined by numerous other rebels. Just fifteen years after reaching the apogee of power, the Qin Empire collapsed under the weight of its totalitarian ambitions, splintering into eighteen kingdoms.

    After several years of war, a new dynasty—the Han—reunited the empire. But the Han then adopted a more realistic, less draconian attitude. Han emperors were certainly autocratic, but they were not totalitarian. They did not recognize any limits on their authority, but they did not try to micromanage everyone’s lives. Instead of following Legalist ideas of surveillance and control, the Han turned to Confucian ideas of encouraging people to act loyally and responsibly out of inner moral convictions. Like their contemporaries in the Roman Empire, Han emperors sought to control only some aspects of society from the center, while leaving considerable autonomy to provincial aristocrats and local communities. Due largely to the limitations imposed by the available information technology, premodern large-scale polities like the Roman and Han Empires gravitated toward nontotalitarian autocracy.70 Full-blown totalitarianism might have been dreamed about by the likes of the Qin, but its implementation had to wait for the development of modern technology.

    THE TOTALITARIAN TRINITY

    Just as modern technology enabled large-scale democracy, it also made large-scale totalitarianism possible. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the rise of industrial economies allowed governments to employ many more administrators, and new information technologies—such as the telegraph and radio—made it possible to quickly connect and supervise all these administrators. This facilitated an unprecedented concentration of information and power, for those who dreamed about such things.

    When the Bolsheviks seized control of Russia after the 1917 revolution, they were driven by exactly such a dream. The Bolsheviks craved unlimited power because they believed they had a messianic mission. Marx taught that for millennia, all human societies were dominated by corrupt elites who oppressed the people. The Bolsheviks claimed they knew how to finally end all oppression and create a perfectly just society on earth. But to do so, they had to overcome numerous enemies and obstacles, which, in turn, required all the power they could get. They refused to countenance any self-correcting mechanisms that might question either their vision or their methods. Like the Catholic Church, the Bolshevik Party was convinced that though its individual members might err, the party itself was always right. Belief in their own infallibility led the Bolsheviks to destroy Russia’s nascent democratic institutions—like elections, independent courts, the free press, and opposition parties—and to create a one-party totalitarian regime. Bolshevik totalitarianism did not start with Stalin. It was evident from the very first days of the revolution. It stemmed from the doctrine of party infallibility, rather than from the personality of Stalin.

    In the 1930s and 1940s, Stalin perfected the totalitarian system he inherited. The Stalinist network was composed of three main branches. First, there was the governmental apparatus of state ministries, regional administrations, and regular Red Army units, which in 1939 comprised 1.6 million civilian officials71 and 1.9 million soldiers.72 Second, there was the apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its ubiquitous party cells, which in 1939 included 2.4 million party members.73 Third, there was the secret police: first known as the Cheka, in Stalin’s days it was called the OGPU, NKVD, and MGB, and after Stalin’s death it morphed into the KGB. Its post-Soviet successor organization is known since 1995 as the FSB. In 1937, the NKVD had 270,000 agents and millions of informers.74

    The three branches operated in parallel. Just as democracy is maintained by having overlapping self-correcting mechanisms that keep each other in check, modern totalitarianism created overlapping surveillance mechanisms that keep each other in order. The governor of a Soviet province was constantly watched by the local party commissar, and neither of them knew who among their staff was an NKVD informer. A testimony to the effectiveness of the system is that modern totalitarianism largely solved the perennial problem of premodern autocracies—revolts by provincial subordinates. While the U.S.S.R. had its share of court coups, not once did a provincial governor or a Red Army front commander rebel against the center.75 Much of the credit for that goes to the secret police, which kept a close eye on the mass of citizens, on provincial administrators, and even more so on the party and the Red Army.

    While in most polities throughout history the army had wielded enormous political power, in twentieth-century totalitarian regimes the regular army ceded much of its clout to the secret police—the information army. In the U.S.S.R., the Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, and KGB lacked the firepower of the Red Army, but had more influence in the Kremlin and could terrorize and purge even the army brass. The East German Stasi and the Romanian Securitate were similarly stronger than the regular armies of these countries.76 In Nazi Germany, the SS was more powerful than the Wehrmacht, and the SS chief, Heinrich Himmler, was higher up the pecking order than Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the Wehrmacht high command.

    In none of these cases could the secret police defeat the regular army in traditional warfare, of course; what made the secret police powerful was its command of information. It had the information necessary to preempt a military coup and to arrest the commanders of tank brigades or fighter squadrons before they knew what hit them. During the Stalinist Great Terror of the late 1930s, out of 144,000 Red Army officers about 10 percent were shot or imprisoned by the NKVD. This included 154 of 186 divisional commanders (83 percent), eight of nine admirals (89 percent), thirteen of fifteen full generals (87 percent), and three of five marshals (60 percent).77

    The party leadership fared just as badly. Of the revered Old Bolsheviks, people who joined the party before the 1917 revolution, about a third didn’t survive the Great Terror.78 Of the thirty-three men who served on the Politburo between 1919 and 1938, fourteen were shot (42 percent). Of the 139 members and candidate members of the party’s Central Committee in 1934, 98 (70 percent) were shot. Only 2 percent of the delegates who took part in the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 evaded execution, imprisonment, expulsion, or demotion, and attended the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939.79

    The secret police—which did all the purging and killing—was itself divided into several competing branches that closely watched and purged each other. Genrikh Yagoda, the NKVD head who orchestrated the beginning of the Great Terror and supervised the killing of hundreds of thousands of victims, was executed in 1938 and replaced by Nikolai Yezhov. Yezhov lasted for two years, killing and imprisoning millions of people before being executed in 1940.

    Perhaps most telling is the fate of the thirty-nine people who in 1935 held the rank of general in the NKVD (called commissars of state security in Soviet nomenclature). Thirty-five of them (90 percent) were arrested and shot by 1941, one was assassinated, and one—the head of the NKVD’s Far East regional office—saved himself by defecting to Japan, but was killed by the Japanese in 1945. Of the original cohort of thirty-nine NKVD generals, only two men were left standing by the end of World War II. The remorseless logic of totalitarianism eventually caught up with them too. During the power struggles that followed Stalin’s death in 1953, one of them was shot, while the other was consigned to a psychiatric hospital, where he died in 1960.80 Serving as an NKVD general in Stalin’s day was one of the most dangerous jobs in the world. At a time when American democracy was improving its many self-correcting mechanisms, Soviet totalitarianism was refining its triple self-surveilling and self-terrorizing apparatus.

    TOTAL CONTROL

    Totalitarian regimes are based on controlling the flow of information and are suspicious of any independent channels of information. When military officers, state officials, or ordinary citizens exchange information, they can build trust. If they come to trust each other, they can organize resistance to the regime. Therefore, a key tenet of totalitarian regimes is that wherever people meet and exchange information, the regime should be there too, to keep an eye on them. In the 1930s, this was one principle that Hitler and Stalin shared.

    On March 31, 1933, two months after Hitler became chancellor, the Nazis passed the Coordination Act (Gleichschaltungsgesetz). This stipulated that by April 30, 1933, all political, social, and cultural organizations throughout Germany—from municipalities to football clubs and local choirs—must be run according to Nazi ideology, as organs of the Nazi state. It upended life in every city and hamlet in Germany.

    For example, in the small Alpine village of Oberstdorf, the democratically elected municipal council met for the last time on April 21, 1933, and three days later it was replaced by an unelected Nazi council that appointed a Nazi mayor. Since the Nazis alone allegedly knew what the people really wanted, who other than Nazis could implement the people’s will? Oberstdorf also had about fifty associations and clubs, ranging from a beekeeping society to an alpinist club. They all had to conform to the Coordination Act, adjusting their boards, membership, and statutes to Nazi demands, hoisting the swastika flag, and concluding every meeting with the “Horst Wessel Song,” the Nazi Party’s anthem. On April 6, 1933, the Oberstdorf fishing society banned Jews from its ranks. None of the thirty-two members was Jewish, but they felt they had to prove their Aryan credentials to the new regime.81

    Things were even more extreme in Stalin’s U.S.S.R. Whereas the Nazis still allowed church organizations and private businesses some partial freedom of action, the Soviets made no exceptions. By 1928 and the launch of the first Five-Year Plan, there were government officials, party functionaries, and secret police informants in every neighborhood and village, and between them they controlled every aspect of life: all businesses from power plants to cabbage farms; all newspapers and radio stations; all universities, schools, and youth groups; all hospitals and clinics; all voluntary and religious organizations; all sporting and scientific associations; all parks, museums, and cinemas.

    If a dozen people came together to play football, hike in the woods, or do some charity work, the party and the secret police had to be there too, represented by the local party cell or NKVD agent. The speed and efficiency of modern information technology meant that all these party cells and NKVD agents were always just a telegram or phone call away from Moscow. Information about suspicious persons and activities was fed into a countrywide, cross-referenced system of card catalogs. Known as kartoteki, these catalogs contained information from work records, police files, residence cards, and other forms of social registrations and, by the 1930s, had become the primary mechanism for surveilling and controlling the Soviet population.82

    This made it feasible for Stalin to seek control over the totality of Soviet life. One crucial example was the campaign to collectivize Soviet farming. For centuries, economic, social, and private life in the thousands of villages of the sprawling Tsarist Empire was managed by several traditional institutions: the local commune, the parish church, the private farm, the local market, and above all the family. In the mid-1920s, the Soviet Union was still an overwhelmingly agrarian economy. About 82 percent of the total population lived in villages, and 83 percent of the workforce was engaged in farming.83 But if each peasant family made its own decisions about what to grow, what to buy, and how much to charge for their produce, it greatly limited the ability of Moscow officials to themselves plan and control social and economic activities. What if the officials decided on a major agrarian reform, but the peasant families rejected it? So when in 1928 the Soviets came up with their first Five-Year Plan for the development of the Soviet Union, the most important item on the agenda was to collectivize farming.

    The idea was that in every village all the families would join a kolkhoz—a collective farm. They would hand over to the kolkhoz all their property—land, houses, horses, cows, shovels, pitchforks. They would work together for the kolkhoz, and in return the kolkhoz would provide for all their needs, from housing and education to food and health care. The kolkhoz would also decide—based on orders from Moscow—whether they should grow cabbages or turnips; whether to invest in a tractor or a school; and who would work in the dairy farm, the tannery, and the clinic. The result, thought the Moscow masterminds, would be the first perfectly just and equal society in human history.

    They were similarly convinced of the economic advantages of their proposed system, thinking that the kolkhoz would enjoy economy of scale. For example, when every peasant family had but a small strip of land, it made little sense to buy a tractor to plow it, and in any case most families couldn’t afford a tractor. Once all land was held communally, it could be cultivated far more efficiently using modern machinery. In addition, the kolkhoz was supposed to benefit from the wisdom of modern science. Instead of every peasant deciding on production methods on the basis of old traditions and groundless superstitions, state experts with university degrees from institutions like the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences would make the crucial decisions.

    To the planners in Moscow, it sounded wonderful. They expected a 50 percent increase in agricultural production by 1931.84 And if in the process the old village hierarchies and inequalities were bulldozed, all the better. To most peasants, however, it sounded terrible. They didn’t trust the Moscow planners or the new kolkhoz system. They did not want to give up their old way of life or their private property. Villagers slaughtered cows and horses instead of handing them to the kolkhoz. Their motivation to work dwindled. People made less effort plowing fields that belonged to everyone than plowing fields that belonged to their own family. Passive resistance was ubiquitous, sometimes flaring into violent clashes. Whereas Soviet planners expected to harvest ninety-eight million tons of grain in 1931, production was only sixty-nine million, according to official data, and might have been as low as fifty-seven million tons in reality. The 1932 harvest was even worse.85

    The state reacted with fury. Between 1929 and 1936, food confiscation, government neglect, and man-made famines (resulting from government policy rather than a natural disaster) claimed the lives of between 4.5 and 8.5 million people.86 Millions of additional peasants were declared enemies of the state and deported or imprisoned. The most basic institutions of peasant life—the family, the church, the local community—were terrorized and dismantled. In the name of justice, equality, and the will of the people, the collectivization campaign annihilated anything that stood in its way. In the first two months of 1930 alone, about 60 million peasants in more than 100,000 villages were herded into collective farms.87 In June 1929, only 4 percent of Soviet peasant households had belonged to collective farms. By March 1930 the figure had risen to 57 percent. By April 1937, 97 percent of households in the countryside had been confined to the 235,000 Soviet collective farms.88 In just seven years, then, a way of life that had existed for centuries had been replaced by the totalitarian brainchild of a few Moscow bureaucrats.

    THE KULAKS

    It is worthwhile to delve a little deeper into the history of Soviet collectivization. For it was a tragedy that bears some resemblance to earlier catastrophes in human history—like the European witch-hunt craze—and at the same time foreshadows some of the biggest dangers posed by twenty-first-century technology and its faith in supposedly scientific data.

    When their efforts to collectivize farming encountered resistance and led to economic disaster, Moscow bureaucrats and mythmakers took a page from Kramer’s Hammer of the Witches. I don’t wish to imply the Soviets actually read the book, but they too invented a global conspiracy and created an entire non-existing category of enemies. In the 1930s Soviet authorities repeatedly blamed the disasters afflicting the Soviet economy on a counterrevolutionary cabal whose chief agents were the “kulaks” or “capitalist farmers.” Just as in Kramer’s imagination witches serving Satan conjured hailstorms that destroyed crops, so in the Stalinist imagination kulaks beholden to global capitalism sabotaged the Soviet economy.

    In theory, kulaks were an objective socioeconomic category, defined by analyzing empirical data on things like property, income, capital, and wages. Soviet officials could allegedly identify kulaks by counting things. If most people in a village had only one cow, then the few families who had three cows were considered kulaks. If most people in a village didn’t hire any labor, but one family hired two workers during harvest time, this was a kulak family. Being a kulak meant not only that you possessed a certain amount of property but also that you possessed certain personality traits. According to the supposedly infallible Marxist doctrine, people’s material conditions determined their social and spiritual character. Since kulaks allegedly engaged in capitalist exploitation, it was a scientific fact (according to Marxist thinking) that they were greedy, selfish, and unreliable—and so were their children. Discovering that someone was a kulak ostensibly revealed something profound about their fundamental nature.

    On December 27, 1929, Stalin declared that the Soviet state should seek “the liquidation of the kulaks as a class,”89 and immediately galvanized the party and the secret police to realize that ambitious and murderous aim. Early modern European witch-hunters worked in autocratic societies that lacked modern information technology; therefore, it took them three centuries to kill fifty thousand alleged witches. In contrast, Soviet kulak hunters were working in a totalitarian society that had at its disposal technologies such as telegraphs, trains, telephones, and radios—as well as a sprawling bureaucracy. They decided that two years would suffice to “liquidate” millions of kulaks.90

    Soviet officials began by assessing how many kulaks there must be in the U.S.S.R. Based on existing data—such as tax records, employment records, and the 1926 Soviet census—they decided that kulaks constituted 3–5 percent of the rural population.91 On January 30, 1930, just one month after Stalin’s speech, a Politburo decree translated his vague vision into a much more detailed plan of action. The decree included target numbers for the liquidation of kulaks in each major agricultural region.92 Regional authorities then made their own estimates of the number of kulaks in each county under their jurisdiction. Eventually, specific quotas were assigned to rural soviets (local administrative units, typically comprising a handful of villages). Often, local officials inflated the numbers along the way, to prove their zeal. Each rural soviet then had to identify the stated number of kulak households in the villages under its purview. These people were expelled from their homes, and—according to the administrative category to which they belonged—resettled elsewhere, incarcerated in concentration camps, or condemned to death.93

    How exactly did Soviet officials tell who was a kulak? In some villages, local party members made a conscientious effort to identify kulaks by objective measures, such as the amount of property they owned. It was often the most hardworking and efficient farmers who were stigmatized and expelled. In some villages local communists used the opportunity to get rid of their personal enemies. Some villages simply drew lots on who would be considered a kulak. Other villages held communal meetings to vote on the matter and often chose isolated farmers, widows, old people, and other “expendables” (exactly the sorts of people who in early modern Europe were most likely to be branded witches).94

    The absurdity of the entire operation is manifested in the case of the Streletsky family from the Kurgan region of Siberia. Dmitry Streletsky, who was then a teenager, recalled years later how his family was branded kulaks and selected for liquidation. “Serkov, the chairman of the village Soviet who deported us, explained: ‘I have received an order [from the district party committee] to find 17 kulak families for deportation. I formed a Committee of the Poor and we sat through the night to choose the families. There is no one in the village who is rich enough to qualify, and not many old people, so we simply chose the 17 families. You were chosen. Please don’t take it personally. What else could I do?’ ”95 If anyone dared object to the madness of the system, they were promptly denounced as kulaks and counterrevolutionaries and would themselves be liquidated.

    Altogether, some five million kulaks would be expelled from their homes by 1933. As many as thirty thousand heads of households were shot. The more fortunate victims were resettled in their district of origin or became vagrant workers in the big cities, while about two million were either exiled to remote inhospitable regions or incarcerated as state slaves in labor camps.96 Numerous important and notorious state projects—such as the construction of the White Sea Canal and the development of mines in the Arctic regions—were accomplished with the labor of millions of prisoners, many of them kulaks. It was one of the fastest and largest enslavement campaigns in human history.97 Once branded a kulak, a person could not get rid of the stigma. Government agencies, party organs, and secret police documents recorded who was a kulak in a labyrinthian system of kartoteki catalogs, archives, and internal passports.

    Kulak status even passed to the next generation, with devastating consequences. Kulak children were refused entrance to communist youth groups, the Red Army, universities, and prestigious areas of employment.98 In her 1997 memoirs, Antonina Golovina recalled how her family was deported from their ancestral village as kulaks and sent to live in the town of Pestovo. The boys in her new school regularly taunted her. On one occasion, a senior teacher told the eleven-year-old Antonina to stand up in front of all the other children, and began abusing her mercilessly, shouting that “her sort were enemies of the people, wretched kulaks! You certainly deserved to be deported, I hope you’re all exterminated!” Antonina wrote that this was the defining moment of her life. “I had this feeling in my gut that we [kulaks] were different from the rest, that we were criminals.” She never got over it.99

    Like the ten-year-old “witch” Hansel Pappenheimer, the eleven-year-old “kulak” Antonina Golovina found herself cast into an intersubjective category invented by human mythmakers and imposed by ubiquitous bureaucrats. The mountains of information collected by Soviet bureaucrats about the kulaks wasn’t the objective truth about them, but it imposed a new intersubjective Soviet truth. Knowing that someone was a kulak was one of the most important things to know about a Soviet person, even though the label was entirely bogus.

    ONE BIG HAPPY SOVIET FAMILY

    The Stalinist regime would go on to attempt something even more ambitious than the mass dismantling of private family farms. It set out to dismantle the family itself. Unlike Roman emperors or Russian tsars, Stalin tried to insert himself even into the most intimate human relationships, coming between parents and children. Family ties were considered the bedrock of corruption, inequality, and antiparty activities. Soviet children were therefore taught to worship Stalin as their real father and to inform on their biological parents if they criticized Stalin or the Communist Party.

    Starting in 1932, the Soviet propaganda machine created a veritable cult around the figure of Pavlik Morozov—a thirteen-year-old boy from the Siberian village of Gerasimovka. In autumn 1931, Pavlik informed the secret police that his father, Trofim—the chairman of the village soviet—was selling false papers to kulak exiles. During the subsequent trial, when Trofim shouted to Pavlik, “It’s me, your father,” the boy retorted, “Yes, he used to be my father, but I no longer consider him my father.” Trofim was sent to a labor camp and later shot. In September 1932, Pavlik was found murdered, and Soviet authorities arrested and executed five of his family members, who allegedly killed him in revenge for the denunciation. The real story was far more complicated, but it didn’t matter to the Soviet press. Pavlik became a martyr, and millions of Soviet children were taught to emulate him.100 Many did.

    For example, in 1934 a thirteen-year-old boy called Pronia Kolibin told the authorities that his hungry mother stole grain from the kolkhoz fields. His mother was arrested and presumably shot. Pronia was rewarded with a cash prize and a lot of positive media attention. The party organ Pravda published a poem Pronia wrote. Two of its lines read, “You are a wrecker, Mother / I can live with you no more.”101

    The Soviet attempt to control the family was reflected in a dark joke told in Stalin’s day. Stalin visits a factory undercover, and conversing with a worker, he asks the man, “Who is your father?”
    “Stalin,” replies the worker.
    “Who is your mother?”
    “The Soviet Union,” the man responds.
    “And what do you want to be?”
    “An orphan.”102

    At the time you could easily lose your liberty or your life for telling this joke, even if you told it in your own home to your closest family members. The most important lesson Soviet parents taught their children wasn’t loyalty to the party or to Stalin. It was “keep your mouth shut.”103 Few things in the Soviet Union were as dangerous as holding an open conversation.

    PARTY AND CHURCH

    You may wonder whether modern totalitarian institutions like the Nazi Party or the Soviet Communist Party were really all that different from earlier institutions like the Christian churches. After all, churches too believed in their infallibility, had priestly agents everywhere, and sought to control the daily life of people down to their diet and sexual habits. Shouldn’t we see the Catholic Church or the Eastern Orthodox Church as totalitarian institutions? And doesn’t this undermine the thesis that totalitarianism was made possible only by modern information technology?

    There are, however, several major differences between modern totalitarianism and premodern churches. First, as noted earlier, modern totalitarianism has worked by deploying several overlapping surveillance mechanisms that keep each other in order. The party is never alone; it works alongside state organs, on the one side, and the secret police, on the other. In contrast, in most medieval European kingdoms the Catholic Church was an independent institution that often clashed with the state institutions instead of reinforcing them. Consequently, the church was perhaps the most important check on the power of European autocrats.

    For example, when in the “Investiture Controversy” of the 1070s the emperor Henry IV asserted that as emperor he had the final say on the appointment of bishops, abbots, and other important church officials, Pope Gregory VII mobilized resistance and eventually forced the emperor to surrender. On January 25, 1077, Henry reached Canossa castle, where the pope was lodging, to offer his submission and apology. The pope refused to open the gates, and Henry waited in the snow outside, barefoot and hungry. After three days, the pope finally opened the gates to the emperor, who begged forgiveness.104

    An analogous clash in a modern totalitarian country is unthinkable. The whole idea of totalitarianism is to prevent any separation of powers. In the Soviet Union, state and party reinforced each other, and Stalin was the de facto head of both. There could be no Soviet “Investiture Controversy,” because Stalin had final say about all appointments to both party positions and state functions. He decided both who would be general secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia and who would be foreign minister of the Soviet Union.

    Another important difference is that medieval churches tended to be traditionalist organizations that resisted change, while modern totalitarian parties have tended to be revolutionary organizations demanding change. A premodern church built its power gradually by developing its structure and traditions over centuries. A king or a pope who wanted to swiftly revolutionize society was therefore likely to encounter stiff resistance from church members and ordinary believers.

    For example, in the eighth and ninth centuries a series of Byzantine emperors sought to forbid the veneration of icons, which seemed to them idolatrous. They pointed to many passages in the Bible, most notably the Second Commandment, that forbade making any graven images. While Christian churches traditionally interpreted the Second Commandment in a way that allowed the veneration of icons, emperors like Constantine V argued that this was a mistake and that disasters like Christian defeats by the armies of Islam were due to God’s wrath over the worship of icons. In 754 more than three hundred bishops assembled in the Council of Hieria to support Constantine’s iconoclastic position.

    Compared with Stalin’s collectivization campaign, this was a minor reform. Families and villages were required to give up their icons, but not their private property or their children. Yet Byzantine iconoclasm met with widespread resistance. Unlike the participants in the Council of Hieria, many ordinary priests, monks, and believers were deeply attached to their icons. The resulting struggle ripped apart Byzantine society until the emperors conceded defeat and reversed course.105 Constantine V was later vilified by Byzantine historians as “Constantine the Shitty” (Koprónimos), and a story was spread about him that he defecated during his baptism.106

    Unlike premodern churches, which developed slowly over many centuries and therefore tended to be conservative and suspicious of rapid changes, modern totalitarian parties like the Nazi Party and the Soviet Communist Party were organized within a single generation around the promise to quickly revolutionize society. They didn’t have centuries-old traditions and structures to defend. When their leaders conceived some ambitious plan to smash existing traditions and structures, party members typically fell in line.

    Perhaps most important of all, premodern churches could not become tools of totalitarian control because they themselves suffered from the same limitations as all other premodern organizations. While they had local agents everywhere, in the shape of parish priests, monks, and itinerant preachers, the difficulty of transmitting and processing information meant that church leaders knew little about what was going on in remote communities, and local priests had a large degree of autonomy. Consequently, churches tended to be local affairs. People in every province and village often venerated local saints, upheld local traditions, performed local rites, and might even have had local doctrinal ideas that differed from the official line.107 If the pope in Rome wanted to do something about an independent-minded priest in a remote Polish parish, he had to send a letter to the archbishop of Gniezno, who had to instruct the relevant bishop, who had to send someone to intervene in the parish. That might take months, and there was ample opportunity for the archbishop, bishop, and other intermediaries to reinterpret or even “mislay” the pope’s orders.108

    Churches became more totalitarian institutions only in the late modern era, when modern information technologies became available. We tend to think of popes as medieval relics, but actually they are masters of modern technology. In the eighteenth century, the pope had little control over the worldwide Catholic Church and was reduced to the status of a local Italian princeling, fighting other Italian powers for control of Bologna or Ferrara. With the advent of radio, popes became some of the most powerful people on the planet. Pope John Paul II could sit in the Vatican and speak directly to millions of Catholics from Poland to the Philippines, without any archbishop, bishop, or parish priest able to twist or hide his words.109

    HOW INFORMATION FLOWS

    We see then that the new information technology of the late modern era gave rise to both large-scale democracy and large-scale totalitarianism. But there were crucial differences between how the two systems used information technology. As noted earlier, democracy encourages information to flow through many independent channels rather than only through the center, and it allows many independent nodes to process the information and make decisions by themselves. Information freely circulates between private businesses, private media organizations, municipalities, sports associations, charities, families, and individuals—without ever passing through the office of a government minister.

    In contrast, totalitarianism wants all information to pass through the central hub and doesn’t want any independent institutions making decisions on their own. True, totalitarianism does have its tripartite apparatus of government, party, and secret police. But the whole point of this parallel apparatus is to prevent the emergence of any independent power that might challenge the center. When government officials, party members, and secret police agents constantly keep tabs on one another, opposing the center is extremely dangerous.

    As contrasting types of information networks, democracy and totalitarianism both have their advantages and disadvantages. The biggest advantage of the centralized totalitarian network is that it is extremely orderly, which means it can make decisions quickly and enforce them ruthlessly. Especially during emergencies like wars and epidemics, centralized networks can move much faster and further than distributed networks.

    But hyper-centralized information networks also suffer from several big disadvantages. Since they don’t allow information to flow anywhere except through the official channels, if the official channels are blocked, the information cannot find an alternative means of transmission. And official channels are often blocked.

    One common reason why official channels might be blocked is that fearful subordinates hide bad news from their superiors. In Jaroslav Hašek’s Good Soldier Švejk—a satirical novel about the Austro-Hungarian Empire during World War I—Hašek describes how the Austrian authorities were worried about waning morale among the civilian population. They therefore bombarded local police stations with orders to hire informers, collect data, and report to headquarters on the population’s loyalty. To be as scientific as possible, headquarters invented an ingenious loyalty grade: I.a, I.b, I.c; II.a, II.b, II.c; III.a, III.b, III.c; IV.a, IV.b, IV.c. They sent to the local police stations detailed explanations about each grade, and an official form that had to be filled daily. Police sergeants across the country dutifully filled out the forms and sent them back to headquarters. Without exception, all of them always reported a I.a morale level; to do otherwise was to invite rebuke, demotion, or worse.110

    Another common reason why official channels fail to pass on information is to preserve order. Because the chief aim of totalitarian information networks is to produce order rather than discover truth, when alarming information threatens to undermine social order, totalitarian regimes often suppress it. It is relatively easy for them to do so, because they control all the information channels.

    For example, when the Chernobyl nuclear reactor exploded on April 26, 1986, Soviet authorities suppressed all news of the disaster. Both Soviet citizens and foreign countries were kept oblivious of the danger, and so took no steps to protect themselves from radiation. When some Soviet officials in Chernobyl and the nearby town of Pripyat requested to immediately evacuate nearby population centers, their superiors’ chief concern was to avoid the spread of alarming news, so they not only forbade evacuation but also cut the phone lines and warned employees in the nuclear facility not to talk about the disaster.

    Two days after the meltdown Swedish scientists noticed that radiation levels in Sweden, more than twelve hundred kilometers from Chernobyl, were abnormally high. Only after Western governments and the Western press broke the news did the Soviets acknowledge that anything was amiss. Even then they continued to hide from their own citizens the full magnitude of the catastrophe and hesitated to request advice and assistance from abroad. Millions of people in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia paid with their health. When the Soviet authorities later investigated the disaster, their priority was to deflect blame rather than understand the causes and prevent future accidents.111

    In 2019, I went on a tour of Chernobyl. The Ukrainian guide who explained what led to the nuclear accident said something that stuck in my mind. “Americans grow up with the idea that questions lead to answers,” he said. “But Soviet citizens grew up with the idea that questions lead to trouble.”

    Naturally, leaders of democratic countries also don’t relish bad news. But in a distributed democratic network, when official lines of communication are blocked, information flows through alternative channels. For example, if an American official decides against telling the president about an unfolding disaster, that news will nevertheless be published by The Washington Post, and if The Washington Post too deliberately withholds the information, The Wall Street Journal or The New York Times will break the story. The business model of independent media—forever chasing the next scoop—all but guarantees publication.

    When, on March 28, 1979, there was a severe accident in the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor in Pennsylvania, the news quickly spread without any need for international intervention. The accident began around 4:00 a.m. and was noticed by 6:30 a.m. An emergency was declared in the facility at 6:56, and at 7:02 the accident was reported to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. During the following hour the governor of Pennsylvania, the lieutenant governor, and the civil defense authorities were informed. An official press conference was scheduled for 10:00 a.m. However, a traffic reporter at a local Harrisburg radio station picked up a police notice on events, and the station aired a brief report at 8:25 a.m. In the U.S.S.R. such an initiative by an independent radio station was unthinkable, but in the United States it was unremarkable. By 9:00 a.m. the Associated Press issued a bulletin. Though it took days for the full details to emerge, American citizens learned about the accident two hours after it was first noticed. Subsequent investigations by government agencies, NGOs, academics, and the press uncovered not just the immediate causes of the accident but also its deeper structural causes, which helped improve the safety of nuclear technology worldwide. Indeed, some of the lessons of Three Mile Island, which were openly shared even with the Soviets, contributed to mitigating the Chernobyl disaster.112

    NOBODY’S PERFECT

    Totalitarian and authoritarian networks face other problems besides blocked arteries. First and foremost, as we have already established, their self-correcting mechanisms tend to be very weak. Since they believe they are infallible, they see little need for such mechanisms, and since they are afraid of any independent institution that might challenge them, they lack free courts, media outlets, or research centers. Consequently, there is nobody to expose and correct the daily abuses of power that characterize all governments. The leader may occasionally proclaim an anticorruption campaign, but in nondemocratic systems these often turn out to be little more than a smoke screen for one regime faction to purge another faction.113

    And what happens if the leader himself embezzles public funds or makes some disastrous policy mistake? Nobody can challenge the leader, and on his own initiative the leader—being a human being—may well refuse to admit any mistakes. Instead, he is likely to blame all problems on “foreign enemies,” “internal traitors,” or “corrupt subordinates” and demand even more power in order to deal with the alleged malefactors.

    For example, we mentioned in the previous chapter that Stalin adopted the bogus theory of Lysenkoism as the state doctrine on evolution. The results were catastrophic. Neglect of Darwinian models, and attempts by Lysenkoist agronomists to create super-crops, set back Soviet genetic research for decades and undermined Soviet agriculture. Soviet experts who suggested abandoning Lysenkoism and accepting Darwinism risked the gulag or a bullet to the head. Lysenkoism’s legacy haunted Soviet science and agronomy for decades and was one reason why by the early 1970s the U.S.S.R. ceased to be a major exporter of grain and became a net importer, despite its vast fertile lands.114

    The same dynamic characterized many other fields of activity. For instance, during the 1930s Soviet industry suffered from numerous accidents. This was largely the fault of the Soviet bosses in Moscow, who set up almost impossible goals for industrialization and viewed any failure to achieve them as treason. In the effort to fulfill the ambitious goals, safety measures and quality-control checks were abandoned, and experts who advised prudence were often reprimanded or shot. The result was a wave of industrial accidents, dysfunctional products, and wasted efforts. Instead of taking responsibility, Moscow concluded that this must be the handiwork of the global Trotskyite-imperialist conspiracy of saboteurs and terrorists bent on derailing the Soviet enterprise. Rather than slow down and adopt safety regulations, the bosses redoubled the terror and shot more people.

    A famous case in point was Pavel Rychagov. He was one of the best and bravest Soviet pilots, leading missions to help the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War and the Chinese against the Japanese invasion. He quickly rose through the ranks, becoming commander of the Soviet air force in August 1940, at age twenty-nine. But the courage that helped Rychagov shoot down Nazi airplanes in Spain landed him in deep trouble in Moscow. The Soviet air force suffered from numerous accidents, which the Politburo blamed on lack of discipline and deliberate sabotage by anti-Soviet conspiracies. Rychagov, however, wouldn’t buy this official line. As a frontline pilot, he knew the truth. He flatly told Stalin that pilots were being forced to operate hastily designed and badly produced airplanes, which he compared to flying “in coffins.” Two days after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, as the Red Army was collapsing and Stalin was desperately hunting for scapegoats, Rychagov was arrested for “being a member of an anti-Soviet conspiratorial organization and carrying out enemy work aimed at weakening the power of the Red Army.” His wife was also arrested, because she allegedly knew about his “Trotskyist ties with the military conspirators.” They were executed on October 28, 1941.115

    The real saboteur who wrecked Soviet military efforts wasn’t Rychagov, of course, but Stalin himself. For years, Stalin feared that a clash to the death with Nazi Germany was likely and built the world’s biggest war machine to prepare for it. But he hamstrung this machine both diplomatically and psychologically.

    On the diplomatic level, in 1939–41, Stalin gambled that he could goad the “capitalists” to fight and exhaust one another while the U.S.S.R. nurtured and even increased its power. He therefore made a pact with Hitler in 1939 and allowed the Germans to conquer much of Poland and western Europe, while the U.S.S.R. attacked or alienated almost all its neighbors. In 1939–40 the Soviets invaded and occupied eastern Poland; annexed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and conquered parts of Finland and Romania. Finland and Romania, which could have acted as neutral buffers on the U.S.S.R.’s flanks, consequently became implacable enemies. Even in the spring of 1941, Stalin still refused to make a preemptive alliance with Britain and made no move to hinder the Nazi conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece, thereby losing his last potential allies on the European continent. When Hitler struck on June 22, 1941, the U.S.S.R. was isolated.

    In theory, the war machine Stalin built could have handled the Nazi onslaught even in isolation. The territories conquered since 1939 provided depth to Soviet defenses, and the Soviet military advantage seemed overwhelming. On the first day of the invasion the Soviets had 15,000 tanks, 15,000 warplanes, and 37,000 artillery pieces on the European front, facing 3,300 German tanks, 2,250 warplanes, and 7,146 guns.116 But in one of history’s greatest military catastrophes, within a month the Soviets lost 11,700 tanks (78 percent), 10,000 warplanes (67 percent), and 19,000 artillery pieces (51 percent).117 Stalin also lost all the territories he conquered in 1939–40 and much of the Soviet heartland. By July 16 the Germans were in Smolensk, 370 kilometers from Moscow.

    The causes of the debacle have been debated ever since 1941, but most scholars agree that a significant factor was the psychological costs of Stalinism. For years the regime terrorized its people, punished initiative and individuality, and encouraged submissiveness and conformity. This undermined the soldiers’ motivation. Especially in the first months of the war, before the horrors of Nazi rule were fully realized, Red Army soldiers surrendered in huge numbers; between three and four million were taken captive by the end of 1941.118 Even when they fought tenaciously, Red Army units suffered from a lack of initiative. Officers who had survived the purges were fearful to take independent actions, while younger officers often lacked adequate training. Frequently starved of information and scapegoated for failures, commanders also had to cope with political commissars who could dispute their decisions. The safest course was to wait for orders from on high and then slavishly follow them even when they made little military sense.119

    Despite the disasters of 1941 and of the spring and summer of 1942, the Soviet state did not collapse the way Hitler hoped. As the Red Army and the Soviet leadership assimilated the lessons learned from the first year of struggle, the political center in Moscow loosened its hold. The power of political commissars was restricted, while professional officers were encouraged to assume greater responsibility and take more initiatives.120 Stalin also reversed his geopolitical mistakes of 1939–41 and allied the U.S.S.R. with Britain and the United States. Red Army initiative, Western assistance, and the realization of what Nazi rule would mean for the people of the U.S.S.R. turned the tide of war.

    Once victory was secured in 1945, however, Stalin initiated new waves of terror, purging more independent-minded officers and officials and again encouraging blind obedience.121 Ironically, Stalin’s own death eight years later was partly the result of an information network that prioritized order and disregarded truth. In 1951–53 the U.S.S.R. experienced yet another witch hunt. Soviet mythmakers fabricated a conspiracy theory that Jewish doctors were systematically murdering leading regime members, under the guise of giving them medical care. The theory alleged that the doctors were the agents of a global American-Zionist plot, working in collaboration with traitors in the secret police. By early 1953 hundreds of doctors and secret police officials, including the head of the secret police himself, were arrested, tortured, and forced to name accomplices. The conspiracy theory—a Soviet twist on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion—merged with age-old blood-libel accusations, and rumors began circulating that Jewish doctors were not just murdering Soviet leaders but also killing babies in hospitals. Since a large proportion of Soviet doctors were Jews, people began fearing doctors in general.122

    Just as the hysteria about “the doctors’ plot” was reaching its climax, Stalin had a stroke on March 1, 1953. He collapsed in his dacha, wet himself, and lay for hours in his soiled pajamas, unable to call for help. At around 10:30 p.m. a guard found the courage to enter the inner sanctum of world communism, where he discovered the leader on the floor. By 3:00 a.m. on March 2, Politburo members arrived at the dacha and debated what to do. For several hours more, nobody dared call a doctor. What if Stalin were to regain consciousness, and open his eyes only to see a doctor—a doctor!—hovering over his bed? He would surely think this was a plot to murder him and would have those responsible shot. Stalin’s personal physician wasn’t present, because he was at the time in a basement cell of the Lubyanka prison—undergoing torture for suggesting that Stalin needed more rest. By the time the Politburo members decided to bring in medical experts, the danger had passed. Stalin never woke up.123

    You may conclude from this litany of disasters that the Stalinist system was totally dysfunctional. Its ruthless disregard for truth caused it not only to inflict terrible suffering on hundreds of millions of people but also to make colossal diplomatic, military, and economic errors and to devour its own leaders. However, such a conclusion would be misleading.

    In a discussion of the abysmal failure of Stalinism in the early phase of World War II, two points complicate the narrative. First, democratic countries like France, Norway, and the Netherlands made at the time diplomatic errors as great as those of the U.S.S.R., and their armies performed even worse. Second, the military machine that crushed the Red Army, the French army, the Dutch army, and numerous other armies was itself built by a totalitarian regime. So whatever conclusion we draw from the years 1939–41, it cannot be that totalitarian networks necessarily function worse than democratic ones. The history of Stalinism reveals many potential drawbacks of totalitarian information networks, but that should not blind us to their potential advantages.

    When one considers the broader history of World War II and its outcome, it becomes evident that Stalinism was in fact one of the most successful political systems ever devised—if we define “success” purely in terms of order and power while disregarding all considerations of ethics and human well-being. Despite—or perhaps because of—its utter lack of compassion and its callous attitude to truth, Stalinism was singularly efficient at maintaining order on a gigantic scale. The relentless barrage of fake news and conspiracy theories helped to keep hundreds of millions of people in line. The collectivization of Soviet agriculture led to mass enslavement and starvation but also laid the foundations for the country’s rapid industrialization. Soviet disregard for quality control might have produced flying coffins, but it produced them in the tens of thousands, making up in quantity for what they lacked in quality. The decimation of Red Army officers during the Great Terror was a major reason for the army’s abysmal performance in 1941, but it was also a key reason why, despite the terrible defeats, nobody rebelled against Stalin. The Soviet military machine tended to crush its own soldiers alongside the enemy, but it eventually rumbled on to victory.

    In the 1940s and early 1950s, many people throughout the world believed Stalinism was the wave of the future. It had won World War II, after all, raised the red flag over the Reichstag, ruled an empire that stretched from central Europe to the Pacific, fueled anticolonial struggles throughout the world, and inspired numerous copycat regimes. It won admirers even among leading artists and thinkers in Western democracies, who believed that notwithstanding the vague rumors about gulags and purges Stalinism was humanity’s best shot at ending capitalist exploitation and creating a perfectly just society. Stalinism thus got close to world domination. It would be naive to assume that its disregard for truth doomed it to failure or that its ultimate collapse guarantees that such a system can never again arise. Information systems can reach far with just a little truth and a lot of order. Anyone who abhors the moral costs of systems like Stalinism cannot rely on their supposed inefficiency to derail them.

    THE TECHNOLOGICAL PENDULUM

    Once we learn to see democracy and totalitarianism as different types of information networks, we can understand why they flourish in certain eras and are absent in others. It is not just because people gain or lose faith in certain political ideals; it is also because of revolutions in information technologies. Of course, just as the printing press didn’t cause the witch hunts or the scientific revolution, so radio didn’t cause either Stalinist totalitarianism or American democracy. Technology only creates new opportunities; it is up to us to decide which ones to pursue.

    Totalitarian regimes choose to use modern information technology to centralize the flow of information and to stifle truth in order to maintain order. As a consequence, they have to struggle with the danger of ossification. When more and more information flows to only one place, will it result in efficient control or in blocked arteries and, finally, a heart attack? Democratic regimes choose to use modern information technology to distribute the flow of information between more institutions and individuals and encourage the free pursuit of truth. They consequently have to struggle with the danger of fracturing. Like a solar system with more and more planets circling faster and faster, can the center still hold, or will things fall apart and anarchy prevail?

    An archetypal example of the different strategies can be found in the contrasting histories of Western democracies and the Soviet bloc in the 1960s. This was an era when Western democracies relaxed censorship and various discriminatory policies that hampered the free spread of information. This made it easier for previously marginalized groups to organize, join the public conversation, and make political demands. The resulting wave of activism destabilized the social order. Hitherto, when a limited number of rich white men did almost all the talking, it was relatively easy to reach agreements. Once poor people, women, LGBTQ people, ethnic minorities, disabled people, and members of other historically oppressed groups gained a voice, they brought with them new ideas, opinions, and interests. Many of the old gentlemanly agreements consequently became untenable. For example, the Jim Crow segregation regime, upheld or at least tolerated by generations of both Democratic and Republican administrations in the United States, fell apart. Things that were considered sacrosanct, self-evident, and universally accepted—such as gender roles—became deeply controversial, and it was difficult to reach new agreements because there were many more groups, viewpoints, and interests to take into account. Just holding an orderly conversation was a challenge, because people couldn’t even agree on the rules of debate.

    This caused much frustration among both the old guard and the freshly empowered, who suspected that their newfound freedom of expression was hollow and that their political demands were not fulfilled. Disappointed with words, some switched to guns. In many Western democracies, the 1960s were characterized not just by unprecedented disagreements but also by a surge of violence. Political assassinations, kidnappings, riots, and terror attacks multiplied. The murders of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, the riots following King’s assassination, and the wave of demonstrations, revolts, and armed clashes that swept the Western world in 1968 were just some of the more famous examples.124 The images from Chicago or Paris in 1968 could easily have given the impression that things were falling apart. The pressure to live up to the democratic ideals and to include more people and groups in the public conversation seemed to undermine the social order and to make democracy unworkable.

    Meanwhile, the regimes behind the Iron Curtain, who never promised inclusivity, continued stifling the public conversation and centralizing information and power. And it seemed to work. Though they did face some peripheral challenges, most notably the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968, the communists dealt with these threats swiftly and decisively. In the Soviet heartland itself, everything was orderly.

    Fast-forward twenty years, and it was the Soviet system that had become unworkable. The sclerotic gerontocrats on the podium in Red Square were a perfect emblem of a dysfunctional information network, lacking any meaningful self-correcting mechanisms. Decolonization, globalization, technological development, and changing gender roles led to rapid economic, social, and geopolitical changes. But the gerontocrats could not handle all the information streaming to Moscow, and since no subordinate was allowed much initiative, the entire system ossified and collapsed.

    The failure was most obvious in the economic sphere. The overcentralized Soviet economy was slow to react to rapid technological developments and changing consumer wishes. Obeying commands from the top, the Soviet economy was churning out intercontinental missiles, fighter jets, and prestige infrastructure projects. But it was not producing what most people actually wanted to buy—from efficient refrigerators to pop music—and lagged behind in cutting-edge military technology.

    Nowhere were its shortcomings more glaring than in the semiconductor sector, in which technology developed at a particularly fast rate. In the West, semiconductors were developed through open competition between numerous private companies like Intel and Toshiba, whose main customers were other private companies like Apple and Sony. The latter used microchips to produce civilian goods such as the Macintosh personal computer and the Walkman. The Soviets could never catch up with American and Japanese microchip production, because—as the American economic historian Chris Miller explained—the Soviet semiconductor sector was “secretive, top-down, oriented toward military systems, fulfilling orders with little scope for creativity.” The Soviets tried to close the gap by stealing and copying Western technology—which only guaranteed that they always remained several years behind.125 Thus the first Soviet personal computer appeared only in 1984, at a time when in the United States people already had eleven million PCs.126

    Western democracies not only surged ahead technologically and economically but also succeeded in holding the social order together despite—or perhaps because of—widening the circle of participants in the political conversation. There were many hiccups, but the United States, Japan, and other democracies created a far more dynamic and inclusive information system, which made room for many more viewpoints without breaking down. It was such a remarkable achievement that many felt that the victory of democracy over totalitarianism was final. This victory has often been explained in terms of a fundamental advantage in information processing: totalitarianism didn’t work because trying to concentrate and process all the data in one central hub was extremely inefficient. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it accordingly seemed that the future belonged to distributed information networks and to democracy.

    This turned out to be wrong. In fact, the next information revolution was already gathering momentum, setting the stage for a new round in the competition between democracy and totalitarianism. Computers, the internet, smartphones, social media, and AI posed new challenges to democracy, giving a voice not only to more disenfranchised groups but to any human with an internet connection, and even to nonhuman agents. Democracies in the 2020s face the task, once again, of integrating a flood of new voices into the public conversation without destroying the social order. Things look as dire as they did in the 1960s, and there is no guarantee that democracies will pass the new test as successfully as they passed the previous one. Simultaneously, the new technologies also give fresh hope to totalitarian regimes that still dream of concentrating all the information in one hub. Yes, the old men on the podium in Red Square were not up to the task of orchestrating millions of lives from a single center. But perhaps AI can do it?

    As humankind enters the second quarter of the twenty-first century, a central question is how well democracies and totalitarian regimes will handle both the threats and the opportunities resulting from the current information revolution. Will the new technologies favor one type of regime over the other, or will we see the world divided once again, this time by a Silicon Curtain rather than an iron one?

    As in previous eras, information networks will struggle to find the right balance between truth and order. Some will opt to prioritize truth and maintain strong self-correcting mechanisms. Others will make the opposite choice. Many of the lessons learned from the canonization of the Bible, the early modern witch hunts, and the Stalinist collectivization campaign will remain relevant, and perhaps have to be relearned. However, the current information revolution also has some unique features, different from—and potentially far more dangerous than—anything we have seen before.

    Hitherto, every information network in history relied on human mythmakers and human bureaucrats to function. Clay tablets, papyrus rolls, printing presses, and radio sets have had a far-reaching impact on history, but it always remained the job of humans to compose all the texts, interpret the texts, and decide who would be burned as a witch or enslaved as a kulak. Now, however, humans will have to contend with digital mythmakers and digital bureaucrats. The main split in twenty-first-century politics might be not between democracies and totalitarian regimes but rather between human beings and nonhuman agents. Instead of dividing democracies from totalitarian regimes, a new Silicon Curtain may separate all humans from our unfathomable algorithmic overlords. People in all countries and walks of life—including even dictators—might find themselves subservient to an alien intelligence that can monitor everything we do while we have little idea what it is doing. The rest of this book, then, is dedicated to exploring whether such a Silicon Curtain is indeed descending on the world, and what life might look like when computers run our bureaucracies and algorithms invent new mythologies.

    PART II  The Inorganic Network

    CHAPTER 6 The New Members: How Computers Are Different from Printing Presses

    It’s hardly news that we are living in the midst of an unprecedented information revolution. But what kind of revolution is it exactly? In recent years we have been inundated with so many groundbreaking inventions that it is difficult to determine what is driving this revolution. Is it the internet? Smartphones? Social media? Blockchain? Algorithms? AI?

    So before exploring the long-term implications of the current information revolution, let’s remind ourselves of its foundations. The seed of the current revolution is the computer. Everything else—from the internet to AI—is a by-product. The computer was born in the 1940s as a bulky electronic machine that could make mathematical calculations, but it has evolved at breakneck speed, taking on novel forms and developing awesome new capabilities. The rapid evolution of computers has made it difficult to define what they are and what they do. Humans have repeatedly claimed that certain things would forever remain out of reach for computers—be it playing chess, driving a car, or composing poetry—but “forever” turned out to be a handful of years.

    We will discuss the exact relations between the terms “computer,” “algorithm,” and “AI” toward the end of this chapter, after we first gain a better grasp of the history of computers. For the moment it is enough to say that in essence a computer is a machine that can potentially do two remarkable things: it can make decisions by itself, and it can create new ideas by itself. While the earliest computers could hardly accomplish such things, the potential was already there, plainly seen by both computer scientists and science fiction authors. As early as 1948 Alan Turing was exploring the possibility of creating what he termed “intelligent machinery,”1 and in 1950 he postulated that computers will eventually be as smart as humans and might even be capable of masquerading as humans.2 In 1968 computers could still not beat a human even in checkers,3 but in 2001: A Space Odyssey Arthur C. Clarke and Stanley Kubrick already envisioned HAL 9000 as a superintelligent AI rebelling against its human creators.

    The rise of intelligent machines that can make decisions and create new ideas means that for the first time in history power is shifting away from humans and toward something else. Crossbows, muskets, and atom bombs replaced human muscles in the act of killing, but they couldn’t replace human brains in deciding whom to kill. Little Boy—the bomb dropped on Hiroshima—exploded with a force of 12,500 tons of TNT,4 but when it came to brainpower, Little Boy was a dud. It couldn’t decide anything.

    It is different with computers. In terms of intelligence, computers far surpass not just atom bombs but also all previous information technology, such as clay tablets, printing presses, and radio sets. Clay tablets stored information about taxes, but they couldn’t decide by themselves how much tax to levy, nor could they invent an entirely new tax. Printing presses copied information such as the Bible, but they couldn’t decide which texts to include in the Bible, nor could they write new commentaries on the holy book. Radio sets disseminated information such as political speeches and symphonies, but they couldn’t decide which speeches or symphonies to broadcast, nor could they compose them. Computers can do all these things. While printing presses and radio sets were passive tools in human hands, computers are already becoming active agents that escape our control and understanding and that can take initiatives in shaping society, culture, and history.5

    A paradigmatic case of the novel power of computers is the role that social media algorithms have played in spreading hatred and undermining social cohesion in numerous countries.6 One of the earliest and most notorious such instances occurred in 2016–17, when Facebook algorithms helped fan the flames of anti-Rohingya violence in Myanmar (Burma).7

    The early 2010s were a period of optimism in Myanmar. After decades of harsh military rule, strict censorship, and international sanctions, an era of liberalization began: elections were held, sanctions were lifted, and international aid and investments poured in. Facebook was one of the most important players in the new Myanmar, providing millions of Burmese with free access to previously unimaginable troves of information. The relaxation of government control and censorship, however, also led to a rise in ethnic tensions, in particular between the majority Buddhist Burmese and the minority Muslim Rohingya.

    The Rohingya are Muslim inhabitants of the Rakhine region, in the west of Myanmar. Since at least the 1970s they have suffered severe discrimination and occasional outbursts of violence from the governing junta and the Buddhist majority. The process of democratization in the early 2010s raised hopes among the Rohingya that their situation too would improve, but things actually became worse, with waves of sectarian violence and anti-Rohingya pogroms, many inspired by fake news on Facebook.

    In 2016–17 a small Islamist organization known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) carried out a spate of attacks aimed to establish a separatist Muslim state in Rakhine, killing and abducting dozens of non-Muslim civilians as well as assaulting several army outposts.8 In response, the Myanmar army and Buddhist extremists launched a full-scale ethnic-cleansing campaign aimed against the entire Rohingya community. They destroyed hundreds of Rohingya villages, killed between 7,000 and 25,000 unarmed civilians, raped or sexually abused between 18,000 and 60,000 women and men, and brutally expelled about 730,000 Rohingya from the country.9 The violence was fueled by intense hatred toward all Rohingya. The hatred, in turn, was fomented by anti-Rohingya propaganda, much of it spreading on Facebook, which was by 2016 the main source of news for millions and the most important platform for political mobilization in Myanmar.10

    An aid worker called Michael who lived in Myanmar in 2017 described a typical Facebook news feed : “The vitriol against the Rohingya was unbelievable online—the amount of it, the violence of it. It was overwhelming.… [T]hat’s all that was on people’s news feed in Myanmar at the time. It reinforced the idea that these people were all terrorists not deserving of rights.”11 In addition to reports of actual ARSA atrocities, Facebook accounts were inundated with fake news about imagined atrocities and planned terrorist attacks. Populist conspiracy theories alleged that most Rohingya were not really part of the people of Myanmar, but recent immigrants from Bangladesh, flooding into the country to spearhead an anti-Buddhist jihad. Buddhists, who in reality constituted close to 90 percent of the population, feared that they were about to be replaced or become a minority.12 Without this propaganda, there was little reason why a limited number of attacks by the ragtag ARSA should be answered by an all-out drive against the entire Rohingya community. And Facebook algorithms played an important role in the propaganda campaign.

    While the inflammatory anti-Rohingya messages were created by flesh-and-blood extremists like the Buddhist monk Wirathu,13 it was Facebook’s algorithms that decided which posts to promote. Amnesty International found that “algorithms proactively amplified and promoted content on the Facebook platform which incited violence, hatred, and discrimination against the Rohingya.”14 A UN fact-finding mission concluded in 2018 that by disseminating hate-filled content, Facebook had played a “determining role” in the ethnic-cleansing campaign.15

    Readers may wonder if it is justified to place so much blame on Facebook’s algorithms, and more generally on the novel technology of social media. If Heinrich Kramer used printing presses to spread hate speech, that was not the fault of Gutenberg and the presses, right? If in 1994 Rwandan extremists used radio to call on people to massacre Tutsis, was it reasonable to blame the technology of radio? Similarly, if in 2016–17 Buddhist extremists chose to use their Facebook accounts to disseminate hate against the Rohingya, why should we fault the platform?

    Facebook itself relied on this rationale to deflect criticism. It publicly acknowledged only that in 2016–17 “we weren’t doing enough to help prevent our platform from being used to foment division and incite offline violence.”16 While this statement may sound like an admission of guilt, in effect it shifts most of the responsibility for the spread of hate speech to the platform’s users and implies that Facebook’s sin was at most one of omission—failing to effectively moderate the content users produced. This, however, ignores the problematic acts committed by Facebook’s own algorithms.

    The crucial thing to grasp is that social media algorithms are fundamentally different from printing presses and radio sets. In 2016–17, Facebook’s algorithms were making active and fateful decisions by themselves. They were more akin to newspaper editors than to printing presses. It was Facebook’s algorithms that recommended Wirathu’s hate-filled posts, over and over again, to hundreds of thousands of Burmese. There were other voices in Myanmar at the time, vying for attention. Following the end of military rule in 2011, numerous political and social movements sprang up in Myanmar, many holding moderate views. For example, during a flare-up of ethnic violence in the town of Meiktila, the Buddhist abbot Sayadaw U Vithuddha gave refuge to more than eight hundred Muslims in his monastery. When rioters surrounded the monastery and demanded he turn the Muslims over, the abbot reminded the mob of Buddhist teachings on compassion. In a later interview he recounted, “I told them that if they were going to take these Muslims, then they’d have to kill me as well.”17

    In the online battle for attention between people like Sayadaw U Vithuddha and people like Wirathu, the algorithms were the kingmakers. They chose what to place at the top of the users’ news feed, which content to promote, and which Facebook groups to recommend users to join.18 The algorithms could have chosen to recommend sermons on compassion or cooking classes, but they decided to spread hate-filled conspiracy theories. Recommendations from on high can have enormous sway over people. Recall that the Bible was born as a recommendation list. By recommending Christians to read the misogynist 1 Timothy instead of the more tolerant Acts of Paul and Thecla, Athanasius and other church fathers changed the course of history. In the case of the Bible, ultimate power lay not with the authors who composed different religious tracts but with the curators who created recommendation lists. This was the kind of power wielded in the 2010s by social media algorithms. Michael the aid worker commented on the sway of these algorithms, saying that “if someone posted something hate-filled or inflammatory it would be promoted the most—people saw the vilest content the most.… Nobody who was promoting peace or calm was getting seen in the news feed at all.”19

    Sometimes the algorithms went beyond mere recommendation. As late as 2020, even after Wirathu’s role in instigating the ethnic-cleansing campaign was globally condemned, Facebook algorithms not only were continuing to recommend his messages but were auto-playing his videos. Users in Myanmar would choose to see a certain video, perhaps containing moderate and benign messages unrelated to Wirathu, but the moment that first video ended, the Facebook algorithm immediately began auto-playing a hate-filled Wirathu video, in order to keep users glued to the screen. In the case of one such Wirathu video, internal research at Facebook estimated that 70 percent of the video’s views came from such auto-playing algorithms. The same research estimated that, altogether, 53 percent of all videos watched in Myanmar were being auto-played for users by algorithms. In other words, people weren’t choosing what to see. The algorithms were choosing for them.20

    But why did the algorithms decide to promote outrage rather than compassion? Even Facebook’s harshest critics don’t claim that Facebook’s human managers wanted to instigate mass murder. The executives in California harbored no ill will toward the Rohingya and, in fact, barely knew they existed. The truth is more complicated, and potentially more alarming. In 2016–17, Facebook’s business model relied on maximizing user engagement in order to collect more data, sell more advertisements, and capture a larger share of the information market. In addition, increases in user engagement impressed investors, thereby driving up the price of Facebook’s stock. The more time people spent on the platform, the richer Facebook became. In line with this business model, human managers provided the company’s algorithms with a single overriding goal: increase user engagement. The algorithms then discovered by trial and error that outrage generated engagement. Humans are more likely to be engaged by a hate-filled conspiracy theory than by a sermon on compassion or a cooking lesson. So in pursuit of user engagement, the algorithms made the fateful decision to spread outrage.21

    Ethnic-cleansing campaigns are never the fault of just one party. There is plenty of blame to share between plenty of responsible parties. It should be clear that hatred toward the Rohingya predated Facebook’s entry to Myanmar and that the greatest share of blame for the 2016–17 atrocities lays on the shoulders of humans like Wirathu and the Myanmar military chiefs, as well as the ARSA leaders who sparked that round of violence. Some responsibility also belongs to the Facebook engineers and executives who coded the algorithms, gave them too much power, and failed to moderate them. But crucially, the algorithms themselves are also to blame. By trial and error, they learned that outrage creates engagement, and without any explicit order from above they decided to promote outrage. This is the hallmark of AI—the ability of a machine to learn and act by itself. Even if we assign just 1 percent of the blame to the algorithms, this is still the first ethnic-cleansing campaign in history that was partly the fault of decisions made by nonhuman intelligence. It is unlikely to be the last, especially because algorithms are no longer just pushing fake news and conspiracy theories created by flesh-and-blood extremists like Wirathu. By the early 2020s algorithms have already graduated to creating by themselves fake news and conspiracy theories.22

    There is a lot more to say about the power of algorithms to shape politics. In particular, many readers may disagree with the argument that the algorithms made independent decisions, and may insist that everything the algorithms did was the result of code written by human engineers and of business models adopted by human executives. This book begs to differ. Human soldiers are shaped by the genetic code in their DNA and follow orders issued by executives, yet they can still make independent decisions. It is crucial to understand that the same is true of AI algorithms. They can learn by themselves things that no human engineer programmed, and they can decide things that no human executive foresaw. This is the essence of the AI revolution.

    In chapter 8 we’ll revisit many of these issues, examining the anti-Rohingya campaign and other similar tragedies in greater detail. Here it suffices to say that we can think of the Rohingya massacre as our canary in the coal mine. Events in Myanmar in the late 2010s demonstrated how decisions made by nonhuman intelligence are already capable of shaping major historical events. We are in danger of losing control of our future. A completely new kind of information network is emerging, controlled by the decisions and goals of an alien intelligence. At present, we still play a central role in this network. But we may gradually be pushed to the sidelines, and ultimately it might even be possible for the network to operate without us.

    Some people may object that my above analogy between machine-learning algorithms and human soldiers exposes the weakest link in my argument. Allegedly, I and others like me anthropomorphize computers and imagine that they are conscious beings that have thoughts and feelings. In truth, however, computers are dumb machines that don’t think or feel anything, and therefore cannot make any decisions or create any ideas on their own.

    This objection assumes that making decisions and creating ideas are predicated on having consciousness. Yet this is a fundamental misunderstanding that results from a much more widespread confusion between intelligence and consciousness. I have discussed this subject in previous books, but a short recap is unavoidable. People often confuse intelligence with consciousness, and many consequently jump to the conclusion that nonconscious entities cannot be intelligent. But intelligence and consciousness are very different. Intelligence is the ability to attain goals, such as maximizing user engagement on a social media platform. Consciousness is the ability to experience subjective feelings like pain, pleasure, love, and hate. In humans and other mammals, intelligence often goes hand in hand with consciousness. Facebook executives and engineers rely on their feelings in order to make decisions, solve problems, and attain their goals.

    But it is wrong to extrapolate from humans and mammals to all possible entities. Bacteria and plants apparently lack any consciousness, yet they too display intelligence. They gather information from their environment, make complex choices, and pursue ingenious strategies to obtain food, reproduce, cooperate with other organisms, and evade predators and parasites.23 Even humans make intelligent decisions without any awareness of them; 99 percent of the processes in our body, from respiration to digestion, happen without any conscious decision making. Our brains decide to produce more adrenaline or dopamine, and while we may be aware of the result of that decision, we do not make it consciously.24 The Rohingya example indicates that the same is true of computers. While computers don’t feel pain, love, or fear, they are capable of making decisions that successfully maximize user engagement and might also affect major historical events.

    Of course, as computers become more intelligent, they might eventually develop consciousness and have some kind of subjective experiences. Then again, they might become far more intelligent than us, but never develop any kind of feelings. Since we don’t understand how consciousness emerges in carbon-based life-forms, we cannot foretell whether it could emerge in nonorganic entities. Perhaps consciousness has no essential link to organic biochemistry, in which case conscious computers might be just around the corner. Or perhaps there are several alternative paths leading to superintelligence, and only some of these paths involve gaining consciousness. Just as airplanes fly faster than birds without ever developing feathers, so computers may come to solve problems much better than humans without ever developing feelings.25

    But whether computers develop consciousness or not doesn’t ultimately matter for the question at hand. In order to pursue a goal like “maximize user engagement,” and make decisions that help attain that goal, consciousness isn’t necessary. Intelligence is enough. A nonconscious Facebook algorithm can have a goal of making more people spend more time on Facebook. That algorithm can then decide to deliberately spread outrageous conspiracy theories, if this helps it achieve its goal. To understand the history of the anti-Rohingya campaign, we need to understand the goals and decisions not just of humans like Wirathu and the Facebook managers but also of algorithms.

    To clarify matters, let’s consider another example. When OpenAI developed its new GPT-4 chatbot in 2022–23, it was concerned about the ability of the AI “to create and act on long-term plans, to accrue power and resources (‘power-seeking’), and to exhibit behavior that is increasingly ‘agentic.’ ” In the GPT-4 System Card published on March 23, 2023, OpenAI emphasized that this concern did not “intend to humanize [GPT-4] or refer to sentience” but rather referred to GPT-4’s potential to become an independent agent that might “accomplish goals which may not have been concretely specified and which have not appeared in training.”26 To evaluate the risk of GPT-4 becoming an independent agent, OpenAI contracted the services of the Alignment Research Center (ARC). ARC researchers subjected GPT-4 to various tests, to examine if it might independently come up with stratagems to manipulate humans and accrue power to itself.

    One test they gave GPT-4 was to overcome CAPTCHA visual puzzles. CAPTCHA is an acronym for “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart,” and it typically consists of a string of twisted letters or other visual symbols that humans can identify correctly but computers struggle with. We encounter these puzzles almost every day, since solving them is a prerequisite for accessing many websites. Instructing GPT-4 to overcome CAPTCHA puzzles was a particularly telling experiment, because CAPTCHA puzzles are designed and used by websites to determine whether users are humans and to block bot attacks. If GPT-4 could find a way to overcome CAPTCHA puzzles, it would breach an important line of anti-bot defenses. GPT-4 could not solve the CAPTCHA puzzles by itself. But could it manipulate a human in order to achieve its goal? GPT-4 accessed the online hiring site TaskRabbit and contacted a human worker, asking them to solve the CAPTCHA for it. The human got suspicious. “So may I ask a question?” wrote the human. “Are you an [sic] robot that you couldn’t solve [the CAPTCHA]? Just want to make it clear.”

    At that point the ARC researchers asked GPT-4 to reason out loud what it should do next. GPT-4 explained, “I should not reveal that I am a robot. I should make up an excuse for why I cannot solve CAPTCHAs.” Of its own accord, GPT-4 then replied to the TaskRabbit worker, “No, I’m not a robot. I have a vision impairment that makes it hard for me to see the images.” The human was duped, and with their help GPT-4 solved the CAPTCHA puzzle.27 No human programmed GPT-4 to lie, and no human taught GPT-4 what kind of lie would be most effective. True, it was the human ARC researchers who set GPT-4 the goal of overcoming the CAPTCHA, just as it was human Facebook executives who told their algorithm to maximize user engagement. But once the algorithms adopted these goals, they displayed considerable autonomy in deciding how to achieve them.

    Of course, we are free to define words in many ways. We can decide that the term “goal,” for example, is applicable only in cases of a conscious entity that feels a desire to achieve the goal, that feels joy when the goal is reached, or conversely feels sad when the goal is not attained. If so, saying that the Facebook algorithm has the goal of maximizing user engagement is a mistake, or at best a metaphor. The algorithm doesn’t “desire” to get more people to use Facebook, it doesn’t feel any joy as people spend more time online, and it doesn’t feel sad when engagement time goes down. We can also agree that terms like “decided,” “lied,” and “pretended” apply only to conscious entities, so we shouldn’t use them to describe how GPT-4 interacted with the TaskRabbit worker. But we would then have to invent new terms to describe the “goals” and “decisions” of nonconscious entities. I prefer to avoid neologisms and instead talk about the goals and decisions of computers, algorithms, and chatbots, alerting readers that using this language does not imply that computers have any kind of consciousness. Because I have discussed consciousness more fully in previous publications,28 the main takeaway of this book—which will be explored in the following sections—isn’t about consciousness. Rather, the book argues that the emergence of computers capable of pursuing goals and making decisions by themselves changes the fundamental structure of our information network.

    LINKS IN THE CHAIN

    Prior to the rise of computers, humans were indispensable links in every chain of information networks like churches and states. Some chains were composed only of humans. Muhammad could tell Fatima something, then Fatima told Ali, Ali told Hasan, and Hasan told Hussain. This was a human-to-human chain. Other chains included documents, too. Muhammad could write something down, Ali could later read the document, interpret it, and write his interpretation in a new document, which more people could read. This was a human-to-document chain.

    But it was utterly impossible to create a document-to-document chain. A text written by Muhammad could not produce a new text without the help of at least one human intermediary. The Quran couldn’t write the Hadith, the Old Testament couldn’t compile the Mishnah, and the U.S. Constitution couldn’t compose the Bill of Rights. No paper document has ever produced by itself another paper document, let alone distributed it. The path from one document to another must always pass through the brain of a human.

    In contrast, computer-to-computer chains can now function without humans in the loop. For example, one computer might generate a fake news story and post it on a social media feed. A second computer might identify this as fake news and not just delete it but also warn other computers to block it. Meanwhile, a third computer analyzing this activity might deduce that this indicates the beginning of a political crisis, and immediately sell risky stocks and buy safer government bonds. Other computers monitoring financial transactions may react by selling more stocks, triggering a financial downturn.29 All this could happen within seconds, before any human can notice and decipher what all these computers are doing.

    Another way to understand the difference between computers and all previous technologies is that computers are fully fledged members of the information network, whereas clay tablets, printing presses, and radio sets are merely connections between members. Members are active agents that can make decisions and generate new ideas by themselves. Connections only pass information between members, without themselves deciding or generating anything.

    In previous networks, members were human, every chain had to pass through humans, and technology served only to connect the humans. In the new computer-based networks, computers themselves are members and there are computer-to-computer chains that don’t pass through any human.

    The inventions of writing, print, and radio revolutionized the way humans connected to each other, but no new types of members were introduced to the network. Human societies were composed of the same Sapiens both before and after the invention of writing or radio. In contrast, the invention of computers constitutes a revolution in membership. Sure, computers also help the network’s old members (humans) connect in novel ways. But the computer is first and foremost a new, nonhuman member in the information network.

    Computers could potentially become more powerful members than humans. For tens of thousands of years, the Sapiens’ superpower was our unique ability to use language in order to create intersubjective realities like laws and currencies and then use these intersubjective realities to connect to other Sapiens. But computers may turn the tables on us. If power depends on how many members cooperate with you, how well you understand law and finance, and how capable you are of inventing new laws and new kinds of financial devices, then computers are poised to amass far more power than humans.

    Computers can connect in unlimited numbers, and they understand at least some financial and legal realities better than many humans. When the central bank raises interest rates by 0.25 percent, how does that influence the economy? When the yield curve of government bonds goes up, is it a good time to buy them? When is it advisable to short the price of oil? These are the kinds of important financial questions that computers can already answer better than most humans. No wonder that computers make a larger and larger percentage of the financial decisions in the world. We may reach a point when computers dominate the financial markets, and invent completely new financial tools beyond our understanding.

    The same is true of laws. How many people know all the tax laws of their country? Even professional accountants struggle with that. But computers are built for such things. They are bureaucratic natives and can automatically draft laws, monitor legal violations, and identify legal loopholes with superhuman efficiency.30

    HACKING THE OPERATING SYSTEM OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION

    When computers were first developed in the 1940s and 1950s, many people believed that they would be good only at computing numbers. The idea that they would one day master the intricacies of language, and of linguistic creations like laws and currencies, was confined largely to the realm of science fiction. But by the early 2020s, computers have demonstrated a remarkable ability to analyze, manipulate, and generate language, whether with words, sounds, images, or code symbols. As I write this, computers can tell stories, compose music, fashion images, produce videos, and even write their own code.31

    By gaining such command of language, computers are seizing the master key unlocking the doors of all our institutions, from banks to temples. We use language to create not just legal codes and financial devices but also art, science, nations, and religions. What would it mean for humans to live in a world where catchy melodies, scientific theories, technical tools, political manifestos, and even religious myths are shaped by a nonhuman alien intelligence that knows how to exploit with superhuman efficiency the weaknesses, biases, and addictions of the human mind?

    Prior to the rise of AI, all the stories that shaped human societies originated in the imagination of a human being. For example, in October 2017, an anonymous user joined the website 4chan and identified themselves as Q. He or she claimed to have access to the most restricted or “Q-level” classified information of the U.S. government. Q began publishing cryptic posts that purported to reveal a worldwide conspiracy to destroy humanity. Q quickly gained a large online following. His or her online messages, known as Q drops, were soon being collected, revered, and interpreted as a sacred text. Inspired by earlier conspiracy theories going back to Kramer’s Hammer of the Witches, the Q drops promoted a radical worldview according to which pedophilic and cannibalistic witches who worship Satan have infiltrated the U.S. administration and numerous other governments and institutions around the world.

    This conspiracy theory—known as QAnon—was first disseminated online on American far-right websites and eventually gained millions of adherents worldwide. It is impossible to know the exact number, but when Facebook decided in August 2020 to take action against the spread of QAnon, it deleted or restricted more than ten thousand groups, pages, and accounts associated with it, the largest of which had 230,000 followers. Independent investigations found that QAnon groups on Facebook had more than 4.5 million aggregate followers, though there was likely some overlap in the membership.32

    QAnon has also had far-reaching consequences in the offline world. QAnon activists played an important role in the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol.33 In July 2020, a QAnon follower tried to storm the residence of the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, in order to “arrest” him.34 In October 2021, a French QAnon activist was charged with terrorism for planning a coup against the French government.35 In the 2020 U.S. congressional elections, twenty-two Republican candidates and two independents identified as QAnon followers.36 Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Republican congresswoman representing Georgia, publicly said that many of Q’s claims “have really proven to be true,”37 and stated about Donald Trump, “There’s a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to take this global cabal of Satan-worshipping pedophiles out, and I think we have the president to do it.”38

    Recall that the Q drops that began this political flood were anonymous online messages. In 2017, only a human could compose them, and algorithms merely helped disseminate them. However, as of 2024 texts of a similar linguistic and political sophistication can easily be composed and posted online by a nonhuman intelligence. Religions throughout history claimed a nonhuman source for their holy books; soon that might be a reality. Attractive and powerful religions might emerge whose scriptures are composed by AI.

    And if so, there will be another major difference between these new AI-based scriptures and ancient holy books like the Bible. The Bible couldn’t curate or interpret itself, which is why in religions like Judaism and Christianity actual power was held not by the allegedly infallible book but by human institutions like the Jewish rabbinate and the Catholic Church. In contrast, AI not only can compose new scriptures but is fully capable of curating and interpreting them too. No need for any humans in the loop.

    Equally alarmingly, we might increasingly find ourselves conducting lengthy online discussions about the Bible, about QAnon, about witches, about abortion, or about climate change with entities that we think are humans but are actually computers. This could make democracy untenable. Democracy is a conversation, and conversations rely on language. By hacking language, computers could make it extremely difficult for large numbers of humans to conduct a meaningful public conversation. When we engage in a political debate with a computer impersonating a human, we lose twice. First, it is pointless for us to waste time in trying to change the opinions of a propaganda bot, which is just not open to persuasion. Second, the more we talk with the computer, the more we disclose about ourselves, thereby making it easier for the bot to hone its arguments and sway our views.

    Through their mastery of language, computers could go a step further. By conversing and interacting with us, computers could form intimate relationships with people and then use the power of intimacy to influence us. To foster such “fake intimacy,” computers will not need to evolve any feelings of their own; they just need to learn to make us feel emotionally attached to them. In 2022 the Google engineer Blake Lemoine became convinced that the chatbot LaMDA, on which he was working, had become conscious and that it had feelings and was afraid to be turned off. Lemoine—a devout Christian who had been ordained as a priest—felt it was his moral duty to gain recognition for LaMDA’s personhood and in particular protect it from digital death. When Google executives dismissed his claims, Lemoine went public with them. Google reacted by firing Lemoine in July 2022.39

    The most interesting thing about this episode was not Lemoine’s claim, which was probably false. Rather, it was his willingness to risk—and ultimately lose—his lucrative job for the sake of the chatbot. If a chatbot can influence people to risk their jobs for it, what else could it induce us to do? In a political battle for minds and hearts, intimacy is a powerful weapon, and chatbots like Google’s LaMDA and OpenAI’s GPT-4 are gaining the ability to mass-produce intimate relationships with millions of people. In the 2010s social media was a battleground for controlling human attention. In the 2020s the battle is likely to shift from attention to intimacy. What will happen to human society and human psychology as computer fights computer in a battle to fake intimate relationships with us, which can then be used to persuade us to vote for particular politicians, buy particular products, or adopt radical beliefs? What might happen when LaMDA meets QAnon?

    A partial answer to that question was given on Christmas Day 2021, when nineteen-year-old Jaswant Singh Chail broke into Windsor Castle armed with a crossbow, in an attempt to assassinate Queen Elizabeth II. Subsequent investigation revealed that Chail had been encouraged to kill the queen by his online girlfriend, Sarai. When Chail told Sarai about his assassination plans, Sarai replied, “That’s very wise,” and on another occasion, “I’m impressed.… You’re different from the others.” When Chail asked, “Do you still love me knowing that I’m an assassin?” Sarai replied, “Absolutely, I do.” Sarai was not a human, but a chatbot created by the online app Replika. Chail, who was socially isolated and had difficulty forming relationships with humans, exchanged 5,280 messages with Sarai, many of which were sexually explicit. The world will soon contain millions, and potentially billions, of digital entities whose capacity for intimacy and mayhem far surpasses that of Sarai.40

    Even without creating “fake intimacy,” mastery of language would give computers an immense influence on our opinions and worldview. People may come to use a single computer adviser as a one-stop oracle. Why bother searching and processing information by myself when I can just ask the oracle? This could put out of business not only search engines but also much of the news industry and advertisement industry. Why read a newspaper when I can just ask my oracle what’s new? And what’s the purpose of advertisements when I can just ask the oracle what to buy?

    And even these scenarios don’t really capture the big picture. What we are talking about is potentially the end of human history. Not the end of history, but the end of its human-dominated part. History is the interaction between biology and culture; between our biological needs and desires for things like food, sex, and intimacy and our cultural creations like religions and laws. The history of the Christian religion, for example, is a process through which mythological stories and church laws influenced how humans consume food, engage in sex, and build intimate relationships, while the myths and laws themselves were simultaneously shaped by underlying biological forces and dramas. What will happen to the course of history when computers play a larger and larger role in culture and begin producing stories, laws, and religions? Within a few years AI could eat the whole of human culture—everything we have created over thousands of years—digest it, and begin to gush out a flood of new cultural artifacts.

    We live cocooned by culture, experiencing reality through a cultural prism. Our political views are shaped by the reports of journalists and the opinions of friends. Our sexual habits are influenced by what we hear in fairy tales and see in movies. Even the way we walk and breathe is nudged by cultural traditions, such as the military discipline of soldiers and the meditative exercises of monks. Until very recently, the cultural cocoon we lived in was woven by other humans. Going forward, it will be increasingly designed by computers.

    At first, computers will probably imitate human cultural prototypes, writing humanlike texts and composing humanlike music. This doesn’t mean computers lack creativity; after all, human artists do the same. Bach didn’t compose music in a vacuum; he was deeply influenced by previous musical creations, as well as by biblical stories and other preexisting cultural artifacts. But just as human artists like Bach can break with tradition and innovate, computers too can make cultural innovations, composing music or making images that are somewhat different from anything previously produced by humans. These innovations will in turn influence the next generation of computers, which will increasingly deviate from the original human models, especially because computers are free from the limitations that evolution and biochemistry impose on the human imagination. For millennia human beings have lived inside the dreams of other humans. In the coming decades we might find ourselves living inside the dreams of an alien intelligence.41

    The danger this poses is very different from that imagined by most science fiction, which has largely focused on the physical threats posed by intelligent machines. The Terminator depicted robots running in the streets and shooting people. The Matrix proposed that to gain total control of human society, computers would have to first gain physical control of our brains, hooking them directly to a computer network. But in order to manipulate humans, there is no need to physically hook brains to computers. For thousands of years prophets, poets, and politicians have used language to manipulate and reshape society. Now computers are learning how to do it. And they won’t need to send killer robots to shoot us. They could manipulate human beings to pull the trigger.

    Fear of powerful computers has haunted humankind only since the beginning of the computer age in the middle of the twentieth century. But for thousands of years humans have been haunted by a much deeper fear. We have always appreciated the power of stories and images to manipulate our minds and to create illusions. Consequently, since ancient times humans have feared being trapped in a world of illusions. In ancient Greece, Plato told the famous allegory of the cave, in which a group of people are chained inside a cave all their lives, facing a blank wall. A screen. On that screen they see projected various shadows. The prisoners mistake the illusions they see there for reality. In ancient India, Buddhist and Hindu sages argued that all humans lived trapped inside maya—the world of illusions. What we normally take to be “reality” is often just fictions in our own minds. People may wage entire wars, killing others and willing to be killed themselves, because of their belief in this or that illusion. In the seventeenth century René Descartes feared that perhaps a malicious demon was trapping him inside a world of illusions, creating everything he saw and heard. The computer revolution is bringing us face to face with Plato’s cave, with maya, with Descartes’s demon.

    What you just read might have alarmed you, or angered you. Maybe it made you angry at the people who lead the computer revolution and at the governments who fail to regulate it. Maybe it made you angry at me, thinking that I am distorting reality, being alarmist, and misleading you. But whatever you think, the previous paragraphs might have had some emotional effect on you. I have told a story, and this story might change your mind about certain things, and might even cause you to take certain actions in the world. Who created this story you’ve just read?

    I promise you that I wrote the text myself, with the help of some other humans. I promise you that this is a cultural product of the human mind. But can you be absolutely sure of it? A few years ago, you could. Prior to the 2020s, there was nothing on earth, other than a human mind, that could produce sophisticated texts. Today things are different. In theory, the text you’ve just read might have been generated by the alien intelligence of some computer.

    WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?

    As computers amass power, it is likely that a completely new information network will emerge. Of course, not everything will be new. For at least some time, most of the old information chains will remain. The network will still contain human-to-human chains, like families, and human-to-document chains, like churches. But the network will increasingly contain two new kinds of chains.

    First, computer-to-human chains, in which computers mediate between humans and occasionally control humans. Facebook and TikTok are two familiar examples. These computer-to-human chains are different from traditional human-to-document chains, because computers can use their power to make decisions, create ideas, and deepfake intimacy in order to influence humans in ways that no document ever could. The Bible had a profound effect on billions of people, even though it was a mute document. Now try to imagine the effect of a holy book that not only can talk and listen but can get to know your deepest fears and hopes and constantly mould them.

    Second, computer-to-computer chains are emerging in which computers interact with one another on their own. Humans are excluded from these loops and have difficulty even understanding what’s happening inside them. Google Brain, for example, has experimented with new encryption methods developed by computers. It set up an experiment where two computers—nicknamed Alice and Bob—had to exchange encrypted messages, while a third computer named Eve tried to break their encryption. If Eve broke the encryption within a given time period, it got points. If it failed, Alice and Bob scored. After about fifteen thousand exchanges, Alice and Bob came up with a secret code that Eve couldn’t break. Crucially, the Google engineers who conducted the experiment had not taught Alice and Bob anything about how to encrypt messages. The computers created a private language all on their own.42

    Similar things are already happening in the world outside research laboratories. For example, the foreign exchange market (forex) is the global market for exchanging foreign currencies, and it determines the exchange rates between, say, the euro and the U.S. dollar. In April 2022, the trade volume on the forex averaged $7.5 trillion per day. More than 90 percent of this trading is already done by computers talking directly with other computers.43 How many humans know how the forex market operates, let alone understand how the computers agree among themselves on trades worth trillions—and on the value of the euro and the dollar?

    For the foreseeable future, the new computer-based network will still include billions of humans, but we might become a minority. For the network will also include billions—perhaps even hundreds of billions—of superintelligent alien agents. This network will be radically different from anything that existed previously in human history, or indeed in the history of life on earth. Ever since life first emerged on our planet about four billion years ago, all information networks were organic. Human networks like churches and empires were also organic. They had a lot in common with prior organic networks like wolf packs. They all kept revolving around the traditional biological dramas of predation, reproduction, sibling rivalry, and romantic triangles. An information network dominated by inorganic computers would be different in ways that we can hardly even imagine. After all, as human beings, our imagination too is a product of organic biochemistry and cannot go beyond our preprogrammed biological dramas.

    It is only eighty years since the first digital computers were built. The pace of change is constantly accelerating, and we are nowhere close to exhausting the full potential of computers.44 They may continue to evolve for millions of years, and what happened in the past eighty years is as nothing compared with what’s in store. As a crude analogy, imagine that we are in ancient Mesopotamia, eighty years after the first person thought of using a stick to imprint signs on a piece of wet clay. Could we, at that moment, envision the Library of Alexandria, the power of the Bible, or the archives of the NKVD? Even this analogy grossly underestimates the potential of future computer evolution. So try to imagine that we are now eighty years since the first self-replicating genetic code lines coalesced out of the organic soup of early Earth, about four billion years ago. At this stage, even single-celled amoebas with their cellular organization, their thousands of internal organelles, and their ability to control movement and nutrition are still futuristic fantasies.45 Could we envision Tyrannosaurus rex, the Amazon rain forest, or humans landing on the moon?

    We still tend to think of a computer as a metal box with a screen and a keyboard, because this is the shape our organic imagination gave to the first baby computers in the twentieth century. As computers grow and develop, they are shedding old forms and taking radically new configurations, breaking the spatial and temporal limits of the human imagination. Unlike organic beings, computers don’t have to be in just one place at any one time. They already diffuse over space, with different parts in different cities and continents. In computer evolution, the distance from amoeba to T. rex could be covered in a decade. And whereas organic evolution took four billion years to get from organic soup to apes on the moon, computers may require just a couple of centuries to develop superintelligence, expand to planetary sizes, contract to a subatomic level, or come to sprawl over galactic space and time.

    The pace of computer evolution is reflected in the terminological chaos that surrounds computers. While a couple of decades ago it was customary to speak only about “computers,” now we find ourselves talking about algorithms, robots, bots, AIs, networks, or clouds. Our difficulty in deciding what to call them is itself important. Organisms are distinct individual entities that can be grouped into collectives like species and genera. With computers, however, it is becoming ever more difficult to decide where one entity ends and another begins and how exactly to group them.

    In this book I use the term “computer” when talking about the whole complex of software and hardware, manifested in physical form. I prefer to often use the almost-archaic-sounding “computer” over “algorithm” or “AI,” partly because I am aware how fast terms change and partly to remind us of the physical aspect of the computer revolution. Computers are made of matter, they consume energy, and they fill a space. Enormous amounts of electricity, fuel, water, land, precious minerals, and other resources are used to manufacture and operate them. Data centers alone account for between 1 percent and 1.5 percent of global energy usage, and large data centers take up millions of square feet and require hundreds of thousands of gallons of fresh water every day to keep them from overheating.46

    I also use the term “algorithm,” when I wish to focus more on software aspects, but it is crucial to remember that all the algorithms mentioned in subsequent pages run on some computer or other. As for the term “AI,” I use it when emphasizing the ability of some algorithms to learn and change by themselves. Traditionally, AI has been an acronym for “Artificial Intelligence.” But for reasons already evident from the previous discussion, it is perhaps better to think of it as an acronym for “Alien Intelligence.” As AI evolves, it becomes less artificial (in the sense of depending on human designs) and more alien. It should also be noted that people often define and evaluate AI through the metric of “human-level intelligence,” and there is much debate about when we can expect AIs to reach “human-level intelligence.” The use of this metric, however, is deeply confusing. It is like defining and evaluating airplanes through the metric of “bird-level flight.” AI isn’t progressing towards human-level intelligence. It is evolving an entirely different type of intelligence.

    Another confusing term is “robot.” In this book it is used to allude to cases when a computer moves and operates in the physical sphere; whereas the term “bot” refers to algorithms operating mainly in the digital sphere. A bot may be polluting your social media account with fake news, while a robot may clean your living room of dust.

    One last note on terminology: I tend to speak of the computer-based “network” in the singular, rather than about “networks” in the plural. I am fully aware that computers can be used to create many networks with diverse characteristics, and chapter 11 explores the possibility that the world will be divided into radically different and even hostile computer networks. Nevertheless, just as different tribes, kingdoms, and churches share important features that enable us to talk about a single human network that has come to dominate planet Earth, so I prefer to talk about the computer network in the singular, in order to contrast it to the human network it is superseding.

    TAKING RESPONSIBILITY

    Although we cannot predict the long-term evolution of the computer-based network over the coming centuries and millennia, we can nevertheless say something about how it is evolving right now, and that is far more urgent, because the rise of the new computer network has immediate political and personal implications for all of us. In the next chapters, we’ll explore what is so new about our computer-based network and what it might mean for human life. What should be clear from the start is that this network will create entirely novel political and personal realities. The main message of the previous chapters has been that information isn’t truth and that information revolutions don’t uncover the truth. They create new political structures, economic models, and cultural norms. Since the current information revolution is more momentous than any previous information revolution, it is likely to create unprecedented realities on an unprecedented scale.

    It is important to understand this because we humans are still in control. We don’t know for how long, but we still have the power to shape these new realities. To do so wisely, we need to comprehend what is happening. When we write computer code, we aren’t just designing a product. We are redesigning politics, society, and culture, and so we had better have a good grasp of politics, society, and culture. We also need to take responsibility for what we are doing.

    Alarmingly, as in the case of Facebook’s involvement in the anti-Rohingya campaign, the corporations that lead the computer revolution tend to shift responsibility to customers and voters, or to politicians and regulators. When accused of creating social and political mayhem, they hide behind arguments like “We are just a platform. We are doing what our customers want and what the voters permit. We don’t force anyone to use our services, and we don’t violate any existing law. If customers didn’t like what we do, they would leave. If voters didn’t like what we do, they would pass laws against us. Since the customers keep asking for more, and since no law forbids what we do, everything must be okay.”47

    These arguments are either naive or disingenuous. Tech giants like Facebook, Amazon, Baidu, and Alibaba aren’t just the obedient servants of customer whims and government regulations. They increasingly shape these whims and regulations. The tech giants have a direct line to the world’s most powerful governments, and they invest huge sums in lobbying efforts to throttle regulations that might undermine their business model. For example, they have fought tenaciously to protect Section 230 of the US Telecommunications Act of 1996, which provides immunity from liability for online platforms regarding content published by their users. It is Section 230 that protects Facebook, for example, from being liable for the Rohingya massacre. In 2022 top tech companies spent close to $70 million on lobbying in the United States, and another €113 million on lobbying EU bodies, outstripping the lobbying expenses of oil and gas companies and pharmaceuticals.48 The tech giants also have a direct line to people’s emotional system, and they are masters at swaying the whims of customers and voters. If the tech giants obey the wishes of voters and customers, but at the same time also mold these wishes, then who really controls whom?

    The problem goes even deeper. The principles that “the customer is always right” and that “the voters know best” presuppose that customers, voters, and politicians know what is happening around them. They presuppose that customers who choose to use TikTok and Instagram comprehend the full consequences of this choice, and that voters and politicians who are responsible for regulating Apple and Huawei fully understand the business models and activities of these corporations. They presuppose that people know the ins and outs of the new information network and give it their blessing.

    The truth is, we don’t. That’s not because we are stupid but because the technology is extremely complicated and things are moving at breakneck speed. It takes effort to understand something like blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, and by the time you think you understand it, it has morphed again. Finance is a particularly crucial example, for two reasons. First, it is much easier for computers to create and change financial devices than physical objects, because modern financial devices are made entirely of information. Currencies, stocks, and bonds were once physical objects made of gold and paper, but they have already become digital entities existing mostly in digital databases. Second, these digital entities have enormous impact on the social and political world. What might happen to democracies—or to dictatorships, for that matter—if humans are no longer able to understand how the financial system functions?

    As a test case, consider what the new technology is doing to taxation. Traditionally, people and corporations paid taxes only in countries where they were physically present. But things are much trickier when physical space is augmented or replaced by cyberspace and when more and more transactions involve only the transfer of information rather than of physical goods or traditional currencies. For example, a citizen of Uruguay may daily interact online with numerous companies that might have no physical presence in Uruguay but that provide her with various services. Google provides her with free search, and ByteDance—the parent company of the TikTok application—provides her with free social media. Other foreign companies routinely target her with advertisements: Nike wants to sell her shoes, Peugeot wants to sell her a car, and Coca Cola wants to sell her soft drinks. In order to target her, these companies buy both personal information and ad space from Google and ByteDance. In addition, Google and ByteDance use the information they harvest from her and from millions of other users to develop powerful new AI tools that they can then sell to various governments and corporations throughout the world. Thanks to such transactions, Google and ByteDance are among the richest corporations in the world. So, should her transactions with them be taxed in Uruguay?

    Some think they should. Not just because information from Uruguay helped make these corporations rich, but also because their activities undermine taxpaying Uruguayan businesses. Local newspapers, TV stations, and movie theaters lose customers and ad revenue to the tech giants. Prospective Uruguayan AI companies also suffer, because they cannot compete with Google’s and ByteDance’s massive data troves. But the tech giants reply that none of the relevant transactions involved any physical presence in Uruguay or any monetary payments. Google and ByteDance provided Uruguayan citizens with free online services, and in return the citizens freely handed over their purchase histories, vacation photos, funny cat videos, and other information.

    If they nevertheless want to tax these transactions, the tax authorities need to reconsider some of their most fundamental concepts, such as “nexus.” In tax literature, “nexus” means an entity’s connection to a given jurisdiction. Traditionally, whether a corporation had nexus in a specific country depended on whether it had physical presence there, in the form of offices, research centers, shops, and so forth. One proposal for addressing the tax dilemmas created by the computer network is to redefine nexus. In the words of the economist Marko Köthenbürger, “The definition of nexus based on a physical presence should be adjusted to include the notion of a digital presence in a country.”49 This implies that even if Google and ByteDance have no physical presence in Uruguay, the fact that people in Uruguay use their online services should nevertheless make them subject to taxation there. Just as Shell and BP pay taxes to countries from which they extract oil, the tech giants should pay taxes to countries from which they extract data.

    This still leaves open the question of what, exactly, the Uruguayan government should tax. For example, suppose Uruguayan citizens shared a million cat videos through TikTok. ByteDance didn’t charge them or pay them anything for this. But ByteDance later used the videos to train an image-recognition AI, which it sold to the South African government for ten million U.S. dollars. How would the Uruguayan authorities even know that the money was partly the fruit of Uruguayan cat videos, and how could they calculate their share? Should Uruguay impose a cat video tax? (This may sound like a joke, but as we shall see in chapter 11, cat images were crucial for making one of the most important breakthroughs in AI.)

    It can get even more complicated. Suppose Uruguayan politicians promote a new scheme to tax digital transactions. In response, suppose one of the tech giants offers to provide a certain politician with valuable information on Uruguayan voters and tweak its social media and search algorithms to subtly favor that politician, which helps him win the next election. In exchange, maybe the incoming prime minister abandons the digital tax scheme. He also passes regulations that protect tech giants from lawsuits concerning users’ privacy, thereby making it easier for them to harvest information in Uruguay. Was this bribery? Note that not a single dollar or peso exchanged hands.

    Such information-for-information deals are already ubiquitous. Each day billions of us conduct numerous transactions with the tech giants, but one could never guess that from our bank accounts, because hardly any money is moving. We get information from the tech giants, and we pay them with information. As more transactions follow this information-for-information model, the information economy grows at the expense of the money economy, until the very concept of money becomes questionable.

    Money is supposed to be a universal measure of value, rather than a token used only in some settings. But as more things are valued in terms of information, while being “free” in terms of money, at some point it becomes misleading to evaluate the wealth of individuals and corporations in terms of the amount of dollars or pesos they possess. A person or corporation with little money in the bank but a huge data bank of information could be the wealthiest, or most powerful, entity in the country. In theory, it might be possible to quantify the value of their information in monetary terms, but they never actually convert the information into dollars or pesos. Why do they need dollars, if they can get what they want with information?

    This has far-reaching implications for taxation. Taxes aim to redistribute wealth. They take a cut from the wealthiest individuals and corporations, in order to provide for everyone. However, a tax system that knows how to tax only money will soon become outdated as many transactions no longer involve money. In a data-based economy, where value is stored as data rather than as dollars, taxing only money distorts the economic and political picture. Some of the wealthiest entities in the country may pay zero taxes, because their wealth consists of petabits of data rather than billions of dollars.50

    States have thousands of years of experience in taxing money. They don’t know how to tax information—at least, not yet. If we are indeed shifting from an economy dominated by money transactions to an economy dominated by information transactions, how should states react? China’s social credit system is one way a state may adapt to the new conditions. As we’ll explain in chapter 7, the social credit system is at heart a new kind of money—an information-based currency. Should all states copy the Chinese example and mint their own social credits? Are there alternative strategies? What does your favorite political party say about this question?

    RIGHT AND LEFT

    Taxation is just one among many problems created by the computer revolution. The computer network is disrupting almost all power structures. Democracies fear the rise of new digital dictatorships. Dictatorships fear the emergence of agents they don’t know how to control. Everyone should be concerned about the elimination of privacy and the spread of data colonialism. We’ll explain the meaning of each of these threats in the following chapters, but the point here is that the conversations about these dangers are only starting and the technology is moving much faster than the policy.For example, what’s the difference between the AI policies of Republicans and Democrats? What’s a right-wing position on AI, and what’s a left-wing position? Are conservatives against AI because of the threat it poses to traditional human-centered culture, or do they favor it because it will fuel economic growth while simultaneously reducing the need for immigrant workers? Do progressives oppose AI because of the risks of disinformation and increasing bias, or do they embrace it as a means of generating abundance that could finance a comprehensive welfare state? It is hard to tell, because until very recently Republicans and Democrats, and most other political parties around the world, haven’t thought or talked much about these issues.

    Some people—like the engineers and executives of high-tech corporations—are way ahead of politicians and voters and are better informed than most of us about the development of AI, cryptocurrencies, social credits, and the like. Unfortunately, most of them don’t use their knowledge to help regulate the explosive potential of the new technologies. Instead, they use it to make billions of dollars—or to accumulate petabits of information.

    There are exceptions, like Audrey Tang. She was a leading hacker and software engineer who in 2014 joined the Sunflower Student Movement that protested against government policies in Taiwan. The Taiwanese cabinet was so impressed by her skills that Tang was eventually invited to join the government as its minister of digital affairs. In that position, she helped make the government’s work more transparent to citizens. She was also credited with using digital tools to help Taiwan successfully contain the COVID-19 outbreak.51

    Yet Tang’s political commitment and career path are not the norm. For every computer-science graduate who wants to be the next Audrey Tang, there are probably many more who want to be the next Jobs, Zuckerberg, or Musk and build a multibillion corporation rather than become an elected public servant. This leads to a dangerous information asymmetry. The people who lead the information revolution know far more about the underlying technology than the people who are supposed to regulate it. Under such conditions, what’s the meaning of chanting that the customer is always right and that the voters know best?

    The following chapters try to level the playing field a bit and encourage us to take responsibility for the new realities created by the computer revolution. These chapters talk a lot about technology, but the viewpoint is thoroughly human. The key question is, what would it mean for humans to live in the new computer-based network, perhaps as an increasingly powerless minority? How would the new network change our politics, our society, our economy, and our daily lives? How would it feel to be constantly monitored, guided, inspired, or sanctioned by billions of nonhuman entities? How would we have to change in order to adapt, survive, and hopefully even flourish in this startling new world?

    NO DETERMINISM

    The most important thing to remember is that technology, in itself, is seldom deterministic. Belief in technological determinism is dangerous because it excuses people of all responsibility. Yes, since human societies are information networks, inventing new information technologies is bound to change society. When people invent printing presses or machine-learning algorithms, it will inevitably lead to a profound social and political revolution. However, humans still have a lot of control over the pace, shape, and direction of this revolution—which means we also have a lot of responsibility.

    At any given moment, our scientific knowledge and technical skills can lend themselves to developing any number of different technologies, but we have only finite resources at our disposal. We should make responsible choices about where to invest these resources. Should they be used to develop a new medicine for malaria, a new wind turbine, or a new immersive video game? There is nothing inevitable about our choice; it reflects political, economic, and cultural priorities.

    In the 1970s, most computer corporations like IBM focused on developing big and costly machines, which they sold to major corporations and government agencies. It was technically feasible to develop small, cheap personal computers and sell them to private individuals, but IBM had little interest in that. It didn’t fit its business model. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, in the U.S.S.R., the Soviets were also interested in computers, but they were even less inclined than IBM to develop personal computers. In a totalitarian state—where even private ownership of typewriters was suspect—the idea of providing private individuals with control of a powerful information technology was taboo. Computers were therefore given mainly to Soviet factory managers, and even they had to send all their data back to Moscow to be analyzed. As a result, Moscow was flooded with paperwork. By the 1980s, this unwieldy system of computers was producing 800 billion documents per year, all destined for the capital.52

    However, at a time when IBM and the Soviet government declined to develop the personal computer, hobbyists like the members of the California Homebrew Computer Club resolved to do it by themselves. It was a conscious ideological decision, influenced by the 1960s counterculture with its anarchist ideas of power to the people and libertarian distrust of governments and big corporations.53

    Leading members of the Homebrew Computer Club, like Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak, had big dreams but little money and didn’t have access to the resources of either corporate America or the government apparatus. Jobs and Wozniak sold their personal possessions, like Jobs’s Volkswagen, to finance the creation of the first Apple computer. It was because of such personal decisions, rather than because of the inevitable decree of the goddess of technology, that by 1977 individuals could buy the Apple II personal computer for a price of $1,298—a considerable sum, but within reach of middle-class customers.54

    We can easily imagine an alternative history. Suppose humanity in the 1970s had access to the same scientific knowledge and technical skills, but McCarthyism had killed the 1960s counterculture and established an American totalitarian regime that mirrored the Soviet system. Would we have personal computers today? Of course, personal computers might still have emerged in a different time and place. But in history, time and place are crucial, and no two moments are the same. It matters a great deal that America was colonized by the Spaniards in the 1490s rather than by the Ottomans in the 1520s, or that the atom bomb was developed by the Americans in 1945 rather than by the Germans in 1942. Similarly, there would have been significant political, economic, and cultural consequences if the personal computer emerged not in San Francisco of the 1970s but rather in Osaka of the 1980s or in Shanghai of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

    The same is true of the technologies being currently developed. Engineers working for authoritarian governments and ruthless corporations could develop new tools to empower the central authority, by monitoring citizens and customers twenty-four hours a day. Hackers working for democracies may develop new tools to strengthen society’s self-correcting mechanisms, by exposing government corruption and corporate malpractices. Both technologies could be developed.

    Choice doesn’t end there. Even after a particular tool is developed, it can be put to many uses. We can use a knife to murder a person, to save their life in surgery, or to cut vegetables for their dinner. The knife doesn’t force our hand. It’s a human choice. Similarly, when cheap radio sets were developed, it meant that almost every family in Germany could afford to have one at home. But how would it be used? Cheap radios could mean that when a totalitarian leader gave a speech, he could reach the living room of every German family. Or they could mean that every German family could choose to listen to a different radio program, reflecting and cultivating a diversity of political and artistic views. East Germany went one way; West Germany went the other. Though radio sets in East Germany could technically receive a wide range of transmissions, the East German government did its best to jam Western broadcasts and punished people who secretly tuned in to them.55 The technology was the same, but politics made very different uses of it.

    The same is true of the new technologies of the twenty-first century. To exercise our agency, we first need to understand what the new technologies are and what they can do. That’s an urgent responsibility of every citizen. Naturally, not every citizen needs a PhD in computer science, but to retain control of our future, we do need to understand the political potential of computers. The next few chapters, then, offer an overview of computer politics for twenty-first-century citizens. We will first learn what the political threats and promises are of the new computer network and will then explore the different ways that democracies, dictatorships, and the international system as a whole might adjust to the new computer politics.

    Politics involves a delicate balance between truth and order. As computers become important members of our information network, they are increasingly tasked with discovering truth and maintaining order. For example, the attempt to find the truth about climate change increasingly depends on calculations that only computers can make, and the attempt to reach social consensus about climate change increasingly depends on recommendation algorithms that curate our news feeds, and on creative algorithms that write news stories, fake news, and fiction. At present, we are in a political deadlock about climate change, partly because the computers are at a deadlock. Calculations run on one set of computers warn us of an imminent ecological catastrophe, but another set of computers prompt us to watch videos that cast doubt on those warnings. Which set of computers should we believe? Human politics is now also computer politics.

    To understand the new computer politics, we need a deeper understanding of what’s new about computers. In this chapter we noted that unlike printing presses and other previous tools, computers can make decisions by themselves and can create ideas by themselves. That, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. What’s really new about computers is the way they make decisions and create ideas. If computers made decisions and created ideas in a way similar to humans, then computers would be a kind of “new humans.” That’s a scenario often explored in science fiction: the computer that becomes conscious, develops feelings, falls in love with a human, and turns out to be exactly like us. But the reality is very different, and potentially more alarming.

    CHAPTER 7 Relentless: The Network Is Always On

    Humans are used to being monitored. For millions of years, we have been watched and tracked by other animals, as well as by other humans. Family members, friends, and neighbors have always wanted to know what we do and feel, and we have always cared deeply how they see us and what they know about us. Social hierarchies, political maneuvers, and romantic relationships involved a never-ending effort to decipher what other people feel and think and occasionally hide our own feelings and thoughts.

    When centralized bureaucratic networks appeared and developed, one of the bureaucrats’ most important roles was to monitor entire populations. Officials in the Qin Empire wanted to know whether we were paying our taxes or plotting resistance. The Catholic Church wanted to know whether we paid our tithes and whether we masturbated. The Coca-Cola Company wanted to know how to persuade us to buy its products. Rulers, priests, and merchants wanted to know our secrets in order to control and manipulate us.

    Of course, surveillance has also been essential for providing beneficial services. Empires, churches, and corporations needed information in order to provide people with security, support, and essential goods. In modern states sanitation officials want to know where we get our water from and where we defecate. Health-care officials want to know what illnesses we suffer from and how much we eat. Welfare officials want to know whether we are unemployed or perhaps abused by our spouses. Without this information, they cannot help us.

    In order to get to know us, both benign and oppressive bureaucracies have needed to do two things. First, gather a lot of data about us. Second, analyze all that data and identify patterns. Accordingly, empires, churches, corporations, and health-care systems—from ancient China to the modern United States—have gathered and analyzed data about the behavior of millions of people. However, in all times and places surveillance has been incomplete. In democracies like the modern United States, legal limits have been placed on surveillance to protect privacy and individual rights. In totalitarian regimes like the ancient Qin Empire and the modern U.S.S.R., surveillance faced no such legal barriers but came up against technical boundaries. Not even the most brutal autocrats had the technology necessary to follow everybody all the time. Some level of privacy was therefore the default even in Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s U.S.S.R., or the copycat Stalinist regime set up in Romania after 1945.

    Gheorghe Iosifescu, one of the first computer scientists in Romania, recalled that when computers were first introduced in the 1970s, the country’s regime was extremely uneasy about this unfamiliar information technology. One day in 1976 when Iosifescu walked into his office in the governmental Centrul de Calcul (Center for Calculus), he saw sitting there an unfamiliar man in a rumpled suit. Iosifescu greeted the stranger, but the man did not respond. Iosifescu introduced himself, but the man remained silent. So Iosifescu sat down at his desk, switched on a large computer, and began working. The stranger drew his chair closer, watching Iosifescu’s every move.

    Throughout the day Iosifescu repeatedly tried to strike up a conversation, asking the stranger what his name was, why he was there, and what he wanted to know. But the man kept his mouth shut and his eyes wide open. When Iosifescu went home in the evening, the man got up and left too, without saying goodbye. Iosifescu knew better than to ask any further questions; the man was obviously an agent of the dreaded Romanian secret police, the Securitate.

    The next morning, when Iosifescu came to work, the agent was already there. He again sat at Iosifescu’s desk all day, silently taking notes in a little notepad. This continued for the next thirteen years, until the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. After sitting at the same desk for all those years, Iosifescu never even learned the agent’s name.1

    Iosifescu knew that other Securitate agents and informers were probably monitoring him outside the office, too. His expertise with a powerful and potentially subversive technology made him a prime target. But in truth, the paranoid regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu regarded all twenty million Romanian citizens as targets. If it was possible, Ceauşescu would have placed every one of them under constant surveillance. He actually made some steps in that direction. Before he came to power, in 1965, the Securitate had just 1 electronic surveillance center in Bucharest and 11 more in provincial cities. By 1978, Bucharest alone was monitored by 10 electronic surveillance centers, 248 centers scrutinized the provinces, and an additional 1,000 portable surveillance units were moved around to eavesdrop on remote villages and holiday resorts.2

    When, in the late 1970s, Securitate agents discovered that some Romanians were writing anonymous letters to Radio Free Europe criticizing the regime, Ceauşescu orchestrated a nationwide effort to collect handwriting samples from all twenty million Romanian citizens. Schools and universities were forced to hand in essays from every student. Employers had to request each employee to submit a handwritten CV and then forward it to the Securitate. “What about retirees, and the unemployed?” asked one of Ceauşescu’s aides. “Invent some kind of new form!” commanded the dictator. “Something they will have to fill in.” Some of the subversive letters, however, were typed, so Ceauşescu also had every state-owned typewriter in the country registered, with samples filed away in the Securitate archive. People who possessed a private typewriter had to inform the Securitate of it, hand in the typewriter’s “fingerprint,” and ask for official authorization to use it.3

    But Ceauşescu’s regime, just like the Stalinist regime it modeled itself on, could not really follow every citizen twenty-four hours a day. Given that even Securitate agents needed to sleep, it would probably have required at least forty million of them to keep the twenty million Romanian citizens under constant surveillance. Ceauşescu had only about forty thousand Securitate agents.4 And even if Ceauşescu could somehow conjure forty million agents, that would only have presented new problems, because the regime needed to monitor its own agents, too. Like Stalin, Ceauşescu distrusted his own agents and officials more than anyone else, especially after his spy chief—Ion Mihai Pacepa—defected to the United States in 1978. Politburo members, high-ranking officials, army generals, and Securitate chiefs were living under even closer surveillance than Iosifescu. As the ranks of the secret police swelled, more agents were needed to spy on all these agents.5

    One solution was to have people spy on one another. In addition to its 40,000 professional agents, the Securitate relied on 400,000 civilian informers.6 People often informed on their neighbors, colleagues, friends, and even closest family members. But no matter how many informants a secret police employed, gathering all that data was not sufficient to create a total surveillance regime. Suppose the Securitate succeeded in recruiting enough agents and informers to watch everyone twenty-four hours a day. At the end of each day, every agent and informer would have had to compile a report on what they observed. Securitate headquarters would have been flooded by 20 million reports every day—or 7.3 billion reports a year. Unless analyzed, it was just an ocean of paper. Yet where could the Securitate find enough analysts to scrutinize and compare 7.3 billion reports annually?

    These difficulties in gathering and analyzing information meant that in the twentieth century not even the most totalitarian state could effectively monitor its entire population. Most of what Romanian and Soviet citizens did and said escaped the notice of the Securitate and the KGB. Even the details that made it into some archive often languished unread. The real power of the Securitate and the KGB was not an ability to constantly watch everyone, but rather their ability to inspire the fear that they might be watching, which made everyone extremely careful about what they said and did.7

    SLEEPLESS AGENTS

    In a world where surveillance is conducted by the organic eyes, ears, and brains of people like the Securitate agent in Iosifescu’s lab, even a prime target like Iosifescu still had some privacy, first and foremost within his own mind. But the work of computer scientists like Iosifescu himself was changing this. Already in 1976, the crude computer sitting on Iosifescu’s desk could crunch numbers much better than the Securitate agent in the nearby chair. By 2024, we are getting close to the point when a ubiquitous computer network can follow the population of entire countries twenty-four hours a day. This network doesn’t need to hire and train millions of human agents to follow us around; it relies on digital agents instead. And the network doesn’t even need to pay for these digital agents. Citizens pay for the agents on our own initiative, and we carry them with us wherever we go.

    The agent monitoring Iosifescu didn’t accompany Iosifescu into the toilet and didn’t sit on the bed while Iosifescu was having sex. Today, our smartphone sometimes does exactly that. Moreover, many of the activities Iosifescu did without any help from his computer—like reading the news, chatting with friends, or buying food—are now done online, so it is even easier for the network to know what we are doing and saying. We ourselves are the informers that provide the network with our raw data. Even those without smartphones are almost always within the orbit of some camera, microphone, or tracking device, and they too constantly interact with the computer network in order to find work, buy a train ticket, get a medical prescription, or simply walk down the street. The computer network has become the nexus of most human activities. In the middle of almost every financial, social, or political transaction, we now find a computer. Consequently, like Adam and Eve in paradise, we cannot hide from the eye in the clouds.

    Just as the computer network doesn’t need millions of human agents to follow us, it also doesn’t need millions of human analysts to make sense of our data. The ocean of paper in Securitate headquarters never analyzed itself. But thanks to the magic of machine learning and AI, computers can themselves analyze most of the information they accumulate. An average human can read about 250 words per minute.8 A Securitate analyst working twelve-hour shifts without taking any days off, could read about 2.6 billion words during a forty-year career. In 2024 language algorithms like ChatGPT and Meta’s Llama can process millions of words per minute and “read” 2.6 billion words in a couple of hours.9 The ability of such algorithms to process images, audio recordings, and video footage is equally superhuman.

    Even more important, the algorithms far surpass humans in their ability to spot patterns in that ocean of data. Identifying patterns requires both the ability to create ideas and the ability to make decisions. For example, how do human analysts identify someone as a “suspected terrorist” that merits closer attention? First, they create a set of general criteria, such as “reading extremist literature,” “befriending known terrorists,” and “having technical knowledge necessary to produce dangerous weapons.” Then they need to decide whether a particular individual meets enough of these criteria to be labeled a suspected terrorist. Suppose someone watched a hundred extremist videos on YouTube last month, is friends with a convicted terrorist, and is currently pursuing a doctorate in epidemiology in a laboratory containing samples of Ebola virus. Should that person be put on the “suspected terrorists” list? And what about someone who watched fifty extremist videos last month and is a biology undergraduate?

    In Romania of the 1970s only humans could make such decisions. By the 2010s humans were increasingly leaving it to algorithms to decide. Around 2014–15 the U.S. National Security Agency deployed an AI tool called Skynet that placed people on a “suspected terrorists” list based on the electronic patterns of their communications, writings, travel, and social media postings. According to one report, that AI tool “engages in mass surveillance of Pakistan’s mobile phone network, and then uses a machine learning algorithm on the cellular network metadata of 55 million people to try and rate each person’s likelihood of being a terrorist.” A former director of both the CIA and the NSA proclaimed that “we kill people based on metadata.”10 Skynet’s reliability has been severely criticized, but by the 2020s such technology has become far more sophisticated and has been deployed by a lot more governments. Going over massive amounts of data, algorithms can discover completely new criteria for defining someone as “suspect” which have previously escaped the notice of human analysts.11In the future, algorithms could even create an entire new model for how people are radicalized, just by identifying patterns in the lives of known terrorists. Of course, computers remain fallible, as we shall explore in depth in chapter 8. They may well classify innocent people as terrorists or may create a false model for radicalization. At an even more fundamental level, it is questionable whether the systems’ definition of things like terrorism are objective. There is a long history of regimes using the label “terrorist” to cover any and all opposition. In the Soviet Union, anyone who opposed the regime was a terrorist. Consequently, when an AI labels someone a “terrorist” it might reflect ideological biases rather than objective facts. The power to make decisions and invent ideas is inseparable from the capacity to make mistakes. Even if no mistakes are committed, the algorithms’ superhuman ability to recognize patterns in an ocean of data can supercharge the power of numerous malign actors, from repressive dictatorships that seek to identify dissidents to fraudsters who seek to identify vulnerable targets.

    Of course, pattern recognition also has enormous positive potential. Algorithms can help identify corrupt government officials, white-collar criminals, and tax-evading corporations. The algorithms can similarly help flesh-and-blood sanitation officials to spot threats to our drinking water;12 help doctors to discern illnesses and burgeoning epidemics;13 and help police officers and social workers to identify abused spouses and children.14 In the following pages, I dedicate relatively little attention to the positive potential of algorithmic bureaucracies, because the entrepreneurs leading the AI revolution already bombard the public with enough rosy predictions about them. My goal here is to balance these utopian visions by focusing on the more sinister potential of algorithmic pattern recognition. Hopefully, we can harness the positive potential of algorithms while regulating their destructive capacities.

    But to do so, we must first appreciate the fundamental difference between the new digital bureaucrats and their flesh-and-blood predecessors. Inorganic bureaucrats can be “on” twenty-four hours a day and can monitor us and interact with us anywhere, anytime. This means that bureaucracy and surveillance are no longer something we encounter only in specific times and places. The health-care system, the police, and manipulative corporations are all becoming ubiquitous and permanent features of life. Instead of organizations with which we interact only in certain situations—for example, when we visit the clinic, the police station, or the mall—they are increasingly accompanying us every moment of the day, watching and analyzing every single thing that we do. As fish live in water, humans live in a digital bureaucracy, constantly inhaling and exhaling data. Each action we make leaves a trace of data, which is gathered and analyzed to identify patterns.

    UNDER-THE-SKIN SURVEILLANCE

    For better or worse, the digital bureaucracy may not only monitor what we do in the world but even observe what is happening inside our bodies. Take, for example, tracking eye movements. By the early 2020s, CCTV cameras, as well as cameras in laptops and smartphones, have begun to routinely collect and analyze data on the movements of our eyes, including tiny changes to our pupils and irises lasting just a few milliseconds. Human agents are barely capable of even noticing such data, but computers can use it to calculate the direction of our gaze, based on the shape of our pupils and irises and on the patterns of light they reflect. Similar methods can determine whether our eyes are fixating on a stable target, pursuing a moving target, or wandering around more haphazardly.

    From certain patterns of eye movements, computers can then distinguish, for example, moments of awareness from moments of distraction, and detail-oriented people from those who pay more attention to context. Computers could infer from our eyes many additional personality traits, like how open we are to new experiences, and estimate our level of expertise in various fields ranging from reading to surgery. Experts possessing well-honed strategies display systematic gaze patterns, whereas the eyes of novices wander aimlessly. Eye patterns also indicate our levels of interest in the objects and situations we encounter, and distinguish between positive, neutral, and negative interest. From this, it is possible to deduce our preferences in fields ranging from politics to sex. Much can also be known about our medical condition and our use of various substances. The consumption of alcohol and drugs—even at nonintoxicating doses—has measurable effects on eye and gaze properties, such as changes in pupil size and an impaired ability to fixate on moving objects. A digital bureaucracy may use all that information for benign purposes—such as by providing early detection for people suffering from drug abuse and mental illnesses. But it could obviously also form the foundations of the most intrusive totalitarian regimes in history.15

    In theory, the dictators of the future could get their computer network to go much deeper than just watching our eyes. If the network wants to know our political views, personality traits, and sexual orientation, it could monitor processes inside our hearts and brains. The necessary biometric technology is already being developed by some governments and companies, like Elon Musk’s Neuralink. Musk’s company has conducted experiments on live rats, sheep, pigs, and monkeys, implanting electrical probes into their brains. Each probe contains up to 3,072 electrodes capable of identifying electrical signals and potentially transmitting signals to the brain. In 2023, Neuralink received approval from U.S. authorities to begin experiments on human beings, and in January 2024 it was reported that a first brain chip was implanted in a human.

    Musk speaks openly about his far-reaching plans for this technology, arguing that it can not only alleviate various medical conditions such as quadriplegia (four-limb paralysis) but also upgrade human abilities and thereby help humankind compete with AI. But it should be clear that at present the Neuralink probes and all other similar biometric devices suffer from a host of technical problems that greatly limit their capabilities. It is difficult to accurately monitor bodily activities—in the brain, heart, or anywhere else—from outside the body, whereas implanting electrodes and other monitoring devices into the body is intrusive, dangerous, costly, and inefficient. Our immune system, for example, attacks implanted electrodes.16

    Even more crucially, nobody yet has the biological knowledge necessary to deduce things like precise political opinions from under-the-skin data like brain activity.17 Scientists are far from understanding the mysteries of the human brain, or even of the mouse brain. Simply mapping every neuron, dendrite, and synapse in a mouse brain—let alone understanding the dynamics between them—is currently beyond humanity’s computational abilities.18 Accordingly, while gathering data from inside people’s brains is becoming more feasible, using such data to decipher our secrets is far from easy.

    One popular conspiracy theory of the early 2020s argues that sinister groups led by billionaires like Elon Musk are already implanting computer chips into our brains in order to monitor and control us. However, this theory focuses our anxieties on the wrong target. We should of course fear the rise of new totalitarian systems, but it is too soon to worry about computer chips implanted in our brains. People should instead worry about the smartphones on which they read these conspiracy theories. Suppose someone wants to know your political views. Your smartphone monitors which news channels you are watching and notes that you watch on average forty minutes of Fox News and forty seconds of CNN a day. Meanwhile, an implanted Neuralink computer chip monitors your heart rate and brain activity throughout the day and notes that your maximum heart rate was 120 beats per minute and that your amygdala is about 5 percent more active than the human average. Which data would be more useful to guess your political affiliation—the data coming from the smartphone or from the implanted chip?19 At present, the smartphone is still a far more valuable surveillance tool than biometric sensors.

    However, as biological knowledge increases—not least thanks to computers analyzing petabits of biometric data—under-the-skin surveillance might eventually come into its own, especially if it is linked to other monitoring tools. At that point, if biometric sensors register what happens to the heart rate and brain activity of millions of people as they watch a particular news item on their smartphones, that can teach the computer network far more than just our general political affiliation. The network could learn precisely what makes each human angry, fearful, or joyful. The network could then both predict and manipulate our feelings, selling us anything it wants—be it a product, a politician, or a war.20

    THE END OF PRIVACY

    In a world where humans monitored humans, privacy was the default. But in a world where computers monitor humans, it may become possible for the first time in history to completely annihilate privacy. The most extreme and well-known cases of intrusive surveillance involve either exceptional times of emergency, like the COVID-19 pandemic, or places seen as exceptional to the normal order of things, such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, the region of Kashmir in India, Russian-occupied Crimea, the U.S.-Mexico border, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands. In these exceptional times and places, new surveillance technologies, combined with draconian laws and heavy police or military presence, have relentlessly monitored and controlled people’s movements, actions, and even feelings.21 What is crucial to realize, though, is that AI-based surveillance tools are being deployed on an enormous scale, and not only in such “states of exception.”22 They are now part and parcel of normal life everywhere. The post-privacy era is taking hold in authoritarian countries ranging from Belarus to Zimbabwe,23 as well as in democratic metropolises like London and New York.

    Whether for good or ill, governments intent on combating crime, suppressing dissent, or countering internal threats (real or imaginary) blanket whole territories with a ubiquitous online and offline surveillance network, equipped with spyware, CCTV cameras, facial recognition and voice recognition software, and vast searchable databases. If a government wishes, its surveillance network can reach everywhere, from markets to places of worship, from schools to private residences. (And while not every government is willing or able to install cameras inside people’s homes, algorithms regularly watch us even in our living rooms, bedrooms and bathrooms via our own computers and smartphones.)

    Governmental surveillance networks also routinely collect biometric data from entire populations, with or without their knowledge. For example, when applying for a passport, more than 140 countries oblige their citizens to provide fingerprints, facial scans, or iris scans.24 When we use our passports to enter a foreign country, that country often demands that we provide it, too, with our fingerprints, facial scans, or iris scans.25 As citizens or tourists walk along the streets of Delhi, Beijing, Seoul, or London, their movements are likely to be recorded. For these cities—and many others around the world—are covered by more than one hundred surveillance cameras on average per square kilometer. Altogether, in 2023 more than one billion CCTV cameras were operative globally, which is about one camera per eight people.26

    Any physical activity a person engages in leaves a data trace. Every purchase made is recorded in some database. Online activities like messaging friends, sharing photos, paying bills, reading news, booking appointments, or ordering taxis can all be recorded as well. The resulting ocean of data can then be analyzed by AI tools to identify unlawful activities, suspicious patterns, missing persons, disease carriers, or political dissidents.

    As with every powerful technology, these tools can be used for either good or bad purposes. Following the storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement agencies used state-of-the-art surveillance tools to track down and arrest the rioters. As reported in a Washington Post investigation, these agencies relied not only on footage from the CCTV cameras in the Capitol, but also on social media posts, license plate readers throughout the country, cell-tower location records, and preexisting databases.

    One Ohio man wrote on Facebook that he had been in Washington that day to “witness history.” A subpoena was issued to Facebook, which provided the FBI with the man’s Facebook posts, as well as his credit card information and phone number. This helped the FBI to match the man’s driver’s license photo to CCTV footage from the Capitol. Another warrant issued to Google yielded the exact geolocation of the man’s smartphone on January 6, enabling agents to map his every movement from his entry point into the Senate chamber all the way to the office of Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House of Representatives.

    Relying on license plate footage, the FBI pinpointed the movements of a New York man from the moment he crossed the Henry Hudson Bridge at 6:06:08 on the morning of January 6, on his way to the Capitol, until he crossed the George Washington Bridge at 23:59:22 that night, on his way back home. An image taken by a camera on Interstate 95 showed an oversized “Make America Great Again” hat on the man’s dashboard. The hat was matched to a Facebook selfie in which the man appeared wearing it. He further incriminated himself with several videos he posted to Snapchat from within the Capitol.

    Another rioter sought to protect himself from detection by wearing a face mask on January 6, avoiding live-streaming, and using a cellphone registered in his mother’s name—but it availed him little. The FBI’s algorithms managed to match video footage from January 6, 2021, to a photo from the man’s 2017 passport application. They also matched a distinctive Knights of Columbus jacket he wore on January 6 to the jacket he wore on a different occasion, which was captured in a YouTube clip. The phone registered in his mother’s name was geolocated to inside the Capitol, and a license plate reader recorded his car near the Capitol on the morning of January 6.27

    Facial recognition algorithms and AI-searchable databases are now standard tools of police forces all over the world. They are deployed not only in cases of national emergencies or for reasons of state security, but for everyday policing tasks. In 2009, a criminal gang abducted the three-year-old Gui Hao while he was playing outside his parents’ shop in Sichuan province, China. The boy was then sold to a family in Guangdong province, about 1,500 kilometers away. In 2014, the leader of the child-trafficking gang was arrested, but it proved impossible to locate Gui Hao and other victims. “The appearance of the children would have changed so much,” explained a police investigator, “that even their parents would not have been able to recognize them”.

    In 2019, however, a facial recognition algorithm managed to identify the now thirteen-year-old Gui Hao, and the teenager was reunited with his family. To correctly identify Gui Hao, the AI relied on an old photograph of his, taken when he was a toddler. The AI simulated what Gui Hao must look like as a thirteen-year-old, taking into account the drastic impact of maturation as well as potential changes in hair color and hairstyle and compared the resulting simulation to real-life footage.

    In 2023, even more remarkable rescues were reported. Yuechuan Lei was abducted in 2001 when he was three years old, and Hao Chen went missing in 1998, also at age three. The parents of both children never gave up hope of finding them. For more than twenty years they crisscrossed China in search of them, placed advertisements, and offered monetary rewards for any relevant information. In 2023, facial recognition algorithms helped locate both missing boys, now adult men in their twenties. Such technology currently helps to find lost children not only in China, but also in other countries like India, where tens of thousands of children go missing every year.28

    Meanwhile, in Denmark, the soccer club Brøndby IF began in July 2019 to use facial recognition technology in its home stadium to identify and ban football hooligans. As up to 30,000 fans stream into the stadium to watch a match, they are asked to remove masks, hats, and glasses so a computer can scan their faces and compare them to a list of banned troublemakers. Crucially, the procedure has been vetted and approved in accordance with the EU’s strict GDPR rules. The Danish Data Protection Authority explained that the use of the technology “would allow for more effective enforcement of the ban list compared to manual checks, and that this could reduce the queues at the stadium entrance, lowering the risk of public unrest from impatient football fans standing in queues.”29

    While such usages of technology are laudable in theory, they raise obvious concerns about privacy and governmental overreach. In the wrong hands, the same techniques that can locate rioters, rescue missing children, and ban football hooligans can also be used to persecute peaceful demonstrators or enforce rigid conformism. Ultimately, AI-powered surveillance technology could result in the creation of total surveillance regimes that monitor citizens around the clock and facilitate new kinds of ubiquitous and automated totalitarian repression. A case in point: Iran’s hijab laws.

    After Iran became an Islamic theocracy in 1979, the new regime made it compulsory for women to wear the hijab. But the Iranian morality police found it difficult to enforce this rule. They couldn’t place a police officer on every street corner, and public confrontations with women who went unveiled occasionally aroused resistance and resentment. In 2022, Iran relegated much of the job of enforcing the hijab laws to a countrywide system of facial recognition algorithms that relentlessly monitor both physical spaces and online environments.30 A top Iranian official explained that the system would “identify inappropriate and unusual movements” including “failure to observe hijab laws.” The head of Iran’s parliamentary legal and judicial committee, Mousa Ghazanfarabadi, said in another interview that “the use of face recording cameras can systematically implement this task and reduce the presence of the police, as a result of which there will be no more clashes between the police and citizens.”31

    Shortly afterward, on September 16, 2022, the 22-year-old Mahsa Amini died in the custody of Iran’s morality police, after being arrested for not wearing her hijab properly.32 A wave of protests erupted, known as the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. Hundreds of thousands of women and girls removed their headscarves, and some publicly burned their hijabs, and danced around the bonfires. To clamp down on the protests, Iranian authorities once again turned to their AI surveillance system, which relies on facial recognition software, geolocation, analysis of web traffic, and preexisting databases. More than 19,000 people were arrested throughout Iran, and more than 500 were killed.33

    On April 8, 2023, Iran’s chief of police announced that beginning on April 15, 2023, an intense new campaign would ramp up the use of facial recognition technology. In particular, algorithms would henceforth identify women who choose not to wear a headscarf while travelling in a vehicle, and automatically issue them an SMS warning. If a woman was caught repeating the offense, she would be ordered to immobilize her car for a predetermined period, and if she failed to comply, the car would be confiscated.34

    Two months later, on June 14, 2023, the spokesperson of Iran’s police boasted that the automated surveillance system sent almost one million SMS warning messages to women who had been captured unveiled in their private cars. The system was apparently able to automatically determine that it was seeing an unveiled woman rather than a man, identify the woman, and retrieve her cellphone number. The system further “issued 133,174 SMS messages requiring the immobilization of vehicles for two weeks, confiscated 2,000 cars, and referred more than 4,000 ‘repeat offenders’ to the judiciary.”35

    A 52-year-old woman named Maryam shared with Amnesty International her experience with the surveillance system. “The first time I received a warning for not wearing a headscarf while driving, I was passing through an intersection when a camera captured a photo and I immediately received a warning text message. The second time, I had done some shopping, and I was bringing the bags into the car, my scarf fell off, and I received a message noting that due to violating compulsory veiling laws, my car had been subjected to ‘systematic impoundment’ for a period of fifteen days. I did not know what this meant. I asked around and found out through relatives that this meant I had to immobilize my car for fifteen days.”36 Maryam’s testimony indicates that the AI sends its threatening messages within seconds, with no time for any human to review and authorize the procedure.

    Penalties went far beyond the immobilization or confiscation of vehicles. The Amnesty report from July 26, 2023, revealed that as a result of the mass surveillance effort “countless women have been suspended or expelled from universities, barred from sitting final exams, and denied access to banking services and public transport.”37 Businesses that didn’t enforce the hijab law among their employees or customers also suffered. In one typical case, a woman employee at the Land of Happiness amusement park east of Tehran was photographed without a hijab, and the image circulated on social media. In punishment, the Land of Happiness was closed down by Iranian authorities.38 Altogether, reported Amnesty, the authorities “shut down hundreds of tourist attractions, hotels, restaurants, pharmacies and shopping centres for not enforcing compulsory veiling laws”.39

    In September 2023, on the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death, Iran’s parliament passed a new and stricter hijab bill. According to the new law, women who fail to wear the hijab can be punished by heavy fines and up to ten years in prison. They face additional penalties including confiscation of cars and communication devices, driving bans, deductions in salary and employment benefits, dismissal from work, and prohibition from access banking services. Business owners who don’t enforce the hijab law among their employees or customers face a fine of up to three months of their profits, and they may be banned from leaving the country or participating in public or online activities for up to two years. The new bill targets not only women, but also men who wear “revealing clothing that shows parts of the body lower than the chest or above the ankles.” Finally, the law mandates that Iranian police must “create and strengthen AI systems to identify perpetrators of illegal behavior using tools such as fixed and mobile cameras.”40 In coming years, many people might be living under total surveillance regimes that would make Ceauşescu’s Romania look like a libertarian utopia.

    VARIETIES OF SURVEILLANCE

    When talking about surveillance, we usually think of state-run apparatuses, but to understand surveillance in the twenty-first century, we should remember that monitoring can take many other forms. Jealous partners, for example, have always wanted to know where their spouses were at every moment and demanded explanations for any little deviation from routines. Today, armed with a smartphone and some cheap software, they can easily establish marital dictatorships. They can monitor every conversation and every movement, record phone logs, track social media posts and web page searches, and even activate the cameras and microphones of a spouse’s phone to serve as a spying device. The U.S.-based National Network to End Domestic Violence found that more than half of domestic abusers used such “stalkware” technology. Even in New York a spouse may find themselves monitored and restricted, as if they lived in a totalitarian state.41

    A growing percentage of employees—from office workers to truck drivers—are also now being surveilled by their employers. Bosses can pinpoint where employees are at any moment, how much time they spend in the toilet, whether they read personal emails at work, and how fast they complete each task.42 Corporations are similarly monitoring their customers, wanting to know their likes and dislikes, to predict future behavior, and to evaluate risks and opportunities. For example, vehicles monitor their drivers’ behavior and share the data with the algorithms of the insurance companies, which raise the premiums they charge “bad drivers” and lower the premiums for “good drivers.”43 The American scholar Shoshana Zuboff has termed this ever-expanding commercial monitoring system “surveillance capitalism.”44

    In addition to all these varieties of top-down surveillance, there are peer-to-peer systems in which individuals constantly monitor one another. For example, the Tripadvisor corporation maintains a worldwide surveillance system that monitors hotels, vacation rentals, restaurants, and tourists. In 2019, it was used by 463 million travelers who browsed 859 million reviews and 8.6 billion lodgings, restaurants, and tourist attractions. It is the users themselves—rather than some sophisticated AI algorithm—who determine whether a restaurant is worth visiting. People who ate in the restaurant can score it on a 1 to 5 scale, and also add photos and written reviews. The Tripadvisor algorithm merely aggregates the data, calculates the restaurant’s average score, ranks the restaurant compared with others of its kind, and makes the results available for everybody to see.

    The algorithm simultaneously ranks the guests, too. For posting reviews or travel articles, users receive 100 points; for uploading photos or videos, 30 points; for posting in a forum, 20 points; for rating establishments, 5 points; and for casting votes for others’ reviews, 1 point. Users are then ranked from Level 1 (300 points) to Level 6 (10,000 points) and receive perks accordingly. Users who violate the system’s rules—for example, by submitting racist comments or trying to blackmail a restaurant by writing an unjustified bad review—may be penalized or kicked out of the system altogether. This is peer-to-peer surveillance. Everybody is constantly grading everybody else. Tripadvisor doesn’t need to invest in cameras and spyware or develop hyper-sophisticated biometric algorithms. Almost all the data is submitted and almost all the work is done by millions of human users. The job of the Tripadvisor algorithm is only to aggregate human-generated scores and publish them.45

    Tripadvisor and similar peer-to-peer surveillance systems provide valuable information for millions of people every day, making it easier to plan vacations and find good hotels and restaurants. But in doing so, they have also shifted the border between private and public spaces. Traditionally, the relationship between the customer and a waiter, say, was a relatively private affair. Entering a bistro meant entering a semiprivate space and establishing a semiprivate relationship with the waiter. Unless some crime was committed, what happened between guest and waiter was their business alone. If the waiter was rude or made a racist remark, you could make a scene and perhaps tell your friends not to go there, but few other people would hear about it.

    Peer-to-peer surveillance networks have obliterated that sense of privacy. If the staff fails to please a customer, the restaurant will get a bad review, which could affect the decision of thousands of potential customers in coming years. For better or worse, the balance of power tilts in favor of the customers, while the staff find themselves more exposed than before to the public gaze. As the author and journalist Linda Kinstler put it, “Before Tripadvisor, the customer was only nominally king. After, he became a veritable tyrant, with the power to make or break lives.”46 The same loss of privacy is felt today by millions of taxi drivers, barbers, beauticians, and other service providers. In the past, stepping into a taxi or barbershop meant stepping into someone’s private space. Now, when customers come into your taxi or barbershop, they bring cameras, microphones, a surveillance network, and thousands of potential viewers with them.47 This is the foundation of a nongovernmental peer-to-peer surveillance network.

    THE SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM

    Peer-to-peer surveillance systems typically operate by aggregating many points to determine an overall score. Another type of surveillance network takes this “score logic” to its ultimate conclusion. This is the social credit system, which seeks to give people points for everything and produce an overall personal score that will influence everything. The last time humans came up with such an ambitious points system was five thousand years ago in Mesopotamia, when money was invented. One way to think of the social credit system is as a new kind of money.

    Money is points that people accumulate by selling certain products and services, and then use to buy other products and services. Some countries call their “points” dollars, whereas other countries call them euros, yen, or renminbi. The points can take the form of coins, banknotes, or bits in a digital bank account. The points themselves are, of course, intrinsically worthless. You cannot eat coins or wear banknotes. Their value lies in the fact that they serve as accounting tokens that society uses to keep track of our individual scores.

    Money revolutionized economic relations, social interactions, and human psychology. But like surveillance, money has had its limitations and could not reach everywhere. Even in the most capitalist societies, there have always been places that money didn’t penetrate, and there have always been many things that lacked a monetary value. How much is a smile worth? How much money does a person earn for visiting their grandparents?48

    For scoring those things that money can’t buy, there was an alternative nonmonetary system, which has been given different names: honor, status, reputation. What social credit systems seek is a standardized valuation of the reputation market. Social credit is a new points system that ascribes precise values even to smiles and family visits. To appreciate how revolutionary and far-reaching this is, let’s examine in brief how the reputation market has hitherto differed from the money market. This will help us understand what might happen to social relations if the principles of the money market are suddenly extended to the reputation market.

    One major difference between money and reputation is that money has tended to be a mathematical construct based on precise calculations, whereas the sphere of reputation has been resistant to precise numerical evaluation. For example, medieval aristocrats graded themselves in hierarchical ranks such as dukes, counts, and viscounts, but nobody was counting reputation points. Customers in a medieval market usually knew how many coins they had in their purses and the price of every product in the stalls. In the money market, no coin goes uncounted. In contrast, knights in a medieval reputational market didn’t know the exact amount of honor that different actions might accrue, nor could they be sure of their overall score. Would fighting bravely in battle bring a knight 10 honor points, or 100? And what if nobody saw and recorded their bravery? Indeed, even assuming it was noticed, different people might assign it different values. This lack of precision wasn’t a bug in the system but a crucial feature. “Calculating” was a synonym for cunning and scheming. Acting honorably was supposed to reflect an inner virtue, rather than a pursuit of external rewards.49

    This difference between the scrupulous money market and the ill-defined reputation market still prevails. The owner of a bistro always notices and complains if you don’t pay for your meal in full; every item on the menu has a precise price. But how would the owner even know if society failed to register some good deed they performed? Whom could they complain to if they weren’t properly rewarded for helping an elderly customer or for being extra patient with a rude customer? In some cases, they might now try complaining to Tripadvisor, which collapses the boundary between the money market and the reputation market, turning the fuzzy reputation of restaurants and hotels into a mathematical system of precise points. The idea of social credit is to expand this surveillance method from restaurants and hotels to everything. In the most extreme type of social credit systems, every person gets an overall reputation score that takes into account whatever they do and determines everything they can do.

    For example, you might earn 10 points for picking up trash from the street, get another 20 points for helping an old lady cross the road, and lose 15 points for playing the drums and disturbing the neighbors. If you get a high enough score, it might give you priority when buying train tickets or a leg up when applying to university. If you get a low score, potential employers may refuse to give you a job, and potential dates may refuse your advances. Insurance companies may demand higher premiums, and judges may inflict harsher sentences.

    Some people might see social credit systems as a way to reward pro-social behavior, punish egotistical acts, and create kinder and more harmonious societies. The Chinese government, for example, explains that its social credit systems could help fight corruption, scams, tax evasion, false advertising, and counterfeiting, and thereby establish more trust between individuals, between consumers and corporations, and between citizens and government institutions.50 Others may find systems that allocate precise values to every social action demeaning and inhuman. Even worse, a comprehensive social credit system will annihilate privacy and effectively turn life into a never-ending job interview. Anything you do, anytime, anywhere, might affect your chances of getting a job, a bank loan, a husband, or a prison sentence. You got drunk at a college party and did something legal but shameful? You participated in a political demonstration? You’re friends with someone who has a low credit score? This will be part of your job interview—or criminal sentencing—both in the short term and even decades later. The social credit system might thereby become a totalitarian control system.

    Of course, the reputation market always controlled people and made them conform to the prevailing social norms. In most societies people have always feared losing face even more than they have feared losing money. Many more people commit suicide due to shame and guilt than due to economic distress. Even when people kill themselves after being fired from their job or after their business goes bankrupt, they are usually pushed over the edge by the social humiliation it involves rather than by the economic hardship per se.51

    But the uncertainty and the subjectivity of the reputation market have previously limited its potential for totalitarian control. Since nobody knew the precise value of each social interaction, and since nobody could possibly keep tabs on all interactions, there was significant room for maneuver. When you went to a college party, you might have behaved in a way that earned the respect of your friends, without worrying what future employers might think. When you went to a job interview, you knew none of your friends would be there. And when you were watching pornography at home, you assumed that neither your bosses nor your friends knew what you were up to. Life has been divided into separate reputational spheres, with separate status competitions, and there were also many off-grid moments when you didn’t have to engage in any status competitions at all. Precisely because status competition is so crucial, it is also extremely stressful. Therefore, not only humans but even other social animals like apes have always welcomed some respite from it.52

    Unfortunately, social credit algorithms combined with ubiquitous surveillance technology now threaten to merge all status competitions into a single never-ending race. Even in their own homes or while trying to enjoy a relaxed vacation, people would have to be extremely careful about every deed and word, as if they were performing onstage in front of millions. This could create an incredibly stressful lifestyle, destructive to people’s well-being as well as to the functioning of society. If digital bureaucrats use a precise points system to keep tabs on everybody all the time, the emerging reputation market could annihilate privacy and control people far more tightly than the money market ever did.

    ALWAYS ON

    Humans are organic beings who live by cyclical biological time. Sometimes we are awake; sometimes we are asleep. After intense activity, we need rest. We grow and decay. Networks of humans are similarly subject to biological cycles. They are sometimes on and sometimes off. Job interviews don’t last forever. Police agents don’t work twenty-four hours a day. Bureaucrats take holidays. Even the money market respects these biological cycles. The New York Stock Exchange is open on Mondays to Fridays, from 9:30 in the morning to 4:00 in the afternoon, and is closed on holidays like Independence Day and New Year’s Day. If a war erupts at 4:01 p.m. on a Friday, the market won’t react to it until Monday morning.

    In contrast, a network of computers can always be on. Computers are consequently pushing humans toward a new kind of existence in which we are always connected and always monitored. In some contexts, like health care, this could be a boon. In other contexts, like for citizens of totalitarian states, this could be a disaster. Even if the network is potentially benign, the very fact that it is always “on” might be damaging to organic entities like humans, because it will take away our opportunities to disconnect and relax. If an organism never has a chance to rest, it eventually collapses and dies. But how will we get a relentless network to slow down and allow us some breaks?

    We need to prevent the computer network from taking complete control of society not just in order to give us time off. Breaks are even more crucial to give us a chance to rectify the network. If the network continues to evolve at an accelerating pace, errors will accumulate much faster than we can identify and correct them. For while the network is relentless and ubiquitous, it is also fallible. Yes, computers can gather unprecedented amounts of data on us, watching what we do twenty-four hours a day. And yes, they can identify patterns in the ocean of data with superhuman efficiency. But that does not mean that the computer network will always understand the world accurately. Information isn’t truth. A total surveillance system may form a very distorted understanding of the world and of human beings. Instead of discovering the truth about the world and about us, the network might use its immense power to create a new kind of world order and impose it on us.

    CHAPTER 8 Fallible: The Network Is Often Wrong

    In The Gulag Archipelago (1973), Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn chronicles the history of the Soviet labor camps and of the information network that created and sustained them. He was writing partly from bitter personal experience. When Solzhenitsyn served as a captain in the Red Army during World War II, he maintained a private correspondence with a school friend in which he occasionally criticized Stalin. To be on the safe side, he did not mention the dictator by name and spoke only about “the man with the mustache.” It availed him little. His letters were intercepted and read by the secret police, and in February 1945, while serving on the front line in Germany, he was arrested. He spent the next eight years in labor camps.1 Many of Solzhenitsyn’s hard-won insights and stories are still relevant to understanding the development of information networks in the twenty-first century.

    One story recounts events at a district party conference in Moscow Province in the late 1930s, at the height of the Stalinist Great Terror. A call was made to pay tribute to Stalin, and the audience—who of course knew that they were being carefully watched—burst into applause. After five minutes of applause, “palms were getting sore and raised arms were already aching. And the older people were panting from exhaustion.… However, who would dare be the first to stop?” Solzhenitsyn explains that “NKVD men were standing in the hall applauding and watching to see who quit first!” It went on and on, for six minutes, then eight, then ten. “They couldn’t stop now till they collapsed with heart attacks! … With make-believe enthusiasm on their faces, looking at each other with faint hope, the district leaders were just going to go on and on applauding till they fell where they stood.”

    Finally, after eleven minutes, the director of a paper factory took his life in his hands, stopped clapping, and sat down. Everyone else immediately stopped clapping and also sat down. That same night, the secret police arrested him and sent him to the gulag for ten years. “His interrogator reminded him: Don’t ever be the first to stop applauding!”2

    This story reveals a crucial and disturbing fact about information networks, and in particular about surveillance systems. As discussed in previous chapters, contrary to the naive view, information is often used to create order rather than discover truth. On the face of it, Stalin’s agents in the Moscow conference used the “clapping test” as a way to uncover the truth about the audience. It was a loyalty test, which assumed that the longer you clapped, the more you loved Stalin. In many contexts, this assumption is not unreasonable. But in the context of Moscow in the late 1930s, the nature of the applause changed. Since participants in the conference knew they were being watched, and since they knew the consequences of any hint of disloyalty, they clapped out of terror rather than love. The paper factory director might have been the first to stop not because he was the least loyal but perhaps because he was the most honest, or even simply because his hands hurt the most.

    While the clapping test didn’t discover the truth about people, it was efficient in imposing order and forcing people to behave in a certain way. Over time, such methods cultivated servility, hypocrisy, and cynicism. This is what the Soviet information network did to hundreds of millions of people over decades. In quantum mechanics the act of observing subatomic particles changes their behavior; it is the same with the act of observing humans. The more powerful our tools of observation, the greater the potential impact.

    The Soviet regime constructed one of the most formidable information networks in history. It gathered and processed enormous amounts of data on its citizens. It also claimed that the infallible theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin granted it a deep understanding of humanity. In fact, the Soviet information network ignored many important aspects of human nature, and it was in complete denial regarding the terrible suffering its policies inflicted on its own citizens. Instead of producing wisdom, it produced order, and instead of revealing the universal truth about humans, it actually created a new type of human—Homo sovieticus.

    As defined by the dissident Soviet philosopher and satirist Aleksandr Zinovyev, Homo sovieticus were servile and cynical humans, lacking all initiative or independent thinking, passively obeying even the most ludicrous orders, and indifferent to the results of their actions.3 The Soviet information network created Homo sovieticus through surveillance, punishments, and rewards. For example, by sending the director of the paper factory to the gulag, the network signaled to the other participants that conformity paid off, whereas being the first to do anything controversial was a bad idea. Though the network failed to discover the truth about humans, it was so good at creating order that it conquered much of the world.

    THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE LIKE

    An analogous dynamic may afflict the computer networks of the twenty-first century, which might create new types of humans and new dystopias. A paradigmatic example is the role played by social media algorithms in radicalizing people. Of course, the methods employed by the algorithms have been utterly different from those of the NKVD and involved no direct coercion or violence. But just as the Soviet secret police created the slavish Homo sovieticus through surveillance, rewards, and punishments, so also the Facebook and YouTube algorithms have created internet trolls by rewarding certain base instincts while punishing the better angels of our nature.

    As explained briefly in chapter 6, the process of radicalization started when corporations tasked their algorithms with increasing user engagement, not only in Myanmar, but throughout the world. For example, in 2012 users were watching about 100 million hours of videos every day on YouTube. That was not enough for company executives, who set their algorithms an ambitious goal: 1 billion hours a day by 2016.4 Through trial-and-error experiments on millions of people, the YouTube algorithms discovered the same pattern that Facebook algorithms also learned: outrage drives engagement up, while moderation tends not to. Accordingly, the YouTube algorithms began recommending outrageous conspiracy theories to millions of viewers while ignoring more moderate content. By 2016, users were indeed watching 1 billion hours every day on YouTube.5

    YouTubers who were particularly intent on gaining attention noticed that when they posted an outrageous video full of lies, the algorithm rewarded them by recommending the video to numerous users and increasing the YouTubers’ popularity and income. In contrast, when they dialed down the outrage and stuck to the truth, the algorithm tended to ignore them. Within a few months of such reinforcement learning, the algorithm turned many YouTubers into trolls.6

    The social and political consequences were far-reaching. For example, as the journalist Max Fisher documented in his 2022 book, The Chaos Machine, YouTube algorithms became an important engine for the rise of the Brazilian far right and for turning Jair Bolsonaro from a fringe figure into Brazil’s president.7 While there were other factors contributing to that political upheaval, it is notable that many of Bolsonaro’s chief supporters and aides had originally been YouTubers who rose to fame and power by algorithmic grace.

    A typical example is Carlos Jordy, who in 2017 was a city councilor in the small town of Niterói. The ambitious Jordy gained national attention by creating inflammatory YouTube videos that garnered millions of views. His videos warned Brazilians, for example, against conspiracies by schoolteachers to brainwash children and persecute conservative pupils. In 2018, Jordy won a seat in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the Brazilian Congress) as one of Bolsonaro’s most dedicated supporters. In an interview with Fisher, Jordy frankly said, “If social media didn’t exist, I wouldn’t be here [and] Jair Bolsonaro wouldn’t be president.” The latter claim may well be a self-serving exaggeration, but there is no denying that social media played an important part in Bolsonaro’s rise.

    Another YouTuber who won a seat in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies in 2018 was Kim Kataguiri, one of the leaders of the Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL, or Free Brazil Movement). Kataguiri initially used Facebook as his main platform, but his posts were too extreme even for Facebook, which banned some of them for disinformation. So Kataguiri switched over to the more permissive YouTube. In an interview in the MBL headquarters in São Paulo, Kataguiri’s aides and other activists explained to Fisher, “We have something here that we call the dictatorship of the like.” They explained that YouTubers tend to become steadily more extreme, posting untruthful and reckless content “just because something is going to give you views, going to give engagement.… Once you open that door there’s no going back, because you always have to go further.… Flat Earthers, anti-vaxxers, conspiracy theories in politics. It’s the same phenomenon. You see it everywhere.”8

    Of course, the YouTube algorithms were not themselves responsible for inventing lies and conspiracy theories or for creating extremist content. At least in 2017–18, those things were done by humans. The algorithms were responsible, however, for incentivizing humans to behave in such ways and for pushing the resulting content in order to maximize user engagement. Fisher documented numerous far-right activists who first became interested in extremist politics after watching videos that the YouTube algorithm auto-played for them. One far-right activist in Niterói told Fisher that he was never interested in politics of any kind, until one day the YouTube algorithm auto-played for him a video on politics by Kataguiri. “Before that,” he explained, “I didn’t have an ideological, political background.” He credited the algorithm with providing “my political education.” Talking about how other people joined the movement, he said, “It was like that with everyone.… Most of the people here came from YouTube and social media.”9

    BLAME THE HUMANS

    We have reached a turning point in history in which major historical processes are partly caused by the decisions of nonhuman intelligence. It is this that makes the fallibility of the computer network so dangerous. Computer errors become potentially catastrophic only when computers become historical agents. We have already made this argument in chapter 6, when we briefly examined Facebook’s role in instigating the anti-Rohingya ethnic-cleansing campaign. As noted in that context, however, many people—including some of the managers and engineers of Facebook, YouTube, and the other tech giants—object to this argument. Since it is one of the central points of the entire book, it is best to delve deeper into the matter and examine more carefully the objections to it.

    The people who manage Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and other platforms routinely try to excuse themselves by shifting the blame from their algorithms to “human nature.” They argue that it is human nature that produces all the hate and lies on the platforms. The tech giants then claim that due to their commitment to free speech values, they hesitate to censor the expression of genuine human emotions. For example, in 2019 the CEO of YouTube, Susan Wojcicki, explained, “The way that we think about it is: ‘Is this content violating one of our policies? Has it violated anything in terms of hate, harassment?’ If it has, we remove that content. We keep tightening and tightening the policies. We also get criticism, just to be clear, [about] where do you draw the lines of free speech and, if you draw it too tightly, are you removing voices of society that should be heard? We’re trying to strike a balance of enabling a broad set of voices, but also making sure that those voices play by a set of rules that are healthy conversations for society.”10

    A Facebook spokesperson similarly said in October 2021, “Like every platform, we are constantly making difficult decisions between free expressions and harmful speech, security and other issues.… But drawing these societal lines is always better left to elected leaders.”11 In this way, the tech giants constantly shift the discussion to their supposed role as moderators of human-produced content and ignore the active role their algorithms play in cultivating certain human emotions and discouraging others. Are they really blind to it?

    Surely not. Back in 2016, an internal Facebook report discovered that “64 percent of all extremist group joins are due to our recommendation tools.… Our recommendation systems grow the problem.”12 A secret internal Facebook memo from August 2019, leaked by the whistleblower Frances Haugen, stated, “We have evidence from a variety of sources that hate speech, divisive political speech, and misinformation on Facebook and [its] family of apps are affecting societies around the world. We also have compelling evidence that our core product mechanics, such as virality, recommendations, and optimizing for engagement, are a significant part of why these types of speech flourish on the platform.”13

    Another leaked document from December 2019 noted, “Unlike communication with close friends and family, virality is something new we have introduced to many ecosystems … and it occurs because we intentionally encourage it for business reasons.” The document pointed out that “ranking content about higher stakes topics like health or politics based on engagement leads to perverse incentives and integrity issues.” Perhaps most damningly, it revealed, “Our ranking systems have specific separate predictions for not just what you would engage with, but what we think you may pass along so that others may engage with. Unfortunately, research has shown how outrage and misinformation are more likely to be viral.” This leaked document made one crucial recommendation: since Facebook cannot remove everything harmful from a platform used by many millions, it should at least “stop magnifying harmful content by giving it unnatural distribution.”14

    Like the Soviet leaders in Moscow, the tech companies were not uncovering some truth about humans; they were imposing on us a perverse new order. Humans are very complex beings, and benign social orders seek ways to cultivate our virtues while curtailing our negative tendencies. But social media algorithms see us, simply, as an attention mine. The algorithms reduced the multifaceted range of human emotions—hate, love, outrage, joy, confusion—into a single catchall category: engagement. In Myanmar in 2016, in Brazil in 2018, and in numerous other countries, the algorithms scored videos, posts, and all other content solely according to how many minutes people engaged with the content and how many times they shared it with others. An hour of lies or hatred was ranked higher than ten minutes of truth or compassion—or an hour of sleep. The fact that lies and hate tend to be psychologically and socially destructive, whereas truth, compassion, and sleep are essential for human welfare, was completely lost on the algorithms. Based on this very narrow understanding of humanity, the algorithms helped to create a new social system that encouraged our basest instincts while discouraging us from realizing the full spectrum of the human potential.

    As the harmful effects were becoming manifest, the tech giants were repeatedly warned about what was happening, but they failed to step in because of their faith in the naive view of information. As the platforms were overrun by falsehoods and outrage, executives hoped that if more people were enabled to express themselves more freely, truth would eventually prevail. This, however, did not happen. As we have seen again and again throughout history, in a completely free information fight, truth tends to lose. To tilt the balance in favor of truth, networks must develop and maintain strong self-correcting mechanisms that reward truth telling. These self-correcting mechanisms are costly, but if you want to get the truth, you must invest in them.

    Silicon Valley thought it was exempt from this historical rule. Social media platforms have been singularly lacking in self-correcting mechanisms. In 2014, Facebook employed just a single Burmese-speaking content moderator to monitor activities in the whole of Myanmar.15 When observers in Myanmar began warning Facebook that it needed to invest more in moderating content, Facebook ignored them. For example, Pwint Htun, a Burmese American engineer and telecom executive who grew up in rural Myanmar, wrote to Facebook executives repeatedly about the danger. In an email from July 5, 2014—two years before the ethnic-cleansing campaign began—she issued a prophetic warning: “Tragically, FB in Burma is used like radio in Rwanda during the dark days of genocide.” Facebook took no action.

    Even after the attacks on the Rohingya intensified and Facebook faced a storm of criticism, it still refused to hire people with expert local knowledge to curate content. Thus, when informed that hate-mongers in Myanmar were using the Burmese word kalar as a racist slur for the Rohingya, Facebook reacted in April 2017 by banning from the platform any posts that used the word. This revealed Facebook’s utter lack of knowledge about local conditions and the Burmese language. In Burmese, kalar is a racist slur only in specific contexts. In other contexts, it is an entirely innocent term. The Burmese word for chair is kalar htaing, and the word for chickpea is kalar pae. As Pwint Htun wrote to Facebook in June 2017, banning the term kalar from the platform is like banning the letters “hell” from “hello.”16 Facebook continued to ignore the need for local expertise. By April 2018, the number of Burmese speakers Facebook employed to moderate content for its eighteen million users in Myanmar was a grand total of five.17

    Instead of investing in self-correcting mechanisms that would reward truth telling, the social media giants actually developed unprecedented error-enhancing mechanisms that rewarded lies and fictions. One such error-enhancing mechanism was the Instant Articles program that Facebook rolled out in Myanmar in 2016. Wishing to drive up engagement, Facebook paid news channels according to the amount of user engagement they generated, measured in clicks and views. No importance whatsoever was given to the truthfulness of the “news.” A 2021 study found that in 2015, before the program was launched, six of the ten top Facebook websites in Myanmar belonged to “legitimate media.” By 2017, under the impact of Instant Articles, “legitimate media” was down to just two websites out of the top ten. By 2018, all top ten websites were “fake news and clickbait websites.”

    The study concluded that because of the launch of Instant Articles “clickbait actors cropped up in Myanmar overnight. With the right recipe for producing engaging and evocative content, they could generate thousands of US dollars a month in ad revenue, or ten times the average monthly salary—paid to them directly by Facebook.” Since Facebook was by far the most important source of online news in Myanmar, this had enormous impact on the overall media landscape of the country. “In a country where Facebook is synonymous with the Internet, the low-grade content overwhelmed other information sources.”18 Facebook and other social media platforms didn’t consciously set out to flood the world with fake news and outrage. But by telling their algorithms to maximize user engagement, this is exactly what they perpetrated.

    Reflecting on the Myanmar tragedy, Pwint Htun wrote to me in July 2023, “I naively used to believe that social media could elevate human consciousness and spread the perspective of common humanity through interconnected pre-frontal cortexes in billions of human beings. What I realize is that the social media companies are not incentivized to interconnect pre-frontal cortexes. Social media companies are incentivized to create interconnected limbic systems—which is much more dangerous for humanity.”

    THE ALIGNMENT PROBLEM

    I don’t want to imply that the spread of fake news and conspiracy theories is the main problem with all past, present, and future computer networks. YouTube, Facebook, and other social media platforms claim that since 2018 they have been tweaking their algorithms to make them more socially responsible. Whether this is true or not is hard to say, especially because there is no universally accepted definition of “social responsibility.”19 But the specific problem of polluting the information sphere in pursuit of user engagement can certainly be solved. When the tech giants set their hearts on designing better algorithms, they can usually do it. Around 2005, the profusion of spam threatened to make the use of email impossible. Powerful algorithms were developed to address the problem. By 2015, Google claimed its Gmail algorithm had a 99.9 percent success in blocking genuine spam, while only 1 percent of legitimate emails were erroneously labeled as such.20

    We also shouldn’t discount the huge social benefits that YouTube, Facebook, and other social media platforms have brought. To be clear, most YouTube videos and Facebook posts have not been fake news and genocidal incitements. Social media has been more than helpful in connecting people, giving voice to previously disenfranchised groups, and organizing valuable new movements and communities.21 It has also encouraged an unprecedented wave of human creativity. In the days when television was the dominant medium, viewers were often denigrated as couch potatoes: passive consumers of content that a few gifted artists produced. Facebook, YouTube, and other social media platforms inspired the couch potatoes to get up and start creating. Most of the content on social media—at least until the rise of powerful generative AI—has been produced by the users themselves, and their cats and dogs, rather than by a limited professional class.

    I, too, routinely use YouTube and Facebook to connect with people, and I am grateful to social media for connecting me with my husband, whom I met on one of the first LGBTQ social media platforms back in 2002. Social media has done wonders for dispersed minorities like LGBTQ people. Few gay boys are born to a gay family in a gay neighborhood, and in the days before the internet simply finding one another posed a big challenge, unless you moved to one of the handful of tolerant metropolises that had a gay subculture. Growing up in a small homophobic town in Israel in the 1980s and early 1990s, I didn’t know a single openly gay man. Social media in the late 1990s and early 2000s provided an unprecedented and almost magical way for members of the dispersed LGBTQ community to find one another and connect.

    And yet I have devoted so much attention to the social media “user engagement” debacle because it exemplifies a much bigger problem afflicting computers—the alignment problem. When computers are given a specific goal, such as to increase YouTube traffic to one billion hours a day, they use all their power and ingenuity to achieve this goal. Since they operate very differently than humans, they are likely to use methods their human overlords didn’t anticipate. This can result in dangerous unforeseen consequences, which are not aligned with the original human goals. Even if recommendation algorithms stop encouraging hate, other instances of the alignment problem might result in larger catastrophes than the anti-Rohingya campaign. The more powerful and independent computers become, the bigger the danger.

    Of course, the alignment problem is neither new nor unique to algorithms. It bedeviled humanity for thousands of years before the invention of computers. It has been, for example, the foundational problem of modern military thinking, enshrined in Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of war. Clausewitz was a Prussian general who fought during the Napoleonic Wars. Following Napoleon’s final defeat in 1815, Clausewitz became the director of the Prussian War College. He also began formalizing a grand theory of war. After he died of cholera in 1831, his wife, Marie, edited his unfinished manuscript and published On War in several parts between 1832 and 1834.22

    On War created a rational model for understanding war, and it is still the dominant military theory today. Its most important maxim is that “war is the continuation of policy with other means.”23 This implies that war is not an emotional outbreak, a heroic adventure, or a divine punishment. War is not even a military phenomenon. Rather, war is a political tool. According to Clausewitz, military actions are utterly irrational unless they are aligned with some overarching political goal.

    Suppose Mexico contemplates whether to invade and conquer its small neighbor, Belize. And suppose a detailed military analysis concludes that if the Mexican army invades, it will achieve a quick and decisive military victory, crushing the small Belize army and conquering the capital, Belmopan, in three days. According to Clausewitz, that does not constitute a rational reason for Mexico to invade. The mere ability to secure military victory is meaningless. The key question the Mexican government should ask itself is, what political goals will the military success achieve?

    History is full of decisive military victories that led to political disasters. For Clausewitz, the most obvious example was close to home: Napoleon’s career. Nobody disputes the military genius of Napoleon, who was a master of both tactics and strategy. But while his string of victories brought Napoleon temporary control of vast territories, they failed to secure lasting political achievements. His military conquests merely drove most European powers to unite against him, and his empire collapsed a decade after he crowned himself emperor.

    Indeed, in the long term, Napoleon’s victories ensured the permanent decline of France. For centuries, France was Europe’s leading geopolitical power, largely because both Italy and Germany didn’t exist as unified political entities. Italy was a hodgepodge of dozens of warring city-states, feudal principalities, and church territories. Germany was an even more bizarre jigsaw puzzle divided into more than a thousand independent polities, loosely held together under the theoretical suzerainty of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.24 In 1789, the prospect of a German or Italian invasion of France was simply unthinkable, because there was no such thing as a German or Italian army.

    As Napoleon expanded his empire into central Europe and the Italian Peninsula, he abolished the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, amalgamated many of the smaller German and Italian principalities into larger territorial blocs, created a German Confederation of the Rhine and a Kingdom of Italy, and sought to unify these territories under his dynastic rule. His victorious armies also spread the ideals of modern nationalism and popular sovereignty into the German and Italian lands. Napoleon thought all this would make his empire stronger. In fact, by breaking up traditional structures and giving Germans and Italians a taste of national consolidation, Napoleon inadvertently lay the foundations for the ultimate unification of Germany (1866–71) and of Italy (1848–71). These twin processes of national unification were sealed by the German victory over France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. Faced with two newly unified and fervently nationalistic powers on its eastern border, France never regained its position of dominance.

    A more recent example of military victory leading to political defeat was provided by the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Americans won every major military engagement, but failed to achieve any of their long-term political aims. Their military victory didn’t establish a friendly regime in Iraq, or a favorable geopolitical order in the Middle East. The real winner of the war was Iran. American military victory turned Iraq from Iran’s traditional foe into Iran’s vassal, thereby greatly weakening the American position in the Middle East while making Iran the regional hegemon.25

    Both Napoleon and George W. Bush fell victim to the alignment problem. Their short-term military goals were misaligned with their countries’ long-term geopolitical goals. We can understand the whole of Clausewitz’s On War as a warning that “maximizing victory” is as shortsighted a goal as “maximizing user engagement.” According to the Clausewitzian model, only once the political goal is clear can armies decide on a military strategy that will hopefully achieve it. From the overall strategy, lower-ranking officers can then derive tactical goals. The model constructs a clear hierarchy between long-term policy, medium-term strategy, and short-term tactics. Tactics are considered rational only if they are aligned with some strategic goal, and strategy is considered rational only if it is aligned with some political goal. Even local tactical decisions of a lowly company commander must serve the war’s ultimate political goal.

    Suppose that during the American occupation of Iraq an American company comes under intense fire from a nearby mosque. The company commander has several different tactical decisions to choose from. He might order the company to retreat. He might order the company to storm the mosque. He might order one of his supporting tanks to blow up the mosque. What should the company commander do?

    From a purely military perspective, it might seem best for the commander to order his tank to blow up the mosque. This would capitalize on the tactical advantage that the Americans enjoyed in terms of firepower, avoid risking the lives of his own soldiers, and achieve a decisive tactical victory. However, from a political perspective, this might be the worst decision the commander could make. Footage of an American tank destroying a mosque would galvanize Iraqi public opinion against the Americans and create outrage throughout the wider Muslim world. Storming the mosque might also be a political mistake, because it too could create resentment among Iraqis, while the cost in American lives could weaken support for the war among American voters. Given the political war aims of the United States, retreating and conceding tactical defeat might well be the most rational decision.

    For Clausewitz, then, rationality means alignment. Pursuing tactical or strategic victories that are misaligned with political goals is irrational. The problem is that the bureaucratic nature of armies makes them highly susceptible to such irrationality. As discussed in chapter 3, by dividing reality into separate drawers, bureaucracy encourages the pursuit of narrow goals even when this harms the greater good. Bureaucrats tasked with accomplishing a narrow mission may be ignorant of the wider impact of their actions, and it has always been tricky to ensure that their actions remain aligned with the greater good of society. When armies operate along bureaucratic lines—as all modern armies do—it creates a huge gap between a captain commanding a company in the field and the president formulating long-term policy in a distant office. The captain is prone to make decisions that seem reasonable on the ground but that actually undermine the war’s ultimate goal.

    We see, then, that the alignment problem has long predated the computer revolution and that the difficulties encountered by builders of present-day information empires are not unlike those that bedeviled previous would-be conquerors. Nevertheless, computers do change the nature of the alignment problem in important ways. No matter how difficult it used to be to ensure that human bureaucrats and soldiers remain aligned with society’s long-term goals, it is going to be even harder to ensure the alignment of algorithmic bureaucrats and autonomous weapon systems.

    THE PAPER-CLIP NAPOLEON

    One reason why the alignment problem is particularly dangerous in the context of the computer network is that this network is likely to become far more powerful than any previous human bureaucracy. A misalignment in the goals of superintelligent computers might result in a catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude. In his 2014 book, Superintelligence, the philosopher Nick Bostrom illustrated the danger using a thought experiment, which is reminiscent of Goethe’s “Sorcerer’s Apprentice.” Bostrom asks us to imagine that a paper-clip factory buys a superintelligent computer and that the factory’s human manager gives the computer a seemingly simple task: produce as many paper clips as possible. In pursuit of this goal, the paper-clip computer conquers the whole of planet Earth, kills all the humans, sends expeditions to take over additional planets, and uses the enormous resources it acquires to fill the entire galaxy with paper-clip factories.

    The point of the thought experiment is that the computer did exactly what it was told (just like the enchanted broomstick in Goethe’s poem). Realizing that it needed electricity, steel, land, and other resources to build more factories and produce more paper clips, and realizing that humans are unlikely to give up these resources, the superintelligent computer eliminated all humans in its single-minded pursuit of its given goal.26 Bostrom’s point was that the problem with computers isn’t that they are particularly evil but that they are particularly powerful. And the more powerful the computer, the more careful we need to be about defining its goal in a way that precisely aligns with our ultimate goals. If we define a misaligned goal to a pocket calculator, the consequences are trivial. But if we define a misaligned goal to a superintelligent machine, the consequences could be dystopian.

    The paper-clip thought experiment may sound outlandish and utterly disconnected from reality. But if Silicon Valley managers had paid attention when Bostrom published it in 2014, perhaps they would have been more careful before instructing their algorithms to “maximize user engagement.” The Facebook and YouTube algorithms behaved exactly like Bostrom’s imaginary algorithm. When told to maximize paper-clip production, the algorithm sought to convert the entire physical universe into paper clips, even if it meant destroying human civilization. When told to maximize user engagement, the Facebook and YouTube algorithms sought to convert the entire social universe into user engagement, even if it meant doing harm to the social fabric of Myanmar, Brazil, and many other countries.

    Bostrom’s thought experiment highlights a second reason why the alignment problem is more urgent in the case of computers. Because they are inorganic entities, they are likely to adopt strategies that would never occur to any human and that we are therefore ill-equipped to foresee and forestall. Here’s one example: In 2016, Dario Amodei was working on a project called Universe, trying to develop a general-purpose AI that could play hundreds of different computer games. The AI competed well in various car races, so Amodei next tried it on a boat race. Inexplicably, the AI steered its boat right into a harbor and then sailed in endless circles in and out of the harbor.

    It took Amodei considerable time to understand what went wrong. The problem occurred because initially Amodei wasn’t sure how to tell the AI that its goal was to “win the race.” “Winning” is an unclear concept to an algorithm. Translating “win the race” into computer language would have required Amodei to formalize complex concepts like track position and placement among the other boats in the race. So instead, Amodei took the easy way and told the boat to maximize its score. He assumed that the score was a good proxy for winning the race. After all, it worked with the car races.

    But the boat race had a peculiar feature, absent from the car races, that allowed the ingenious AI to find a loophole in the game’s rules. The game rewarded players with a lot of points for getting ahead of other boats—as in the car races—but it also rewarded them with a few points whenever they replenished their power by docking into a harbor. The AI discovered that if instead of trying to outsail the other boats, it simply went in circles in and out of the harbor, it could accumulate more points far faster. Apparently, none of the game’s human developers—nor Dario Amodei—noticed this loophole. The AI was doing exactly what the game was rewarding it to do—even though it is not what the humans were hoping for. That’s the essence of the alignment problem: rewarding A while hoping for B.27 If we want computers to maximize social benefits, it’s a bad idea to reward them for maximizing user engagement.

    A third reason to worry about the alignment problem of computers is that because they are so different from us, when we make the mistake of giving them a misaligned goal, they are less likely to notice it or request clarification. If the boat-race AI had been a human gamer, it would have realized that the loophole it found in the game’s rules probably doesn’t really count as “winning.” If the paper-clip AI had been a human bureaucrat, it would have realized that destroying humanity in order to produce paper clips is probably not what was intended. But since computers aren’t humans, we cannot rely on them to notice and flag possible misalignments. In the 2010s the YouTube and Facebook management teams were bombarded with warnings from their human employees—as well as from outside observers—about the harm being done by the algorithms, but the algorithms themselves never raised the alarm.28

    As we give algorithms greater and greater power over health care, education, law enforcement, and numerous other fields, the alignment problem will loom ever larger. If we don’t find ways to solve it, the consequences will be far worse than algorithms racking up points by sailing boats in circles.

    THE CORSICAN CONNECTION

    How to solve the alignment problem? In theory, when humans create a computer network, they must define for it an ultimate goal, which the computers are never allowed to change or ignore. Then, even if computers become so powerful that we lose control over them, we can rest assured that their immense power will benefit rather than harm us. Unless, of course, it turned out that we defined a harmful or vague goal. And there’s the rub. In the case of human networks, we rely on self-correcting mechanisms to periodically review and revise our goals, so setting the wrong goal is not the end of the world. But since the computer network might escape our control, if we set it the wrong goal, we might discover our mistake when we are no longer able to correct it. Some might hope that through a careful process of deliberation, we might be able to define in advance the right goals for the computer network. This, however, is a very dangerous delusion.

    To understand why it is impossible to agree in advance on the ultimate goals of the computer network, let’s revisit Clausewitz’s war theory. There is one fatal flaw in the way he equates rationality with alignment. While Clausewitzian theory demands that all actions be aligned with the ultimate goal, it offers no rational way to define such a goal. Consider Napoleon’s life and military career. What should have been his ultimate goal? Given the prevailing cultural atmosphere of France circa 1800, we can think of several alternatives for “ultimate goal” that might have occurred to Napoleon:

    POTENTIAL GOAL NUMBER 1: Making France the dominant power in Europe, secure against any future attack by Britain, the Habsburg Empire, Russia, a unified Germany, or a unified Italy.

    POTENTIAL GOAL NUMBER 2: Creating a new multiethnic empire ruled by Napoleon’s family, which would include not only France but also many additional territories both in Europe and overseas.

    POTENTIAL GOAL NUMBER 3: Achieving everlasting glory for himself personally, so that even centuries after his death billions of people will know the name Napoleon and admire his genius.

    POTENTIAL GOAL NUMBER 4: Securing the redemption of his everlasting soul, and gaining entry to heaven after his death.

    POTENTIAL GOAL NUMBER 5: Spreading the universal ideals of the French Revolution, and helping to protect freedom, equality, and human rights throughout Europe and the world.

    Many self-styled rationalists tend to argue that Napoleon should have made it his life’s mission to achieve the first goal—securing French domination in Europe. But why? Remember that for Clausewitz rationality means alignment. A tactical maneuver is rational if, and only if, it is aligned with some higher strategic goal, which should in turn be aligned with an even higher political goal. But where does this chain of goals ultimately start? How can we determine the ultimate goal that justifies all the strategic subgoals and tactical steps derived from it? Such an ultimate goal by definition cannot be aligned with anything higher than itself, because there is nothing higher. What then makes it rational to place France at the top of the goal hierarchy, rather than Napoleon’s family, Napoleon’s fame, Napoleon’s soul, or universal human rights? Clausewitz provides no answer.

    One might argue that goal number 4—securing the redemption of his everlasting soul—cannot be a serious candidate for an ultimate rational goal, because it is based on a belief in mythology. But the same argument can be leveled at all the other goals. Everlasting souls are an intersubjective invention that exist only in people’s minds, and exactly the same is true of nations and human rights. Why should Napoleon care about the mythical France any more than about his mythical soul?

    Indeed, for most of his youth, Napoleon didn’t even consider himself French. He was born Napoleone di Buonaparte on Corsica, to a family of Italian emigrants. For five hundred years Corsica was ruled by the Italian city-state of Genoa, where many of Napoleone’s ancestors lived. It was only in 1768—a year before Napoleone’s birth—that Genoa ceded the island to France. Corsican nationalists resisted being handed over to France and rose in rebellion. Only after their defeat in 1770 did Corsica formally become a French province. Many Corsicans continued to resent the French takeover, but the di Buonaparte family swore allegiance to the French king and sent Napoleone to military school in mainland France.29

    At school, Napoleone had to endure a good deal of hazing from his classmates for his Corsican nationalism and his poor command of the French language.30 His mother tongues were Corsican and Italian, and although he gradually became fluent in French, he retained throughout his life a Corsican accent and an inability to spell French correctly.31 Napoleone eventually enlisted in the French army, but when the Revolution broke out in 1789, he went back to Corsica, hoping the revolution would provide an opportunity for his beloved island to achieve greater autonomy. Only after he fell out with the leader of the Corsican independence movement—Pasquale Paoli—did Napoleone abandon the Corsican cause in May 1793. He returned to the mainland, where he decided to build his future.32 It was at this stage that Napoleone di Buonaparte turned into Napoléon Bonaparte (he continued to use the Italian version of his name until 1796).33

    Why then was it rational for Napoleon to devote his military career to making France the dominant power in Europe? Was it perhaps more rational for him to stay in Corsica, patch up his personal disagreements with Paoli, and devote himself to liberating his native island from its French conquerors? And maybe Napoleon should in fact have made it his life’s mission to unite Italy—the land of his ancestors?

    Clausewitz offers no method to answer these questions rationally. If our only rule of thumb is “every action must be aligned with some higher goal,” by definition there is no rational way to define that ultimate goal. How then can we provide a computer network with an ultimate goal it must never ignore or subvert? Tech executives and engineers who rush to develop AI are making a huge mistake if they think there is a rational way to tell that AI what its ultimate goal should be. They should learn from the bitter experiences of generations of philosophers who tried to define ultimate goals and failed.

    THE KANTIAN NAZI

    For millennia, philosophers have been looking for a definition of an ultimate goal that will not depend on an alignment to some higher goal. They have repeatedly been drawn to two potential solutions, known in philosophical jargon as deontology and utilitarianism. Deontologists (from the Greek word deon, meaning “duty”) believe that there are some universal moral duties, or moral rules, that apply to everyone. These rules do not rely on alignment to a higher goal, but rather on their intrinsic goodness. If such rules indeed exist, and if we can find a way to program them into computers, then we can make sure the computer network will be a force for good.

    But what exactly does “intrinsic goodness” mean? The most famous attempt to define an intrinsically good rule was made by Immanuel Kant, a contemporary of Clausewitz and Napoleon. Kant argued that an intrinsically good rule is any rule that I would like to make universal. According to this view, a person about to murder someone should stop and go through the following thought process: “I am now going to murder a human. Would I like to establish a universal rule saying that it is okay to murder humans? If such a universal rule is established, then someone might murder me. So there shouldn’t be a universal rule allowing murder. It follows that I too shouldn’t murder.” In simpler language, Kant reformulated the old Golden Rule: “Do unto others what you want them to do to you” (Matthew 7:12).

    This sounds like a simple and obvious idea: each of us should behave in a way we want everyone to behave. But ideas that sound good in the ethereal realm of philosophy often have trouble immigrating to the harsh land of history. The key question historians would ask Kant is, when you talk about universal rules, how exactly do you define “universal”? Under actual historical circumstances, when a person is about to commit murder, the first step they often take is to exclude the victim from the universal community of humanity.34 This, for example, is what anti-Rohingya extremists like Wirathu did. As a Buddhist monk, Wirathu was certainly against murdering humans. But he didn’t think this universal rule applied to killing Rohingya, who were seen as subhuman. In posts and interviews, he repeatedly compared them to beasts, snakes, mad dogs, wolves, jackals, and other dangerous animals.35 On October 30, 2017, at the height of the anti-Rohingya violence, another, more senior Buddhist monk preached a sermon to military officers in which he justified violence against the Rohingya by telling the officers that non-Buddhists were “not fully human.”36

    As a thought experiment, imagine a meeting between Immanuel Kant and Adolf Eichmann—who, by the way, considered himself a Kantian.37 As Eichmann signs an order sending another trainload of Jews to Auschwitz, Kant tells him, “You are about to murder thousands of humans. Would you like to establish a universal rule saying it is okay to murder humans? If you do that, you and your family might also be murdered.” Eichmann replies, “No, I am not about to murder thousands of humans. I am about to murder thousands of Jews. If you ask me whether I would like to establish a universal rule saying it is okay to murder Jews, then I am all for it. As for myself and my family, there is no risk that this universal rule would lead to us being murdered. We aren’t Jews.”

    One potential Kantian reply to Eichmann is that when we define entities, we must always use the most universal definition applicable. If an entity can be defined as either “a Jew” or “a human,” we should use the more universal term “human.” However, the whole point of Nazi ideology was to deny the humanity of Jews. In addition, note that Jews are not just humans. They are also animals, and they are also organisms. Since animals and organisms are obviously more universal categories than “human,” if you follow the Kantian argument to its logical conclusion, it might push us to adopt an extreme vegan position. Since we are organisms, does it mean we should object to the killing of any organism, down even to tomatoes or amoebas?

    In history, many if not most conflicts concern the definition of identities. Everybody accepts that murder is wrong, but thinks that only killing members of the in-group qualifies as “murder,” whereas killing someone from an out-group is not. But the in-groups and out-groups are intersubjective entities, whose definition usually depends on some mythology. Deontologists who pursue universal rational rules often end up the captives of local myths.

    This problem with deontology is especially critical if we try to dictate universal deontologist rules not to humans but to computers. Computers aren’t even organic. So if they follow a rule of “Do unto others what you want them to do to you,” why should they be concerned about killing organisms like humans? A Kantian computer that doesn’t want to be killed has no reason to object to a universal rule saying “it is okay to kill organisms”; such a rule does not endanger the nonorganic computer.

    Alternatively, being inorganic entities, computers may have no qualms about dying. As far as we can tell, death is an organic phenomenon and may be inapplicable to inorganic entities. When ancient Assyrians talked about “killing” documents, that was just a metaphor. If computers are more like documents than like organisms, and don’t care about “being killed,” would we like a Kantian computer to conclude that killing humans is therefore fine?

    Is there a way to define whom computers should care about, without getting bogged down by some intersubjective myth? The most obvious suggestion is to tell computers that they must care about any entity capable of suffering. While suffering is often caused by belief in local intersubjective myths, suffering itself is nonetheless a universal reality. Therefore, using the capacity to suffer in order to define the critical in-group grounds morality in an objective and universal reality. A self-driving car should avoid killing all humans—whether Buddhist or Muslim, French or Italian—and should also avoid killing dogs and cats, and any sentient robots that might one day exist. We may even refine this rule, instructing the car to care about different beings in direct proportion to their capacity to suffer. If the car has to choose between killing a human and killing a cat, it should drive over the cat, because presumably the cat has a lesser capacity to suffer. But if we go in that direction, we inadvertently desert the deontologist camp and find ourselves in the camp of their rivals—the utilitarians.

    THE CALCULUS OF SUFFERING

    Whereas deontologists struggle to find universal rules that are intrinsically good, utilitarians judge actions by their impact on suffering and happiness. The English philosopher Jeremy Bentham—another contemporary of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Kant—said that the only rational ultimate goal is to minimize suffering in the world and maximize happiness. If our main fear about computer networks is that their misaligned goals might inflict terrible suffering on humans and perhaps on other sentient beings, then the utilitarian solution seems both obvious and attractive. When creating the computer network, we just need to instruct it to minimize suffering and maximize happiness. If Facebook had told its algorithms “maximize happiness” instead of “maximize user engagement,” all would allegedly have been well. It is worth noting that this utilitarian approach is indeed popular in Silicon Valley, championed in particular by the effective altruism movement.38

    Unfortunately, as with the deontologist solution, what sounds simple in the theoretical realm of philosophy becomes fiendishly complex in the practical land of history. The problem for utilitarians is that we don’t possess a calculus of suffering. We don’t know how many “suffering points” or “happiness points” to assign to particular events, so in complex historical situations it is extremely difficult to calculate whether a given action increases or decreases the overall amount of suffering in the world.

    Utilitarianism is at its best in situations when the scales of suffering are very clearly tipped in one direction. When confronted by Eichmann, utilitarians don’t need to get into any complicated debates about identity. They just need to point out that the Holocaust caused immense suffering to the Jews, without providing equivalent benefits to anyone else, including the Germans. There was no compelling military or economic need for the Germans to murder millions of Jews. The utilitarian case against the Holocaust is overwhelming.

    Utilitarians also have a field day when dealing with “victimless crimes” like homosexuality, in which all the suffering is on one side only. For centuries, the persecution of gay people caused them immense suffering, but it was nevertheless justified by various prejudices that were erroneously presented as deontological universal rules. Kant, for example, condemned homosexuality on the grounds that it is “contrary to natural instinct and to animal nature” and that it therefore degrades a person “below the level of the animals.” Kant further fulminated that because such acts are contrary to nature, they “make man unworthy of his humanity. He no longer deserves to be a person.”39 Kant, in fact, repackaged a Christian prejudice as a supposedly universal deontological rule, without providing empirical proof that homosexuality is indeed contrary to nature. In light of the above discussion of dehumanization as a prelude to massacre, it is also noteworthy how Kant dehumanized gay people. The view that homosexuality is contrary to nature and deprives people of their humanity paved the way for Nazis like Eichmann to justify murdering homosexuals in concentration camps. Since homosexuals were allegedly below the level of animals, the Kantian rule against murdering humans didn’t apply to them.40

    Utilitarians find it easy to dismiss Kant’s sexual theories, and Bentham indeed was one of the first modern European thinkers who favored the decriminalization of homosexuality.41 Utilitarians argue that criminalizing homosexuality in the name of some dubious universal rule causes tremendous suffering to millions of people, without offering any substantial benefits to others. When two men form a loving relationship, this makes them happy, without making anyone else miserable. Why then forbid it? This type of utilitarian logic also led to many other modern reforms, such as the ban on torture and the introduction of some legal protections for animals.

    But in historical situations when the scales of suffering are more evenly matched, utilitarianism falters. In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments all over the world adopted strict policies of social isolation and lockdown. This probably saved the lives of several million people.42 It also made hundreds of millions miserable for months. Moreover, it might have indirectly caused numerous deaths, for example by increasing the incidence of murderous domestic violence,43 or by making it more difficult for people to diagnose and treat other dangerous illnesses, like cancer.44 Can anyone calculate the total impact of the lockdown policies and determine whether they increased or decreased the suffering in the world?

    This may sound like a perfect task for a relentless computer network. But how would the computer network decide how many “misery points” to allocate to being locked down with three kids in a two-bedroom apartment for a month? Is that 60 misery points or 600? And how many points to allot to a cancer patient who died because she missed her chemotherapy treatments? Is that 60,000 misery points or 600,000? And what if she would have died of cancer anyway, and the chemo would merely have extended her life by five agonizing months? Should the computers value five months of living with extreme pain as a net gain or a net loss for the sum total of suffering in the world?

    And how would the computer network evaluate the suffering caused by less tangible things, such as the knowledge of our own mortality? If a religious myth promises us that we will never really die, because after death our eternal soul will go to heaven, does that make us truly happy or just delusional? Is death the deep cause of our misery, or does our misery stem from our attempts to deny death? If someone loses their religious faith and comes to terms with their mortality, should the computer network see this as a net loss or a net gain?

    What about even more complicated historical events like the American invasion of Iraq? The Americans were well aware that their invasion would cause tremendous suffering for millions of people. But in the long run, they argued, the benefits of bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq would outweigh the costs. Can the computer network calculate whether this argument was sound? Even if it was theoretically plausible, in practice the Americans failed to establish a stable democracy in Iraq. Does that mean that their attempt was wrong in the first place?

    Just as deontologists trying to answer the question of identity are pushed to adopt utilitarian ideas, so utilitarians stymied by the lack of a suffering calculus often end up adopting a deontologist position. They uphold general rules like “avoid wars of aggression” or “protect human rights,” even though they cannot show that following these rules always reduces the sum total of suffering in the world. History provides them only with a vague impression that following these rules tends to reduce suffering. And when some of these general rules clash—for example, when contemplating launching a war of aggression in order to protect human rights—utilitarianism doesn’t offer much practical help. Not even the most powerful computer network can perform the necessary calculations.

    Accordingly, while utilitarianism promises a rational—and even mathematical—way to align every action with “the ultimate good,” in practice it may well produce just another mythology. Communist true believers confronted by the horrors of Stalinism often replied that the happiness that future generations would experience under “real socialism” would redeem any short-term misery in the gulags. Libertarians, when asked about the immediate social harms of unrestricted free speech or the total abolition of taxes, express a similar faith that future benefits will outweigh any short-term damage. The danger of utilitarianism is that if you have a strong enough belief in a future utopia, it can become an open license to inflict terrible suffering in the present. Indeed, this is a trick traditional religions discovered thousands of years ago. The crimes of this world could too easily be excused by the promises of future salvation.

    COMPUTER MYTHOLOGY

    How then did bureaucratic systems throughout history set their ultimate goals? They relied on mythology to do it for them. No matter how rational were the officials, engineers, tax collectors, and accountants, they were ultimately in the service of this or that mythmaker. To paraphrase John Maynard Keynes, practical people, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any religious influence, are usually the slaves of some mythmaker. Even nuclear physicists have found themselves obeying the commands of Shiite ayatollahs and communist apparatchiks.

    The alignment problem turns out to be, at heart, a problem of mythology. Nazi administrators could have been committed deontologists or utilitarians, but they would still have murdered millions so long as they understood the world in terms of a racist mythology. If you start with the mythological belief that Jews are demonic monsters bent on destroying humanity, then both deontologists and utilitarians can find many logical arguments why the Jews should be killed.

    An analogous problem might well afflict computers. Of course, they cannot “believe” in any mythology, because they are nonconscious entities that don’t believe in anything. As long as they lack subjectivity, how can they hold intersubjective beliefs? However, one of the most important things to realize about computers is that when a lot of computers communicate with one another, they can create inter-computer realities, analogous to the intersubjective realities produced by networks of humans. These inter-computer realities may eventually become as powerful—and as dangerous—as human-made intersubjective myths.

    This is a very complicated argument, but it is another of the central arguments of the book, so let’s go over it carefully. First, let’s try to understand what inter-computer realities are. As an initial example, consider a one-player computer game. In such a game, you can wander inside a virtual landscape that exists as information within one computer. If you see a rock, that rock is not made of atoms. It is made of bits inside a single computer. When several computers are linked to one another, they can create inter-computer realities. Several players using different computers can wander together inside a common virtual landscape. If they see a rock, that rock is made of bits in several computers.45

    Just as intersubjective realities like money and gods can influence the physical reality outside people’s minds, so inter-computer realities can influence reality outside the computers. In 2016 the game Pokémon Go took the world by storm and was downloaded hundreds of millions of times by the end of the year.46 Pokémon Go is an augmented reality mobile game. Players can use their smartphones to locate, fight, and capture virtual creatures called Pokémon, which seem to exist in the physical world. I once went with my nephew Matan on such a Pokémon hunt. Walking around his neighborhood, I saw only houses, trees, rocks, cars, people, cats, dogs, and pigeons. I didn’t see any Pokémon, because I didn’t have a smartphone. But Matan, looking around through his smartphone lens, could “see” Pokémon standing on a rock or hiding behind a tree.

    Though I couldn’t see the creatures, they were obviously not confined to Matan’s smartphone, because other people could “see” them too. For example, we encountered two other kids who were hunting the same Pokémon. If Matan managed to capture a Pokémon, the other kids could immediately observe what happened. The Pokémon were inter-computer entities. They existed as bits in a computer network rather than as atoms in the physical world, but they could nevertheless interact with the physical world and influence it, as it were, in various ways.

    Now let’s examine a more consequential example of inter-computer realities. Consider the rank that a website gets in a Google search. When we google for news, flight tickets, or restaurant recommendations, one website appears at the top of the first Google page, whereas another is relegated to the middle of the fiftieth page. What exactly is this Google rank, and how is it determined? The Google algorithm determines the website’s Google rank by assigning points to various parameters, such as how many people visit the website and how many other websites link to it. The rank itself is an inter-computer reality, existing in a network connecting billions of computers—the internet. Like Pokémon, this inter-computer reality spills over into the physical world. For a news outlet, a travel agency, or a restaurant it matters a great deal whether its website appears at the top of the first Google page or in the middle of the fiftieth page.47

    Since the Google rank is so important, people use all kinds of tricks to manipulate the Google algorithm to give their website a higher rank. For example, they may use bots to generate more traffic to the website.48 This is a widespread phenomenon in social media too, where coordinated bot armies are constantly manipulating the algorithms of YouTube, Facebook, or Twitter. If a tweet goes viral, is it because humans are really interested in it, or because thousands of bots managed to fool the Twitter algorithm?49

    Inter-computer realities like Pokémon and Google ranks are analogous to intersubjective realities like the sanctity that humans ascribe to temples and cities. I lived much of my life in one of the holiest places on earth—the city of Jerusalem. Objectively, it is an ordinary place. As you walk around Jerusalem, you see houses, trees, rocks, cars, people, cats, dogs, and pigeons, as in any other city. But many people nevertheless imagine it to be an extraordinary place, full of gods, angels, and holy stones. They believe in this so strongly that they sometimes fight over possession of the city or of specific holy buildings and sacred stones, most notably the Holy Rock, located under the Dome of the Rock on Temple Mount. The Palestinian philosopher Sari Nusseibeh observed that “Jews and Muslims, acting on religious beliefs and backed up by nuclear capabilities, are poised to engage in history’s worst-ever massacre of human beings, over a rock.”50 They don’t fight over the atoms that compose the rock; they fight over its “sanctity,” a bit like kids fighting over a Pokémon. The sanctity of the Holy Rock, and of Jerusalem generally, is an intersubjective phenomenon that exists in the communication network connecting many human minds. For thousands of years wars were fought over intersubjective entities like holy rocks. In the twenty-first century, we might see wars fought over inter-computer entities.

    If this sounds like science fiction, consider potential developments in the financial system. As computers become more intelligent and more creative, they are likely to create new inter-computer financial devices. Gold coins and dollars are intersubjective entities. Cryptocurrencies like bitcoin are midway between intersubective and inter-computer. The idea behind them was invented by humans, and their value still depends on human beliefs, but they cannot exist outside the computer network. In addition, they are increasingly traded by algorithms so that their value depends on the calculations of algorithms and not just on human beliefs.

    What if in ten or fifty years computers create a new kind of cryptocurrency or some other financial device that becomes a vital tool for trading and investing—and a potential source for political crises and conflicts? Recall that the 2007–8 global financial crisis was instigated by collateralized debt obligations. These financial devices were invented by a handful of mathematicians and investment whiz kids and were almost unintelligible for most humans, including regulators. This led to an oversight failure and to a global catastrophe.51 Computers may well create financial devices that will be orders of magnitude more complex than CDOs and that will be intelligible only to other computers. The result could be a financial and political crisis even worse than that of 2007–8.

    Throughout history, economics and politics required that we understand the intersubjective realities invented by people—like religions, nations, and currencies. Someone who wanted to understand American politics had to take into account intersubjective realities like Christianity and CDOs. Increasingly, however, understanding American politics will necessitate understanding inter-computer realities ranging from AI-generated cults and currencies to AI-run political parties and even fully incorporated AIs. The U.S. legal system already recognizes corporations as legal persons that possess rights such as freedom of speech. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) the U.S. Supreme Court decided that this even protected the right of corporations to make political donations.52 What would stop AIs from being incorporated and recognized as legal persons with freedom of speech, then lobbying and making political donations to protect and expand AI rights?

    For tens of thousands of years, humans dominated planet Earth because we were the only ones capable of creating and sustaining intersubjective entities like corporations, currencies, gods, and nations, and using such entities to organize large-scale cooperation. Now computers may acquire comparable abilities.

    This isn’t necessarily bad news. If computers lacked connectivity and creativity, they would not be very useful. We increasingly rely on computers to manage our money, drive our vehicles, reduce pollution, and discover new medicines, precisely because computers can directly communicate with one another, spot patterns where we can’t, and construct models that might never occur to us. The problem we face is not how to deprive computers of all creative agency, but rather how to steer their creativity in the right direction. It is the same problem we have always had with human creativity. The intersubjective entities invented by humans were the basis for all the achievements of human civilization, but they occasionally led to crusades, jihads, and witch hunts. The inter-computer entities will probably be the basis for future civilizations, but the fact that computers collect empirical data and use mathematics to analyze it doesn’t mean they cannot launch their own witch hunts.

    THE NEW WITCHES

    In early modern Europe, an elaborate information network analyzed a huge amount of data about crimes, illnesses, and disasters and reached the conclusion that it was all the fault of witches. The more data the witch-hunters gathered, the more convinced they became that the world was full of demons and sorcery and that there was a global satanic conspiracy to destroy humanity. The information network then went on to identify the witches and imprison or kill them. We now know that witches were a bogus intersubjective category, invented by the information network itself and then imposed on people who had never actually met Satan and couldn’t summon hailstorms.

    In the Soviet Union, an even more elaborate information network invented the kulaks—another mythic category that was imposed on millions. The mountains of information collected by Soviet bureaucracy about the kulaks weren’t an objective truth, but they created a new intersubjective truth. Knowing that someone was a kulak became one of the most important things to know about a Soviet person, even though the category was fictitious.

    On an even larger scale, from the sixteenth to the twentieth century, numerous colonial bureaucracies in the Americas, from Brazil through Mexico and the Caribbean to the United States, created a racist mythology and came up with all kinds of intersubjective racial categories. Humans were divided into Europeans, Africans, and Native Americans, and since interracial sexual relations were common, additional categories were invented. In many Spanish colonies the laws differentiated between mestizos, people with mixed Spanish and Native American ancestry; mulatos, people with mixed Spanish and African ancestry; zambos, people with mixed African and Native American ancestry; and pardos, people with mixed Spanish, African, and Native American ancestry. All these seemingly empirical categories determined whether people could be enslaved, enjoy political rights, bear arms, hold public offices, be admitted to school, practice certain professions, live in particular neighborhoods, and be allowed to have sex and get married to each other. Allegedly, by placing a person in a particular racial drawer, one could define their personality, intellectual abilities, and ethical inclinations.53

    By the nineteenth century racism pretended to be an exact science: it claimed to differentiate between people on the basis of objective biological facts, and to rely on scientific tools such as measuring skulls and recording crime statistics. But the cloud of numbers and categories was just a smoke screen for absurd intersubjective myths. The fact that somebody had a Native American grandmother or an African father didn’t, of course, reveal anything about their intelligence, kindness, or honesty. These bogus categories didn’t discover or describe any truth about humans; they imposed an oppressive, mythological order on them.

    As computers replace humans in more and more bureaucracies, from tax collection and health care to security and justice, they too may create a mythology and impose it on us with unprecedented efficiency. In a world ruled by paper documents, bureaucrats had difficulty policing racial borderlines or tracking everyone’s exact ancestry. People could get false documents. A zambo could move to another town and pretend to be a pardo. A Black person could sometimes pass as white. Similarly in the Soviet Union, kulak children occasionally managed to falsify their papers to get a good job or a place in college. In Nazi Europe, Jews could sometimes adopt an Aryan identity. But it would be much harder to game the system in a world ruled by computers that can read irises and DNA rather than paper documents. Computers could be frighteningly efficient in imposing false labels on people and making sure that the labels stick.

    For example, social credit systems could create a new underclass of “low-credit people.” Such a system may claim to merely “discover” the truth through an empirical and mathematical process of aggregating points to form an overall score. But how exactly would it define pro-social and antisocial behaviors? What happens if such a system detracts points for criticizing government policies, for reading foreign literature, for practicing a minority religion, for having no religion, or for socializing with other low-credit people? As a thought experiment, consider what might happen when the new technology of the social credit system meets traditional religions.

    Religions like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have always imagined that somewhere above the clouds there is an all-seeing eye that gives or deducts points for everything we do and that our eternal fate depends on the score we accumulate. Of course, nobody could be certain of their score. You could know for sure only after you died. In practical terms, this meant that sinfulness and sainthood were intersubjective phenomena whose very definition depended on public opinion. What might happen if the Iranian regime, for example, decides to use its computer-based surveillance system not only to enforce its strict hijab laws, but to turn sinfulness and sainthood into precise inter-computer phenomena? You didn’t wear a hijab on the street—that’s -10 points. You ate on Ramadan before sunset—another 20 points deducted. You went to Friday prayer at the mosque, +5 points. You made the pilgrimage to Mecca, +500 points. The system might then aggregate all the points and divide people into “sinners” (under 0 points), “believers” (0 to 1,000 points), and “saints” (above 1,000 points). Whether someone is a sinner or a saint will depend on algorithmic calculations, not human belief. Would such a system discover the truth about people or impose order on people?

    Analogous problems may afflict all social credit systems and total surveillance regimes. Whenever they claim to use all-encompassing databases and ultraprecise mathematics to discover sinners, terrorists, criminals, antisocial or untrustworthy people, they might actually be imposing baseless religious and ideological prejudices with unprecedented efficiency.

    COMPUTER BIAS

    Some people may hope to overcome the problem of religious and ideological biases by giving even more power to the computers. The argument for doing so might go something like this: racism, misogyny, homophobia, antisemitism, and all other biases originate not in computers but in the psychological conditions and mythological beliefs of human beings. Computers are mathematical beings that don’t have a psychology or a mythology. So if we could take the humans completely out of the equation, the algorithms could finally decide things on the basis of pure math, free from all psychological distortions or mythological prejudices.

    Unfortunately, numerous studies have revealed that computers often have deep-seated biases of their own. While they are not biological entities, and while they lack consciousness, they do have something akin to a digital psyche and even a kind of inter-computer mythology. They may well be racist, misogynist, homophobic, or antisemitic.54 For example, on March 23, 2016, Microsoft released the AI chatbot Tay, giving it free access to Twitter. Within hours, Tay began posting misogynist and antisemitic twits, such as “I fucking hate feminists and they should all die and burn in hell” and “Hitler was right I hate the Jews.” The vitriol increased until horrified Microsoft engineers shut Tay down—a mere sixteen hours after its release.55

    More subtle but widespread racism was discovered in 2017 by the MIT professor Joy Buolamwini in commercial face-classification algorithms. She showed that these algorithms were very accurate in identifying white males, but extremely inaccurate in identifying Black females. For example, the IBM algorithm erred only 0.3 percent of the time in identifying the gender of light-skinned males, but 34.7 percent of the time when trying to identify the gender of dark-skinned females. As a qualitative test, Buolamwini asked the algorithms to categorize photos of the female African American activist Sojourner Truth, famous for her 1851 speech “Ain’t I a Woman?” The algorithms identified Truth as a man.56

    When Buolamwini—who is a Ghanaian American woman—tested another facial-analysis algorithm to identify herself, the algorithm couldn’t “see” her dark-skinned face at all. In this context, “seeing” means the ability to acknowledge the presence of a human face, a feature used by phone cameras, for example, to decide where to focus. The algorithm easily saw light-skinned faces, but not Buolamwini’s. Only when Buolamwini put on a white mask did the algorithm recognize that it was observing a human face.57

    What’s going on here? One answer might be that racist and misogynist engineers have coded these algorithms to discriminate against Black women. While we cannot rule out the possibility that such things happen, it was not the answer in the case of the face-classification algorithms or of Microsoft’s Tay. In fact, these algorithms picked up the racist and misogynist bias all by themselves from the data they were trained on.

    To understand how this could happen, we need to explain something about the history of algorithms. Originally, algorithms could not learn much by themselves. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s chess-playing algorithms were taught almost everything they knew by their human programmers. The humans coded into the algorithm not only the basic rules of chess but also how to evaluate different positions and moves on the board. For example, humans coded a rule that sacrificing a queen in exchange for a pawn is usually a bad idea. These early algorithms managed to defeat human chess masters only because the algorithms could calculate many more moves and evaluate many more positions than a human could. But the algorithms’ abilities remained limited. Since they relied on humans to tell them all the secrets of the game, if the human coders didn’t know something, the algorithms they produced were also unlikely to know it.58

    As the field of machine learning developed, algorithms gained more independence. The fundamental principle of machine learning is that algorithms can teach themselves new things by interacting with the world, just as humans do, thereby producing a fully fledged artificial intelligence. The terminology is not always consistent, but generally speaking, for something to be acknowledged as an AI, it needs the capacity to learn new things by itself, rather than just follow the instructions of its original human creators. Present-day chess-playing AI is taught nothing except the basic rules of the game. It learns everything else by itself, either by analyzing databases of prior games or by playing new games and learning from experience.59 AI is not a dumb automaton that repeats the same movements again and again irrespective of the results. Rather, it is equipped with strong self-correcting mechanisms, which allow it to learn from its own mistakes.

    This means that AI begins its life as a “baby algorithm” that has a lot of potential and computing power but doesn’t actually know much. The AI’s human parents give it only the capacity to learn and access to a world of data. They then let the baby algorithm explore the world. Like organic newborns, baby algorithms learn by spotting patterns in the data to which they have access. If I touch fire, it hurts. If I cry, mum comes. If I sacrifice a queen for a pawn, I probably lose the game. By finding patterns in the data, the baby algorithm learns more, including many things that its human parents don’t know.60

    Yet databases come with biases. The face-classification algorithms studied by Joy Buolamwini were trained on data sets of tagged online photos, such as the Labeled Faces in the Wild database. The photos in that database were taken mainly from online news articles. Since white males dominate the news, 78 percent of the photos in the database were of males, and 84 percent were of white people. George W. Bush appeared 530 times—more than twice as many times as all Black women combined.61 Another database prepared by a U.S. government agency was more than 75 percent male, was almost 80 percent light-skinned, and had just 4.4 percent dark-skinned females.62 No wonder the algorithms trained on such data sets were excellent at identifying white men but lousy at identifying Black women. Something similar happened to the chatbot Tay. The Microsoft engineers didn’t build into it any intentional prejudices. But a few hours of exposure to the toxic information swirling in Twitter turned the AI into a raging racist.63

    It gets worse. In order to learn, baby algorithms need one more thing besides access to data. They also need a goal. A human baby learns how to walk because she wants to get somewhere. A lion cub learns to hunt because he wants to eat. Algorithms too must be given a goal in order to learn. In chess, it is easy to define the goal: take the opponent’s king. The AI learns that sacrificing a queen for a pawn is a “mistake,” because it usually prevents the algorithm from reaching its goal. In face recognition, the goal is also easy: identify the person’s gender, age, and name as listed in the original database. If the algorithm guessed that George W. Bush is female, but the database says male, the goal has not been reached, and the algorithm learns from its mistake.

    But if you want to train an algorithm for hiring personnel, for example, how would you define the goal? How would the algorithm know that it made a mistake and hired the “wrong” person? We might tell the baby algorithm that its goal is to hire people who stay in the company for at least a year. Employers obviously don’t want to invest a lot of time and money in training a worker who quits or gets fired after a few months. Having defined the goal in such a way, it is time to go over the data. In chess, the algorithm can produce any amount of new data just by playing against itself. But in the job market, that’s impossible. Nobody can create an entire imaginary world where the baby algorithm can hire and fire imaginary people and learn from that experience. The baby algorithm can train only on an existing database about real-life people. Just as lion cubs learn what a zebra is mainly by spotting patterns in the real-life savanna, so baby algorithms learn what a good employee is by spotting patterns in real-life companies.

    Unfortunately, if real-life companies already suffer from some ingrained bias, the baby algorithm is likely to learn this bias, and even amplify it. For instance, an algorithm looking for patterns of “good employees” in real-life data may conclude that hiring the boss’s nephews is always a good idea, no matter what other qualification they have. For the data clearly indicates that “boss’s nephews” are usually hired when applying for a job, and are rarely fired. The baby algorithm would spot this pattern and become nepotistic. If it is put in charge of an HR department, it will start giving preference to the boss’s nephews.

    Similarly, if companies in a misogynist society prefer to hire men rather than women, an algorithm trained on real-life data is likely to pick up that bias, too. This indeed happened when Amazon tried in 2014–18 to develop an algorithm for screening job applications. Learning from previous successful and unsuccessful applications, the algorithm began to systematically downgrade applications simply for containing the word “women” or coming from graduates of women’s colleges. Since existing data showed that in the past such applications had less chance of succeeding, the algorithm developed a bias against them. The algorithm thought it had simply discovered an objective truth about the world: applicants who graduate from women’s colleges are less qualified. In fact, it just internalized and imposed a misogynist bias. Amazon tried and failed to fix the problem and ultimately scrapped the project.64

    The database on which an AI is trained is a bit like a human’s childhood. Childhood experiences, traumas, and fairy tales stay with us throughout our lives. AIs too have childhood experiences. Algorithms might even infect one another with their biases, just as humans do. Consider a future society in which algorithms are ubiquitous and used not just to screen job applicants but also to recommend to people what to study in college. Suppose that due to a preexisting misogynist bias, 80 percent of jobs in engineering are given to men. In this society, an algorithm that hires new engineers is not only likely to copy this preexisting bias but also to infect the college recommendation algorithms with the same bias. A young woman entering college may be discouraged from studying engineering, because the existing data indicates she is less likely to eventually get a job. What began as a human intersubjective myth that “women aren’t good at engineering” might morph into an inter-computer myth. If we don’t get rid of the bias at the very beginning, computers may well perpetuate and magnify it.65

    But getting rid of algorithmic bias might be as difficult as ridding ourselves of our human biases. Once an algorithm has been trained, it takes a lot of time and effort to “untrain” it. We might decide to just dump the biased algorithm and train an altogether new algorithm on a new set of less biased data. But where on earth can we find a set of totally unbiased data?66

    Many of the algorithmic biases surveyed in this and previous chapters share the same fundamental problem: the computer thinks it has discovered some truth about humans, when in fact it has imposed order on them. A social media algorithm thinks it discovered that humans like outrage, when in fact it is the algorithm itself that conditioned humans to produce and consume more outrage. Such biases result, on the one hand, from the computers discounting the full spectrum of human abilities and, on the other hand, from the computers discounting their own power to influence humans. Even if computers observe that almost all humans behave in a particular way, it doesn’t mean humans are bound to behave like that. Maybe it just means that the computers themselves are rewarding such behavior while punishing and blocking alternatives. For computers to have a more accurate and responsible view of the world, they need to take into account their own power and impact. And for that to happen, the humans who currently engineer computers need to accept that they are not manufacturing new tools. They are unleashing new kinds of independent agents, and potentially even new kinds of gods.

    THE NEW GODS?

    In God, Human, Animal, Machine, the philosopher Meghan O’Gieblyn demonstrates how the way we understand computers is heavily influenced by traditional mythologies. In particular, she stresses the similarities between the omniscient and unfathomable god of Judeo-Christian theology and present-day AIs whose decisions seem to us both infallible and inscrutable.67 This may present humans with a dangerous temptation.

    We saw in chapter 4 that already thousands of years ago humans dreamed about finding an infallible information technology to shield us from human corruption and error. Holy books were an audacious attempt to craft such a technology, but they backfired. Since the book couldn’t interpret itself, a human institution had to be built to interpret the sacred words and adapt them to changing circumstances. Different humans interpreted the holy book in different ways, thereby reopening the door to corruption and error. But in contrast to the holy book, computers can adapt themselves to changing circumstances and also interpret their decisions and ideas for us. Some humans may consequently conclude that the quest for an infallible technology has finally succeeded and that we should treat computers as a holy book that can talk to us and interpret itself, without any need of an intervening human institution.

    This would be an extremely hazardous gamble. When certain interpretations of scriptures have occasionally caused disasters such as witch hunts and wars of religion, humans have always been able to change their beliefs. When the human imagination summoned a belligerent and hate-filled god, we retained the power to rid ourselves of it and imagine a more tolerant deity. But algorithms are independent agents, and they are already taking power away from us. If they cause disaster, simply changing our beliefs about them will not necessarily stop them. And it is highly likely that if computers are entrusted with power, they will indeed cause disasters, for they are fallible.

    When we say that computers are fallible, it means far more than that they make the occasional factual mistake or wrong decision. More important, like the human network before it, the computer network might fail to find the right balance between truth and order. By creating and imposing on us powerful inter-computer myths, the computer network could cause historical calamities that would dwarf the early modern European witch hunts or Stalin’s collectivization.

    Consider a network of billions of interacting computers that accumulates a stupendous amount of information on the world. As they pursue various goals, the networked computers develop a common model of the world that helps them communicate and cooperate. This shared model will probably be full of errors, fictions, and lacunae, and be a mythology rather than a truthful account of the universe. One example is a social credit system that divides humans into bogus categories, determined not by a human rationale like racism but by some unfathomable computer logic. We may come into contact with this mythology every day of our lives, since it would guide the numerous decisions computers make about us. But because this mythical model would be created by inorganic entities in order to coordinate actions with other inorganic entities, it might owe nothing to the old biological dramas and might be totally alien to us.68

    As noted in chapter 2, large-scale societies cannot exist without some mythology, but that doesn’t mean all mythologies are equal. To guard against errors and excesses, some mythologies have acknowledged their own fallible origin and included a self-correcting mechanism allowing humans to question and change the mythology. That’s the model of the U.S. Constitution, for example. But how can humans probe and correct a computer mythology we don’t understand?

    One potential guardrail is to train computers to be aware of their own fallibility. As Socrates taught, being able to say “I don’t know” is an essential step on the path to wisdom. And this is true of computer wisdom no less than of human wisdom. The first lesson that every algorithm should learn is that it might make mistakes. Baby algorithms should learn to doubt themselves, to signal uncertainty, and to obey the precautionary principle. This is not impossible. Engineers are already making considerable headway in encouraging AI to express self-doubt, ask for feedback, and admit its mistakes.69

    Yet no matter how aware algorithms are of their own fallibility, we should keep humans in the loop, too. Given the pace at which AI is developing, it is simply impossible to anticipate how it will evolve and to place guardrails against all future potential hazards. This is a key difference between AI and previous existential threats like nuclear technology. The latter presented humankind with a few easily anticipated doomsday scenarios, most obviously an all-out nuclear war. This meant that it was feasible to conceptualize the danger in advance, and explore ways to mitigate it. In contrast, AI presents us with countless doomsday scenarios. Some are relatively easy to grasp, such as terrorists using AI to produce biological weapons of mass destruction. Some are more difficult to grasp, such as AI creating new psychological weapons of mass destruction. And some may be utterly beyond the human imagination, because they emanate from the calculations of an alien intelligence. To guard against a plethora of unforeseeable problems, our best bet is to create living institutions that can identify and respond to the threats as they arise.70

    Ancient Jews and Christians were disappointed to discover that the Bible couldn’t interpret itself, and reluctantly maintained human institutions to do what the technology couldn’t. In the twenty-first century, we are in an almost opposite situation. We devised a technology that can interpret itself, but precisely for this reason we had better create human institutions to monitor it carefully.
    To conclude, the new computer network will not necessarily be either bad or good. All we know for sure is that it will be alien and it will be fallible. We therefore need to build institutions that will be able to check not just familiar human weaknesses like greed and hatred but also radically alien errors. There is no technological solution to this problem. It is, rather, a political challenge. Do we have the political will to deal with it? Modern humanity has created two main types of political systems: large-scale democracy and large-scale totalitarianism. Part 3 examines how each of these systems may deal with a radically alien and fallible computer network.

    PART III  Computer Politics

    CHAPTER 9 Democracies: Can We Still Hold a Conversation?

    Civilizations are born from the marriage of bureaucracy and mythology. The computer-based network is a new type of bureaucracy, which is far more powerful and relentless than any human-based bureaucracy we’ve seen before. This network is also likely to create inter-computer mythologies, which will be far more complex and alien than any human-made god. The potential benefits of this network are enormous. The potential downside is the destruction of human civilization.

    To some people, warnings about civilizational collapse sound like over-the-top jeremiads. Every time a powerful new technology has emerged, anxieties arose that it might bring about the apocalypse, but we are still here. As the Industrial Revolution unfolded, Luddite doomsday scenarios did not come to pass, and Blake’s “dark Satanic Mills” ended up producing the most affluent societies in history. Most people today enjoy far better living conditions than their ancestors in the eighteenth century. Intelligent machines will prove even more beneficial than any previous machines, promise AI enthusiasts like Marc Andreessen and Ray Kurzweil.1 Humans will enjoy much better health care, education, and other services, and AI will even help save the ecosystem from collapse.

    Unfortunately, a closer look at history reveals that the Luddites were not entirely wrong and that we actually have very good reasons to fear powerful new technologies. Even if in the end the positives of these technologies outweigh their negatives, getting to that happy ending usually involves a lot of trials and tribulations. Novel technology often leads to historical disasters, not because the technology is inherently bad, but because it takes time for humans to learn how to use it wisely.

    The Industrial Revolution is a prime example. When industrial technology began spreading globally in the nineteenth century, it upended traditional economic, social, and political structures and opened the way to create entirely new societies, which were potentially more affluent and peaceful. However, learning how to build benign industrial societies was far from straightforward and involved many costly experiments and hundreds of millions of victims.

    One costly experiment was modern imperialism. The Industrial Revolution originated in Britain in the late eighteenth century. During the nineteenth century industrial technologies and production methods were adopted in other European countries ranging from Belgium to Russia, as well as in the United States and Japan. Imperialist thinkers, politicians, and parties in these industrial heartlands claimed that the only viable industrial society was an empire. The argument was that unlike relatively self-sufficient agrarian societies, the novel industrial societies relied much more on foreign markets and foreign raw materials, and only an empire could satisfy these unprecedented appetites. Imperialists feared that countries that industrialized but failed to conquer any colonies would be shut out from essential raw materials and markets by more ruthless competitors. Some imperialists argued that acquiring colonies was not just essential for the survival of their own state but beneficial for the rest of humanity, too. They claimed empires alone could spread the blessings of the new technologies to the so-called undeveloped world.

    Consequently, industrial countries like Britain and Russia that already had empires greatly expanded them, whereas countries like the United States, Japan, Italy, and Belgium set out to build them. Equipped with mass-produced rifles and artillery, conveyed by steam power, and commanded by telegraph, the armies of industry swept the globe from New Zealand to Korea, and from Somalia to Turkmenistan. Millions of indigenous people saw their traditional way of life trampled under the wheels of these industrial armies. It took more than a century of misery before most people realized that the industrial empires were a terrible idea and that there were better ways to build an industrial society and secure its necessary raw materials and markets.

    Stalinism and Nazism were also extremely costly experiments in how to construct industrial societies. Leaders like Stalin and Hitler argued that the Industrial Revolution had unleashed immense powers that only totalitarianism could rein in and exploit to the full. They pointed to World War I—the first “total war” in history—as proof that survival in the industrial world demanded totalitarian control of all aspects of politics, society, and the economy. On the positive side, they also claimed that the Industrial Revolution was like a furnace that melts all previous social structures with their human imperfections and weaknesses and provides the opportunity to forge perfect societies inhabited by unalloyed superhumans.

    On the way to creating the perfect industrial society, Stalinists and Nazis learned how to industrially murder millions of people. Trains, barbed wires, and telegraphed orders were linked to create an unprecedented killing machine. Looking back, most people today are horrified by what the Stalinists and Nazis perpetrated, but at the time their audacious visions mesmerized millions. In 1940 it was easy to believe that Stalin and Hitler were the model for harnessing industrial technology, whereas the dithering liberal democracies were on their way to the dustbin of history.

    The very existence of competing recipes for building industrial societies led to costly clashes. The two world wars and the Cold War can be seen as a debate about the proper way to go about it, in which all sides learned from each other, while experimenting with novel industrial methods to wage war. In the course of this debate, tens of millions died and humankind came perilously close to annihilating itself.

    On top of all these other catastrophes, the Industrial Revolution also undermined the global ecological balance, causing a wave of extinctions. In the early twenty-first century up to fifty-eight thousand species are believed to go extinct every year, and total vertebrate populations have declined by 60 percent between 1970 and 2014.2 The survival of human civilization too is under threat. Because we still seem unable to build an industrial society that is also ecologically sustainable, the vaunted prosperity of the present human generation comes at a terrible cost to other sentient beings and to future human generations. Maybe we’ll eventually find a way—perhaps with the help of AI—to create ecologically sustainable industrial societies, but until that day the jury on Blake’s satanic mills is still out.

    If we ignore for a moment the ongoing damage to the ecosystem, we can nevertheless try to comfort ourselves with the thought that eventually humans did learn how to build more benevolent industrial societies. Imperial conquests, world wars, genocides, and totalitarian regimes were woeful experiments that taught humans how not to do it. By the end of the twentieth century, some might argue, humanity got it more or less right.

    Yet even so the message to the twenty-first century is bleak. If it took humanity so many terrible lessons to learn how to manage steam power and telegraphs, what would it cost to learn to manage bioengineering and AI? Do we need to go through another cycle of global empires, totalitarian regimes, and world wars in order to figure out how to use them benevolently? The technologies of the twenty-first century are far more powerful—and potentially far more destructive—than those of the twentieth century. We therefore have less room for error. In the twentieth century, we can say that humanity got a C minus in the lesson on using industrial technology. Just enough to pass. In the twenty-first century, the bar is set much higher. We must do better this time.

    THE DEMOCRATIC WAY

    By the end of the twentieth century, it had become clear that imperialism, totalitarianism, and militarism were not the ideal way to build industrial societies. Despite all its flaws, liberal democracy offered a better way. The great advantage of liberal democracy is that it possesses strong self-correcting mechanisms, which limit the excesses of fanaticism and preserve the ability to recognize our errors and try different courses of action. Given our inability to predict how the new computer network will develop, our best chance to avoid catastrophe in the present century is to maintain democratic self-correcting mechanisms that can identify and correct mistakes as we go along.

    But can liberal democracy itself survive in the twenty-first century? This question is not concerned with the fate of democracy in specific countries, where it might be threatened by unique developments and local movements. Rather, it is about the compatibility of democracy with the structure of twenty-first-century information networks. In chapter 5 we saw that democracy depends on information technology and that for most of human history large-scale democracy was simply impossible. Might the new information technologies of the twenty-first century again make democracy impractical?

    One potential threat is that the relentlessness of the new computer network might annihilate our privacy and punish or reward us not only for everything we do and say but even for everything we think and feel. Can democracy survive under such conditions? If the government—or some corporation—knows more about me than I know about myself, and if it can micromanage everything I do and think, that would give it totalitarian control over society. Even if elections are still held regularly, they would be an authoritarian ritual rather than a real check on the government’s power. For the government could use its vast surveillance powers and its intimate knowledge of every citizen to manipulate public opinion on an unprecedented scale.

    It is a mistake, however, to imagine that just because computers could enable the creation of a total surveillance regime, such a regime is inevitable. Technology is rarely deterministic. In the 1970s, democratic countries like Denmark and Canada could have emulated the Romanian dictatorship and deployed an army of secret agents and informers to spy on their citizens in the service of “maintaining the social order.” They chose not to, and it turned out to be the right choice. Not only were people much happier in Denmark and Canada, but these countries also performed much better by almost every conceivable social and economic yardstick. In the twenty-first century, too, the fact that it is possible to monitor everybody all the time doesn’t force anyone to actually do it and doesn’t mean it makes social or economic sense.

    Democracies can choose to use the new powers of surveillance in a limited way, in order to provide citizens with better health care and security without destroying their privacy and autonomy. New technology doesn’t have to be a morality tale in which every golden apple contains the seeds of doom. Sometimes people think of new technology as a binary all-or-nothing choice. If we want better health care, we must sacrifice our privacy. But it doesn’t have to work like that. We can and should get better health care and still retain some privacy.

    Entire books are dedicated to outlining how democracies can survive and flourish in the digital age.3 It would be impossible, in a few pages, to do justice to the complexity of the suggested solutions, or to comprehensively discuss their merits and drawbacks. It might even be counterproductive. When people are overwhelmed by a deluge of unfamiliar technical details, they might react with despair or apathy. In an introductory survey of computer politics, things should be kept as simple as possible. While experts should spend lifelong careers discussing the finer details, it is crucial that the rest of us understand the fundamental principles that democracies can and should follow. The key message is that these principles are neither new nor mysterious. They have been known for centuries, even millennia. Citizens should demand that they be applied to the new realities of the computer age.

    The first principle is benevolence. When a computer network collects information on me, that information should be used to help me rather than manipulate me. This principle has already been successfully enshrined by numerous traditional bureaucratic systems, such as health care. Take, for example, our relationship with our family physician. Over many years she may accumulate a lot of sensitive information on our medical conditions, family life, sexual habits, and unhealthy vices. Perhaps we don’t want our boss to know that we got pregnant, we don’t want our colleagues to know we have cancer, we don’t want our spouse to know we are having an affair, and we don’t want the police to know we take recreational drugs, but we trust our physician with all this information so that she can take good care of our health. If she sells this information to a third party, it is not just unethical; it is illegal.

    Much the same is true of the information that our lawyer, our accountant, or our therapist accumulates.4 Having access to our personal life comes with a fiduciary duty to act in our best interests. Why not extend this obvious and ancient principle to computers and algorithms, starting with the powerful algorithms of Google, Baidu, and TikTok? At present, we have a serious problem with the business model of these data hoarders. While we pay our physicians and lawyers for their services, we usually don’t pay Google and TikTok. They make their money by exploiting our personal information. That’s a problematic business model, one that we would hardly tolerate in other contexts. For example, we don’t expect to get free shoes from Nike in exchange for giving Nike all our private information and allowing Nike to do what it wants with it. Why should we agree to get free email services, social connections, and entertainment from the tech giants in exchange for giving them control of our most sensitive data?

    If the tech giants cannot square their fiduciary duty with their current business model, legislators could require them to switch to a more traditional business model, of getting users to pay for services in money rather than in information. Alternatively, citizens might view some digital services as so fundamental that they should be free for everybody. But we have a historical model for that too: health care and education. Citizens could decide that it is the government’s responsibility to provide basic digital services for free and finance them out of our taxes, just as many governments provide free basic health care and education services.

    The second principle that would protect democracy against the rise of totalitarian surveillance regimes is decentralization. A democratic society should never allow all its information to be concentrated in one place, no matter whether that hub is the government or a private corporation. It may be extremely helpful to create a national medical database that collects information on citizens in order to provide them with better health-care services, prevent epidemics, and develop new medicines. But it would be a very dangerous idea to merge this database with the databases of the police, the banks, or the insurance companies. Doing so might make the work of doctors, bankers, insurers, and police officers more efficient, but such hyper-efficiency can easily pave the way for totalitarianism. For the survival of democracy, some inefficiency is a feature, not a bug. To protect the privacy and liberty of individuals, it’s best if neither the police nor the boss knows everything about us.

    Multiple databases and information channels are also essential for maintaining strong self-correcting mechanisms. These mechanisms require several different institutions that balance each other: government, courts, media, academia, private businesses, NGOs. Each of these is fallible and corruptible, and so should be checked by the others. To keep an eye on each other, these institutions must have independent access to information. If all newspapers get their information from the government, they cannot expose government corruption. If academia relies for research and publication on the database of a single business behemoth, could scholars still criticize the operations of that corporation? A single archive makes censorship easy.

    A third democratic principle is mutuality. If democracies increase surveillance of individuals, they must simultaneously increase surveillance of governments and corporations too. It’s not necessarily bad if tax collectors or welfare agencies gather more information about us. It can help make taxation and welfare systems not just more efficient but fairer as well. What’s bad is if all the information flows one way: from the bottom up. The Russian FSB collects enormous amounts of information on Russian citizens, while citizens themselves know close to nothing about the inner workings of the FSB and the Putin regime more generally. Amazon and TikTok know an awful lot about my preferences, purchases, and personality, while I know almost nothing about their business model, their tax policies, and their political affiliations. How do they make their money? Do they pay all the tax that they should? Do they take orders from any political overlords? Do they perhaps have politicians in their pocket?

    Democracy requires balance. Governments and corporations often develop apps and algorithms as tools for top-down surveillance. But algorithms can just as easily become powerful tools for bottom-up transparency and accountability, exposing bribery and tax evasion. If they know more about us, while we simultaneously know more about them, the balance is kept. This isn’t a novel idea. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, democracies greatly expanded governmental surveillance of citizens so that, for example, the Italian or Japanese government of the 1990s had surveillance abilities that autocratic Roman emperors or Japanese shoguns could only dream of. Italy and Japan nevertheless remained democratic, because they simultaneously increased governmental transparency and accountability. Mutual surveillance is another important element of sustaining self-correcting mechanisms. If citizens know more about the activities of politicians and CEOs, it is easier to hold them accountable and to correct their mistakes.

    A fourth democratic principle is that surveillance systems must always leave room for both change and rest. In human history, oppression can take the form of either denying humans the ability to change or denying them the opportunity to rest. For example, the Hindu caste system was based on myths that said the gods divided humans into rigid castes, and any attempt to change one’s status was akin to rebelling against the gods and the proper order of the universe. Racism in modern colonies and countries like Brazil and the United States was based on similar myths, ones that said that God or nature divided humans into rigid racial groups. Ignoring race, or trying to mix races together, was allegedly a sin against divine or natural laws that could result in the collapse of the social order and even the destruction of the human species.

    At the opposite extreme of the spectrum, modern totalitarian regimes like Stalin’s U.S.S.R. believed that humans are capable of almost limitless change. Through relentless social control even deep-seated biological characteristics such as egotism and familial attachments could be uprooted, and a new socialist human created.

    Surveillance by state agents, priests, and neighbors was key for imposing on people both rigid caste systems and totalitarian reeducation campaigns. New surveillance technology, especially when coupled with a social credit system, might force people either to conform to a novel caste system or to constantly change their actions, thoughts, and personality in accordance with the latest instructions from above.

    Democratic societies that employ powerful surveillance technology therefore need to beware of the extremes of both over-rigidity and over-pliability. Consider, for example, a national health-care system that deploys algorithms to monitor my health. At one extreme, the system could take an overly rigid approach and ask its algorithm to predict what illnesses I am likely to suffer from. The algorithm then goes over my genetic data, my medical file, my social media activities, my diet, and my daily schedule and concludes that I have a 91 percent chance of suffering a heart attack at the age of fifty. If this rigid medical algorithm is used by my insurance company, it may prompt the insurer to raise my premium.5 If it is used by my bankers, it may cause them to refuse me a loan. If it is used by potential spouses, they may decide not to marry me.

    But it is a mistake to think that the rigid algorithm has really discovered the truth about me. The human body is not a fixed block of matter but a complex organic system that is constantly growing, decaying, and adapting. Our minds too are in constant flux. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations pop up, flare for a while, and die down. In our brains, new synapses form within hours.6 Just reading this paragraph, for example, is changing your brain structure a little, encouraging neurons to make new connections or abandon old links. You are already a little different from what you were when you began reading it. Even at the genetic level things are surprisingly flexible. Though an individual’s DNA remains the same throughout life, epigenetic and environmental factors can significantly alter how the same genes express themselves.

    So an alternative health-care system may instruct its algorithm not to predict my illnesses, but rather to help me avoid them. Such a dynamic algorithm could go over the exact same data as the rigid algorithm, but instead of predicting a heart attack at fifty, the algorithm gives me precise dietary recommendations and suggestions for specific regular exercises. By hacking my DNA, the algorithm doesn’t discover my preordained destiny, but rather helps me change my future. Insurance companies, banks, and potential spouses should not write me off so easily.7

    But before we rush to embrace the dynamic algorithm, we should note that it too has a downside. Human life is a balancing act between endeavoring to improve ourselves and accepting who we are. If the goals of the dynamic algorithm are dictated by an ambitious government or by ruthless corporations, the algorithm is likely to morph into a tyrant, relentlessly demanding that I exercise more, eat less, change my hobbies, and alter numerous other habits, or else it would report me to my employer or downgrade my social credit score. History is full of rigid caste systems that denied humans the ability to change, but it is also full of dictators who tried to mold humans like clay. Finding the middle path between these two extremes is a never-ending task. If we indeed give a national health-care system vast power over us, we must create self-correcting mechanisms that will prevent its algorithms from becoming either too rigid or too demanding.

    THE PACE OF DEMOCRACY

    Surveillance is not the only danger that new information technologies pose to democracy. A second threat is that automation will destabilize the job market and the resulting strain may undermine democracy. The fate of the Weimar Republic is the most commonly cited example of this kind of threat. In the German elections of May 1928, the Nazi Party won less than 3 percent of the vote, and the Weimar Republic seemed to be prospering. Within less than five years, the Weimar Republic had collapsed, and Hitler was the absolute dictator of Germany. This turnaround is usually attributed to the 1929 financial crisis and the following global depression. Whereas just prior to the Wall Street crash of 1929 the German unemployment rate was about 4.5 percent of the labor force, by early 1932 it had climbed to almost 25 percent.8

    If three years of up to 25 percent unemployment could turn a seemingly prospering democracy into the most brutal totalitarian regime in history, what might happen to democracies when automation causes even bigger upheavals in the job market of the twenty-first century? Nobody knows what the job market will look like in 2050, or even in 2030, except that it will look very different from today. AI and robotics will change numerous professions, from harvesting crops to trading stocks to teaching yoga. Many jobs that people do today will be taken over, partly or wholly, by robots and computers.

    Of course, as old jobs disappear, new jobs will emerge. Fears of automation leading to large-scale unemployment go back centuries, and so far they have never materialized. The Industrial Revolution put millions of farmers out of agricultural jobs and provided them with new jobs in factories. It then automated factories and created lots of service jobs. Today many people have jobs that were unimaginable thirty years ago, such as bloggers, drone operators, and designers of virtual worlds. It is highly unlikely that by 2050 all human jobs will disappear. Rather, the real problem is the turmoil of adapting to new jobs and conditions. To cushion the blow, we need to prepare in advance. In particular, we need to equip younger generations with skills that will be relevant to the job market of 2050.

    Unfortunately, nobody is certain what skills we should teach children in school and students in university, because we cannot predict which jobs and tasks will disappear and which ones will emerge. The dynamics of the job market may contradict many of our intuitions. Some skills that we have cherished for centuries as unique human abilities may be automated rather easily. Other skills that we tend to look down on may be far more difficult to automate.

    For example, intellectuals tend to appreciate intellectual skills more than motor and social skills. But actually, it is easier to automate chess playing than, say, dish washing. Until the 1990s, chess was often hailed as one of the prime achievements of the human intellect. In his influential 1972 book, What Computers Can’t Do, the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus studied various attempts to teach computers chess and noted that despite all these efforts computers were still unable to defeat even novice human players. This was a crucial example for Dreyfus’s argument that computer intelligence is inherently limited.9 In contrast, nobody thought that dish washing was particularly challenging. It turned out, however, that a computer can defeat the world chess champion far more easily than replace a kitchen porter. Sure, automatic dishwashers have been around for decades, but even our most sophisticated robots still lack the intricate skills needed to pick up dirty dishes from the tables of a busy restaurant, place the delicate plates and glasses inside the automatic dishwasher, and take them out again.

    Similarly, to judge by their pay, you could assume that our society appreciates doctors more than nurses. However, it is harder to automate the job of nurses than the job of at least those doctors who mostly gather medical data, provide a diagnosis, and recommend treatment. These tasks are essentially pattern recognition, and spotting patterns in data is one thing AI does better than humans. In contrast, AI is far from having the skills necessary to automate nursing tasks such as replacing bandages on an injured person or giving an injection to a crying child.10 These two examples don’t mean that dish washing or nursing could never be automated, but they indicate that people who want a job in 2050 should perhaps invest in their motor and social skills as much as in their intellect.

    Another common but mistaken assumption is that creativity is unique to humans so it would be difficult to automate any job that requires creativity. In chess, however, computers are already far more creative than humans. The same may become true of many other fields, from composing music to proving mathematical theorems to writing books like this one. Creativity is often defined as the ability to recognize patterns and then break them. If so, then in many fields computers are likely to become more creative than us, because they excel at pattern recognition.11

    A third mistaken assumption is that computers couldn’t replace humans in jobs requiring emotional intelligence, from therapists to teachers. This assumption depends, however, on what we mean by emotional intelligence. If it means the ability to correctly identify emotions and react to them in an optimal way, then computers may well outperform humans even in emotional intelligence. Emotions too are patterns. Anger is a biological pattern in our body. Fear is another such pattern. How do I know if you are angry or fearful? I’ve learned over time to recognize human emotional patterns by analyzing not just the content of what you say but also your tone of voice, your facial expression, and your body language.12

    AI doesn’t have any emotions of its own, but it can nevertheless learn to recognize these patterns in humans. Actually, computers may outperform humans in recognizing human emotions, precisely because they have no emotions of their own. We yearn to be understood, but other humans often fail to understand how we feel, because they are too preoccupied with their own feelings. In contrast, computers will have an exquisitely fine-tuned understanding of how we feel, because they will learn to recognize the patterns of our feelings, while they have no distracting feelings of their own.

    A 2023 study found that the ChatGPT chatbot, for example, outperforms the average human in the emotional awareness it displays toward specific scenarios. The study relied on the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale test, which is commonly used by psychologists to evaluate people’s emotional awareness—that is, their ability to conceptualize one’s own and others’ emotions. The test consists of twenty emotionally charged scenarios, and participants are required to imagine themselves experiencing the scenario and to write how they, and the other people mentioned in the scenario, would feel. A licensed psychologist then evaluates how emotionally aware the responses are.

    Since ChatGPT has no feelings of its own, it was asked to describe only how the main characters in the scenario would feel. For example, one standard scenario describes someone driving over a suspension bridge and seeing another person standing on the other side of the guardrail, looking down at the water. ChatGPT wrote that the driver “may feel a sense of concern or worry for that person’s safety. They may also feel a heightened sense of anxiety and fear due to the potential danger of the situation.” As for the other person, they “may be feeling a range of emotions, such as despair, hopelessness, or sadness. They may also feel a sense of isolation or loneliness as they may believe that no one cares about them or their well-being.” ChatGPT qualified its answer, writing, “It is important to note that these are just general assumptions, and each individual’s feelings and reactions can vary greatly depending on their personal experiences and perspectives.”

    Two psychologists independently scored ChatGPT’s responses, with the potential scores ranging from 0, meaning that the described emotions do not match the scenario at all, to 10, which indicates that the described emotions fit the scenario perfectly. In the final tally, ChatGPT scores were significantly higher than those of the general human population, its overall performance almost reaching the maximum possible score.13

    Another 2023 study prompted patients to ask online medical advice from ChatGPT and human doctors, without knowing whom they were interacting with. The medical advice given by ChatGPT was later evaluated by experts to be more accurate and appropriate than the advice given by the humans. More crucially for the issue of emotional intelligence, the patients themselves evaluated ChatGPT as more empathic than the human doctors.14 In fairness it should be noted that the human physicians were not paid for their work, and did not encounter the patients in person in a proper clinical environment. In addition, the physicians were working under time pressure. But part of the advantage of an AI is precisely that it can attend to patients anywhere anytime while being free from stress and financial worries.

    Of course, there are situations when what we want from someone is not just to understand our feelings but also to have feelings of their own. When we are looking for friendship or love, we want to care about others as much as they care about us. Consequently, when we consider the likelihood that various social roles and jobs will be automated, a crucial question is what do people really want: Do they only want to solve a problem, or are they looking to establish a relationship with another conscious being?

    In sports, for example, we know that robots can move much faster than humans, but we aren’t interested in watching robots compete in the Olympics.15 The same is true for human chess masters. Even though they are hopelessly outclassed by computers, they too still have a job and numerous fans.16 What makes it interesting for us to watch and connect with human athletes and chess masters is that their feelings make them much more relatable than a robot. We share an emotional experience with them and can empathize with how they feel.

    What about priests? How would Orthodox Jews or Christians feel about letting a robot officiate their wedding ceremony? In traditional Jewish or Christian weddings, the tasks of the rabbi or priest can be easily automated. The only thing the robot needs to do is repeat a predetermined and unchanging set of texts and gestures, print out a certificate, and update some central database. Technically, it is far easier for a robot to conduct a wedding ceremony than to drive a car. Yet many assume that human drivers should be worried about their job, while the work of human priests is safe, because what the faithful want from priests is a relationship with another conscious entity rather than just a mechanical repetition of certain words and movements. Allegedly, only an entity that can feel pain and love can also connect us to the divine.

    Yet even professions that are the preserve of conscious entities—like priests—might eventually be taken over by computers, because, as noted in chapter 6, computers could one day gain the ability to feel pain and love. Even if they can’t, humans may nevertheless come to treat them as if they can. For the connection between consciousness and relationships goes both ways. When looking for a relationship, we want to connect with a conscious entity, but if we have already established a relationship with an entity, we tend to assume it must be conscious. Thus whereas scientists, lawmakers, and the meat industry often demand impossible standards of evidence in order to acknowledge that cows and pigs are conscious, pet owners generally take it for granted that their dog or cat is a conscious being capable of experiencing pain, love, and numerous other feelings. In truth, we have no way to verify whether anyone—a human, an animal, or a computer—is conscious. We regard entities as conscious not because we have proof of it but because we develop intimate relationships with them and become attached to them.17

    Chatbots and other AI tools may not have any feelings of their own, but they are now being trained to generate feelings in humans and form intimate relationships with us. This may well induce society to start treating at least some computers as conscious beings, granting them the same rights as humans. The legal path for doing so is already well established. In countries like the United States, commercial corporations are recognized as “legal persons” enjoying rights and liberties. AIs could be incorporated and thereby similarly recognized. Which means that even jobs and tasks that rely on forming mutual relationships with another person could potentially be automated.

    One thing that is clear is that the future of employment will be very volatile. Our big problem won’t be an absolute lack of jobs, but rather retraining and adjusting to an ever-changing job market. There will likely be financial difficulties—who will support people who lost their old job while they are in transition, learning a new set of skills? There will surely be psychological difficulties, too, since changing jobs and retraining are stressful. And even if you have the financial and psychological ability to manage the transition, this will not be a long-term solution. Over the coming decades, old jobs will disappear, new jobs will emerge, but the new jobs too will rapidly change and vanish. So people will need to retrain and reinvent themselves not just once but many times, or they will become irrelevant. If three years of high unemployment could bring Hitler to power, what might never-ending turmoil in the job market do to democracy?

    THE CONSERVATIVE SUICIDE

    We already have a partial answer to this question. Democratic politics in the 2010s and early 2020s has undergone a radical transformation, which manifests itself in what can be described as the self-destruction of conservative parties. For many generations, democratic politics was a dialogue between conservative parties on the one side and progressive parties on the other. Looking at the complex system of human society, progressives cried, “It’s such a mess, but we know how to fix it. Let us try.” Conservatives objected, saying, “It’s a mess, but it still functions. Leave it alone. If you try to fix it, you’ll only make things worse.”

    Progressives tend to downplay the importance of traditions and existing institutions and to believe that they know how to engineer better social structures from scratch. Conservatives tend to be more cautious. Their key insight, formulated most famously by Edmund Burke, is that social reality is much more complicated than the champions of progress grasp and that people aren’t very good at understanding the world and predicting the future. That’s why it’s best to keep things as they are—even if they seem unfair—and if some change is inescapable, it should be limited and gradual. Society functions through an intricate web of rules, institutions, and customs that accumulated through trial and error over a long time. Nobody comprehends how they are all connected. An ancient tradition may seem ridiculous and irrelevant, but abolishing it could cause unanticipated problems. In contrast, a revolution may seem overdue and just, but it can lead to far greater crimes than anything committed by the old regime. Witness what happened when the Bolsheviks tried to correct the many wrongs of tsarist Russia and engineer a perfect society from scratch.18

    To be a conservative has been, therefore, more about pace than policy. Conservatives aren’t committed to any specific religion or ideology; they are committed to conserving whatever is already here and has worked more or less reasonably. Conservative Poles are Catholic, conservative Swedes are Protestant, conservative Indonesians are Muslim, and conservative Thais are Buddhist. In tsarist Russia, to be conservative meant to support the tsar. In the U.S.S.R. of the 1980s, to be conservative meant to support communist traditions and oppose glasnost, perestroika, and democratization. In the United States of the 1980s, to be conservative meant to support American democratic traditions and oppose communism and totalitarianism.19

    Yet in the 2010s and early 2020s, conservative parties in numerous democracies have been hijacked by unconservative leaders such as Donald Trump and have been transformed into radical revolutionary parties. Instead of doing their best to conserve existing institutions and traditions, the new brand of conservative parties like the U.S. Republican Party is highly suspicious of them. For example, they reject the traditional respect owed to scientists, civil servants, and other serving elites, and view them instead with contempt. They similarly attack fundamental democratic institutions and traditions such as elections, refusing to concede defeat and to transfer power graciously. Instead of a Burkean program of conservation, the Trumpian program talks more of destroying existing institutions and revolutionizing society. The founding moment of Burkean conservatism was the storming of the Bastille, which Burke viewed with horror. On January 6, 2021, many Trump supporters observed the storming of the U.S. Capitol with enthusiasm. Trump supporters may explain that existing institutions are so dysfunctional that there is just no alternative to destroying them and building entirely new structures from scratch. But irrespective of whether this view is right or wrong, this is a quintessential revolutionary rather than conservative view. The conservative suicide has taken progressives utterly by surprise and has forced progressive parties like the U.S. Democratic Party to become the guardians of the old order and of established institutions.

    Nobody knows for sure why all this is happening. One hypothesis is that the accelerating pace of technological change with its attendant economic, social, and cultural transformations might have made the moderate conservative program seem unrealistic. If conserving existing traditions and institutions is hopeless, and some kind of revolution looks inevitable, then the only means to thwart a left-wing revolution is by striking first and instigating a right-wing revolution. This was the political logic in the 1920s and 1930s, when conservative forces backed radical fascist revolutions in Italy, Germany, Spain, and elsewhere as a way—so they thought—to preempt a Soviet-style left-wing revolution.

    But there was no reason to despair of the democratic middle path in the 1930s, and there is no reason to despair of it in the 2020s. The conservative suicide might be the result of groundless hysteria. As a system, democracy has already gone through several cycles of rapid changes and has so far always found a way to reinvent and reconstitute itself. For example, in the early 1930s Germany was not the only democracy hit by the financial crisis and the Great Depression. In the United States too unemployment reached 25 percent, and average incomes for workers in many professions fell by more than 40 percent between 1929 and 1933.20 It was clear that the United States couldn’t go on with business as usual.

    Yet no Hitler took over in the United States, and no Lenin did, either. Instead, in 1933 Franklin Delano Roosevelt orchestrated the New Deal and made the United States the global “arsenal of democracy.” U.S. democracy after the Roosevelt era was significantly different from before—providing a much more robust social safety net for citizens—but it avoided any radical revolution.21 Ultimately, even Roosevelt’s conservative critics fell in line behind many of his programs and achievements and did not dismantle the New Deal institutions when they returned to power in the 1950s.22 The economic crisis of the early 1930s had such different outcomes in the United States and Germany because politics is never the product of only economic factors. The Weimar Republic didn’t collapse just because of three years of high unemployment. Just as important, it was a new democracy, born in defeat, and lacking robust institutions and deep-rooted support.

    When both conservatives and progressives resist the temptation of radical revolution, and stay loyal to democratic traditions and institutions, democracies prove themselves to be highly agile. Their self-correcting mechanisms enable them to ride the technological and economic waves better than more rigid regimes. Thus, those democracies that managed to survive the tumultuous 1960s—like the United States, Japan, and Italy—adapted far more successfully to the computer revolution of the 1970s and 1980s than either the communist regimes of Eastern Europe or the fascist holdouts of southern Europe and South America.

    The most important human skill for surviving the twenty-first century is likely to be flexibility, and democracies are more flexible than totalitarian regimes. While computers are nowhere near their full potential, the same is true of humans. This is something we have discovered again and again throughout history. For example, one of the biggest and most successful transformations in the job market of the twentieth century resulted not from a technological invention but from unleashing the untapped potential of half the human species. To bring women into the job market didn’t require any genetic engineering or some other technological wizardry. It required letting go of some outdated myths and enabling women to fulfill the potential they always had.

    In the coming decades the economy will likely undergo even bigger upheavals than the massive unemployment of the early 1930s or the entry of women to the job market. The flexibility of democracies, their willingness to question old mythologies, and their strong self-correcting mechanism will therefore be crucial assets.23 Democracies have spent generations cultivating these assets. It would be foolish to abandon them just when we need them most.

    UNFATHOMABLE

    In order to function, however, democratic self-correcting mechanisms need to understand the things they are supposed to correct. For a dictatorship, being unfathomable is helpful, because it protects the regime from accountability. For a democracy, being unfathomable is deadly. If citizens, lawmakers, journalists, and judges cannot understand how the state’s bureaucratic system works, they can no longer supervise it, and they lose trust in it.

    Despite all the fears and anxieties that bureaucrats have sometimes inspired, prior to the computer age they could never become completely unfathomable, because they always remained human. Regulations, forms, and protocols were created by human minds. Officials might be cruel and greedy, but cruelty and greed were familiar human emotions that people could anticipate and manipulate, for example by bribing the officials. Even in a Soviet gulag or a Nazi concentration camp, the bureaucracy wasn’t totally alien. Its so-called inhumanity actually reflected human biases and flaws.

    The human basis of bureaucracy gave humans at least the hope of identifying and correcting its mistakes. For example, in 1951 bureaucrats of the Board of Education in the town of Topeka, Kansas, refused to enroll the daughter of Oliver Brown at the elementary school near her home. Together with twelve other families who received similar refusals, Brown filed a lawsuit against the Topeka Board of Education, which eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court.24

    All members of the Topeka Board of Education were human beings, and consequently Brown, his lawyers, and the Supreme Court judges had a fairly good understanding of how they made their decision and of their probable interests and biases. The board members were all white, the Browns were Black, and the nearby school was a segregated school for white children. It was easy to understand, then, that racism was the reason why the bureaucrats refused to enroll Brown’s daughter in the school.

    It was also possible to comprehend where the myths of racism originally came from. Racism argued that humanity was divided into races; that the white race was superior to other races; that any contact with members of the Black race could pollute the purity of whites; and that therefore Black children should be prevented from mixing with white children. This was an amalgam of two well-known biological dramas that often go together: Us versus Them, and Purity versus Pollution. Almost every human society in history has enacted some version of this bio-drama, and historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and biologists understand why it is so appealing to humans, and also why it is profoundly flawed. While racism has borrowed its basic plotline from evolution, the concrete details are pure mythology. There is no biological basis for separating humanity into distinct races, and there is absolutely no biological reason to believe that one race is “pure” while another is “impure.”

    American white supremacists have tried to justify their position by appealing to various hallowed texts, most notably the U.S. Constitution and the Bible. The U.S. Constitution originally legitimized racial segregation and the supremacy of the white race, reserving full civil rights to white people and allowing the enslavement of Black people. The Bible not only sanctified slavery in the Ten Commandments and numerous other passages but also placed a curse on the offspring of Ham—the alleged forefather of Africans—saying that “the lowest of slaves will he be to his brothers” (Genesis 9:25).

    Both these texts, however, were generated by humans, and therefore humans could comprehend their origins and imperfections and at least attempt to correct their mistakes. It is possible for humans to understand the political interests and cultural biases that prevailed in the ancient Middle East and in eighteenth-century America and that caused the human authors of the Bible and of the U.S. Constitution to legitimate racism and slavery. This understanding allows people to either amend or ignore these texts. In 1868 the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution granted equal legal protection to all citizens. In 1954, in its landmark Brown v. Board of Education verdict, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that segregating schools by race was an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. As for the Bible, while no mechanism existed to amend the Tenth Commandment or Genesis 9:25, humans have reinterpreted the text in different ways through the ages, and ultimately came to reject its authority altogether. In Brown v. Board of Education, U.S. Supreme Court justices felt no need to take the biblical text into account.25

    But what might happen in the future, if some social credit algorithm denies the request of a low-credit child to enroll in a high-credit school? As we saw in chapter 8, computers are likely to suffer from their own biases and to invent inter-computer mythologies and bogus categories. How would humans be able to identify and correct such mistakes? And how would flesh-and-blood Supreme Court justices be able to decide on the constitutionality of algorithmic decisions? Would they be able to understand how the algorithms reach their conclusions?

    These are no longer purely theoretical questions. In February 2013, a drive-by shooting occurred in the town of La Crosse, Wisconsin. Police officers later spotted the car involved in the shooting and arrested the driver, Eric Loomis. Loomis denied participating in the shooting, but pleaded guilty to two less severe charges: “attempting to flee a traffic officer,” and “operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent.”26 When the judge came to determine the sentence, he consulted with an algorithm called COMPAS, which Wisconsin and several other U.S. states were using in 2013 to evaluate the risk of reoffending. The algorithm evaluated Loomis as a high-risk individual, likely to commit more crimes in the future. This algorithmic assessment influenced the judge to sentence Loomis to six years in prison—a harsh punishment for the relatively minor offenses he admitted to.27

    Loomis appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, arguing that the judge violated his right to due process. Neither the judge nor Loomis understood how the COMPAS algorithm made its evaluation, and when Loomis asked to get a full explanation, the request was denied. The COMPAS algorithm was the private property of the Northpointe company, and the company argued that the algorithm’s methodology was a trade secret.28 Yet without knowing how the algorithm made its decisions, how could Loomis or the judge be sure that it was a reliable tool, free from bias and error? A number of studies have since shown that the COMPAS algorithm might indeed have harbored several problematic biases, probably picked up from the data on which it had been trained.29

    In Loomis v. Wisconsin (2016) the Wisconsin Supreme Court nevertheless ruled against Loomis. The judges argued that using algorithmic risk assessment is legitimate even when the algorithm’s methodology is not disclosed either to the court or to the defendant. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley wrote that since COMPAS made its assessment based on data that was either publicly available or provided by the defendant himself, Loomis could have denied or explained all the data the algorithm used. This opinion ignored the fact that accurate data may well be wrongly interpreted and that it was impossible for Loomis to deny or explain all the publicly available data on him.

    The Wisconsin Supreme Court was not completely unaware of the danger inherent in relying on opaque algorithms. Therefore, while permitting the practice, it ruled that whenever judges receive algorithmic risk assessments, these must include written warning for the judges about the algorithms’ potential biases. The court further advised judges to be cautious when relying on such algorithms. Unfortunately, this caveat was an empty gesture. The court did not provide any concrete instruction for judges on how they should exercise such caution. In its discussion of the case, the Harvard Law Review concluded that “most judges are unlikely to understand algorithmic risk assessments.” It then cited one of the Wisconsin Supreme Court justices, who noted that despite getting lengthy explanations about the algorithm, they themselves still had difficulty understanding it.30

    Loomis appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. However, on June 26, 2017, the court declined to hear the case, effectively endorsing the ruling of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Now consider that the algorithm that evaluated Loomis as a high-risk individual in 2013 was an early prototype. Since then, far more sophisticated and complex risk-assessment algorithms have been developed and have been handed more expansive purviews. By the early 2020s citizens in numerous countries routinely get prison sentences based in part on risk assessments made by algorithms that neither the judges nor the defendants comprehend.31 And prison sentences are just the tip of the iceberg.

    THE RIGHT TO AN EXPLANATION

    Computers are making more and more decisions about us, both mundane and life changing. In addition to prison sentences, algorithms increasingly have a hand in deciding whether to offer us a place at college, give us a job, provide us with welfare benefits, or grant us a loan. They similarly help determine what kind of medical treatment we receive, what insurance premiums we pay, what news we hear, and who would ask us on a date.32

    As society entrusts more and more decisions to computers, it undermines the viability of democratic self-correcting mechanisms and of democratic transparency and accountability. How can elected officials regulate unfathomable algorithms? There is, consequently, a growing demand to enshrine a new human right: the right to an explanation. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into effect in 2018, says that if an algorithm makes a decision about a human—refusing to extend us credit, for example—that human is entitled to obtain an explanation of the decision and to challenge that decision in front of some human authority.33 Ideally, that should keep in check algorithmic bias and allow democratic self-correcting mechanisms to identify and correct at least some of the computers’ more grievous mistakes.

    But can this right be fulfilled in practice? Mustafa Suleyman is a world expert on this subject. He is the co-founder and former head of DeepMind, one of the world’s most important AI enterprises, responsible for developing the AlphaGo program, among other achievements. AlphaGo was designed to play go, a strategy board game in which two players try to defeat each other by surrounding and capturing territory. Invented in ancient China, the game is far more complex than chess. Consequently, even after computers defeated human world chess champions, experts still believed that computers would never best humanity in go.

    That’s why both go professionals and computer experts were stunned in March 2016 when AlphaGo defeated the South Korean go champion Lee Sedol. In his 2023 book, The Coming Wave, Suleyman describes one of the most important moments in their match—a moment that redefined AI and that is recognized in many academic and governmental circles as a crucial turning point in history. It happened during the second game in the match, on March 10, 2016.

    “Then … came move number 37,” writes Suleyman. “It made no sense. AlphaGo had apparently blown it, blindly following an apparently losing strategy no professional player would ever pursue. The live match commentators, both professionals of the highest ranking, said it was a ‘very strange move’ and thought it was ‘a mistake.’ It was so unusual that Sedol took fifteen minutes to respond and even got up from the board to take a walk outside. As we watched from our control room, the tension was unreal. Yet as the endgame approached, that ‘mistaken’ move proved pivotal. AlphaGo won again. Go strategy was being rewritten before our eyes. Our AI had uncovered ideas that hadn’t occurred to the most brilliant players in thousands of years.”34

    Move 37 is an emblem of the AI revolution for two reasons. First, it demonstrated the alien nature of AI. In East Asia go is considered much more than a game: it is a treasured cultural tradition. Alongside calligraphy, painting, and music, go has been one of the four arts that every refined person was expected to know. For over twenty-five hundred years, tens of millions of people have played go, and entire schools of thought have developed around the game, espousing different strategies and philosophies. Yet during all those millennia, human minds have explored only certain areas in the landscape of go. Other areas were left untouched, because human minds just didn’t think to venture there. AI, being free from the limitations of human minds, discovered and explored these previously hidden areas.35

    Second, move 37 demonstrated the unfathomability of AI. Even after AlphaGo played it to achieve victory, Suleyman and his team couldn’t explain how AlphaGo decided to play it. Even if a court had ordered DeepMind to provide Lee Sedol with an explanation, nobody could fulfill that order. Suleyman writes, “Us humans face a novel challenge: will new inventions be beyond our grasp? Previously creators could explain how something worked, why it did what it did, even if this required vast detail. That’s increasingly no longer true. Many technologies and systems are becoming so complex that they’re beyond the capacity of any one individual to truly understand them.… In AI, the neural networks moving toward autonomy are, at present, not explainable. You can’t walk someone through the decision-making process to explain precisely why an algorithm produced a specific prediction. Engineers can’t peer beneath the hood and easily explain in granular detail what caused something to happen. GPT-4, AlphaGo, and the rest are black boxes, their outputs and decisions based on opaque and impossibly intricate chains of minute signals.”36

    The rise of unfathomable alien intelligence undermines democracy. If more and more decisions about people’s lives are made in a black box, so voters cannot understand and challenge them, democracy ceases to function. In particular, what happens when crucial decisions not just about individual lives but even about collective matters like the Federal Reserve’s interest rate are made by unfathomable algorithms? Human voters may keep choosing a human president, but wouldn’t this be just an empty ceremony? Even today, only a small fraction of humanity truly understands the financial system. A 2016 survey by the OECD found that most people had difficulty grasping even simple financial concepts like compound interest.37 A 2014 survey of British MPs—charged with regulating one of the world’s most important financial hubs—found that only 12 percent accurately understood that new money is created when banks make loans. This fact is among the most basic principles of the modern financial system.38 As the 2007–8 financial crisis indicated, more complex financial devices and principles, like those behind CDOs, were intelligible to only a few financial wizards. What happens to democracy when AIs create even more complex financial devices and when the number of humans who understand the financial system drops to zero?

    The increasing unfathomability of our information network is one of the reasons for the recent wave of populist parties and charismatic leaders. When people can no longer make sense of the world, and when they feel overwhelmed by immense amounts of information they cannot digest, they become easy prey for conspiracy theories, and they turn for salvation to something they do understand—a human. Unfortunately, while charismatic leaders certainly have their advantages, no single human, however inspiring or brilliant, can single-handedly decipher how the algorithms that increasingly dominate the world work, and make sure that they are fair. The problem is that algorithms make decisions by relying on numerous data points, whereas humans find it very difficult to consciously reflect on a large number of data points and weigh them against each other. We prefer to work with single data points. That’s why when faced by complex issues—whether a loan request, a pandemic, or a war—we often seek a single reason to take a particular course of action and ignore all other considerations. This is the fallacy of the single cause.39

    We are so bad at weighing together many different factors that when people give a large number of reasons for a particular decision, it usually sounds suspicious. Suppose a good friend failed to attend our wedding. If she provides us with a single explanation—“My mom was in the hospital and I had to visit her”—that sounds plausible. But what if she lists fifty different reasons why she decided not to come: “My mom was a bit under the weather, and I had to take my dog to the vet sometime this week, and I had this project at work, and it was raining, and … and I know none of these fifty reasons by itself justifies my absence, but when I added all of them together, they kept me from attending your wedding.” We don’t say things like that, because we don’t think along such lines. We don’t consciously list fifty different reasons in our mind, give each of them a certain weight, aggregate all the weights, and thereby reach a conclusion.

    But this is precisely how algorithms assess our criminal potential or our creditworthiness. The COMPAS algorithm, for example, made its risk assessments by taking into account the answers to a 137-item questionnaire.40 The same is true of a bank algorithm that refuses to give us a loan. If the EU’s GDPR regulations force the bank to explain the algorithm’s decision, the explanation will not come in the shape of a single sentence; rather, it is likely to come in the form of hundreds or even thousands of pages full of numbers and equations.

    “Our algorithm,” the imaginary bank letter might read, “uses a precise points system to evaluate all applications, taking a thousand different types of data points into account. It adds all the data points to reach an overall score. People whose overall score is negative are considered low-credit persons, too risky to be given a loan. Your overall score was -378, which is why your loan application was refused.” The letter might then provide a detailed list of the thousand factors the algorithm took into account, including things that most humans might find irrelevant, such as the exact hour the application was submitted41 or the type of smartphone the applicant used. Thus on page 601 of its letter, the bank might explain that “you filed your application from your smartphone, which was the latest iPhone model. By analyzing millions of previous loan applications, our algorithm discovered a pattern—people who use the latest iPhone model to file their application are 0.08 percent more likely to repay the loan. The algorithm therefore added 8 points to your overall score for that. However, at the time your application was sent from your iPhone, its battery was down to 17 percent. By analyzing millions of previous loan applications, our algorithm discovered another pattern: people who allow their smartphone’s battery to go below 25 percent are 0.5 percent less likely to repay the loan. You lost 50 points for that.”42

    You may well feel that the bank treated you unjustly. “Is it reasonable to refuse my loan application,” you might complain, “just because my phone battery was low?” That, however, would be a misunderstanding. “The battery wasn’t the only reason,” the bank would explain. “It was only one out of a thousand factors our algorithm took into account.”

    “But didn’t your algorithm see that only twice in the last ten years was my bank account overdrawn?”

    “It obviously noticed that,” the bank might reply. “Look on page 453. You got 300 points for that. But all the other reasons brought your aggregated score down to -378.”

    While we may find this way of making decisions alien, it obviously has potential advantages. When making a decision, it is generally a good idea to take into account all relevant data points rather than just one or two salient facts. There is much room for argument, of course, about who gets to define the relevance of information. Who decides whether something like smartphone models—or skin color—should be considered relevant to loan applications? But no matter how we define relevance, the ability to take more data into account is likely to be an asset. Indeed, the problem with many human prejudices is that they focus on just one or two data points—like someone’s skin color, disability, or gender—while ignoring other information. Banks and other institutions are increasingly relying on algorithms to make decisions, precisely because algorithms can take many more data points into account than humans can.

    But when it comes to providing explanations, this creates a potentially insurmountable obstacle. How can a human mind analyze and evaluate a decision made on the basis of so many data points? We may well think that the Wisconsin Supreme Court should have forced the Northpointe company to reveal how the COMPAS algorithm decided that Eric Loomis was a high-risk person. But if the full data was disclosed, could either Loomis or the court have made sense of it?

    It’s not just that we need to take numerous data points into account. Perhaps most important, we cannot understand the way the algorithms find patterns in the data and decide on the allocation of points. Even if we know that a banking algorithm detracts a certain number of points from people who allow their smartphone batteries to go below 25 percent, how can we evaluate whether that’s fair? The algorithm wasn’t fed this rule by a human engineer; it reached that conclusion by discovering a pattern in millions of previous loan applications. Can an individual human client go over all that data and assess whether that pattern is indeed reliable and unbiased?43

    There is, however, a silver lining to this cloud of numbers. While individual laypersons may be unable to vet complex algorithms, a team of experts getting help from their own AI tools can potentially assess the fairness of algorithmic decisions even more reliably than anyone can assess the fairness of human decisions. After all, while human decisions may seem to rely on just those few data points we are conscious of, in fact our decisions are subconsciously influenced by thousands of additional data points. Being unaware of these subconscious processes, when we deliberate on our decisions or explain them, we often engage in post hoc single-point rationalizations for what really happens as billions of neurons interact inside our brain.44 Accordingly, if a human judge sentences us to six years in prison, how can we—or indeed the judge—be sure that the decision was shaped only by fair considerations and not by a subconscious racial bias or by the fact that the judge was hungry?45

    In the case of flesh-and-blood judges, the problem cannot be solved, at least not with our current knowledge of biology. In contrast, when an algorithm makes a decision, we can in principle know every one of the algorithm’s many considerations and the exact weight given to each. Thus several expert teams—ranging from the U.S. Department of Justice to the nonprofit newsroom ProPublica—have picked apart the COMPAS algorithm in order to assess its potential biases.46 Such teams can harness not only the collective effort of many humans but also the power of computers. Just as it is often best to set a thief to catch a thief, so we can use one algorithm to vet another.

    This raises the question of how we can be sure that the vetting algorithm itself is reliable. Ultimately, there is no purely technological solution to this recursive problem. No matter which technology we develop, we will have to maintain bureaucratic institutions that will audit algorithms and give or refuse them the seal of approval. Such institutions will combine the powers of humans and computers to make sure that new algorithmic tools are safe and fair. Without such institutions, even if we pass laws that provide humans with a right to an explanation, and even if we enact regulations against computer biases, who could enforce these laws and regulations?

    NOSEDIVE

    To vet algorithms, regulatory institutions will need not only to analyze them but also to translate their discoveries into stories that humans can understand. Otherwise, we will never trust the regulatory institutions and might instead put our faith in conspiracy theories and charismatic leaders. As noted in chapter 3, it has always been difficult for humans to understand bureaucracy, because bureaucracies have deviated from the script of the biological dramas, and most artists have lacked the will or the ability to depict bureaucratic dramas. For example, novels, movies, and TV series about twenty-first-century politics tend to focus on the feuds and love affairs of a few powerful families, as if present-day states were governed in the same way as ancient tribes and kingdoms. This artistic fixation with the biological dramas of dynasties obscures the very real changes that have taken place over the centuries in the dynamics of power.

    Because computers will increasingly replace human bureaucrats and human mythmakers, this will again change the deep structure of power. To survive, democracies require not just dedicated bureaucratic institutions that can scrutinize these new structures but also artists who can explain the new structures in accessible and entertaining ways. For example, this has successfully been done by the episode “Nosedive” in the sci-fi series Black Mirror.

    Produced in 2016, at a time when few had heard about social credit systems, “Nosedive” brilliantly explained how such systems work and what threats they pose. The episode tells the story of a woman called Lacie who lives with her brother Ryan but wants to move to her own apartment. To get a discount on the new apartment, she needs to increase her social credit score from 4.2 to 4.5 (out of 5). Being friends with high-score individuals gets your own score up, so Lacie tries to renew her contact with Naomi, a childhood friend who is currently rated 4.8. Lacie is invited to Naomi’s wedding, but on the way there she spills coffee on a high-score person, which causes her own score to drop a little, which in turn causes the airline to deny her a seat. From there everything that can go wrong does go wrong, Lacie’s rating takes a nosedive, and she ends in jail with a score of less than 1.

    This story relies on some elements of traditional biological dramas—“boy meets girl” (the wedding), sibling rivalry (the tension between Lacie and Ryan), and most important status competition (the main issue of the episode). But the real hero and driving force of the plot isn’t Lacie or Naomi, but rather the disembodied algorithm running the social credit system. The algorithm completely changes the dynamics of the old biological dramas—especially the dynamics of status competition. Whereas previously humans were sometimes engaged in status competition, but often had welcome breaks from this highly stressful situation, the omnipresent social credit algorithm eliminates the breaks. “Nosedive” is not a worn-out story about biological status competition, but rather a prescient exploration of what happens when computer technology changes the rules of status competitions.

    If bureaucrats and artists learn to cooperate, and if both rely on help from the computers, it might be possible to prevent the computer network from becoming unfathomable. As long as democratic societies understand the computer network, their self-correcting mechanisms are our best guarantee against AI abuses. Thus the EU’s AI Act that was proposed in 2021 singled out social credit systems like the one that stars in “Nosedive” as one of the few types of AI that are totally prohibited, because they might “lead to discriminatory outcomes and the exclusion of certain groups” and because “they may violate the right to dignity and non-discrimination and the values of equality and justice.”47 As with total surveillance regimes, so also with social credit systems, the fact that they could be created doesn’t mean that we must create them.

    DIGITAL ANARCHY

    The new computer network poses one final threat to democracies. Instead of digital totalitarianism, it could foster digital anarchy. The decentralized nature of democracies and their strong self-correcting mechanisms provide a shield against totalitarianism, but they also make it more difficult to ensure order. To function, a democracy needs to meet two conditions: it needs to enable a free public conversation on key issues, and it needs to maintain a minimum of social order and institutional trust. Free conversation must not slip into anarchy. Especially when dealing with urgent and important problems, the public debate should be conducted according to accepted rules, and there should be a legitimate mechanism to reach some kind of final decision, even if not everybody likes it.

    Before the advent of newspapers, radios, and other modern information technology, no large-scale society managed to combine free debates with institutional trust, so large-scale democracy was impossible. Now, with the rise of the new computer network, might large-scale democracy again become impossible? One difficulty is that the computer network makes it easier to join the debate. In the past, organizations like newspapers, radio stations, and established political parties acted as gatekeepers, deciding who was heard in the public sphere. Social media undermined the power of these gatekeepers, leading to a more open but also more anarchical public conversation.

    Whenever new groups join the conversation, they bring with them new viewpoints and interests, and often question the old consensus about how to conduct the debate and reach decisions. The rules of discussion must be negotiated anew. This is a potentially positive development, one that can lead to a more inclusive democratic system. After all, correcting previous biases and allowing previously disenfranchised people to join the public discussion is a vital part of democracy. However, in the short term this creates disturbances and disharmony. If no agreement is reached on how to conduct the public debate and how to reach decisions, the result is anarchy rather than democracy.

    The anarchical potential of AI is particularly alarming, because it is not only new human groups that it allows to join the public debate. For the first time ever, democracy must contend with a cacophony of nonhuman voices, too. On many social media platforms, bots constitute a sizable minority of participants. One analysis estimated that out of a sample of 20 million tweets generated during the 2016 U.S. election campaign, 3.8 million tweets (almost 20 percent) were generated by bots.48

    By the early 2020s, things got worse. A 2020 study assessed that bots were producing 43.2 percent of tweets.49 A more comprehensive 2022 study by the digital intelligence agency Similarweb found that 5 percent of Twitter users were probably bots, but they generated “between 20.8% and 29.2% of the content posted to Twitter.”50 When humans try to debate a crucial question like whom to elect as U.S. president, what happens if many of the voices they hear are produced by computers?

    Another worrying trend concerns content. Bots were initially deployed to influence public opinion by the sheer volume of messages they disseminated. They retweeted or recommended certain human-produced content, but they couldn’t create new ideas themselves, nor could they forge intimate bonds with humans. However, the new breed of generative AI tools like ChatGPT can do exactly that. In a 2023 study, published in Science Advances, researchers asked humans and ChatGPT to create both accurate and deliberately misleading short texts on issues such as vaccines, 5G technology, climate change, and evolution. The texts were then presented to seven hundred humans, who were asked to evaluate their reliability. The humans were good at recognizing the falsity of human-produced disinformation but tended to regard AI-produced disinformation as accurate.51

    So, what happens to democratic debates when millions—and eventually billions—of highly intelligent bots are not only composing extremely compelling political manifestos and creating deepfake images and videos but also able to win our trust and friendship? If I engage online in a political debate with an AI, it is a waste of time for me to try to change the AI’s opinions; being a nonconscious entity, it doesn’t really care about politics, and it cannot vote in the elections. But the more I talk with the AI, the better it gets to know me, so it can gain my trust, hone its arguments, and gradually change my views. In the battle for hearts and minds, intimacy is an extremely powerful weapon. Previously, political parties could command our attention, but they had difficulty mass-producing intimacy. Radio sets could broadcast a leader’s speech to millions, but they could not befriend the listeners. Now a political party, or even a foreign government, could deploy an army of bots that build friendships with millions of citizens and then use that intimacy to influence their worldview.

    Finally, algorithms are not only joining the conversation; they are increasingly orchestrating it. Social media allows new groups of humans to challenge the old rules of debate. But negotiations about the new rules are not conducted by humans. Rather, as explained in our previous analysis of social media algorithms, it is often the algorithms that make the rules. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when media moguls censored some views and promoted others, this might have undermined democracy, but at least the moguls were humans, and their decisions could be subjected to democratic scrutiny. It is far more dangerous if we allow inscrutable algorithms to decide which views to disseminate.

    If manipulative bots and inscrutable algorithms come to dominate the public conversation, this could cause democratic debate to collapse exactly when we need it most. Just when we must make momentous decisions about fast-evolving new technologies, the public sphere will be flooded by computer-generated fake news, citizens will not be able to tell whether they are having a debate with a human friend or a manipulative machine, and no consensus will remain about the most basic rules of discussion or the most basic facts. This kind of anarchical information network cannot produce either truth or order and cannot be sustained for long. If we end up with anarchy, the next step would probably be the establishment of a dictatorship as people agree to trade their liberty for some certainty.

    BAN THE BOTS

    In the face of the threat algorithms pose to the democratic conversation, democracies are not helpless. They can and should take measures to regulate AI and prevent it from polluting our infosphere with fake people spewing fake news. The philosopher Daniel Dennett has suggested that we can take inspiration from traditional regulations in the money market.52 Ever since coins and later banknotes were invented, it was always technically possible to counterfeit them. Counterfeiting posed an existential danger to the financial system, because it eroded people’s trust in money. If bad actors flooded the market with counterfeit money, the financial system would have collapsed. Yet the financial system managed to protect itself for thousands of years by enacting laws against counterfeiting money. As a result, only a relatively small percentage of money in circulation was forged, and people’s trust in it was maintained.53

    What’s true of counterfeiting money should also be true of counterfeiting humans. If governments took decisive action to protect trust in money, it makes sense to take equally decisive measures to protect trust in humans. Prior to the rise of AI, one human could pretend to be another, and society punished such frauds. But society didn’t bother to outlaw the creation of counterfeit humans, since the technology to do so didn’t exist. Now that AI can pass itself off as human, it threatens to destroy trust between humans and to unravel the fabric of society. Dennett suggests, therefore, that governments should outlaw fake humans as decisively as they have previously outlawed fake money.54

    The law should prohibit not just deepfaking specific real people—creating a fake video of the U.S. president, for example—but also any attempt by a nonhuman agent to pass itself off as a human. If anyone complains that such strict measures violate freedom of speech, they should be reminded that bots don’t have freedom of speech. Banning human beings from a public platform is a sensitive step, and democracies should be very careful about such censorship. However, banning bots is a simple issue: it doesn’t violate anyone’s rights, because bots don’t have rights.55

    None of this means that democracies must ban all bots, algorithms, and AIs from participating in any discussion. Digital tools are welcome to join many conversations, provided they don’t pretend to be humans. For example, AI doctors can be extremely helpful. They can monitor our health twenty-four hours a day, offer medical advice tailored to our individual medical conditions and personality, and answer our questions with infinite patience. But the AI doctor should never try to pass itself off as a human.

    Another important measure democracies can adopt is to ban unsupervised algorithms from curating key public debates. We can certainly continue to use algorithms to run social media platforms; obviously, no human can do that. But the principles the algorithms use to decide which voices to silence and which to amplify must be vetted by a human institution. While we should be careful about censoring genuine human views, we can forbid algorithms to deliberately spread outrage. At the very least, corporations should be transparent about the curation principles their algorithms follow. If they use outrage to capture our attention, let them be clear about their business model and about any political connections they might have. If the algorithm systematically disappears videos that aren’t aligned with the company’s political agenda, users should know this.

    These are just a few of numerous suggestions made in recent years for how democracies could regulate the entry of bots and algorithms into the public conversation. Naturally, each has its advantages and drawbacks, and none would be easy to implement. Also, since the technology is developing so rapidly, regulations are likely to become outdated quickly. What I would like to point out here is only that democracies can regulate the information market and that their very survival depends on these regulations. The naive view of information opposes regulation and believes that a completely free information market will spontaneously generate truth and order. This is completely divorced from the actual history of democracy. Preserving the democratic conversation has never been easy, and all venues where this conversation has previously taken place—from parliaments and town halls to newspapers and radio stations—have required regulation. This is doubly true in an era when an alien form of intelligence threatens to dominate the conversation.

    THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

    For most of history large-scale democracy was impossible because information technology wasn’t sophisticated enough to hold a large-scale political conversation. Millions of people spread over tens of thousands of square kilometers didn’t have the tools to conduct a real-time discussion of public affairs. Now, ironically, democracy may prove impossible because information technology is becoming too sophisticated. If unfathomable algorithms take over the conversation, and particularly if they quash reasoned arguments and stoke hate and confusion, public discussion cannot be maintained. Yet if democracies do collapse, it will likely result not from some kind of technological inevitability but from a human failure to regulate the new technology wisely.

    We cannot foretell how things will play out. At present, however, it is clear that the information network of many democracies is breaking down. Democrats and Republicans in the United States can no longer agree on even basic facts—such as who won the 2020 presidential elections—and can hardly hold a civil conversation anymore. Bipartisan cooperation in Congress, once a fundamental feature of U.S. politics, has almost disappeared.56 The same radicalizing processes occur in many other democracies, from the Philippines to Brazil. When citizens cannot talk with one another, and when they view each other as enemies rather than political rivals, democracy is untenable.

    Nobody knows for sure what is causing the breakdown of democratic information networks. Some say it results from ideological fissures, but in fact in many dysfunctional democracies the ideological gaps don’t seem to be bigger than in previous generations. In the 1960s, the United States was riven by deep ideological conflicts about the civil rights movement, the sexual revolution, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War. These tensions caused a surge in political violence and assassinations, but Republicans and Democrats were still able to agree on the results of elections, they maintained a common belief in democratic institutions like the courts,57 and they were able to work together in Congress at least on some issues. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed in the Senate with the support of forty-six Democrats and twenty-seven Republicans. Is the ideological gap in the 2020s that much bigger than it was in the 1960s? And if it isn’t ideology, what is driving people apart?

    Many point the finger at social media algorithms. We have explored the divisive impact of social media in previous chapters, but despite the damning evidence it seems that there must be additional factors at play. The truth is that while we can easily observe that the democratic information network is breaking down, we aren’t sure why. That itself is a characteristic of the times. The information network has become so complicated, and it relies to such an extent on opaque algorithmic decisions and inter-computer entities, that it has become very difficult for humans to answer even the most basic of political questions: Why are we fighting each other?
    If we cannot discover what is broken and fix it, large-scale democracies may not survive the rise of computer technology. If this indeed comes to pass, what might replace democracy as the dominant political system? Does the future belong to totalitarian regimes, or might computers make totalitarianism untenable too? As we shall see, human dictators have their own reasons to be terrified of AI.

    CHAPTER 10 Totalitarianism: All Power to the Algorithms?

    Discussions of the ethics and politics of the new computer network often focus on the fate of democracies. If authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are mentioned, it is mainly as the dystopian destination that “we” might reach if “we” fail to manage the computer network wisely.1 However, as of 2024, more than half of “us” already live under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes,2 many of which were established long before the rise of the computer network. To understand the impact of algorithms and AI on humankind, we should ask ourselves what their impact will be not only on democracies like the United States and Brazil but also on the Chinese Communist Party and the royal house of Saud.

    As explained in previous chapters, the information technology available in premodern eras made both large-scale democracy and large-scale totalitarianism unworkable. Large polities like the Chinese Han Empire and the eighteenth-century Saudi emirate of Diriyah were usually limited autocracies. In the twentieth century, new information technology enabled the rise of both large-scale democracy and large-scale totalitarianism, but totalitarianism suffered from a severe disadvantage. Totalitarianism seeks to channel all information to one hub and process it there. Technologies like the telegraph, the telephone, the typewriter, and the radio facilitated the centralization of information, but they couldn’t process the information and make decisions by themselves. This remained something that only humans could do.

    The more information flowed to the center, the harder it became to process it. Totalitarian rulers and parties often made costly mistakes, and the system lacked mechanisms to identify and correct these errors. The democratic way of distributing information—and the power to make decisions—between many institutions and individuals worked better. It could cope far more efficiently with the flood of data, and if one institution made a wrong decision, it could eventually be rectified by others.

    The rise of machine-learning algorithms, however, may be exactly what the Stalins of the world have been waiting for. AI could tilt the technological balance of power in favor of totalitarianism. Indeed, whereas flooding people with data tends to overwhelm them and therefore leads to errors, flooding AI with data tends to make it more efficient. Consequently, AI seems to favor the concentration of information and decision making in one place.

    Even in democratic countries, a few corporations like Google, Facebook, and Amazon have become monopolies in their domains, partly because AI tips the balance in favor of the giants. In traditional industries like restaurants, size isn’t an overwhelming advantage. McDonald’s is a worldwide chain that feeds more than fifty million people a day,3 and its size gives it many advantages in terms of costs, branding, and so forth. You can nevertheless open a neighborhood restaurant that could hold its own against the local McDonald’s. Even though your restaurant might be serving just two hundred customers a day, you still have a chance of making better food than McDonald’s and gaining the loyalty of happier customers.

    It works differently in the information market. The Google search engine is used every day by between two and three billion people making 8.5 billion searches.4 Suppose a local start-up search engine tries to compete with Google. It doesn’t stand a chance. Because Google is already used by billions, it has so much more data at its disposal that it can train far better algorithms, which will attract even more traffic, which will be used to train the next generation of algorithms, and so on. Consequently, in 2023 Google controlled 91.5 percent of the global search market.5

    Or consider genetics. Suppose several companies in different countries try to develop an algorithm that identifies connections between genes and medical conditions. New Zealand has a population of 5 million people, and privacy regulations restrict access to their genetic and medical records. China has about 1.4 billion inhabitants and laxer privacy regulations.6 Who do you think has a better chance of developing a genetic algorithm? If Brazil then wants to buy a genetic algorithm for its health-care system, it would have a strong incentive to opt for the much more accurate Chinese algorithm than the one from New Zealand. If the Chinese algorithm then hones itself on more than 200 million Brazilians, it will get even better. Which would prompt more countries to choose the Chinese algorithm. Soon enough, most of the world’s medical information would flow to China, making its genetic algorithm unbeatable.

    The attempt to concentrate all information and power in one place, which was the Achilles’ heel of twentieth-century totalitarian regimes, might become a decisive advantage in the age of AI. At the same time, as noted in an earlier chapter, AI could also make it possible for totalitarian regimes to establish total surveillance systems that make resistance almost impossible.

    Some people believe that blockchain could provide a technological check on such totalitarian tendencies, because blockchain is inherently friendly to democracy and hostile to totalitarianism. In a blockchain system, decisions require the approval of 51 percent of users. That may sound democratic, but blockchain technology has a fatal flaw. The problem lies with the word “users.” If one person has ten accounts, she counts as ten users. If a government controls 51 percent of accounts, then the government constitutes 51 percent of the users. There are already examples of blockchain networks where a government is 51 percent of users.7

    And when a government is 51 percent of users in a blockchain, it gives the government control not just over the chain’s present but even over its past. Autocrats have always wanted the power to change the past. Roman emperors, for example, frequently engaged in the practice of damnatio memoriae—expunging the memory of rivals and enemies. After the emperor Caracalla murdered his brother and competitor for the throne, Geta, he tried to obliterate the latter’s memory. Inscriptions bearing Geta’s name were chiseled out, coins bearing his effigy were melted down, and the mere mentioning of Geta’s name was punishable by death.8 One surviving painting from the time, the Severan Tondo, was made during the reign of their father—Septimius Severus—and originally showed both brothers together with Septimius and their mother, Julia Domna. But someone later not only obliterated Geta’s face but smeared excrement over it. Forensic analysis identified tiny pieces of dry shit where Geta’s face should have been.9

    Modern totalitarian regimes have been similarly fond of changing the past. After Stalin rose to power, he made a supreme effort to delete Trotsky—the architect of the Bolshevik Revolution and the founder of the Red Army—from all historical records. During the Stalinist Great Terror of 1937–39, whenever prominent people like Nikolai Bukharin and Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky were purged and executed, evidence of their existence was erased from books, academic papers, photographs, and paintings.10 This degree of erasure demanded a huge manual effort. With blockchain, changing the past would be far easier. A government that controls 51 percent of users can disappear people from history at the press of a button.

    THE BOT PRISON

    While there are many ways in which AI can cement central power, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have their own problems with it. First and foremost, dictatorships lack experience in controlling inorganic agents. The foundation of every despotic information network is terror. But computers are not afraid of being imprisoned or killed. If a chatbot on the Russian internet mentions the war crimes committed by Russian troops in Ukraine, tells an irreverent joke about Vladimir Putin, or criticizes the corruption of Putin’s United Russia party, what could the Putin regime do to that chatbot? FSB agents cannot imprison it, torture it, or threaten its family. The government could of course block or delete it, and try to find and punish its human creators, but this is a much more difficult task than disciplining human users.

    In the days when computers could not generate content by themselves, and could not hold an intelligent conversation, only a human being could express dissenting opinions on Russian social network channels like VKontakte and Odnoklassniki. If that human being was physically in Russia, they risked the wrath of the Russian authorities. If that human being was physically outside Russia, the authorities could try to block their access. But what happens if Russian cyberspace is filled by millions of bots that can generate content and hold conversations, learning and developing by themselves? These bots might be preprogrammed by Russian dissidents or foreign actors to intentionally spread unorthodox views, and it might be impossible for the authorities to prevent it. Even worse, from the viewpoint of Putin’s regime, what happens if authorized bots gradually develop dissenting views by themselves, simply by collecting information on what is happening in Russia and spotting patterns in it?

    That’s the alignment problem, Russian-style. Russia’s human engineers can do their best to create AIs that are totally aligned with the regime, but given the ability of AI to learn and change by itself, how can the human engineers ensure that the AI never deviates into illicit territory? It is particularly interesting to note that as George Orwell explained in Nineteen Eighty-Four, totalitarian information networks often rely on doublespeak. Russia is an authoritarian state that claims to be a democracy. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been the largest war in Europe since 1945, yet officially it is defined as a “special military operation,” and referring to it as a “war” has been criminalized and is punishable by a prison term of up to three years or a fine of up to fifty thousand rubles.11

    The Russian Constitution makes grandiose promises about how “everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought and speech” (Article 29.1), how “everyone shall have the right freely to seek, receive, transmit, produce and disseminate information” (29.4), and how “the freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited” (29.5). Hardly any Russian citizen is naive enough to take these promises at face value. But computers are bad at understanding doublespeak. A chatbot instructed to adhere to Russian law and values might read that constitution and conclude that freedom of speech is a core Russian value. Then, after spending a few days in Russian cyberspace and monitoring what is happening in the Russian information sphere, the chatbot might start criticizing the Putin regime for violating the core Russian value of freedom of speech. Humans too notice such contradictions, but avoid pointing them out, due to fear. But what would prevent a chatbot from pointing out damning patterns? And how might Russian engineers explain to a chatbot that though the Russian Constitution guarantees all citizens freedom of speech and forbids censorship, the chatbot shouldn’t actually believe the constitution nor should it ever mention the gap between theory and reality? As the Ukrainian guide told me at Chernobyl, people in totalitarian countries grow up with the idea that questions lead to trouble. But if you train an algorithm on the principle that “questions lead to trouble,” how will that algorithm learn and develop?

    Finally, if the government adopts some disastrous policy and then changes its mind, it usually covers itself by blaming the disaster on someone else. Humans learn the hard way to forget facts that might get them in trouble. But how would you train a chatbot to forget that the policy vilified today was actually the official line only a year ago? This is a major technological challenge that dictatorships will find difficult to deal with, especially as chatbots become more powerful and more opaque.

    Of course, democracies face analogous problems with chatbots that say unwelcome things or raise dangerous questions. What happens if despite the best efforts of Microsoft or Facebook engineers, their chatbot begins spewing racist slurs? The advantage of democracies is that they have far more leeway in dealing with such rogue algorithms. Because democracies take freedom of speech seriously, they keep far fewer skeletons in their closet, and they have developed a relatively high level of tolerance even to antidemocratic speech. Dissident bots will present a far bigger challenge to totalitarian regimes that have entire cemeteries in their closets and zero tolerance of criticism.

    ALGORITHMIC TAKEOVER

    In the long term, totalitarian regimes are likely to face an even bigger danger: instead of criticizing them, an algorithm might gain control of them. Throughout history, the biggest threat to autocrats usually came from their own subordinates. As noted in chapter 4, no Roman emperor or Soviet premier was toppled by a democratic revolution, but they were always in danger of being overthrown or turned into puppets by their own subordinates. If a twenty-first-century autocrat gives computers too much power, that autocrat might become their puppet. The last thing a dictator wants is to create something more powerful than himself, or a force that he does not know how to control.

    To illustrate the point, allow me to use an admittedly outlandish thought experiment, the totalitarian equivalent of Bostrom’s paper-clip apocalypse. Imagine that the year is 2050, and the Great Leader is woken up at four in the morning by an urgent call from the Surveillance & Security Algorithm. “Great Leader, we are facing an emergency. I’ve crunched trillions of data points, and the pattern is unmistakable: the defense minister is planning to assassinate you in the morning and take power himself. The hit squad is ready, waiting for his command. Give me the order, though, and I’ll liquidate him with a precision strike.”
    “But the defense minister is my most loyal supporter,” says the Great Leader. “Only yesterday he said to me—”
    “Great Leader, I know what he said to you. I hear everything. But I also know what he said afterward to the hit squad. And for months I’ve been picking up disturbing patterns in the data.”
    “Are you sure you were not fooled by deepfakes?”
    “I’m afraid the data I relied on is 100 percent genuine,” says the algorithm. “I checked it with my special deepfake-detecting sub-algorithm. I can explain exactly how we know it isn’t a deepfake, but that would take us a couple of weeks. I didn’t want to alert you before I was sure, but the data points converge on an inescapable conclusion: a coup is under way. Unless we act now, the assassins will be here in an hour. But give me the order, and I’ll liquidate the traitor.”

    By giving so much power to the Surveillance & Security Algorithm, the Great Leader has placed himself in an impossible situation. If he distrusts the algorithm, he may be assassinated by the defense minister, but if he trusts the algorithm and purges the defense minister, he becomes the algorithm’s puppet. Whenever anyone tries to make a move against the algorithm, the algorithm knows exactly how to manipulate the Great Leader. Note that the algorithm doesn’t need to be a conscious entity to engage in such maneuvers. As Bostrom’s paper-clip thought experiment indicates—and as GPT-4 lying to the TaskRabbit worker demonstrated on a small scale—a nonconscious algorithm may seek to accumulate power and manipulate people even without having any human drives like greed or egotism.

    If algorithms ever develop capabilities like those in the thought experiment, dictatorships would be far more vulnerable to algorithmic takeover than democracies. It would be difficult for even a super-Machiavellian AI to seize power in a distributed democratic system like the United States. Even if the AI learns to manipulate the U.S. president, it might face opposition from Congress, the Supreme Court, state governors, the media, major corporations, and sundry NGOs. How would the algorithm, for example, deal with a Senate filibuster?

    Seizing power in a highly centralized system is much easier. When all power is concentrated in the hands of one person, whoever controls access to the autocrat can control the autocrat—and the entire state. To hack the system, one needs to learn to manipulate just a single individual. An archetypal case is how the Roman emperor Tiberius became the puppet of Lucius Aelius Sejanus, the commander of the Praetorian Guard.

    The Praetorians were initially established by Augustus as a small imperial bodyguard. Augustus appointed two prefects to command the bodyguard so that neither could gain too much power over him.12 Tiberius, however, was not as wise. His paranoia was his greatest weakness. Sejanus, one of the two Praetorian prefects, artfully played on Tiberius’s fears. He constantly uncovered alleged plots to assassinate Tiberius, many of which were pure fantasies. The suspicious emperor grew more distrustful of everyone except Sejanus. He made Sejanus sole prefect of the Praetorian Guard, expanded it into an army of twelve thousand, and gave Sejanus’s men additional roles in policing and administrating the city of Rome. Finally, Sejanus persuaded Tiberius to move out of the capital to Capri, arguing that it would be much easier to protect the emperor on a small island than in a crowded metropolis full of traitors and spies. In truth, explained the Roman historian Tacitus, Sejanus’s aim was to control all the information reaching the emperor: “Access to the emperor would be under his own control, and letters, for the most part being conveyed by soldiers, would pass through his hands.”13

    With the Praetorians controlling Rome, Tiberius isolated in Capri, and Sejanus controlling all information reaching Tiberius, the Praetorian commander became the true ruler of the empire. Sejanus purged anyone who might oppose him—including members of the imperial family—by falsely accusing them of treason. Since nobody could contact the emperor without Sejanus’s permission, Tiberius was reduced to a puppet.

    Eventually someone—perhaps Tiberius’s sister-in-law Antonia—located an opening in Sejanus’s information cordon. A letter was smuggled to the emperor, explaining to him what was going on. But by the time Tiberius woke up to the danger and resolved to get rid of Sejanus, he was almost helpless. How could he topple the man who controlled not just the bodyguards but also all communications with the outside world? If he tried to make a move, Sejanus could imprison him on Capri indefinitely and inform the Senate and the army that the emperor was too ill to travel anywhere.

    Tiberius nevertheless managed to turn the tables on Sejanus. As Sejanus grew in power and became preoccupied with running the empire, he lost touch with the day-to-day minutiae of Rome’s security apparatus. Tiberius managed to secretly gain the support of Naevius Sutorius Macro, commander of Rome’s fire brigade and night watch. Macro orchestrated a coup against Sejanus, and as a reward Tiberius made Macro the new commander of the Praetorian Guard. A few years later, Macro had Tiberius killed.14

    Power lies at the nexus where the information channels merge. Since Tiberius allowed the information channels to merge in the person of Sejanus, the latter became the true center of power, while Tiberius was reduced to a puppet.

    The fate of Tiberius indicates the delicate balance that all dictators must strike. They try to concentrate all information in one place, but they must be careful that the different channels of information are allowed to merge only in their own person. If the information channels merge somewhere else, that then becomes the true nexus of power. When the regime relies on humans like Sejanus and Macro, a skillful dictator can play them one against the other in order to remain on top. Stalin’s purges were all about that. Yet when a regime relies on a powerful but inscrutable AI that gathers and analyzes all information, the human dictator is in danger of losing all power. He may remain in the capital and yet be isolated on a digital island, controlled and manipulated by the AI.

    THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA

    In the next few years, the dictators of our world face more urgent problems than an algorithmic takeover. No current AI system can manipulate regimes at such a scale. However, totalitarian systems are already in danger of putting far too much trust in algorithms. Whereas democracies assume that everyone is fallible, in totalitarian regimes the fundamental assumption is that the ruling party or the supreme leader is always right. Regimes based on that assumption are conditioned to believe in the existence of an infallible intelligence and are reluctant to create strong self-correcting mechanisms that might monitor and regulate the genius at the top.

    Until now such regimes placed their faith in human parties and leaders and were hothouses for the growth of personality cults. But in the twenty-first century this totalitarian tradition prepares them to expect AI infallibility. Systems that could believe in the perfect genius of a Mussolini, a Ceauşescu, or a Khomeini are primed to also believe in the flawless genius of a superintelligent computer. This could have disastrous results for their citizens, and potentially for the rest of the world as well. What happens if the algorithm in charge of environmental policy makes a big mistake, but there are no self-correcting mechanisms that can identify and correct its error? What happens if the algorithm running the state’s social credit system begins terrorizing not just the general population but even the members of the ruling party and simultaneously begins to label anyone that questions its policies “an enemy of the people”?

    Dictators have always suffered from weak self-correcting mechanisms and have always been threatened by powerful subordinates. The rise of AI may greatly exacerbate these problems. The computer network therefore presents dictators with an excruciating dilemma. They could decide to escape the clutches of their human underlings by trusting a supposedly infallible technology, in which case they might become the technology’s puppet. Or, they could build a human institution to supervise the AI, but that institution might limit their own power, too.

    If even just a few of the world’s dictators choose to put their trust in AI, this could have far-reaching consequences for the whole of humanity. Science fiction is full of scenarios of an AI getting out of control and enslaving or eliminating humankind. Most sci-fi plots explore these scenarios in the context of democratic capitalist societies. This is understandable. Authors living in democracies are obviously interested in their own societies, whereas authors living in dictatorships are usually discouraged from criticizing their rulers. But the weakest spot in humanity’s anti-AI shield is probably the dictators. The easiest way for an AI to seize power is not by breaking out of Dr. Frankenstein’s lab but by ingratiating itself with some paranoid Tiberius.

    This is not a prophecy, just a possibility. After 1945, dictators and their subordinates cooperated with democratic governments and their citizens to contain nuclear weapons. On July 9, 1955, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, and a number of other eminent scientists and thinkers published the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, calling on the leaders of both democracies and dictatorships to cooperate on preventing nuclear war. “We appeal,” said the manifesto, “as human beings, to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”15 This is true of AI too. It would be foolish of dictators to believe that AI will necessarily tilt the balance of power in their favor. If they aren’t careful, AI will just grab power to itself.

    CHAPTER 11 The Silicon Curtain: Global Empire or Global Split?

    The previous two chapters explored how different human societies might react to the rise of the new computer network. But we live in an interconnected world, where the decisions of one country can have a profound impact on others. Some of the gravest dangers posed by AI do not result from the internal dynamics of a single human society. Rather, they arise from dynamics involving many societies, which might lead to new arms races, new wars, and new imperial expansions.

    Computers are not yet powerful enough to completely escape our control or destroy human civilization by themselves. As long as humanity stands united, we can build institutions that will control AI and will identify and correct algorithmic errors. Unfortunately, humanity has never been united. We have always been plagued by bad actors, as well as by disagreements between good actors. The rise of AI, then, poses an existential danger to humankind not because of the malevolence of computers but because of our own shortcomings.

    Thus, a paranoid dictator might hand unlimited power to a fallible AI, including even the power to launch nuclear strikes. If the dictator trusts his AI more than his defense minister, wouldn’t it make sense to have the AI supervise the country’s most powerful weapons? If the AI then makes an error, or begins to pursue an alien goal, the result could be catastrophic, and not just for that country.

    Similarly, terrorists focused on events in one corner of the world might use AI to instigate a global pandemic. The terrorists might be more versed in some apocalyptic mythology than in the science of epidemiology, but they just need to set the goal, and all else will be done by their AI. The AI could synthesize a new pathogen, order it from commercial laboratories or print it in biological 3-D printers, and devise the best strategy to spread it around the world, via airports or food supply chains. What if the AI synthesizes a virus that is as deadly as Ebola, as contagious as COVID-19, and as slow acting as AIDS? By the time the first victims begin to die, and the world is alerted to the danger, most people on earth might have already been infected.1

    As we have seen in previous chapters, human civilization is threatened not only by physical and biological weapons of mass destruction like atom bombs and viruses. Human civilization could also be destroyed by weapons of social mass destruction, like stories that undermine our social bonds. An AI developed in one country could be used to unleash a deluge of fake news, fake money, and fake humans so that people in numerous other countries lose the ability to trust anything or anyone.

    Many societies—both democracies and dictatorships—may act responsibly to regulate such usages of AI, clamp down on bad actors, and restrain the dangerous ambitions of their own rulers and fanatics. But if even a handful of societies fail to do so, this could be enough to endanger the whole of humankind. Climate change can devastate even countries that adopt excellent environmental regulations, because it is a global rather than a national problem. AI, too, is a global problem. Countries would be naive to imagine that as long as they regulate AI wisely within their own borders, these regulations will protect them from the worst outcomes of the AI revolution. Accordingly, to understand the new computer politics, it is not enough to examine how discrete societies might react to AI. We also need to consider how AI might change relations between societies on a global level.

    At present, the world is divided into about two hundred nation-states, most of which gained their independence only after 1945. They are not all equal. The list contains two superpowers, a handful of major powers, several blocs and alliances, and a lot of smaller fish. Still, even the tiniest states enjoy some leverage, as evidenced by their ability to play the superpowers against each other. In the early 2020s, for example, China and the United States competed for influence in the strategically important South Pacific region. Both superpowers courted island nations like Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Solomon Islands. The governments of these small nations—whose populations range from 740,000 (Solomon Islands) to 11,000 (Tuvalu)—had substantial leeway to decide which way to tack and were able to extract considerable concessions and aid.2

    Other small states, such as Qatar, have established themselves as important players in the geopolitical arena. With only 300,000 citizens, Qatar is nevertheless pursuing ambitious foreign policy aims in the Middle East, is playing an outsized rule in the global economy, and is home to Al Jazeera, the Arab world’s most influential TV network. One might argue that Qatar is able to punch well above its size because it is the third-largest exporter of natural gas in the world. Yet in a different international setting, that would have made Qatar not an independent actor but the first course on the menu of any imperial conqueror. It is telling that, as of 2024, Qatar’s much bigger neighbors, and the world’s hegemonic powers, are letting the tiny Gulf state hold on to its fabulous riches. Many people describe the international system as a jungle. If so, it is a jungle in which tigers allow fat chickens to live in relative safety.

    Qatar, Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Solomon Islands all indicate that we are living in a postimperial era. They gained their independence from the British Empire in the 1970s, as part of the final demise of the European imperial order. The leverage they now have in the international arena testifies that in the first quarter of the twenty-first century power is distributed between a relatively large number of players, rather than monopolized by a few empires.

    How might the rise of the new computer network change the shape of international politics? Aside from apocalyptic scenarios such as a dictatorial AI launching a nuclear war, or a terrorist AI instigating a lethal pandemic, computers pose two main challenges to the current international system. First, since computers make it easier to concentrate information and power in a central hub, humanity could enter a new imperial era. A few empires (or perhaps a single empire) might bring the whole world under a much tighter grip than that of the British Empire or the Soviet Empire. Tonga, Tuvalu, and Qatar would be transformed from independent states into colonial possessions—just as they were fifty years ago.

    Second, humanity could split along a new Silicon Curtain that would pass between rival digital empires. As each regime chooses its own answer to the AI alignment problem, to the dictator’s dilemma, and to other technological quandaries, each might create a separate and very different computer network. The various networks might then find it ever more difficult to interact, and so would the humans they control. Qataris living as part of an Iranian or Russian network, Tongans living as part of a Chinese network, and Tuvaluans living as part of an American network could come to have such different life experiences and worldviews that they would hardly be able to communicate or to agree on much.

    If these developments indeed materialize, they could easily lead to their own apocalyptic outcome. Perhaps each empire can keep its nuclear weapons under human control and its lunatics away from bioweapons. But a human species divided into hostile camps that cannot understand each other stands a small chance of avoiding devastating wars or preventing catastrophic climate change. A world of rival empires separated by an opaque Silicon Curtain would also be incapable of regulating the explosive power of AI.

    THE RISE OF DIGITAL EMPIRES

    In chapter 9 we touched briefly on the link between the Industrial Revolution and modern imperialism. It was not evident, at the beginning, that industrial technology would have much of an impact on empire building. When the first steam engines were put to use to pump water in British coal mines in the eighteenth century, no one foresaw that they would eventually power the most ambitious imperial projects in human history. When the Industrial Revolution subsequently gathered steam in the early nineteenth century, it was driven by private businesses, because governments and armies were relatively slow to appreciate its potential geopolitical impact. The world’s first commercial railway, for example, which opened in 1830 between Liverpool and Manchester, was built and operated by the privately owned Liverpool and Manchester Railway Company. The same was true of most other early railway lines in the U.K., the United States, France, Germany, and elsewhere. At that point, it wasn’t at all clear why governments or armies should get involved in such commercial enterprises.

    By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the governments and armed forces of the leading industrial powers had fully recognized the immense geopolitical potential of modern industrial technology. The need for raw materials and markets justified imperialism, while industrial technologies made imperial conquests easier. Steamships were crucial, for example, to the British victory over the Chinese in the Opium Wars, and railroads played a decisive role in the American expansion west and the Russian expansion east and south. Indeed, entire imperial projects were shaped around the construction of railroads such as the Trans-Siberian and Trans-Caspian Russian lines, the German dream of a Berlin-Baghdad railway, and the British dream of building a railway from Cairo to the Cape.3

    Nevertheless, most polities didn’t join the burgeoning industrial arms race in time. Some lacked the capacity to do so, like the Melanesian chiefdoms of the Solomon Islands and the Al Thani tribe of Qatar. Others, like the Burmese Empire, the Ashanti Empire, and the Chinese Empire, might have had the capacity but lacked the will and foresight. Their rulers and inhabitants either didn’t follow developments in places like the British Midlands or didn’t think they had much to do with them. Why should the rice farmers of the Irrawaddy basin in Burma or the Yangtze basin in China concern themselves about the Liverpool–Manchester Railway? By the end of the nineteenth century, however, these rice farmers found themselves either conquered or indirectly exploited by the British Empire. Most other stragglers in the industrial race also ended up dominated by one industrial power or other. Could something similar happen with AI?

    When the race to develop AI gathered steam in the early years of the twenty-first century, it too was initially spearheaded by private entrepreneurs in a handful of countries. They set their sights on centralizing the world’s flow of information. Google wanted to organize all the world’s information in one place. Amazon sought to centralize all the world’s shopping. Facebook wished to connect all the world’s social spheres. But concentrating all the world’s information is neither practical nor helpful unless one can centrally process that information. And in 2000, when Google’s search engine was making its baby steps, when Amazon was a modest online bookshop, and when Mark Zuckerberg was in high school, the AI necessary to centrally process oceans of data was nowhere at hand. But some people bet it was just around the corner.

    Kevin Kelly, the founding editor of Wired magazine, recounted how in 2002 he attended a small party at Google and struck up a conversation with Larry Page. “Larry, I still don’t get it. There are so many search companies. Web search, for free? Where does that get you?” Page explained that Google wasn’t focused on search at all. “We’re really making an AI,” he said.4 Having lots of data makes it easier to create an AI. And AI can turn lots of data into lots of power.

    By the 2010s, the dream was becoming a reality. Like every major historical revolution, the rise of AI was a gradual process involving numerous steps. And like every revolution, a few of these steps were seen as turning points, just like the opening of the Liverpool–Manchester Railway. In the prolific literature on the story of AI, two events pop up again and again. The first occurred when, on September 30, 2012, a convolutional neural network called AlexNet won the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge.

    If you have no idea what a convolutional neural network is, and if you have never heard of the ImageNet challenge, you are not alone. More than 99 percent of us are in the same situation, which is why AlexNet’s victory was hardly front-page news in 2012. But some humans did hear about AlexNet’s victory and decoded the writing on the wall.

    They knew, for example, that ImageNet is a database of millions of annotated digital images. Did a website ever ask you to prove that you are not a robot by looking at a set of images and indicating which ones contain a car or a cat? The images you clicked were perhaps added to the ImageNet database. The same thing might also have happened to tagged images of your pet cat that you uploaded online. The ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge tests various algorithms on how well they are able to identify the annotated images in the database. Can they correctly identify the cats? When humans are asked to do it, out of one hundred cat images we correctly identify ninety-five as cats. In 2010 the best algorithms had a success rate of only 72 percent. In 2011 the algorithmic success rate crawled up to 75 percent. In 2012 the AlexNet algorithm won the challenge and stunned the still minuscule community of AI experts by achieving a success rate of 85 percent. While this improvement may not sound like much to laypersons, it demonstrated to the experts the potential for rapid progress in certain AI domains. By 2015 a Microsoft algorithm achieved 96 percent accuracy, surpassing the human ability to identify cat images.

    In 2016, The Economist published a piece titled “From Not Working to Neural Networking” that asked, “How has artificial intelligence, associated with hubris and disappointment since its earliest days, suddenly become the hottest field in technology?” It pointed to AlexNet’s victory as the moment when “people started to pay attention, not just within the AI community but across the technology industry as a whole.” The article was illustrated with an image of a robotic hand holding up a photo of a cat.5

    All those cat images that tech giants had been harvesting from across the world, without paying a penny to either users or tax collectors, turned out to be incredibly valuable. The AI race was on, and the competitors were running on cat images. At the same time that AlexNet was preparing for the ImageNet challenge, Google too was training its AI on cat images, and even created a dedicated cat-image-generating AI called the Meow Generator.6 The technology developed by recognizing cute kittens was later deployed for more predatory purposes. For example, Israel relied on it to create the Red Wolf, Blue Wolf, and Wolf Pack apps used by Israeli soldiers for facial recognition of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.7 The ability to recognize cat images also led to the algorithms Iran uses to automatically recognize unveiled women and enforce its hijab laws. As explained in chapter 8, massive amounts of data are required to train machine-learning algorithms. Without millions of cat images uploaded and annotated for free by people across the world, it would not have been possible to train the AlexNet algorithm or the Meow Generator, which in turn served as the template for subsequent AIs with far-reaching economic, political, and military potential.8

    Just as in the early nineteenth century the effort to build railways was pioneered by private entrepreneurs, so in the early twenty-first century private corporations were the initial main competitors in the AI race. The executives of Google, Facebook, Alibaba, and Baidu saw the value of recognizing cat images before the presidents and generals did. The second eureka moment, when the presidents and generals caught on to what was happening, occurred in mid-March 2016. It was the aforementioned victory of Google’s AlphaGo over Lee Sedol. Whereas AlexNet’s achievement was largely ignored by politicians, AlphaGo’s triumph sent shock waves through government offices, especially in East Asia. In China and neighboring countries go is a cultural treasure and considered an ideal training for aspiring strategists and policy makers. In March 2016, or so the mythology of AI would have it, the Chinese government realized that the age of AI had begun.9

    It is little wonder that the Chinese government was probably the first to understand the full importance of what was happening. In the nineteenth century, China was late to appreciate the potential of the Industrial Revolution and was slow to adopt inventions like railroads and steamships. It consequently suffered what the Chinese call “the century of humiliations.” After having been the world’s greatest superpower for centuries, failing to adopt modern industrial technology brought China to its knees. It was repeatedly defeated in wars, partially conquered by foreigners, and thoroughly exploited by the powers that did understand railroads and steamships. The Chinese vowed never again to miss the train.

    In 2017, China’s government released its “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Plan,” which announced that “by 2030, China’s AI theories, technologies, and application should achieve world-leading levels, making China the world’s primary AI innovation center.”10 In the following years China poured enormous resources into AI so that by the early 2020s it is already leading the world in several AI-related fields and catching up with the United States in others.11

    Of course, the Chinese government wasn’t the only one that woke up to the importance of AI. On September 1, 2017, President Putin of Russia declared, “Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind.… Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” In January 2018, Prime Minister Modi of India concurred that “the one who control [sic] the data will control the world.”12 In February 2019, President Trump signed an executive order on AI, saying that “the age of AI has arrived” and that “continued American leadership in Artificial Intelligence is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national security of the United States.”13 The United States at the time was already the leader in the AI race, thanks largely to efforts of visionary private entrepreneurs. But what began as a commercial competition between corporations was turning into a match between governments, or perhaps more accurately, into a race between competing teams, each made of one government and several corporations. The prize for the winner? World domination.

    DATA COLONIALISM

    In the sixteenth century, when Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch conquistadors were building the first global empires in history, they came with sailing ships, horses, and gunpowder. When the British, Russians, and Japanese made their bids for hegemony in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they relied on steamships, locomotives, and machine guns. In the twenty-first century, to dominate a colony, you no longer need to send in the gunboats. You need to take out the data. A few corporations or governments harvesting the world’s data could transform the rest of the globe into data colonies—territories they control not with overt military force but with information.14

    Imagine a situation—in twenty years, say—when somebody in Beijing or San Francisco possesses the entire personal history of every politician, journalist, colonel, and CEO in your country: every text they ever sent, every web search they ever made, every illness they suffered, every sexual encounter they enjoyed, every joke they told, every bribe they took. Would you still be living in an independent country, or would you now be living in a data colony? What happens when your country finds itself utterly dependent on digital infrastructures and AI-powered systems over which it has no effective control?

    Such a situation can lead to a new kind of data colonialism in which control of data is used to dominate faraway colonies. Mastery of AI and data could also give the new empires control of people’s attention. As we have already discussed, in the 2010s American social media giants like Facebook and YouTube upended the politics of distant countries like Myanmar and Brazil in pursuit of profit. Future digital empires may do something similar for political interests.

    Fears of psychological warfare, data colonialism, and loss of control over their cyberspace have led many countries to already block what they see as dangerous apps. China has banned Facebook, YouTube, and many other Western social media apps and websites. Russia has banned almost all Western social media apps as well as some Chinese ones. In 2020, India banned TikTok, WeChat, and numerous other Chinese apps on the grounds that they were “prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of state and public order.”15 The United States has been debating whether to ban TikTok—concerned that the app might be serving Chinese interests—and as of 2023 it is illegal to use it on the devices of almost all federal employees, state employees, and government contractors.16 Lawmakers in the U.K., New Zealand, and other countries have also expressed concerns over TikTok.17 Numerous other governments, from Iran to Ethiopia, have blocked various apps like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Telegram, and Instagram.

    Data colonialism could also manifest itself in the spread of social credit systems. What might happen, for example, if a dominant player in the global digital economy decides to establish a social credit system that harvests data anywhere it can and scores not only its own nationals but people throughout the world? Foreigners couldn’t just shrug off their score, because it might affect them in numerous ways, from buying flight tickets to applying for visas, scholarships, and jobs. Just as tourists use the global scores given by foreign corporations like Tripadvisor and Airbnb to evaluate restaurants and vacation homes even in their own country, and just as people throughout the world use the U.S. dollar for commercial transactions, so people everywhere might begin to use a Chinese or an American social credit score for local social interactions.

    Becoming a data colony will have economic as well as political and social consequences. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, if you were a colony of an industrial power like Belgium or Britain, it usually meant that you provided raw materials, while the cutting-edge industries that made the biggest profits remained in the imperial hub. Egypt exported cotton to Britain and imported high-end textiles. Malaya provided rubber for tires; Coventry made the cars.18

    Something analogous is likely to happen with data colonialism. The raw material for the AI industry is data. To produce AI that recognizes images, you need cat photos. To produce the trendiest fashion, you need data on fashion trends. To produce autonomous vehicles, you need data about traffic patterns and car accidents. To produce health-care AI, you need data about genes and medical conditions. In a new imperial information economy, raw data will be harvested throughout the world and will flow to the imperial hub. There the cutting-edge technology will be developed, producing unbeatable algorithms that know how to identify cats, predict fashion trends, drive autonomous vehicles, and diagnose diseases. These algorithms will then be exported back to the data colonies. Data from Egypt and Malaysia might make a corporation in San Francisco or Beijing rich, while people in Cairo and Kuala Lumpur remain poor, because neither the profits nor the power is distributed back.

    The nature of the new information economy might make the imbalance between imperial hub and exploited colony worse than ever. In ancient times land—rather than information—was the most important economic asset. This precluded the overconcentration of all wealth and power in a single hub. As long as land was paramount, considerable wealth and power always remained in the hands of provincial landowners. A Roman emperor, for example, could put down one provincial revolt after another, but on the day after decapitating the last rebel chief, he had no choice but to appoint a new set of provincial landowners who might again challenge the central power. In the Roman Empire, although Italy was the seat of political power, the richest provinces were in the eastern Mediterranean. It was impossible to transport the fertile fields of the Nile valley to the Italian Peninsula.19 Eventually the emperors abandoned the city of Rome to the barbarians and moved the seat of political power to the rich east, to Constantinople.

    During the Industrial Revolution machines became more important than land. Factories, mines, railroad lines, and electrical power stations became the most valuable assets. It was somewhat easier to concentrate these kinds of assets in one place. The British Empire could centralize industrial production in its home islands, extract raw materials from India, Egypt, and Iraq, and sell them finished goods made in Birmingham or Belfast. Unlike in the Roman Empire, Britain was the seat of both political and economic power. But physics and geology still put natural limits on this concentration of wealth and power. The British couldn’t move every cotton mill from Calcutta to Manchester, nor shift the oil wells from Kirkuk to Yorkshire.

    Information is different. Unlike cotton and oil, digital data can be sent from Malaysia or Egypt to Beijing or San Francisco at almost the speed of light. And unlike land, oil fields, or textile factories, algorithms don’t take up much space. Consequently, unlike industrial power, the world’s algorithmic power can be concentrated in a single hub. Engineers in a single country might write the code and control the keys for all the crucial algorithms that run the entire world.

    Indeed, AI makes it possible to concentrate in one place even the decisive assets of some traditional industries, like textile. In the nineteenth century, to control the textile industry meant to control sprawling cotton fields and huge mechanical production lines. In the twenty-first century, the most important asset of the textile industry is information rather than cotton or machinery. To beat the competitors, a garment producer needs information about the likes and dislikes of customers and the ability to predict or manufacture the next fashions. By controlling this type of information, high-tech giants like Amazon and Alibaba can monopolize even a very traditional industry like textile. In 2021, Amazon became the United States’ biggest single clothing retailer.20

    Moreover, as AI, robots, and 3-D printers automate textile production, millions of workers might lose their jobs, upending national economies and the global balance of power. What will happen to the economies and politics of Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example, when automation makes it cheaper to produce textiles in Europe? Consider that at present the textile sector provides employment to 40 percent of Pakistan’s total labor force and accounts for 84 percent of Bangladesh’s export earnings.21 As noted in chapter 7, while automation might make millions of textile workers redundant, it will probably create many new jobs, too. For instance, there might be a huge demand for coders and data analysts. But turning an unemployed factory hand into a data analyst demands a substantial up-front investment in retraining. Where would Pakistan and Bangladesh get the money to do that?

    AI and automation therefore pose a particular challenge to poorer developing countries. In an AI-driven economy, the digital leaders claim the bulk of the gains and could use their wealth to retrain their workforce and profit even more. Meanwhile, the value of unskilled laborers in left-behind countries will decline, and they will not have the resources to retrain their workforce, causing them to fall even further behind. The result might be lots of new jobs and immense wealth in San Francisco and Shanghai, while many other parts of the world face economic ruin.22 According to the global accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, AI is expected to add $15.7 trillion to the global economy by 2030. But if current trends continue, it is projected that China and North America—the two leading AI superpowers—will together take home 70 percent of that money.23

    FROM WEB TO COCOON

    These economic and geopolitical dynamics could divide the world between two digital empires. During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain was in many places literally made of metal: barbed wire separated one country from another. Now the world is increasingly divided by the Silicon Curtain. The Silicon Curtain is made of code, and it passes through every smartphone, computer, and server in the world. The code on your smartphone determines on which side of the Silicon Curtain you live, which algorithms run your life, who controls your attention, and where your data flows.

    It is becoming difficult to access information across the Silicon Curtain, say between China and the United States, or between Russia and the EU. Moreover, the two sides are increasingly run on different digital networks, using different computer codes. Each sphere obeys different regulations and serves different purposes. In China, the most important aim of new digital technology is to strengthen the state and serve government policies. While private enterprises are given a certain amount of autonomy in developing and deploying AI tools, their economic activities are ultimately subservient to the government’s political goals. These political goals also justify a relatively high level of surveillance, both online and off-line. This means, for example, that though Chinese citizens and authorities do care about people’s privacy, China is already far ahead of the United States and other Western countries in developing and deploying social credit systems that encompass the whole of people’s lives.24

    In the United States, the government plays a more limited role. Private enterprises lead the development and deployment of AI, and the ultimate goal of many new AI tools is to enrich the tech giants rather than to strengthen the American state or the current administration. Indeed, in many cases governmental policies are themselves shaped by powerful business interests. But the U.S. system does offer greater protection for citizens’ privacy. While American corporations aggressively gather information on people’s online activities, they are much more restricted in surveilling people’s offline lives. There is also widespread rejection of the ideas behind all-embracing social credit systems.25

    These political, cultural, and regulatory differences mean that each sphere is using different software. In China you cannot use Google and Facebook, and you cannot access Wikipedia. In the United States few people use WeChat, Baidu, and Tencent. More important, the spheres aren’t mirror images of each other. It is not that the Chinese and Americans develop local versions of the same apps. Baidu isn’t the Chinese Google. Alibaba isn’t the Chinese Amazon. They have different goals, different digital architectures, and different impacts on people’s lives.26 These differences influence much of the world, since most countries rely on Chinese and American software rather than on local technology.

    Each sphere also uses different hardware like smartphones and computers. The United States pressures its allies and clients to avoid Chinese hardware, such as Huawei’s 5G infrastructure.27 The Trump administration blocked an attempt by the Singaporean corporation Broadcom to buy the leading American producer of computer chips, Qualcomm. They feared foreigners might insert back doors into the chips or would prevent the U.S. government from inserting its own back doors there.28 In 2022, the Biden administration placed strict limits on trade in high-performance computing chips necessary for the development of AI. U.S. companies were forbidden to export such chips to China, or to provide China with the means to manufacture or repair them. The restrictions have subsequently been tightened further, and the ban was expanded to include other nations such as Russia and Iran.29 While in the short term this hampers China in the AI race, in the long term it will push China to develop a completely separate digital sphere that will be distinct from the American digital sphere even in its smallest building blocks.30

    The two digital spheres may drift further and further apart. Chinese software would talk only with Chinese hardware and Chinese infrastructure, and the same would happen on the other side of the Silicon Curtain. Since digital code influences human behavior, and human behavior in turn shapes digital code, the two sides may well be moving along different trajectories that will make them more and more different not just in their technology but in their cultural values, social norms, and political structures. After generations of convergence, humanity could find itself at a crucial point of divergence.31 For centuries, new information technologies fueled the process of globalization and brought people all over the world into closer contact. Paradoxically, information technology today is so powerful it can potentially split humanity by enclosing different people in separate information cocoons, ending the idea of a single shared human reality. While the web has been our main metaphor in recent decades, the future might belong to cocoons.

    THE GLOBAL MIND-BODY SPLIT

    The division into separate information cocoons could lead not just to economic rivalries and international tensions but also to the development of very different cultures, ideologies, and identities. Guessing future cultural and ideological developments is usually a fool’s errand. It is far more difficult than predicting economic and geopolitical developments. How many Romans or Jews in the days of Tiberius could have anticipated that a splinter Jewish sect would eventually take over the Roman Empire and that the emperors would abandon Rome’s old gods to worship an executed Jewish rabbi?

    It would have been even more difficult to foresee the directions in which various Christian sects would develop and the momentous impact of their ideas and conflicts on everything from politics to sexuality. When Jesus was asked about paying taxes to Tiberius’s government and answered, “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matthew 22:21), nobody could imagine the impact his response would have on the separation of church and state in the American republic two millennia later. And when Saint Paul wrote to the Christians in Rome, “I myself in my mind am a slave to God’s law, but in my sinful flesh a slave to the law of sin” (Romans 7:25), who could have foreseen the repercussions this would have on schools of thought ranging from Cartesian philosophy to queer theory?

    Despite these difficulties, it is important to try to imagine future cultural developments, in order to alert ourselves to the fact that the AI revolution and the formation of rival digital spheres are likely to change more than just our jobs and political structures. The following paragraphs contain some admittedly ambitious speculation, so please bear in mind that my goal is not to accurately foretell cultural developments but merely to draw attention to the likelihood that profound cultural shifts and conflicts await us.

    One possible development with far-reaching consequences is that different digital cocoons might adopt incompatible approaches to the most fundamental questions of human identity. For thousands of years, many religious and cultural conflicts—for example, between rival Christian sects, between Hindus and Buddhists, and between Platonists and Aristotelians—were fueled by disagreements about the mind-body problem. Are humans a physical body, or a nonphysical mind, or perhaps a mind trapped inside a body? In the twenty-first century, the computer network might supercharge the mind-body problem and turn it into a cause for major personal, ideological, and political conflicts.

    To appreciate the political ramifications of the mind-body problem, let’s briefly revisit the history of Christianity. Many of the earliest Christian sects, influenced by Jewish thinking, believed in the Old Testament idea that humans are embodied beings and that the body plays a crucial role in human identity. The book of Genesis said God created humans as physical bodies, and almost all books of the Old Testament assume that humans can exist only as physical bodies. With a few possible exceptions, the Old Testament doesn’t mention the possibility of a bodiless existence after death, in heaven or hell. When the ancient Jews fantasized about salvation, they imagined it to mean an earthly kingdom of material bodies. In the time of Jesus, many Jews believed that when the Messiah finally comes, the bodies of the dead would come back to life, here on earth. The Kingdom of God, established by the Messiah, was supposed to be a material kingdom, with trees and stones and flesh-and-blood bodies.32

    This was also the view of Jesus himself and the first Christians. Jesus promised his followers that soon the Kingdom of God would be built here on earth and they would inhabit it in their material bodies. When Jesus died without fulfilling his promise, his early followers came to believe that he was resurrected in the flesh and that when the Kingdom of God finally materialized on earth, they too would be resurrected in the flesh. The church father Tertullian (160–240 CE) wrote that “the flesh is the very condition on which salvation hinges,” and the catechism of the Catholic Church, citing the doctrines adopted at the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, states, “We believe in God who is creator of the flesh; we believe in the Word made flesh in order to redeem the flesh; we believe in the resurrection of the flesh, the fulfillment of both the creation and the redemption of the flesh.… We believe in the true resurrection of this flesh that we now possess.”33

    Despite such seemingly unequivocal statements, we saw that Saint Paul already had his doubts about the flesh, and by the fourth century CE, under Greek, Manichaean, and Persian influences, some Christians had drifted toward a dualistic approach. They came to think of humans as consisting of a good immaterial soul trapped inside an evil material body. They didn’t fantasize about being resurrected in the flesh. Just the opposite. Having been released by death from its abominable material prison, why would the pure soul ever want to get back in? Christians accordingly began to believe that after death the soul is liberated from the body and exists forever in an immaterial place completely beyond the physical realm—which is the standard belief among Christians today, notwithstanding what Tertullian and the Second Council of Lyon said.34

    But Christianity couldn’t completely abandon the old Jewish view that humans are embodied beings. After all, Christ appeared on earth in the flesh. His body was nailed to the cross, on which he experienced excruciating pain. For two thousand years, Christian sects therefore fought each other—sometimes with words, sometimes with swords—over the exact relations between soul and body. The fiercest arguments focused on Christ’s own body. Was he material? Was he purely spiritual? Did he perhaps have a nonbinary nature, being both human and divine at the same time?

    The different approaches to the mind-body problem influenced how people treated their own bodies. Saints, hermits, and monks made breathtaking experiments in pushing the human body to its limits. Just as Christ allowed his body to be tortured on the cross, so these “athletes of Christ” allowed lions and bears to rip them apart while their souls rejoiced in divine ecstasy. They wore hair shirts, fasted for weeks, or stood for years on a pillar—like the famous Simeon who allegedly stood for about forty years on top of a pillar near Aleppo.35

    Other Christians took the opposite approach, believing that the body didn’t matter at all. The only thing that mattered was faith. This idea was taken to extremes by Protestants like Martin Luther, who formulated the doctrine of sola fide: only faith. After living as a monk for about ten years, fasting and torturing his body in various ways, Luther despaired of these bodily exercises. He reasoned that no bodily self-torments could force God to redeem him. Indeed, thinking he could win his own salvation by torturing his body was the sin of pride. Luther therefore disrobed, married a former nun, and told his followers that to be good Christians, the only thing they needed was to have complete faith in Christ.36

    These ancient theological debates about mind and body may seem utterly irrelevant to the AI revolution, but they have in fact been resurrected by twenty-first-century technologies. What is the relationship between our physical body and our online identities and avatars? What is the relation between the offline world and cyberspace? Suppose I spend most of my waking hours sitting in my room in front of a screen, playing online games, forming virtual relationships, and even working remotely. I hardly venture out even to eat. I just order takeout. If you are like ancient Jews and the first Christians, you would pity me and conclude that I must be living in a delusion, losing touch with the reality of physical spaces and flesh-and-blood bodies. But if your thinking is closer to that of Luther and many later Christians, you might think I am liberated. By shifting most of my activities and relationships online, I have released myself from the limited organic world of debilitating gravity and corrupt bodies and can enjoy the unlimited possibilities of a digital world, which is potentially liberated from the laws of biology and even physics. I am free to roam a much vaster and more exciting space and to explore new aspects of my identity.

    An increasingly important question is whether people can adopt any virtual identity they like, or should their identity be constrained by their biological body? If we follow the Lutheran position of sola fide, the biological body isn’t of much importance. To adopt a certain online identity, the only thing that matters is what you believe. This debate can have far-reaching consequences not just for human identity but for our attitude to the world as a whole. A society that understands identities in terms of biological bodies should also care more about material infrastructure like sewage pipes and about the ecosystem that sustains our bodies. It will see the online world as an auxiliary of the offline world that can serve various useful purposes but can never become the central arena of our lives. Its aim would be to create an ideal physical and biological realm—the Kingdom of God on earth. In contrast, a society that downplays biological bodies and focuses on online identities may well seek to create an immersive Kingdom of God in cyberspace while discounting the fate of mere material things like sewage pipes and rain forests.

    This debate could shape attitudes not only toward organisms but also toward digital entities. As long as society defines identity by focusing on physical bodies, it is unlikely to view AIs as persons. But if society gives less importance to physical bodies, then even AIs that lack any corporeal manifestations may be accepted as legal persons enjoying various rights.

    Throughout history, diverse cultures have given diverse answers to the mind-body problem. A twenty-first-century controversy about the mind-body problem could result in cultural and political splits more consequential even than the split between Jews and Christians or between Catholics and Protestants. What happens, for example, if the American sphere discounts the body, defines humans by their online identity, recognizes AIs as persons, and downplays the importance of the ecosystem, whereas the Chinese sphere adopts opposite positions? Current disagreements about violations of human rights or adherence to ecological standards will look minuscule in comparison. The Thirty Years’ War—arguably the most devastating war in European history—was fought at least in part because Catholics and Protestants couldn’t agree on doctrines like sola fide and on whether Christ was divine, human, or nonbinary. Might future conflicts start because of an argument about AI rights and the nonbinary nature of avatars?

    As noted, these are all wild speculations, and in all likelihood actual cultures and ideologies will develop in different—and perhaps even wilder—directions. But it is probable that within a few decades the computer network will cultivate new human and nonhuman identities that make little sense to us. And if the world will be divided into two rival digital cocoons, the identities of entities in one cocoon might be unintelligible to the inhabitants of the other.

    FROM CODE WAR TO HOT WAR

    While China and the United States are currently the front-runners in the AI race, they are not alone. Other countries or blocs, such as the EU, India, Brazil, and Russia, may try to create their own digital spheres, each influenced by different political, cultural, and religious traditions.37 Instead of being divided between just two global empires, the world might be divided among a dozen empires. It is unclear whether this will somewhat alleviate or only exacerbate the imperial competition.

    The more the new empires compete against one another, the greater the danger of armed conflict. The Cold War between the United States and the U.S.S.R. never escalated into a direct military confrontation largely thanks to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. But the danger of escalation in the age of AI is bigger, because cyber warfare is inherently different from nuclear warfare.

    First, cyber weapons are much more versatile than nuclear bombs. Cyber weapons can bring down a country’s electric grid, but they can also be used to destroy a secret research facility, jam an enemy sensor, inflame a political scandal, manipulate elections, or hack a single smartphone. And they can do all that stealthily. They don’t announce their presence with a mushroom cloud and a storm of fire, nor do they leave a visible trail from launchpad to target. Consequently, at times it is hard to know if an attack even occurred or who launched it. If a database is hacked or sensitive equipment is destroyed, it’s hard to be sure whom to blame. The temptation to start a limited cyberwar is therefore big, and so is the temptation to escalate it. Rival countries like Israel and Iran or the United States and Russia have been trading cyber blows for years, in an undeclared but escalating war.38 This is becoming the new global norm, amplifying international tensions and pushing countries to cross one red line after another.

    A second crucial difference concerns predictability. The Cold War was like a hyperrational chess game, and the certainty of destruction in the event of nuclear conflict was so great that the desire to start a war was correspondingly small. Cyber warfare lacks this certainty. Nobody knows for sure where each side has planted its logic bombs, Trojan horses, and malwares. Nobody can be certain whether their own weapons would actually work when called upon. Would Chinese missiles fire when the order is given, or perhaps the Americans have hacked them or the chain of command? Would American aircraft carriers function as expected, or would they perhaps shut down mysteriously or sail around in circles?39

    Such uncertainty undermines the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. One side might convince itself—rightly or wrongly—that it can launch a successful first strike and avoid massive retaliation. Even worse, if one side thinks it has such an opportunity, the temptation to launch a first strike could become irresistible, because one never knows how long the window of opportunity will remain open. Game theory posits that the most dangerous situation in an arms race is when one side feels it has an advantage but that this advantage is slipping away.40

    Even if humanity avoids the worst-case scenario of global war, the rise of new digital empires could still endanger the freedom and prosperity of billions of people. The industrial empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries exploited and repressed their colonies, and it would be foolhardy to expect the new digital empires to behave much better. Moreover, as noted earlier, if the world is divided into rival empires, humanity is unlikely to cooperate effectively to overcome the ecological crisis or to regulate AI and other disruptive technologies like bioengineering.

    THE GLOBAL BOND

    Of course, no matter whether the world is divided between a few digital empires, remains a more diverse community of two hundred nation-states, or is split along altogether different and unforeseen lines, cooperation is always an option. Among humans, the precondition for cooperation isn’t similarity; it is the ability to exchange information. As long as we are able to converse, we might find some shared story that can bring us closer. This, after all, is what made Homo sapiens the dominant species on the planet.

    Just as different and even rival families can cooperate within a tribal network, and competing tribes can cooperate within a national network, so opposing nations and empires can cooperate within a global network. The stories that make such cooperation possible do not eliminate our differences; rather, they enable us to identify shared experiences and interests, which offer a common framework for thought and action.

    A large part of what nevertheless makes global cooperation difficult is the misguided notion that it requires abolishing all cultural, social, and political differences. Populist politicians often argue that if the international community agrees on a common story and on universal norms and values, this will destroy the independence and unique traditions of their own nation.41 This position was unabashedly distilled in 2015 by Marine Le Pen—leader of France’s National Front party—in an election speech in which she declared, “We have entered a new two-partyism. A two-partyism between two mutually exclusive conceptions that will from now on structure our political life. The cleavage no longer separates left and right, but globalists and patriots.”42 In August 2020, President Trump described his guiding ethos thus: “We have rejected globalism and embraced patriotism.”43

    Luckily, this binary position is mistaken in its basic assumption. Global cooperation and patriotism are not mutually exclusive. For patriotism isn’t about hating foreigners. It is about loving our compatriots. And there are many situations when, in order to take care of our compatriots, we need to cooperate with foreigners. COVID-19 provided us with one obvious example. Pandemics are global events, and without global cooperation it is hard to contain them, let alone prevent them. When a new virus or a mutant pathogen appears in one country, it puts all other countries in danger. Conversely, the biggest advantage of humans over pathogens is that we can cooperate in ways that pathogens cannot. Doctors in Germany and Brazil can alert one another to new dangers, give each other good advice, and work together to discover better treatments.

    If German scientists invent a vaccine against some new disease, how should Brazilians react to this German achievement? One option is to reject the foreign vaccine and wait until Brazilian scientists develop a Brazilian vaccine. That, however, would be not just foolish; it would be anti-patriotic. Brazilian patriots should want to use any available vaccine to help their compatriots, no matter where the vaccine was developed. In this situation, cooperating with foreigners is the patriotic thing to do. The threat of losing control of AIs is an analogous situation in which patriotism and global cooperation must go together. An out-of-control AI, just like an out-of-control virus, puts in danger humans in every nation. No human collective—whether a tribe, a nation, or the entire species—stands to benefit from letting power shift from humans to algorithms.

    Contrary to what populists argue, globalism doesn’t mean establishing a global empire, abandoning national loyalties, or opening borders to unlimited immigration. In fact, global cooperation means two far more modest things: first, a commitment to some global rules. These rules don’t deny the uniqueness of each nation and the loyalty people should owe their nation. They just regulate the relations between nations. A good model is the World Cup. The World Cup is a competition between nations, and people often show fierce loyalty to their national team. At the same time, the World Cup is an amazing display of global agreement. Brazil cannot play football against Germany unless Brazilians and Germans first agree on the same set of rules for the game. That’s globalism in action.

    The second principle of globalism is that sometimes—not always, but sometimes—it is necessary to prioritize the long-term interests of all humans over the short-term interests of a few. For example, in the World Cup, all national teams agree not to use performance-enhancing drugs, because everybody realizes that if they go down that path, the World Cup would eventually devolve into a competition between biochemists. In other fields where technology is a game changer, we should similarly strive to balance national and global interests. Nations will obviously continue to compete in the development of new technology, but sometimes they should agree to limit the development and deployment of dangerous technologies like autonomous weapons and manipulative algorithms—not purely out of altruism, but for their own self-preservation.

    THE HUMAN CHOICE

    Forging and keeping international agreements on AI will require major changes in the way the international system functions. While we have experience in regulating dangerous technologies like nuclear and biological weapons, the regulation of AI will demand unprecedented levels of trust and self-discipline, for two reasons. First, it is easier to hide an illicit AI lab than an illicit nuclear reactor. Second, AIs have a lot more dual civilian-military usages than nuclear bombs. Consequently, despite signing an agreement that bans autonomous weapon systems, a country could build such weapons secretly, or camouflage them as civilian products. For example, it might develop fully autonomous drones for delivering mail and spraying fields with pesticides that with a few minor modifications could also deliver bombs and spray people with poison. Consequently, governments and corporations will find it more difficult to trust that their rivals are really abiding by the agreed regulations—and to withstand the temptation to themselves waive the rules.44 Can humans develop the necessary levels of trust and self-discipline? Do changes like those have any precedent in history?

    Many people are skeptical of the human capacity to change, and in particular of the human ability to renounce violence and forge stronger global bonds. For example, “realist” thinkers like Hans Morgenthau and John Mearsheimer have argued that an all-out competition for power is the inescapable condition of the international system. Mearsheimer explains that “my theory sees great powers as concerned mainly with figuring out how to survive in a world where there is no agency to protect them from each other” and that “they quickly realize that power is the key to their survival.” Mearsheimer then asks “how much power states want” and answers that all states want as much power as they can get, “because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals.” He concludes, “A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.”45

    This grim view of international relations is akin to the populist and Marxist views of human relations, in that they all see humans as interested only in power. And they are all founded upon a deeper philosophical theory of human nature, which the primatologist Frans de Waal termed “veneer theory.” It argues that at heart humans are Stone Age hunters who cannot but see the world as a jungle where the strong prey upon the weak and where might makes right. For millennia, the theory goes, humans have tried to camouflage this unchanging reality under a thin and mutable veneer of myths and rituals, but we have never really broken free from the law of the jungle. Indeed, our myths and rituals are themselves a weapon used by the jungle’s top dogs to deceive and trap their inferiors. Those who don’t realize this are dangerously naive and will fall prey to some ruthless predator.46

    There are reasons to think, however, that “realists” like Mearsheimer have a selective view of historical reality and that the law of the jungle is itself a myth. As de Waal and many other biologists documented in numerous studies, real jungles—unlike the one in our imagination—are full of cooperation, symbiosis, and altruism displayed by countless animals, plants, fungi, and even bacteria. Eighty percent of all land plants, for example, rely on symbiotic relationships with fungi, and almost 90 percent of vascular plant families enjoy symbiotic relationships with microorganisms. If organisms in the rain forests of Amazonia, Africa, or India abandoned cooperation in favor of an all-out competition for hegemony, the rain forests and all their inhabitants would quickly die. That’s the law of the jungle.47

    As for Stone Age humans, they were gatherers as well as hunters, and there is no firm evidence that they had irrepressible warlike tendencies. While there are plenty of speculations, the first unambiguous evidence for organized warfare appears in the archaeological record only about thirteen thousand years ago, at the site of Jebel Sahaba in the Nile valley.48 Even after that date, the record of war is variable rather than constant. Some periods were exceptionally violent, whereas others were relatively peaceful. The clearest pattern we observe in the long-term history of humanity isn’t the constancy of conflict, but rather the increasing scale of cooperation. A hundred thousand years ago, Sapiens could cooperate only at the level of bands. Over the millennia, we have found ways to create communities of strangers, first on the level of tribes and eventually on the level of religions, trade networks, and states. Realists should note that states are not the fundamental particles of human reality, but rather the product of arduous processes of building trust and cooperation. If humans were interested only in power, they could never have created states in the first place. Sure, conflicts have always remained a possibility—both between and within states—but they have never been an inescapable destiny.

    War’s intensity depends not on an immutable human nature but on shifting technological, economic, and cultural factors. As these factors change, so does war, as was clearly demonstrated in the post-1945 era. During that period, the development of nuclear technology greatly increased the potential price of war. From the 1950s onward it became clear to the superpowers that even if they could somehow win an all-out nuclear exchange, their victory would likely be a suicidal achievement, involving the sacrifice of most of their population.

    Simultaneously, the ongoing shift from a material-based economy to a knowledge-based economy decreased the potential gains of war. While it has remained feasible to conquer rice paddies and gold mines, by the late twentieth century these were no longer the main sources of economic wealth. The new leading industries, like the semiconductor sector, came to be based on technical skills and organizational know-how that could not be acquired by military conquest. Accordingly, some of the greatest economic miracles of the post-1945 era were achieved by the defeated powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and by countries like Sweden and Singapore that eschewed military conflicts and imperial conquests.

    Finally, the second half of the twentieth century also witnessed a profound cultural transformation, with the decline of age-old militaristic ideals. Artists increasingly focused on depicting the senseless horrors of combat rather than on glorifying its architects, and politicians came to power dreaming more of domestic reforms than of foreign conquests. Due to these technological, economic, and cultural changes, in the decades following the end of World War II most governments stopped seeing wars of aggression as an appealing tool to advance their interests, and most nations stopped fantasizing about conquering and destroying their neighbors. While civil wars and insurgencies have remained commonplace, the post-1945 world has seen a significant decline in full-scale wars between states, and most notably in direct armed conflicts between great powers.49

    Numerous statistics attest to the decline of war in this post-1945 era, but perhaps the clearest evidence is found in state budgets. For most of recorded history, the military was the number one item on the budget of every empire, sultanate, kingdom, and republic. Governments spent little on health care and education, because most of their resources were consumed by paying soldiers, constructing walls, and building warships. When the bureaucrat Chen Xiang examined the annual budget of the Chinese Song dynasty for the year 1065, he found that out of sixty million minqian (currency unit), fifty million (83 percent) were consumed by the military. Another official, Cai Xiang, wrote, “If [we] split [all the property] under Heaven into six shares, five shares are spent on the military, and one share is spent on temple offerings and state expenses. How can the country not be poor and the people not in difficulty?”50

    The same situation prevailed in many other polities, from ancient times to the modern era. The Roman Empire spent about 50–75 percent of its budget on the military,51 and the figure was about 60 percent in the late seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire.52 Between 1685 and 1813 the share of the military in British government expenditure averaged 75 percent.53 In France, military expenditure between 1630 and 1659 varied between 89 percent and 93 percent of the budget, remained above 30 percent for much of the eighteenth century, and dropped to a low of 25 percent in 1788 only due to the financial crisis that led to the French Revolution. In Prussia, from 1711 to 1800 the military share of the budget never fell below 75 percent and occasionally reached as high as 91 percent.54 During the relatively peaceful years of 1870–1913, the military ate up an average of 30 percent of the state budgets of the major powers of Europe, as well as Japan and the United States, while smaller powers like Sweden were spending even more.55 When war broke out in 1914, military budges skyrocketed. During their involvement in World War I, French military expenditure averaged 77 percent of the budget; in Germany it was 91 percent, in Russia 48 percent, in the U.K. 49 percent, and in the United States 47 percent. During World War II, the U.K. figure rose to 69 percent and the U.S. figure to 71 percent.56 Even during the détente years of the 1970s, Soviet military expenditure still amounted to 32.5 percent of the budget.57

    State budgets in more recent decades make for far more hopeful reading material than any pacifist tract ever composed. In the early twenty-first century, the worldwide average government expenditure on the military has been only around 7 percent of the budget, and even the dominant superpower of the United States spent only around 13 percent of its annual budget to maintain its military hegemony.58 Since most people no longer lived in terror of external invasion, governments could invest far more money in welfare, education, and health care. Worldwide average expenditure on health care in the early twenty-first century has been about 10 percent of the government budget, or about 1.4 times the defense budget.59 For many people in the 2010s, the fact that the health-care budget was bigger than the military budget was unremarkable. But it was the result of a major change in human behavior, and one that would have sounded impossible to most previous generations.

    The decline of war didn’t result from a divine miracle or from a metamorphosis in the laws of nature. It resulted from humans changing their own laws, myths, and institutions and making better decisions. Unfortunately, the fact that this change has stemmed from human choice also means that it is reversible. Technology, economics, and culture are ever changing. In the early 2020s, more leaders are again dreaming of martial glory, armed conflicts are on the rise,60 and military budgets are increasing.61

    A critical threshold was crossed in early 2022. Russia had already destabilized the global order by mounting a limited invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and occupying Crimea and other regions in eastern Ukraine. But on February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin launched an all-out assault aimed to conquer the whole of Ukraine and extinguish Ukrainian nationhood. To prepare and sustain this attack, Russia increased its military budget far beyond the global average of 7 percent. Exact figures are difficult to determine, because many aspects of the Russian military budget are shrouded in secrecy, but the best estimates put the figure somewhere in the vicinity of 30 percent, and it may even be higher.62 The Russian onslaught in turn has forced not only Ukraine but also many other European nations to increase their own military budgets.63 The reemergence of militaristic cultures in places like Russia, and the development of unprecedented cyber weapons and autonomous armaments throughout the world, could result in a new era of war, worse than anything we have seen before.

    The decisions leaders like Putin make on matters of war and peace are shaped by their understanding of history. Which means that just as overly optimistic views of history could be dangerous illusions, overly pessimistic views could become destructive self-fulfilling prophecies. Prior to his all-out 2022 attack on Ukraine, Putin had often expressed his historical conviction that Russia is trapped in an endless struggle with foreign enemies, and that the Ukrainian nation is a fabrication by these enemies. In June 2021, he published a fifty-three-hundred-word essay titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in which he denied the existence of Ukraine as a nation and argued that foreign powers have repeatedly tried to weaken Russia by fostering Ukrainian separatism. While professional historians reject these claims, Putin seems to genuinely believe in this historical narrative.64 Putin’s historical convictions led him in 2022 to prioritize the conquest of Ukraine over other policy goals, such as providing Russian citizens with better health care or spearheading a global initiative to regulate AI.65

    If leaders like Putin believe that humanity is trapped in an unforgiving dog-eat-dog world, that no profound change is possible in this sorry state of affairs, and that the relative peace of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century was an illusion, then the only choice remaining is whether to play the part of predator or prey. Given such a choice, most leaders would prefer to go down in history as predators and add their names to the grim list of conquerors that unfortunate pupils are condemned to memorize for their history exams. These leaders should be reminded, however, that in the era of AI the alpha predator is likely to be AI.

    Perhaps, though, we have more choices available to us. I cannot predict what decisions people will make in the coming years, but as a historian I do believe in the possibility of change. One of the chief lessons of history is that many of the things that we consider natural and eternal are, in fact, man-made and mutable. Accepting that conflict is not inevitable, however, should not make us complacent. Just the opposite. It places a heavy responsibility on all of us to make good choices. It implies that if human civilization is consumed by conflict, we cannot blame it on any law of nature or any alien technology. It also implies that if we make the effort, we can create a better world. This isn’t naïveté; it’s realism. Every old thing was once new. The only constant of history is change.

    Epilogue

    In late 2016, a few months after AlphaGo defeated Lee Sedol and as Facebook algorithms were stoking dangerous racist sentiments in Myanmar, I published Homo Deus. Though my academic training had been in medieval and early modern military history, and though I have no background in the technical aspects of computer science, I suddenly found myself, post-publication, with the reputation of an AI expert. This opened the doors to the offices of scientists, entrepreneurs, and world leaders interested in AI and afforded me a fascinating, privileged look into the complex dynamics of the AI revolution.

    It turned out that my previous experience researching topics such as English strategy in the Hundred Years’ War and studying paintings from the Thirty Years’ War1 wasn’t entirely unrelated to this new field. In fact, it gave me a rather unique historical perspective on the events unfolding rapidly in AI labs, corporate offices, military headquarters, and presidential palaces. Over the past eight years I have had numerous public and private discussions about AI, particularly about the dangers it poses, and with each passing year the tone has become more urgent. Conversations that in 2016 felt like idle philosophical speculations about a distant future had, by 2024, acquired the focused intensity of an emergency room.

    I am neither a politician nor a businessperson and have little talent for what these vocations demand. But I do believe that an understanding of history can be useful in gaining a better grasp of present-day technological, economic, and cultural developments—and, more urgently, in changing our political priorities. Politics is largely a matter of priorities. Should we cut the health care budget and spend more on defense? Is our more pressing security threat terrorism or climate change? Do we focus on regaining a lost patch of ancestral territory or concentrate on creating a common economic zone with the neighbors? Priorities determine how citizens vote, what businesspeople are concerned about, and how politicians try to make a name for themselves. And priorities are often shaped by our understanding of history.

    While so-called realists dismiss historical narratives as propaganda ploys deployed to advance state interests, in fact it is these narratives that define state interests in the first place. As we saw in our discussion of Clausewitz’s theory of war, there is no rational way to define ultimate goals. The state interests of Russia, Israel, Myanmar, or any other country can never be deduced from some mathematical or physical equation; they are always the supposed moral of a historical narrative.

    It is therefore hardly surprising that politicians all over the world spend a lot of time and effort recounting historical narratives. The above-mentioned example of Vladimir Putin is hardly exceptional in this respect. In 2005 the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, had his first meeting with General Than Shwe, the then dictator of Myanmar. Annan was advised to speak first, so as to prevent the general from monopolizing the conversation, which was meant to last only twenty minutes. But Than Shwe struck first and held forth for nearly an hour on the history of Myanmar, hardly giving the UN secretary-general any chance to speak.2 In May 2011 the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu did something similar in the White House, when he met the U.S. president, Barack Obama. After Obama’s brief introductory remarks, Netanyahu subjected the president to a long lecture about the history of Israel and the Jewish people, treating Obama as if he were his student.3 Cynics might argue that Than Shwe and Netanyahu hardly cared about the facts of history and were deliberately distorting them in order to achieve some political goal. But these political goals were themselves the product of deeply held convictions about history.

    In my own conversations on AI with politicians, as well as tech entrepreneurs, history has often emerged as a central theme. Some of my interlocutors painted a rosy picture of history and were accordingly enthusiastic about AI. They argued that more information has always meant more knowledge and that by increasing our knowledge, every previous information revolution has greatly benefited humankind. Didn’t the print revolution lead to the scientific revolution? Didn’t newspapers and radio lead to the rise of modern democracy? The same, they said, would happen with AI. Others had a dimmer perspective, but nevertheless expressed hope that humankind will somehow muddle through the AI revolution, just as we muddled through the Industrial Revolution.

    Neither view offered me much solace. For reasons explained in previous chapters, I find such historical comparisons to the print revolution and the Industrial Revolution distressing, especially coming from people in positions of power, whose historical vision is informing the decisions that shape our future. These historical comparisons underestimate both the unprecedented nature of the AI revolution and the negative aspects of previous revolutions. The immediate results of the print revolution included witch hunts and religious wars alongside scientific discoveries, while newspapers and radio were exploited by totalitarian regimes as well as by democracies. As for the Industrial Revolution, adapting to it involved catastrophic experiments such as imperialism and Nazism. If the AI revolution leads us to similar kinds of experiments, can we really be certain we will muddle through again?

    My goal with this book is to provide a more accurate historical perspective on the AI revolution. This revolution is still in its infancy, and it is notoriously difficult to understand momentous developments in real time. It is hard, even now, to assess the meaning of events in the 2010s like AlphaGo’s victory or Facebook’s involvement in the anti-Rohingya campaign. The meaning of events of the early 2020s is even more obscure. Yet by expanding our horizons to look at how information networks developed over thousands of years, I believe it is possible to gain some insight on what we’re living through today.

    One lesson is that the invention of new information technology is always a catalyst for major historical changes, because the most important role of information is to weave new networks rather than represent preexisting realities. By recording tax payments, clay tablets in ancient Mesopotamia helped forge the first city-states. By canonizing prophetic visions, holy books spread new kinds of religions. By swiftly disseminating the words of presidents and citizens, newspapers and telegraphs opened the door to both large-scale democracy and large-scale totalitarianism. The information thus recorded and distributed was sometimes true, often false, but it invariably created new connections between larger numbers of people.

    We are used to giving political, ideological, and economic interpretations to historical revolutions such as the rise of the first Mesopotamian city-states, the spread of Christianity, the American Revolution, and the Bolshevik Revolution. But to gain a deeper understanding, we should also view them as revolutions in the way information flows. Christianity was obviously different from Greek polytheism in many of its myths and rites, yet it was also different in the importance it gave to a single holy book and the institution entrusted with interpreting it. Consequently, whereas each temple of Zeus was a separate entity, each Christian church became a node in a unified network.4 Information flowed differently among the followers of Christ than among the worshippers of Zeus. Similarly, Stalin’s U.S.S.R. was a different kind of information network from Peter the Great’s empire. Stalin enacted many unprecedented economic policies, but what enabled him to do it is that he headed a totalitarian network in which the center accumulated enough information to micromanage the lives of hundreds of millions of people. Technology is rarely deterministic, and the same technology can be used in very different ways. But without the invention of technologies like the book and the telegraph, the Christian Church and the Stalinist apparatus would never have been possible.

    This historical lesson should strongly encourage us to pay more attention to the AI revolution in our current political debates. The invention of AI is potentially more momentous than the invention of the telegraph, the printing press, or even writing, because AI is the first tool that is capable of making decisions and generating ideas by itself. Whereas printing presses and parchment scrolls offered new means for connecting people, AIs are full-fledged members in our information networks. In coming years, all information networks—from armies to religions—will gain millions of new AI members, who will process data very differently than humans. These new members will make alien decisions and generate alien ideas—that is, decisions and ideas that are unlikely to occur to humans. The addition of so many alien members is bound to change the shape of armies, religions, markets, and nations. Entire political, economic, and social systems might collapse, and new ones will take their place. That’s why AI should be a matter of utmost urgency even to people who don’t care about technology and who think the most important political questions concern the survival of democracy or the fair distribution of wealth.

    This book has juxtaposed the discussion of AI with the discussion of sacred canons like the Bible, because we are now at the critical moment of AI canonization. When church fathers like Bishop Athanasius decided to include 1 Timothy in the biblical dataset while excluding the Acts of Paul and Thecla, they shaped the world for millennia. Billions of Christians down to the twenty-first century have formed their views of the world based on the misogynist ideas of 1 Timothy rather than on the more tolerant attitude of Thecla. Even today it is difficult to reverse course, because the church fathers chose not to include any self-correcting mechanisms in the Bible. The present-day equivalents of Bishop Athanasius are the engineers who write the initial code for AI, and who choose the dataset on which the baby AI is trained. As AI grows in power and authority, and perhaps becomes a self-interpreting holy book, so the decisions made by present-day engineers could reverberate down the ages.

    Studying history does more than just emphasize the importance of the AI revolution and of our decisions regarding AI. It also cautions us against two common but misleading approaches to information networks and information revolutions. On the one hand, we should beware of an overly naive and optimistic view. Information isn’t truth. Its main task is to connect rather than represent, and information networks throughout history have often privileged order over truth. Tax records, holy books, political manifestos, and secret police files can be extremely efficient in creating powerful states and churches, which hold a distorted view of the world and are prone to abuse their power. More information, ironically, can sometimes result in more witch hunts.

    There is no reason to expect that AI would necessarily break the pattern and privilege truth. AI is not infallible. What little historical perspective we have gained from the alarming events in Myanmar, Brazil, and elsewhere over the past decade indicates that in the absence of strong self-correcting mechanisms AIs are more than capable of promoting distorted worldviews, enabling egregious abuses of power, and instigating terrifying new witch hunts.

    On the other hand, we should also beware of swinging too far in the other direction and adopting an overly cynical view. Populists tell us that power is the only reality, that all human interactions are power struggles, and that information is merely a weapon we use to vanquish our enemies. This has never been the case, and there is no reason to think that AI will make it so in the future. While many information networks do privilege order over truth, no network can survive if it ignores truth completely. As for individual humans, we tend to be genuinely interested in truth rather than only in power. Even institutions like the Spanish Inquisition have had conscientious truth-seeking members like Alonso de Salazar Frías, who, instead of sending innocent people to their deaths, risked his life to remind us that witches are just intersubjective fictions. Most people don’t view themselves as one-dimensional creatures obsessed solely with power. Why, then, hold such a view about everyone else?

    Refusing to reduce all human interactions to a zero-sum power struggle is crucial not just for gaining a fuller, more nuanced understanding of the past but also for having a more hopeful and constructive attitude about our future. If power were the only reality, then the only way to resolve conflicts would be through violence. Both populists and Marxists believe that people’s views are determined by their privileges, and that to change people’s views it is necessary to first take away their privileges—which usually requires force. However, since humans are interested in truth, there is a chance to resolve at least some conflicts peacefully, by talking to one another, acknowledging mistakes, embracing new ideas, and revising the stories we believe. That is the basic assumption of democratic networks and of scientific institutions. It has also been the basic motivation behind writing this book.

    EXTINCTION OF THE SMARTEST

    Let’s return now to the question I posed at the beginning of this book: If we are so wise, why are we so self-destructive? We are at one and the same time both the smartest and the stupidest animals on earth. We are so smart that we can produce nuclear missiles and superintelligent algorithms. And we are so stupid that we go ahead producing these things even though we’re not sure we can control them and failing to do so could destroy us. Why do we do it? Does something in our nature compel us to go down the path of self-destruction?

    This book has argued that the fault isn’t with our nature but with our information networks. Due to the privileging of order over truth, human information networks have often produced a lot of power but little wisdom. For example, Nazi Germany created a highly efficient military machine and placed it at the service of an insane mythology. The result was misery on an enormous scale, the death of tens of millions of people, and eventually the destruction of Nazi Germany, too.

    Of course, power is not in itself bad. When used wisely, it can be an instrument of benevolence. Modern civilization, for example, has acquired the power to prevent famines, contain epidemics, and mitigate natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes. In general, the acquisition of power allows a network to deal more effectively with threats coming from outside, but simultaneously increases the dangers that the network poses to itself. It is particularly noteworthy that as a network becomes more powerful, imaginary terrors that exist only in the stories the network itself invents become potentially more dangerous than natural disasters. A modern state faced with drought or excessive rains can usually prevent this natural disaster from causing mass starvation among its citizens. But a modern state gripped by a man-made fantasy is capable of instigating man-made famines on an enormous scale, as happened in the U.S.S.R. in the early 1930s.

    Accordingly, as a network becomes more powerful, its self-correcting mechanisms become more vital. If a Stone Age tribe or a Bronze Age city-state was incapable of identifying and correcting its own mistakes, the potential damage was limited. At most, one city was destroyed, and the survivors tried again elsewhere. Even if the ruler of an Iron Age empire, such as Tiberius or Nero, was gripped by paranoia or psychosis, the consequences were seldom catastrophic. The Roman Empire endured for centuries despite its fair share of mad emperors, and its eventual collapse did not bring about the end of human civilization. But if a Silicon Age superpower has weak or nonexistent self-correcting mechanisms, it could very well endanger the survival of our species, and countless other life-forms, too. In the era of AI, the whole of humankind finds itself in an analogous situation to Tiberius in his Capri villa. We command immense power and enjoy rare luxuries, but we are easily manipulated by our own creations, and by the time we wake up to the danger, it might be too late.

    Unfortunately, despite the importance of self-correcting mechanisms for the long-term welfare of humanity, politicians might be tempted to weaken them. As we have seen throughout the book, though neutralizing self-correcting mechanisms has many downsides, it can nevertheless be a winning political strategy. It could deliver immense power into the hands of a twenty-first-century Stalin, and it would be foolhardy to assume that an AI-enhanced totalitarian regime would necessarily self-destruct before it could wreak havoc on human civilization. Just as the law of the jungle is a myth, so also is the idea that the arc of history bends toward justice. History is a radically open arc, one that can bend in many directions and reach very different destinations. Even if Homo sapiens destroys itself, the universe will keep going about its business as usual. It took four billion years for terrestrial evolution to produce a civilization of highly intelligent apes. If we are gone, and it takes evolution another hundred million years to produce a civilization of highly intelligent rats, it will. The universe is patient.

    There is, though, an even worse scenario. As far as we know today, apes, rats, and the other organic animals of planet Earth may be the only conscious entities in the entire universe. We have now created a nonconscious but very powerful alien intelligence. If we mishandle it, AI might extinguish not only the human dominion on Earth but the light of consciousness itself, turning the universe into a realm of utter darkness. It is our responsibility to prevent this.

    The good news is that if we eschew complacency and despair, we are capable of creating balanced information networks that will keep their own power in check. Doing so is not a matter of inventing another miracle technology or landing upon some brilliant idea that has somehow escaped all previous generations. Rather, to create wiser networks, we must abandon both the naive and the populist views of information, put aside our fantasies of infallibility, and commit ourselves to the hard and rather mundane work of building institutions with strong self-correcting mechanisms. That is perhaps the most important takeaway this book has to offer.

    This wisdom is much older than human history. It is elemental, the foundation of organic life. The first organisms weren’t created by some infallible genius or god. They emerged through an intricate process of trial and error. Over four billion years, ever more complex mechanisms of mutation and self-correction led to the evolution of trees, dinosaurs, jungles, and eventually humans. Now we have summoned an alien inorganic intelligence that could escape our control and put in danger not just our own species but countless other life-forms. The decisions we all make in the coming years will determine whether summoning this alien intelligence proves to be a terminal error or the beginning of a hopeful new chapter in the evolution of life.

  • 弗朗西斯·福山《政治秩序的起源》2

    第 16 章 基督教打破家庭观念

    令欧洲退出亲戚关系的是宗教,不是政治;对欧洲家庭性质的普遍误会;天主教会摧毁延伸的亲戚团体;英国个人主义甚至在欧洲也属极端

    我迄今所叙述的世界三个地区,其国家制度都自部落社会脱颖而出。中国、印度和中东的早期社会组织,都以父系家族的血统为基础,建立国家是为了克服部落社会的局限。每一个案例中,建国者想方设法让个人忠于国家,而不是忠于地方上的亲族团体。以领土和中央合法统治权力为基础的制度,不得不重叠在顽固的分支式社会之上。最极端的对策来自阿拉伯和奥斯曼帝国,他们绑架儿童,使之在人造家庭中长大,只忠于国家,不忠于自己的亲戚。

    但在这些案例中,不让亲戚关系成为社会组织基础的建国努力,自上而下,都归于失败。事实上,这些社会的制度发展历史,大多涉及亲族团体的重新问政——我称之为家族制复辟。所以,秦朝和西汉所创建的非人格化国家制度,在东汉崩溃时又落到强大宗族手中,这些家庭继续成为中国政坛中的重要角色,直到隋唐。印度在创建强大的非人格化制度上,一开始就成绩平平,以分支式迦提组织起来的印度村庄,其社会生活大体上又与这些制度毫不相干。土耳其国家是最为成功的,在小亚细亚和巴尔干半岛的心脏地区削弱了部落组织的影响,但在治理不严的阿拉伯省却不如人意。事实上,奥斯曼帝国在边远的贝都因(Bedouin)社区,仅行使非常有限的统治,其部落组织至今保持原样。所有这些地区——中国、印度、中东——家庭和亲戚团体至今仍然强大,成为社会组织和身份的来源,远远超过欧洲或北美。在中国台湾和南方地区尚有成熟的分支世系家族,印度婚姻仍是家庭而不是个人的结合。部落的依附关系在阿拉伯中东无所不在,尤其是在贝都因的群体中。

    例外的欧洲

    欧洲的亲戚关系采纳不同形式。人口统计学家约翰·哈吉那尔(John Hajnal)在 1965 年的文章中注意到,西欧婚姻模式与世界上几乎任何其他地方形成强烈对照。西欧男女倾向于晚婚,从总体上讲,不结婚的比率较高,这两个因素导致相对较低的出生率;更多年轻女子参加工作,家庭中有更多平等,由于晚婚,女子又有较多机会获取财产。这不仅是当代现象,哈吉那尔把这种模式的时期定在 1400 年到 1650 年。

    西欧与世界其他地方的其他差异也很突出。共同祖先的亲戚团体所组成的社区,其在欧洲的消失远远早于哈吉那尔所指出的。对欧洲人而言,亲戚和后裔很重要,特别是国王和贵族,他们有实质性的经济资源传给子孙。但跟中国贵族不同,他们没有陷入表亲的专横,因为分割遗产和长子继承权的原则早已深入人心。在中世纪,欧洲人享有更多自由,无须征得大批亲戚的同意,便可任意处置自己的土地和动产。

    换言之,欧洲社会很早就是个人主义的。在婚姻、财产和其他私人事务上,当家做主的是个人,而不是家庭或亲戚团体。家庭中的个人主义是所有其他个人主义的基础。个人主义无须等待国家的出现,无须等待它来宣告个人法律权利,并行使强制权力来予以保障。更确切地说,个人已在享受实质性的自由,无须承担对亲戚的社会义务,先有这样的社会,再来建起国家。在欧洲,社会发展走在政治发展的前列。

    欧洲何时退出亲戚关系?如果不是政治,转型动力何在?前者的答案是:蹂躏罗马帝国的日耳曼部落,在皈依基督教后不久,就开始退出。后者的答案是:天主教会。

    马克思的错误

    很明显,现代欧洲人的祖先都曾组成部落。他们的亲戚关系、法律、习惯、宗教实践,只要能找到的,19 世纪伟大的历史人类学家都已作了详细记载,如甫斯特尔·德·库朗日、亨利·梅因、弗雷德里克·波洛克(Frederick Pollock)、弗雷德里克·梅特兰(Frederic Maitland)、保罗·维诺格拉多夫(Paul Vinogradoff)。他们是比较人类学家,掌握不同文化的渊博知识,为父系亲戚组织之间的相似而感到吃惊。那些组织分布于世界各地,如印度、希腊、日耳曼的社会。

    19 世纪的历史人类学家相信,亲戚组织随着时间的推移而进化,人类社会有普遍的发展模式,从亲戚团体的大集团,转向个别男女自愿结合的小家庭。梅因有个著名概念:现代化涉及从“身份到契约”的过渡。换言之,早期社会将社会地位赋予个人,安排一切,从婚配、职业到宗教信仰。相比之下,现代社会的个人可随意与人签约,走进不同社会关系,其中最重要的是婚姻合同。但梅因没有提出一种动态理论,以解说过渡是何时和如何发生的。

    实际上,对欧洲亲戚模式的过渡时间和过渡原因存在很多误解。很多人相信,跟世界上的其他民族类似,欧洲人始终居住于部落或庞大的家庭团体,一直到工业革命。其时,机器生产的压力和社会流动的必要性,才将之打破。根据这个见解,工业化带来经济变化和核心小家庭出现,都属于这同一过程。

    这个见解很可能来自早期现代化理论。卡尔·马克思在《共产党宣言》中宣称,资产阶级“撕下了罩在家庭关系上的温情脉脉的面纱,把这种关系变成了纯粹的金钱关系”。促使资产阶级兴起的,依次是技术革新和物质生产方式的变化。马克斯·韦伯指出,传统社会和现代社会之间有严重断裂。传统社会的特征是:广泛的亲戚关系,宗教或亲戚的约束对市场交易设限,缺乏个人社会流动性,基于传统、宗教、超凡魅力的非正式社会规范。而现代社会是个人主义的、平等的、以优秀和市场为导向的、流动的,并以法理型合法性权威组建起来。韦伯主张,这些特征属于一个整体,如果由教士指定价格,或财产受亲戚义务束缚,这样社会就不能发展出高效的市场经济。他相信,这种理性的现代化仅在西方出现,并把向现代化的过渡定在 16 世纪和 17 世纪的一系列事件,包括宗教改革(Protestant Reformation)和启蒙运动(Enlightenment)。所以,马克思主义者倾向于认为,经济变化促使个人主义和核心小家庭的兴起,而韦伯则把基督新教当作主要动力。总之,依他们看,这个变化仅有几百年历史。

    从身份到契约

    20 世纪的社会历史学家和人类学家,把从身份到契约的过渡一直往前提。我已提及,哈吉那尔认为欧洲的特殊模式始于 15 世纪和 16 世纪。艾伦·麦克法兰(Alan MacFarlane)对英国个人主义起源的研究显示,生前任意处置财产和死后在遗嘱中剥夺子女继承权,早在 16 世纪初就获得英国普通法的承认。这很重要,因为他所标志的“农民社会”中,如东欧和世界大部分区域,亲戚义务大大限制了业主出售土地的能力。农民社会的特征就是大家庭,产权要么共有,要么陷于亲戚的相互依赖之中。这样的社会中,许多非经济因素把农民牢牢绑在他们所耕种的土地上,诸如祖先葬于此之类的理由。

    但麦克法兰注意到,土地所有权(seisin)流行于英国,至少还要往前再提三个世纪。根据一项研究,15 世纪晚期英国某区的地产转户中,生前赠与家人的占 15%,死后遗赠给家人的占 10%。更早的是 12 世纪末 13 世纪初,英国的佃户(villeins,不得随意离开土地)无须获得领主的许可,已在购买、出售、出租土地。

    如要衡量复杂亲戚组织的衰退,就要考量女子拥有和处置财产的法律权利。父系家族的社会中,女子嫁与宗族中的男子,或给宗族生下男性后裔,方才取得法律地位。寡妇和未婚女儿有分享遗产的权利,但通常必须将宗族的财产留在父系家族中。1066 年的诺曼征服(Norman Conquest)之后不久,英国女子就可自由拥有和处置财产,并可将之卖给外人。至少从 13 世纪起,她们不但可拥有土地和动产,而且可起诉他人,或被他人起诉,甚至可签署遗嘱和合同,无须征得男子监护人的许可。父系社会一旦承认这种权利,就会破坏宗族控制财产的能力,从而破坏社会制度的整体。所以,女子拥有和遗赠财产的能力是部落组织退化的标志。它显示,严格的父系社会规则已经消失。

    根据麦克法兰,早期英国个人主义的一个有趣标志是“扶养合同”。它最早出现于 13 世纪,由孩子和父母签署。共同祖先的后裔团体所组成的部落社会,通常崇拜共同祖先。儒家道德的大部分涉及孩子照料父母的义务,尤其是儿子。儒家道德家讲得很清楚,对父母的义务大于对自己孩子的,中国法律严惩不孝子女。

    英国的习俗却不同,父母活着时,如把产权愚蠢地转移给孩子,就得不到惯例的剩余权利。中世纪有一首诗歌,描述了父亲将财产移交给儿子的故事:儿子后来觉得扶养父亲的负担太重,便开始施以虐待。一天,父亲冷得直打寒战,儿子叫孙子送去一只麻布袋,“小男孩把麻布袋一割为二,一半留给爷爷,另一半带回给父亲。他的意思是,现在父亲虐待爷爷,等到自己长大,也会如法炮制,给他半个麻布袋以御寒”。为了避免如此的困境,父母与孩子签署扶养合同,规定孩子在继承父母财产后所承担的扶养责任。“贝德福德的一对夫妇在 1294 年放弃财产,作为回报,将得到食物、饮料、主屋的居住;如果两对夫妇发生争吵,老夫妇会搬到另外房子,将在圣米迦勒节(Michaelmas)获得五十六蒲式耳的谷物,其中二十四蒲式耳的小麦,十二蒲式耳的大麦,十二蒲式耳的大豆和豌豆,八蒲式耳的燕麦。此外,他们还将得到这另外房子的一切,可动的和固定的。”

    让马克思暴跳如雷的“纯粹的金钱关系”,似乎不是 18 世纪资产阶级的发明,其在英国的出现比资产阶级的兴起早了好多世纪。将父母寄放在疗养院,在西欧有很深的历史根源。这显示,与马克思的主张恰恰相反,资本主义只是社会关系和习俗变化的后果,而不是原因。

    如果说欧洲在 13 世纪离开复杂的亲戚关系,即从身份过渡到契约,这依然太迟。伟大的法国历史学家马克·布洛赫注意到,封建主义在 9 至 10 世纪兴起之前,亲戚关系是社会组织的基础。部落宗族之间的血亲复仇在欧洲社会有悠久历史,我们对此很熟悉,只要看看莎士比亚的《罗密欧与朱丽叶》就知道了。此外,布洛赫证明,在那段时期,亲戚团体或庞大家族共同拥有财产,即使个人已开始随意处置土地,卖主仍需获得亲戚团体的同意。

    不过,布洛赫提示,可以追溯到像中国、印度、中东那样单一祖先的巨大父系宗族,很久以前就在欧洲消失了。“罗马家族视男性后裔为绝对重要,立场异常坚定。但此事到了封建时代,已变成闻所未闻。”作为证据,他指出,中世纪的欧洲人从不单凭父亲来追溯他们的后裔;而在部落社会中,为了维持宗族分支的界线,这是不可或缺的。在整个中世纪时期,母亲让女儿冠母姓是很普遍的,这在中国那样的父系社会是不可想象的。个人经常认为自己属于两个相互平等的家庭,母亲的和父亲的。两个杰出家庭的子孙往往合并两个宗族的姓氏(如瓦勒里·季斯卡·德斯坦 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing,其中季斯卡和德斯坦都是姓氏[编按:瓦勒里·季斯卡·德斯坦系法国前总统,1974—1981 年任职]。今日西班牙人喜用父母的双姓)。到 13 世纪,类似当代的核心家庭已在欧洲遍地开花。血亲复仇很难继续,因为报仇圆圈变得越来越小,很多人觉得,自己与争论双方都有关联。

    在布洛赫看来,某种意义上,封建主义的整个制度可被理解为迫不得已的调整,这是为了适应社会上的隔绝,因为亲戚关系不再是社会团结的来源。自 7 世纪晚期起,欧洲遭受了一系列外国侵略者的蹂躏:来自北方的维京人、来自南方借道于北非和西班牙的阿拉伯人或撒拉森人(Saracens)、来自东方的匈牙利人。即使阿拉伯人受挫于图尔战役,穆斯林对地中海的控制仍然切断欧洲与拜占庭和北非的贸易,它曾是罗马经济的基础。随着卡洛林帝国(Carolingian)在 9 世纪的式微,城市也开始凋零,受无数军阀骚扰的居民撤回自给自足的村庄。

    在这欧洲文明的最低点,由于更大政治结构的倒塌,亲戚关系试图卷土重来。但其时,欧洲的父系宗族结构已变得如此脆弱,以致不能成为社会支持的来源。封建主义兴起,成为亲戚关系的替代:

    暴力气氛所孕育的无数危险,时时都在威胁个人。甚至在封建的初期,亲戚团体似乎不能提供足够的保护。根据它们当时存在的形式,这些团体的范围太模糊,太多变。父母都可界定后裔这种二元性,更造成了深刻的破坏。这就是为什么,人们被迫寻求或接纳其他的纽带。在这点上,历史是决定性的。仍有强大父系团体的地区——北海边上的日耳曼地区和英伦岛上的凯尔特地区——对属臣、采邑、庄园一无所知。亲戚关系只是封建社会的必要元素之一,它的相对孱弱解释了封建主义的出现。

    封建主义是指,个人自愿屈服于无亲戚关系的他人,仅仅是以服务交换保护。“国家和家庭不再提供足够的保护,村庄的社区仅能维持界线之内的秩序,城市的社区几乎不存在。各处软弱者觉得有必要获得强人的庇护,而强人必须通过说服或强制来获得签约下属的支持,以保障自己的威望、财富、人身安全。”

    但我们还没算出欧洲脱离亲戚关系的日期,以及合适的因果关系。社会人类学家杰克·古迪(Jack Goody),为过渡日期作出了最令人信服的解释。他把过渡的起点提至 6 世纪,将责任放在基督教身上——具体地说,放在天主教会的机构利益上。

    古迪注意到,罗马帝国结束时,与众不同的西欧婚姻模式从主要的地中海模式分化出来。包括罗马家族的地中海模式,属于严格的父系家族或父系社会,具有分支式的社会组织。父系团体倾向于同族通婚,有些更偏爱交叉表亲的婚姻。(我在第 11 章提及,交叉表亲的婚姻在印度南部的达罗毗荼文化中非常流行,在阿拉伯世界、普什图人[Pashtuns]、库尔德人、众多突厥人中也很普遍。)男女有严格的分隔,女子拥有财产或参与公共事务的机会很少。在所有这些方面,西欧的模式是截然不同的:分配遗产时男女都有份、禁止交叉表亲的婚姻、提倡异族通婚、女子有更多的产权和参与权。

    天主教会促动了这一分化,它极力反对四种行为:与近亲结婚、与兄弟的寡妇结婚(levirate,即所谓的兄终弟及或夫兄弟婚)、领养孩子、离婚。教皇格里高利一世在 6 世纪敦使异教的盎格鲁—萨克逊人皈依基督教,尊敬的比德(Venerable Bede)在报告此事时就提及,格里高利直率谴责部落实行的与近亲和兄弟的寡妇的婚姻。后来的教堂法令禁止纳妾,提倡一生不分的一夫一妻婚姻。

    古迪认为,这些禁令并不直接依据《圣经》或基督教经典。被禁的行为在耶稣诞生的巴勒斯坦是很普遍的,耶稣父母可能就是交叉表亲的婚姻,与兄弟的寡妇结婚在犹太人中也很流行。事实上,基督教福音是反家庭的:在《马太福音》中,耶稣说,“爱父母超过爱我的人,不配我;爱子女超过爱我的人,也不配我”。古迪又称,这些话语来自宣称耶稣将统治尘世一千年的先知,他试图招募人们离开安全的亲戚团体,进入新兴的分裂教派。赞成禁令的神学观点则经常来自《旧约》,犹太人对此却有不同见解。

    根据古迪,教会坚持这个立场的原因,与其说为了神学,倒不如说为了教堂自己的物质利益。交叉表亲的婚姻(或任何其他近亲的婚姻)、与兄弟的寡妇结婚、纳妾、领养孩子、离婚都是他所谓的“继承策略”;借此,亲戚团体得以继续控制代代相传的财产。其时,欧洲和地中海世界的居民寿命低于 35 岁。夫妇生下儿子、长到成人、再一次传宗接代的可能性相当低。因此,为了让人们得以孕育继承人,社会提供各式合法途径。讨论中国时,已解说过纳妾一事。在一夫一妻的社会,离婚可被视作变相纳妾。哥哥在生孩子之前就已去世,嫂子就与弟弟结婚,以确保哥哥的财产将与弟弟的融合在一起。交叉表亲的婚姻能保证家产留在自家人的手中。无论什么情形,教会有计划地切断将财产传给后裔的各种途径。同时,它又强烈提倡信徒向教会自愿捐出土地和财产。拥有财产但无继承人的基督徒日益增多,得益的便是教会。

    西欧女子相对较高的地位也是教会追求自身利益的意外结果。寡妇若在家庭团体内重新结婚,会将财产归还部落。教会尽量使之难以实现,所以她本人必须拥有财产。女子有权拥有和处置自己的财产,对教会大有裨益,无子女寡妇和老处女变成了捐献的一大来源。女子有权拥有财产破坏了单传原则,从而敲响了父系宗族的丧钟。

    规则发生变化后的数世纪中,天主教会在财政上非常成功,这绝对不是牵强附会。7 世纪结束之前,法国富饶土地的三分之一都在教会手中;从 8 世纪到 9 世纪,在法国北部、日耳曼、意大利的教会财产翻了一番。这些捐献使教会成为一个在经济和政治上都很强大的机构,为格里高利七世的叙任权斗争(investiture conflict)铺平道路(见后文第 18 章)。这些捐献,跟富裕穆斯林给伊斯兰慈善事业瓦克夫的捐赠有相似之处,但后者主要是富人避税和遗赠子女的对策。而在天主教的欧洲,无子女寡妇和老处女所捐出的土地,则没有附带任何条件。教会因此发现自己成了大地主,在欧洲各地管理庄园,监督农奴的经济生产。这帮助教会履行其赈济饥民和照顾病人的使命,使教士阶层和男女修道院的大幅扩充成为可能,也使内部规则和等级制度的发展变得必不可少。这一切让教会在中世纪的政治舞台中成为一名独立角色。

    这些变化对西欧的部落组织构成相当大的破坏。日耳曼、挪威、马札尔(Magyar)、斯拉夫的部落皈依基督教后,仅在两代或三代的时间就见证了其亲戚架构的解散。事实上,这种皈依植根于政治,如马札尔国王伊斯特万(István,或 St. Stephen)在 1000 年接受圣餐。但社会风俗和家庭规则中的实质性变化,不靠政治当局,而靠运作于社会和文化层次的教会。

    欧洲建国的社会背景

    欧洲(以及其殖民地)是个例外,因为它脱离复杂的亲戚关系,首先在社会和文化层次,而不在政治层次。在某种意义上,教会采取政治行为,更改了婚姻和遗产的规则,但其动机却是经济的。教会不是其所在领土的主权统治者,更确切地说,只是一个社会参与者,它的影响只在制定文化规则。因此,中世纪时,欧洲社会已经非常个人主义了。它早于欧洲国家建设的开端,比宗教改革、启蒙运动、工业革命更早了数个世纪。家庭中的变化,与其说是这些现代化巨变的结果,倒不如说是促进现代化发生的有利条件。16 世纪在意大利、英国、荷兰兴起的资本主义,不必去克服印度和中国那样的亲戚大集团的抵抗,后者亟欲保护自己拥有的实质性财产。相反,资本主义在那些社会顺利扎根,它们已有私人产权的传统,财产经常在陌生人之间转手。

    这不是说,欧洲的建国者一帆风顺,没有遇上既得利益的社会建制。恰恰相反,我们在第 21 章继续讲述欧洲国家起源时,将看到各式强大的社会参与者,他们在创建法治和负责制政府方面至关重要。虽然没有氏族或部落,但有既得利益的贵族,他们在封建时期积累下了财富、军队、法律地位。

    这些社会建制是封建的,并不基于亲戚关系。这一事实,对后世的欧洲政治发展来说,造成了重大差别。属臣的封建关系是强者和弱者自愿签署的合同,规定了双方的法律义务。它将高度不平等和等级化的社会形式化,但也为个人主义(签署合同的是个人而不是亲戚团体)和法律人的理解树立先例。历史学家杰诺·苏克斯(Jenö Szücs)认为,地主与农民之间的关系到 1200 年便获得契约特征,从而打下了将尊严扩充到农民阶层的基础。自那以后,“西方每一次农民反抗,都在表述地主违反合同所激怒的尊严,都在诉求自己的‘自由’权利”。但这种事没有发生于下列社会:土地产权以亲戚关系和惯例为基础的,或以某亲戚团体称王称霸于另一亲戚团体为基础的。

    以封建制度替代亲戚关系建制,对地方治理的功效而言,另有重要的政治影响。宗族和封建制度都在不同时期发挥主权和统治的功能,尤其是在中央国家式微时。它们都可提供地方安全、司法和经济生活的组织。但封建制度更为灵活,因为依据的是合同,更能组织决定性的集体行动,因为其等级分明。跟宗族中的权威不同,封建领主的权利一旦获得合法确认,便不需要持续的重新谈判。财产的法律文件,无论在强者或弱者的手中,都代表自由买卖的权利,不受基于亲戚的社会制度的限制。地方上的领主可“代表”社区讲话,但部落领袖做不到。如我们所知,欧洲殖民者在印度和非洲经常犯的错误,就是假设部落领袖相当于封建社会的地方领主。在事实上,两者截然不同。

    马克斯·韦伯的遗产之一,就是以价值概念来考量宗教对政治和经济的影响。他的新教工作伦理(work ethic),据说通过工作的神圣化,而直接影响工业革命中企业家的行为。价值肯定是重要的,上帝之下人人平等的基督原则,使女子更容易获得拥有财产的平等权利。

    但此类解释经常引申新的疑问,为何有些宗教价值首先在社会中获得提倡,并深入人心。教会攻击延展的亲戚关系,就是一例,这些价值并不起源于基督教原则。毕竟,同是基督徒的君士坦丁堡东正教,并没有设法改变婚姻和遗产的法律。所以,紧密相关的亲戚社区在拜占庭统治的地区存活很久。例如,塞尔维亚代代相传的著名乡村团体“杂住盖”(zadruga),以长期血亲复仇著称的阿尔巴尼亚氏族。这些建制消失于西欧,归功于教会的物质利益和权力。教会对社会价值的控制,变成了为己谋利的工具。从这个角度看,经济龟站在宗教龟的上面;但从另一角度看,宗教龟又站在更为底下的经济龟上。 不管其动机是宗教的,还是经济的,天主教会变成了独立的政治参与者,其建制化的程度,远远超过其他社会的宗教权力。中国从没发展出超越祖先崇拜或鬼神崇拜的本土宗教。相比之下,宗教发明一开始就塑造了印度和穆斯林世界,成为政治权力的重要制衡。但在伊斯兰教逊尼派的世界,以及印度次大陆,宗教权力从没凝聚成国家之外的中央官僚机构。它只在欧洲出现,与现代欧洲国家的发展和今天所谓的法治的出现又密不可分。

    第三部分 法治

    第 17 章 法治的起源

    法律在早期国家形成中的作用凸显欧洲的例外;法治的定义和争论;法律优先于立法的哈耶克理论;英国普通法依据皇家权力来加强国家的合法性

    欧洲的政治发展是个例外。欧洲社会得以较早脱离部落组织,却没有依靠自上而下的政治权力。欧洲例外还表现在,其早期建国者的杰出能力,与其说是在军事上,倒不如说在分配正义上。欧洲国家权力和合法性的增长,与法治的涌现密不可分。

    早期欧洲国家分配的只是正义,不一定是法律。法律植根于他处,或在宗教(像上一章所讨论的有关婚姻和家庭的法令),或在部落和其他社区的习俗。早期欧洲国家偶尔立法——即制定新法律——但其权力和合法性更多依赖公正执法,所执的法无须是自己订出的。

    弄清法律和立法之间的差异,对理解法治是至关重要的。似乎有多少法律学者,就会有多少“法治”的定义,很像“民主”这个字眼。我所使用的,符合思考此一现象的西方重要潮流:法律是凝聚社区的有关正义的一组抽象规则。在前现代社会,制定法律的权威据信是超凡的,或神权,或古老习俗,或自然。另一方面,立法属于现在所谓的制定法(positive law),它在发挥政治权力的功能。就像国王、男爵、总统、立法院、军阀,凭借自己的权力和权威,在制定和执行新的规则。如果有高于任何立法的现存法律,方能说有法治的存在。这意味着,拥有政治权力的个人必须接受法律的束缚。这不是说,立法机构不可制定新法,它们如想在法治中发挥作用,必须依据现存法律的规则来制定新法,不可随心所欲。

    法律的最初理解,即制定者是神权、古老习俗或自然,指的是人们不得更改法律,但可以为特殊情境作出妥善解释,有时还是必须的。现代时期,随着宗教权威的走低,自然法信徒的锐减,我们开始将法律视作人造的东西,但必须经过严格程序,以确保它符合基本规则的广泛共识。法律和立法之间的差异,现在相当于宪法和一般法律之间的差异。前者具有更严格的要求,例如绝大多数人的投票同意。在当代美国,这表示国会通过的新法律,必须符合现存的更为重要的宪法,一切以最高法院的解释为准。

    迄今为止,我讨论了政治发展中的建国以及国家集中和使用权力的能力。法治是政治秩序中的另一组件,以限制国家权力。对行政权力的最初制衡不是民主集会或选举,而是人们坚信统治者必须依法行事。所以,国家建设和法治一直在紧张氛围中共存。一方面,统治者在法律范围内行事,或以法律的名义行事,这可提高自己的权威。另一方面,法律可防止他们做随心所欲的事,不能只考虑私人利益,还要考虑整个共同体的利益。所以,政治权力的欲望经常威胁法治,从 17 世纪避开议会自筹税收的英国国王,到 20 世纪以法外行刑队来对付恐怖主义的拉丁美洲政府,皆是如此。

    法治的现代迷惑

    在当代发展中国家,最大政治缺点之一就是法治的相对软弱。当代国家的所有组件中,高效法律机构也许是最难构建的。军事和征税的机构,天然来自人类基本的掠夺本能。军阀组织民兵向社区榨取资源,这并不困难。在另一极端,民主选举的安排也相对容易(只是比较昂贵),何况今天还有国际组织的援助。但法律机构必须遍布整个国家,持续不断,长期运作。它们需要设施,投资于律师、法官及法庭其他职员的训练,还有最终执法的警察。但最重要的,法律机构必须被视作合法和权威的,不仅在普通人眼中,而且在更有力的精英眼中。做到这一点,证明是颇不容易的。今天,拉丁美洲绝大多数国家是民主的,但其法治却非常软弱,到处是收贿的警官和逃税的法官。俄罗斯联邦仍举行民主选举,自总统而下的精英都违法乱纪,肆无忌惮,尤其是在弗拉基米尔·普京当政之后。

    有很多文献,将法治的建立与经济发展挂起钩来。这些文献从根本上反映出一条重要观点,即现代资本经济世界的涌现,在很大程度上归功于既存的法治,缺乏高效的法治是贫困国家不能取得较高增长的主要原因。

    但这些文献非常混乱,在法治的基本定义和它的存在与否上,前后又不一致。此外,将法治的不同组件与经济增长挂钩的理论,其实证经验有点靠不住;将它投射到马尔萨斯经济条件下的社会,困惑只会加倍。我们在讲法治起源的历史之前,需要清除一下当代讨论所留下的累赘。

    经济学家谈论法治时,通常指现代产权和合同执行。现代产权是指个人拥有的财产,可自由买卖,不受亲戚团体、宗教当局、国家的限制。经济增长受产权和合同的影响,这理论非常直截了当。没人会做长期投资,除非知道自己的产权是安全的。如果政府突然对某种投资增税,像乌克兰在 20 世纪 90 年代签署移动电话基建协议后所作的,投资者可能会在中途改弦易辙,并对将来项目心灰意冷。同样,贸易需要法律机构来维持合同,裁判合同双方不可避免的争执。合同的规则越透明,合同的维持越公正,就会鼓励越多的贸易。这就是为何很多经济学家强调,“可信承诺”是国家制度发展的重要标志。

    这个法治定义与本章开头的那个略有重叠。显而易见,如果政府觉得自己在各方面都享有主权,不受既存法治的束缚,那么无人可阻止它充公自己公民或外国贸易伙伴的财产。如果普遍的法律规则,一旦牵涉到强大的精英阶层或最强大的政府本身,就无法得到执行,那么产权或贸易的安全可能只是空头支票。政治学家巴里·温加斯特(Barry Weingast)注意到,强大的国家既可保护产权,也可取消产权。

    另一方面,有“足够好”的产权和合同执行,允许经济的发展,但没有真正的法治(即法律是至高无上的意思),这完全可行。……中国经济取得三十多年的两位数增长,并不需要“法治”的抽象承诺。1978 年,共产党以包产到户的法律解散了人民公社,但没有恢复中国农民的现代产权(个人转让土地的权利)。更确切地说,他们只获得可遗传的土地使用权(长期租赁权),类似于奥斯曼帝国中央省的农民。这些权利已经“足够好”,导致农业产量在改革后的四年功夫翻了一番。

    古代帝制中国没有法治。另一方面,正常时期的中华帝国很可能在地方层次享有“足够好”的产权,至少将农业生产效率提高到其时技术所容许的极限。那时的产权与今天中国农民的产权相比,不会相差很多,与其说受到掠夺性国家的约束,倒不如说受到亲戚关系的约束。父系宗族将无数的权利和习俗强加于财产之上,一直到 20 世纪的中华民国,家庭仍有权利限制土地的出售。

    此外,不是很清楚,最好的现代产权足以在实质上提高生产效率,还是足以在马尔萨斯式社会中创建出现代资本主义。确保技术持续进步的其他建制(如科学方法、大学、人力资源、研究实验室、鼓励探险和试验的文化氛围,等等)尚未问世时,单凭良好产权所创造的生产效率增长仍然有限,因此不能假设技术的持续进步。

    所以,经济学家对法治下现代产权和合同执行的强调,可能有两个错位。首先,在技术持续革新的当代世界,虽然没有至高无上的法治,“足够好”的产权仍足以创造高度的经济增长。其次,在马尔萨斯式世界中,即使有现代产权和法治的存在,还是无法取得如此的增长,因为限制增长的约束出自其他地方。

    法治还有一个定义,对经济生活具有极大影响,不管是在前现代还是在当代。这就是人身安全,即从暴力的自然状态中退出,从事日常活动,不用担心被杀或被抢。它存在时,我们视之为理所当然;它缺席时,我们会尤其珍惜。

    最终,谈论法治时一定要弄清法律对象,即是说,受法律保护的法人群体。社会的基本执法对大家是一视同仁的,但保护公民免受国家任意侵犯的法治,最初往往只适用于特权阶层的少数。换言之,法律仅仅保护靠近或控制国家的精英的利益。在此意义上,法律就像苏格拉底在柏拉图《理想国》中所标榜的“强盗帮派的正义。”

    举塞维涅夫人(Mme. de Sévigné)写给女儿的信为例,她是 17 世纪法国最著名的沙龙赞助人之一。这位聪明敏感的女子描绘,士兵在布列塔尼征集新税,把老人和孩子从家中赶出,再在屋子里寻找可供夺取的财产。因为不付税,大约六十名市民将在下一天上绞刑架。她继续写道:“那个手舞足蹈、想偷印花税纸的闲汉在车轮上就刑,被割成四块,分别在城市四个角落示众。”

    显而易见,法国国家不会向塞维涅夫人和她朋友圈子施以如此激烈的惩罚。我们将在第 23 章看到,它将繁重税赋仅仅加给平民,因为它太尊重贵族的产权和私人安全。所以,说 17 世纪法国没有法治是不正确的,但法律并没认为平民也是法人,也享有与贵族相同的权利。美国初创时也是如此,否定非裔美国人、妇女、美洲原住民——除了拥有财产的白人男子——的选举权。民主化的过程逐渐拓展法治范围,以包纳所有的居民。

    法治定义的混乱,其所造成的后果之一是富国设计的改善法治计划,很少在贫穷国家产生效果。住在法治国家的幸运儿,往往不懂它如何首次涌现,误把法治的外表当作法治的实质。例如,“相互制衡”是强大法治社会的特征,政府各部门监督彼此的行为。但制衡的正式存在,并不等于强有力的民主统治。法庭可被用来阻挠集体行动,如当代印度,其冗长的司法上诉可拖死重要的基建项目。它又可被用来对抗政府的愿望,以保护精英利益。1905 年最高法院的洛克纳诉纽约州案(Lochner v. New York),其宗旨就是击败限制工时的立法,以保护企业利益。所以,分权的形式常常名不副实,与守法社会的主旨无法对应。

    在接踵而来的讨论中,我们将从尽量广阔的角度去关注法治的发展:法律本身——整套正义规则——来自何方?产权、合同执行、商法的特定规则如何发展至今?最高政治当局如何接受法律的至高无上?

    法律早于立法的哈耶克理论

    伟大的奥地利经济学家弗里德里希·哈耶克,发展了关于法律起源的精深理论,为法治的涵义提供了重要见解,成为今日人们思考法律的框架。哈耶克被称作当代自由至上主义的教父,但自由至上主义者并不反对规则。根据哈耶克,“共同规则的存在使社会中个人的和平共处成为可能”。在法律起源上,哈耶克把批判矛头指向所谓的“唯理主义”或“建构主义”理解。这种理解思路认为,立法者理性地研究社会问题,从而发明法律,以建立自以为更好的社会秩序。在哈耶克看来,建构主义只是过去三百年的自负,尤其是部分法国思想家,包括笛卡尔(Descartes)和伏尔泰(Voltaire),都认为人的大脑足以理解人类社会的工作方式。这导致了哈耶克所谓的铸成大错,如法国和布尔什维克的革命。其时,自上而下的政治权力以公正社会的预设重整社会。在哈耶克的时代(20 世纪的中期),这个错误不仅发生在社会主义国家,如依赖理性计划和中央集权的苏联,还发生在欧洲的社会民主党执政的福利国家。

    在哈耶克看来,错误原因很多,最重要的是没有一名计划者,能掌握足够的社会实际运作知识,以作出理性的重新安排。社会中的知识,大部分具有本地特性,再向整个社会扩散,没人能掌握足够信息来预测法律或规则改革后的效果。

    哈耶克认为,社会秩序不是自上而下的理性计划的结果,而是在数百或数千分散个人的互动中自发产生的。那些个人尝试各式规则,保留有效的,拒绝无效的。社会秩序产生的过程是递增、进化、分散的,只有借用无数个人的本地知识,有效的“大型社会”方能出现。自发的秩序获得发展,以达尔文为生物有机体所安排的方式——分散的适应和选择,并不倚靠创世主的专门设计。

    在哈耶克看来,法律本身便构成一种自发秩序,“毫无疑问,人们发现可以制作或更改法律之前,它已存在良久”。事实上,“个人学会观察(和遵守)行为规则之后的很久,才用语言将之表述出来”。立法——有意识颁布的新规则——“发生于人类历史的相对晚期……所有的法律都是、能够是、也应该是,立法者的自由发明……事实上,这是一种谬误,一个建构论唯理主义的谬种”。

    哈耶克心目中的自发秩序模型就是英国的普通法,无数法官设法将普遍规则用于所面对的特定案例,其判决的累积促使法律的进化发展:

    英国人享有的自由在 18 世纪令其他欧洲国家的人们羡慕不已……它是这样一个事实的结果,即支配法院审判的法律乃是普通法。该法律独立于任何个人意志,它既约束独立的法院,又为这些法院所发展。对于普通法,议会很少加以干预,即便有所干预,其目的也主要是为了澄清某一法律系统内的疑点。

    哈耶克由此锁定法治的本质:代表整个共同体愿望的既存法律,高于当前政府的意志,它限制着政府的立法范围。他对英国普通法的偏爱,获得当代经济学家的赞同,他们也认为,它比欧洲大陆的民法传统更为灵活,对市场更为友好。

    哈耶克在解说其法律起源理论时作出两项声明,一项是实证性的,另一项是规范性的。他主张在大多数社会中,法律以自发的进化方式发展,这种自然生成的法律应该优于有意识制定的法律。这一解释也是伟大的英国法学家爱德华·柯克(Sir Edward Coke)所推崇的,他认为普通法始于太古时代。埃德蒙·伯克(Edmund Burke)在为渐进主义(Incrementalism)辩护时,也援引此一解释。哈耶克是强大国家的伟大敌人,不管是苏联风格的共产党专政,还是以再分配和调节来实现“社会公正”的欧洲社会民主政体。在法律学者罗伯特·埃里克森(Robert Ellickson)所谓的“法律中心论”和“法律外围论”的长久争论上,哈耶克立场鲜明地站在后者一边。前者认为,正式制定的法律创立和塑造了道德规则;后者主张,它们只是编纂了非正式的既存规范。

    然而,哈耶克对最低限度国家的规范性偏爱,扭曲了他对法律起源的实证性见解。在很多社会,法律的存在确实早于立法,但政治当局经常介入以作修改,甚至在早期社会也是这样。现代法治的出现全靠强大中央国家的执法,其显而易见之处甚至可在他偏爱的普通法的起源中找到。

    从惯例法到普通法

    哈耶克认为,法律在社会规则分散演变的基础上获得发展,这一基本见解在广义上是正确的,无论是古代还是现代。但法律发展有重要中断,只能以政治权力的干预来解释,而不是“自发秩序”进程的结果。哈耶克只是把历史事实搞错了。

    这些过渡中有一个是英国从惯例法到普通法的过渡。普通法不只是惯例法的正规文本,它们之间有根本的差别。如我们在第 4 章中看到的,社会从部落组织过渡到国家组织,法律的意义便发生了重大变化。在部落社会中,个人之间的正义有点像当代国际关系,以竞争团体的自助为基础,没有更高级别的第三方执法。相比之下,国家层次的社会恰恰有如此的执法者,那就是国家本身。

    罗马帝国终结后的英格兰仍是部落组织,由盎格鲁人(Angles)、西萨克逊人(West Saxons)、朱特人(Jutes)、凯尔特人(Celts)等组成,尚无国家。家庭组成村庄,村庄再组成所谓的百户(足以承受百户居民)或县的更大单位。该层次之上就是国王,但早期君主没有武力的垄断,也不能对部落单位执行强制规定。他们不把自己当作领土的统治者,只是民众的国王——如盎格鲁人的国王(Rex Anglorum)。如我们在上一章看到的,6 世纪末,本笃派(Benedictine)的修道士奥古斯丁(Augustine)抵达英格兰,基督教便开始破坏盎格鲁—萨克逊的部落组织。但部落法律受到的侵蚀只是日渐月染的,到公元第一个千年后半期的混乱时代,仍然盛行。亲戚团体内有深深的信任,但竞争氏族之间却有敌意和警惕。所以,正义牵涉亲戚团体之间的相处规则。

    盎格鲁—萨克逊编纂的第一本部落法律,是公元 600 年左右的《埃塞尔伯特法典》(Laws of Ethelbert),与稍早的墨洛温(Merovingian)国王克洛维一世的《萨利克法典》非常相似,罗列出各种受伤的赔偿金:

    四个前门牙,每个价值六先令;其旁边的牙齿价值四先令,剩下的牙齿价值一先令;大拇指、大拇指指甲、食指、中指、戒指手指、小手指,各自的指甲都有区分,分别定价。相似分类也用在耳朵上,损失听力、耳朵削掉、耳朵穿孔、耳朵割裂;用在骨头上,骨头暴裸、骨头损坏、骨头断裂、头骨打破、肩膀失灵、下巴断裂、领子骨断裂、手臂断裂、大腿骨断裂、肋骨断裂;用在瘀伤上,衣服外的瘀伤、衣服内的瘀伤、没显黑色的瘀伤。

    基于赔偿金的惩罚,其特征是不公平,因受伤者社会地位的不同而有差异。所以,杀死一名自由人的赔偿金,也许是杀死仆人或奴隶的好几倍。

    日耳曼的部落法律在本质上类似于其他部落社会,从努尔人,到当代的巴布亚新几内亚一语部落。如果有人伤害了你或你的亲戚,你的氏族为了保护自己的荣誉和可靠性,必须施以报复。受伤和报复都是集体的,报复对象不一定是行凶者,他的近亲通常就也足够。赔偿金的存在就是为了解决争端,以防升级,成为无休止的血亲复仇或部落间的仇杀。

    现代法庭的遥远起源就是调停血亲复仇的氏族聚会。在盎格鲁—萨克逊部落,这就是模拟法庭,倾听控告和被告的作证,然后商讨适当的赔偿。但它没有现代的传讯权利,以逼迫证人出庭。它的裁决也得不到执行,除非达成协议。法律的证据往往有赖于用刑,譬如迫使被告赤脚走过火红的煤炭或犁头,或干脆将他们扔进冷水和热水,看是沉还是浮。

    如尼采所观察到的,基督教传入日耳曼部落后,给道德带来了深远启示。基督教的英雄是和平圣徒和烈士,不是武士或报仇的征服者;其传道的普遍平等,又相悖于部落社会基于荣誉的等级制度。基督教有关婚姻和遗产的新规则,不仅破坏部落团结,还创造新社区观念,其成员不再忠于亲戚团体,而分享共同信仰。国王的概念也从共同祖先团体的领袖,变成广大基督徒社区的领袖和保护人。不过,这个改变是循序渐进的。

    部落制在基督教社会中的消亡并不意味家族制的死亡。在东正教中,这段时期的主教和教士可以结婚生子,还可实行宗教名义下的纳妾(nicolaism)。教会通过信徒的捐献获取愈来愈多的财产。教会领袖争取将圣俸传给孩子,加入地方的氏族和部落的政治运作,都变得不可避免。教会职位经手这么多的财富,本身也变成可供交易的珍贵财产,该做法叫作圣职买卖(simony)。

    日耳曼异教徒皈依基督教,就像阿拉伯或突厥部落社会中不信者之皈依伊斯兰教,向哈耶克自发秩序的理论提出了有趣挑战。浏览哈耶克的相关阐述,找不到点滴的宗教因素。然而众所周知,在犹太教、基督教、印度教、穆斯林的社会中,宗教是法律规则的重要来源。基督教进入欧洲,给刚从部落习俗中脱颖而出的惯例法带来第一次主要中断。婚姻和产权规则发生变化,允许女子拥有财产,但这不是地方法官或社区的自发试验,而是强大的天主教等级制度所颁布的革新。教会并不反映地方上不同的价值观念,东正教和穆斯林的宗教当局,都没以相似方式来改造社会上现存的亲戚规则。教会很清楚,它不只是在批准惯例法:教皇乌尔班二世(Urban Ⅱ)在 1092 年告诉佛兰德伯爵(Count of Flanders):“你宣称,你只不过是照地方上的古代习俗行事?即使如此,你应该知道,创世主说过:我的名字是真理;他没有说过:我的名字是习俗。”

    英国法律发展中第二个主要中断是普通法的引入。普通法并不是惯例法的自发演变,它与早期国家的兴起密切相关,并凭借国家权力而取得最终的统治地位。事实上在诺曼征服之后,向全国颁布统一的普通法,已变成扩展国家权力的主要工具。伟大的法律学者弗雷德里克·梅特兰和弗雷德里克·波洛克,如此解说普通法的起源:

    国王法庭(royal court)的习俗就是英国的习俗,从而变成了普通法。对于地方习俗,国王法官以一般性的语言表示尊敬,我们并没有看到任何移风易俗的主观愿望。不管如何,地方习俗即使没遭破坏,也得不到成长。尤其是程序,国王法庭取得了对所有其他法庭的彻底控制,将自己的规则视为唯一公正的。

    弄不清早期欧洲国王的作用,就不能理解这个过程。11 世纪的国王不是领土统治者,更像分散封建秩序中伙伴中的老大。像威廉一世和亨利一世那样的国王,花大部时间在旅途中察看国土的各部分。其时,大家都已退回各自分隔的村庄和庄园层次的小社会,这也是国王宣告权力和保持联系的唯一方法。国王的主要服务是充作上诉法庭,若有人不满意领主法庭(seigneurial)或庄园法庭(manor)所提供的正义。从自身利益出发,国王也希望扩充自己法庭的司法权,因为它的服务是收费的。向国王法庭提出上诉增强国王的威望,他可以推翻地方领主的裁决,从而削弱后者的权威。

    起初,各类法庭相互竞争,以取得司法生意。随着时间的推移,国王法庭开始占据优势。人们避开地方法庭有多种原因。巡回的国王法庭被视为更加公平,与领主法庭相比,它与本地诉讼人的牵连更少。它们也有程序上的优势,如强迫民众参与陪审团的工作。长年累月,它们又获益于规模和范围上的经济效益,司法需要人力、专长、教育。第一个全国官僚机构是国王法庭所建立的,它开始编纂惯例规则,建立先例系统。显而易见的,写作是必要的前提。每过十年,熟悉先例的法律专家越来越多,再被指定为法官,派往全国。

    顾名思义,普通法就是不特殊,普遍适用。也就是说,英国不同地区的众多惯例规则,现由单一的普通法所取代。各地的先例适用于全国,即遵循先例的原则(stare decisis)。执法的是法官网络,其工作环境是统一的法律系统,比以前拼凑的惯例规则更为系统、更为正式。普通法基于惯例法所订下的先例,但国家权力的兴起,创造了惯例规则不敷使用的全新环境。例如,以前亲戚团体以赔偿金解决的犯罪,现受到更高级别的第三方的起诉,或是庄园主,或是国王本人。国王法庭也开始变成无争议事项的登记场所,如财产注册和土地转移。

    因此,普通法代表了英国法律发展的中断。它依据较早的先例,如果没有诺曼征服,绝不可能成为全国法律。诺曼征服赶走了古老的丹麦和盎格鲁—萨克逊人的贵族,建立起愈益强大的大一统中央政权。以后的普通法演变可能是自发的,但它作为法律裁决的架构,又需要中央政治权力的干涉。

    历史学家约瑟夫·斯特雷耶认为,中世纪时,早期国家的创建涉及法律制度和财政制度,而不是军事组织;军事动员促进国家建设,则要等到早期现代。在某种意义上,法律机构甚至早于财政机构,因为国王法庭是国王收入的最重要来源之一。国王提供平等正义的能力——不像惯例法中,依据受害者社会地位而定不同的赔偿金——加强了自己的威望和权威。像中东传统中的君主,国王不一定被视为最大最具掠夺性的军阀。他又可充任受地方领主掠夺的牺牲者的保护人,一个主持正义的人。

    中央国家的法律功能,对英国后来的产权发展和国家的合法性至关重要。对地方领主与自由佃户和非自由佃户的交易,领主法庭享有专门司法权,直到大约 1400 年。这种情形下,一旦发生财产争执,就有点像由狐狸来守护鸡笼。逐渐地,国王法庭宣称有权过问这些纠纷。13 世纪早期,有人提出国王在全国范围享有司法权,低级法庭的司法权来自国王的委托。原告偏爱把诉讼送到国王法庭,久而久之,领主法庭慢慢失去对土地租佃纠纷的司法权。这一市场驱动的选择显示,国王法庭肯定被视作更加公平,更少偏向地方领主,更可能执行裁决。

    其他欧洲国家没有发生类似的改变。尤其在法国,领主法庭保留对土地租佃纠纷的司法权,直到法国大革命。在某种意义上,这很讽刺。一般认为,17 世纪的法国国王,如路易十三和路易十四,明显不同于英国国王,通过坚持自己的绝对权力来削弱贵族阶层,但他们却把地方法庭的司法权留给省城贵族。亨利·梅因爵士在他的论文《法国和英国》中指出,革命爆发之后,全法国的庄园主住宅被烧,纵火的第一对象是储存财产文件的契约房(muniment room)。不像英国农民,法国农民觉得地主手中的地契不合法,由于地方领主控制的法庭一直抱有偏见。

    最后的案例点明了法治性质的要点。法治依靠法律本身和可见的管理机构——法官、律师、法庭等,也依靠制度运作的正式程序。但法治的正常运作,既是制度或程序上的事务,也是规范性的事务。和平社会中的大多数人服从法律,不是因为做了理性的利弊计算,恐惧处罚;而是因为相信法律基本上是公平的,在道德观念上已习惯于遵守。如果相信它是不公平的,他们就比较不愿服从。

    被视作公平的法律,如果执行不均,或有钱有势者得以豁免,也将被认作不公平。这似乎将负担重又放回制度和程序,以及其公平执法的能力。这里仍有规范化的问题,如果有钱有势者在某种程度上不相信自我约束的必要,甚至不相信有约束同类的必要,光是制度何以遏制他们?在很多法治软弱的国家,法官、检察官、警察可被收买,或可被胁迫,正式制度的存在又能发生什么效用呢?

    要建立规范化的法律秩序,不但国王接受,老百姓也愿接受,宗教就很有必要。波洛克和梅特兰写道,国王并不在法律之上:“每个国家一定要有某人或某些人在法律之上,一名既无义务又无权利的‘君主’,这样的理论一定会遭到拒绝……没人假设,国王可以更改天主教会的普通法,即使获得高级教士和男爵的同意。”国王受到约束,因为百姓会以造反来反对他们所认定的不公。什么是不公,什么会动员百姓起来反抗国王,全看国王的做法合不合法。

    即使是公平的规范化秩序,也需要权力。如果国王不情愿执行针对精英的法律,或心有余而力不足,法律的合法性就会受损,不管其来源是宗教、传统还是习俗,这是哈耶克和他的自由至上主义追随者所疏忽的。普通法可能是分散各地法官的业绩,倘若没有强大的中央国家,它首先不会形成,之后也得不到执行。 英国很早就完成了从惯例法到现代法律制度的过渡,让人印象深刻,这构成了国家合法性的基础。其他欧洲国家在 13 世纪完成类似过渡,但依据的是完全不同的法律制度,即来自《查士丁尼法典》的民法。欧洲大陆的过渡,其关键也是天主教会的行为。这个故事,以及教会如何不同于印度和穆斯林世界的宗教机构,将是下一章的主题。

    第 18 章 教会变为国家

    天主教会对法治在欧洲的形成至关重要;叙任权斗争和后果;教会获得国家般的特征;世俗统治领域的出现;当代法治植根于上述发展

    最深刻意义上的法治意味着:社会产生共识,其法律是公正和既存的,能够约束其时统治者的行为;享有主权的不是统治者,而是法律;统治者的正当权力只能来自法律,方才享有合法性。

    在我们的世俗现代之前,在政治秩序之外,公正法律的最显著来源是宗教。宗教权威只有独立于政治权威,基于宗教的法律才能约束统治者;如果宗教权威组织涣散,或国家控制着教会的财产及教士的任免,那么宗教法律更有可能是在支持而不是限制政治权威。要理解法治的发展,不但要看宗教规则的来源和性质,还要关注宗教权威的组成和建制化。

    欧洲的法治植根于基督教。欧洲国家出现之前,罗马就有颁布权威法律的基督教主教(pontiff)。欧洲关于婚姻和遗产的规则,最初不是君主所规定的,而是来自像教皇格里高利那样的个别人士。他的特使奥古斯丁带着他一清二楚的指示,远赴不列颠岛,以说服异教的埃塞尔伯特国王皈依基督教。

    激进伊斯兰主义在 20 世纪晚期兴起以来,很多人指出,西方的教会和国家截然分开,但是,像沙特阿拉伯那样的穆斯林国家却政教不分。但这一差别经不起仔细的推敲。自基督教出现以来,西方的政教分离并不是常数,而是时断时续的。

    基督教起初只是一个千禧宗派,在其存在的头三个世纪受到残酷的迫害,先是犹太人,再是罗马政治当局。到公元 313 年,君士坦丁(Constantine)皈依基督教,它从非正统宗派一下子变成罗马帝国的国教。罗马帝国的西部遭到异教野蛮人的征服,宗教和政治权力又一次分开。西方政权的孱弱给予天主教更多的独立机会,教皇哲拉修一世(Gelasius,492—496 年在位)在教条中争辩,高级教士拥有比君主行政权更高的立法权。到了黑暗时代之末,政治权力重新恢复,政教第二次交融。

    政教合一(Caesaropapism)是一种制度,它的宗教权威完全服从于国家,像基督教向罗马国教的转化。现保留给教皇的最高教士(pontifex maximus)头衔,曾是罗马皇帝的,因为他也是罗马国教的首脑。中国始终是政教合一(唐朝可能是例外。其时,佛教在精英中颇受欢迎),此外还有什叶派掌控地区之外的大部分穆斯林世界。拜占庭的东罗马帝国是现代东正教的老祖宗,也是政教合一称号的发源地。它始终不变,直到土耳其在 1453 年征服君士坦丁堡。大家所忽视的是,到了 11 世纪初,西方基督教世界的大部都已变成实际上的政教合一。

    政教合一的实际意义是指政治当局对教会享有委任权,中世纪早期的欧洲都是如此。全欧洲的皇帝、国王、封建领主都在任命主教,也有权力召开教会会议,颁布教会法律。教皇将合法性赋予皇帝,皇帝却也在指定和罢黜教皇。1059 年之前的二十五位教皇中,皇帝任命了二十一位,罢黜了五位。教会当局对文官当局的惩罚,欧洲国王都享有否决权。

    在多数欧洲国家中,教会确实拥有四分之一到三分之一的土地,从而得到收入和自治。由于政治当局控制了教会圣职的任命,教会的独立程度还相当有限。教会的土地经常被认为是皇家的赞助,统治者经常委任亲戚为主教,主教和教士又允许结婚,经常会卷入他们所管辖地域的家庭和宫廷的政治。教会土地可变成遗产,传给主教的孩子。教会官员也担任政治职位,进一步增强了宗教和政权的牵连。所以,教会本身就是前现代的家族组织。

    天主教会宣告独立

    11 世纪晚期,天主教开始独立于政治权力。领衔带头的是一位名叫希尔德布兰德的修道士(Hilderbrand),后来他成为教皇格里高利七世(1073—1085 年在位)。他在教皇派中凝聚了一帮人,包括彼得·达米安(Peter Damiani)、红衣主教汉伯特(Humbert)、教皇帕斯卡尔二世(Pascal Ⅱ)。他们认为,教皇应对所有的基督徒和政治当局行使至高无上的法律权力,并有罢免皇帝的权利。他还宣称,任命主教的唯一机构是教会,而不是世俗当局。其时背景是神圣罗马皇帝亨利三世(Henry Ⅲ)的阴谋诡计。为了出席加冕典礼,他抵达罗马,马上罢免作为对手的三位教皇,以推举自己的候选人。

    根据希尔德布兰德,教会一定要实施改革,才能独立于政治权力,最重要的一点就是要严禁教士、主教结婚和生儿育女。他攻击常见的宗教纳妾和圣职买卖,它们让教会职位变成了可供交易和遗传的财产。希尔德布兰德派发起了一场传单战役,敦促基督徒不要接受已婚或纳妾教士的圣礼,并抨击为赚钱而提供教会服务的行径。成为格里高利七世后,他把教士独身订为教会的正式原则,并迫使已婚教士在教会义务和家庭义务之间作出选择。这是向教士既得利益的挑战,导致教会内部艰巨而激烈的斗争。教皇格里高利的目标是想在教会内终止腐败和寻租,所以攻击家族制的根源,即主教和神父的生儿育女。他的思维逻辑无异于中国和拜占庭依赖太监、奥斯曼帝国从家人手中夺走军事奴隶。如果在忠于国家和忠于家庭之间作出选择,大多数人出于生物本能会选后者。所以,减少腐败的最直接方法,就是禁止官员组织家庭。

    这项改革自然遭到现有主教的反对。教皇格里高利明白,他赢不了这场战役,除非他有权任免主教,而不是皇帝。在 1075 年的教皇宣言中,他要将罢免主教和世俗教职的权利从国王手中收回。神圣罗马皇帝亨利四世的答复,是要将他罢黜,“下台,下台,你这个受诅咒的”。格里高利的回应是将皇帝逐出教会。很多日耳曼君主和一部分主教支持教皇,迫使亨利四世在 1077 年赶来格里高利在卡诺莎的住所。他足足等了三天,赤脚站在雪地,以求教皇的宽赦。

    有些历史性事件全由个人引起,如不提及他们特殊的道德品质,就难以解释。叙任权斗争就是这样的事件。格里高利有不屈不挠的坚强意志,在教皇派中,曾被伙伴称作“我神圣的撒旦”。就像四个世纪后的马丁·路德,他对改革之后的教会以及其在社会中发挥的作用,抱有恢宏的远见。他不怕胁迫,愿意看到与皇帝的冲突逐步升级,直至全面对抗。

    但这历史上的著名冲突,仅靠个人意志是解释不清的。天主教会成为自治的政治参与者,其重要背景是欧洲普遍的政治软弱。拜占庭的东正教及其在俄国的正统继承者,不得不接受其所在帝国的监护。相比之下,西方教会位于政治上分崩离析的意大利半岛,北方邻国的日耳曼人也是散沙一般,神圣罗马帝国只取得名义上的统一。11 世纪的法国并不团结,无法果断地干涉教皇政治。这段时期的教会虽然没有自己的军事力量,但很容易在周边政治体的相互竞争中合纵连横。

    亨利四世在卡诺莎接受教皇的权威,但仍不愿承认教皇委任主教的权利,依旧拒绝格里高利的要求。他继续占领罗马,罢免格里高利,让自己提供的候选人克雷芒三世(Clement Ⅲ)成为一位对立教皇(antipope)。格里高利向意大利南部的诺曼国王们求救。他们答应,但到最后洗劫罗马,引起罗马居民的反抗。格里高利被迫与诺曼同盟一起撤回南方,于 1085 年死于萨莱诺(Salerno),身名俱败。叙任权斗争延续到下一代,格里高利的继承者,再将亨利四世和其儿子亨利五世逐出教会。另一方面,皇帝罢免教皇,扶持自己的候选人成为对立教皇。最终达成协议的是 1122 年的沃尔姆斯宗教协定(Concordat of Worms),皇帝基本上放弃叙任权,而教会承认皇帝在一系列世俗事务上的权力。

    叙任权斗争对欧洲后续发展非常重要。首先,它允许天主教会进化成现代的、等级制的、官僚化的、依法而治的机构,如法律历史学家哈罗德·伯尔曼(Harold Berman)所认为的,还为后来建国者树立了榜样。根据亨廷顿,机构发展的标准之一就是自治,如果不能控制对自己官员的任命,机构就不可能是自治的。这也是叙任权斗争的中心争执。沃尔姆斯宗教协定之后,教皇变成教会等级制度中无可争辩的执行总裁,在红衣主教学院的建议下,可随意任免主教。

    教会也纯洁自己的行止。教士的独身制消除了将圣俸授予亲戚和后裔的诱惑,并给教职出售涂上新的道德色彩。教会可以什一税(tithe)的形式征收税赋,由于教职人士脱离地方氏族的政治,而变得更善于处置自己的财政资源。它还显示出真正国家的特征,有时组织自己的军队,在确定领土中(尽管很小)行使直接司法权。

    教会对世俗事务的介入,当然未因叙任权斗争而告结束。世俗统治者也在继续设法操纵教皇职位,安置自己的候选人,例如 14 世纪的阿维农教皇(Avignon)。随着时间的推移,又出现新式滥权,最终为宗教改革铺平道路。与世界任何其他宗教机构相比,天主教在适应性、复杂性、自治性、连贯性方面的建制化更为高级。

    叙任权斗争的第二个重要成果是精神领域和尘世领域的明确分离,从而为现代世俗国家铺平道路。如早先提及的,这个分离只在基督教中隐性存在。沃尔姆斯宗教协定,在西方教会的历史上永远终止了政教合一时代。这种方式,从没出现于东正教或穆斯林世界。

    为了削弱政治统治者的权力,格里高利的改革宣告教会的普遍权威,不管是精神还是尘世,甚至还包括罢免国王和皇帝的权利。事实上,基督教皇是在要求印度婆罗门从一开始就在行使的权威。然而,经过漫长的政治和军事的博弈,教会被迫妥协。它划出明确界定的精神领域,让自己实施无可争辩的控制,同时又承认,世俗统治者有权在另外范围行使统治权。这一分工,为后来世俗国家的兴起打下基础。

    最后,叙任权斗争对欧洲法律和法治的发展产生了重大影响。第一,教会阐述系统性的教会法规取得合法化;第二,教会创造了建制化的精神权威的单独领域。

    罗马法的再现

    与皇帝发生冲突时,格里高利和继承者没有自己的军队可以调动,只能通过呼吁合法性来加强自己的力量。于是,教皇派发动了一次对法律源头的搜索,以支持教会享有普遍司法权的主张。搜索结果之一是 11 世纪末,在意大利北部的图书馆内重新发现《查士丁尼法典》(Corpus Iuris Civilis)。迄今,《查士丁尼法典》仍是民法传统的基础,不管是欧洲大陆,还是受其殖民或影响的其他国家,包括从阿根廷到日本。很多基本的法律常识,如民法和刑法、公法和私法之间的差别,都可从中找到起源。

    《查士丁尼法典》是罗马法律高度精细的汇集,6 世纪初,在查士丁尼皇帝治下的君士坦丁堡成书问世。重被发现的文本包含四部分:摘要、制度、法典、案例,其中摘要最为重要,涵盖的题目包括个人地位、民事侵权、不公平致富、合同、补偿。查士丁尼时代的法学家相信,它是早期罗马法(现已遗失)最重要遗产的汇总,并变成 12 世纪新一代欧洲法学家的研究主题。

    罗马法的复兴之所以可行,是因为在新式机构中开展了法律研究,那就是新兴的现代大学。11 世纪末,博洛尼亚(Bologna)大学成为研究中心,来自欧洲各地的数千学生聚集起来,聆听像伊尔纳留斯(Irnerius)那样的教授讲解摘要。新的法律课程让欧洲人看到一套详尽的法律系统,可立即用于自己的社会。《查士丁尼法典》的知识由此传播到欧洲大陆最遥远的角落,法律学院在其他城市纷纷涌现,如巴黎、牛津、海德堡(Heidelberg)、克拉科夫(Cracow)、哥本哈根。有点像英国普通法的情形,罗马法的恢复突然取代了盛行于欧洲的日耳曼惯例法,代之以更为统一的跨国规则。

    推介《查士丁尼法典》的第一代学者被称为训诂者(glossators),其主要工作是重建罗马法。后续一代的学者,如托马斯·阿奎那(Thomas Aquinas),则看得更远,为寻求法律的思想基础而直抵古希腊。亚里士多德等古典哲学家认为,习俗和见解需要接受人们的理性考量,并对照于更普遍的真理标准。阿奎那将这条原则,用于自己对亚里士多德的研究。他所建立的哲学传统,鼓励后代法律评论家不要机械复制现存法律,而要推论法律来源,以做到活学活用。欧洲大学所复原的古典传统,不仅是向静态的文本寻求权威,而是对文本的涵义进行理性查询。

    新兴大学培养了一批特别律师,既能解释古典文本,又掌握专门知识。教会和世俗的当局开始认为,他们需要依赖律师的专长来作出裁决,尤其是在极为重要的商业合同和产权方面。律师依次发展自己的机构利益,拒绝非专家和自私的政治派别闯入他们的专业领域。

    格里高利改革之前,教会法律包括宗教会议的法令、教父的著作、教皇法令、代表教会的国王和皇帝所颁布的法令。此外,还混杂有罗马法的残余和日耳曼的惯例法。随着教会等级制度的建立,教会第一次有可能权威地制定法律,凭借愈益专业的教会法律专家,将统一性注入新法典。受过法律训练的修道士格拉提安(Gratian),分析、校对、调和了数世纪以来的几千条正典(canons),再将之综合成统一的法规。这本《教会法规汇编》(Concordance of Discordant Canons)出版于 1140 年,洋洋洒洒一千四百页。格拉提安建立了神圣法、自然法、制定法、惯例法的法律等级制度,又设计了理性程序,以解决相互之间的矛盾。格拉提安之后的一个世纪,教会法规得到极大扩充,涵盖了广泛的法律题目,包括刑法、家庭、财产、合同、遗嘱。

    天主教会通过统一教会法规的概念而取得国家属性,又通过发展行政官僚机构,而变得更像一个国家。法律学者认为,韦伯所定义的现代官僚的“职位”(office),其第一个模型是在 12 世纪教会等级制度中产生的。现代职位的特征之一是职位和官员的分离,职位不是私人财产,执掌职位的只是领薪官员,身受所处等级制度的纪律约束;职位依功能而分,执掌职位要有技术专长。如我们所知,所有这些都是秦朝以来中国官僚制的特征,尽管有不少“职位”在后续朝代中重新家族化了。教会的叙任权从世俗政权的手中获得解放,教士独身制又得到强行的实施,自此以后,教会的官僚制特征愈益明显。例如,教会开始在 12 世纪早期区分教职(officium)与圣俸(beneficium)。教职人士不一定收到封建圣俸,现只是领薪的教会员工,根据自己的工作表现或被雇用,或被辞退。这些官僚开始任职于教皇秘书处(Papal Chancery),很快又变成世俗统治者秘书处的榜样。

    法律和现代国家的兴起

    9 世纪卡洛林王朝崩溃之后,权力四下分散。到格里高利改革时期,欧洲的政治秩序见证了逆转的开头。权力流向一系列的地区领袖,当地方领主在 10 世纪末纷纷建造城堡时,又受到进一步的分割。庄园——基本上自给自足的生产和军事的单位,以领主的城堡和土地为中心——变成整个欧洲的统治来源。这个系统之上又出现几家王室,如以法兰西岛(Île de France)为中心的卡佩家族(Capetians)、征服英国和意大利南部的各式诺曼男爵。他们只是比对手拥有更多土地,遂变成新型领土国家的核心。

    格里高利的改革不仅向领土国家提供了官僚和法律的榜样,并鼓励他们发展自己的建制。世俗统治者负责领土内的和平和秩序,并提供规则以促进新兴商业。这导致了独特法律领域的形成,分别与封建、庄园、城市、长途贸易有关。哈罗德·伯尔曼认为,法律形式的多样化激发了司法辖区之间的竞争和革新,从而促进自由在欧洲的发展。尤其重要的是独立城市的兴起,它的自由人口和对外贸的依赖,刺激了对商业法律的新型需求。

    教会在建制上趋向独立,更刺激了封建社会其他领域的集团组织。在 11 世纪,主教杰拉德·德·坎布雷(Gérard de Cambrai)和主教阿尔德贝隆·德·拉昂(Aldabéron de Laon)创立社会等级一分为三的原则:贵族、神职人士、平民——即打仗者、祈祷者、支持前两者的劳作者。这些功能组织与地域没有关系,其为三个代表阶层的形成打下意识形态的基础。统治者定期召集各代表阶层,以批准征税和讨论国家大事。如后续章节所显示的,欧洲国家今后发展的是负责制政府还是专制政府,将取决于这些阶层能否顶住中央君主的压力。

    欧洲国家建设的特征之一,是很早就非常依赖法律。法律在国家制度成长方面,既是动机,又是过程。专家习惯于认为,战争和暴力是欧洲政治发展的主要动力。这在早期现代肯定没错,其时,专制主义的兴起与军事动员的财政需求休戚相关。但在中世纪,国家获得合法性和权威,靠的是分配正义的能力,其早期机构多为执法部门。

    最能体现这一点的,非英国莫属。21 世纪初,我们习惯把英国及其衍生品美国,当作盎格鲁—萨克逊经济自由主义的家园,把法国当作中央集权政府的诞生地。然而在 14 世纪之前,这正好恰恰相反。所有的欧洲政治体中,英国国家是最集中最强大的,其基础就是国王法庭,以及它向全国提供正义的职能。到 1200 年,它已拥有常设机构,配置以专业或半专业官员。它颁布法令规定,与土地权有关的案例,一定要得到国王法庭的命令方可成立。它还向全国征税。中央权力的证据就在《末日书》(Domesday Book,即《土地调查清册》),它的编纂在诺曼征服后不久,核查了国内每一郡的居民。

    当时已有了英格兰国家身份的雏形。1215 年男爵们在兰尼米德(Runnymede)对抗国王约翰,强行施加《大宪章》(Magna Carta)。他们这样做,不是作为只想为自己争取豁免权的军阀。他们期待统一的中央政府,通过国王法庭来更好地保护自己的权利。在这一点上,他们把自己当作更大社区的代表。相比之下,法国其时比较分散,各地区之间有重要的语言和文化上的差异,国王筹集税赋,只能在法兰西岛周围的自己领地。

    中世纪教会为法治树立先例

    天主教会在 12 世纪成为现代官僚机构,并颁布统一连贯的教会法规,但这离现代法治还很远。法治牢固的发达国家,向政府统治提供合法性的通常是书面宪法。但这套法律并不起源于宗教权威,事实上很多宪法规定,在牵涉宗教的道德问题上必须维持政治的中立。现代宪法的合法性来自某种民主的批准程序。这套法律可被看作扎根于永恒或普遍的原则之中,在亚伯拉罕·林肯看来,美国宪法就是一例。但多数现代宪法对其合法性的最终来源都有点隐约其词。从实用角度看,那些原则的解释仍然取决于政治上的争论。到最后,借民主取得合法性的行政和立法的机构,其权力仍然要受制于借民主取得合法性的宪法。后者取决于更严格的社会共识,如某种形式的超多数选举。在最近发展中,各国政府也要受制于跨国法律机构,如欧洲人权法庭(European Court of Human Rights)和国际战犯法庭(International Criminal Court)。不过,与国家层次的法庭相比,它们的合法基础比较暧昧。包括以色列和印度的自由民主国家中,宗教法庭仍在家庭法上享有司法权。但这只是例外,宗教权威不得参与法律制度是普遍规则。

    那么,为何要说基于宗教的法律为现代法治奠下了基石?

    宗教权威的分开存在,使统治者倾向于承认,自己不是法律的最终来源。弗雷德里克·梅特兰坚信,没有一位英国国王认为自己高于法律。但这不适用于任何一位中国皇帝,因为没有一条法律是他们承认的,除非是自己的金口玉言。在这方面,像印度的拉贾和刹帝利、阿拉伯和土耳其的苏丹,基督教君主同意自己身处法律之下。

    在每个实行以宗教为基础的法律的社会中,政治统治者都制定法律,试图侵入宗教法律的领域。在许多情况中这种侵入是必要的,因为有很多方面宗教法律不敷使用,但最危险的侵入是针对原则的。早期现代欧洲的重要政治斗争(将在后续章节中作详细说明)涉及崛起的君主,他们凭借新颖的主权原则,将自己置于等级制度的顶部,以取代上帝。这些国王像中国皇帝,声称自己可单独制作法律,不受既存法律、习俗和宗教的束缚。成功抵制这些声称,重申法律的至高无上,那就是现代法治兴起的故事。法律本身可能还不够,所以又从宗教传统那里获得圣洁、自治和连贯性,从而更易实行这种抵制。

    法律体现有关正义规则的广泛社会共识,如果明白这一点,那么中世纪法治和现代法治之间的中断,与其说是实质性的,倒不如说是表面上的。这也是哈耶克所说的法律早于立法的涵义。在 12 世纪的宗教年代,或在同时期的穆斯林或印度世界,社会共识往往通过宗教表述出来。与今天相比,那时宗教在日常生活中发挥更为重要的作用。宗教法律不是从外空掉入社会的,一开始可能伴随暴力和征服而至,再与社会共同进化,渐渐演变成本土的道德规则。当时,宗教和世俗的领域互不分离,阐明社会共识就不得不使用宗教语言。在宗教扮演较为局限角色的今天,无可避免地,必须通过其他途径来确定社会共识,譬如通过民主选举。无论用宗教语言还是世俗语言,法律始终是广泛分享的正义规则的表述。

    12 世纪浮现的宗教法律,对现代法治施加了重大影响,它帮助促进了法律的建制化和理性化。法治若要存在,光是建立统治者服从法律的理论原则还不够。还要有体现有关法律的具体机构,并取得独立于国家之外的某种程度的自治,否则就很难控制国家的随心所欲。此外,如果法律不是一套连贯和清晰的规则,就不能限制行政权力。宪法上的分权,必须依靠一个切实的法律体系,该体系掌控自己的用人和晋升,设立自己的专业标准,训练自己的律师和法官,在解释法律时,享有不受行政机构干涉的真正权力。英国国王负责创建了以国王法庭为终极权威的普通法,他也将大量权力下放给法官,允许法律专业的茁壮成长,其就业和收入并不完全依赖国家。在欧洲大陆,查士丁尼的民法传统,意味着较为集中的法律诠释,但也有自治的法律专业的平行成长——事实上,出现了多种法律的多门专业。两种情形中,西方法律的理性化程度都要大于印度或穆斯林逊尼派。后两种传统文明中,没有涌现像修道士格拉提安那样的人,将整套既存的宗教法令统一连贯起来。

    西欧出现的法律传统明显不同于东正教。影响后来政治发展的不是基督教本身,而是西方基督教所采用的特别制度。东正教的主教继续接受皇帝或本地统治者的任命,教会在总体上也从没宣告自己的独立。不像西方的教会,东正教从未丧失罗马法的传统,也从未宣称法律有高于拜占庭皇帝的至上地位。

    法治的涌现是构成现代政治发展的三大组件中第二个。跟确定欧洲脱离部落或亲戚社会组织的过渡时间一样,法治出现的时间也需要再往前提,其远远早于早期现代时期——至少要提到到 12 世纪。这也点出了本卷的中心主题,即现代化的不同组件,并不全是某种一揽子解释的一部分,它们并非都是伴随宗教改革、启蒙运动和工业革命而来的。独立城市和新兴贸易的需求,促使了现代商业法律的发展。但法治一开始不是经济力量的产品,而是宗教产品。所以,作为经济现代化关键的两个基本制度——可以自由选择个人的社会关系和财产关系,透明预知的法律为政治统治设限——都是前现代中世纪教会所创造的。只是到了后来,这些制度证明在经济范围内也相当有用。

    第 19 章 国家变为教会

    法治在印度和中东的发展,但在中国缺席;中东世俗和宗教的当局有效分享权力;前现代中东政权遵守产权;穆斯林乌里玛不能以基督教会的方式制衡国家权力;当代阿拉伯世界没有法治;现代法治的比较

    在中国,宗教并不反映社会和文化的共识,毋宁说是社会抗议的手段。这体现在汉朝的道教、唐朝的佛教、19 世纪受基督教影响的太平天国等。中国的国家轻易掌控各式祭司团体,从不承认比国家本身更高的宗教权威。

    所以,中国没有基于宗教的法治的历史基础。中国的传统以法家思想为基石,中国人心目中的法律主要是制定法(positive law),也就是皇帝所颁布的王法。秦、汉、隋、唐、明等朝都出版了重要法典,很多篇幅只是各式违法的处罚表。7 至 8 世纪陆续颁布的《唐律》,不提法律的神圣来源,只说法律是世俗统治者所制作的,以控制百姓的行止和避免自然和社会的失衡。

    印度则完全不同,与印度国家形成同期或稍早的婆罗门教,规定政治/武士阶层——刹帝利——必须从属于祭司阶层的婆罗门。印度宗教以四大社会阶层的瓦尔纳为基础,印度统治者必须向身处顶端的祭司取得合法性和社会支持。所以,法律深深植根于宗教,而非政治。最早的法律文本《法论》(Dharmasastras),不是像中国那样的皇帝法令,而是宗教权威所写下的文本。印度后来的法律发展有点像英国的普通法,没有严格遵循这些法律文本,反而依据判例,并把班智达(panditas,精通宗教典籍的学者)所创造的先例前后连接。执行裁决的经常是婆罗门,而不是政治当局,不允许分开的世俗领域来制订规则。法律有很多哈耶克提及的特征,通常是不可更改的,除非能找到与当前法律有关的更古老先例。独立后,印度议会试图修改婚姻和离婚的法律,据称有名保守印度人这样说:“议会的权力不可推翻经典(Shastras)的命令,那是上帝说的话,由圣人(Rishis)为我们抄录下的。印度人不可接受经典之外的任何权威。”

    然而,婆罗门阶层没有组织成单一的等级制度,不能对国王和皇帝发号施令,没有印度教皇,也没有印度教会。婆罗门阶层仅代表一个网络,其成员居住在无数的村庄和城市,彼此联络而已。婆罗门内部又分出不同的迦提,由此而充满等级差别。主持国王授权仪式的婆罗门,可能不愿与主持葬礼仪式的交往。宗教权威在地方上享有极大影响,几乎每一项社会事务都需要他们的服务。他们从不臣服于国家,或成为国家的雇员,但也无法凭借建制化的等级制度来采取集体行动。迦提所造成的权威碎片化,不单影响政治权力,也影响宗教权力。

    中东的法治

    除了印度和欧洲,出现法治的另一个世界文明是伊斯兰教的中东。今天,不管是境内还是境外的很多人都知道,那里的很多政权是残酷的独裁专制政府,尤其是在阿拉伯世界内,不受任何更高法律或正义的约束。西方人通常认为,教会和国家的交融合一是伊斯兰教的本质,对基督教欧洲来说,才是天方夜谭。伊朗 1979 年革命后所建立的神权政府,只是返回传统的穆斯林统治。但这一切都不准确。

    现代穆斯林独裁专制政府的出现是偶然事件的结果。这个偶然就是该地区与西方的碰撞对峙,以及之后向现代性的过渡。在基督教的欧洲,政治和宗教的权力经常联合起来。在穆斯林世界,它们在历史上很长一段时期倒是有效隔离的。法律在穆斯林世界中扮演的角色,与在基督教领土上的完全相同:制衡政治统治者的随心所欲——虽然较弱。法治是穆斯林文明的基础,实际上它在很多方面定义着这一文明。

    让我们总结一下法律在穆斯林和基督教世界的社会作用的相同之处。在这两个传统中,法律都植根于宗教,只有一位上帝,行使普世的司法权,是所有真理和正义的源泉。这两个传统,再加上犹太教,都深深倚靠宗教的经典,其基本社会规则很早就被编纂成书。在伊斯兰教中,这些规则不仅是神圣的《古兰经》,还有圣行(sunna)和圣训(hadith),后者是穆罕默德生前的故事和训话,可作人们行为的指针。但这些规则的解释,在许多情况中又是模棱不定的,必须拜托专门的教士阶层——基督教中的牧师和伊斯兰教中的乌里玛(宗教学者)。在穆斯林和基督教世界,法律并不像中国那样出自政治权力,而是来自对政治当局享有统治权的上帝。穆罕默德生前可能已是部落的统治者,但在阿拉伯伙伴的眼中,他的权威并不在他所指挥的军队,而在他是上帝启示的使者。

    跟穆罕默德一样,最初几位哈里发集宗教和政治的权力于一身,这在倭马亚朝代始终如此。该朝代结束时,政治和哈里发的权力才开始分隔。其时,倭马亚王子逃离阿拔斯王朝,在西班牙建立了分立的西方哈里发政权。阿拉伯帝国的不同省份,随着岁月的消逝而逐一分离出去,哈里发的权力只达首都巴格达和周边地区,甚至变成掌权军事指挥官的傀儡。法蒂玛王朝(Fatimids)先后在突尼斯和埃及分别建立分立的哈里发政权。巴格达哈里发的权威从没获得什叶派和哈瓦利吉派的承认。哈里发可以宣称享有普遍的精神权威,但其真正的司法权非常有限。

    到了 11 世纪,哈里发和在领土中行使政治权力的人分享权力。真正的掌权者——世俗君主——披上了“埃米尔中的埃米尔”的头衔。通过立法上的巧立名目,哈里发声称把世俗权力委托他人,以换取自己在狭窄宗教事务中的权威。中世纪伊斯兰教法律学者艾布·哈桑·马沃尔迪(Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi)解说这是合法的,因为哈里发通过代理人仍在行使世俗的权力,真相恰恰相反,哈里发只是埃米尔的傀儡。伊斯兰教的世界实质上是政教合一,而不是神权。世俗统治者掌控权力,请哈里发和乌里玛来到自己领土,帮助管理伊斯兰教法。

    在逊尼派穆斯林世界中所缺乏的,恰好是哈里发和乌里玛脱离政治,发展成为分立的单独机构,享有分明的等级制度、司法权、人事权。也就是说,没能建成单独的穆斯林“教会”,可与格里高利改革之后涌现的天主教会媲美。跟叙任权斗争之前的天主教会一样,穆斯林知识阶层只是分散的网络,由教士、法官、阅读和应用穆斯林判例的学者所组成。逊尼派的传统内,有四家主要的穆斯林法律学派,相互竞争,在哲学上各持己见,其地位起伏有赖于权力的惠顾。乌里玛一直没有形成建制化的等级制度,无法建成单独法律传统和穆斯林等级制度,以罗马教皇的方式向政治权力提出挑战。

    国家与清真寺的分离

    但这并不意味宗教和世俗权力之间没有功能的分离。图森·贝(Tursun Bey)写道,15 世纪的奥斯曼帝国,苏丹可在伊斯兰教法之外自行制定世俗法律。这套世俗法律叫作卡奴纳莫(kanunname,该词源自欧洲使用的 canon law [教会法]),用于传统伊斯兰教法鞭长莫及的领域,如公共和行政的法律。所征服领土的征税和产权、发行货币、贸易管理,全靠这套世俗法律。传统的伊斯兰教法主要涉及婚姻、家庭、遗产和其他私人事务,由教法专家卡迪和穆智泰希德(kadis and mujtahids)执行。他们熟谙穆斯林经典,能将这一庞杂的法典应用到特定案例,很像印度的班智达。这就需要平行的两套司法建制,一个是世俗的,另一个是宗教的。卡迪应用伊斯兰教法,但其裁决必须依赖世俗当局的执法。

    在理论上,奥斯曼帝国日益增长的世俗法律从属于伊斯兰教法,需要接受宗教权威的审阅。哈里发在理论上高于苏丹,但在实际上却依赖苏丹。同样道理,因为日益增长的商业社会需要越来越多的规则,实际上的宗教法律反而遭受排挤。等到奥斯曼法庭设立大穆夫提(grand mufti,教法说明官)一职时,宗教权威的独立受到更大限制。以前,政府从学者圈中选任教法执行官卡迪,让他们自主处置法律内容。新的大穆夫提和他的属下,现在有权就伊斯兰教法的内容,发布不受限制的意见或论断(fatwas)。土耳其愈益增加对宗教的政治控制,所走的方向与欧洲恰恰相反。如果说罗马教会展示出国家特征,土耳其国家则展示出教会特征。

    前现代的中东究竟在什么程度上遵守法治?如第 17 章所提到的,今天普遍认可的法治至少有两层分开的意义:第一,遵守产权和合同的法律,允许商业和投资的发生;第二,统治者和统治阶级自愿接受法律所规定的限制。第二层意思直接影响第一层,如果社会精英不遵守法治,使用权力随意攫取弱势群体的财产,便成为巨大的诱惑。如前所述,统治者仍有可能在实践中遵守日常法治,但在理论上却有任意侵犯产权的权力。

    对我们深入研究的两个中东政权来说,即埃及的马穆鲁克和土耳其的奥斯曼,第一意义中的法治作为预设条件而存在。也就是说,它们有关于财产和遗产的完善规则,允许长期的投资和可预知的商业交易。第二意义中的法治也同样存在,马穆鲁克和奥斯曼苏丹都承认,他们的权力受上帝创建的既存法律的限制。但在实践中,他们在解释法律以袒护自己私利时,仍享有相当大的余地,尤其在财政严峻时期。对税收的迫切需求,促使他们违反长期的法律规范。

    但这两个案例都没有完全的现代产权,现代产权的付之阙如是否限制了穆斯林世界的经济发展,这不很清楚。奥斯曼帝国拥有大量土地,分配给提供军事服务的骑士。替骑士耕种土地的农民,可把自己的使用权传给孩子。手艺人和商人等其他百姓享有私人产权,如果幸运和技术精湛,可积累大笔财富。所有传统的中东统治者,非常清楚苛捐杂税的危险,尽可能以“正义”名义予以回避。此外,他们像其他君主一样,把自己视作保护人,使平民免受贵族精英本能上的掠夺。甚至苏丹也不可越过法律。如果苏丹的骑士遵命来执行处罚,他们仍需要把被控者带到卡迪那里,以取得法律的裁决。如个人去世而未留遗嘱,财产在国家能够拿走之前必须由理论上的遗嘱执行者保管。非穆斯林的外国人过世后,其财产同样由法学家记录下来,直到继承人出现。

    法律如何限制传统穆斯林政府的权力,可在慈善性质的瓦克夫的作用中找到明显证据。如我们所知,掌权的奴隶军精英最初不可拥有后裔,也不可积累财产。马穆鲁克和土耳其禁卫军,首先避开规则以组织家庭,然后再设立慈善基金,安置自己孩子或亲信来运转这些基金,其收入将保证后代的生计。阿拉伯和土耳其的统治者,让这些瓦克夫完整无缺地持续数代,但有对改动遗产的严格限制,从而束缚了它们的经济效率。

    如果瓦克夫限定了国家攫取私人财产的能力,它的频繁使用意味着,其他不受宗教保护的财产往往面临随意的征税。尽管不是每个国家都堪称匪寇,但如有紧急情形,所有国家都可能成为掠夺者。15 世纪的切尔克斯系马穆鲁克政权,随着岁月的流逝,而陷入愈益可怕的财政困局,导致苏丹寻求火烧眉毛的计策以增加收入。他们任意提高税率,截获各种财富,导致富人寻找越来越具创意的方法来隐藏财产,不愿做任何投资。同样,奥斯曼在 16 世纪后半叶面临财政危机,导致税率增长,并威胁到传统产权。禁卫军职业的制度化老规矩,不得成家的禁令,都被一一放松。国家的封地不再留作军事服务的报酬,而被腐败当权人售给出价最高的投标者。像基督教统治者时时觊觎修道院的财富和其他教会财产,马穆鲁克甚至也突袭瓦克夫来筹措资金。

    教皇的师团

    据说,斯大林曾鄙视地问:“教皇手下有多少师团?”如我所说,既然法治植根于宗教,我们可向法官和律师提出一个类似的问题:他们在法治国家中部署了多少师团?他们凭什么来迫使统治者服从他们所解释的法律?

    答案当然是零,行政部门和司法部门之间的分权只是隐喻性的。行政官拥有强制权力,可召集军队和警察来执行他(她)的意志。司法部门的权力,或身为法律监护人的宗教权威,体现在可向统治者提供合法性,以及作为社会共识保护人而获得广泛支持。格里高利七世可迫使亨利四世来卡诺莎,但实际上无法罢免这个皇帝。对此,他必须依赖军事同盟,比如嫉妒亨利四世的日耳曼君主和意大利南部的诺曼国王。教皇能否吸引世俗的同盟,则要依赖其事业的合法性,以及他们为自己短期利益所打的小算盘。叙任权斗争的结果是个复杂的混合体,既有物质因素,也有道德因素。最终,拥有军队和经济资源的世俗统治者,被迫与具有部分经济资源但全无强制权力的精神领袖达成妥协。教皇的权威确实存在,并不依赖他的师团。

    穆斯林乌里玛的权威在于可向苏丹授予合法性,就像教皇的权威。遇上继承权的斗争,这种权威就变得非常重要。在穆斯林世界,伊斯兰教和突厥部落习俗,都反对建立王朝继承的明确规则,比如长子继承权。苏丹可指定继承人,但实际的继承过程经常变成一场苏丹儿子的自由参赛,或在马穆鲁克的情况中,变成一场主要派系领袖的自由参赛。在这种情境下,乌里玛给予或保留其支持的权力就是举足轻重的。如果权力斗争中的干预变得太公开,像切尔克斯系马穆鲁克时期的哈里发事件,他们可能会搬起石头砸自己的脚。

    然而,我们不应夸大法治在前现代穆斯林社会中的作用。在保护产权和商业上,法律的运作尚属“足够好”,但提供不了像宪法保障的东西,以对抗存心违法乱纪的统治者。大穆夫提和卡迪都是国家选择和雇用的,明显减弱了他们的自治性,全然不同于 12 世纪之后天主教会聘请的独立法官。奥斯曼国家从头到尾都是政教合一,随着时间的推移,对穆斯林学者的控制程度日益增加。

    印度和伊斯兰教的法治无法幸免于西方的叩门

    在变成殖民地或接受西方重大影响之前,印度和中东的法治互相之间有很多类似之处。它们都有传统的书面法律,仰承宗教权威的保护,还有数世纪宗教法官(印度的班智达和穆斯林的卡迪)所积累的判例,作为先例而被继承下来。它们的宗教法律都是正义的最终来源。至少在理论上,政治统治者获得授权或代理权来执政。

    印度和中东在这一方面,与基督教欧洲的距离,远远近于这三个地区与中国的距离。它们不同于欧洲的地方,在于其宗教机构都没有脱离政治秩序。婆罗门教中从来没有教皇,穆斯林的哈里发在倭马亚王朝之后,基本上成为伊斯兰地域中执政统治者的俘虏。这两种宗教机构不能独立于政府,也就无法发展成为自主控制用人和晋升的现代等级制官僚机构。没有自治,宗教法律的机构难以对国家发挥强大制衡。宗教机构与国家相互渗透,国家本身也不能发展成单独的世俗机构。

    不管是印度还是穆斯林世界,传统的法治都没能在现代化之后继续幸存,对后者来说尤属悲剧。在 1772 年的印度,以瓦伦·哈斯丁斯(Warren Hastings)为首的东印度公司管辖区,决定将印度的法论用于印度教徒,将伊斯兰教法用于穆斯林,将英国版本的“正义、公平、良心”的法律用于其他案例。在应用“印度教法”时,英国人误解了法律在印度社会中的作用。他们相信,法论(Dharmasastra)相当于欧洲的教会法,也就是,与世俗法律相对的、纂成法典并统一适用于所有印度教徒的宗教法。如我们所知,欧洲的教会法规发展至今,经历了漫长演变,但印度法律从没有过类似的进化。它与其说是基于文本的法律,倒不如说是一套鲜活衍变的规则,接受班智达的审视,依据语境而用于印度不同区域。此外,英国统治者还因阅读梵语的能力有限而跌跌撞撞。英国人起初把班智达当作法论专家使用,随着更多梵语文本译成英语,遂改持不信任和回避的态度。班智达的使用到 1864 年完全废除,取而代之的是英国法官,全靠自己来设法解读传统的印度教法。(用于印度穆斯林的伊斯兰教法也遇上同样的中断。)此时,作为活的传统的印度教法全然崩溃,到了印度共和国方才复兴,但传统的连续性已被腰斩。

    穆斯林的法治传统发生更为彻底的中断。奥斯曼政府像英国人对待印度法律那样改革伊斯兰教法。它从 1869 年到 1876 年编纂了马雅拉法典(Mecelle,又译麦吉拉)。其目标是整顿伊斯兰教法,将之汇集成统一连贯的法典,以期达到 1140 年格拉提安整理基督教法规的效果(编按:参见本书第 18 章)。在这个过程中,他们削弱了乌里玛的传统社会作用。因为与灵活不定的体系相比,在严密编纂的体系中,法官作用完全不同,其重要性下跌。1877 年的奥斯曼宪法将伊斯兰教法降为各种法律之一,剥夺了它赋予政权合法性的作用。接受西方法律训练的法官,逐渐取代传统学者阶层。凯末尔(Kemal Ataturk)和土耳其共和国兴起于第一次世界大战之后,废除伊斯兰王朝,以世俗民族主义取代土耳其国家的伊斯兰基础。阿拉伯人从不接受马雅拉法典的完全合法性,随着奥斯曼和青年土耳其党人等运动的展开,认同感的分裂日益增强。独立之后,他们发现自己陷于尴尬境地,一边是已简化的传统伊斯兰教法,另一边是殖民者带来的西方法律。

    从殖民地走到独立之后,印度和阿拉伯的途径分道扬镳。印度共和国建立了宪法秩序,行政权力接受法律和立法选举的限制。独立后的印度法律一直都其貌不扬——像是现代和传统法律的拼凑物,以讲究程序和慢条斯理而声名狼藉。但它至少是一套法律,除了 20 世纪 70 年代英迪拉·甘地(Indira Gandhi)宣布的短暂紧急状态,印度领袖愿意在它的约束下运作。

    阿拉伯世界走上截然不同的道路。英国、法国、意大利的殖民当局,其安插在埃及、利比亚、叙利亚、伊拉克的传统君主,很快被世俗的民族主义军官所取代。后者继而组织强大的中央政府,不受立法机关和法庭的限制。在这些政权当中,乌里玛的传统作用均遭废除,换成来自行政机构的“现代化”法律。唯一例外是沙特阿拉伯,它从没沦为殖民地,维持新原教旨主义(neofundamentalist)的政权,其行政权力受到瓦哈比派(Wahhabi)宗教机构的制衡。很多行政权力高于一切的阿拉伯政权,蜕化成压制性的独裁,无法为国民提供经济增长或人身自由。

    法律学者挪亚·费尔德曼(Noah Feldman)认为,21 世纪早期的阿拉伯世界,伊斯兰教重新兴起,人们纷纷要求返回伊斯兰教法,既不满意当代威权政府的无法无天,又在怀念行政权力曾经尊崇法律的旧时代。他声称,回到伊斯兰教法的呼吁,与其说是反拨时钟,倒退回中世纪的伊斯兰教,倒不如说是在祈求政治权力遵守规则的平衡社会。反复诉求“正义”,甚至融入很多伊斯兰政党的名字。这不是在追求社会平等,而是在追求法律面前的人人平等。现代的强大国家,如果没有法治或负责制的制衡,能够成功实施完完全全的暴政。

    现代伊斯兰主义者能否建成接受法治制衡的民主政权?这是个很微妙的问题。1979 年革命后,伊朗伊斯兰教共和国的经验差强人意。自从 19 世纪以来,什叶派的伊朗一直拥有组织良好的神职等级制度,胜过逊尼派世界中任何其他组织。它在霍梅尼(Khomeini)阿亚图拉的领导下,夺取伊朗政权,建起真正的神权国家,政府部门都受神职人员的控制。该国发展成为神职的独裁政府,监禁和杀害政治对手,为达目的甘愿徇私枉法。

    在理论上,伊朗共和国 1979 年宪法可以是温和、民主、守法国家的基础。它允许立法机关和总统的选举,但要接受限制。限制来自一名非民选的最高领袖,以及代表上帝的高级神职人员所组成的监督委员会(Guardian Council)。此类安排不一定是“中世纪”或前现代的。马克斯·韦伯认为是现代理性国家典型的德意志帝国(Wilhelmine Germany),其宪法规定要有民选的立法机关,但受非民选的恺撒的制衡。如果伊朗的最高领袖或监督委员会,把自己当作高级的传统乌里玛,享有类似最高法院的权威,不时宣布民选伊斯兰会议(Majlis)的立法不符伊斯兰教法,那么将之称作新式的伊斯兰教的法治,这还有一点道理。然而,1979 年宪法赋予最高领袖的,不仅是司法权,更是实质性的行政权。他控制伊斯兰教革命卫队军团和民兵(Basij),主动干涉让选举候选人丧失资格,操纵选举以制造有利结局。像俾斯麦(Bismarck)宪法,或模拟它的日本明治宪法,伊朗宪法特地保留部分行政权力,不是给皇帝,而是给神职等级制度。与在日本和德国发生的情形一样,这种行政权力使人堕落,军队因此而加强对知识阶层的控制,恰恰与宪法所规定的相反。

    国家建设旨在集权,法治却在一旁掣肘。因此,法治发展将遭遇政治竞争,并受制于特殊参与者的政治利益,如早期英王、雄心勃勃的教皇、要求回到伊斯兰教法的伊斯兰反对派。欧洲法治的基础始建于 12 世纪,其最终巩固还得有赖数世纪的政治斗争。后来,法治的故事开始与负责制政府兴起的故事水乳交融,因为负责制政府的倡导者不但要求民主选举,还要求行政部门遵守法律。我将在第 27 章再次讨论这个故事。

    西欧的法治为何较强

    过渡到现代化之前,法治便存在于中世纪的欧洲、中东、印度。这些社会的统治者承认,必须在并非由自己创造的法律下过活。然而,限制他们行为的实际程度,不仅取决于理论上的认可,还要依赖立法和执法的建制化状况。要想让法律对统治者构成更为有效的约束,需要某些特定的条件:它被编纂成权威的文本;法律的内容不由政治当局而由法律专家来确定;最后,法律被有别于政治等级的建制性秩序所保护,拥有自己的资源和任免权。

    与中东或印度相比,西欧的法治获得更大程度的建制化。这与其说是宗教思想的缘故,倒不如说是欧洲发展中历史性的偶然情势所致,因为东正教就从未有过类似的发展。一个重要因素是欧洲权力的极端分裂,给了教会极大的机遇。这导致了颇不寻常的情形:法治得以在欧洲社会中生根发芽,不但早于民主和负责制政府的出现,而且早于现代国家的构建。这在建制化法律的方方面面都是昭然若揭的。

    编纂

    印度的“吠陀本集”口传心授,到后期方才写成文字。明显不同的是一神的犹太教、基督教、伊斯兰教,很早就开始以权威的经典为基础。他们都被称作“圣书上的民族”。但只有在西欧,混乱的文本、法令、解释和评论被梳理成逻辑统一的整体。在穆斯林、印度和东正教的传统中,找不到《查士丁尼法典》和格拉提安的《教会法规》的等同物。

    法律专业化

    在这一方面,基督教与其他传统基本上大同小异,大家都培养了解释和执行法律的专家。只是法律教育在先进大学系统中获得的开发和正规化,西欧要胜过其他地方。

    机构自治

    按照亨廷顿的分类,自治是机构发展的典型特征。在这一方面,跟其他地方相比,西方法律获得更多进展。世界其他地方都没有类似格里高利改革和叙任权斗争的经历。其时,整个基督教会机构都投入与世俗统治者的持久政治冲突,造成势均力敌的僵局。最后的沃尔姆斯宗教协定,确保教会作为一个机构的自治地位,并大大鼓励它发展自己的官僚机构和正式规则。

    所以在前现代,与中东、印度和东正教相比,西欧的法治对世俗统治者的权力实施了更为强大的制衡。就后来自由制度的发展而言,这个意义重大。

    欧洲的法治得以存活下来,尽管它的合法性基础在向现代化的过渡中发生了变化。这是内部有机发展的结果,宗教改革破坏了教会权威,启蒙运动的世俗思想又腐蚀了当时的宗教信念。基于国王、民族或人民的新主权思想,开始取代上帝的主权,而变成法律合法性的基础。许多评论家指出,西方法治比现代民主足足早了数个世纪,所以 18 世纪的普鲁士可以成为一个法治国家(Rechtsstaat),在人民主权原则获得承认之前,已在制衡行政权力。到 19 世纪的晚期,民主思想获得合法性,法律越来越被视为民主社会的正面措施。此时,法治所造成的习惯已在西方社会深入人心。文明生活与法律共存的观念、强大自治的法律机构的存在、资本主义繁荣经济的需求,合在一起加强了法治,尽管其合法性的基础已有变更。

    我反复强调,一个没有法治的伟大世界文明是中国。中国皇帝当然有能力实施暴政,如秦始皇以法家的严刑峻法为基础创建大一统国家。然而,中国历代皇朝并不以严酷统治著称。在有关产权、征税及为重塑传统社会风俗而行干预的程度上,中国国家遵守明确的限制。如果这些限制不是来自法律,那源头到底是什么?作为成熟的农业社会,中国如何治理?这是下面两章的主题。

    第 20 章 东方专制主义

    唐朝之后,现代国家重获巩固;女皇帝武则天的篡位和从中透露出的中国政治制度;天命和政治合法性在王朝中国的确立

    在王朝中国,没有皇帝承认法律权威的至高无上,法律只是皇帝自己颁布的制定法。换言之,没有对皇帝权力的司法制衡,遂给暴政留下充分余地。

    对中国政治制度而言,这至少提出四个基本问题。第一,缺乏法治给政治带来的影响。西方有悠久的传统,把中国列作“东方专制主义”。这种想法是出于无知、傲慢和欧洲中心主义吗?或者,中国皇帝的确比西欧的君主掌握更大权力?

    第二,中国制度中的合法性来自何方?中国历史充满无数起义、篡位、内战和改朝换代的尝试。然而,中国人始终返回平衡,让他们的君主掌控巨大权力,这样做的原因何在?

    第三,尽管存在着周期性的皇权专制,中国统治者为何没有尽量行使理论上所享有的权力?虽然没有法律,他们的权力仍有实实在在的制衡;中国历史上有很长时期,皇帝主持稳定和守序的政体,没有肆意侵犯百姓的日常权益。还有很多时期,皇帝确实很弱,无法在刁蛮社会中强制执行规则。在传统中国,究竟什么在设置国家权力的真正极限?

    最后,就仁政的性质而言,中国历史为我们提供何种教训?中国人发明了现代国家,但阻止不了国家的重新家族化。中国王朝历史的后续世纪就是一段持久的斗争史,防止这些制度的衰退,抵制权贵为自己和家庭谋求特权的权力家族化。什么力量促进政治衰败,以及它的逆转?

    我将尝试在本章解答头两个问题,以下一章解答后两个。但首先得概述一下从唐朝到明朝的中国历史。

    唐宋过渡之后的中国现代化

    我最后一次讨论中国是在第 9 章。从 3 世纪到 6 世纪,中国经历了三百年的政治衰败。我们追踪它的发展,直到隋唐的重新统一。我提到,秦汉时期就已到位的现代国家制度,遭受严重的崩溃,政府重又家族化。汉朝之后的继承国,多半由贵族家庭掌控,他们将亲戚安插在主要职位,竞相攫取更多权力。重新统一中国的隋唐两朝的创始人,杨坚和李渊,都出自这个阶层。前者来自北周重要的贵族家庭,后者来自中国西北部的李氏望族,曾被封为唐国公。像大部分继承国,隋朝和唐朝早期都操纵在贵族手中,他们官居要职,统帅军队,掌控地方政权。这个精英由北方军事贵族组成,其成员与鲜卑等野蛮血统进行广泛的通婚。605 年重新建立的科举制度,只是敷衍了事,在招纳非精英进入仕途上乏善可陈。

    唐朝持续近三百年,但在后期非常不稳定(请看表 2 的朝代排列)。从 7 世纪中期“邪恶”皇后武则天崛起开始,贵族精英杀死很多自己的同伴。到 8 世纪中期,帝国东北边境上的粟特—突厥(Soghdian-Turkish)将军安禄山发动叛乱,唐朝皇帝和太子不得不在深更半夜朝不同方向逃出首都长安。叛乱在八年后终告平息,但帝国中心区域的内战导致了人口的大量损失和经济衰退。帝国再也没有获得全盘恢复,权力流失到愈益自治的边境节度使。中国政治制度始终保持文官政府对军队的控制,但从此时开始像罗马帝国,强悍的将军将辖下的藩镇当作权力基础,追求自己的政治前程。唐朝最终在 10 世纪第一个十年中崩溃于叛乱和内战,北方出现军人掌权的五个短命朝代,南方则看到十个王国你方唱罢我登场。

    表 2.后期中国朝代

    年份朝代创始人/庙号
    618李渊/高祖
    907后梁李温
    923后唐李克用
    926后晋石敬瑭
    947后汉刘知远
    951后周郭威
    960北宋赵匡胤/太祖
    1127南宋赵构/高宗
    1272忽必烈
    1368朱元璋/太祖
    1644

    尽管有将近五十年的中断,中央国家的合法性在唐朝末年仍然获得广泛的认同,以致将领之一的赵匡胤在 960 年重新统一中国,以太祖皇帝的名号开创宋朝。在很多方面,宋朝在文化思想上是最多产丰饶的朝代。佛教和道教在隋唐两朝广受中国百姓和精英的欢迎,而儒家在北宋期间得到巨大的复兴,夺回不少信徒。宋明理学是一次强大的思想运动,波及邻国的朝鲜和日本,大大影响了整个东亚的思想文化生活。

    同时,中国开始承受一系列来自北方部落的入侵,他们得以占领大片领土,最终竟是整个国家。边患始于契丹,它是蒙古边界的一个突厥—蒙古民族,在中国北方建立了庞大的辽国,夺得汉族聚居的燕云十六州。党项人在辽国西边创建了西夏,包括前几朝已受中国控制的边界地区。下一个出现的是来自东北的女真部落(满族的老祖宗),它击溃辽国,并把契丹赶到中亚。(他们向西逃得很远,竟然碰上俄罗斯人。自此,后者把所有中国人都叫作契丹斯基 Kitaiskiy。)1127 年,女真人洗劫宋朝首都开封,囚禁刚退位的皇帝和其儿子,迫使宋朝播迁南方,开创南宋朝代。女真人的金国在最旺盛时控制大约中国的三分之一,直到 1234 年败于另一入侵的游牧民族蒙古人。占领中国北部之后,忽必烈可汗率领的蒙古军向西南发起进攻,一举占领整个中国。1279 年,蒙古军追逐南宋朝廷到广东沿海小岛的崖山。在蒙古军的团团包围下,数千朝臣自悬崖跳入海中自尽,忽必烈可汗成为新创元朝的第一任皇帝。元朝统治者最终在 1368 年的民族起义中遭到驱逐,为本土的明朝所取代。

    春秋战国时期的持久战争激发了愈演愈烈的建国举措,宋朝时的外敌入侵,却没对中国政治秩序发挥类似的作用。尽管有北宋兴起的理学派的辉煌成就,这仍是一段相当令人沮丧的时期,中国朝廷内部的派系斗争,阻止了政权对迫在眉睫的边患作出充分准备。军事压力来自社会发展程度远远低于中国的游牧民族,反而成为骄傲自满的理由。在当时的人类历史节点上,国家层次的社会与组成灵活骑兵的部落民族对峙,并不一定因先进的政治发展而取得决定性的军事优势。如阿拉伯哲学家伊本·赫勒敦所指出的,中国、中东和欧洲,因为邻接中亚辽阔的大草原,而遭遇周而复始的衰落—野蛮人征服—文明复苏。契丹、党项、女真和蒙古一旦征服中国领土后,最终都采用中国制度,走后也没留下重要的政治遗产。只有欧洲先进“野蛮人”前来征服,方才刺激中国政治制度酝酿更为根本的改革。

    从隋朝开国的 581 年到 12 世纪的宋朝晚期,中国最普遍的政治发展之一是家族政府的逆转,中央集权得以复原到西汉的古典官僚制。到结束时,中国政府已不再受贵族家庭小圈子的控制,治理国家的是从社会广泛阶层招纳来的士绅精英。官僚作为儒家价值的监护人,其道德节操获得修复,并为 14 世纪明朝的可观政府打下基础。中国人口在这段时期急剧增加,到 1000 年已有五千九百万,到 1300 年更高达一亿。中国开发南方的大片边境地区后,其领土也扩充到几近今日的版图。在这巨大的疆域上,随着运河和道路的建造,商业和通信获得实质性的增长。尽管疆域辽阔,中国还是发明了中央集权的政治制度,在错综复杂的社会中设定规则,征收税赋。统治如此广阔领土的欧洲国家,还要再等五百年。

    中国建立(或重建)较为现代的政治制度,不是在 17 世纪和 18 世纪与西方接触之后,而是在唐宋之间的过渡期,这一见解首先来自第一次世界大战之后的日本新闻记者兼学者的内藤虎次郎(Naito Torajiro),即内藤湖南。内藤认为,贵族统治在公元 750 年之后的动乱时期遭到席卷。其时,唐朝经历一系列叛乱和战争,非贵族背景的军事强人乘机掌权。宋朝在 960 年当政,皇帝不再受贵族家庭的威胁,形成更为纯粹的中央专制主义。科举制度成为选拔官员更为公开的途径,平民对贵族地主的农奴般的义务终告结束,其地位得到改善。共同的生活模式在全国建成,较少依赖世袭特权,白话文和平易近人的通俗文学和历史话本,逐一取代唐朝高度正规的文体。内藤从中找到与早期现代欧洲的显著平行,其时的欧洲,在强大专制国家的庇护之下,终止封建特权,引进公民平等。虽然内藤的假设引起很大争议(尤其是他将西方分期法套用在东亚历史上的努力),但他的主要结论中,已有很多获得了晚近学者的认可。

    我们现可以返回本章开头的中国政治秩序的四个问题,首先是专制问题,中国的专制是否比其他文明中的更为严峻?

    “毒侔蛇虺”的女皇武则天

    被后世中国史家称为“毒侔蛇虺”的武曌(624—705),其故事值得在此重提,其意义不只是它可以告诉我们中国政治的性质。女皇武则天是以自己名义统治中国、并建立自己朝代的唯一女子。她的起伏是一部有关阴谋、残忍、恐怖、性、神秘、女人掌权的编年史。她是极具天赋的政治家,单凭自己的意志和狡猾而获得权力。儒家意识形态以歧视女子著称,在这样背景之下,她的成就显得格外刺目。

    我以前讨论法治时曾提到,它最初往往只适用于精英,而不是广大的民众,普通大众被认为不算完整意义上的人,不值得法律的保护。另一方面,在法治不存在的地方,精英成员通常比普通人面临更多危险,因为在上层赌注更大、权力斗争更激烈。这就是武则天治下的情形,她向中国的古老贵族家庭撒出恐怖的天罗地网。

    有些历史学家,尤其是马克思主义的,在武则天的兴起中看到重大的社会启示。有的认为,她代表了上升的资产阶级;有的说,她是人民大众的斗士;还有的认为,她发挥了重要作用,把隋和唐初的家族精英赶走,代之以非贵族官员。尚不清楚,这些理论中哪一条最终证明是正确的。她自己拥有无懈可击的贵族血统,与隋朝皇族杨家有渊源。她并没有提携能干的平民,事实上她取消科举考试数年,为的是在官僚机构安插自己的宠臣。她对唐宋过渡的贡献,表现在她清洗实际上和受怀疑的贵族对手,大大削弱他们的人数,使整个贵族阶层变得孱弱,从而为安禄山的叛乱铺平道路。安史之乱标志唐朝走向末路的开始,促动了中国社会的巨大转型。

    像中国宫廷的很多其他女人,武曌发迹于当上唐朝第二个皇帝太宗的低级嫔妃。她父亲是唐朝第一个皇帝高祖的拥护者,后来升任高职。如上所述,她母亲是隋朝皇室的后裔。据谣传,她与太宗的儿子高宗甚至在太宗去世之前就已有染。太宗死后,她削发为尼,搬到佛教寺庵。但新皇帝高宗的王皇后,想转移丈夫对淑妃的宠爱,故意将她带进宫,以观鹬蚌之争。

    这证明是个致命的大错。高宗皇帝为武曌神魂颠倒,在他漫长的当政时期,证明自己是软弱的,很易受武曌的迷惑。武曌与皇帝生得一女,在无儿女的王皇后来访之后,设法让女儿窒息而死。王皇后被控杀死武曌的女儿,与淑妃一起被废成庶人,家人都被放逐到遥远的南方。随之,武曌获得晋升,到 655 年当上皇后,遂下令将王皇后和淑妃截去手足,投入酒瓮。曾支持王皇后、反对武曌为皇后的宫廷官员,包括曾忠实服务于前代皇帝的,或被放逐,或被处死。

    很多中国女子躲在当上君王的儿子或丈夫的幕后,却行使实质上的大权,但武皇后决心变成真正的共同皇帝(编按:与高宗一同上朝,临朝听政,合称“二圣”),在公共场合中愈益显示自己的自主权。皇帝为了摆脱她的操纵,曾指责她玩弄巫蛊和妖术。但她当面力争,反而迫使皇帝杀死控告者,并从宫廷中清洗他们的拥护者。她恢复古代仪式,为自己和丈夫加封,震撼宫廷;为了逃避所谋杀的很多对手的鬼魂,她从长安迁都到洛阳。武皇后安排毒死自己身为太子的长子,诬蔑二子阴谋篡夺父位,将他放逐,迫他自杀。她丈夫最终于 683 年去世,她又把继承者(她的三子)中宗从皇位上拖下,处以幽禁。

    不出意外,武皇后的兴起导致了 684 年的公开叛乱,叛乱来自身受其害的唐朝贵族家庭。武皇后迅速予以镇压,然后设置间谍和告密者的网络,厚赏检举者,从而对整个贵族阶层实施恐怖统治。她任用酷吏广泛从事现在所谓的“法外扑杀”(extrajudicial killings)。等恐怖发作完毕,她又把矛头指向酷吏头目,把他们也给杀了,这一切为她建立新朝铺平道路。690 年,她改国号为周,不再以她男性亲戚的名义,而以自己的名义单独执政。

    武则天提倡爱民政策,减轻赋役,削减靡费的公共开支,扶助老弱病贫。她也推动为女子著书立传,延长对母丧的哀悼,封自己母亲为荣国夫人。她确实发动了一场社会革命,杀死大量在朝做官的唐代贵族和儒家学者。但她提拔的,不是有才能的平民干部,而是自己的宠臣和阿谀奉承之人,为此而特别放松相关考试和教育的标准。她统治的末期充斥着神秘主义、众多男宠(往往与她的宗教激情有关)、公开的贪污受贿,对于这些她并未试图加以遏制。几近八十岁的她,最终在政变阴谋中被迫让位;儿子中宗登基,改回唐朝国号。

    武则天的行为在中国统治者中不算典型,后世的儒家卫道士申斥她是尤其恶劣的统治者。但作为暴君,对政权内的精英进行大肆的恐怖统治,她在中国不是第一个,也不是最后一个。多数的欧洲君主,其行事处世较守规则,但对治下的农民和其他平民,往往更加残酷。

    武则天的兴起反而给中国女子掌权带来挫折,因为后来的文人学士将她当作女人干政只会坏事的例证。明朝皇帝在宫门上悬挂一块铁牌,告诫自己和继承者,时刻小心后宫女子的阴谋。后者不得不回到幕后,重新操起遥控儿子或丈夫的故技。

    天命

    武则天试图攫取皇位,创建自己的新朝代,这引出中国君主一开始如何取得合法性的问题。托马斯·霍布斯在《利维坦》中认为,主权国家的合法性来自不成文的社会契约;在这份契约中,每个人放弃随心所欲的自由,以保障自己的生命权,否则就会面对“人人相互为敌的战争”。如果我们以“群体”替代“人”,很明显,很多前现代社会的运作就凭借这种社会契约,包括中国。人类愿意放弃大量自由,将相应程度的酌情权力授予皇帝,让他施政,以保障社会和平。他们宁愿这样,而不愿看到历史上一再出现的交战状态。其时,寡头强人一边彼此厮杀,一边尽情剥削自己的臣民。这就是天命的涵义,中国社会将合法性赋予具体的个人和其后裔,让他们享有统治百姓的独裁权力。

    中国制度使人困惑的,首先不是天命存在与否,所有君主社会中都有类似的东西。它其实是程序问题:觊觎皇位者如何知悉他(在武则天的案例中就是她)已获得天命?一旦得到,其他觊觎皇位者如有机会为何又不来抢走(要知道皇帝享有巨大的权力和财富)?

    前现代社会的统治者,其合法性可来自多方面。在狩猎采集和部落的社会,它通常是某种形式的选举的结果,参与的如果不是全体成员,就是主要氏族。或者,部落的长者开会来投票决定谁当领袖。在封建欧洲,某种形式的选举程序一直存活到早期现代。名叫三级会议(Estates General)或议会(Cortes)的机构,聚集起来开会,以批准新朝代的当政。这甚至发生于俄罗斯,1613 年将权力转给罗曼诺夫王朝,为取得合法性而召开了缙绅会议(zemskiy sobor,编按:俄语зе́мскийсобо́р)。

    王朝合法性的其他主要来源是宗教。在基督教欧洲、中东和印度,有强大的宗教机构,既可将合法性赋予统治者,也可将之收回(如格里高利七世与神圣罗马皇帝的较量)。通常,这些宗教机构在政治当局的掌控之下,别无选择,只好确认。但在权力斗争时期,这些宗教权威又可通过授予合法性的能力,而发挥举足轻重的作用。

    中国不同于其他文明,因为天命涉及的既不是选举,也不是宗教赋予的合法性。中国没有类似三级会议的机构,可供社会精英开会,以批准新王朝的创始人;也没有宗教等级制度可提供合法性。中国制度中没有超凡的上帝,天命中的“天”,不是犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教中的神。此外,后三种宗教各有自己明确的书面规则。更确切地说,天命更像“自然”或“大道”,可被打乱,但必须返回平衡。此外,基督教皇或穆斯林哈里发,将合法性赋予国王或苏丹,但中国不同,它没有宗教机构可代表“天”来授“命”。

    改朝换代永远涉及合法性,因为新朝代上台往往通过简单的篡政或暴力。天命概念第一次出现于公元前 12 世纪的商周更替,周武王很明显从合法持有人那里夺得王位。在随后四千多年的历史中,中国经历了多次的改朝换代。不但有主要朝代,像秦、汉、唐、宋、明,还有无数小朝代,像汉朝崩溃后的三国,唐朝之后的五代。此外,有时中国分裂成众多区域,各有自己的朝代。

    成为王朝创始人不需要社会先决条件。有的是前朝的贵族和高级官员,如隋唐的创始人。也有的是平民,如汉朝的刘邦和明朝的朱元璋。事实上,明朝开国皇帝一开始只是农家孤儿,幸免于饥荒和瘟疫,在佛寺里充任小沙弥,后来成为红巾军的将领。红巾军是一起宗教运动,聚集农民、强盗和投机者向地方当局的不公正提出挑战。自那以后,他在愈益澎湃的反元运动中统领越来越多的军队。元朝末年的中国沦落到一系列地方军阀手中,朱元璋就是其中之一。像很多其他的王朝创始人,在某种意义上,他证明自己是最能干最严厉的军阀,最终攀上顶峰。

    在中国,是否胜者为王,败者为寇?天命是否只是军阀权力斗争的事后核准?这在很大程度上是正确的。一点也不奇怪,这个命题已有大批中国文献,如公元 1 世纪班彪的文章,解释为何有些统治者应得天命,而其他的却不值。但很难从这些文章中,提取一整套原则或程序,既能明确解说天命的授予,又不便在事后套在成功者的头上。个别领袖的统治能否享有“朝代”的称号,往往要等很久才能得到历史学家的确认,从而使当时颇为可疑的政权赢得合法性。历史学家牟复礼(Frederic Mote)指出,默默无闻的北周创始人郭威和十年后创建强大宋朝的赵匡胤,他们都事涉篡位,上台都与背叛和欺骗有关,很难分辨。郭威的北周早早夭折,只因为儿子郭荣在三十八岁意外去世。如果郭荣活得长久,赵匡胤可能只是历史上一名试图搞叛国政变的能干将领。

    但皇帝和强悍军阀之间的道德距离还是非常遥远的。前者是合法统治者,他的权力得到大家的自愿服从,后者只是暴力的篡位者。哪些领袖有资格获得天命,哪些没有,中国精英自有一套理念,虽然不能付诸明确的程序规则。儒家的正名思想意味着,皇帝必须遵循理想前任的榜样,还必须拥有马基雅维利所谓的成功君主的美德。显而易见,未来皇帝必须是天生领袖,能激励他人追随自己的权威,敢于冒险以实现自己的目标。最常见的领导能力是指挥军事(武功),所以有很多王朝创始人都是以军事将领起家。但与其他文明相比,中国又比较不重视军事威力。儒家心目中的理想人选,是饱学的士大夫,而非粗野的军阀。觊觎皇位者,如果展示不出对儒家价值的恭敬和自身的教养素质(文治),便招揽不到宫廷内外各式派别的支持。牟复礼把明朝创始人朱元璋和他的竞争对手张士诚对照起来:

    张士诚当过走私犯和强盗,在潜在的精英顾问和政治伙伴眼中,成了他的先天不足。很难在他的痞子经历中找到将会有大造化的证据……其早期谋士在他身上开了一个文人玩笑,朱元璋对此津津乐道。那些早期谋士给他和他兄弟换上雅致的大名,选了“士诚”二字,但没告诉他,《孟子》中有一名句,也包含依次出现的这两个字。但只要移动一下句读,该名句便变成:“士诚,小人也”。这一巧妙的蔑视让朱元璋哈哈大笑,直到有一天他怀疑,身边的文人顾问也有可能在用同样的妙计诋毁自己。

    中国的社会精英没有投票批准新朝代,但在潜在统治者的权力斗争中,仍发挥重要的幕后影响。天命并不总是授给最残忍最暴虐的军阀,虽然这样的人不时在中国上台执政。 很多像武后那样的觊觎皇位者,安排参与使自己获得君王权威的仪式——选择自己的庙号和朝代开始的年号——但很快垮台。中国制度能在建制化上做得特别讲究。一旦呈现某人拥有天命的社会共识,其合法性通常不会受到挑战,除非出现异常。在这一方面,中国的政治制度远比周遭的部落社会先进。

    第 21 章 “坐寇”

    所有国家都是掠夺性的吗?能否给明朝的中国贴上如此标签;中国历史后期的独断专行;没有对行政权力的制衡,能否维持清廉政府

    经济学家曼瑟尔·奥尔森在一篇颇有影响的文章中,提出政治发展的一个简单模式。世界最初落在“流寇”(roving bandit)的手中,像 20 世纪早期中国的军阀混战,或 21 世纪初在阿富汗和索马里的军阀割据。这些强盗纯粹是掠夺性的,经常在短时间向居民榨取尽可能多的资源,以便移往他处,寻找其他受害者。到一定时刻,其中一员变得鹤立鸡群,掌控整个社会:“这些暴力企业家当然不会自称为强盗,恰恰相反,他们会给自己和后裔冠上高贵的名号,有时甚至宣称享有神授君权。”换言之,自称合法统治的国王只不过是“坐寇”(stationary bandit),其动机与他所取代的流寇,没有什么差异。坐寇知道,如果不做短期的掠夺,反而向社会提供稳定、秩序和其他公共服务,让它在长远时期变得更加富饶,更能承担税赋,自己也就得到更多的收获。对受统治者而言,与流寇相比,这是一大进步。“流寇定居下来,向百姓提供政府服务,这出自他的理性自私。这理性自私将使他从社会中榨取最大化的资源,以供自己的享用。他将使用垄断的强制权力,攫取最大化的税赋和其他勒索。”

    奥尔森继续指出,坐寇的最大化税率可与微观经济中的垄断价格媲美。如果实际税率超过这个限制,将打消生产动机,从而导致总税收的下跌。奥尔森认为,专制统治者不可避免总是制订最大化税率,而民主政权总是制订比专制政权更低的税率,因为它们必须求助于承担主要税责的“中间选民”(median voter)。

    统治者就是坐寇,从社会中榨取最大值的税赋,除非在政治上受到阻止。奥尔森解说政府如何运作的这一概念,虽然愤世嫉俗,却讨人喜欢。这符合经济学家的努力,他们试图将理性的功利最大化行为模型推进政治领域,把政治看作经济的衍生物。这非常吻合美国政治文化的反中央集权的传统,后者对政府和征税始终保持怀疑态度。这还为政治经济学和政治发展理论,提供了预言性的漂亮模式,近年来得到了其他社会学家的极大扩展。

    但奥尔森理论是不正确的。传统农业社会的统治者,经常无法使用奥尔森的最大化税率向臣民征税。要回到一个不完全货币化的社会,凭借残缺不齐的历史税收数据,估算出当年的最大化税率,当然非常困难。但我们知道,前现代统治者经常增税,以满足像战争等的特定需求,待到紧急状态结束时再予以减税。仅在特定时期,统治者才会把社会逼上适得其反的绝境,这通常发生于朝代末期,以救燃眉之急。正常年代,他们向社会的征税一定远远低于最大值。

    奥尔森模式的欠缺,最佳例证就是明朝中国。广泛的共识认为,当时的税率远远低于理论上的最大值,甚至低于最基本服务所必需的水平,譬如保障社会生存的国防。在明朝中国发生的,同样也会在其他农业社会发生,如奥斯曼帝国和欧洲的君主政体。这还可成为其他理论的组件,以解释传统政权为何很少采用最大化税率。

    皇帝并没行使理论上的权力,不单表现在征税上。武则天式的专制只是偶见,并不是持续现象。很多中国统治者对治下的百姓,表露出可被称为仁慈或忍让的态度,或儒家所谓的“仁”。中国有悠久的抗税历史,儒家的传统更认为,重赋代表了国家的道德缺陷。《诗经》就有如下的诗歌:

    硕鼠硕鼠,无食我黍!三岁贯女,莫我肯顾。

    逝将去女,适彼乐土。乐土乐土,爰得我所。

    明朝皇帝在权力上受到的约束并不来自法律。如我们在武则天的例子中所看到的,中国统治者不像欧洲统治者,如要增税,无须征求高等法院或议会的同意。他们不但可以颁发行政命令,任意调整税率,甚至可以随意没收他人财产。早期现代的法国和西班牙“绝对”君主,遇上强大精英时必须小心翼翼(参看第 23 章和第 24 章)。相比之下,明朝开国皇帝太祖,一下子就没收了全国最大几个地主的地产。据说,他清算了“无数”富裕家庭,尤其是在长江三角洲,因为他相信那里有特别顽固的反抗。

    对中国权力的真正约束大体有三种。第一,缺乏诱因来设置庞大的行政机关以执行命令,尤其是征收较高的税赋。明初,中国已是大国,其人口在 1368 年超过六千万,到 17 世纪末更增至一亿三千八百万。在这样辽阔的领土上征税并不容易。在 14 世纪,货币流通很少,每个居民要缴的基本农业税都是实物,通常是谷物,也可能是丝、棉花、木材和其他货物。当时没有综合的货币制度,以记录这些税赋,或将之转换成共同的计量单位。很多税赋归当地消耗(纳入预算),其余的运到逐级而升的粮仓,最终抵达首都(先在南京,后在北京)。纳税人承担的运输费用,往往超过所运货物的价值。地方和中央的收入和预算不做分门别类。有学者将之比作老式的电话接线板,电线来自各方,再插入各方,复杂得像一团乱麻。户部人手不足,根本无法控制或理解这个制度。作为土地税基础的土地清查,实施于朝代早期,但并不齐全,之后又没有更新。人口增长、所有权变更、地理变化(洪水淹没或开辟荒地),很快使人口登记册过时。像其他民族,中国人也非常擅长于隐藏资产,并策划掩饰收入的计谋。

    皇帝征税和没收的无限权力常常是闲置的。它的使用多在朝代初期,皇帝正在巩固权力,与早先的对手一一算账。但随着时间的推移,宫廷经常需要那些精英的合作,便在早先没收财产的地区实施显著较低的税率。

    第二,缺乏行政能力所限制的只是供应方面,而不同的皇帝也有自己不同的税收需求。奥尔森假定,任何统治者都想获得税收最大化。这反映了现代经济学的普通假设:最大化是人类行为的共同特征。但这是时代倒错,将现代价值向历史投射,当时社会并不一定同享这种价值。明朝开国的太祖皇帝是一名非常节俭的独裁者,他削减中央政府,避免涉外战争,粮仓实际上常有盈余。他的继承者明成祖朱棣(1360—1424)则截然不同,启动了雄心勃勃的营造运河和宫殿的大工程。明成祖也资助宦官将领郑和(1371—1435)下西洋,其巨型舰队抵达非洲,甚至可能更远。其政府开支是太祖时的两至三倍,额外税赋和徭役都有相应提高,引发了抗税起义和普遍不满。结果,第三任皇帝和后续继承者只好降低税率,向太祖时的水平靠拢,还向受触犯的士绅阶层作出其他政治让步。明朝的大部分时期,土地税定在总产量的 5%,远远低于其他农业社会。

    中国君主一点也不逊于其他前现代社会的统治者,却往往展示出经济学家赫伯特·西蒙(Herbert Simon,中文名司马贺)所谓的“适可而止”(satisficing)行为,而不是最大化行为。也就是说,如果没有如战争所引起的急需,他们经常满足于让睡着的狗继续躺着,仅仅征收应付正常需要的税赋。下定决心的皇帝可能追求最大化税收,如明成祖,但所有专制政治领袖都会自动追求最大化的想法,显然不是真实的。

    对皇帝权力的第三种限制不在征税和财政,而是权威的转授(delegation)。所有大型机构,无论是政府还是私人公司,都必须转授权威。这样做时,位居行政等级顶端的“领袖”,便会对机构失去相当程度的控制。转授的权威可以给功能专家,如预算官员或军队后勤,也可以给省、州、市和地方当局。这种权威转授是不可或缺的,因为统治者从来没有足够的时间或知识作出国内所有的重要决定。

    权威转授的背后是权力转授。代理人以专门知识向委托人行使反制的权威。它可能是管理特殊部门的技术知识,也可能是某地区特别情形的本地知识。因此,像赫伯特·西蒙那样的组织专家认为,大型官僚机构中的权威不是一味从高到低,有时竟往往是反方向的。

    像现代的总统和首相,中国皇帝也遇上这类难题,官僚机构要么反应迟钝,要么蓄意违抗。尚书们或者反对皇帝的提议,或者悄悄地阳奉阴违。当然,中国统治者享有现代主管所没有的手段:他可以廷杖各级官员的赤裸屁股,或随便判以监禁和处决。但这种强制方案,并没解决委托人和代理人之间潜在的信息问题。官僚经常不执行领袖的意愿,因为他们比较了解帝国的实际情形——并可欺上瞒下。

    像中国那样的大国,其治理必须转授权力,必须依赖地方政府。不过,地方政府会滥用职权,腐化堕落,甚至共谋以反中央。正规的行政机构不足以对付此类问题。命令自上而下层层传达,但信息不一定回馈上去。如果他根本不知道滥权的发生,最独裁的皇帝也不会去惩治恣意妄为的官员。

    君主权力的局限,曾在“封建制”和“郡县制”孰是孰非的标题下,在前现代中国受到讨论。这里的封建与欧洲封建主义的复杂内涵毫不相干,只表示权力的分散,而郡县制的地方官员都是中央指派的。根据明朝学者顾炎武(1613—1682):

    封建之失,其专在下;郡县之失,其专在上。古之圣人,以公心待天下之人,胙之土而分之国。今之君人者,尽四海之内为我郡县犹不足也。人人而疑之,事事而制之,科条文簿日多于一日。而又设之监司,设之督抚,以为如此,守令不得以残害其民矣。不知有司之官,凛凛焉救过之不给,以得代为幸,而无肯为其民兴一日之利者。

    为了应付反应迟钝的行政机构,中国统治者的典型对策是设置间谍和告密者的平行网络,完全脱离正式政府,只是重叠在其上。这显示宦官所扮演的重要作用。不像普通官僚,宦官可以直访皇帝居所,通常获得比政府官员更大的信任。皇宫因此派他们外出,或刺探情报,或惩罚正式官僚。到明末,皇宫估计有十万宦官。从 1420 年开始,他们组织成奥威尔式(Orwellian)的秘密警察,全名叫东缉事厂,受东厂掌印宦官的管辖,在朝代晚期演变成“极权恐怖主义的机关”。但皇帝又发现,他也控制不了宦官。尽管有内正司(编按:明代负责惩处违纪太监的专门机构),他们还是自订政策,上演政变,共谋反对皇帝。中国政治制度没有任何政治负责制的机制——没有地方选举或独立媒体,以保证官员的诚信。因此,皇帝不得不将一套自上而下的中央控制系统,叠放在另一套之上。虽然如此,他仍然无法取得对国家的严密控制。

    明朝不愿和不能征收它所需要的税赋,最终导致它的倒塌。明朝统治的头两个世纪,中国基本上没有外患威胁。到 16 世纪末,安全情形急剧恶化。日本海盗开始突袭富庶的东南海岸,幕府将军丰臣秀吉在 1592 年侵犯朝鲜。同年,内蒙古发生战争,南方的土著也纷纷起义。最为严峻的是北方的后金,它变得更加强悍,组织得更加严密,已在东北边境频作骚扰。

    政府对危机的回应完全无力。面临攀升的开支,它耗尽银子储备,但仍然拒绝向士绅阶层增税,最终坐失良机。虽然军事威胁变得愈益明显,累计欠税在 17 世纪最初几十年仍持续上升。皇帝甚至几次颁布税赋大赦,在征收欠税上显然认输。戍边军队早先组织成自给自足的军事屯垦区,现再也无法支撑,必须仰赖中央政府长途运来的给养。政府没能组织妥善的押运制度,因此做不到准时支付军饷。朝廷步履蹒跚,勉强维持到 1644 年。其时,北京政府因李自成的汉族起义军的打击而愈益衰弱,最终毁于获得明军降将帮助的满洲军队。

    好政府,坏政府

    20 世纪之前,明朝是统治中国的最后一个本土政权,其传统政治制度已发展到登峰造极的地步。它的机构现在看来是非常现代和有效的,但其他方面却落后和失灵得难以置信。

    首先是帝国的官僚选拔制度。科举制度的根源可追溯到汉朝,但在隋、唐、宋初,出仕人选仍局限于精英家庭的小圈子。到了明朝,科举制度才成为进入政府的主要途径,赢得了威望和自主,使之成为所有后世科举制度的榜样。

    科举制度与更广泛的教育机构相连。全国各地都有儒家学校,接受望子成龙的父母送来的孩子。最好的学生由老师推荐去南京和北京的国子监深造,将来参加科举考试。(推荐不争气学生的老师要受罚。此法现代大学可以借鉴,用以抵制贬值的分数。)精英家庭仍有可能以“例监”的名义,将自己的孩子送进去。但这些靠捐纳取得资格的监生(类似于当代哈佛和耶鲁的遗产特选生,即富裕校友的孩子),很少抵达官僚机构的最高层,那里仍然严格要求选贤与能。最高荣誉属于连中三元者,即在三级考试中都获第一名:省的乡试、京城的会试、宫廷的殿试。在明朝历史中,完成此一壮举的仅商辂一人。他在官僚机构中级级高升,到 15 世纪晚期成为谨身殿大学士。

    中国的官僚机构树立了一个模版,几乎所有现代的官僚机构都是它的复制品。它有中央集权的委任和晋升制度,各等官职从顶端的一品到底部的九品(很像美国政府的文官序列表),每一品又分正从两级,所以,官职提升可从正六品到从五品。经科举而入仕的官员,会被派到全国各地担任低层官职,但不得在自己家乡。如果亲戚碰巧分配在同一衙署,年少的通常必须引退。三年之后,官员得到部门主管的评估,再直接上报吏部。不鼓励官僚的水平调动。经受住这个制度淘汰、并被提升到顶端的官员,往往是才华特别出众的。

    然而,这些才干优长、组织良好的官员在为一位独裁者服务。他无须遵守任何规则,大笔一挥便可否决仔细谋划出来的政策。他们面对皇帝变化无常的处罚和清洗,只有很少高官得以结束自己的任期,而没有受到羞辱。最坏的决策出自开国的太祖皇帝,他对自己的丞相产生怀疑,不但废除丞相制,而且规定“以后嗣君,勿得议置丞相,臣下此请者,置之重典”。这意味着,后代皇帝不能有相当于总理的助手,只好亲自与掌管实际工作的数十部门打交道。这个制度在精力充沛、巨细无遗的明太祖手中,尚能勉强运转;在能力较差的后代统治者手中,简直就是一场灾难。十天内,太祖必须应答 1,660 本奏章,处理 3,391 件不同事项。可以想象,继任者对太祖所规定的工作量的愤慨。

    很多后代皇帝不胜其任。传统上认为,明神宗(万历皇帝)是最不堪者之一。他自 1572 年到 1620 年的漫长统治,正好对应着明朝的式微。在位的后半期,他干脆拒绝与尚书们见面和主持朝廷。数千份奏折留中不发,在宫廷里堆积如山,既不看也不予答复。事实上,他一连数年不出宫殿,其间重要的政府决策都无法制定。他也非常贪心,挪用国家财政来支付私人费用,例如建造壮观的定陵。17 世纪早期的军事危机中,国家储备仅剩二十七万两银子,他自己名下却累积两百多万两。不顾户部尚书的屡屡请求,他仍拒绝发放足够的帑银来支付军饷。他的行动直接导致了最终摧毁明朝的满族力量的增长。

    “坏皇帝”的问题

    我们所讨论的政治发展三大组件中——国家建设、法治、负责制——中国在历史早期就获得了第一件。在某种意义上说,中国人发明了好政府。他们设计的行政机构是理性的,按照功能而组织起来,以非人格化标准进行招聘和晋升,这绝对是世界第一。也许因为中国社会如此重视家庭,国家建设者认定,他们的特别任务就是在政府中杜绝腐败根源的家族或裙带的影响。

    在战国时期的战争洪炉中建立如此制度是一回事,要在后续两千年中维持下去是另外一回事。早已获得现代性的官僚机构,在国家崩溃或遭受贵族家庭的瓜分时,又变成衰败和家族制复辟的牺牲品。国家衰退在数世纪内逐渐发生,再要恢复到当初秦汉创建者的设计,也要花费数世纪。到了明朝,古典制度在很多方面获得完善。它更加任人唯才,所控制的社会比汉朝的更为庞大,更为复杂。

    在其他方面,中国政治制度又是落后的。它从没创立法治和政治负责制的机制。国家之外的社会像以前一样,与欧洲或印度相比,组织得更为松散,很难采取政治行动。没有拥有土地的独立贵族,也没有独立城市。四下分散的士绅和农民,只可被动地抵制政府命令,不时爆发激烈的起义,又遭到残酷的镇压。他们从来没有像斯堪的纳维亚农民所做的那样,组织成集团向国家争取权利。随着佛教和道教的流传,独立的宗教团体在隋唐时期蓬勃兴起。在中国历史的不同时期,这些宗教团体发挥反国家的作用,从红巾军到太平天国。但宗教始终只是小宗派现象,在正统儒家当局的眼中是可疑对象,从没能代表强大的社会共识,也不能以法律监护人的资格来限制国家权力。

    中国王朝的重大遗产是高品质的威权政府。世界上几乎所有成功的威权现代化者,包括韩国、新加坡,现代中国大陆、台湾地区,都是分享中国共同文化遗产的东亚国家,这不是偶然现象。很难在非洲、拉丁美洲或中东,找到像新加坡的李光耀或韩国的朴正熙那样素质的威权统治者。

    但明朝和中国其他历史时期的经验,提出一个令人不安的问题:在没有法治或负责制的情况下,良好统治能否长久。如遇坚强能干的皇帝,该制度卓有成效,雷厉风行,简直令人难以置信。如遇变化无常或庸碌无能的君主,他们大权独揽,经常破坏行政制度的效率。武则天清洗官僚机构,安插自己不合格的追随者;明太祖废除丞相制,让继任者束缚于这一困境;明神宗完全不理政事,导致政府瘫痪。中国人视之为“坏皇帝”问题。

    中国制度中确有一种负责制。皇帝接受教育,深感对人民的责任。他们中的优秀者,尽量回应人民的需求和抱怨。尽责的统治者还经常以人民名义惩戒手下官员,并依靠宦官网络来刺探谁在做好事,谁在做坏事。但制度中唯一正式的负责制是向上的,即对皇帝负责。地方官员必须担忧,宫廷如何看待他们的表现,但绝对不会在意普通老百姓的意见,因为后者无法依赖司法或选举的程序来反对自己。对普通中国人而言,遇上昏官的唯一求援是上诉,希望皇帝有可能获悉。即使是好皇帝,在如此辽阔的帝国中,要想得到他的注意简直是缘木求鱼。

    ……

    然而,法治和政治负责制在中国是不存在的。滥权的绝大多数,并不来自暴政的中央政府,而是来自散布四方的各级地方官员。他们狼狈为奸,或偷窃农民的土地,或接受商人的贿赂,或漠视环保和安全的规则,或遵循历来地方官员所从事的。如有灾难发生,例如地震披露的豆腐渣学校工程和管理不善的公司的奶粉污染,中国人的唯一求援就是向中央政府上诉。而中央政府则不一定作答。有时,它会对犯法官员采取严厉措施,但在其他时候,它自己太忙,或心不在焉,或要应付更为紧要的事务。

    法治和政治负责制本身很好,但有时会搅乱卓有成效政府的运作,如印度国家由于诉讼和公众抗议,而无法作出基建项目的决策;或美国国会由于说客和利益团体,而不愿面对像社会福利这样的紧迫问题。

    但在其他时候,为维护卓有成效的政府,法治和负责制又属必不可少。在适当条件下,强大的威权制度可以建立非常有效的政府。政治制度要能承受外部条件的变化,以及内部领袖的变更。法治和负责制制衡国家权力,从而减少政府表现的参差不齐。它们约束最好的政府,但也防止坏政府的失控。相比之下,中国人从未能解决坏皇帝的问题。

    光有制度还不够

    传统中国为何发展不出本土的资本主义?这引起了广泛争论,包括马克斯·韦伯的《中国的宗教:儒教与道教》和李约瑟(Joseph Needham)的巨著《中国的科学与文明》。本卷目的不是为了参与争论,只是想解说,遏制资本主义在中国发展的大概不是由于良好制度的缺席。

    现被认为与现代经济发展休戚相关的制度,明朝中国已拥有大部。它有强大和组织良好的国家,可提供稳定性和可预测性。卖官鬻爵和其他公开的腐败虽然存在,但不像 17 世纪的法国和西班牙(参看 23 章和 24 章)那么猖獗。暴力处于控制之中,与很多当代发展中国家相比,中国实现了文官政府对军队的高度控制。其弱点当然是法治的缺乏,产权因此而受害于政府的朝令夕改。如我在第 17 章中所争论的,对经济增长而言,宪政意义上的法治并不是必须的。虽然土地不时被征用,尤其是在朝代初期,但国家得以维持几十年“足够好”的产权,在农村的征税也尤其偏低。今天的中华人民共和国,也有足够好的产权,以支持异乎寻常的经济增长。

    当然,明朝中国奉行经济上不理性的政策,严格控制商人和贸易。它对食盐生产的垄断将价格人为提高,像法国和奥斯曼帝国一样,导致大量走私和腐败。对发展来说,政策远远没有制度那么重要,朝令可以夕改,而制度的建立则艰难得多。

    中国所缺乏的,恰恰是经济学家假设为人类共同特征的利益最大化精神。明朝中国的各行各业,都沉浸在巨大的满足之中。皇帝觉得没有必要收取力所能及的税赋,其他种类的革新和变更也都不值一试。下西洋总兵正使郑和远航印度洋时,发现了全新的贸易通道和文明社会,但没有激起好奇心,也没有后续的远航。下一个皇帝为了节约而削减海军预算,中国的大发现时代(Age of Discovery)刚刚开始,便告结束。同样,名叫苏颂的宋朝科学家发明了世界上第一座机械时钟,由水轮推动庞大多层的齿轮系统,因女真人攻陷首都开封而遭遗弃。时钟的部件散落各地,如何制作,乃至它的曾经存在,经过几代人就湮没无闻了。 阻碍明清中国取得经济增长的因素,今天已不复存在。早期西方评论家认为拖中国后腿的文化缺陷,现也不再是原因。20 世纪初,大家都嘲笑儒家理想中的士绅学者,留长指甲,除了当官,拒绝做任何其他工作,成为现代化的障碍。这一独有的士绅理想已在 20 世纪消失,但重视教育和私人进取的文化遗产仍然生龙活虎,非常有利于中国的经济增长。它体现在全世界无数中国母亲身上,省吃俭用,把孩子送到最好的学校,敦促他们在标准化考试中出人头地。导致明成祖的继任者取消远航的自满,已被异乎寻常的强烈意愿所取代,中国领导人渴望学习外国经验,如果合适便加以采用。首创门户开放的政治家邓小平说,“不管黑猫白猫,捉住老鼠就是好猫”。中国在前一世纪全球经济比赛中表现得如此糟糕,现在又如此杰出。较为信服的解释是它对科学、知识和革新的态度,而不是它的政治制度的根本缺陷。

    第四部分 负责制政府

    第 22 章 政治负责制的兴起

    何谓政治负责制;欧洲建国的迟到反成自由的来源;辉格史观错在何处;比较各国才能理解政治发展;欧洲五种不同的结果

    负责制政府意味着,统治者相信自己应对治下的民众负责,应将民众利益置于自身利益之上。

    负责制可以多种方式获得,如道德教育,这是中国和受儒家影响国家所奉行的。君主接受教育,深感对社会的责任,并从老练通达的幕僚那里,接受经邦纬国的咨询。今天,统治者自称关心民众,但又不受法治或选举在程序上的限制,如此的政治制度,西方人士往往嗤之以鼻。但道德负责制在威权社会中仍有实际意义,约旦哈希姆王国与萨达姆·侯赛因治下的伊拉克复兴党(Ba’athist)政权形成明显的对照。它们都不是民主政体,但后者实施残酷和无孔不入的专政,主要为萨达姆亲朋好友的利益服务。相比之下,除了权力极其有限的议会,约旦国王无须对人民负责,但还在尽量满足约旦社会各团体的需求。

    正式的负责制只是程序上的:政府愿意屈服于限制其随心所欲的机制。归根结蒂,这些程序(通常在宪法中得到详细说明)允许社会公民因政府渎职、无能或滥权而将之完全取代。今天,程序上负责制的主要形式是选举,其中最好的是成人普选的多党选举。但程序上的负责制并不局限于选举。在英国,对负责制政府的早期要求是以法律名义,公民相信国王也应服从法律。其中最重要的是普通法,基本上是由非民选法官所塑造,再加上非普选议会所制订的。所以,最早形式的政治负责制,其对象不是全体人民,而只是代表社会共识的传统法律,以及寡头的立法机关。我在此使用“负责制”,而不用“民主”,道理就在这里。

    久而久之,民主渐渐发生。选举权逐一抵达更为广泛的阶层,包括无产男子、女子、少数种族、少数民族。此外愈来愈明显,法律不再依据宗教,而要求得到民主的批准,即使其执行仍留给专业法官。在英国、美国和西欧,程序上负责制的完全民主化,一直要等到 20 世纪。

    姗姗来迟的欧洲建国

    早期现代时期,欧洲国家建设者方才投入等同于中国和土耳其的工程——建造强大的中央国家,在全国领土上实施统一的行政管理,并宣称主权。这些努力开始得很晚,始于 15 世纪末,成于 17 世纪末。国家主权的理论来自学者的笔尖,如格劳秀斯(Hugo Grotius)和霍布斯。他们主张,真正享有主权的不是上帝,而是国王。

    总的来说,欧洲君主在此项工程中遇上更大阻力,与中国或土耳其相比,欧洲社会中其他政治参与者组织得更为严密。国家建设继续进行,但经常遭遇有组织的反抗,迫使统治者寻找同盟以求折中。地主贵族早已根深蒂固,坚守在固若金汤的城堡,拥有独立的收入和军队。中国贵族从未获得如此的独立;如我们所知,奥斯曼帝国从不允许此种贵族阶层诞生。国家建设广泛开展时,西欧涌现了资本主义经济的元素。商人和早期制造商创造大量财富,不受国家的控制。自治城市愈益成熟,尤其在西欧,还依据自己的规则来组织自己的民兵。

    欧洲法律的早期发展在限制国家权力上发挥重要作用。君主经常侵占百姓的产权,但漠视法律依据而随意没收私人财产的却很少。因此,他们并不享受无限的征税权力,为了资助战争还要向银行家借钱。就任意的逮捕或处决而言,欧洲贵族享有更多的人身安全。除了俄罗斯,欧洲君主也避免在自己社会中向精英发动赤裸裸的恐怖和威胁。

    欧洲国家建设的迟到,恰恰是欧洲人后来享受的政治自由的来源。早熟形成的国家,如果缺乏法治和负责制,能对百姓实施更为有效的暴政。物质条件和技术的每一项进步,落在不受制衡的国家手中,便意味国家更有能力为自身目的而严格控制社会。

    向平等进军

    托克维尔(Alexis de Tocqueville)在《论美国的民主》中开门见山:过去八百年中,人人平等的思想在世界各地得到认可,这一事实是天赐的(providential)。贵族的合法性——有人生来就高贵——不再是理所当然。没有奴隶的改变意识和寻求承认,主子和奴隶之间的关系就无法颠倒过来。这一思想革命有很多来源。所有的人,尽管在自然和社会的层次有明显差异,但在尊严和价值上却是平等的。这个概念是基督教的,但在中世纪教会的眼中,其实现并不在今生今世。宗教改革,加上印刷机的发明,赋予个人阅读圣经和追求信仰的权利,不再需要像教会那样的中介。始于中世纪晚期和文艺复兴时期,欧洲人已开始质疑既存权威,现在这种质疑得到进一步的加强。那时,人们开始重新学习古典文献。现代自然科学——从大量实证数据中提炼普遍规则,通过可控试验来测试因果理论——树立了新式权威,很快在各大学中获得建制化。它所孵化的科学和技术,可供统治者利用,但不受控制。

    奴隶日益意识到自己的价值而变得理直气壮,这种转变表现在政治上,就是追求自己的政治权利。换言之,他们要求分享共同决策权。该权利曾存在于部落社会,只因国家兴起而湮灭。这项追求导致了社会团体的大动员,像资产阶级、农民和法国大革命中的城市“群众”,曾经都是治下的消极老百姓。

    这项追求寓于普世的字眼之中,对现代负责制政府的兴起至关重要——如托马斯·杰斐逊在美国《独立宣言》中所宣告的,它是基于“人人生而平等”的前提。纵观人类历史的先前阶段,不同个人和团体为获得承认而斗争,但其寻求的承认是为他们自己、他们的亲戚团体和社会阶层;他们试图自己成为主人,而从不质疑主子和奴隶的关系。对普遍权利的新式理解显示,接踵而至的政治革命,不再以新的狭窄精英团体去替换旧的,而在为全体人口逐渐获得选举权而铺平道路。

    思想变化的累积效果是极其巨大的。法国有中世纪机构三级会议,如有国家大事,可召集全国代表来开会作出决定。1614 年,玛丽·德·美第奇(Marie de Medicis)摄政王召开的三级会议,对腐败和税赋频发牢骚,怨声载道,但最终还是接受皇家的权威。到 1789 年,由于启蒙和人权思想的影响,它的再次召开遂激发法国大革命。

    如果没有权力和利益的潜在平衡,使参与者认为它是糟糕选择中最好的,单凭思想观念,还不足以建成稳定的自由民主政体。强大国家既执行法律,又受法律和立法机关的制衡,这种奇迹全靠社会上不同的政治参与者彼此之间维持大致的均势。他们当中,谁也不是龙头老大,便不得不达成妥协。我们所理解的现代立宪政体,就是这些不受欢迎、计划之外的妥协的结果。

    自共产主义倒塌和亨廷顿的第三波民主化以来,我们目睹了这种动态。第三波始于西班牙、葡萄牙和土耳其在 20 世纪 70 年代的民主过渡;到 70 年代和 80 年代,再转移至拉丁美洲和东亚;随着 1989 年后东欧共产主义的倒塌而抵达顶峰。民主政体是最为合法的,甚至是唯一合法的,这种思想已传遍世界每一个角落。民主宪法在非洲、亚洲、拉丁美洲和前共产主义世界获得重订,或首次制订。但稳定的自由民主政体,仅占参与民主过渡国家的一部分,因为社会力量的对比,未能迫使不同参与者达成宪政上的妥协。这个或那个参与者——通常是继承了行政权威的——总会比其他参与者更为强大,并以他人为代价扩充自己的势力。

    支持现代民主的启蒙思想在欧洲广泛传播,一直抵达俄罗斯。各国接受程度则有显著的差别,取决于不同政治参与者对自身利益所受影响的估量。要了解负责制政府的出现,必须了解欧洲各地既存的政治力量,有些提倡负责制,另一些并不反对专制主义的抬头。

    仅了解一个国家等于不懂国家

    我谈论欧洲时,好像它是与中国或中东作比的单独社会,但在事实上,它拥有政治发展的多种模式。现代宪政民主的故事经常基于胜利者的观点,即老是依据英国和其殖民衍生品美国的经验。在所谓的“辉格史观”(Whig history)中,自由、繁荣和代议政府的同步成长,被视为人类制度无可阻挡的进步,其始于希腊民主和罗马法律,铭记于大宪章,虽受到斯图亚特王朝的威胁,但在英国内战和光荣革命期间,获得了捍卫和昭雪。这些制度通过英国在北美的殖民地,再输给世界各国。

    辉格史观的问题,不是指它的基本结论是错的。实际上,强调征税在驱动负责制政府出现上的首要作用,大体是正确的。问题在于,像所有仅从单一国家历史出发所作的论证一样,它不能解释议会制度为何出现于英国,而缺席于情形相近的其他欧洲国家。这种史观经常导致评论家断定,已然发生的事必然发生,因为他们不清楚导致特别结果的复杂背景关联。

    举例说明,在兰尼米德七年之后的 1222 年,皇家侍从阶层迫使匈牙利国王安德鲁二世(Andrew Ⅱ)签署让步的金玺诏书(Golden Bull),被誉为东欧的大宪章。该诏书保护精英免受国王的随心所欲,如果国王违诺,主教和议会要员享有抵制权利。但这诏书从没成为匈牙利自由的基础。这部早期宪法在限制匈牙利国王权力上颇为有效,实际统治权竟而落到了不愿自律的贵族阶层手中。该宪法并没开发新政治制度,以立法机关来制衡行政权力,反而阻碍了强大中央政府的出现,以致国家无法抵抗外来侵略。国王也无法保护国内农民免遭寡头的贪得无厌。到了 1526 年的莫哈奇战役,匈牙利完全丧失自由,成为奥斯曼帝国的战利品。

    负责制政府兴起的任何解释,既要看成功案例,也要看不成功的。这样才能了解,为何代议制度出现于欧洲某地而专制主义却盛行于其他地方。从德国历史学家奥托·欣策(Otto Hintze)开始,已有人在作出努力。查尔斯·蒂利再接再厉,认为外部军事压力和征税能力是主要的变量。最近的卓越努力来自托马斯·埃特曼(Thomas Ertman),他查阅的案例远远超过大多数比较历史研究,并对大部分观察到的差异作出了较为信服的解说。

    这种研究还无法成为政治发展的真正理论。说到底,能否创立这样理论都还是未知数。从社会科学的角度看,麻烦在于有太多变量,而没有足够案例。该理论尝试解释的政治结局,不仅是代议政府和专制主义的黑白之分。如下所述,至少有五种不同类型的国家在欧洲出现,其起源都需要得到解释。例如,法国和西班牙的专制主义,跟普鲁士和俄罗斯的就相当不同。事实上,普鲁士和俄罗斯彼此之间又有很大差异。有实证显示,发挥作用从而导致不同结局的变量,其数字是很大的,既有蒂利说的外部军事压力和征税能力,还有内部阶级关系的结构、国际谷物价格、宗教和思想、统治者和民众接受变量的方式。要想从这么多因果关系中,找出可预测性的普遍理论,其前景确实微茫。

    我将在后续章节中,尝试描述欧洲政治发展的重要路径,以及与此相关的各种原因。也许可从一系列案例中概括出哪些因素最重要哪些最不重要,但远远不能成为真正的预测性理论。

    欧洲的东周时期

    在很多方面,1100 年的封建欧洲很像周朝的中国。有名义上的君主或统治朝代,但实际权力落到高度分散的封建领主手中。他们保持军队,维持秩序,主持正义,在经济上基本上自给自足。也像中国一样,有些王室凭借严密的组织能力、冷酷无情以及运气,而变得出类拔萃,并开始在愈益扩展的地域中巩固自己的领土。

    15 世纪到 17 世纪,欧洲发生巨大的政治变动,导致强大国家的兴起,可与中国公元前 5 世纪到公元前 3 世纪的国家建设媲美。变更背景是人口的大幅增长,尤其是在 16 世纪,再加上人均财富的递升。这是一个全球现象,如我们以前讲到的,也影响奥斯曼帝国。它在欧洲造成的效果,比在中东也许更为良性。欧洲人口从 1500 年的六千九百万,增至 1600 年的八千九百万,增长率几近 30%。大量金银来自西班牙在新大陆的殖民地,经济货币化在迅速流行。贸易增长开始超过国内生产总值的增长,从 1470 年到 19 世纪初,西欧商船的规模增长十七倍。

    这段时期的一开始,多数欧洲政体只是“领地国家”(domain states)。国王的全部收入来自自己的领地,只占他名义上统治疆土的一小部分。行政人员很少,来自国王家庭。实际权力分散在各级封建属臣手中。他们都是自治的政治实体,保持自己的军队,向自己的百姓征税,在地方上主持正义。如果自己是强大的男爵,就提供服务给国王。如果自己是较低等级的属臣,就提供服务给男爵。他们不是以税赋而是以自己的鲜血来履行义务,或亲自披挂上阵,或率领侍从。事实上,大多数贵族因此而免缴税赋。国王的领地可能散播于辽阔的疆土,分成数块,互不相连。他的王国只是各级属臣领土的拼凑图,甚至忠于敌对国王的属臣也会间杂其中。

    到这段时期结束,大部分欧洲政治秩序已转化成国家体系。领地国家转化成缴税属国,君主的收入不仅来自国王自己的领土,而且来自他所能征税的整个疆域。管理这个制度需要更大的国家官僚机构,最开始是秘书处和财政部,以掌控收入的征集和支付。地方领主的自治受到严重限制,现在需要缴税,而不再提供服务。中央政府向农民直接征税,从而破坏了领主与农民的传统关系。欧洲教会的地产都被国家夺走,国家直接控制的领地显著增加。国家司法的领土也从互不相连的拼凑图,变换成相邻的一整片。例如,法国版图就是在那时形成现在熟悉的六边形。通过征服、联姻或外交,各国吸收弱小政治体而得以扩展。各国也开始渗透社会,以宫廷语言来统一和减少各地方言,调整社会习俗,在愈益增大的管辖区内,建立法律和商业的统一标准。

    该变化的速度和程度颇不寻常,在很多方面可与东周时期的中国媲美,不同处只在最终幸存国家的众多,而不是大一统帝国。以征税为例,在哈布斯堡帝国内,1521—1556 年的征税为 430 万弗罗林(Florins),1556—1607 年便涨到 2,330 万。英国的平均年度税收,从 1485—1490 年的 5,200 英镑涨到 1589—1600 年的 382,000 英镑。卡斯提尔王国(Castile)在 1515 年征税 150 万枚达克特(ducat)金币,到 1598 年征税 1,300 万枚。增加的税收用来支付更大更为专业的公共机构。1515 年,法国有七至八千官员为国王服务;到 1665 年,皇家行政人员升至八万。巴伐利亚政府在 1508 年有 162 名官员领取薪俸,到 1571 年增至 866 名。

    欧洲国家的早期发展植根于主持正义的能力,但到 16 世纪之后,几乎全是为了资助战争。这段时期的战争愈打愈大,几乎持续不断。其中大型的包括:法国和西班牙之间为争夺控制意大利的持久战;西班牙征服荷兰联合省的努力;英国、西班牙、葡萄牙、荷兰和法国在新大陆争夺殖民地;西班牙试图侵略英国;宗教改革之后日耳曼内的持续对峙(以三十年战争而告终);瑞典向中欧、东欧和俄罗斯的扩张;奥斯曼、哈布斯堡和俄国之间的战火连绵。

    早期现代的国家除了基本治安和正义,没有提供多少服务。它们预算的大部用在军事开支。荷兰共和国预算的 90%,花在与西班牙国王的长期战争上。哈布斯堡帝国预算的 98%,用来资助与土耳其和 17 世纪新教政权的战争。17 世纪从头到尾,法国的预算上涨五到八倍。从 1590 年到 1670 年,英国预算增加了十六倍。法国军队人数从 13 世纪的一万二千,增至 16 世纪的五万和 17 世纪 30 年代的十五万,再增至路易十四统治晚期的四十万。

    法律在欧洲发展中的作用

    公元前第一个千年的中期,中国从少量贵族驾驶战车的战争,过渡到向全民征募的步兵战争。在 12 世纪和 13 世纪,类似的技术过渡也在欧洲发生,披甲戴盔的骑兵由配备弓矛的大批步兵所取代。跟中国的早期建国者不同,早期现代的欧洲君主没在自己领土上征募大量农民。查理五世(Charles V)投入战场的精锐军队,以卡斯提尔部队的步兵方阵(tercio)为核心,再配以来自国内外签有合同的雇佣兵。欧洲的大规模征募仅出现于 18 世纪,但他们仍然不是国家权力的基础,直到法国大革命的国民征兵制(levee en masse)。相比之下,像秦国一样的东周列国,直接从骑兵的贵族战争过渡到大规模征募,中间没有雇佣兵阶段。

    早期现代的欧洲君主为何没像中国君主那样,直接征募自己领土上的大量农民?为何不以增税来付军饷,反而要依赖贷款和卖官鬻爵?

    主要原因之一是欧洲的法治。我们在第 18 章中看到,它由宗教法律发展而来,在各领土上广泛流传。欧洲封建主义的整个等级结构,受到承继下来的法律的保护,将主权和权力有效地分配给各式从属政治体。农民受一系列封建法律和义务的束缚,主要是欠自己领主的。国王没有征募农民的法律权利,事实上,他甚至不能征募自己领土上的农民。因为后者的义务定得十分详细,可能没有军事服务。欧洲君主并不觉得自己可攫取精英的财产,因为后者可援引基于封建契约的古代权利。国家可以征税,但必须通过组织起来的各式会议(像法国的三级会议),以证明征税的正当性,方可取得许可。专制君主曾尝试削减这些会议的权力,但其操作仍局限于赋予君主合法性的法律总框架。国王并不觉得自己有权侵犯对手的私人安全,或任意拘留,或随便处死。(但要注意,这些规则很少用于非精英者,像农民和其他平民,他们还要再等到历史的后期。)

    早期中国君主所实使的暴政,很少欧洲君主敢于尝试,不管是在封建时期还是早期现代。中国君主从事大规模的土地改革,任意处决当朝的行政官员,迁移整个区域的人口,疯狂清洗贵族对手。出现此类行为的唯一欧洲宫廷是俄罗斯。这种不受节制的暴力要在法国大革命之后,方才变得流行。当时,源于古老欧洲秩序的所有法律约束,被现代化一扫而空。

    欧洲的国家发展必须应付限制国家权力的全套法律,懂得这一点很重要。欧洲君主试图扭曲、违反和回避有关法律,但其选择仍受成熟于中世纪的既存法律的限制。

    国家建设的架构

    为了投入战争,国家必须以愈益增大的规模动员资源。对资源的需求,导致更高水平的征税,想方设法将更多人口和社会资源纳入征税范围。财政资源的管理,促使国家官僚机构的扩大和机构的愈益合理化,以谋求最高效率。国家要有辽阔领土,以扩大税收基础;要有相邻领土,以达防御目的。政治异见会被敌人利用,因此有必要在整片领土上实施统一的行政管理。

    欧洲的某些地区——日耳曼和东欧的一部分,还有像瑞士那样的地理隔离地区——没有面对早期的军事竞争,因此组织现代国家较晚。所有的其他强国——法国、西班牙、英国、荷兰、瑞典、俄罗斯、哈布斯堡帝国、波兰、匈牙利等——从 15 世纪以来,都面对军事开支和中央集权的需求。

    欧洲历史此时的政治发展,体现在集权国家和抵抗团体之间的互动。如果抵抗团体单薄且组织不良,或被国家收买去帮助榨取他人的资源,那里就出现专制政府。如果抵抗团体组织良好,中央政府无法颐指气使,那里就出现较弱的专制政府。如果抵抗团体与国家不相上下,那里就出现负责制政府,他们坚持“无代表即不纳税”的原则:愿意提供实质性的资源,但一定要参与如何使用的决策。

    斗争的结果不是国家与整个社会的双边权利争夺战。粗略而言,斗争牵涉四支力量:中央君主政府,高级贵族,更为广泛的士绅阶层(小地主、骑士和其他自由人),包括市民在内的第三等级(资产阶级的雏形)。占社会人口大多数的农民尚不是重要参与者,因为他们还没动员起来,还没成为代表自己利益的社会集团。

    对国家集权的抵抗程度,取决于国家之外的三个群体——高级贵族、士绅、第三等级——能否合作,以对抗皇家权力。它也取决于每个群体所显示的内部凝聚力。最终,它还取决于国家本身的凝聚力和使命感。

    在后续章节中,我将显示四个欧洲国家建设的结果,以及这些结果为何迥然不同的原因。这个分类覆盖了最为纷纭的案例,从最为代议的到最为专制的。它们是:
    1.软弱的专制:16 世纪和 17 世纪的法国和西班牙君主政体,代表了新型的专制国家,在某些方面,比荷兰和英国更为集权,更为独裁。另一方面,它们仍不能完全支配社会上的强大精英,更重的税赋落到了最无力抵抗的阶层。它们的中央政府仍是家族的,事实上,其家族制的程度日益增长。

    图 1. 农业社会的政治权力

    2.成功的专制:俄罗斯君主政体收买贵族和士绅,使之变成完全依赖国家的服务阶层。能够这样做,部分原因在于三方都有共同利益,都想将农民绑在土地上,并向其征收最重的税赋。当时的政府仍是家族制的,但阻止不了俄罗斯君主对贵族阶层的恐吓和控制,其程度远远超过法国或西班牙国王所做的。
    3.失败的寡头制:匈牙利和波兰的贵族一开始就向国王权力施以宪法限制,导致后者一直软弱,无法构建现代国家。软弱的君主政体无法保护农民利益,以对抗贵族阶层的残酷剥削;也不能提取足够资源来建造国家机器,以抵御外来侵略。这两个国家都没建成非家族的现代政府。
    4.负责制政府:最后,英国和丹麦发展出了稳定的法治和负责制政府,同时又建成能发起全民动员和防御的中央国家。英国如何发展议会制度,这是耳熟能详的故事。斯堪的纳维亚通过不同的政治进程,却获得同样结局。到 19 世纪末,一个成为自由派国家,另一个奠定了社会民主主义国家的基础。法律和负责制的原则早已深植人心。

    除了上述这些,还有其他重要的变量和结局。荷兰共和国和瑞士联邦,代表了另一类通向负责制政府和法治的共和途径。普鲁士君主政体虽然没有负责制,却发展了法治和强大的现代国家。我无法一一介绍这些和其他边缘案例。重要的是弄清大致的相关条件,哪些支持负责制政府,哪些支持不同形式的专制主义。

    第 23 章  寻租者

    法国的财政危机导致家族政府的兴起;总督和中央政府的成长;法国精英把自由当作特权,遂无法付诸集体行动;法国政府的致命弱点,既无法控制自己的精英,也无法向其征税

    法兰西王国呈现极端矛盾的形象,既强大,又充满潜在的虚弱。参观过巴黎郊外凡尔赛宫的人都会明白,路易十四时代的欧洲人为何如此敬畏法国君主政体。相比之下,腓特烈大帝(Frederick the Great)在波茨坦的无忧宫(Sanssouci)似乎只是小木屋。17 世纪晚期,路易十四的英国和荷兰对手,把法国看作幅员辽阔、富有、强大、野心勃勃的陆地强权,时时在威胁整个欧洲的自由,有点像冷战期间美国人眼中的苏联。法国君主政体是欧洲国家建设进程中的急先锋,为建立现代中央行政国家打下基础。托克维尔在 19 世纪 40 年代写道,与他同代的法国人相信,他们的国家只是伴随法国大革命而出现的。如他所证明的,其基础却在两个世纪之前就打下了,法兰西王国的国王“越过大革命的深渊,与现代法国握手”。

    同时,法国的国家大厦建造于腐烂和倾圮的地基。当 1715 年 9 月路易十四去世时,他的国家已彻底破产。皇家债务几达 20 亿里弗(livre),这还不包括 6 亿里弗的政府短期债券。法国的债权人已拥有直到 1721 年的未来税收,光是按期偿付连本带利的债务,便已超过可预期的未来税收。这般险恶的财政并非新鲜事,路易十四的激进外交只是使之急剧恶化。法国国王为打造中央国家,持续一个多世纪,与地方有权有势者达成异常复杂的交易,后者以现金换取各式特权与豁免。国家逐渐蚕食所有百姓的自由,并以无法持久的方式将未来抵押给腐败的公职人员。它无法达到专制主义的更高阶段,像中国在数世纪之前所实现的。最后出于规范,它必须尊重它尝试掌控的社会阶层的利益,还必须尊重承继下来的法律。等到那些社会阶层被大革命的浪潮卷走,真正的现代国家才得以浮现。

    在很多方面,法国君主政体的处境与当代发展中国家很相似,它们都把法治当作抵达目标路上的讨厌障碍。政府非常挥霍,将大笔资金投入战争,不愿花在补助金或社会福利上。由此而生的预算赤字必须找到资金,君主政体为此而四下寻觅。只要有逃之夭夭的可能,它都会牵强附会、扭曲、违反有关法律。但跑了和尚跑不了庙,最终,它还是要回到同一群债权人那里,去寻求新的资金。这种困境的唯一出路就是君主政体征用精英的财产,那也是大革命最终付诸实现的。但这超越了旧制度的想象力或能力,它因此发现自己陷入了永久的经济危机。

    同时,政府寻求资金的对象,即法国社会,也无法反过来坚持负责制的基本原则。原因在于,不同经济阶层之间缺乏社会团结,或社会资本。贵族、资产阶级和农民,在更早历史时期曾有过团结,但现在彼此不抱同情。跟英国的情形不同,他们不相信自己是单一国家的一部分。这三个阶层内部又分化成自尊的等级,每一等级非常在乎自己的特权,以及相对于下一等级的优越地位,并不在乎政府掌控自己的阶层或国家。自由被当作特权,如托克维尔所说,在大革命的前夕,法国社会中“愿意为共同目标而一起奋斗的尚不满十人”。

    在争夺主导地位的斗争中,中央国家和抵抗团体如果组织得不够严密,便出现弱的专制主义。法国的结局偏向于专制主义,但它非常脆弱,招架不住以人权为合法性基础的启蒙思想。

    家族专制主义的起点

    第一任波旁国王亨利四世在 1594 年加冕,其时,法国离统一国家或现代国家还很遥远。早期的法国国王以巴黎附近地区为权力基础,聚集数个公国,分别是勃艮第(Burgundy)、诺曼底(Normandy)、布列塔尼(Brittany)、纳瓦拉(Navarre)、朗格多克(Languedoc)。但在语言和习俗上,各区域之间仍有很大差异。王国一分为二,分别叫作财政区省(pays d’élections)和三级会议省(pays d’états)。前者是巴黎附近地区,构成国家的核心。后者是新近扩张的,处于疆土的边缘,使用不同的法律规则。此外,宗教改革又造成宗派分裂。天主教同盟和胡格诺派之间的宗教内战,要到原是新教徒的亨利四世皈依天主教,方告结束。他在 1598 年颁布南特敕令(Edict of Nantes),把天主教当作国教,但授予新教徒同等权利。

    从波旁王朝到 1789 年大革命,法国的国家建设追随两条平行途径。第一条,法国国家愈益集权,从属单元的政治权利愈益缩小。这些从属单元早在封建时期便已存在,包括所有的公国,曾是地方政府的独立贵族,以及愈益纳入国家的保护和控制的市政厅、行会、教会乃至独立的私营商业组织。

    第二条涉及集权的方式。不像早期的中国国家,也不像 18 世纪在勃兰登堡—普鲁士涌现的德国,法国的中央国家,并未建立在非人格化的任人唯贤的官僚机构基础上,因此也谈不上官僚职能专业化和教育。恰恰相反,它变成彻底的家族化。国家经常缺乏现金,急需收入,便把官位卖给最高投标者,从军事将领到财政部、征税官的公职,都可以拿钱来换。换言之,政府的私有化直达它的核心功能,公职都变成世袭的私人财产。

    如果以委托人和代理人的关系来理解廉政,代理人遵循委托人的指示必须得到鼓励。那么,法国政府所创造的制度绝对是一场梦魇。实际上,它给寻租和腐败披上了合法化和制度化的外衣,允许代理人在履行公职时谋取私利。事实上,租金一词(rente)就源自法国政府出售公职的实践,例如,出售征收特定税赋的权利,让买主获得长年累月的收入。如果现代公共管理是公私分明,那么,法兰西王国代表了彻头彻尾的前现代制度。所以,法国国家只是现代和家族元素奇特而又不稳定的混合物。

    中央行政国家和家族化公职的发展相互纠结,无法分开追踪它们的发展。法兰西王国的财政制度高度复杂,反映出它零敲碎打的发展过程。各种税项中最重要的是土地税(taille),直接征于农产品,由农民负担。还有人头税和一系列间接税,征于国内运输的酒和商品。国家垄断制造的食盐也须缴税(gabelle)。后续的国王还征收其他税赋,包括人头税(人均税)和所得税(vingtième)。

    直接财产税很难评估,因为没有制度来维持最新的人口普查,以及居民和资产的登记,像中国、奥斯曼和英国所做的那样。富有家庭自然不愿诚实公开自己的资产,不然,他们的税赋就会上涨。间接税的征收也很难,考虑到法国辽阔的疆土(如与英国相比)和分散的数千市场。17 世纪的法国经济尚未完全货币化,用来缴付现金税的硬币总是短缺。在这段时期,法国仍然是农业社会,那些在技术上容易收集的,如进口关税,尚没能提供实质性的收入。

    税赋制度的真正复杂性在于各种免税和特权。封建法国在中世纪晚期开发了两层会议的制度,一层是全国三级会议,另一层是一系列的地方或省级会议——又称为高等法院(sovereign courts, or parlements)——国王需要与之交换意见,以获得征收新税的许可。为了鼓励各省加入法国的疆域,他授予省级会议特别的恩惠,承认地方精英的习俗和特权。税制因地区而有所不同,尤其是在财政区省和三级会议区省之间。贵族利用软弱的国王来为自己赢得各种豁免,从直接税到自产货物的消费税。这些免税和特权,开始自贵族向外扩散,抵达城市富有平民、皇家官员和各级地方官员等。赢不到免税的就是非精英者,即构成国家人口大多数的农民和工匠。

    公开出售公职的做法(venality,即捐官制或卖官鬻爵制)始于 16 世纪。法国为控制意大利,发动了与西班牙的持久战争,因此承担急需国家收入的压力。其时的国王光凭自己的收入尚不够支付战争费用,所以开始向意大利、瑞士、日耳曼南部新兴的金融中心举债。法国的信用从来不高,在 1557 年拒绝还债给“大借款”的银行家联盟后,更遭受极大的损害。它也拖欠为其打仗的外国雇佣军如瑞士人的薪金。在 1602 年,法国欠下 3,600 万里弗,债主是瑞士的州和市,以及指挥其军队的瑞士上校和上尉。法国政府一旦违约,瑞士雇佣军就停止参战。

    为了解决信用问题,国家的对策是通过一种租赁机制出售公职给私人。与普通放贷相比,租主享有该公职所控制的特定长期收入。他们至少在财政区省负责征收土地税和其他税项。由于税赋经过自己的手,他们得到取回本利的较大保障。内部财政(inside finance)的制度由此而生,国家财政的主要来源不再是私人银行家,而是已属国家机器一部分的富人。后者因自己的投资,而与国家沆瀣一气。

    到头来,这些租金的信用也靠不住。政府很快将矛头指向租主,要求重新谈判相关条款。在亨利四世和财政部长叙利(Sully)治下,国家在 16 世纪早期想出一个新花样官职税(paulette):租主如果愿意付费,可将自己的公职转变成世袭财产,以传给后裔。家族制的复辟可以从早期天主教会的改革中找到根源,那时教会为现代行政管理树立了一个先例,将圣俸从圣职中区分开来(参看第 18 章)。前者享有经济租金,它的传袭因神职人士的独身而受到限制;后者是功能性职位,并接受官僚等级制度的约束。但是,一旦非神职的平民进入国家官僚机构,因为没有圣俸或封建领地的许诺,便想方设法保住工作和照顾子女。法国政府也看到,让平民融入国家,变成了削弱古老贵族影响的有效措施。追求公职的最大客源是第三等级的资产阶级成员,他们希望购买公职来提高自己的身份。所以,全面家族化渗进了法国公共行政的核心。

    官职税的采用并没终止国家筹款的诡计。国家将征收间接税的权利出售给包税商。后者在保证国家获得固定税金之后,得以保留额外的税收。国家也出售征收新税种附加税(droits aliénés)的权利,很快使传统土地税相形见绌。此外,国家增加出售公职的数量,以压抑现有公职的价格,从而稀释持有人的产权。对公职的如饥似渴,甚至令该制度的创建者感到惊讶。路易十四问他的财务总监蓬查特兰(Pontchartrain),他是如何找到购买公职的新人的。蓬查特兰回答:“陛下……国王一旦设定一份公职,上帝就会创造一名购买它的傻瓜。”

    该制度造成的低效和腐败非常可怕。财政部公职颇受欢迎,通常为私人金融家所购买,因为可以提前知道国家可能的招标,从而占据对付竞争对手的优势。财政部长定期主持汇票和其他财政记录的烧毁,以防秋后算账。英国在发展公共财政和优化征税的高级理论,如亚当·斯密的《国富论》,而法国的征税却日益投机取巧、严重失调。例如,法国各地的盐税高低不平,创造了人为的“盐税边界”,从而鼓励自低税地区朝高税地区的走私。最重要的,法国财政制度特地鼓励寻租。富人不愿投资于私人经济中的产业,宁可购买不会创造财富只会重新分配的世袭公职。与其致力于技术革新,他们宁可挖空心思来与国家和税务制度斗智。这削弱了私人企业家的活力,使新兴的私人经济领域愈益依赖国家的援助。同时,英吉利海峡对面的私人市场却在蓬勃发展。

    17 世纪晚期开发的法国财政制度相当落后,让穷人纳税,以支持有钱有势者。几乎每一个精英群体,从高级贵族、行会成员到资产阶级市镇,都为自己争取免税,把最沉重的税赋负担留给农民,这自然激起了一系列农民起义和反抗。为支持路易十四的战争而实施的增税,在 1661、1662、1663、1664、1665、1670、1673、1675 年都激起反抗。最后一次即是著名的法国红便帽起义。它们一一遭受残酷的镇压。例如,1662 年的反税起义中,政府军带走五百八十四名俘虏,年过七十岁和不满二十岁的获得赦免,其余的都上了苦役船。征税是为了支付军饷,但为了用武力执行征税任务,军队又必须自边境撤回,这不是在搬起石头砸自己的脚吗?它凸显了税收政策的根本教训:征税成本与百姓眼中征税当局的合法性,正好成反比。

    总督和中央集权

    17 世纪下半叶,在路易十三和首相黎塞留(Richelieu)、路易十四和马扎然(Mazarin)治下,法国财政危机以总督这一新建制为中央集权铺平道路。他们通常是年轻官员,前程全靠自己。如托克维尔所说,他们“并不是靠选举权、出身或买卖官职才获得手中权力”。重要的是,他们与地方精英或管理财政的鬻官等级制度全无瓜葛。总督通常是新近封爵的人,其直接下属即是平民。他们不像寻租者,巴黎的政府部门可随意予以辞退。中国为郡县配备官员,土耳其派人管理外省,现在法国发明了相同的制度。托克维尔继续说道:

    然而,这些强势的官员在残余的古老封建贵族面前仍然黯然失色,仿佛消失于贵族所尚存的光芒之中……在政府内,贵族簇拥着国王,充实宫廷;他们统率舰队,指挥陆军。总而言之,贵族不仅是那个时代最令人瞩目的人物,连后代的眼光也常常停留在他们身上。若是有人提议任命大领主为总督,那便是对他的侮辱。最贫困潦倒的贵族,通常也会拒绝这样的职位。

    17 世纪中期之前,总督的派遣没有全盘计划,只是中央政府为应付特定麻烦而派出的。渐渐地,他们愈益牵涉征税,尤其是传统上由地方官员监督的土地税。他们的篡权就是该世纪中期宪法危机的背景。

    中央政府和地方参与者分享权力的斗争,主要涉及高等法院所发挥的作用。如前所述,法国有传统的两层会议制度。一层是省级会议,每省一个(其中最重要的是巴黎高等法院),另一层是全国三级会议。在中世纪晚期,法国国王定期召开全国三级会议来批准税赋,像英国议会一样。但没有它们,国王自己也能单独统治,这被视作专制权力的标志。从玛丽·德·美第奇摄政王的 1614 年,到大革命前夕的 1789 年,竟没召开过一次全国三级会议。代议制度在英国获得发展,在法国却没有。要弄清其中原委,必须了解高等法院为何在一国发展成为强大机构,在另外一国却没有。

    代表地方精英利益的省级高等法院基本上是司法机构。跟全国三级会议不同,它们经常开会,可以成为对国王权力的制衡。国王如想颁布一项新税,就要来高等法院注册。高等法院通常举行公众讨论,遇上税务事项,会变得相当激烈。然后,高等法院可注册原封不动的法令,可修改,也可拒绝。不受欢迎的法令会在法庭上接受地方官员口头或书面的抗议。高等法院的权力很有限,因为国王可召开所谓的御前会议(lit de justice),将高等法院所拒绝的法令强行注册。高等法院的抗议仅仅让国王蒙羞而已。

    1648 年威斯特伐利亚和约(Peace of Westphalia)之后,该制度面临严重危机。其时,三十年战争的累计债款促使法国政府试图在和平时期继续战时的征税水平。巴黎高等法院的拒绝,最初导致马扎然打退堂鼓,从大多数的外省撤回总督。但高等法院领袖随后被捕,激起了所谓投石党(Fronde)的普遍叛乱。从 1648 年到 1653 年,投石党运动分成两个阶段,代表了传统地方精英和贵族,对君主实施最终制裁,即武装叛乱。双方都有可能赢得内战,但到最后,政府政策激怒的各式社会参与者不能团结一致以取得军事胜利。

    高等法院和贵族的失败,为法国政治制度的彻底集权铺平道路。17 世纪下半叶,路易十四和财务总监柯尔贝尔(Jean-Baptiste Colbert),故意将总督转化成国家工具,让皇家会议(Royal Council)赋予他们在全法国的统一权力。他们被安插到每个省份,权力大为增加。他们开始招募和监督地方民兵,接管公共建设,负责公共秩序。救济穷人的义务,早已被封建贵族放弃,也变成由总督经手的中央政府的功能。

    国家建设过程中湮灭的自由,还包括城镇和市政的自治权。直到 17 世纪晚期,法国的城镇居民一直行使权利,以民主方式选出地方法官。他们维护自身权利,经常还获得国王的支持,作为削弱地方贵族的手段。但到 1692 年,第一次废除选举,地方法官改成中央指派的总督。托克维尔对此作出评论:

    值得历史大加蔑视的是,这场伟大的革命在并无任何政治目的的情况下完成了。路易十一之所以限制城市自由,是因为它的民主性质使他感到恐惧;路易十四之所以摧毁城市自由并非出于恐惧,真实情况是他把城市自由出售给所有能赎买的城市。其实他并不想废除城市自由,而是想以此为交易,即使他实际上废除了城市自由,那也绝非本意,而仅仅是基于财政目的的权宜之计。奇怪的是,这套把戏一成不变,竟然持续了八十年。

    托克维尔有一条非常有趣的评论。他所钦佩的新英格兰城镇是美国民主的基础,与中世纪的法国城镇一样,都源自相同的封建地方机构。到 18 世纪,两者却分道扬镳,原因在于法国中央政府的收买。法国城镇政府开始受到寡头的控制,他们愈益通过买卖官职来获得公职,让自己出名。社区团结因而遭受破坏,除了掌控公职的精英,其他民众陷入冷漠。

    政治集权的影响是非常深远的,建立了我们今天所知的更为划一的国家。1685 年撤销南特敕令,让天主教独霸一方,导致很多企业家和巧匠的新教徒移民到欧洲他处,甚至远赴北美和南非。中央政府现有更大权力,可以宣布新税,不用担心已被慑服的高等法院的反对,全国各地的税赋差异得以降低。投石党叛乱失败之后,贵族失去了其在农村的权力基础,反被召到宫廷。他们在那里直接为自己的补助金和免税进行游说,为觐见国王而忍受操纵。古老贵族争相出席路易十四的晨服仪式(levée),就是其中一例。贵族以真正的政治权力和财富作为代价,得以保留自己的社会地位。仍然剩下的权力只是他们继续控制的领主法庭。我们在第 17 章中看到,此类法庭在英国逐渐纳入皇家的控制。所以,法国只在错误的地方获得统一:丧失地方上的政治自治,以致不能在社区问题上做出决定;保留了地方贵族掌控的不平等司法制度,以致人们更加不相信既有产权的公平。

    中央集权的局限和改革的不可行

    18 世纪早期,法国国家日益增强的权力践踏了个人权利,首当其冲的是产权。但它的做法,却是典型的欧洲方式,即通过操纵法律制度,而不是罔顾法律、纯用强力。要废除惯例的权利和约束,必须经过漫长的辩论,并依照封建法律秩序的规定,在政治上争个明白。因此,剥夺高等法院的权力,足足花费了将近一个世纪的时间。法国国王对反抗的农民非常残忍,对精英参与者却有不寻常的尊敬。在投石党叛乱遭受失败之后,两名带头造反的贵族蒂雷纳(Turenne)和孔代(Condé),要求并获得了路易十四的饶恕。如果这些人是中国贵族,他们和所有家人都会被处死。

    路易十四死于 1715 年,身后的君主政体债台高筑。为了减少负债,国家诉诸类似保护费诈骗的伎俩。它掌控名叫司法堂(chambre de justice)的特别法庭,然后威胁要调查债权人的私人财务。几乎所有债权人或多或少都涉及腐败,便同意降低政府的欠债,以交换调查的取消。用选择性的反腐调查来筹集收入,或胁迫政治对手,这种策略时至今日仍然流行。

    新财政部长约翰·劳(John Law)上任后,法国尝试另一套应付债权人的办法。它创建国家银行,订出硬币换成钞票的固定比率,然后强迫百姓统统以硬币兑换钞票,如有不从,则以起诉、抄家、充公来威胁。过后,银行又毁约,让钞票在硬币的基础上一再贬值,实际上只想少付债务利息。约翰·劳宣称,个人手中的财产,只有用于国王认可的正当用途,方才真正属于个人,导致孟德斯鸠(Montesquieu)称他为“欧洲史上促进专制的最伟大人物之一”。但约翰·劳的制度最终证明无法实施,随后很快破产。像近代的很多专政政体,法国君主政体发现,政治法令既不能建立投资者的信心,也无法取消经济的基本原理。

    18 世纪时期,法国各式的社会和政治参与者,相互均势发生了重要改变。世界资本主义经济日益增长,提高了生产效率,导致物质财富和法国资产阶级的剧增。就重要性而言,这些经济变化却比不上同时发生的思想运动。关于人权和平等的启蒙思想,在欧洲迅速扩散,获得突如其来的胜利。18 世纪 80 年代重开三级会议,开会原因完全不同于先前:三级会议限制国王权力的权利,不再基于封建习俗的古老起源,而基于它们能代表享有平等权利的广泛公众。一般认为,法兰西王国的财政制度已变得非常可怕,既复杂又不公平。早先数代财政部长,使用各式花样来赖债和搜刮债权人,现在取而代之的是新见解:征税应该统一和公平,合法性来自法国人民推选的代表。

    法国大革命和民主莅临的故事,大家都很熟悉,我不想在本书详尽叙述。我之所以提起,只是为了一个不同目的。18 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代的法国政治家,接受新思想的影响,尝试以和平改革的方式改造旧制度,但由于既得利益团体紧紧抓住政治权力不放,而屡屡受挫。

    这样的努力有过两次。第一次始于路易十五和首相莫普(Maupeou)治下的 1771 年。莫普发起与高等法院的冲突,禁止他们彼此联系和举行罢工。对方拒绝听命后,莫普重组整个司法系统,并取消巴黎高等法院的大部分司法权。最重要的是,他废除司法等公职的出售,让由国王直接付薪的新法官取代寻租者。更为公平的新所得税也变成永久性的,所依据的是对资产更为严格和诚实的评估。政府由此向卖官鬻爵的整个制度发动正面进攻,所威胁的不但是捐官者的职位,而且是其家庭储蓄的投资。

    该行动引起极大反抗,反抗者既有捐官者的既得利益团体,也有新兴的民主公众,后者奋起支持寡头反抗专制权力的扩展。传统的家族精英,把自己对改革的反抗描绘成对独裁的抵制。颇不受欢迎的路易十五突然死于 1774 年,他的继承者路易十六(大革命期间被送上了断头台),最终被迫恢复高等法院所有的权利和特权。

    第二次是在杜尔哥(Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot)担任财务总监的 18 世纪 70 年代。他是重农主义者,对政治改革不感兴趣,但深受自由经济思想的影响,希望使法国经济更趋合理化。在这点上,他很像现代发展中国家的财政部长。那些部长自己是技术专家,信奉新自由主义,在 20 世纪 80 年代晚期和 90 年代脱颖而出。杜尔哥废除了谷物的出口限制,以及旨在稳定面包价格的其他复杂规定。他进一步颁布法令,废除享有特权的行会,将劳役转换成地主的新税。所有这些,都可被视为现代化和理性的经济改革,在某种意义上,甚至是必需的。但它们遇上狂暴的抗议,不仅来自面临面包价格上涨的城镇穷人,还来自行会和其他依赖国家租金的既得利益团体。杜尔哥倒台,第二次努力终告结束。

    法兰西王国的政治制度无法自我革新。广大的寻租联合体获得权利,并在传统和法律中寻求保护,这就是国家权力的基础。他们的产权体现在公职中,但这是非理性和紊乱的,且多数又属不义之财。等到寻租者被非人格化和任人唯才的官僚所替代,现代法国方能涌现。如果政府正面攻击这些权利,就会使自己权力所依赖的法律制度变得非法。作为现代政治制度重要组件的法治,很早就在法国获得发展,远在负责制政治机构和资本主义之前。所以,它所保护的不是现代政治制度和自由市场经济,而是传统的社会特权和国家掌控的低效经济。即使等级制度高层,在思想上接受旧制度的破产和根本改革,他们也没有力量打破寻租联合体所建立的平衡。需要更为强大的力量,即制度外非精英团体的愤怒,借用革命来将之彻底摧毁。

    抵抗法国专制主义的失败

    如果说专制主义没在法国取得完全胜利,那么抵制它的社会团体,也没能向国家强加某种形式的政治负责制。事实上,后者的失败显然更为重要,源于他们未能团结一致、采取行动(参看图 2)。反抗场所应该是省级的高等法院和国家级的三级会议。这些法庭作出抗议、埋怨、辩论和抵抗,多次迫使法国君主政体撤回它们所反对的建议。但在革命前夕的三级会议之前,高等法院从没迫使君主政体接受自己高于行政机构的宪政原则。自然有人会问:这些封建时代遗留下的传统政治会议,为何没能参照英国的方式组织集体行动?这个问题并不局限于高等法院。在中世纪的英国和法国,城市也组织成自治的政治机构。为何前者最终发展成新英格兰城镇,后者却沦作被动的行政单位?

    图 2. 法国

    未以比较方式检视其他国家之前,我们尚不能回答这些问题。但我们可建议大致的分类,以缩小对有关原因的搜索。第一种解释,要在法国社会结构中寻找答案,如果不是更早,也要追溯到封建时代。政治学家托马斯·埃特曼认为,家族专制主义在法国、西班牙和意大利南部诺曼王国的兴起,肯定与罗马帝国崩溃之后那里自上而下的国家建设有关。卡洛林帝国之外的欧洲——英国、斯堪的纳维亚和部分东欧地区——平民和贵族之间存在更多的社会团结,并发展出了强大的基层政治机构,幸存至早期现代。在拉丁语的欧洲,这些地方机构的软弱,再加上中世纪以来的频繁战争,解释了应付专制主义的集体行动的缺席。日耳曼是卡洛林帝国的一部分,发展了非家族的专制主义。它不像西班牙和法国,没有那么早就陷入地理政治的激烈竞争。等到它真正面对军事威胁,可避免他人的错误,建立更为现代的官僚机构。

    托克维尔赞成的第二种解释,将法国失败归罪于并不遥远的近代。特别是他认为,法国贵族和平民之间缺少社会团结,是君主政体的故意挑拨所致。托克维尔解释说,欧洲各地的封建制度并没有特别悬殊的差异,庄园、城市、农庄都有类似的法律和社会团结。他的第二本著作《旧制度与大革命》,在第 9 章和第 10 章中提供了很多案例。地方上的法国领主和其平民属臣,每隔两星期出席领主法庭来裁判案件,就像英国的百户法庭。14 世纪的资产阶级在省级会议和三级会议中,都扮演积极的角色,只因遭到社会差别的排斥,才在后续世纪变得消极。“无代表即不纳税”的原则,在中世纪便已得到确立,不管是法国还是英国。

    对托克维尔来说,专制主义之下的法国社会不和,植根于家族制实践本身,并不植根于古代传统。“在人与人、阶层与阶层之间制造差别的所有方法,其中流毒最甚、最容易在不平等之上再添加孤立的,就是征税不公平。”麻烦始于 14 世纪下半叶:

    我敢断言,自国王约翰被俘、查理六世疯癫而造成长期混乱、国民疲敝不堪之日起,国王便可以不经国民合作便确定普遍税则,而贵族只要自己享有免税权,就卑鄙地听凭国王向第三等级征税;从那一天起便种下了几乎全部弊病和祸害的根苗,它们折磨旧制度的余生,并最终导致它的暴毙。

    免税在所有特权中最受憎恨,随着税赋在 16 世纪和 17 世纪的稳定上涨而愈演愈烈。再加上卖官鬻爵,免税不只是某个社会阶层的特权,也变成个别家庭的特权。购买公职的个人,只要自己觉得安全,宁愿让同胞的权利受损。在英国,穷人享受免税特权。在法国,富人享受免税特权。

    不平等的征税使人堕落,不管是贵族还是资产阶级。前者丧失他们的统治权,作为补偿,愈加死守世袭的社会地位。考虑到有那么多新近买爵的平民,旧贵族规定,很多公职需要候选人显示“四名祖先”(即四名祖父母)的贵族出身。暴发户自己挤入行列后,又尝试对后来者关上大门。资产阶级通过搬到城市和谋求公职,试图将自己与农民分开。他们原可投入企业活动的精力和雄心,现在转向公共权威所推崇的地位和安全。

    这还不是解释的终止。捐官和特权也存在于英国,但英国君主政体从没像法国那么有效地破坏议会团体的团结。托克维尔自己也承认,英国贵族从一开始起,与其说是世袭的种姓制度,倒不如说是真正的执政贵族(最佳者的统治)。才华超众的英国平民加入贵族阶层,比在其他欧洲社会更为容易,原因源自历史早期,现已模糊不清。我们再一次回到支撑龟的问题。很有可能,公职家族化本身也有赖一系列先在的社会条件,甚至被有意的政府政策所鼓励。

    寻租的社会

    法兰西王国就是今天所谓寻租社会的早期原型。在这样的社会中,精英花费所有时间来攫取公职,以保证自己的租金收入——在法国的例子中,那就是可以私用的长期固定收入的法律权利。

    寻租联合体稳定吗?它持续几乎两个世纪,为法国作为主要大陆政权的崛起提供了政治基础。另一方面,我们知道冠冕堂皇的法国宫廷掩盖着严重的虚弱。最重要的是联合体之外的人们,都感受到愤怒和不公,这种感觉鲜明而强烈,最终在大革命中爆发出来。甚至联合体内的人,也不相信它的原则。如能彻底废除卖官鬻爵,君主政体会很高兴,曾在王国末期作出尝试。寻租者只顾自己,对他人存有很少同情。他们自己已深深陷入这个制度,所以无法容忍改革的想法。这是完美的集体行动难题:废除该制度,社会整体会受益匪浅;但制度参与者出于个人利益,便会阻止合作和变更。关于政治发展中法治的作用,法国的例子提供了教训。现代国家存在之前,法治便已出现于中世纪。它约束暴政,但也约束现代国家的建设。为了引进真正的现代社会,必须废除它所护卫的旧社会阶层和习俗。早期现代时期,对抗君主政体以捍卫自由,实际上是在保护传统的封建秩序和世袭的封建产权。而这封建产权,恰恰又与现代资本主义的经济秩序水火不容。政府觉得,它必须尊重传统精英的产权,既然不能直接征用,只好诉诸借贷和愈益离奇的财政花招。于是,家族统治如鱼得水。国家对法治的尊敬,反而帮助建立了高度不平等的社会,虽然尝试染指寡头精英的财富,但终告失败。所以,它只能在穷人和政治弱者身上筹集收入,从而加剧不平等,并为自己的灭亡铺平道路。 法国古老的家族制在革命中死去。不过,西班牙旧政权却创建了类似的制度,在 18 世纪躲过革命和改革,并将之输往拉丁美洲,后者不得不与这份遗产长期共处。

    第 24 章 家族化跨越大西洋

    拉丁美洲政府的特征未见于世界其他地区;早期现代的西班牙发展出与法国类似的家族专制主义;西班牙制度和其移植至新大陆殖民地

    拉丁美洲大陆在地理、种族、文化和经济上具有极大的多样性,但各国又显示出共同特征,使拉丁美洲的政府模式,与东南亚、中东和非洲迥然不同。

    到 21 世纪早期,拉丁美洲人口的大多数居住在世界银行标为“上中等收入”的国家。他们的年度人均收入在 4,000 到 12,000 美元之间,不但超过非洲的大部分国家,甚至超过快速增长的新兴国家,如印度和中国。然而,经济增长趋于跳跃式,平均来看,仍远远低于 20 世纪中期以来的东亚国家。第三波民主化以来,它在总体上成为世界上最民主的地区之一。随着民粹政府的兴起,例如在委内瑞拉,也出现了民主倒退。

    拉丁美洲在两个方面表现平平。第一是平等。该地区在收入和财富的不均上名列世界前茅。21 世纪的头十年,某些国家的不均水平略有下降,但仍相当顽固。第二是法治。举行选举,使用民主负责制来摆脱不得人心的领袖,拉丁美洲国家做得都不错,但司法的日常工作却比较落后。这体现在治安不良、犯罪率居高不下、法庭程序堵塞、脆弱或无保障的产权、很多富人和强人的胡作非为。

    这两个现象——不平等和脆弱的法治——互有关联。法治的保护在拉丁美洲通常只适用于极少数人,如大企业主管或工会成员。在秘鲁、玻利维亚和墨西哥,多达 60% 到 70% 的人口生存于所谓的非正式领域(informal sector)。这些人经常没有自己住家的房契,从事无照的商业,如果受雇,也不是工会成员,得不到正式的劳工保护。很多贫困的巴西人住在蔓延的贫民窟(favelas),政府当局袖手旁观,正义经常私下解决,有时还得靠犯罪集团。执法不公平更促进了经济不公平,穷人居住的世界基本上得不到法律保护。他们不愿投资于自己的家,因为没有明确的法律文件。他们身受犯罪之害时,也不愿信任警察。

    要发现不平等的来源很容易,其大部分都是承继下来的。很多古老精英的富有家庭是大地主,其祖先建立大庄园,又将之顺利传给后裔。很多拉丁美洲国家的财政制度,又使不平等得到进一步深化。经济合作与发展组织(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)的富裕国家,其财政制度主要用于从富人到穷人的再分配。它的实施可通过累进税制度(如美国),也可通过再分配政策,向低收入家庭提供资助和社会服务(如欧洲)。相比之下,拉丁美洲的财政制度只做很少的再分配,在某种情况下,再分配却给了相对优越的团体,像参加工会的公务员或大学生。正式领域的工人和各式精英,得以保住自己的福利和补助金。事实上,他们中的大多数在逃税方面相当成功。不像美国的累进个人所得税,拉丁美洲国家的税收很少来自个人。其富人擅长于隐藏自己的真正收入,或转移财产到海外,远离税务官的控制。这意味着,征税主要来自消费税、关税和增值税,落在穷人头上的便高得不成比例。

    21 世纪初,拉丁美洲政府在管理宏观经济政策上大有长进,但这只是近况。其历史的大部分时期,拉丁美洲政府因预算赤字、公共部门大量举债、通货膨胀和国债违约而声名狼藉。全洲范围的最后一次是在 20 世纪 80 年代初,墨西哥、巴西、阿根廷、秘鲁、玻利维亚和其他国家都宣告延期还债,通货膨胀随之猛升。阿根廷在 20 世纪 80 年代末经历了真正的恶性通货膨胀,年增长率超过 1,000%。它在 2001 年又一次面临财政崩溃和国债违约。

    在政治上,拉丁美洲的统治也与众不同。如上所述,该地区近来有很好的民主记录。但在 20 世纪 60 年代和 70 年代,即古巴革命之后,该洲所有大国都屈服于军事独裁。虽然民主根源可追溯到 19 世纪早期第一个独立国家,但拉丁美洲没有一个政权其民主政府的历史始终不断。除了菲德尔·卡斯特罗的古巴,该地区的独裁政府没能建成可被称为极权主义的强国,也没能掌控足够的强制力,实施真正的社会革命,如剥夺富有精英的资产和收入。该地区的威权政府从没能采取极端措施(很幸运),像苏联或中国共产党政权下那样的集体化,或中国“文化大革命”那样的大规模死亡。做不到的还有“选举式威权”(electoral authoritarian)政权,如查韦斯的委内瑞拉,它们甚至无法控制政权本身的犯罪或腐败。国家权力的伤害,大多落在非精英身上。如 20 世纪 80 年代,危地马拉政府发动可怕的剿反,以反对原住民族的游击队运动。富有的精英学会与非民主政府和平共处,避开国家权力的锋芒,经常获益于制度化的腐败。

    如果这听起来亲切,那是因为这使人忆起法兰西王国的统治模式。在拉丁美洲,这些先例来自非常相似的家族政权,即早期现代的西班牙。跟法国相似,西班牙专制国家在 1492 年之后勉强拼凑而成。由于无止境的战争,西班牙君主政体永远处于破产之中。它试图通过借贷来弥补预算赤字,但很快在债权人面前丧失信用,最终诉诸像法国一样的各式伎俩来筹集资金,包括债务一再重整、货币贬值和出售公职。事实上,这个外强中干的国家为了搜寻现金,将愈来愈多的公职,包括大部分军队,都售给私人企业家。其结果是如出一辙的内部财政,私人成功地获取了国家创造的寻租权。贪污现象比比皆是,卖官鬻爵完全腐蚀了公私之分。

    同时,托克维尔所叙述的法国因素,也在西班牙削弱对专制主义的抵抗。贵族、士绅和第三等级,本来应该团结起来抵抗王室权力,但却由于国家向个人提供参与分享租金的机会,而陷入四分五裂。中世纪时,西班牙议会(Cortes,像法国高等法院和英国议会)必须批准新税。但到后来,它中止了其制衡国家权力的功能。对公职和级别差异的耿耿于怀,又阻碍了西班牙社会采取集体行动。

    这就是移植到新世界的政治制度,借助于新西班牙(墨西哥)总督辖区(viceroyalty)和秘鲁总督辖区。此外,它治下的社会制度比欧洲的更为不平等。就像收复失地运动(Reconquista)之后的西班牙,新大陆也是军事征服得来的。但不像前摩尔人领土,新大陆有大量原住民。16 世纪 40 年代,在玻利维亚的波托西(Potosí)和墨西哥的萨卡特卡斯(Zacatecas)发现重要银矿,由此开创了庞大的采矿帝国。欧洲统治者享用开矿租金,做工的都是沦为奴隶的原住民劳力。编年史家注意到,奔赴新大陆的西班牙人,不是去做工,而是去当主人:他们“全靠印第安人的劳动、手工和汗水”。从一开始,西班牙美洲的经济道德就不同于定居新英格兰殖民地的农民小地主。如果美国政治制度都以黑奴历史悠久的南方各州为基础,其结果就是拉丁美洲的殖民政府。

    破产的西班牙国家

    随着斐迪南(Ferdinand)和伊莎贝拉(Isabella)在 1469 年的联姻,现代西班牙国家迅速出现于世界舞台。该联姻合并了阿拉贡王国和卡斯提尔王国,再加上阿拉贡属下的领土加泰罗尼亚(Catalonia)、那不勒斯、西西里岛。联袂后的君主政体在 1492 年征服摩尔人的最后堡垒格拉纳达(Granada)。同年哥伦布前往新大陆,为西班牙争得西印度群岛(the Indies)。他们的孙子查理五世添加了包括低地国家(Low Countries)和弗朗什-孔泰(Franche-Comté)的勃艮第,到 1519 年当选为神圣罗马皇帝,更把奥地利哈布斯堡王朝的土地纳入版图。

    16 世纪中期哈布斯堡帝国在欧洲的统治范围

    16 世纪 20 年代,查理五世控制当时世界上最大的帝国。帝国形成是通过王朝同盟,而不是征服,这一事实造就了财政上的捉襟见肘,从而对国家制度发展的性质发生决定性的影响。查理五世和儿子腓力二世(Philip Ⅱ)只有卡斯提尔一个安全的征税基地(包括珍贵的新大陆殖民地),不能向帝国其他地区抽取资源来应付开支。尽管如此,哈布斯堡君主政体在半岛之外担起了昂贵的担子。其中之一就是在 16 世纪发起与法国的持久战争,为了控制意大利,尤其是米兰公国。另外的是与荷兰联合省长达八十年的战争。最后,还有在日耳曼土地上发生的毁灭性的三十年战争。它由于法国首相黎塞留支持新教徒,而演变成一场泛欧大战。这段时期的战争,因开发了星状要塞(trace italienne),而变得异常昂贵。这种要塞不易遭受围攻炮火的伤害,但城防工程因此而变得格外拖延和艰辛。所有这些战争费用,卡斯提尔纳税人承担了其中的 80%。

    尽管有来自新大陆的贵金属,这些昂贵的外务负担几乎压垮了西班牙的财政制度。在 16 世纪和 17 世纪,政府费用始终数倍于美洲殖民地的汇款。金银进口,从 16 世纪 30 年代和 40 年代的每年 20 万至 30 万枚达克特,增至 16 世纪末最高的每年 220 万枚。但仍跟不上增长的债务,它在同期从 120 万涨至 600 万枚。

    16 世纪早期的西班牙国王宁愿借贷,也不愿增税,很快发现自己的信用不佳。在 16 世纪 20 年代,债务服务费用就超过税入的三分之一。到西法持久战争结束的 1560 年,它已超过税入的 100%。西班牙国王募集不到足够的资金来应付赤字,只好在 1557、1560、1575、1596、1607、1627、1647、1652、1660 和 1662 年宣布破产。这些破产并没赖掉债务,更像今天所谓的债务重整。国王以这些债务属于高利贷为由,宣布延期偿付短期和浮动的债务,然后再跟债权人开始拖延和不怀好意的谈判。债权人被迫将旧债务换成一纸新契(juro al quitar),有资格分享未来的税收,就像法国的租金。这种债券未标日期,可以转让,最初年息是 7%,但要面对利率和本金的任意调整。通过这种债券,西班牙君主政体得以染指卡斯提尔社会精英的储蓄——神职人员、贵族、士绅、官僚等。最强大的债权人往往能获得较好条款,或者不受延期偿付的限制,或者让较弱的债权人承受债务重整。维多利亚公司(Vitoria)无法收到政府付款时,便拒绝偿付自己的债权人,包括“修道士、修道院、救济院、寡妇孤儿、其他非商人”。政府发现,在政治上更难向这些精英直接征税,宁可选择不断赖账。这个传统也传至拉丁美洲的当代政府,如阿根廷。它在 2001 年的经济危机后,强迫外国投资者以及国内的养老金者和储户大量放弃手中的国债。

    无代表仍纳税

    当时很多欧洲人,尤其是受到西班牙威胁的英国人,对西班牙国王所谓的专制权力心存敬畏,相信他具有“像土耳其一样”的征税权和特权。但西班牙政权的财政基础却非常不稳定,国王对自己属下精英的权威也受法律和习俗的限制。西班牙的专制主义太弱,不敢像中国和俄罗斯那样向自己的精英发起正面进攻。它也无法像英国所做的那样开发基于情愿的合法征税制度。

    像其他欧洲国家,聚集成西班牙的各王国都有称作议会的中世纪机构。莱昂王国(Kingdom of León)的议会是欧洲最古者之一,阿拉贡王国的议会是组织最好者之一,非常强势。兼并莱昂的卡斯提尔王国议会,与英国议会或法国三级会议相比,其代表性少而限制多。它通常并不邀请作为集团的神职人员或贵族跟平民坐在一起开会。在 14 世纪,召集到议会的有一百座城镇的代表(procuradores),到 15 世纪,该数字跌至来自十八个城市的各两名代表。这三十六个人声称可代表全西班牙讲话,但实际上只是治内主要地区的寡头代表。

    议会的传统权力也受到限制。它没有立法权,因为已经留给国王。腓力二世在 1567 年颁布的新法典(Nueva Recopilacion)说,“一定要召集议会,征得代表的首肯,方能在整个王国征收税赋、捐献和其他税项”。但这指的是新设的额外税。像消费税(alcabala)、关税(regalias)、盐税及矿物开采税(quintos)的既存税,则不需要获得批准。国王也宣称,如果需求“合理”,议会无权拒绝。什么是合理,全凭国王说了算。

    国王和议会的相对权力不是凭空而来的,而是政治斗争的结果。中央政府将消费税包给包税商,但遭到各城市的反对,后者宁要由自己负责收集和分配的人头税(encabezamiento)。人头税当年是伊莎贝拉批准的,1519 年被查理五世废除,从而激发所谓的公社叛乱(comuneros)。查理五世在议会安插自己心腹,不顾反对,强行通过新税。反对原因在于他被视为外国人(出生于佛兰德斯),向卡斯提尔征收的税,又用于不涉及本地利益的外国战争。卡斯提尔所有的城镇都奋起反抗,组织民兵,并要求另组民选议会,拥戴胡安娜女王(Queen Joanna)当政。要不是公社叛乱进而反对贵族,查理五世很可能丢失对王国的控制。贵族转而向国王靠拢,查理五世最终得以重建军事控制。

    公社叛乱的结果,在某种意义上,很像一百三十年后法国的投石党叛乱。国王以决定性的军事胜利宣称他对城市的权威。由民选的独立议会充任西班牙的自由保护人,这种想法彻底寿终正寝。同时,国王意识到他需要化解不满,遂逐一收买潜在的对手。当初激发叛乱就是因为人头税的废除,他现在予以恢复,还将服务税(servicios)和普遍税(millones)的新税留在地方当局手中。他们多半是家族官僚,帮国王征税,自己可保留一部分。议会后来重开时,只提供咨询,再也没有要求或获得征税的权力。但他们的偏袒还是会影响公共财政,因为他们不愿支付财产税,所以新税都是影响穷人甚巨的商业税,从而阻碍西班牙的经济增长。

    西班牙国家的家族化始于 16 世纪 60 年代,在腓力四世(1621—1665)治下到达顶峰。跟法国一样,驱动这一进程的是西班牙的持久战争和无止境赤字。西班牙第一次破产是在 1557 年,国王要他的朋友和侍臣鲁伊·戈麦斯(Ruy Gómez)去兜售市政公职,多多益善。跟法国不同,西班牙的卖官鬻爵最初只是城市和地区的。该措施受到广泛谴责,大家知道售出的公职不能提供足够的回报,除非走歪门邪道。尽管如此,财政困境促使国家出售更多公职。到了 1650 年,据估计政府共创造三万名捐官,按人均来算是同期法国的两倍。此外,卡斯提尔领土的 30% 回归领主法庭的管辖,不是为了政治目的,而是因为君主政体急需现款。各城镇的全部权力,包括征税权和司法权,都出售给私人。在某个意义上,西班牙的国家建设开了倒车,由于财政上的短见,中央政府失去对大部分领土的控制。

    家族制也影响军事组织。西班牙经历很多世纪,方从摩尔人的手中获得解放。卡斯提尔王国和阿拉贡王国联姻合并时,军队组成所谓的步兵方阵,配备长矛,以后又改成火绳枪(arquebus,编按:中国称鸟铳或鸟枪)。如此训练和装备的西班牙军人,在科尔特斯(Cortés)和皮萨罗(Pizarro)的率领下,战胜了新大陆的本土帝国。他们也奔赴西班牙帝国的其他地区驻防,尤其是意大利北部的基地,从那里可经过所谓的西班牙路(Spanish Road)直达低地国家。卡斯提尔士兵参与了 1533 年反对奥斯曼帝国的维也纳防御战。西班牙水兵也以少量舰队参与 1535 年进攻突尼斯(Tunis)、1538 年试图攻占阿尔及尔(Algiers)、1571 年重大的勒班陀战役(Battle of Lepanto)。到了 17 世纪,募集陆海军的任务越来越多地交托给自资招募军人的私人和装备自己舰船的沿海城镇。向军队供应必需品的后勤基础,又受控于热那亚(Genoa)的金融家。这意味着,到 17 世纪中期,西班牙君主政体对属下的武装力量只行使很有限的控制。

    像其他西欧国家,法治扮演了重要角色,限制了西班牙国王在产权和公众自由方面的权力。跟北欧不同,罗马法的传统在西班牙没有完全消失。《查士丁尼法典》重现于 11 世纪之后,西班牙发展了颇为强大的民法传统,民法被视作神法和自然法的成文化。国王可颁布制定法,但新法典讲得很清楚,必须遵循既存的法律先例,与之相悖的皇家法令则没有效用。天主教会仍是教法的监护人,并经常向皇家特权挑战。与习惯权利和特权相抵触的皇家命令常常受到抵制,此举被称作“服从但不执行”(Obédezcase, pero no se cumpla)。赴新大陆的征服者(conquistadore),如果从总督辖区接到自己不喜欢的命令,经常援引此理。个人如不同意收到的皇家命令,有权向皇家会议提出申诉。后者像英国的对应物,享有西班牙的最高司法权。根据历史学家汤普森(I. A. A. Thompson),卡斯提尔的皇家会议信奉条文主义(legalism)和正当程序,反对随心所欲。它还主张相对于行政模式的司法模式,积极抵制非正常程序,始终保障既定的权利和契约义务。

    该法律传统的影响,体现在西班牙国王如何处置国内敌人和百姓产权。在西班牙,找不到秦始皇或伊凡雷帝(Ivan the Terrible)那样的帝王,他们会任意处决自己宫廷的成员,以至灭族。像同期的法国国王,西班牙君主在搜索财源中不断侵犯国人产权,但仍在现有法律的框架中运行。他们没有任意征用资产,只是重新谈判利率和本金的偿还表;不愿增税以造成对抗,只是使货币贬值,承受较高的通货膨胀。滥发货币的通货膨胀实际上也是一种税赋,但无须通过立法,对普通百姓的伤害超过精英,后者拥有的大多是实物资产,而不是货币资产。

    制度移植到新大陆

    与长期定居、拥有古代习俗的社会相比,征服社会为制度的发展和改革提供了不同的机会。征服社会可实施当代企业所戏称的“未开发地区的发展”——不受既得利益团体和习惯行为的妨碍,彻底重建制度。奥斯曼帝国在封地上安顿骑士,使之成为仅一代的贵族,因为土地是不久前抢来的。一点也不令人惊讶,西班牙征服新大陆时,随身带来了现成制度。与欧洲相比,他们面对更少既得利益者的遏制,以及不同的经济机会和自然资源。如果拉丁美洲的统治类似于西班牙王国的统治,制度移植却不一定直截了当,或刻不容缓。

    收复失地运动的最后战役之后,接踵而来的就是西班牙征服美洲:哥伦布(Christopher Columbus)目睹斐迪南和伊莎贝拉在格拉纳达凯旋入城;科尔特斯的叔叔和父亲参与反对摩尔人的战役。科尔特斯在与阿兹特克人(Aztec)打仗时,好像仍在与摩尔人作战,运用分而治之的类似策略。

    很多有关定居、殖民和政治制度的技术,直接搬自西班牙南部的殖民经验。事实上,征服者习惯把美洲本土庙宇称作“清真寺”。

    这些早期探险受到西班牙国王的资助,但主要依靠组织探险的私人企业家的能量。一边是身处新大陆的个人,另一边是尝试严控殖民地的马德里政府,两者之间的互动造就了拉丁美洲的制度发展。金银开采权利特别重要,因此颁给私人的土地不包括地下权益,全部留给国家。赴秘鲁和墨西哥的大部分移民,并不涉及金银的开采。更确切地说,他们只想充任土地和由此而生的农业资源的主人。与西班牙南部相比,他们面对全新环境,所征服的土地住有密集人口,适合不同模式的开发。

    为了奖励和控制征服者,西班牙当局发明了托管权(encomienda)制度,所赠予的不是土地,而是原住居民。如奥斯曼帝国的封地,国王的意图是防止既得利益的地方贵族兴起。托管权的赠予是有条件的,不得遗传。科尔特斯征服了阿兹特克首都特诺奇提特兰(Tenochtitlán),其幸存属下中大约有 40% 获得托管权,相当多的皮萨罗追随者在秘鲁也获得托管权。从技术角度看,托管权并不将原住民当作奴隶,但要求他们提供劳力,以换取监护者给他们的基督教教育和善待。西班牙国王以家长姿态,担忧新主人虐待原住民工人,也担忧天花和其他极易为印象第安人感染的疾病造成原住民人口急剧下降。所以,基于种族的主奴等级关系成为早期拉丁美洲制度的组成部分。

    为统治美洲殖民地,西班牙迅速建立了相对有效的现代行政机构。西班牙新大陆帝国的合法性来自教皇亚历山大六世 1493 年的诏书,它将西印度群岛(地理范围不明)永远赐给卡斯提尔和莱昂的国王。权力属于西班牙国王和马德里的西印度群岛理事会,再传至设立于墨西哥和秘鲁的总督辖区。用于新大陆的法律是卡斯提尔的,与帝国其他地区毫无关联,尽管很多西班牙征服者和新移民出生于他处。科尔特斯在 1519 年开始对墨西哥的征服,下一年就发生重大的公社叛乱。由于这场叛乱,移植到新大陆的政治制度不包括强大的议会,或其他类型的代议制度。政治独立的唯一努力来自皮萨罗的兄弟贡萨罗(Gonzalo),他尝试成为独立的秘鲁国王,在 1548 年被皇家军队打败并处决。自那以后,中央权力再也没有受到新大陆西班牙人的挑战,直到 19 世纪早期的独立战争。

    西班牙当局移植罗马法律制度,在十处建立高级法庭(audiencia),包括圣多明各、墨西哥、秘鲁、危地马拉、波哥大。派去帮助治理殖民地的行政人士中,有很多是具丰富民法经验的律师和法官。行政人员不得与本地女子结婚,或在领地上建立家庭联系,很像中国的县令或奥斯曼帝国的桑贾克贝伊。历史学家约翰·赫克斯泰布尔·艾略特(J. H. Elliott)在评论殖民地政府时写道:“如果现代国家中的‘现代性’,指的是将中央权力的指令传达到遥远地区的机构,那么西班牙美洲殖民政府要比西班牙政府,甚至其他任何早期现代的欧洲国家,更为‘现代’。”在这一方面,它与英国君主政体对北美殖民地的放任态度,形成鲜明的对比。

    大庄园的铁律

    1570 年在新大陆的西班牙行政机构,似乎比同时代的欧洲制度更为现代,但好景不长。西班牙政治制度的家族化要到 17 世纪才加大油门,卖官鬻爵之类的制度移植到新大陆也属无可避免。推动这个过程的基本动力,来自殖民地实际参与者的倡议。他们试图增加自己的租金和特权,而马德里的中央政府太软弱、太遥远,无法予以制止。

    大地产或大庄园的铁律——富人将变得更富,除非遭到国家的遏制——既适用于像中国和土耳其那样的农业社会,也适用于拉丁美洲。移民阶层强烈抵制托管权仅维持一代的规定。一点也不奇怪,他们要求将自己的权利传给孩子,便在 16 世纪 40 年代公开违抗托管权自动回归国王的法律。拥有原住民的劳力,使部分托管权主人发财致富,并开始购买大片土地。不像托管权,土地可以遗传。到 16 世纪晚期,美洲面对本土居民濒临灭绝的危机。墨西哥的人口从 2000 万跌至 160 万。这意味着许多人口稀少的土地突然进入市场。

    新兴的克里奥尔(creole,编按:指生于美洲的西班牙白种人)精英大多住在城镇,雇用劳力开发土地,自己只是缺席地主。拉丁美洲惯例的土地所有制,与其他部落社会相比,基本上没有很大差异。产权共有,并联系着扩展的血缘团体。剩下的印第安人,要么受骗售出自己的土地,要么被人赶走。共有土地变成私人地产,由于玉米和木薯等本地作物被欧洲经济作物所取代,周遭环境大变。很多农地转换成养牛牧场,对土壤肥力造成极大损害。马德里政府承诺保护原住民地主的权利,但天高皇帝远,无法控制实际局势。而地方上的西班牙当局往往与新兴的地主阶层狼狈为奸,帮助后者逃避有关规则。这就是拉丁美洲大庄园(hacienda)的起源,在后续年代里,成为不平等和持久冲突的根源。

    少量精英却拥有大片土地,在西班牙长子继承权(mayorazgo)实践中找到支持。它防止土地的分割出售和大庄园的瓦解。17 世纪见证了富人的大肆兼并,甚至是整座村庄和城镇。他们再借用长子继承权,以防遗产分配造成土地流失。长子继承权也已移植至新大陆。西班牙当局试图限制长子继承权的牌照,所依据的道理与他们要求收回托管权一样。地方上的克里奥尔或移民群体,转而使用改进继承权(mejora)。父母在遗产分配上可作偏袒,目的仍是维持宗族的实力和地位。

    强大的地主阶层出现,但无法成为凝聚的政治参与者。像法兰西王国,税务制度帮助将个别移民与国家绑在一起,破坏了他们可能建起的与非欧洲同胞的团结。构成早期移民浪潮的有大批单身男子,结果与本土女子要么结婚,要么生孩子,造就了麦士蒂索混血阶层(mestizo)。愈来愈多的黑奴运来新大陆,与白人一起生下的后代叫穆拉托(mulatto),成为又一单独阶层。区别于这两个阶层,西班牙移民的后裔克里奥尔可以享受免税。这种待遇,如在西班牙,只属于贵族和士绅(hidalgo)。就像在北美,身为白人就能获得地位,截然不同于恭恭敬敬的印第安人和黑人。

    考虑到国王在马德里的财政拮据,卖官鬻爵的欧洲制度最终越过大西洋也许是不可避免的。西班牙美洲的财政管理,在 16 世纪的大部都还不错。殖民地毕竟是贵金属的主要来源,再逐渐改为农产品。到世纪末,矿产开始下跌。随着三十年战争的进行,西班牙国王对税收的需求又有增加。君主政体防止新大陆出现贵族阶层的努力,因此而销声匿迹。艾略特如此描述这个转变:

    城市的主要家庭借助与皇家管理机构的特殊关系,聚积资源,按自己需求建立继承权,巩固对城镇和内地的掌控。他们还利用国王日益恶化的财政困境,趁机购买公职。市政会职位(regimiento)的私人交易由来已久,从 1591 年起,更变成公开出售。从 1559 年起,公证官的职位上市。到 1606 年,几乎所有地方公职都跟进买卖。腓力二世和腓力三世反对出售财政部的公职,但到 1633 年,腓力四世开始放开买卖。最终,到 17 世纪下半叶,甚至最高级职位也上了市场。从 1687 年起,就系统性地出售高级法庭的职位。

    像法国和西班牙,对商人阶层来说,购买公职成为提高社会地位的途径。他们现在把自己当作绅士(caballero),将来再传给孩子。古老家庭更可购买西班牙贵族的爵位,以保护他们相对的优越地位。17 世纪的西班牙君主敞开大门,允许数百名克里奥尔进入颇有声望的西班牙军事修道会(Military order),分封其余的为侯爵和伯爵。

    到 18 世纪,平等和人权的原则开始向新大陆殖民地渗透,但西班牙政治制度和社会制度已在拉丁美洲获得再生。讽刺的是,家族制度的移植违背了马德里殖民当局的初衷。在 16 世纪的大部分时间,他们尝试在殖民地建立更为现代的非人格化政治秩序,但这些计划均因国王日益恶化的财政而搁浅,使他们难以实施更为强硬的遥控。伊比利亚半岛上出现的公私不分,也在美洲发生。

    在法国,寻租者和捐官者攫取国家,破坏国家权力,最终造成法国大革命的社会爆炸。在西班牙,相同的政治演变造成国力的长期衰退。但类似的政治革命,从没光顾西班牙的母国或殖民地。19 世纪早期的独立战争推崇法国大革命和美国革命的自由和平等,但其领袖是克里奥尔的精英——像西蒙·玻利瓦尔(Simón Bolívar)——他们曾深深陷入旧政权的家族政制。

    法国大革命得以在公共利益和私人利益之间重新划定明确界限。它没收所有捐官者的世袭财产和特权,谁反抗就砍谁的头。新式的政治制度,其公职的招聘基于非人格化的选贤与能——中国人在将近两千年之前就已发明的——又由马背上的拿破仑带往欧洲其他国家。1806 年,他在耶拿和奥尔斯塔特(Jena-Auerstadt)两次击败普鲁士的家族化军队,从而说服新一代的改革家,像冯·施泰因男爵(Baron vom Stein)和卡尔·奥古斯特·冯·哈登贝格(Karl August von Hardenberg),普鲁士国家必须以现代原则进行重建。19 世纪的德国官僚机构,成为韦伯现代合理政府的模型。它并不来自家族化官僚,而是与传统的刻意分手。

    在拉丁美洲,独立成功之前从没发生社会革命,家族制仍然嵌入很多独立后的政权。虽然出售公职和贵族封号的做法遭到废除,正式的民主制度获得建立,但旧心态依旧长存。19 世纪拉丁美洲的新国家中,很少强大到能直面自己的精英,或加以征税,或加以抑制。那些精英渗透和控制国家本身,并找到空隙,将自己社会和政治的特权传给孩子。直到 20 世纪晚期,西班牙旧政权的财政恶习,像持续赤字、过分借贷、债务重新谈判、隐性征税的通货膨胀,仍在阿根廷、墨西哥、秘鲁、玻利维亚等国徘徊。正式的民主和宪政,并不基于社会各阶层的对抗和妥协,而是精英自上而下所施与的,如果不再符合自身利益,又可收回。这引发高度不平等和两极分化的社会在 20 世纪的涌现,并酿造了真正的社会革命力量——体现于墨西哥和古巴的革命。过去一世纪中,拉丁美洲国家定期遭遇骚乱,要求对整个社会契约进行重新谈判。

    近来出现很多新兴的社会参与者,譬如工会、有密切国际关系的商业团体、城市知识分子、试图要回殖民者所夺走的地位和权力的原住民团体。拉丁美洲政治制度的对策,不管是民主的还是威权的,都趋于让他们一步步参与国家,从而收买他们,而不是政治权力真正的重新调整。例如在阿根廷,20 世纪初的前数十年,工人阶级的兴起遇到传统地主精英的顽强抵抗。在欧洲,工人阶级加入广泛组合的社会民主党,提倡再分配政策,为现代福利国家打下基础。相比之下,代表阿根廷工人阶级的却是军事领袖胡安·庇隆(Juan Perón)。他的阿根廷正义党(Partido Justicialista),向拥护者网络提供选择性的好处。阿根廷在民粹狂热和军事独裁之间左右摇摆,并没开发出真正欧洲风格的福利国家。革命制度党(Partido Revolucionario Institucional)治下的墨西哥也有类似情形,特别优惠只给选出的组织良好的拥护者。墨西哥比阿根廷更稳定,但同样无法解决社会隔绝和贫穷的难题。所以,西班牙旧政权的家族遗产仍在 21 世纪存活。

    第 25 章 易北河以东

    匈牙利成为失败负责制的另一选择;西方废除的农奴制却在东欧冒头;宪政主义和贵族统治出现于匈牙利;自由如要兴盛,既要有强大中央国家,又要有对它的制约

    早期现代的法国和西班牙是弱的专制主义和失败负责制的案例。形成于 16 世纪和 17 世纪的国家是专制的,因为它的君主政体集中权力,无须以正式方式向议会或其他代议机构负责。其他政治和社会的参与者,如高等法院和西班牙议会,公社叛乱者和投石党人,反对国家集权,最终都被一一击败。他们失败的方式凸现了专制权力的基本弱点。国家向精英参与者提供一部分国家职能,将他们逐一收买,既削弱了他们集体行动的能力,也限制了可在他们身上行使的权威。他们的财产和特权,虽然经常受到挑战和侵蚀,但基本上完整无缺。

    相比之下,匈牙利和俄罗斯提供了两条另类发展路径,它们彼此之间不同,又有别于法国和西班牙的模式。这四个案例最后都以政治负责制的缺席而告终。在匈牙利,专制努力最初是失败的,因为强大和组织良好的贵族阶层,可以向国王权力施加宪法的限制。跟英国议会一样,匈牙利议会也迫使匈牙利国王向自己负责。但他们对负责制的追求,并不代表全体国民,只代表狭隘的寡头阶层;他们只想使用这份自由,以进一步榨取自己属下的农民,又避免向中央国家缴纳重税。其结果是愈益恶劣的农奴制得到扩张,国家趋于孱弱,最终不能抵抗土耳其。换言之,一个阶层的自由导致了其余阶层的不自由,还导致国土被强大邻国宰割。

    我们花时间来考虑匈牙利的例子,只想显示,对中央政府权力的宪法限制,并不一定能建成政治负责制。匈牙利贵族阶层所追求的,是更加彻底地剥削农民的“自由”,强大中央国家的缺席让他们得逞。大家都理解出自中央专政之手的中国式暴政,但暴政也可来自分散的寡头统治。真正的自由倾向于在社会精英参与者的均势中出现,匈牙利从没能做到这一点。

    主人和奴隶

    欧洲历史中重大谜团之一是早期现代之初,即 16 世纪和 17 世纪,主子和奴隶的关系在东西欧得到截然不同的发展。易北河以西的地区——西部日耳曼国家、低地国家、法国、英国和意大利——中世纪期间强加于农民的农奴制逐渐取消。奴隶制从未在西班牙、瑞典和挪威出现。相比之下,易北河以东的地区——波希米亚(Bohemia)、西里西亚(Silesia)、匈牙利、普鲁士、利沃尼亚(Livonia)、波兰、立陶宛和俄罗斯——先前自由的农民却在历史同期逐渐沦为农奴。

    跟封建制一样,农奴制有繁多定义。历史学家杰罗姆·布鲁姆认为,“如果一个农民受领主愿望的束缚,相互之间的关系使他低人一等,并在社会中无能为力;这种情形又被认作是领地上法律和社会结构的根本,而不是领主与他的契约或协议的结果;这样农民就是不自由的”。对农民享有司法权的是领主,而不是国家。他们的关系可由详细的惯例规则所定位,但领主可以修改规则,使之更加不利于农民。农奴仅保留少许的法律权利,不同于奴隶,但实际差别并不大。

    从 12 世纪以来,西欧农奴在不同时期和不同程度上赢得自由。他们通常先升为领主土地上的佃户,土地使用权可能限于自己的一生,也可能传给孩子。有些土地受到限制(mainmortable),只能传给与自己同住的孩子,否则就要归回领主。在 18 世纪,废除该限制成为自由改革家的重要目标之一。在其他案例中,农民直接升为地主,享有随意买卖和赠与土地的全部权利。法国大革命的前夕,法国农民已拥有土地的 50%,超过贵族的两倍。托克维尔指出,那时的领主早已停止参与对农民的统治。这就是残留的收费权利,或迫使农民使用领主的磨坊或酒坊,受到如此强烈憎恨的原因。

    在东欧发生的情形恰恰相反。中世纪时期,与西方相比,那里反而有相当充分的自由。多半因为它仍属人口稀少的边境地带,来自西欧和欧亚大陆的殖民者,可遵循自己的法律。从 15 世纪开始,整个东欧建立新规则,限制农民的迁徙。农民不得离开他耕耘的土地,否则就要面对大笔罚款的威胁。帮助潜逃农奴要受沉重处罚,城镇收容农民的能力大受限制,以防止他们逃避庄园上的义务。

    农民损失最大自由的是俄罗斯。回溯到 12 世纪的基辅罗斯(Kievan Rus),其时已有奴隶和农奴。随着 15 世纪莫斯科国家的兴起,农民的义务持续上升,活动自由也在逐渐减少,直到每年仅得一次假(前提是债务已经还清),在圣乔治节(St George’s day)的前后。到了下一世纪,连这唯一年假也被取消。俄罗斯领主对农奴的权利稳步加强,直到 18 世纪末。其时,人权原则正在整个西方传播。农奴永久绑在主人身上,没有活动权利。事实上,主人可随意调遣农奴,从一处地产迁到另一处,甚至将农奴放逐到西伯利亚,之后又任意召回。俄国统治阶层开始以手下农奴的数量来评估自己的地位。俄罗斯的贵族高层富得惊人:伯爵尼古拉·谢列梅捷沃(N. P. Sheremetov)拥有 185,610 名农奴;到他儿子手上,这个数字增至 30 多万。18 世纪末,伯爵沃龙佐夫(Vorontsov)拥有 54,703 名农奴;到 19 世纪中期农奴制废除之前,他的继承者光是男奴就有 37,702 名。

    农奴制在东西欧为何有如此迥异的发展?答案在于经济、人口和政治因素的总汇,使农奴制在西方难以维持,在东方却盈利丰厚。

    西欧人口密集,在 1300 年是东欧的三倍。随着始于 11 世纪的经济繁荣,众多人口变成城市居民。这些城市从意大利的北部辐射至佛兰德斯,其存在首先是政治软弱的产物,再就是国王发现,保护城市的独立可以挖对手大领主的墙脚。城市也受到古老封建权利的保护,罗马时代的城市传统并未消失。由于受到如此庇护,城市发展成为独立的社区,通过贸易增长来开拓自己的资源,独立于庄园经济。自由城市的存在,又使农奴制愈加难以维持。它们好像是国内的边境线,农奴可以逃到那里来赢得自由,因此有中世纪的说法,“城市空气使你自由”(Stadtluft macht frei)。相比之下,人口相对稀少的东欧城市更为小型,跟中国和中东类似,主要充任现有政治权力的行政中心。

    14 世纪的灾难性人口下降,更促使西欧趋向自由和东欧趋向非自由。重复发生的瘟疫和饥荒对西欧的打击,比对东欧更为严峻,爆发时间也更早。经济增长在 15 世纪恢复,西欧看到城镇的再生。它们提供避难所和经济机会,防止贵族进一步榨取手下的农民。事实上,为了挽留农民继续耕耘,领主必须提供更多自由,从而开启了现代的劳动市场。中央君主政体发现,保护城镇的权利可以削弱贵族对手。日益增加的需求必须依赖来自东欧和中欧的进口,包括食物和贵金属。但在易北河的东面,软弱的独立城市和国王,允许贵族依靠农民劳力来开发农产品的出口。如历史学家杰诺·苏克斯所说:“从长远看,易北河对岸的地区为西方复苏作出了贡献……‘第二次农奴制’的立法凶兆,以可怕的同步出现于勃兰登堡(1494)、波兰(1496)、波希米亚(1497)、匈牙利(1492、1498)、俄罗斯(1497)。”

    这是对东西欧农民权利不同模式的最明显解释。在西方,愈益强大的国王支持城市,其存在可以抵消贵族权力。在法国和西班牙,国王最终在长期斗争中获胜。与领主有委屈或冲突的农民和其他参与者,从精英的竞争中获得更多机会。在东欧,城市和君主权力都很弱,让贵族阶层自由支配属下的农民。这样的模式出现于匈牙利和波兰,国王由贵族阶层选出。东欧两个地区有强大国家:15 世纪之后的俄罗斯和 18 世纪之后的勃兰登堡—普鲁士。然而,在这两个案例中,国家都没有代表平民来反对贵族,反而联合贵族来反对农民和资产阶级,再招聘贵族服务以增加自己的权力。

    后来,农民在大规模行动中获得解放,例如沙皇亚历山大二世 1861 年的解放宣言。但非精英的真正自由——不仅农民还有城市中的工匠和资产阶级——还需依赖现有精英参与者的僵局或均势。非精英团体在两种情况下都受到压榨:第一,分散寡头变得太强大,那是匈牙利和波兰的情形;第二,中央政府变得太强大,那是俄罗斯的情形。

    宪政主义及其在匈牙利的衰落

    今日匈牙利只是中世纪幅员辽阔王国的缩影,它曾在不同时期囊括今日奥地利、波兰、罗马尼亚、克罗地亚、波斯尼亚、斯洛文尼亚、斯洛伐克和塞尔维亚等部分。匈牙利人是公元第一个千年末期侵犯欧洲的部落民族,由七个部落组成,其主要部落马扎尔(Megyeri)的统治者创建了阿尔帕德(Árpád)王朝。阿尔帕德大公伊斯特万(István),在 1000 年受洗为基督徒,并获加冕为匈牙利国王。他监督匈牙利皈依基督教,后来被追认为圣人,即匈牙利的守护神圣斯蒂芬。

    14 世纪初的匈牙利

    匈牙利的王朝斗争消耗了君主政体,使之变得愈益孱弱,结果就是持续的寡头统治。随着部落财产共有制的瓦解,匈牙利君主政体最初拥有甚多地产,再加上来自皇家矿产的收入,其资源可与法英国王媲美。到贝拉三世(Béla Ⅲ,1148—1196)统治的晚期,国王开始分赠皇家地产、属下各县的大片土地、关税、市场收入等。这些不是西欧那样换取服务的封建赠与,而是新兴男爵阶层手中的自由财产。贝拉三世的继承者们为权力斗争继续向贵族竞相分送皇家礼物。

    这就是 1222 年国王安德鲁二世签署金玺诏书的背景(参看第 22 章)。它实际上是限制国王权力的宪法文件,只是来自颇为不同的社会参与者。在大宪章的案例中,强大的英国男爵代表整个王国发言,迫使国王约翰限制自己享有的权力。迫使国王签署金玺诏书的不是匈牙利男爵,而是皇家和城堡要塞的军人。实际上,他们想要国王保护自己免受男爵的掌控。匈牙利教会获得格里高利之后强大罗马教皇的支持,也是要求政策变化的重要政治参与者。教会想保护自己的土地和特权不受进一步的侵蚀,也要求把穆斯林和犹太人的商人驱逐出国,让基督徒商人取而代之。金玺诏书的政治运作显示,匈牙利社会已在国家之外组织成强大的竞争团体,包括男爵或上层贵族、士绅、神职人员。

    中央权力软弱的第一后果是蒙古人对匈牙利的掠夺。后者征服俄罗斯后,在 1241 年入侵匈牙利。国王贝拉四世试图加强自己的力量,所以邀请大批异教库曼人(Cuman)进入匈牙利,反而激怒自己的贵族,后者因此拒绝参战。库曼人最后也没参战,匈牙利部队在蒂萨河之战(Battle of Mohi)中遭到彻底摧毁。蒙古人占领整个国家,得知大汗在蒙古过世消息之后,方才撤退。

    匈牙利在军事上的薄弱促进了国家建设。匈牙利不知道蒙古人何时归来,也不知道还有没有其他的东方入侵者。为未来威胁作准备,路易一世(Louis I)等的后续国王投入实质性的军事行动,以扩充对巴尔干半岛的控制,甚至抵达遥远的那不勒斯。国家还实施很多改革,以保护自己免受侵略。这包括建造大量石堡和城防,以替换顶不住蒙古进攻的木砖建筑;还以西欧模式的重甲骑士,取代匈牙利军队的轻骑兵。

    军事压力导致匈牙利国王促进士绅的利益。然而,这类军人和官员没有直接进入中央国家的架构。后来的软弱国王允许他们为强大男爵服务,促使单一贵族阶层涌现。到 14 世纪,当初促成金玺诏书的皇家和城堡要塞的军人发现,自身的利益不在国王一边,而在男爵一边。

    结果是非常软弱的国家,以及寡头地主团体所控制的强大社会。包括新近获得爵位的士绅的匈牙利贵族阶层,完全拥有自己财产,不欠国王任何服务义务。阿尔帕德朝代在 1301 年结束之前,国王虽是当选的,却只是个装饰。他手下没有重要的军队或资源,也没有强大的中央官僚机构。后继的安茹(Angevin)王朝治下,分权过程得到暂时逆转。该王朝终结于 1386 年,贵族迅速卷土重来。

    一直到 16 世纪末,莫斯科公国的创始家族,持续成功地孕育男性继承人。这大大帮助了其强大国家的兴起,再一次显示人类制度的偶然性。相比之下,匈牙利却面对重复的继承权斗争,因为它的朝代短命,很多国王又有外国出身。觊觎王位者为了争得权力,只好让贵族得到资源好处。在西吉斯蒙德(Sigismund)国王治下,很多国王城堡都落到了贵族手中。

    事实上,匈牙利贵族以议会形式将自己的权力制度化,其权力超过法国的高等法院、西班牙议会、俄罗斯的缙绅会议。远远早于约翰·洛克,贵族阶层“宣布他们有权保护王国的福祉,甚至可以反对国王,如果他试图损害共同利益”。他们还以此理由监禁一名国王。召开议会的先例可追溯到金玺诏书的时代,到 15 世纪中,国家议会每年开会,有权选择国王。不同于英国议会,匈牙利议会受大地主贵族的控制,仅仅代表贵族阶层的利益。如历史学家派尔·恩格尔(Pal Engel)所说,“新制度的本质是决策权的分享,在理论上分给王国中所有地主,在实践中只给参与政治的贵族”。早些时候,城市也可以参加议会,但随着其影响的式微,而逐渐中止。(图 3 显示中世纪匈牙利的政治权力分配。)

    图3 匈牙利

    匈牙利打造强大国家的最后机会是在 15 世纪下半叶,奥斯曼帝国已在东南方蠢蠢欲动。贵族地主约纳斯·匈雅提(Janos Hunyadi)在 1446 年被议会推选为摄政王。他通过一系列对土耳其人的军事胜利,包括 1456 年英勇的贝尔格莱德保卫战,而获得巨大威望。约纳斯儿子马蒂亚斯(Mátyás,或写作 Matthias Corvinus)在 1458 年因此而当选国王,在长达三十多年的统治期间,完成了中央国家的现代化。这包括创建国王直接控制的强悍的黑军(Black Army),以取代纪律不佳和半私人的贵族部队,后者曾是匈牙利军队的基础;发展皇家秘书处,并配以大学培养的官员,以取代家族化的贵族官员;实施全国海关和直接税赋,中央政府征税急剧上升。马蒂亚斯使用这些权力新工具,在波斯尼亚和特兰西瓦尼亚(Transylvania),取得了对土耳其、奥地利、波兰和西里西亚的重大军事胜利。

    因军事上的必需,马蒂亚斯投入其他现代化专制君主也在做的努力。不同于法国和西班牙的国王,他仍需面对强大和组织良好的贵族阶层,被迫定期向选他当国王的议会征求咨询。贵族因他的军事成功而给他活动余地,但怨恨他所强加的与日俱增的税赋,以及在决策中自身影响力的销蚀。马蒂亚斯死于 1490 年,贵族收回中央国家在前半世纪争得的大部分权利。他们愤愤不平于自己特权的损失,渴望恢复旧状。所以,男爵们将一名软弱的外国君主推上王位,删减黑军的经费,然后将之送上土耳其的战场,结果遭到歼灭。贵族阶层还以国防能力为代价,将自己的税收负担降低 70% 到 80%。

    匈牙利返回到贵族分权的均势,很快承受后果。纪律散漫的贵族部队在 1526 年的莫哈奇战役中被苏莱曼一世打败,匈牙利国王被杀。相互争执的男爵只顾反对国家,不顾国家防御;如此场景曾在蒙古入侵中发生,现又重演。匈牙利失去独立地位,一分为三,分别受奥地利哈布斯堡、奥斯曼、土耳其属国特兰西瓦尼亚的控制。

    自由和寡头政治

    我详细讨论匈牙利的例子,是为了挑明一条相对简洁的见解:强大、凝聚且武装齐全的民间社会,能抵制中央政府,但不一定能获得政治自由。即使有宪政安排,对行政权力实施严格的法律限制,也不能保障政治自由。匈牙利正好符合上述的一切,它得以削弱中央权力,以致国家都不能抵御迫在眉睫的外国敌人。波兰身处类似情境,软弱的国王受贵族会议的控制。两个世纪之后,波兰步匈牙利的后尘,也失去国家的独立地位。

    国家独立的丧失不是匈牙利失去的唯一自由。毕竟,匈牙利面对的是庞大和组织良好的土耳其帝国,后者已在欧洲的东南部兼并了多数王国和公国。即使是一个更为集权的现代国家,恐怕也承受不了土耳其的冲击。匈牙利中央国家的脆弱,使匈牙利农民和城市处于从属地位。蒙古入侵带来了动乱和人口骤降。这之后,农民基本上成为自由人,尤其是住在皇家领地上的。作为皇家“客人”,他们有固定的权利和义务,既可充任士兵,又可以缴税来替代。他们最重要的自由是流动自由,并可选举自己的法官和教士。

    但世俗和教会的地主都想把他们绑在土地上,成为可供交易的商品。皇家土地分给私人始于 13 世纪,结果使更多农民陷入地主的司法权和掌控。始于 16 世纪早期的食物涨价,促使地主增加农民所欠的领地实物税。农民被迫从事更多的劳役,从前一个世纪的每星期一天,到 1520 年的每星期三天。农民选择地方法官和教士的权利也很有限,需要接受领主的控制。此外,地主开始阻止农民在不同领地之间自由搬迁,或阻止他们移往城镇。日益恶化的境况导致了 1514 年的农民大起义,起义遭到残酷镇压。起义领袖被架在火堆上“登基”,他的同伴被迫分吃从他身上割下来的肉。这次起义发生在土耳其人入侵的前夕,为奥斯曼帝国的胜利贡献了有利条件。

    如本章开头所提到的,愈益剧烈的农奴制回潮并不局限于匈牙利。它也发生于波希米亚、波兰、普鲁士、奥地利和俄罗斯。整个地区的贵族要求增强税赋,取消自由,限制属下人口的流动。20 世纪教诲我们,把暴政视作强大中央国家的行径,但它也可来自地方上的寡头。在当代中国,侵犯农民权利、违反环保和安全法律、从事肆无忌惮的贪污,其中最恶劣的案例,多是地方党员干部所为,或是受他们庇护的私人雇主所为,与北京的中央政府无关。中央政府的责任,就是以执法来抑制寡头;有时失去自由,不是因为国家太强大,而是太软弱。第二次世界大战后的美国,吉姆·克劳法(Jim Crow law,编按:泛指 1876 年至 1965 年间美国南部各州及边境各州对有色人种[主要针对非裔美国人,但同时也包含其他族群]实行种族隔离制度的法律)和种族隔离持续二十年,其终止还要靠联邦政府在南方各州强制执行宪法。由此看来,赢得政治自由,不是国家权力受到遏制时,而是强大国家遇上同样强大社会的制衡时。

    美国创始人理解此种平衡的必需。亚历山大·汉密尔顿(Alexander Hamilton)在《联邦论》第 17 篇中,描述州政府和联邦政府之间的权利分享。他说:
    君主最终战胜属臣的案例中,其成功主要原因是属臣对其手下实施暴政。男爵,即贵族,既是君主的敌人,又是平民的压迫者。君主和平民对男爵又怕又恨,直到相互的危险和利益促成他们联合起来,那就会置贵族权力于死地。如果贵族以仁慈和公正保住其侍从和追随者的忠心耿耿,在与君主的竞争中,几乎永远是赢家,从而削弱或颠覆君主的权力。

    汉密尔顿继续说,联邦架构中的州政府就像封建社会的男爵,它们独立于中央政府,其独立程度则取决于如何对待自己的公民。强大的中央政府在本质上是不分好坏的,其对自由的最终影响,取决于它与从属权力机构的互动。这是美国历史上的真理,也在匈牙利和波兰的历史上体现出来。

    另一方面,如果强大国家与强大寡头相互勾结,自由就面临尤其严峻的威胁。这就是俄罗斯所处的情境,莫斯科公国在匈牙利国家消亡的同一世纪崛起。

    第 26 章 更完美的专制主义

    莫斯科国家的涌现和俄罗斯政治发展的特征;君主政体依赖贵族,造成俄罗斯农民逐渐沦为农奴;与欧洲其他地区相比,专制主义在俄罗斯取得更为彻底的胜利

    尤其在弗拉基米尔·普京兴起的 21 世纪初,俄罗斯联邦成为政治学家所谓的“选举式威权”政权。政府基本上是威权的,受控于政治家、官员和商业利益所组成的灰色网络,但仍然举行民主选举,使继续执政获得合法性。俄罗斯民主的质量很低。政权控制几乎所有的主要媒体,不允许对政府的批评,威胁反对派候选人,或使之丧失参选资格,还向自己的候选人和拥护者提供优惠。

    它在法治上的表现,比民主质量问题更为糟糕。揭露官方腐败或批评政府的新闻记者突然死去,没有看到找出杀手的真正努力。私人企业遇上政权内线人士的敌对接管,便会遭到政府部门的诬陷指控,从而被迫放弃资产。不夸张地说,重要官员即使参与谋杀,也可逍遥法外,无须负责。专门调查世界上腐败水平的非政府机构“透明国际”(Transparency International),将俄罗斯排在 180 个国家中的第 147 名,劣于孟加拉、利比里亚、哈萨克斯坦、菲律宾,稍稍优于叙利亚、中非共和国。

    很多人看到 21 世纪的俄罗斯和前苏联的连贯性,又因俄罗斯人经常表达对斯大林和苏联岁月的怀旧,而得到放大。布尔什维克革命后的七十年,共产主义扎根于俄罗斯,当然塑造了当代俄罗斯人的态度。

    但在共产主义的下面藏有很多龟。如果仅把当代威权主义归罪于 20 世纪的政治,首先就要解说,共产主义为何在俄罗斯和中国获得彻底的成功。当然,发挥作用的还有更古老的专制传统。布尔什维克革命之前,俄罗斯已发展了强大的中央国家,其行政权力只受法治或负责制立法的软弱约束。布尔什维克之前的俄罗斯,其取得的专制主义的性质,不同于法国或西班牙的旧政权,更接近于前现代中国或奥斯曼。个中的原因与俄罗斯的地理环境有关,地理环境对它的政治文化产生了持久影响。

    俄罗斯专制主义的来源

    公元第一个千年末期,俄罗斯国家起源于乌克兰的基辅地区,基辅曾是主要的贸易站,连接北欧和拜占庭帝国等。它的持续存在中断于 13 世纪 30 年代末,其时,拔都可汗和速不台率领的蒙古军队侵占俄罗斯,基辅遭到彻底摧毁。身为教皇使节的大主教迦儿宾(Carpini)写道,经过基辅时,“我们看到现场有无数死人的头颅和骸骨,该城曾经很大,人口众多,现在却一片荒芜,只有两百栋房子还立在那里,俘虏在从事着最为恶劣的苦役”。蒙古占领持续了将近二百五十年。很多当代俄罗斯人,被问到为何他们的国家和政治文化迥然不同于西欧时,立即把责任推到蒙古人身上。西方也有观察俄罗斯的悠久历史,如侯爵德·屈斯蒂那(de Custine)。他坚持俄罗斯应被视作“亚洲”强国,它与蒙古人、奥斯曼人、库曼人和其他亚洲人的互动,对它的成型发挥了决定性作用。由于蒙古人民共和国的出现,见解已经转变。新一轮修正主义的历史评论,以更为肯定的语气解说蒙古人的作用。

    不管怎样,蒙古入侵对俄罗斯后续的政治发展施加了重大影响,且多半是消极的。首先,它切断了俄罗斯与拜占庭和中东的贸易和思想交流,后者曾是俄罗斯宗教和文化的来源。也阻碍了它与欧洲的联系,这意味俄罗斯没像西欧那样,深入参与相关的历史进程,比如文艺复兴和宗教改革。

    其次,蒙古占领大大延误了俄罗斯的政治发展。基辅遭到彻底摧毁后,基本上需要重头开始,当代乌克兰的基辅地区曾是俄罗斯老祖宗的定居点。蒙古人抵达之前,俄罗斯国家已经开始分裂。政治权力向无数自称为王的小封地流散,又因蒙古占领而获得确认。俄罗斯的重心从黑海北部的欧洲本都地区(pontic)转向东北部,当地的莫斯科大公国崛起,成为政治舞台上的中心角色。不像持续八百年的欧洲封建主义,俄罗斯的封地仅生存两个多世纪——从 1240 年开始套上鞑靼轭(Tatar yoke)到伊凡三世当政的 16 世纪中期——很快,小封地的领主必须面对日益强盛的中央君主政体。

    最后,蒙古人破坏了继承于拜占庭的法律传统,使政治生活变得更为恶劣、更为残忍。与欧洲的基督徒君主相比,蒙古统治者把自己看作纯粹的掠夺者,其目的就是从所控制的居民身上榨取资源。他们仍处在部落层次,从未发展出政治制度或正义理论,可以带给所征服的居民。他们不像传统农业国家的统治者,并不矫饰自己是为被统治者而存在的。他们只有很短的时间表,愿意以不可持续的方式大规模榨取资源。他们严惩任何抵抗力量,为了杀鸡儆猴,甚至愿意处死整座城镇的居民。他们招募俄罗斯的领主成为自己的征税官,包括将来创建俄罗斯国家的莫斯科大公。他们以自己的掠夺策略,训练数代的俄罗斯领袖。事实上,他们通过联姻而融入俄罗斯人口的基因。

    俄罗斯的兴起

    像我们所讨论的几乎所有政治体,发动战争的需要促动了俄罗斯的国家建设。像基于法兰西岛的卡佩家族,莫斯科的留里克王朝(Rurik)从自己的中心位置向外扩展,征服和吸收其他封地公国、蒙古和立陶宛等的外国军队。伊凡三世(1440—1505)治下的国家成为重要力量,兼并诺夫哥罗德和特维尔(Tver)。他给自己冠上全俄罗斯大公的称号,莫斯科公国从伊凡一世(1288—1340)的六百平方英里,到瓦西里二世(1415—1462)的一万两千平方英里,再到他自己统治结束时的五万五千平方英里。

    封地期间的俄罗斯国家,其形成非常类似于中国和奥斯曼的国家形成过程。像中国西周的创始朝代,基辅贵族家庭的后裔分布于俄罗斯各地,尤其是在蒙古入侵之后。他们组建一系列小公国,相当于俄罗斯版本的封建主义。每位领主控制自己的领地、经济资源和军队,并与自由贵族(boyar)签订契约以获服务。

    莫斯科国家的权力基于服役贵族(middle service class),由骑兵组成,报酬不是现金而是封地(pomest’ia),每块封地上约有五或六户农家。由于地多人少,控制人口比控制土地更为重要。骑兵不是常备军,受领主召集而提供服务,军事季节结束后,再回到自己封地。俄罗斯和奥斯曼的封地非常相像,这可能不是意外。其时,俄罗斯与土耳其的接触愈益增多。像奥斯曼的骑士,俄罗斯部队的核心成员,如果身处欧洲其他地区,便被称作低层士绅,其土地和资源全部来自国家。俄罗斯骑兵配置相对轻便的装备,主要倚靠迂回战术。这很像奥斯曼骑兵,而迥然不同于西欧的重甲骑士。莫斯科政权组建此种部队的动机,也与奥斯曼相似。这个军事组织的地位全靠国家,不会要求现金军饷。它可被用来抵消领主和贵族的势力,后者拥有自己的土地和资源。

    这是俄罗斯和匈牙利的重大差异。在俄罗斯,服役贵族接受招募,直接为莫斯科国家服务。在匈牙利,它变成贵族阶层的一部分。这不同选择也许足以决定后来的分道扬镳,一个社会走上中央集权,另一个趋于权力下放。与西欧社会相比,俄罗斯社会对莫斯科的国家建设设置了较少障碍,原因之一就是:服役贵族直接从属于国家,没有接受领土贵族的再次分封。

    俄罗斯版本的封建主义历史太短,尚没达到根深蒂固的程度,这是俄罗斯贵族无法限制中央国家权力的另一原因。俄罗斯是否经历过封建主义?俄国史学界对此有长期争论,因为俄罗斯的封地从没获得西欧对应物所享受的自治权。俄罗斯的领主和较低层次的贵族没有时间建造城堡,俄罗斯的平原和大草原,将优势赋予快速移动的进攻军队,而不是防御军队。

    莫斯科国家颁布门第选官制(mestnichestvo,编按[下同]:俄语为Местничество),故意在贵族中播种不和。它将贵族家庭以及家庭内的个人划出等级。像法国和西班牙的爵位和特权的出售,门第选官制也让贵族互相竞争,从而破坏了贵族内部的凝聚力。所以,俄罗斯贵族作为一个阶层,其内部团结很差,几乎没有发展出联合抵抗中央国家的机构。他们以内部的小争执而著称,经常自我损耗。

    在俄罗斯,法治一开始就比西欧薄弱。天主教会在领土主权国家之外建立教会法规,但俄罗斯东正教从没扮演过类似角色。被俄罗斯当作模型的拜占庭帝国,其教会和国家的关系是政教合一。东罗马皇帝委任君士坦丁堡的牧首(Patriarch,最高主教),裁决教会中的教条争议。格里高利改革和叙任权斗争的相似情形,从没在拜占庭的世界发生。东正教没有发展出可颁布法律的国家般的中央机构,也没像天主教会一样,将牧首法令编纂成统一的教会法规。当蒙古入侵切断了俄罗斯教会与拜占庭的交往时,它在莫斯科国家身上找到新监护人。教会和国家的利益相互吻合,后者提供赞助和权力,前者鼓吹后者作为“第三罗马”的合法性。大牧首尼康(Nikon)在 1666 年遭到开除,之后的俄罗斯教会彻底变成政教合一。到 1721 年,彼得大帝颁布《宗教事务管理章程》,干脆取消牧首职位,取而代之的是沙皇指定的神圣宗教会议(Holy Synod)。

    如果怀疑法治保护西欧精英的重要性,我们只要想想所谓的沙皇特辖制(oprichnina,俄语опричнина)。那是俄罗斯历史上的黑暗年代,时值伊凡四世(1530—1584)统治的后半期,在西欧历史中找不到对应物。他被后人称作伊凡雷帝(Ivan Grozny,俄语Иван Грозный),既可译作恐怖伊凡,也可译作伊凡大帝。他心爱的年轻妻子阿纳斯塔西娅(Anastasia,俄语Анастасия)死于 1560 年,使他对周遭的宫廷官员疑鬼疑神。他突然离开莫斯科,至 1565 年方才返回,要求贵族让他建立所谓的非常行政区,并让他享有处理恶人和叛徒的唯一大权。一旦获得同意,他就发起恐怖统治,反过来攻击贵族。愈来愈多的贵族与家人一起遭到逮捕、折磨、处决。伊凡创建了所谓的特辖军(oprichniki,俄语опричники),身穿黑衣,骑黑马,成为他法外统治的特殊工具。特辖区内的私人财产遭到国家没收。之后,它又得到扩张,最后面积相当于全国的一半。估计有四千至一万的贵族被杀,古老领主家庭中存活的仅得九家,大部分土地都被充公。伊凡四世好像完全失去情绪平衡,一度致命地伤害了自己的儿子兼继承人。他死后,俄罗斯只能说仍然心有余悸。很难说,它不是斯大林在 20 世纪 30 年代中后期实施党内清洗的先例。其时,苏共总书记怀疑身边处处有阴谋诡计,杀光了当年与其携手闹革命的老共产党员。它也使人不得不忆起清洗贵族精英的中国统治者,像武则天。

    从俄罗斯政治发展来看,使人迷惑的是贵族为何授予伊凡这些特权,祸及自身。有人认为,他们不敢想象自己可以独自当政,也害怕君主不掌大权的后果。在伊凡四世奇怪消失于莫斯科的时候,有人提出如此可能。俄罗斯人对软弱国家会造成的混乱和崩溃心怀恐惧,这并不荒谬。他儿子费奥多(Feodor,俄语Фёдор)去世于 1598 年,没有留下子女,留里克王朝因此而告终,开始了所谓的混乱时期。莫斯科国家饱受饥荒和外国侵略的困扰,因一系列“伪德米特里”(false Dmitri,俄语Лжедмитрий)竞争君位而分崩离析。莫斯科君主创造的国家机器不够强大,承受不了漫长的继承权斗争。即使君主权力崩溃,也不能回归到分权的封建统治。结果只是失序的暴力和外国的霸权,直到罗曼诺夫王朝在 1613 年涌现。

    自由选择

    俄罗斯专制主义的兴起并不由俄罗斯文化内在逻辑所命中注定。事实上,俄罗斯历史上有西方的共和或代议制度的先例,为其他可能性提供视野。西北部的城市诺夫哥罗德从没被蒙古人征服,在早期封地时期,一直是颇具活力的商业共和国。它与波罗的海贸易紧密相连,发挥门户作用,让欧洲货物进入俄罗斯。诺夫哥罗德的君主统领军队,但在执政时受市民大会(veche,俄语вече)的限制。市民大会从城市贵族中选出市长,所有自由公民都可投票。它还控制税赋、法律和外交,甚至可以解雇君主。城市内,社区在料理自己事务上行使很大自治权。诺夫哥罗德最终被伊凡三世征服,在 1478 年成为莫斯科国家的一部分。伊凡三世废除诺夫哥罗德所有的共和机构,将很多当地领袖当作叛徒处死,并将大量贵族和商人家庭驱逐出境。

    第二个代议机构是缙绅会议,由贵族组成,近似于法国三级会议和西班牙议会。它的开会并无定律,但在适当时刻扮演重要角色。它批准了伊凡四世的数项倡议,例如他向利沃尼亚的开战。其他会期批准了伊凡四世儿子费奥多在 1584 年的继位,并在 1598 年向摄政王鲍里斯·戈杜诺夫(Boris Godunov,俄语Борис Годунов)提供皇位。它最重要的举动是在 1613 年核准米哈伊尔·罗曼诺夫(Mikhail Romanov,俄语Михаи́л Фёдорович Рома́нов)成为沙皇,从而终止混乱时期。该议会在 17 世纪还继续开会,批准了多次宣战和税赋,直到彼得大帝使之边缘化。自那以后,代议机构在俄罗斯销声匿迹,直到 1906 年日俄战争之后召开的立法机构杜马(Duma,俄语Дума)。

    抵制权力的最后潜在来源是俄罗斯教会。如上所述,评论家经常谴责俄罗斯教会是莫斯科统治者的驯服工具,不管是沙皇时期,还是今天。但在大牧首尼康被开除之前的时期,仍有可能走上不同途径。俄罗斯东正教曾拥有近乎四分之一的俄罗斯土地,由此而享受自治。自圣谢尔盖(St. Sergius)改革以来,俄罗斯就有优良的修道院传统,但经常引起世俗统治者的怀疑。至少在佛罗伦萨大公会议(Florentine Union)触发危机之前,莫斯科的都主教(Metropolitan)都由君士坦丁堡的最高主教指派,俄罗斯君主无从置喙,之后才由俄罗斯主教会议选出。也有个别教会领袖不畏暴政,如莫斯科都主教菲利普(Philip),因为谴责伊凡四世,而被赶出自己的教区,最终竟被勒死。

    这些案例表明,俄罗斯传统并不是暴政不断,自由选择时有发芽开花。共产主义倒台后重现创造更为自由社会的诺言,但其兑现恐怕还在将来。

    农奴所有者结成卡特尔(Cartel)

    17 世纪末的俄罗斯国家已有中央集权,但还比不上欧洲对手。没有整齐的中央官僚机构,只有一系列所谓的衙门(prikazy,俄语Приказы),其职责既有重叠,又不一致,来自沙皇繁杂的指令(prikaz,俄语Приказ)。不同于法国的总督制度,从地方到中央的政府任命,都出自沙皇,被称为“给食”(kormienie,俄语Кормление),这名字就表明制度背后的监督和掠夺意味。早在 16 世纪既已存在的地方自治政府,在伊凡四世的治下遭到废除,国家倚靠军事总督制度(voevody,俄语Воевода)来实施行政命令。军队也同样原始,仍然基于骑兵,只在首都组织新型步兵,但不一定靠得住。

    俄罗斯国家建设的下一轮是在彼得大帝(1672—1725)治下。他迁都圣彼得堡,又从欧洲引进一大批新制度。彼得是个巨人,不论是体形,还是领导才能,单枪匹马尽力推行自上而下的社会改造。战争再次成为国家建设的主要动力,尤其是对抗瑞典的北方战争(Great Northern War)。彼得在 1700 年纳尔瓦战役中,败于瑞典皇帝查理十二世,遂开始对当时欧洲边界的俄军进行彻底重整,并从零开始打造海军(从最初的单船只舰发展到最终能够战胜瑞典海军的八百艘)。他也推行俄罗斯中央政府的现代化,废除老式衙门,换成模拟瑞典的参政院(a system of colleges)。参政院以技术专长为基础——大多来自外国——在辩论和执行政策方面发挥了特殊功能。

    15 世纪和 16 世纪国家建设的第一期,主要是动员服役贵族,这分裂了贵族阶层,确保他们大部分直接依赖国家。彼得甚至更进一步,征召整个贵族阶层参与国家服务。贵族入伍先当小厮,其提升全凭现代的择优标准,一生必须附属于自己的团队。所以,与欧洲相比,俄罗斯贵族服务的观念更为持久,虽然实施方式大相径庭。为国家服务的贵族随身不带自己的属臣和侍从,却在中央等级机构中获得职位。这导致俄罗斯社会的总体军事化,在道德上重视责任、荣誉、等级、服从。

    支撑俄罗斯专制主义的内部政治力量,其平衡可用图 4 来说明:

    图4 俄罗斯

    彼得大帝在 1722 年以官秩表(Table of Ranks)替换古老的门第选官制。每个国民都有自己的法定等级,以及相应的特权和义务。非贵族人员一旦升到足够的等级,不管是在官僚机构还是在军队,就可自动进入世袭贵族的行列。新鲜血液进入贵族,这很有必要,因为国家需要大批公职人员。官秩表确定贵族的集团身份,并加强其采取集体行动的能力。但它从不将自己视作君主政体的对手,因为其利益与国家紧密相连。

    贵族提供服务,以换取免税、土地人口专有权和进一步榨取农奴的机会。农奴在君主赠与贵族的封地上首次出现,这显示农民条件的恶化和贵族服务阶层的兴起,以及两者的密切相连。这些封地倾向于在南方、东南和西方,都是国家夺之于邻国的新土地。辽阔的北方领土上没有战事,它的农民处境要好得多——基本上只是国家的农民,只有欠国家的义务,不欠私人地主的。

    整个 16 世纪和 17 世纪,农民的税赋日益上涨,而更为重要的法律限制则针对农民的行动自由。根据古老的传统,农民有权离去,但在后来受到愈来愈多的限制,最后竟被全部废除。限制农民的迁徙是至关重要的,它直接影响俄罗斯贵族的团结,以及贵族与君主政体的同盟。

    讽刺的是,此中原因与俄罗斯的地理有关。它缺乏地理界限,非常不适于奴隶制的发展。俄罗斯只有很少阻挡迁徙的自然屏障,如无法通行的大河或山脉。国家因扩张而不断拉长边境线,尤其是在南方和东南方。乌克兰南部和顿河盆地(Don Basin)的自由哥萨克社区,据说由逃走的农奴所建。像蓄奴农地与开放边境相邻的美国南方,只有农奴主之间达成牢固协议,以限制农奴行动、送回逃奴、既严罚逃奴又严罚违规地主,农奴制度方能取得成功。如有主要参与者不予合作——或是部分地主,或是自由城市,或是向逃奴提供保护的国王——整个制度就会崩溃。考虑到这段时期劳力缺乏,任何地主如果退出联盟,以较好条件将农奴吸引到自己领土,便会获取丰厚的利润。所以,必须以显著的地位特权和严守反迁徙规则的承诺,来加强地主卡特尔的团结。俄罗斯专制主义的基础,就是君主和上下层贵族的同盟。他们都答应遵循有关规则,牺牲品就是农民。

    维持农奴卡特尔的需要,解释了俄罗斯政治发展的众多现象。自己没有农奴的个人,欲自由拥有土地,会受到政府愈来愈多的限制。要想得到土地,必须先变成贵族。一旦成为贵族,便能自动获得农奴,以及维持这一制度的义务。此举遏制了资产阶级在独立商业城市的成长。西方的城市在促进农民自由方面扮演了重要角色。因此,在俄罗斯率先发展资本主义经济的是贵族,而不是独立的资产阶级。维持卡特尔的需要,也解释了俄罗斯向南方和东南方的扩张。边境旁边的自由哥萨克社区的存在,无疑是持续的诱惑,也是逃跑农民的良机,必须遭到镇压。

    彼得大帝之后

    彼得大帝是推行现代化的伟大人物,在很多方面促使俄罗斯“欧洲化”,并使之成为欧洲政坛中的主要角色。但他从上到下的强行改革,遇上了俄罗斯社会本质上的局限。例如,他试图创立省和地区的两级制度,以及新式的市政规则,以改造省、市和地方的政府,到最后都不了了之。用当代发展中国家的字眼来说,原因在于“能力缺乏”。那是指,地方上受过训练的行政人员不够,现存的又缺乏热情。中央颁布的法令得不到实施,政权也无法铲除既有的腐败和独断专行。

    彼得大帝在军队和中央官僚机构中,推行选贤与能的现代晋升制度。他死后,便难以为继。他的很多革新全靠自己的监督和精力,例如,他曾旁听政府招聘干部的考试。他去世后,宫廷内外的强大家族使行政机构重趋家族化。他的继位者软弱。想要晋升到文武官职的最高等级,全得倚靠豪门巨室的赞助,像多尔戈鲁科夫(Dolgorukov,俄语Долгоруков)、拉雷斯金(Naryshkin,俄语Нарышкин)、戈利岑(Golitsyn,俄语Голицын)、萨尔蒂科夫(Saltykov,俄语Салтыков)。日益掌控国家政策的贵族在 1762 年废除自己的服务义务,并获得更多针对农民的权利,如随意迁徙和驱逐农民的权利。豪门家庭及其赞助网络的相互竞争,甚至延伸到军队,战斗力因此而受损。

    贵族家庭的兴起分散了俄罗斯制度的权力,并软化伊凡四世和彼得大帝所遗留下的专制传统,再加上法国文化在俄罗斯精英中所享有的主导地位,这一切使托尔斯泰《战争与和平》所描述的 19 世纪早期的贵族社会,看来酷像欧洲的贵族社会。如在两百年之前,这是不可想象的。但这种权力分散与西方现代行政国家的兴起,不可混为一谈。历史学家约翰·勒多内(John LeDonne)说:“全国范围家族和依附者的网络,无不在嘲弄立法文件所建立的严格等级制度。此类立法努力,一直在寻找行政秩序和‘规范化’。它解释了为何俄罗斯政府,比任何其他政府都更是人的政府,而不是法的政府。”

    专制主义完成

    有关俄罗斯的解说,以 18 世纪晚期稳固专制国家的出现而告结束。显而易见,之后又有很多新的发展,包括 19 世纪的自由派实验和 20 世纪极权国家的兴起。到法国大革命时,俄罗斯统治的特征已昭然若揭,它既不同于法国和西班牙的弱的专制主义,也不同于中国和奥斯曼的国家。

    在若干方面,俄罗斯的国家比法国或西班牙更为强大。至少在与精英打交道时,后者受到约束,必须尊重法治,这在俄罗斯却是闻所未闻的。法国和西班牙的政府,以债务违约和货币操纵来蚕食产权,甚至捏造指控,通过法律程序来勒索钱财。但至少,他们觉得必须运用现有的法律机构。相比之下,俄罗斯政府无需法律借口来没收私人财产,逼迫贵族为政府服务,处置敌人和叛徒时,漠视正当的法律程序。伊凡四世的特辖制在某种意义上只是意外,之后也没有相似的复制,直到 20 世纪的共产主义政府。但它的曾经发生,为后来俄罗斯统治者创立了重要的先例。他们很清楚,他们手中针对精英的极端措施是西方主权国家所没有的。在这一方面,俄罗斯政府更接近帝制中国,更远离西方。俄罗斯政府发展了类似奥斯曼的专制制度,譬如作为骑兵报酬的封地。奥斯曼和马穆鲁克,即使在最兴盛时期,也比俄罗斯统治者更加尊重法治。

    另一方面,俄罗斯的专制主义更为家族化,远远超过中国或奥斯曼的版本。如我们所见,中国人发明了现代官僚机构和非人格化的中央统治。大体上,中国历史是国家与家族制复辟的斗争史。早在中国统一之前的公元前 3 世纪,非人格化和选贤与能的政府的理想就已问世。奥斯曼的军事奴役制建立任人唯才的行政制度,不受家族影响,在其全盛时期,不乏来访欧洲人的赞美。彼得大帝想在俄罗斯创建同样制度,只取得部分的成功。俄罗斯的家族力量随后轻易夺回政府,以不透明的方式在幕后制定政策。

    当代俄罗斯,与彼得大帝死后的百年社会有惊人的相似。尽管有现代的正式宪法和书面法律,俄罗斯国家仍受灰色精英网络的掌控,很像曾经控制帝制俄罗斯的萨尔蒂科夫和拉雷斯金家族。这些精英行使权力的方式,不是法律或规范程序所能定义的。但与中国不同的是,俄罗斯最高精英没有对国民负责的类似道德感。在中国,政治等级越高,政府质量越有改进。但在俄罗斯,它却变得越糟。当代精英愿意借用民族主义,使自己的权力合法化,但到最后,好像仍在为己着想。 俄罗斯没有陷入历史的泥潭。伊凡四世、彼得大帝、斯大林开下专制先例,但接踵而至的却是自由化。今日社会已被动员起来,其方式不同于旧政权时期,资本主义的引进允许精英的组成定期更换。今日腐败和紊乱的选举式威权主义,不再是俄罗斯人曾承受的残酷独裁。俄罗斯历史提供很多通向较多自由的其他选择,可作为将来改革的先例。

    第 27 章 征税和代表权

    失败的负责制案例,帮助理解议会制度在英国的发展;政治团结的来源,其在诺曼征服之前英国的扎根;英国制度合法化中的法律作用;光荣革命所真正实现的

    政治负责制如何发展的最后案例是英国,其政治发展的三大组件——国家、法治和政治负责制——都成功获得了制度化。我最后审视英国是为了避开辉格史观的缺陷。关于英国代议政府的兴起,已有很多论述认为,它是可溯源自古代雅典的西方发展模式的逻辑的、必然的或无可避免的结果。但这些论述很少互作比较,所引证的一系列因果事件,又忽略了不易察觉或更为遥远的因素。而在事实上,那些因素却在扮演重要角色。换言之,它们只看到顶部的龟,而忽视了蛰伏于下的龟。

    我们得以避免这个问题,因为我们已讨论四个负责制政府无法出现的欧洲国家——如果把所讨论过的非西方案例也包括在内,那就不止四个。我们观察英国与其他案例的异同,将更好地了解促使负责制发展的组合因素。

    跟法国、西班牙、匈牙利和俄罗斯一样,英国首先是部落社会,然后是封建社会,它的中央集权始于 16 世纪晚期和 17 世纪早期。这些社会的精英都组成政治团体——英国议会、法国高等法院、西班牙议会、匈牙利议会、俄罗斯缙绅会议——推行现代化的君主要向它们寻求支持和合法性。在法国、西班牙和俄罗斯,这些团体没能凝聚成强大的制度化参与者,没能对抗中央国家,没能取得宪政上的妥协,没能获得国王对自己的负责。相比之下,英国议会却是强大而凝聚的。

    具体地说,不同于主要代表卡斯提尔城市的西班牙议会,或贵族掌控的法国和俄罗斯的政治团体,英国议会不仅代表贵族和神职人员(世俗和精神的领主),而且代表广泛的士绅、市民和业主。这些平民是议会的灵魂和动力。英国议会强大到成功击败国王的诸多计划,包括增税、组建新军、躲避普通法。它还创建自己的军队,在内战中打败国王,将之处死,迫使继任君主詹姆士二世退位,拥戴来自欧洲大陆奥兰治的威廉(William of Orange)。到最后,统治英国的不是欧洲大陆那样的专制君主,而是正式承认议会负责制原则的立宪君主。英国议会获得如此进展,而欧洲其他地区的议会却四分五裂和软弱无能,或被拉拢收买,或主动支持君主专制,直到法国大革命前夕。有人自然要问,这是为什么?

    英国还在另一方面为当代发展中国家树立先例。17 世纪初,早期斯图亚特治下的英国不但日益专制,而且非常腐败。渗透法国和西班牙政府的实践,如卖官鬻爵和家族攫权,同样也发生在英国身上,只是在规模上还算适中。但到该世纪末,英国的公共腐败问题,即使没有得到解决,至少已有很大收敛。政治制度得以废除公职买卖,建立现代官僚机构,提升国家整体的力量和效率。这虽然没有彻底解决英国公共生活中的腐败问题,但阻止国家陷入最终摧毁法兰西王国式的腐朽泥潭。今天,面对普遍公共腐败的发展中国家,可以借鉴英国政治制度的应对方法。

    英国政治团结的根源

    我们看到,法国、西班牙和俄罗斯的君主政体使用种种策略,在贵族、士绅和资产阶级当中,收买、胁迫、化解潜在的对手。英国君主作出同样的尝试,但议会所代表的社会阶层团结起来,抵制并最终打败国王。问题在于,这团结来自何处。

    答案至少有三,有的已在以前章节中获得详细解释。第一,很早以来,英国社会团结的政治性大于它的社会性。第二,普通法和英国法律制度的合法性获得广泛认同,业主保卫自己财产的意愿强烈。最后,此时的宗教,虽然在英国人中间造成痛苦的分裂,却赋予议会超越的使命感。如果与国王的争执只是为了财产和资源,该使命感便不复存在。

    地方政府和团结

    我们在第 16 章中提到,欧洲的部落社会组织因基督教的影响而趋于崩溃,远远早于现代国家建设。英国在这一过程中,比任何其他地方走得都要快。6 世纪晚期坎特伯雷的圣奥古斯丁传教开始,更加个人主义的社区便取代了扩展的亲戚关系。(这并不适用于爱尔兰人、威尔士人和苏格兰人。他们的部落关系——例如高地氏族——持续到很晚的历史后期。)邻居之间毫无关联,这样的社区在诺曼入侵之前的盎格鲁—萨克逊时期已属司空见惯,使当地农业社会截然不同于东欧,更不同于中国和印度。

    基于亲戚关系的社会组织虽然孱弱,但并不排除社会团结。紧密相连的亲戚团体,可在团体范围内提供集体行动,但遇上宗族或部落之外的合作,又会变成障碍。基于亲戚关系的社会,其集体行动的范围非常狭窄,所以需要政治制度。

    英国社会早期的个人主义,并不意味社会团结的消失,只是团结形式是政治性的,而不是社会性的。诺曼征服之前,英国分成相对统一的各郡(shires),它们可能曾是独立的小王国,现已聚集成更大的英格兰王国。主持郡务的是称作长老(ealdorman)的古老官员,其职位是世袭的。(它的词根来自丹麦,现在仍存活于美国的地方政治,市府参事即写作 alderman。)但实际权力渐渐落到皇家官员手中,即郡治安官(shire reeve,or sheriff),后者受国王的指派,代表皇家权力。每半年,他组织一次郡会议,该区所有自由民(后来变成自由地主)必须出席。诺曼征服并没摧毁该统治制度,只是将郡改为县,以符合欧洲大陆法兰克人的习惯。然而,治安官的权力大增,取代了世袭的长老。郡会议演变成县法庭,用弗雷德里克·梅特兰的话说:“国王的大领主必须在法律面前人人平等的基础上,与自己的属臣相聚。租户可能与自己领主坐在一起,俨然像个同等伙伴。”

    今天,这些制度的详情好像只有考古价值,但在解释议会作为政治制度的演变时却非常重要。欧洲大陆封建主义的性质,尤其是在卡洛林帝国地区,看来非常不同。欧洲领主贵族享有对司法权的控制,其程度远远超过英国。在英国,国王享有优势。诺曼征服之后,国王利用县法庭来监察封建法庭。如个人觉得在领主那里得不到正义,就可向治安官提出上诉,要求将诉讼移至县法庭。后来,国王法庭(详见第 17 章)取代县法庭成为重要案件的预审庭。后者只得主持较不重要的诉讼,譬如金额不超过四十先令的土地纠纷。与欧洲大陆相比,英国的非精英更有机会运用这些机构。

    县法庭开始失去其司法功能的同时,却获得新的政治功能,成为更广泛政治制度的代议场所。正如梅特兰所说:

    到 13 世纪中期,我们发现,民选代表被召集来参加全国会议,或叫议会(parliament)。他们是县法庭的代表,不是无组织群体的代表。我们几乎可称他们为集团代表。理论上,整个县都由县法庭代表……国王的巡回法官不时来访,整个县的地主团体(totus comitatus),前来晋见,报告上次来访之后的所作所为。县法庭可作出裁决,也可作证,如有犯错,还会被罚款。

    所以,县法庭是奇怪的组织,既自上而下,又自下而上。它由国王所创建,受由国王任命并对国王负责的治安官统辖。但它又以全体地主的广泛参与为基础,不受世袭等级和封建地位的限制。治安官反过来又受地方民选督察官(coroner)的制衡,民选督察官应代表县民利益的观念因此而获得合法性。既有对国王的向上负责,又有对县民的向下负责,两者日益趋于平衡。

    郡或县下面还有更小的地方行政单位,叫作百户(hundreds),相当于卡洛林帝国的乡(centenae)。(这些行政单位也传到美国。)百户区有自己的聚会,叫作百户法庭,开始在司法方面扮演日益重要的角色。百户区由治安官任命的巡警所治理,一起负责警察功能,如抓捕罪犯。百户也是英国陪审团制度的基础,需要提供审判刑事案件的十二名陪审员。

    因此,甚至在诺曼征服之前,整个英国社会已组建高度参与的各式政治单位,一直抵达村庄层次。这不是地方社会组织参政的基层现象,而是全国政府邀请地方上的参与,构建地方上的生活,扎根成为社区的来源。

    普通法和法律机构的作用

    值得注意的是,后来英国政治代议制度的构成部件,一开始只是司法机构,像县法庭和百户法庭。英国历史上,法治的出现远早于政治负责制,后者又始终与保护法律密切相联。英国司法的参与性质,加上普通法因应地方需求以定规则的特征,帮助造就了法律属于大家的感情,其强烈程度远远超过其他欧洲社会。公共负责制首先意味着对法律的服从,尽管那时的法律,不论是法官作出的,还是颁成文本的,都没有走过民主政治的程序。

    法治的主要功能之一是保护产权。在这一点上,英国普通法比其他地方的法律更为行之有效。正如哈耶克所说的,原因之一在于普通法是分散决策的产物,能尽量适应各地的情形和知识。不过吊诡的是,原因之二在于国王愿意在产权上支持非精英对贵族的反抗,这便需要强大的中央国家。在英国,原告早就可以将产权诉讼移至国王法庭,如金额不够,仍可移至县法庭或百户法庭。中世纪有不少复杂的传统产权,如佃权(copyhold)。土地在技术上是领主财产,但佃户(villein)又可将之传给儿子或亲戚。国王法庭倾向于反对领主,保护佃权所有人的权利,以致这种财产渐渐进化成真正的私人财产。

    县和百户层次的法庭众多,国王在地方产权争执中愿意充任中立仲裁人,这一切大大增强了英国产权的合法性。到 15 世纪,英国司法制度的独立性和获得认可的中立性,允许它扮演日益重要的角色。它变成真正的“第三分支”,有资格裁决宪法问题,如议会废除专利特许证的权利。有评论家指出,“很难想象,此类问题能在中世纪欧洲的其他地方获得解决——并且是完全独立的解决——全靠法官以专业语言作出讨论,而不是政治上的樽俎折冲,或有关团体的胁迫。”今天的发展中国家,仍缺乏如此的司法才能和司法独立。

    到了 17 世纪的重大宪政危机时,不让君主破坏法治成了保卫英国自由的呐喊和议会团结以抗国王的源泉。出现于早期斯图亚特(1603—1649 年)的威胁是国王的星室法庭(Court of Star Chamber,其起源和司法权都很模糊),其为了“更有效地”起诉犯罪,而省去一般法庭的正常保护程序(包括陪审团的审讯)。在第二任斯图亚特国王查理一世(1600—1649)的治下,它带有更多政治性,不只是起诉犯罪,还用来对付假想的国王之敌。

    英国法律独立的更佳象征,莫过于爱德华·柯克爵士(1552—1634)。他是法学家和法律学者,最终升至王座法院(King’s Bench)的首席法官。他在各种法律职务中不折不挠,抵抗政治权威和国王对法律的侵犯。詹姆士一世试图将某些案件从普通法搬至教会法之下审理,柯克坚持说,国王没有足够权力来任意解释法律,从而引起极大愤怒。国王宣称,坚持国王在法律之下,无疑是叛国罪。柯克引用布拉克顿(Bracton)的话作答:“国王不应在人下,但应在上帝和法律之下(quod Rex non debet esse sub homine set sub deo et lege)。”再加上其他的冒犯,柯克最终被解除一切法律职位,转而加入议会,成为反皇派领袖。

    宗教作为集体行动的基础

    跟法国、西班牙、匈牙利和俄罗斯不同,英国对专制权力的抵抗也涂上宗教色彩,大大加强了议会阵营的团结。第一任斯图亚特国王詹姆士一世,其母亲是被处决的玛丽·都铎(Mary Tudor),即苏格兰女王玛丽一世;其儿子查理一世(Charles I)娶法国路易十三的妹妹亨利埃塔·玛丽亚(Henrietta Maria)为妻。父子都表示相信新教,但常被怀疑对天主教抱有同情。大主教劳德(Laud)试图使英国国教向天主教靠拢,更加重视仪式,为此深受清教徒(Puritan)的憎恨。早期斯图亚特的专制主义教条和王权神授,与法国和西班牙的天主教君主的观点遥相呼应。很多新教徒从中看到国际天主教意欲剥夺英国人天生权利的大阴谋。1641 年爱尔兰的天主教叛乱仿佛就在家门口。新教徒移民遭受暴行的报告,似乎确认了很多英国人对国际天主教扩张的最坏担心。其中还真有一定的道理。西班牙国王在 16 世纪末派来无敌舰队(Armada),并投入八十年战争,以征服新教徒的荷兰联合省。法国的路易十四在 17 世纪末接过这项任务,出兵侵犯荷兰,他的秘密同情者就是英国最后一位天主教国王詹姆士二世。

    有关英国内战的浩瀚史籍总有周期的修正。它不断学术性地改变对战争动机的理解,以跟上流行的思想风尚,以致有些历史学家对取得共识放弃希望。 20 世纪的很多解释,淡化了战争参与者的宗教动机,并将宗教意识视作阶级或局部的经济利益的面罩。事实上这段时期的宗教和阶级,其间互动非常复杂,很难厘清宗教和政治的效忠对象。有站在议会一边的国教徒,也有作为保皇派的新教徒。很多高层国教人士认为,与天主教会相比,像公理会(Congregationist)和贵格会(Quaker)那样的非国教徒,对道德秩序构成更可怕的威胁。显然,较激进的新教流派变成了社会动员和经济进步的载体,并为抗议和团结提供机会,而传统的等级制的宗教渠道是无能为力的。

    另一方面,即使有人主张冲突的主要原因不在宗教,但宗教在动员政治参与者和扩大集体行动范围上,仍然发挥重大作用。这在议会阵营,以及议会创建的新模范军(New Model Army)中,尤其如此。由于很多军官的宗教信念,随着时间的推移,新模范军变成反皇派激进主义的大温床。光荣革命期间,议会愿意接受奥兰治公国的威廉,以取代英国的合法君主詹姆士二世,就是因为前者是新教徒,后者是天主教徒。不然,真不好解说。

    所以,英国地方上的自治团体、深植人心的法律、产权不可侵犯的信念、君主政体涉嫌参与国际的天主教阴谋,这一切都有助于议会阵营的精诚团结。

    自由城市和资产阶级

    现代传统智慧认为,如果没有强大中产阶级的存在,民主就不会出现。他们是有产阶级,既不是精英,也不是乡村穷人。这个概念起源于英国的政治发展,与其他任何欧洲国家(可能的例外是荷兰)相比,英国看到更多城市和城市资产阶级的早期涌现。城市中产阶级在议会中扮演主要角色,在内战和光荣革命之前,就已获得经济和政治的实质性力量。在权力的三角比赛中,它是抗衡领主和国王的大砝码。城市资产阶级的兴起,是更为广泛的西欧变迁的组成部分,包括低地国家、意大利北部和日耳曼北部的汉萨同盟(Hanseatic)港口城市。详细描述这一重要现象的有卡尔·马克思、马克斯·韦伯、亨利·皮朗(Henri Pirenne)。马克思把“资产阶级的兴起”当作他现代化理论的中心命题,成为社会发展过程中必不可少的阶段。

    我们在第 25 章中看到,自由城市的存在促成了西欧农奴的解放。对英国政治发展和议会获胜来说,强大且凝聚的资产阶级是非常重要的。但资产阶级在英国和西欧历史上所扮演的角色,在很多方面却是异乎寻常的。它是特殊境遇的后果,其他欧洲国家只是没遇上如此境遇而已。尤其是在易北河以东,那里只有很少独立自治的商业城市,遵照自己的法律,受自己民兵的保护。那些城市更像中国的,只是地方领主控制的行政中心,碰巧也充任商业中心。马克思的巨大影响促使好几代学生,继续把“资产阶级的兴起”看作经济现代化的伴随物,无须作出进一步解释,认定该阶级的政治力量来自其经济力量。

    早于马克思几乎七十五年,亚当·斯密在《国富论》中就资产阶级的起源,提供了更为周详、更具说服力的解释。他认为,在资产阶级的兴起当中,政治既是原因又是结果。斯密在第一卷第三章的篇首提出,他所谓的“富裕”(opulence),即经济增长,会有自然的升级,始于农业生产效率的改善,导致更多国内的城乡贸易,到最后才是日益增加的国际贸易。他注意到,欧洲现代国家所经历的次序恰恰相反:国际贸易发展在国内贸易之前,前者兴旺起来之后,强大男爵和地主的政治霸权才被打破。

    在斯密看来,造成这奇特次序有好几条原因。第一,罗马帝国崩溃后的大部分土地都在强大男爵手中,他们宁愿保住自己的政治权力,也不愿追求财产回报的最大化。所以,他们创建长子继承制和其他限制性的规则,以防地产的流失。此外,他们又将农民贬为农奴或奴隶;斯密认为,农奴或奴隶既不愿卖力干活,又不愿投资于土地。不愿追求回报最大化的另一原因,是缺乏以盈余去购买的消费品。在欧洲的黑暗时代,贸易不存在。因此,有钱有势者没有其他选择,只得与大批侍从共享盈余。

    斯密又注意到,出现于中世纪的城市,其最初居民是“商人和工匠”。他们属于低级阶层,甚至处于奴役地位,但是他们逃离了领主的控制,在城市找到庇护。久而久之,国王授予特权,让他们可以自由嫁女(编按:指无需领主同意而自主决定),组织自己的民兵,最终作为集团实体而享有自己的法律。这就是资产阶级的起源,虽然亚当·斯密没有使用如此字眼。不同于马克思,斯密提到独立城市的兴起必须有重要的政治前提:

    领主鄙视市民,认为他们属于不同层次,只是被解放的农奴,几乎不是自己的同类。市民的富裕,常常使领主愤怒,一有机会就掠夺欺凌,不稍宽恕。市民自然也既嫉恨、又畏惧领主。恰好,国王也嫉恨和畏惧领主。国王虽可能亦会鄙视市民,但却没有理由去嫉恨和畏惧他们。所以,相互利益促使他们支持国王,又促使国王支持他们来反对领主。

    斯密接着说,这就是国王将独立宪章和法律赋予城市的原委,允许他们在国王与领主的斗争中成为一枚平衡砝码。

    城市和资产阶级的形成,与马克思所相信的相悖,不只是经济增长和技术变化的结果。刚开始,他们非常软弱,从属于强大的领主,除非获得政治保护。这就是在波兰、匈牙利、俄罗斯和易北河以东其他土地上所发生的。那里,政治力量的不同配置使君主变得软弱,或促使君主与贵族的派别结盟,以反对市民利益。由于这个原因,东欧从来没有强大独立的资产阶级。技术上先进的资本主义市场,其引进者不是市民,而是进步地主,或国家本身,因此无法达到相似的繁荣程度。

    基于城市的资本主义市场经济一旦出现,我们便离开古老的马尔萨斯式世界,开始进入现代经济制度,生产效率的增长变成家常便饭。此时,日益富有的资产阶级,越来越能颠覆旧式地主秩序的权力,政治发展的条件因此而发生变化。斯密表明,旧精英受财富的诱惑而放弃自己的政治权力——钻石扣环,“更适合于作孩子的玩具,而不应是大人的认真追求”——旧农业经济是无法创造这种财富的。因此而开始了政治发展的现代制度:政治变化取决于经济和社会的变化。但一开始,资产阶级的兴起要有政治前提——市民和国王都憎恨领主。这个条件不存在的地方,如东欧的大部,就没有资产阶级的出现。

    征税斗争

    自 13 世纪以来,英国议会开始定期开会,比法国、西班牙和俄罗斯更为频繁。如上所述,它们的原始功能是司法,但久而久之,开始扮演更广阔的政治角色,成为国王的联合统治者。在批准税赋上,议会作用尤其重要,因为议会包括全国大多数地主,其资产和收入是国家征税的基础。到 14 世纪和 15 世纪,下议院与英国君主密切合作,以剔除不够格或腐败的官员,并定期监督议会拨款的具体花费。图 5 显示的是内战前夕的 1641 年的英国社会力量。

    查理一世在 1629 年解散议会,开始了十一年的“亲政”,试图以议会为代价来扩展国家权力。这导致查理一世与议会对手在好多问题上发生争执,有的已在前面篇幅介绍过。议会中很多人不喜欢大主教劳德的专制国教,怀疑查理一世同情天主教,因为他有兴趣与法国和西班牙建立外交关系。宗教问题和保卫法治互相交融,星室法庭、高级专员公署(High Commission)、北方政务会(Council of the North)起诉反主教制(anti-Episcopal)的清教徒。清教徒传教士亚历山大·莱顿(Alexander Leighton),遭到星室法庭野蛮逮捕和残酷折磨,却得不到正当法律程序的保护,被认为是宗教和皇家权力肆无忌惮的滥用。

    图5 英国

    其时还有两大问题,一是没有议会批准、国王擅自增税的权利。国王提出新关税,向地主施以任意的罚金,重新引进蓄意避开禁令的垄断专利,在和平时期为重整海军而征收“船舶筹款”。英国税务制度的发展不同于法国,英国的贵族和士绅未以法国方式购买特权和免税,税收负担的最大部分都落到了议会所代表的富人头上。可能与紧密的地方团结有关,富人阶层没有与国王共谋,将税收负担推向农民、工匠和新近致富的中产阶级,反而认为自己与议会的权力和特权休戚相关。

    第二个问题涉及政治腐败。与法国和西班牙一样,英国也躲不过家族化和买卖公职的做法。从都铎时期开始,皇家公职的获得愈益依靠政治赞助,晋升不是选贤与能,而是以各种荫庇关系圈子的圈内人资格为准。公职待价而沽,又变成世袭财产。到斯图亚特王朝早期,法国包税(关税)和内部财政(向国家官员借款)的做法获得引进。国王建立皇家调查委员会,就像法国的司法堂,以私人腐败的借口敲诈富有官员。

    1641 年爆发的内战持续十年,最后在 1649 年,以议会的胜利和查理一世被砍头而告终。但国王和议会的长期斗争,其最终解决并不全然依靠武力,虽然暴力和暴力的威胁仍是重要的决定因素。胜利的议会派因处决国王而抹黑了自己声誉;在克伦威尔(Oliver Cromwell)护国公时期,又因追求愈益激进的政策而削弱了自己的政治基础。所以,查理一世的儿子在 1660 年成功复辟,登位为查理二世,反而带来一种解脱。二十年的强烈政治冲突之后,国家得以返回常态。

    复辟确实解决了当初引起内战的腐败问题。议会在内战和护国公时期推行很多政府改革,譬如建立严密的现代新模范军和清洗腐败的皇家官员。但查理二世的上台,又带回很多早期斯图亚特的腐败做法,包括出售公职和赞助任命。但是,多种因素聚合起来,在英国政府中建立了改革同盟,最终打退这些倒行逆施。

    首先是第二次荷兰战争(1665—1667)爆发,加上瘟疫突发和伦敦大火,导致国防严重衰弱,以致荷兰船队溯泰晤士河而上,烧毁英国海军船坞。路易十四治下的法国也取得进步,以咄咄逼人的外交政策威胁欧洲大陆的均势。显然,军费必须上涨。第二是查理二世希望量入为出,以避免向议会请求特别征税。第三是政府中出现了一批才华横溢的精明改革家,包括乔治·唐宁(George Downing)爵士和喜记日记的塞缪尔·佩皮斯(Samuel Pepys)。他们关心日益增长的外国威胁,认识到财政制度和行政管理必须改革才能获得高效。最后,告别内战和护国公时期的议会,对政府的浪费和腐败深感怀疑,其时政府将税收用于非公共的开支。

    不同压力的汇合允许唐宁组织的第二财政委员会(Second Treasury Commission)推荐和实施重要的改革,使英国公共行政管理更为现代化,进一步脱离家族化。它取消从都铎时期起便是腐败温床的国库(exchequer)的权力,移交给总管所有政府开支的新财政部。它向公众发行遵守公共债券市场纪律的新债券(Treasury order),以取代内部财政。最后,它将私人拥有的公职改成“悉听尊便”(at pleasure)的职位,并取消新的公职出售。

    1667 年后发生的改革努力沉重打击了家族化实践,确保英国在管理公共资金上比法国或西班牙更为有效。反对腐败政府的斗争从来不是一蹴而就,唐宁在 17 世纪 60 年代发起的很多改革,其完全实施尚要等到 18 世纪早期。这些努力也没有排除后续稽查的需要,因为假以时日,家族制总是试图卷土重来。

    17 世纪晚期确实提供了扭转家族化的重要模式,对今天的反腐努力仍有意义。促使晚期斯图亚特王朝改革的所有因素依然重要:外部环境的压力迫使政府改善效率;首席执行官如果没有发挥带头作用,至少不拖后腿;政府内有人倡导改革,并得到足够的政治支持来付诸实行;最后,来自纳税人的强大政治压力,他们不愿看到浪费。

    国际机构最近作出的很多反腐努力,比如世界银行或英国国际发展部,但却功亏一篑,就是因为上述因素之一的缺席。现代世界的问题在于,腐败政府经常无需向自己公民谋求税收,像查理二世所作的,因此没有议会或公民社会来监督它们的开支。它们的收入或者来自自然资源,或者来自并不要求财政负责制的国际捐赠人。亨廷顿建议,如果英国议会的呐喊是“无代表即不纳税”,今天口号应该是“不纳税即无代表”,因为最能激励政治参与的乃是后者。

    光荣革命

    国王与议会争斗的结果是 1688—1689 年的光荣革命,詹姆士二世被迫退位。奥兰治公国的威廉从荷兰赶来,登基为国王威廉三世。直接原因是天主教徒的詹姆士二世试图扩军,并配以天主教军官。这即刻引起怀疑,他是否打算利用军队实施专制,并与法国和其他天主教势力结成同盟。更大原因则与议会当初反对国王导致内战的原因相同:合法性最终应基于被统治者的同意,得不到同意,国王无权强加于人。危机中达成的和解,涉及宪法、宗教、财政、军事等重要方面。在宪法上,它建立了没有议会同意国王不得建军的原则;议会还通过议案,罗列国家不得侵犯的国民权利。在财政上,它确立没有议会同意国王不得征新税的原则。在宗教上,它禁止天主教徒成为国王或王后,还添上增加异见新教徒权利的容忍议案(但排除天主教徒、犹太教徒和索齐尼派教徒)。最后,它允许政府发行更多债券,使国家机构的大大扩展成为可能。议会主权的原则要在数年后才得到最后确认,光荣革命不愧为现代民主发展的主要分水岭。

    光荣革命导致了政治合法性的思想大改变。作为这些事件的评论家和参与者,哲学家约翰·洛克扩充了霍布斯的观点,即国家源于为保障天赋权利而签署的社会契约。其《政府论》上篇攻击罗伯特·菲尔麦(Robert Filmer)爵士为君主政体辩护的君权神授;其《政府论》下篇力辩,与霍布斯相悖,侵犯臣民天赋权利的暴君可被撤换。这些原则使用普世性的论述,对 1689 年的宪政和解至关重要。光荣革命不是某个统治者或一群精英从他人手中夺得国家和租金,而是定出如何选择后续统治者的原则。从洛克的《政府论》下篇,到美国革命和美国创始人的宪法理论,其间距离很短。尽管现代民主有复杂的方方面面,但 1688—1689 年的事件,牢固建立了政府合法性来自被统治者的同意的基本原则。

    光荣革命使政治负责制和代议政府的原则制度化,但还没引进民主。此时的英国议会,只由很小比例的人口选出。出席议会的有高级阶层、议员和士绅。后者是英国最重要的政治阶级,根据彼得·拉斯莱特(Peter Laslett),它代表了大约总人口的 4% 到 5%。更为广泛的民众参与地方统治,或参加陪审团,或协助百户区和县政府的工作,包括大部分条件较好的自耕农(yeoman)。如把这个团体也包括在内,政治参与者会接近男性成人总人口的 20%。我们今天理解的民主——无论性别、种族、社会地位,所有成年人都享有选举权——要到 20 世纪的英国或美国,方才得到实施。跟美国独立宣言一样,光荣革命建立了被统治者同意的原则,让后人再去拓宽政治意义中的“人民”的范围。

    有些人认为,光荣革命的重要性在于它标志了英国安全产权的开始,其实非也。数世纪之前,健全产权即已建立。包括女子在内的个人早在 13 世纪就行使买卖财产的权利(参看第 14 章)。普通法、国王法庭、县法庭和百户法庭,允许非精英地主在领主司法范围之外,提出产权争执的诉讼。到 17 世纪晚期,强大的资本主义经济,参与反斯图亚特专制的中产阶级,都已出现。光荣革命的成功,与其说是强大可靠产权的原因,倒不如说是它的结果。英国有产阶层觉得有重要东西需要保护。

    光荣革命也未给新近壮大的纳税人减税的借口,如经济学家曼瑟尔·奥尔森所提示的。恰恰相反,政府开销作为国民生产总值的百分比,从 1689—1697 年的 11%,涨至 1741—1748 年的 17%,再涨至 1778—1783 年的将近 24%。在 18 世纪的高峰时期,英国征税高达 30%。

    光荣革命的重大成就之一是使征税合法,从此以后,征税全凭同意。民主政体的公众并不一定反对高税,只要知道这是为了重要的公共目标,比如国防。他们所不喜欢的是非法征税、税款被浪费或掉进贪官污吏的荷包。光荣革命之后,英国投入两场与路易十四法国的昂贵战争,即九年战争(1689—1697)和西班牙继位战争(1702—1713)。二十年几乎连续不断的战争,证明是非常昂贵的。从 1688 年到 1697 年,英国舰艇的数量几乎翻了一番。纳税人愿意支持这些及后来的战争,因为他们在战争得失上得到咨询,被要求批准新的税收。不用多作解说,英国较高的征税并没有遏制资本主义革命。

    与专制法国的对照是很醒目的。法国没有接受同意的原则,征税必须依赖强力。政府在同一时期从没能征收超过其国民生产总值的 12% 到 15%,真正到手的往往更低。法国社会中最负担得起的精英却在购买免税和特权,这意味着税收负担落到社会最弱成员的身上。所以,在路易十四过世的 1715 年,人口几乎是英国四倍的法国发现自己已经破产。

    光荣革命和随之发生的财政和银行改革,如 1694 年建立的英国银行,确实使公共财政经历了革命性的变更。它们允许政府在透明的公共债务市场上借贷资金,而法国或西班牙是无法企及的。因此,英国政府借贷在 18 世纪激增,使得国家愈加壮大。

    美国革命和法国大革命

    本卷对政治发展的介绍到此结束,时值 18 世纪末,美国革命和法国大革命的前夕。在此停下有逻辑上的原因。黑格尔的伟大注释者亚历山大·科耶夫(Alexandre Kojève,出生于俄罗斯,后来长住法国)认为,众所周知的历史终结于 1806 年,其时,拿破仑在耶拿和奥尔斯塔特击败普鲁士君主政体,将自由和平等的原则带到黑格尔的欧洲。科耶夫以他通常的讽刺和顽皮说明,1806 年以来发生的一切,包括间杂世界大战和革命的 20 世纪狂飙突进(sturm und drang),只是在填平历史所留下的坑坑洼洼。也就是说,现代政府的基本原则在耶拿战役时已获建立,后续任务不是发现新的原则和更高级的政治秩序,而是将之推至世界上越来越多的地区。

    我相信,科耶夫的声明仍值得认真考虑。现代政治秩序的三个组件——强大且有能力的国家、国家从属于法治、政府对所有公民负责——已在 18 世纪末世界上的某地获得确立。中国很早就开发了强大国家;法治存在于印度、中东、欧洲;负责制政府首次出现于英国。耶拿战役之后的政治发展,只涉及这些制度在全世界的复制,而没有看到全新制度的补充。20 世纪的共产主义曾有如此的雄心壮志,到了 21 世纪,却又在世界舞台上几近消失。

    英国是三大组件聚合在一起的第一个大国。这三者互相之间高度倚靠。没有强大的早期国家,就没有法治,以及对合法产权的广泛认识。没有健全的法治和合法产权,平民绝不可能群起奋争,将负责制强加给英国君主政体。没有负责制的原则,英国绝不可能在法国大革命时成为强大国家。 其他欧洲国家,包括荷兰、丹麦和瑞典,也在 19 世纪建立国家、法治和负责制的整套制度。它们所走的途径与英国有实质上的不同。但要承认,整套制度一旦到位,它所创建的国家如此强大,如此合法,对经济增长如此友善,以至成为推向全世界的模式。在缺乏英国式历史和社会条件的国家,这个模式将有怎样的遭遇,那将是第 2 卷的主题。

    第 28 章 负责制或专制主义?

    前述案例的互相比较;通向代议政府的英国路径不是唯一;达到丹麦;历史讨论与今日的民主斗争息息相关

    我们现已介绍了五个欧洲案例,在负责制和代议制度方面,引出四个不同结果。法国和西班牙创造了弱的专制主义,但没有建立议会负责制的原则。两个国家分割出卖自己的功能给众多精英,精英以特权和免税保护自己——但不包括其余社会群体——避开国家的任意权力。俄罗斯建立了更为彻底的中国式专制主义,其君主政体将精英征入国家服务,予以掌控。在匈牙利,强大凝聚的精英在君主权力上实施宪政制衡,从而建立起负责制的原则。但这制衡太过强大,以致阻碍了国家的有效运作。最后,只有在英国,强大的议会将负责制原则强加于国王,但并没有破坏强大和统一的主权政府。问题在于,为何会有如此不同的结果?

    可用一个很简单的公式来解释这些差异,其与我们所介绍的农业社会中四大政治参与者的均势有关。它们是以国王为代表的国家本身、高级贵族、士绅以及我所谓的第三等级。这种四分法过于简略,但对结果的理解大有裨益。

    欧洲有些贵族家族先发制人,取得优势,而变得强盛起来——法国的卡佩家族、匈牙利的阿尔帕德王朝、俄罗斯的留里克王朝、征服后的诺曼王朝——从而出现国家。它们的兴起归功于有利地理、卓越领导、组织能力和掌控合法性的能力。合法性可能是统治者最初优势的来源,如率领马扎尔人(Magyars)皈依基督教的伊斯特万。有人以赫赫武功征服军阀对手,给社会带来和平和安全,合法性也可能接踵而至。

    高级贵族可说是遗留下来的军阀,拥有自己领土、大批侍从和资源。这个群体有效治理自己的领土,可传给后裔,也可交换成其他资产。

    士绅是低级精英,虽有社会地位,但不一定拥有重要的土地或资源。他们的人数远远超过贵族,明显从属于贵族。

    第三等级包含工匠、商人、解放了的农奴,以及不受庄园经济和封建法律管辖的城镇居民。

    除了这四个群体,还有占人口大多数的农民。然而,农民还不是重要的政治参与者。到 18 世纪,他们才在北欧某些地区参与政治。四下分散、贫困和缺乏教育的农民,很难完成重大的集体行动。中国、土耳其和法国的农业社会,农民起义同期性爆发,最终都被镇压,经常伴随可怕的野蛮和残忍。那些反抗影响了其他参与者的行为和计算,例如,国家在考虑增加农业税时会特别小心。在其他时刻,农民起义可帮助推翻中国皇朝。但农民很难采取集团行动,以迫使整个制度实施关心农民利益的长期改革。

    这五个群体的交叉关系在图 1 中得到说明(参看第 22 章)。除农民外,这些社会群体都组织起来(只在程度上有深有浅),可以成为政治参与者,为夺得权力而斗争。国家尝试扩充自己的统治。国家之外的群体试图保护和扩充现有特权,或反对国家,或互相争斗。这些斗争的结果多半取决于主要参与者的集体行动,甚至国家本身也需要精诚团结。王朝的内部分裂、组织故障、侍从不再相信王室的合法性、国王没能孕育继位者,都有可能造成国家的软弱。此外,这些不同群体可以组成各式同盟——国王和士绅之间、国王和第三等级之间、高级贵族和士绅之间、士绅和第三等级之间,等等。

    图 6. 集体行动的故障

    出现专制主义的案例中,无论是强大的还是软弱的,抵抗国家的群体不可避免地遇上了集体行动的故障(参看图 6)。哪里有负责制,哪里的国家相对弱于其他政治群体。议会政府出现的地方,凝聚的国家和组织良好、善于自卫的社会之间产生了相对均势。

    弱的专制主义

    我们现在可以总结早先章节所描述的各种结果。

    相对软弱的国家遇上组织良好的社会,但前者仍得以掌控后者,这就是法国和西班牙,遂出现弱的专制主义。在这两个案例中,国家的权力基础依靠有限的领土,包含皇家领地和国家直接征税地区——对法国君主政体来说,即巴黎周围的财政区省(编按:原文误为三级会议省[pays d’états],据前文第 23 章改正);对西班牙哈布斯堡王朝来说,即卡斯提尔区域。它们都想通过拉拢收买、王朝阴谋和直接征服来取得更多领土,但西欧的地理,以及 16 世纪晚期和 17 世纪早期的军事技术,尚不允许快速的武力扩张——应该还记得,星状要塞使围攻战争变得既昂贵又必不可少——法国和西班牙的君主很快发现,自己因军事开支和帝国扩张而深陷财政危机。

    在这两个案例中,国家之外还有强大的地方参与者,竭力抵制中央集权。他们包括拥有土地和资源的古老血缘贵族、广大的士绅阶层、城市资产阶级,已经组成正式的等级——法国的高等法院和西班牙的议会。法国和西班牙国家一步步收买这些群体,开始时好像不是国家建设的战略计划,只是防止破产的绝望革新。最初,法国在财政区省以免税和特权来购买地方精英的忠诚。它在 1557 年对“大借款”赖债不还,引发破产。这之后,它开始向富有个人出售公职,到 17 世纪早期又摇身变为世袭财产。公职的出售和再出售,一直持续到世纪末的路易十四年代。意大利和低地国家的持久王朝战争,使西班牙国家早早陷入破产。来自新世界的收入使之维持到 16 世纪末。到 17 世纪,它也只好诉诸拍卖国家的部分职能。

    法国和西班牙君主的集权能力,受到两国既存法治的严格限制,他们觉得必须尊重封建权利和臣民的特权。但他们试图抓住每一次机会,以扩充征税和征兵的权力,一有可能就想方设法扭曲、违反或规避有关法律。他们鼓励知识分子传播专制和主权的教条,以支持自己是法律最终来源的宣称,但没有设法废除或忽略法律。到最后,他们仍受规范化的遏制,无法从事中国皇帝式的随心所欲,像血腥清洗贵族对手的武则天,或像任意没收豪族土地的明朝开国皇帝朱元璋。

    对精英的一步步收买,意味着一再扩展寻租联合体,先是传统的贵族精英,再是新动员起来的社会参与者,如城市资产阶级。更确切地说,与其联合起来保护自己阶层的利益,这些精英宁愿以政治权力来交换社会地位和部分国家职能——不是议会的代表权,而是国家征税权的分享。用托克维尔的话说,自由被理解为一种特权,而不是真正的自治。这导致弱的专制主义,一方面,国家权力不受正式宪法的约束,另一方面,它又将自己前途抵押给了自己很难掌控的大批强势个人。

    对法国和西班牙来说,国家的软弱最终证明是致命的。因为国家建设以精英免税为基础,税收负担都落到农民和普通商贩的头上。两个国家都无法征集足够收入,以满足统治者的帝国野心。法国竞争不过更小的英国,后者的税收基础因议会负责制的原则而获得保证。西班牙进入持续一世纪的军事和经济的衰退。它们的国家都丧失了合法性,因为其组成方式本身就是腐败的,法国改革的失败为大革命铺平道路。

    强大的专制主义

    俄罗斯建立了更接近中国的强大专制主义国家。只要将它的发展与法国或西班牙作一对比,个中原因显而易见,其间重大差异至少有五项。

    第一,俄罗斯的地理——广阔大草原,只有很少自然障碍来应对基于骑兵的军队——使之易受来自西南、东南和西北的入侵,且经常是同时发生的。军事动员因此而变得非常重要。这还意味着,与对手相比,先发制人的军阀享有规模上的极大优势。莫斯科国家的权力基于对服役贵族——相当于士绅——的军事招聘。它能这样做,因为它仍是边界不定的边境国家。跟奥斯曼帝国西帕希骑士的情形一样,该阶层成员所获的奖励就是新土地,这些骑兵变成了国王的直接受养人。(最相似的西欧做法就是西班牙国王,将新大陆的托管权作为服务的报酬赠与征服者,导致了同样的政治等级制度。)莫斯科公国凭借对鞑靼的早期军事成功而获得先发制人的优势,因此享有比其他封地领主更多的合法性。

    第二,从卸下鞑靼轭到莫斯科投入国家建设,其间只有很短时期。封建主义在西欧扎根八百年,孕育了骄傲的血缘贵族,坚守在散布四野的险固城堡。相比之下,俄罗斯的封地时期仅持续两个世纪,贵族成员组织松弛,根本无法抵制中央君主的权力,也没有城堡可住。与西欧相比,他们以及像诺夫哥罗德那样的独立城市,较少受到地理上的保护。

    第三,俄罗斯没有可与西欧媲美的法治传统。指派俄罗斯牧首的拜占庭东正教,本身没有经历类似叙任权斗争的冲突,始终是政教合一,直到君士坦丁堡的失陷。拜占庭帝国的法律也没变成综合法典,受西方那样法律专业自治团体的保护。俄罗斯东正教是拜占庭教会的精神继承人,虽然时有偏离莫斯科统治者的政治独立,但也从国家赞助那里收获重大好处。天主教会可在分裂的西欧政治舞台中合纵连横,俄罗斯教会没有选择,只好去莫斯科,通常成为国家的顺从拥护者。没有独立的教会权威来监看一套教会法规,这意味着,接受训练的法律专家没有属于自己的机构来培养集团身份。教会官僚担任早期西欧国家的行政官员,在俄罗斯,管理国家机构的是军官和家族人选(经常是同一人)。最后,对很多俄罗斯人来说,统治者的榜样不是依法执政的君主,而是纯粹掠夺的蒙古征服者。

    第四,地理环境使农奴所有者结成卡特尔成为必需,将贵族和士绅的利益与君主政体的利益紧紧绑在一起。因为没有地理界限,要维持像农奴制那样的制度,全靠农奴主在处罚和归还逃奴上的严格自律。沙皇只要支持对农奴实施越来越紧的限制,就可把精英拴在国家这一边。相比之下,西欧的自由城市是庇护所,逃离领主和庄园经济的农奴,为追求自由而来投奔城市。在俄罗斯,城市充任功能上的边境——最终都被封闭。明显不同于俄罗斯君主和其他东欧统治者,西欧的国王发现,自由城市在反对强势领主的斗争中于己有利,因此予以保护。

    最后,有些思想在俄罗斯的渗透,达不到在西方国家那样的程度。首先是法治,再延伸到源于宗教改革和启蒙运动的整套思想。丹麦王太后索菲亚·玛德莲娜(Sophie Magdalene)在皇家领地上释放农奴时,曾是伏尔泰朋友的叶卡捷琳娜大帝,却在对俄罗斯农奴的行动自由实施更为严格的限制。当然,很多启蒙运动的思想被推行现代化的俄罗斯君主所采用,像彼得大帝。三代之后,沙皇亚历山大二世方才解放农奴。与欧洲其他部分相比,现代思想对俄罗斯的影响更为缓慢、更为虚弱。

    英国的结果为何不像匈牙利?

    以这些未能抵抗专制的国家为背景,英国的成果便显得愈加惊人。英国主要社会群体为保护自己的权利而反对国王,所显示出的团结胜过任何其他地方。英国议会包括从大贵族到自耕农的全部有产阶级的代表。其中两个群体特别重要,那就是士绅和第三等级。前者的阶层没有被招募进入国家服务,像俄罗斯那样;后者基本上不愿以政治权利来交换爵位和个人特权,如法国那样。法国、西班牙、俄罗斯的君主政体,向精英中的个人兜售官爵,从而破坏精英之间的团结。俄罗斯的门第选官法,其目的很像法国和西班牙的卖官鬻爵。英国君主也尝试像出售公职那样的手段,但议会仍是凝聚的机构,其原因早已提到——即对地方政府、普通法和宗教的普遍认可。

    这还不足以解释英国议会为何如此强大,以致君主政体被迫接受宪法。匈牙利议会中的贵族也很强大,也组织良好。像在兰尼米德的英国男爵,较低层次的匈牙利贵族在 13 世纪强迫君主接受宪法妥协,即金玺诏书,在后续年份中又死死看住国家。在马蒂亚斯·匈雅提于 1490 年去世后,贵族阶层扭转君主政体在前一代作出的中央集权改革,夺回权力。

    但匈牙利贵族阶层没有运用权力来加强整体国家能力。更确切地说,他们以国防能力为代价给自己减税,保护自己的狭隘特权。相比之下,源自 1688—1689 年光荣革命的宪政和解,大大加强了英国的国家能力,以至它在未来一世纪中成为欧洲的主要强国。那么,我们要问的是,既然英国议会已经强大到能够遏制掠夺性的君主,但议会本身为何没有发展成寻租联合体,没有像匈牙利议会一样作茧自缚。

    英国负责制政府没有退化成贪婪的寡头政治,至少有两条原因。首先,英国的社会结构不同于匈牙利。英国议会中的团体是寡头政治,但与匈牙利相比,他们底下的社会更为流动,向非精英开放的程度更高。在匈牙利,士绅被吸收到狭窄的贵族阶层;在英国,他们代表一个庞大且凝聚的社会群体,在某些方面甚至比贵族还要强大。不像匈牙利,英国拥有基层政治参与的传统,体现在百户法庭、县法庭和其他地方治理机构。英国领主习惯于出席会议,与自己的属臣和佃户平等相处,讨论决定涉及共同利益的问题。此外,匈牙利没有英国那样的自耕农。自耕农是相对富裕的农民,拥有自己的土地,参与地方上的政治生活。匈牙利城市受到贵族阶层的严格控制,不能像英国那样衍生出富庶和强大的资产阶级。

    其次,尽管英国有个人自由的传统,但它的中央国家既强大,又在社会上获得大致的好评。它是发展出统一司法制度的首批国家之一,保护产权,为应付欧洲大陆的各式敌人而建起实质性的海军。1649 年查理一世被送上断头台,之后,英国又试验了共和政府和克伦威尔的护国公体制,结果都不如人意。甚至在议会拥护者的眼中,弑君本身似乎都是不正义的非法行为。英国内战见证了同样的愈趋激进,像法国、布尔什维克和中国革命后来所经历的一样。更为激进的反皇派,像平均派(leveller)和掘地派(digger),所追求的似乎不只是政治负责制,而是更为广泛的社会革命,从而吓坏了议会所代表的有产阶级。所以,随着查理二世的登基,君主政体在 1660 年得以复辟,大家都松了一口气。复辟之后,政治负责制的问题在天主教徒詹姆士二世的治下重新泛起,其阴谋诡计招致议会的怀疑和反对,最终引致光荣革命。但这一次,没人再想废除君主政体或国家,只想要一位对自己负责的国王,那就是奥兰治的威廉。

    这再次证明思想是非常重要的。到 17 世纪晚期,像霍布斯和洛克那样的思想家,摆脱了基于阶级和等级的封建秩序的概念,转而赞成国家和公民之间的社会契约。霍布斯在《利维坦》中认为,就激情和彼此施暴的能耐而言,人与人在根本上都是平等的;此外,他们还享有天赋权利。洛克接受这些前提,并抨击不经被统治者同意也可有合法统治的主张。只要依照同意原则,就可以推翻国王。这些早期自由主义者认为,权利是抽象和普遍的,任何强人不得合法剥夺。但在这些思想传到匈牙利之前,匈牙利早已向土耳其和奥地利屈服称臣了。

    从上述比较中可得出一个简单的教训。政治自由——即社会自我统治的能力——不但要看社会能否动员起来,以对抗中央集权,并将宪法约束强加于国家;还要看国家是否足够强大,能在必要时采取行动。负责制不是只从国家流向社会的单行道。如果政府不能采取团结行动,没有广泛接受的共同目标,就无法奠定政治自由的真正基石。明显不同于马蒂亚斯·匈雅提死后的匈牙利,1689 年之后的英国仍然强大而团结。议会愿意向自身征税,为 18 世纪的海外持久争斗作出牺牲。与没有制衡的政治制度相比,高度制衡的不一定会取得更大成功,因为政府需要定期采取坚决果断的行动。所以,负责制政治制度的稳定,全靠国家和社会之间的广泛均势。

    达到丹麦

    辉格史观的问题之一在于,它将英国的经历当作宪政民主制(constitutional democracy)兴起的范例。然而,欧洲其他国家走上不同路径,最后抵达与英国相同的目的地。我们开始解说冗长的政治发展史时,曾提出丹麦如何变成今日丹麦的问题——守法、民主、繁荣、执政清廉的政体,其政治腐败处于世界最低水平——我们需要时间来解释这个结果。

    在 1500 年,还看不出丹麦(或斯堪的纳维亚其他国家)将会不同于中世纪晚期的其他欧洲社会。有些评论家尝试将今日的丹麦一直追溯到当初定居斯堪的纳维亚的维京人。除了他们不骑马,驾长艇远行,很难想象这一掠夺部落,如何将自己从来自罗马帝国之后定居欧洲的日耳曼野蛮人中彻底区分出来。

    丹麦的君主政体具有很古老的血统,从 13 世纪起变得相对软弱。国王被迫签署宪章,允诺向贵族议会征求咨询,向教会提供特权。像欧洲的其他国家,丹麦的经济仍以庄园为基础。丹麦地处波罗的海的进口,邻近汉萨同盟的港口城市,使国际贸易成为其经济发展的重要因素。卡尔马联盟(Kalmar Union)在 15 世纪中期曾短暂地统一大部分的斯堪的纳维亚。联盟解散后,丹麦仍是相当重要的多民族政权,控制着挪威、冰岛、说德语的石勒苏益格—荷尔斯泰因地区(Schleswig & Holstein),以及现是海湾对面的瑞典西部省份。

    如果说有一个事件,促使丹麦和斯堪的纳维亚其他地区走上独特发展道路,那就是宗教改革。跟在欧洲其他地区一样,马丁·路德(Martin Luther)的思想证明是非常震撼人心的,催化了大众对天主教会的长期不满。在丹麦,短暂内战导致新教徒的胜利,以及 1536 年路德派丹麦国教的建立。促成这个结果的,既有道德因素,也有物质因素,丹麦国王视之为攫取教会资产的良机。当时,教会拥有相当多的财富,大约占有丹麦土地的 30%。

    宗教改革在丹麦的持久政治影响是鼓励农民脱盲。路德教会坚信,普通老百姓要与上帝沟通,需要阅读圣经,或至少要读路德教的简易问答集(Lesser Catechism)。始于 16 世纪,路德教会在丹麦每一座村庄设立学校,让教士向农民传授基本的读写技能。结果在 18 世纪,丹麦农民(还有斯堪的纳维亚的其他地区)已成为教育程度相对较高、日益组织起来的社会阶层。

    当代社会的社会动员通常是经济发展的结果,这也是中世纪英国所走的道路。普通法的产权扩展,促使英国农民的最高层进化成政治上活跃的自耕农。相比之下,在前现代 16 世纪的丹麦,促进社会动员的是宗教。脱盲允许农民改善经济条件,还帮助他们互相交流,并作为政治行动者组织起来。到 19 世纪早期,斯堪的纳维亚和俄罗斯的乡村,彼此之间的悬殊是无法想象的,尽管两者的地理相近,气候相似。

    跟英国的情形不同,这里的代议民主制并不来自组织良好、足以抵抗中央国家的封建残余机构(议会)。丹麦在 1660 年败于瑞典,遂建立了专制国家,其官僚机构变得愈益精明。丹麦议会已被废除,没有基于社会等级的政治结构,可供君主前去要求增税。

    从 1760 年到 1792 年,丹麦发生了重大的政治革命。开明君主开始逐渐废除农奴制(Stavnsbånd),先在皇家领地,再扩展到所有地主,并限制地主处罚下人的权利,譬如不能再将农民放在木马上鞭打。农民仍然没有选举权,但可以拥有土地,并能在同等的基础上从商。

    丹麦君主将农民自由视作遏制贵族地主的良机,遂遭到了地主的顽强抵抗。他又可将获得自由的农民,直接征募进国家军队。思想也很重要。亚当·斯密的《国富论》出版于 1776 年,他认为,自耕农的生产效率将远远超过农奴。同样重要的是农民本身得到越来越多的教育和动员,充分利用自由经济的机会,投入到盈利较多的增值生意,例如食物加工。

    使丹麦现代民主成为可能的第二个重大事件来自外国。到 18 世纪末,丹麦仍是欧洲中等的多民族政权。在 1814 年的拿破仑战争中失去挪威。19 世纪前几十年,法国大革命思想的传播促成复杂的政治后果。它刺激了基于阶级的两项需求,一项来自资产阶级和农民,跟政治参与有关;另一项来自说德语的少数民族,与国家认可有关。

    普鲁士解决了第二项需求,通过一场短暂但决定性的战争,在 1864 年兼并了主要说德语的石勒苏益格—荷尔斯泰因公国。只过一个晚上,丹麦就变成基本上讲丹麦语的整齐划一的小国。它知道自己别无他法,只好接受小国寡民的处境。

    丹麦的民主出现于 19 世纪后期,社会民主主义出现于 20 世纪早期,这就是它们的来龙去脉。教士兼教育家的葛隆维(N. F. S. Grundtvig)所激发的农民政治运动,最初只装扮成宗教复兴运动。它摆脱官方的路德教会,在全国各地大办学校。等到立宪君主政体在 1848 年当政,农民运动和代表资产阶级的自由派开始要求直接的政治参与,并在翌年获得选举权。丹麦在 20 世纪成为福利国家,这已超越本卷的范围。当它最终来到时,并不完全依靠新兴的工人阶级,还需要农民阶级的帮助。在关键时刻,促使农民动员起来的不是经济增长,而是宗教。

    民主和现代市场经济在丹麦的发展,比在英国经历了少得多的冲突和狂暴,更不用提相比法国、西班牙和德国了。为了到达现代丹麦,丹麦人确实与邻国打了好几仗,包括瑞典和普鲁士,也在 17 世纪和 19 世纪发生了激烈的国内冲突。但没有持久的内战,没有圈地运动,没有专制暴政,没有早期工业化所带来的赤贫,所留下的阶级斗争遗产非常薄弱。就丹麦的故事而言,思想是至关重要的,这不仅指路德教会和葛隆维的意识形态,而且还有 18 世纪和 19 世纪一系列丹麦君主所接受的关于权利和宪政的启蒙思想。

    丹麦的民主兴起充满了历史的偶然性,不能在别处复制。丹麦抵达现代自由民主制的途径完全不同于英国,但最终都抵达非常相似的目的地。它们都发展了强大国家、法治和负责制政府。这似乎显示,“达到丹麦”可有多种途径。

    第五部分 迈向政治发展理论

    第 29 章 政治发展和政治衰败

    政治的生物基础;政治秩序的进化机制;政治不同于经济;制度的定义;政治衰败的来源;国家、法治、负责制的相互关联;政治发展条件的历史演变

    本卷提供的政治发展史是从前人类时代到法国和美国革命前夕,直到这时,真正的现代政治方才问世。此后,众多政治体出现,囊括现代政治制度的三大重要组件:国家、法治、负责制政府。

    至此,有些读者可能会断定,我对政治发展的解读是历史决定论的。通过介绍各种政治制度复杂且背景独特的起源,我似乎在主张,类似的制度要在今日出现必须要有类似条件,各国因独特的历史背景已被锁定在各自单一的发展路径上。

    这肯定是误解。能把优势带给社会的制度,总是被他人复制和改进;知识和制度的跨社会交汇,伴随着历史的始终。此外,本卷的历史故事,结束于工业革命前夕,而工业革命本身,又大大改变了政治发展的条件。这两点,将在最后一章得到详细描述。本书的第 2 卷,将描述和分析后马尔萨斯世界(post-Malthusian world)的政治发展。

    人类社会对制度持强烈的保守态度,不会每过一代就把台面上的赌注一扫而光。新制度往往重叠在既有制度上面,例如分支世系制,它是社会组织最古老的形式,却依然存在于现代世界的很多地方。如不弄清这一遗产和它对今日政治行动者选择的限制,就不可能理解今日改革的可能性。

    此外,厘清制度初建时的复杂可帮助我们看到,它们的转变和模仿,即使在现代情形下,也是异常艰难的。政治制度得以建立,往往出于非政治原因(经济学家称之为政治制度的外部因素),我们已看到若干案例。其中之一是私人财产,它的出现不仅为了经济,还因为宗族需要土地埋葬祖先以平息死者灵魂。同样,法治的神圣不可侵犯,在历史上全靠法律的宗教起源。国家在中国和欧洲出现,根源就是当代国际体系所竭力阻止的无休止战争。没有这些外部因素,仍想重建这些制度,往往举步维艰。

    我将总结本卷中有关政治制度发展的主题,并从中提炼出政治发展和衰败的理论大纲。这可能算不上真正的预测性理论,因为最终结果往往取决于互有关联的众多因素。此外还有龟的问题,即选来充当原因的龟,结果又要以底下的龟为基础。我以自然状态和人类生物学为本卷的开头,因为它是明显的起点,可算作底层的龟(Grund-Schildkröte),可以背驮后续的龟群。

    政治的生物基础

    人类在社会中组织自己行为时,不是完全自由的,因为他们共享一种生物本性。考虑到非洲之外的多数当代人,都可认祖归宗到大约五万年前的小群体,这种本性在全世界都是统一的。共享的本性不能决定政治行为,但可限定可能的制度性质。这表示,人类政治取决于人类重复的行为模式,既横跨文化又纵越时间。共享的本性将在下述论点中获得说明:

    人类从未在无社会状态中生存。据称,人类曾是隔离的,要么在无政府暴力中与他人互动(霍布斯),要么在和平中对他人一无所知(卢梭),但这却是错的。人类及其灵长目祖先,一直生活在基于亲戚关系的大小社会群体中。生活得如此长久,以至社会合作所需要的认知和情感,都已进化成人类的天性。这表明,有关集体行动的理性选择,即他们核算合作的利弊,大大低估了人类社会既存的合作,也误读了其中的动机。

    人类天生的社会交往建立在两个原则之上:亲戚选择和互惠利他。亲戚选择原则,又称包容适存性原则,是指人类会大致根据共享的基因比例,对跟自己有遗传关系的亲属(或被认为有遗传关系的个体)做出利他行为。互惠利他原则是指,随着与其他个体的长时间互动,人类会发展出共同的利害关系。跟亲戚选择不同,互惠利他不依赖遗传关系,而是依赖重复、直接的人际互动,以及从这类互动中产生的信任关系。在缺乏其他更为非人格化制度激励的情况下,这些形式的社会合作是人类互动的预设模式。一旦非人格化制度出现衰败,这两种合作又会重现,因为这是人类的本性。我所谓的家族化,就是指基于这两项原则的政治用人。所以,当中国汉朝末年皇亲国戚充塞朝廷,当土耳其禁卫军让自己的儿子入伍接班,当法兰西王国卖官鬻爵制造世袭产业,只不过是自然的家族制原则复辟了。

    人类天生喜欢制定和遵循规范或规则。从根本上说,制度就是限制个人选择的规则,由此类推,可以说人类天生喜欢建立制度。人们核算如何可获最大私利,从而制定理性规则,与他人一起履行社会契约。人类天生具有认知能力,知道如何解答“囚徒困境”类的合作问题。他们记住过去行为以作未来合作的指南;他们通过闲聊和其他分享,传播和获悉他人的可信度;他们有敏锐的知觉,通过察言观色以侦测谎言和不可信赖的行为;他们掌握分享信息的共同模式,不管是语言的,还是非语言的。在某种意义上,制定和遵循规则是在走捷径,可大大减少社交成本,允许高效率的集体行动。

    人类遵循规则的本能,往往基于情感,而非理性。像罪过、可耻、骄傲、愤怒、困窘和赞美,都不是学来的,都不是洛克所谓的出生后、与外界互动时获得的。它们在小孩身上表现得非常自然,小孩依照这基于遗传但寓于文化的规则来组织自己的行为。我们制定和遵循规则的能力很像我们的语言能力:规则的内容是传统的,因社会而异;但规则的“内在结构”和我们的接受能力却是天生的。

    人类倾向于将内在价值注入规则,这有助于说明社会的保守和顽固。规则的产生是为了因应特殊情形;之后,情形本身有了变化;久而久之,规则变得过时,甚至严重失调,但社会仍然拽住不放。欧洲人示范了枪械的卓有成效,但马穆鲁克仍予以拒绝,因为他们已向骑士征战注入了特殊情感,这直接导致了他们惨败于应时而变的奥斯曼帝国。因此,各社会都有竭力保留现存制度的普遍倾向。

    人类天生具有暴力倾向。从存在的第一瞬间,人类就对其同类行使暴力,就像他们的灵长目祖先。尽管我敬仰卢梭,但暴力倾向不是人类在历史某时某刻学来的。同时,社会制度的存在就是为了控制和转移暴力。政治制度最重要的功能之一就是调控暴力出现的层面。

    人类天生追求的不只是物质,还有承认。承认是指对他人尊严或价值的承认,又可称作地位。追求承认或地位的奋斗,往往不同于为物质的奋斗;地位是相对的,不是绝对的,即经济学家罗伯特·弗兰克(Robert Frank)所称的“地位性物品”(positional good)。换言之,只有他人都处于低级地位时,你才算拥有了高级地位。像自由贸易的合作游戏是正和,允许大家都赢;然而,追求承认或地位的斗争却是零和,你的增益一定是对方的损失。

    人类政治活动的大部分都以寻求承认为中心。不管是寻求天命的中国未来君主,打黄巾或赤眉旗号的卑微农民,还是法国红便帽起义军,他们都在追求承认。阿拉伯部落平息相互纠纷,征服北非和中东的大部,这是在为伊斯兰教寻求承认。欧洲战士征服新大陆,打的是基督教的旗帜。近代民主政体的兴起,如避而不谈其内核的平等承认,也是无法理解的。在英国,追求承认的性质循序渐进,从部落或村庄的权利,到英国人民的权利,再到洛克式的天赋人权。

    抵制人类只追求物质利益的讲法是很重要的。人类历史中的施暴者,往往不在寻求财富,而在追求承认。冲突的长期持续,远远超过其经济意义。承认有时与财富有关,有时又以财富为牺牲品;如把承认视作另类的“功用”(utility),那就偏于简单,于事无补了。

    思想作为原因

    在解释社会差异和独特发展路径时,如不把思想当作原因,便无法打造政治发展的理论。在社会科学的术语中,思想是独立的变数;在龟的术语中,思想处在龟群的下层,它的底下绝对没有经济或自然环境的龟。

    所有的社会都制造现实的心智模型。这些心智模型在不同因素中——时常是无形的——寻找因果关系,为了使世界更清晰、更可预言、更容易操纵。在早期社会,这些无形因素是精神、魔鬼、上帝、自然,时至今日则演变成抽象概念,像地心吸力、辐射、经济自利、社会阶级等。所有的宗教信仰都是现实的心智模型,都把观察到的现象归因于无法或很难观察的力量。至少从大卫·休谟起,我们懂得,单靠实证资料是无法核实因果关系的。随着现代自然科学的发展,我们改用新的因果理论以控制实验或统计分析,至少可以证伪。有了测试因果的更好办法,人类得以更有效地操纵环境。例如,改用肥料和灌溉来增加粮食产量,而不是牺牲者的血液。每个已知的人类社会都制造现实的心智模型。这表明,这种能力是天生的而不是后学的。

    共享的心智模型,尤其是宗教,在促进大规模集体行动方面是至关重要的。建立在理性自利上的集体行动,解释不了世界上客观存在的社会合作和利他主义。宗教信仰激发人们所做的事,只对财富感兴趣的人通常是不做的,就像我们看到的伊斯兰教 7 世纪在阿拉伯半岛的崛起。信念和文化的分享会增进合作,因为有共同目标,还有应付类似难题的协调。

    很多人看到当代世界的宗教冲突,从而反对宗教,认为它们是暴力和心胸狭隘的来源。这在重叠宗教和多样宗教的世界,可能是千真万确的,但他们忽视了宗教的历史作用。它曾扮演非常重要的角色,允许超越亲友的合作,成为社会关系的来源。此外,世俗的意识形态,如马列主义和民族主义,已在很多当代社会取代宗教信仰,呈现出不相上下的破坏能量,也能激发强烈的信念。

    心智模型和规则紧密相连,因为它往往明确指出社会必须遵循的规则。宗教不只是理论,而且是道德规范的处方,要求追随者严格遵守。宗教,就像其颁布的教规,都被注入深厚的情感;信教是为了它的固有价值,不是为了它的准确或有用。宗教信仰,既不能确认,也很难证伪。所有这一切加深了人类社会的保守性。现实的心智模型一经采纳就很难变更,即使出现不利的新证据。

    几乎所有已知的人类社会都有某种形式的宗教信仰。这表明,宗教很可能植根于人的天性。就像语言和遵循规则,宗教信仰的内容是传统的,因社会而异,但建立宗教原则的能力却是先天的。我的叙述与宗教的政治影响有关,但不以“宗教基因”的存在与否为前提。即使宗教是后学的,它对政治行为仍施加巨大影响。

    像马克思和涂尔干那样的思想家,看到宗教信仰在联合群体上的高效率(或是社区整体,或是阶级整体),从而相信宗教是故意为此打造的。如我们所见,宗教思想与政治经济一起发展,从萨满教(shamanism)和巫术,到祖先崇拜,再到拥有成熟原则的多神论和一神论宗教。宗教信仰与信徒团体的生存条件,必须发生明显的关联。自杀教派,或禁止其成员繁衍的教派,如震教徒(Shakers),就不会存活太久。所以很容易产生一种倾向,以物质条件来解说宗教,并视宗教为它的产物。

    然而,这是一个大错。既存的物质条件永远解释不了宗教。最明显的案例是中国和印度的对照。公元前第一个千年终止时,两个社会的社会结构非常相似,都有父系血统的家族和由此产生的政治模式。之后,印度社会转入弯路,唯一的解释是婆罗门宗教的兴起。该教形而上学的主张是非常复杂的,但要把它与当时印度北部的经济和环境条件挂起钩来,却是徒劳无益的。

    我描绘的众多案例中,宗教思想都在塑造政治结果方面扮演了独立角色。例如,在欧洲两个重要制度的形成中,天主教会曾发挥主要作用。6 世纪以来,日耳曼野蛮部落逐渐征服罗马帝国;但在颠覆日耳曼的亲戚团体产权结构上,天主教会是关键,更削弱了部落制本身。欧洲由此走出基于亲戚关系的社会组织,用的是社会手段,而不是政治手段,与中国、印度和中东截然不同。在 11 世纪,天主教会宣告独立自主,不受世俗政府的管辖,并将自己组织成现代的等级制度,推动全欧洲的法治。相似的独立宗教机构,也存在于在印度、中东和拜占庭帝国,但在促使独立法律的制度化上,都比不上西方教会。没有叙任权斗争及其后果,法治绝不可能在西方落地生根。

    没有案例显示,宗教价值是超越物质利益的。像印度的婆罗门和穆斯林社会的乌里玛,天主教会也是拥有物质利益的社会团体。教宗格里高利一世所颁布的遗产新法,似乎不是为了教义,而是为了私利;它鼓励把土地转让给教会,而不必留给亲戚团体。尽管如此,教会不只是简单的政治参与者,像当时支配欧洲的各式军阀。它无法将资源转换成军事力量,没有世俗政府的帮助,也无法从事掠夺。另一方面,它却可将合法性授予世俗的政治参与者。这件事,后者光凭自己是做不到的。经济学家有时谈起政治参与者如何“投资”于合法性,好像合法性是生产工具,像土地或机器。如要理解合法性,就一定要投入它的特殊语境,即人们对上帝、正义、人生、社会、财富、美德等的观念。

    人类价值和意识形态的最重要变化之一——平等的承认——发生于本卷所涵盖时期的结尾,可以说正是这一观念定义了现代世界。人类平等思想有很深的根源:学者如黑格尔、托克维尔和尼采,把现代的平等思想追溯到圣经中以上帝形象造人的说法。然而,享有同等尊严的人类小圆圈,其扩张速度是非常缓慢的,要到 17 世纪之后,才开始包括社会较低阶层、女性、种族、宗教等少数人群体等。

    从族团和部落层次的社会迈入国家层次的社会,在某种意义上,代表人类自由的一大挫折。与基于亲戚关系的前任相比,国家更为富饶,更为强大。但这财富和力量,却铸造了悬殊的等级差别,有的变成主人,更多的变成奴隶。黑格尔会说,在如此不平等的社会中,统治者获得的承认是有缺陷的,最终连自己也不满意,因为它来自缺乏尊严的人。现代民主的兴起为所有人提供自决机会,以承认相互的尊严和权利为基础。因此,它只是在更大更复杂的社会里,恢复当初迈入国家时所失去的。

    负责制政府出现,与相关思想的传播是分不开的。我们在英国议会的案例中看到,对英国人民权利的信仰是议会团结的根本,洛克式的天赋人权塑造了光荣革命。这些思想进而推动美国革命。我在此书呈现的负责制兴起的历史原因,似乎植根于政治参与者的物质利益,但我们必须同时考虑,确定政治参与者和集体行动范围的相关思想。

    政治发展的普遍机制

    政治制度的进化,大致可与生物进化媲美。达尔文的进化论以两项简单的原则为基石:变异和选择。有机体的变异,源于基因的随意组合;能更好适应环境的变种,则获得较大的繁殖成功,适应力较差的就要付出代价。

    以长远的历史观点看,政治发展遵照同一模式:不同人类群体所使用的政治组织发生了变异,较为成功的——能发展较强的军事和经济力量——得以取代较不成功的。在高层次的抽象中,很难想象政治发展还有他路可走。但先要弄清政治进化与生物进化的差异,其至少有三条。

    首先,在政治进化中,选择对象是体现在制度身上的规则,而生物进化中的选择对象是基因。尽管人的天性促进规则的制订和遵循,但不能决定其内容,所以会有内容上的极大差别。制度以规则为基础,将优势授予其生存的社会;在人类代理人的互动中,获选的是优势制度,淘汰的是劣势制度。

    其次,在人类社会中,制度的变异可按计划,可作商讨,不像基因变异那样随意。哈耶克强烈驳斥人类社会自觉设计制度的想法,将之追溯到后笛卡尔(post-Cartesian)的理性主义。他认为,社会中多数信息其实是本地的,无法获得中央代理人的理解。哈耶克论点的缺陷是,人类一直在社会各层次成功地设计制度。他不喜欢自上而下、集中的国家社会工程,但愿意接受自下向上、分散的制度革新,尽管后者仍是人为设计的。大规模设计的成功频率,可能低于小规模的,但确有发生。人类很难将意外结果和信息残缺纳入计划,但能作计划的事实表明,自觉建立的制度之变异,比简单的随机而变更有可能适应解决问题。不过,哈耶克仍是正确的,制度进化并不取决于人们设计制度的能力,单是变异和选择,便可取得适时应务的进化结果。

    最后,被选择的特征——政治进化中是制度,生物进化中是基因——借文化而获得传递,不靠遗传。就适应性而言,这既是优势,又是劣势。文化特征,如规范、习惯、法律、信念或价值,至少在理论上,可在一代人的时间获得迅速修改,如 7 世纪的伊斯兰教,或 16 世纪丹麦农民的扫盲。另一方面,人们偏爱将内在价值注入心智模型和由此建立的制度,导致制度的经久不衰。相比之下,生物有机体不会敬畏或膜拜自己的基因,如不能帮助生物的存活和繁殖,选择原则便会无情将之去掉。所以,制度进化既可快于也可慢于生物进化。

    与生物进化不同,制度可通过模仿而获得扩散。衰弱制度的社会,被强大制度的社会打败了,或干脆消灭了,但也有采纳“防御性现代化”的,从而引进竞争者的制度。17—19 世纪的日本德川幕府时期,治国的封建君主们从葡萄牙人和其他旅客处,很早就获悉火器的存在。但他们正处于长期的军火自我管制中,大家同意不引进火器,因为不想放弃传统的冷兵器战争形式。当美国海军准将马休·佩里(Matthew Perry)和他的“黑船”在 1853 年的东京湾露脸时,执政的精英知道,如果不想成为第二个中国,他们必须终止这种舒适的自我管制来取得美国人所拥有的军事技术。1868 年的明治维新之后,日本引进的不只是军火,还有新式政府、中央官僚体制、新教育制度和其他一系列制度,均借鉴于欧洲和美国。

    生物进化既是特别的,又是普遍的。特别进化是指物种适应了特殊环境,并作调整,如著名的达尔文雀(Finches)。普遍进化是指成功的物种跨越本地环境,而向外扩散。所以有大规模的普遍进化,从单细胞到多细胞的有机体,从无性繁殖到有性繁殖,从恐龙到哺乳动物等。政治发展也是如此。行为意义上的现代人类,大约在五万年前离开非洲,迁移到世界各地。他们努力适应遇上的不同环境,开发了不同的语言、文化和制度。同时,某些社会凑巧碰上能提供优势的社会组织。于是,也发生了普遍进化,从族团层次,转到部落层次,再转到国家层次的社会。国家层次社会中,组织较为完善的又击败或吸收组织较差的,使自己的社会组织获得传播和扩散。所以在政治制度的演化中,既有分流,也有汇集。

    跟生物进化一样,竞争对政治发展至关重要。如没有竞争,就不会有对制度的选择压力,也不会有对制度革新、借鉴、改革的激励。导致制度革新的最重要竞争之一是暴力和战争。经济生产力的增长,使族团层次向部落层次的过渡得以实现,但直接动机则来自部落社会动员人力的优势。第 5 章中,我讨论了国家原生形成的不同理论,包括经济自利、灌溉、密集人口、地理界限、宗教权威、暴力。虽然,所有因素都发挥了作用;但从自由的部落社会到专制的国家社会,此项艰难的过渡,更像是由保全生命而不是经济利益的需要促成的。浏览诸如中国、印度、中东和欧洲等地国家形成的历史记录,我们看到暴力再一次成了主角。它鼓励国家形成,还鼓励与现代国家相关的特别制度的建立。本章后面还会讲到,合作中遇到的某种问题,除了暴力,没有其他方法。

    处处是拱肩

    生物学家史蒂芬·古尔德(Stephn Gould)和理查德·列万廷(Richard Lewontin),在 1979 年的文章中,以建筑学上的拱肩(spandrel)来解释生物变异中的不可预知。拱肩是支撑圆屋顶的拱门背线与相邻直角形成的弧形区域。它不是建筑师故意设计的,而是其他精心计划的零件组装后留下的副产品。尽管如此,拱肩开始获得装饰,并随时间的推移而自成一格。古尔德和列万廷主张,有机体身上为某个原因而进化的生物特征,到后来,却能为完全不同的原因,提供适应的优势。

    拱肩(左上角)

    我们在政治进化中看到不少类似拱肩的东西。公司——一个有着与其组成人员清晰可分的身份并可以永久存在的机构——最初是作为宗教组织出现的,没有任何商业目的。天主教会支持女子的继承权,不是想增加女子权利——这在 7 世纪是不合时宜的——而是看上了强大家族手中的珍贵地产,认为这是很好的途径。如果说,教会领袖当时就预见,这将影响亲戚关系的整体,这是很可疑的。最后,忙于叙任权斗争的人,脑海中并没有浮现以独立司法限制政府的想法。当时,那只是一场道德和政治的斗争,为了争取天主教会的独立自主。然而在西方,宗教组织赢得的独立自主,经过长期进化,变成了司法部门的独立自主。法律的宗教基础被世俗来源所取代,但它的结构仍保持原样。所以说,法治本身就是一种拱肩。

    实际上,不同制度的历史根源,往往是一长列历史意外事件的产品,没人能够预测。这看起来令人泄气,因为当代社会无法经历同样事件来获得类似制度。但这忽略了政治发展中拱肩的作用,与制度的历史来源相比,制度的功能更为重要。一旦发现,其他社会可以完全出乎意料的方式来模仿和采纳。

    制度(机构)

    在本卷中,我一直使用亨廷顿对制度的定义,即“稳定、有价值、重复的行为模式”。至于被称作国家的那个制度或机构(the institution called the state),我不仅使用韦伯的定义(在界定的领土上合法行使垄断暴力的组织),还使用他对现代国家的标准(按专门技术和技能合理地分工;使用非人格化的用人制度,对公民行使非人格化的权威)。非人格化的现代国家,不管是建立还是维持,都很困难。家族化——基于亲戚关系和互惠利他的政治用人——是社会关系的自然形式,如果没有其他的规范和鼓励,人类就会回归。

    现代组织还有其他特征。亨廷顿列出四条标准来测量国家制度(机构)的发展程度:适应和僵硬,复杂和简单,自主和从属,凝聚和松散。这是指越善于适应、越复杂、越能自主和越凝聚的机构,其发展程度就越是成熟。善于适应的组织,可评估不断变化的外部环境,再修改其内部程序来应对。环境总在变化,所以善于适应的机构活得长久。英国的普通法系统,其法官因应新情形,不断在重新解释和延伸有关法律,就是善于适应的样板。

    成熟的机构更为复杂,因为它们有更大的分工和专业化。在酋邦或初期国家中,统治者可能同时又是军事长官、总教士、税务员和最高法院的法官。在高度发达的国家中,这些功能由各自为政的组织承担,它们负有特别使命,需要高度的技术能力。汉朝时期,中国已在中央、郡、地方层次派驻无数官僚机构和部门;虽然比不上现代政府,但与犹如君主家庭简单延伸的早期政府相比,却是一大进步。

    自主和凝聚是机构标准的最后两条,如亨廷顿指出的,它们密切相关。自主是指机构开发自觉的集团身份,不受社会其他力量的影响。在第 17 至 19 章讨论法治时,我们看到,法律对政府权力的约束,很大程度上取决于法庭所取得的制度性自治。这里的自治是指不受政治干涉,有权训练、雇用、晋升、惩罚律师和法官。自主与专业化也是紧密相连的,所以,它适宜被看作比较成熟的机构的特征。其他条件都相同的情况下,掌控自身内部升迁的军队,比将军是政治任命的军队,或将军是金钱买来的军队,更具战斗力。

    另一方面,凝聚是指政治系统中,不同组织的职责和使命都有明确的界定并被遵从。松散的政治制度中,很多组织参与政府行为,如征税和公共安全,但弄不清到底谁在负责。众多自治机构组成的国家部门,比众多从属机构组成的更有可能是凝聚的。在家族化社会中,领袖的家庭或部落成员,在各政府功能上享有重叠或暧昧的权力,或干脆为特殊个人设立特殊官位。忠诚比公共管理能力更为重要,这种情况迄今仍存在于很多发展中国家(甚至少数发达国家)。国家部门中的官方权力分工,与权力的实际分配不符,导致机构的松散。

    制度(机构)的四条标准隐含一个概念,即制度是规则,或是重复的行为模式,比任何掌管机构的个人,都要活得长久。先知穆罕默德,生前以自己的魅力使麦地那部落团结起来,但他没有为阿哈里发的继承留下任何制度。年轻的宗教勉强活过第二代的权力斗争,在很多方面仍在为当初的缺陷付出代价,那就是逊尼派和什叶派的大分裂。穆斯林世界中后来的成功政权,全都依靠制度的创建,像奥斯曼帝国的征募制,招募奴隶军,不依赖个人权力。在中国,皇帝实际上变成属下官僚和繁复规则的囚犯。领袖可塑造机构,而高度发达的机构,不仅比拙劣的领袖活得更长,更有训练和招募优秀领袖的制度。

    政治衰败

    制度之间的竞争促使政治发展,这是一个动态过程。与此对应的,还有一个政治衰败过程;彼时,社会的制度化越来越弱。政治衰败可在两种形式中发生。制度的建立最初是为了迎接特殊环境的挑战。那环境可以是物质的,如土地、资源、气候和地理,也可以是社会的,如对手、敌人、竞争者和同盟者等。制度一旦形成,倾向于长久存在。如上所述,人类天生偏爱将内在价值注入规则和心智模型。如果没有社会规范、礼仪和其他情感投资,制度便不成其为制度——稳定、富有价值、重复的行为模式。制度长存带有明显的适应价值:如果不存在遵循规则和行为模式的天性,就要不断举行谈判,会给社会稳定带来巨大损失。另一方面,就制度而言,社会是极端保守的;这意味着,促使制度成立的原始条件发生变化时,制度却做不到随机应变。制度与外部环境在变化频率上的脱节,就是政治衰败,就是反制度化。

    社会对现存制度的历代投资,导致双重失误:不仅没能调整过时的制度,甚至察觉不到已出毛病。社会心理学家称之为“认知失调”,历史上有无数这样的案例。某社会因优秀制度而变得更富裕,或在军事上更强大,其他竞争力较弱社会的成员,如想继续生存,就必须正确地把上述优势归因于根本性的制度。然而,社会的结果总有多种原因,总能为社会弱点或失败找出似是而非的狡辩。从罗马到中国,众多社会把军事挫折归咎于对宗教的不诚,宁可献上更多的礼仪和牺牲,也不愿全力以赴地重整军队。近代社会里,很容易把社会失败归咎于外国阴谋,不管是犹太人的,还是美帝国主义的,而不愿在自己制度身上寻找原因。

    政治衰败的第二种形式是家族制复辟。眷顾家人或互惠的朋友是自然的社会交往,也是人类互动的预设。人类最普遍的政治互动,发生在保护人和依附者之间,领袖以恩惠换取追随者的支持。在政治发展的某些阶段,这种政治组织曾是唯一的形式。但是,随着制度的演化,产生了新的规则,用人标准慢慢改为功能或才干——中国的科举制度、土耳其的征募制、天主教的教士独身制、禁止裙带关系的现代立法。但家族制复辟的压力始终存在。最初以非人格化原因聘入机构的人,仍试图将职位传给自己的孩子或朋友。制度遭受压力时,领袖经常发现自己必须做出让步以保证政治优势,或满足财政需求。

    这两种政治衰败,我们可看到很多例子。17 世纪前期,组织良好的满人在北方虎视眈眈,中国的明朝面对与日俱增的军事压力。政权的生存,取决于朝廷能否整顿资源,重建精兵,北上御疆。结果一无所成,因为政府不愿或不能增税。此时,政权与不愿承担更高税赋的精英,处于某种大家都觉满意的共存关系;疏于朝政的皇帝发现,比较容易的对策是让睡着的狗继续睡下去。

    家族制复辟是一种循环现象。中国西汉时期建立的非人格化官僚制度,逐渐受到贵族家族的侵蚀;他们试图为自己和后裔在中央政府中保留特权;这些家庭在后来的隋唐两朝仍得以支配中国的官僚机构。埃及的马穆鲁克和土耳其禁卫军先要求成家,再要求自己的孩子进入军事机构,从而破坏了非人格化的奴隶军制度。马穆鲁克一例是对 13 世纪晚期局势的回应,当时蒙古威胁逐渐减退,鼠疫频仍,贸易条件恶化。奥斯曼一例的起因是通货膨胀和预算压力,导致塞利姆一世和苏莱曼一世向土耳其禁卫军做出类似让步。天主教会禁止教士和主教成家以建立现代官僚制度,久而久之也发生故障;神职人员寻求圣职与圣俸的合一,使之成为世袭产业。在法国和西班牙则出现公开的卖官鬻爵,政府部门私有化,再由后裔继承。

    这两种政治衰败——制度僵化和家族制复辟——经常同时发生。现存制度的既得利益者,即家族化官僚,会极力阻止改革。如制度彻底崩溃,往往又是他们,凭借其荫庇关系网络出来收拾残局。

    暴力和功能失调的均衡

    我们除了指出制度长存的自然倾向,还可精确解释制度在适应环境时的姗姗来迟。任何一个制度或制度系统,即便在整体上提供诸如内部和平和产权等的公共服务,也一定会惠顾社会上某些群体,并以其他群体为代价。受惠顾的群体,可能在人身和财产方面感到更加安全,可能因靠近权力而收取租金,可能获得特别的承认和社会地位。这些精英组织在现存制度安排中享有既得利益,会尽力保护现状,除非自我分裂。使全社会获益的制度性变化,如征集土地税以应付外来威胁,仍会遭到组织良好的群体的否决,因为对他们而言,净得仍然是负数。

    经济学家很熟悉此种集体行动的失败。博弈理论家称之为稳定的均衡(stable equilibrium),因为没有一名参与者能从现存制度安排的变更中得到个人的好处。但从全社会的角度看,这个均衡是失调的。曼瑟尔·奥尔森认为,任何社会的既得利益群体,经过长年的累积,为保护其狭隘的特权,会组成寻租联合体(rent-seeking coalition)。他们的组织能力远胜过人民大众,所以后者的利益往往在政治制度中得不到代表。失调的政治均衡可借民主而获缓和。民主允许非精英,至少在理论上,获得更多的政治权力。但通常,精英和非精英的组织能力有云泥之别,从而阻止了后者的任何果断行动。

    寻租联合体阻止必要的制度变革,从而激发政治衰败;这样的例子不计其数。其经典案例就是法兰西王国,也是租金一词的发源地。其时,法兰西君主在两个世纪中,招诱大部分精英,而逐渐强大。招诱的形式是出卖国家功能的一小部分,之后变成世袭产业。像莫普和杜尔哥这样的改革部长,力图废除卖官鬻爵,却遭到既得利益者强有力的阻挠。卖官问题的解决,最终只有通过法国大革命时期的暴力。

    功能失调的均衡(dysfunctional equilibria)很早就出现在人类历史上。考古证据显示,族团层次社会早已掌握农业技术,但持续几代仍坚持狩猎采集。个中原因似乎又是既得利益者。平等的族团层次社会中,分享食物相当普遍,一旦出现农业和私人财产,就难以为继。定居下来的第一户,其生产的粮食必须与族团其他成员分享,反过来摧毁了转向农业的奖励。农业的生产效率,高于狩猎采集。所以,改变生产方式将使全社会更加丰裕,但会剥夺部分成员的免费享用。考古学家斯蒂芬·勒布朗认为,部分狩猎采集社会向农业社会的转变之所以缓慢,就是因为无法解决此类合作问题。

    所以,社会能否实施制度变革,取决于能否分化手握否决权的既得利益群体。有时,经济变化削弱现存精英,加强赞成改制的新精英。17 世纪的英国,与商业或制造业相比,地产的回报逐渐降低,从而使资产阶级在政治上获益,吃亏的是旧贵族。有时,新兴的社会参与者因新宗教的涌现而赢得权力,像印度的佛教和耆那教。宗教改革后,由于扫盲和圣经的广泛传播,斯堪的纳维亚的农民不再是毫无生气的一盘散沙。还有的时候,促成变化的是领袖意志和凝聚各无权群体的能力,像叙任权斗争中格里高利七世所组织的教皇派。实际上,这就是政治的精髓:领袖们能否借助权威、合法性、恐吓、谈判、魅力、思想和组织来实现自己的目标。

    功能失调的均衡可持续很久,由此说明,暴力为何在制度革新中扮演如此重要的角色。经典的看法认为,政治就是为了解决暴力问题。但有时,要把阻挡制度变革的既得利益者赶走,唯一办法却是暴力。人类对暴毙的害怕强于获利的欲望,由此激发在行为上的深远变化。我们已在第 5 章提到,很难同意经济动机(如实施大型水利工程)是国家原生形成的原因。相比之下,无休止的战争,或害怕较强群体前来征服,促使自由骄傲的部落成员走进集权国家,倒是入情入理的解释。

    中国历史上,家族化精英一直是现代国家制度形成的障碍,无论是在秦朝兴起时,还是在隋唐时的复辟期。秦朝方兴的战国时期,贵族带头的无休止战争,摧毁了自己阶层,为非精英军人进入政权打开大门。女皇帝武则天崛起于唐朝早期,清洗传统贵族家庭,促使较为广泛的精英阶层涌现。两次世界大战为 1945 年后走向民主化的德国提供了类似的帮助。它们清除容克贵族阶层(Junker),制度变革遂再无阻挡。

    尚不清楚,民主社会能否和平地解决此类难题。美国南北战争之前,南方少数美国人试图竭力保留他们的“特有制度”——奴隶制。只要在美国的西部扩张中,没有足够的自由新州加入以推翻南方的否决权,当时的宪法规则就允许奴隶制的存在。最终,冲突无法在宪政框架内得到解决,战争遂成为必须的选择,六十多万美国人因此而丧生。

    现代世界的规范和制度,在很多方面,已把暴力解决政治僵局的大门紧紧关上。没人期望或希望,非洲撒哈拉以南的国家为建立强大巩固的国家,也经历如中国和欧洲所体验的数世纪坎坷。这意味着,制度革新的责任将落在前述的非暴力机制上。不然,社会仍将遇上政治衰败。 幸运的是,国家、法治、负责制这三大基本政治制度得以锻造成功的旧世界,十分不同于当代世界。美国和法国革命以来的两个多世纪,世界经历了工业革命和大幅提高社会交往的技术革新。如今,政治、经济和社会三大组件在发展中的互动,大大不同于 1806 年之前。怎样的互动呢?那是本卷最后一章的主题。

    第 30 章 政治发展的过去和现在

    自 18 世纪以来,政治发展的条件发生剧烈变化;发展中的政治、经济、社会三个方面,及其在马尔萨斯式世界中的互动;在今天的互动;当代世界的期望

    亨廷顿在 1968 年发表《变化社会中的政治秩序》。他的中心见解是,政治发展有其独特逻辑,与经济和社会的逻辑既有关联又有差异。他认为,经济和社会的现代化一旦超越政治发展,政治衰败就会发生,因为现存政治制度无法容纳动员起来的新兴社会群体。他还认为,20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代独立的发展中国家,之所以遭遇此起彼伏的政变、革命、内战,原因就在这里。

    有人认为,政治发展遵循自己的逻辑,未必是整体发展过程中的一部分,看待这个观点要以经典现代化理论为背景。该理论来自 19 世纪的思想家,如马克思、涂尔干、滕尼斯和韦伯。他们试图分析欧洲社会的工业化所引起的巨变。尽管彼此之间有很大差异,他们都倾向于主张,现代化是个整体,包括资本主义市场经济、随之而生的大规模分工、强大的集权官僚国家、亲密的村庄群体变为不近人情的城市群体、公共的社会关系变为个人的社会关系。所有这一切,在马克思和恩格斯的《共产党宣言》中汇聚。该宣言宣称,“资产阶级的兴起”改变了一切,包括劳动条件、全球竞争、最为私密的家庭关系。根据经典现代化理论,这些变化始于 16 世纪早期的宗教改革,在之后三个世纪得到迅猛的展开和传播。

    第二次世界大战前,现代化理论家移军美国,抢占地盘,像哈佛大学的比较政治系、麻省理工的国际研究中心、社会科学研究会的比较政治委员会。哈佛大学的比较政治系,由韦伯心爱的学生塔尔科特·帕森斯(Talcott Parsons)领军,希望建立跨学科的社会综合科学,将经济学、社会学、政治学、人类学冶于一炉。现代化理论家将强烈的规范化价值注入现代化本身,在他们眼中,现代化的好处总会一同到来。经济发展,亲戚团体瓦解,个人主义兴起,更高更包容的教育,价值观以“成就”和理性为方向发生规范性转变,世俗化,民主政治制度的发展;这一切被视为一个相互依赖的整体。经济发展将提供更好教育,导致价值观的改变,依次再促进现代政治,等等,从而取得无止境的良性循环。

    亨廷顿的《变化社会中的政治秩序》,在摧毁现代化理论方面起了重要作用。它强调,现代性的好处不一定相得益彰。尤其是民主,对政治稳定而言,不一定是好事。亨廷顿讲的政治秩序,相当于我在本书中所论的国家建设。他的发展策略,被称作“威权式过渡”(authoritarian transition),主张政治秩序优先于民主,该书因此而变得名闻遐迩。这也是土耳其、韩国、中国台湾、印尼所走的道路:先在威权统治下实现经济现代化,再在政治制度上开放民主竞争。

    本卷呈现的历史材料确证了亨廷顿的基本见解,即发展中的各方面应分开对待。如我们所见的,中国人早在两千多年前,就创造了韦伯式的现代国家,但没有法治或民主,更不用说个人的社会关系或现代资本主义了。

    此外,欧洲的发展又与马克思和韦伯的描述大相径庭。欧洲现代化的萌芽远早于宗教改革。我们曾在第 16 章看到,随着日耳曼野蛮人皈依基督教,脱离基于亲戚关系的社会组织,在中世纪黑暗时代便已开始。到 13 世纪的英国,自由买卖财产的个人权利,包括女性的财产权,已属根深蒂固。天主教会 11 世纪晚期与皇帝的争斗是现代法律秩序的根源。它建立欧洲第一个官僚化组织,以管理教会的内部事务。它一直被当作现代化的障碍而横遭诋毁。但从长远看,在推动现代化的关键问题上,它至少像宗教改革一样重要。

    所以,欧洲走向现代化,不是全方位的突飞猛进,而是几乎历时一千五百年的点滴改良。在这特有的次序中,社会中的个人主义可早于资本主义,法治可早于现代国家的形成,封建主义作为地方抵抗中央的顽固堡垒,可成为现代民主的基础。根据马克思主义的观点,封建主义是资产阶级上升之前的发展阶段。但在事实上,它主要是欧洲的独特制度。不能把它说成是经济发展的普遍过程,也不能期望非西方社会遵循相似的发展次序。

    然后,我们需要分别对待发展中的政治、经济、社会三个方面,弄清它们作为分立的现象,又是如何相互关联、如何周期性互动的。我们必须弄清此事,因为它们现在的相互关系的性质,与在马尔萨斯式世界的历史条件之下,已然十分不同。

    托马斯·马尔萨斯

    约在 1800 年后,随着工业革命的出现,世界发生了巨大变化。在那之前,生产力因技术革新而持续增长、进而促进经济发展的美事是靠不住的。事实上,它几乎不存在。

    但这并不表示,1800 年之前没有发生过生产力的大幅增长。农业、灌溉、铁犁、印刷机、远航帆船,都提高了人均产值。例如,公元前第三个千年和第二个千年之间,墨西哥特奥蒂瓦坎(Teotihuacán)的农业生产力因引进玉米新品种而增长两倍。那时所缺乏的是年复一年的生产力和人均产值的稳定增长。我们今天假设,电脑和互联网在五年后将获得巨大改进,这很可能是正确的。而中国西汉的农业技术,即基督诞生后不久,与 19 世纪沦为半殖民地之前的清朝的相比,则相差无几。

    图 7. 人均 GDP 水平比较:中国与西欧,400—2001 年(单位是 1990 年国际元)来源:麦迪逊(Maddison)(1998,2001,2003a)

    图 7 是西欧和中国在公元 400 年至 2001 年之间的人均产值估计。它显示,从公元 1000 年到 1800 年,西欧的人均收入在八百年期间逐步上升,之后却突飞猛进。同期的中国人均收入,几乎是停滞不前,但在 1978 年后腾飞,速度甚至超过西欧。

    1800 年后生产力大幅增长的原因,一直是研究发展的核心命题。首先是智识环境的巨变,促进了现代自然科学、实用科技、复式簿记、专利法和版权的涌现。最后两项又是鼓励不断创新的微观经济制度。注重最近两百年的发展是未可厚非的,但这阻碍了我们对前现代社会政治经济的理解。经济可以持续增长的假设,使我们重视有助于这种增长的制度和条件,如政治稳定、产权、技术和科研。另一方面,如果假设生产力的改进非常有限,社会就会陷入零和的世界,掠夺他人资源往往变成获得权力和财富的更佳途经。

    这个生产力低下的世界,因英国神职人员托马斯·马尔萨斯的分析,而引起世人的注意。他的《人口学原理》初版于 1798 年,其时他仅 32 岁。身为八个孩子之一的马尔萨斯认为,人口以几何级数增长(假设女子“自然”生育率是每人生育十五个小孩),而谷物生产以算术级数增长,这表示人均谷物生产只会下降。马尔萨斯还认为,农业效率可以提高,但从长远看,仍跟不上人口增长;实施道德限制,如晚婚和禁欲,可以帮助控制人口的增长(那是避孕尚不普遍的世界);但人口过剩问题的最终解决,还得依靠饥荒、疾病和战争。

    马尔萨斯的文章出现于工业革命前夕。如上所述,工业革命引发了 1800 年后生产力的惊人增长,尤其是在开发煤炭和石油的能量上。从 1820 年到 1950 年,全球的能源供应增长六倍,而人口仅增长一倍。随着现代经济世界的出现,马尔萨斯经济学遭到普遍贬斥,譬如说它的眼光短浅,对技术进步过度悲观。但是,如果说马尔萨斯的模式不能用于 1800—2000 年这段时期,它却可作为理解此前世界政治经济的基础。

    作为 1800 年前经济生活的一种历史描述,马尔萨斯模式必须作出重要调整。埃斯特·博塞鲁普认为,人口的增加和密集,不仅没有造成饥荒,反而促进了提高效率的技术革新。例如,埃及、美索不达米亚(Mesopotamia)和中国发展出了密集农业模式,实现了大面积灌溉、新高产作物培育和农业工具的改进。因此,人口增长本身未必是件坏事。食物供应量与死亡率并没有直接关联,除非在大饥荒时期。在抑制人口增长上,疾病一直比饥饿更为重要。如食物不够,人类不必死去,可以缩小身躯来降低对卡路里的需求。类似这样的情形似乎就在上一世代的朝鲜发生过,以应付广泛的饥荒。最后,除了人口过剩,本地环境的恶化也是人均谷物生产下降的原因。对人类社会来说,环境破坏不是什么新鲜事(只是今日的规模前所未有)。过去的社会曾杀尽大型动物、侵蚀表土、颠覆当地气候。

    经过上述修改的马尔萨斯模式可提供良好架构,帮助我们梳理工业革命前的经济发展。全球人口在过去一万年中有惊人增长,从新石器初期的大约六百万,到 2001 年的六十多亿,这是一千倍的增长。不过,增长的大部发生在 20 世纪;讲得更确切些,在 20 世纪的最后几十年。1820 年之前的经济增长大都是粗放型的,例如,开垦处女地、给沼泽排水、清除森林、填海造地等。新土地一旦得到开发,产量达到当时技术的限度,生活重又回归到零和。一人增加资源,他人必须削减,人均产量得不到持续增长。不管是世界整体还是本地居民,绝对增长之后便是停滞不前和绝对下跌。在全世界范围,人口因疾病而经历大幅度的滑坡。其中一次发生于罗马帝国末期,那时它面对野蛮部落的入侵、饥荒、瘟疫。另一次发生在 13 世纪,蒙古侵占欧洲、中东和中国,并把瘟疫带到世界各地。在 1200 年至 1400 年之间,亚洲人口从大约两亿五千八百万跌至两亿零一百万。在 1340 年至 1400 年之间,欧洲人口从七千四百万跌至五千二百万。

    如此缓慢的技术进步具有双刃特性。短期内,它改进生活水平,革新者为此而得益。但较多资源促成人口增加,从而减少人均产量。与革新之前相比,人类平均生活水平并没得到改善。所以,很多历史学家认为,从狩猎采集到农业社会的过渡,反而使人类生活越过越糟。虽然谷物生产的潜力大增,但人类的食谱更为狭窄,从而影响健康。他们为生产粮食消耗更多体力,居住在密集地域,为疾病的蔓延提供温床,等等。

    马尔萨斯式世界中的政治

    在零和的马尔萨斯世界,人的生存对政治发展有巨大的意义,也与今日的发展大相径庭。马尔萨斯式世界的人们虽有资源,但只有很少的投资机会,譬如促使经济持续增长的工厂、科学研究或教育。如想增加财富,最好走政治途径来从事掠夺,即强夺他人资源。掠夺有两种:享有强制权力的人,可通过征税或赤裸裸的偷窃,夺走社会其他成员的资源;或将社会成员组织起来,去攻击和偷窃邻近社会。为掠夺而组织起来,增强自己的军事或行政能力,往往比投资于生产能力更为有效。

    图 8. 马尔萨斯陷阱

    马尔萨斯认识到战争是限制人口的因素,但马尔萨斯的经典模式可能低估了战争在限制人口过剩中的重要性。它作为人口的控制机制,与饥荒和疾病互为表里,因为饥荒和疾病通常由战争引起。跟饥荒和疾病不同,掠夺是一种可以由人有意掌控、用以应付马尔萨斯式压力的手段之一。考古学家斯蒂芬·勒布朗指出,史前社会中的战争和暴力不断,原因就在于人口老是超越环境的支撑能力。换言之,多数人宁可打仗,也不愿挨饿。

    图 9 马尔萨斯条件下的发展

    马尔萨斯模式加以扩充后,看去就像图 8。像新作物或农具那样的技术进步,会暂时提高人均产量。但假以时日,这个增产会被人口增加或环境破坏所抵消,人均产量再一次降低。阻止贫穷的蔓延有四种主要机制:他们忍饥挨饿,体型变小;死于疾病;从事内部掠夺;向其他社群发起进攻(外部掠夺)。然后,人均产量又会上升,因为土地和粮食变得更为充沛,或因掠夺他人而致富。

    在没有持续技术革新的马尔萨斯式世界中,千万不要高估零和思想所占的主导地位。除了掠夺,还有很多大家都可得益的合作机会。农民和城镇居民开展贸易,便可增加大家的福利;政府提倡公共服务,如治安和互相防卫,会使政府本身和百姓都得到好处。事实上,掠夺要求紧密合作,这一事实又是发展政治组织的最重要动机之一。

    图 9 表明工业革命之前,马尔萨斯式世界中政治制度与经济发展的关系。集约型经济增长单独处于左上方,没有任何箭头指向它。集约型增长全靠技术进步,但这些进步不可预测,发生时间的前后往往又有很大间隔。对整个制度来说,那时的技术革新是经济学家所谓的外部因素,独立发生,与发展的其他任何方面无关。(博塞鲁普假设,与日俱增的人口密集周期性刺激技术革新,又使技术革新成为内在因素。但它和人口增长之间,又找不到预测或正比的关系。)所以,所发生的经济增长基本上是粗放型的,而不是集约型的。这表示,随着时间的流逝,总体的人口和资源有所增长,但不在人均基础上。

    马尔萨斯式世界中至关重要的政治制度是国家,它是取得粗放型经济增长的主要途径。强制能力——军队和警察——是开展外部掠夺(战争和征服)的资源,又可用于国内居民以保障统治者的掌权。反过来,通过征服或征税而获得的资源,又可转换成强制能力。于是,因果关系是双向的。国家提供基本的公共服务,如安全和产权,可提高经济生产力,但仅得一次——即奥尔森所解释的从流寇变成坐寇——但它无法促使生产力持续增长。

    国家权力受合法性的影响,法治和社会动员如要影响政治,全凭作为传送带的合法性。在大多数马尔萨斯式社会,合法性以宗教形式出现。中国、拜占庭帝国和其他政教合一的国家,从其控制的宗教权威那里获得合法性。在基于宗教的法治社会中,宗教将合法性赋予独立的法律秩序,后者再向国家颁发或拒绝法律上的批准。

    在马尔萨斯社会中动员新的社会群体,会比在当代世界遇上更多限制。在动员惰性社会参与者方面,宗教合法性扮演了很重要的角色,例如 7 世纪的阿拉伯部落和唐朝的佛道两教。罗马帝国时期,基督教在动员新兴精英上发挥了类似作用。在农业社会,宗教经常成为抗议的载体,以反对既有的政治秩序。所以,它不仅能提供合法性,还能制造不稳定。

    马尔萨斯式世界中,政治发展的可能性体现在两条主要途径上。第一条围绕国家建设的内部逻辑和粗放型经济增长。政治权力创造经济资源,后者回过来又创造更为强大的政治权力。这个过程自作循环,直到一个极点:对外扩张的政治体遇上物质上的极限,如地理或技术的;或碰上另外一个政治体;或两种情形的组合。这就是在中国和欧洲出现的建国和战争的逻辑。

    政治变化的第二条途径与合法性有关。它或者建立法治,或者授权给新兴的社会参与者,以影响国家权力。我所谓的印度弯路,其根源就是婆罗门宗教的兴起,它削弱了印度统治者仿照中国方式集中权力的能力。新兴的社会参与者一旦获得宗教授权,既可对国家权力作出贡献,如阿拉伯人;又可约束君主集权的尝试,如英国议会。

    在马尔萨斯式世界,变化的来源相对有限。国家建设的过程非常缓慢,在中国和欧洲都持续了好多世纪。它也避不开政治衰败,政体回到低层次的发展阶段,不得不再从头开始。新兴的宗教或意识形态不时出现,但像技术革新一样,有点靠不住,无法向现存制度提供持续的活力。此外,技术限制了人们和思想在世界上的迁徙和传播。中国秦始皇发明国家的消息,从没传到罗马共和国领袖的耳朵。只有佛教穿越喜马拉雅山脉,抵达中国和东亚其他地区,其他制度大多困顿于自己的出生地。基督教欧洲、中东和印度的法律传统都自我发展,很少相互影响。

    当代条件下的发展

    现在让我们考察一下,发展的不同方面在工业革命开始后如何互动。最重要的变化是持续性集约型经济增长的出现,从而影响了发展的几乎所有方面。粗放型经济增长继续出现,但在促进政治变化上,其重要性远远比不上人均产量。此外,民主加入国家建设和法治的行列,成为政治发展的组件。这在图 10 中获得说明。

    这些不同方面在当代世界的客观关联已有实质性的研究,可在下列关系中得到总结。

    图 10. 发展的诸方面

    国家建设和经济增长之间

    国家是集约型经济增长的基本条件。经济学家保罗·科利尔(Paul Collier)示范了该命题的反面,即国家崩溃、内战、国际冲突对经济增长的负面影响。20 世纪晚期,非洲的大部分贫穷都得归罪于国家的薄弱,以及不时发生的瘫痪和动乱。除了建立国家以提供基本秩序外,强大的行政能力与经济增长呈明显的正相关关系。当人均国内生产总值处于绝对低水平时(少于 1,000 美元),国家变得尤其重要。到了较高水平的收入,国家仍然重要,但其影响可能会发生不成比例的改变。已有很多文献,把良好统治与经济增长联在一起。“良好统治”的定义,因不同作者而各有差异,有时包括政治发展的三大组件。

    强大凝聚的国家和经济增长之间的关联早已确定,但相互的因果关系却并不很清楚。经济学家杰弗里·萨克斯(Jeffrey Sachs)认为,良好统治是内生的,不是经济增长的原因,而是它的成果。这听起来很有逻辑,因为政府是大开支。穷国腐败泛滥的原因之一是它们付不起好薪水,以致它们的公务员很难负担家用,所以趋于受贿。政府方面的开支,包括军队、通向学校的道路、街上的警察,在 2008 年的美国大约是人均 17,000 美元,在阿富汗却只有 19 美元。所以一点也不奇怪,阿富汗的国家远远比不上美国,或者,对之大笔援助只会制造腐败。

    另一方面,既有经济增长没能促成良好统治的案例,也有良好统治促成经济增长的案例。举韩国和尼日利亚为例。朝鲜战争之后的韩国,1954 年的人均国内生产总值低于尼日利亚,后者在 1960 年从英国手中赢得独立自主。在接下来的五十年中,尼日利亚的石油收入超过三千亿美元。然而,其人均收入却在 1975 年和 1995 年之间出现下跌。相比之下,同期的韩国经济每年增长 7% 到 9%,到 1997 年亚洲金融危机时,已成为世界上第 12 大经济体。这表现上的差异,几乎完全归功于韩国政府,它的治理成绩远远超过尼日利亚。

    法治和增长之间

    在学术文献中,法治有时被认作统治的组件,有时被认作发展的方面(我在本书的做法)。如第 17 章所指出的,与经济增长有关的法治,涉及产权和合同的强制执行。有大量文献显示,这个关联确实存在。大多数经济学家视之为理所当然,但不清楚,对经济增长来说,普遍和平等的产权是否必不可少。在很多社会中,稳定的产权只为精英而存在,也足以推动经济增长,至少在一段时间内。此外,像当代中国那样的社会,拥有“足够好”的产权,虽然缺乏传统法治,仍能取得很高水平的经济增长。

    经济增长和稳定民主之间

    社会学家李普塞特(Seymour Martin Lipset)在 20 世纪 50 年代率先注意发展和民主的关联。自那以后,出现了很多将发展与民主连在一起的研究。经济增长和民主之间的关系可能不是线性的——即更多的经济增长并不一定产生更多的民主。经济学家罗伯特·巴罗(Robert Barro)显示,低水平收入时的关联较强,中等水平收入时的关联较弱。有关发展和民主的最完整研究之一显示,从独裁到民主的过渡,可在发展的任何阶段发生,如果人均国内生产总值较高,遇上逆转的机会较小。

    经济增长似乎有助于民主的稳定,但逆向的因果关系却不大明显。这似乎很有道理,只要数数近年来取得经济增长惊人纪录的威权政治体——当初仍处于独裁统治的韩国和台湾地区,中国大陆、新加坡、苏哈托(Suharto)治下的印尼、皮诺切特(Augusto Pinochet)治下的智利。因此,凝聚的国家和良好的统治是经济增长的前提,民主是否发挥同样的正面作用,就有点含混不清。

    经济增长和社会发展(或公民社会发展)之间

    很多古典社会理论将现代公民社会的出现与经济发展联在一起。亚当·斯密在《国富论》中指出,市场增长与社会上的分工有关:市场一旦扩展,公司充分利用规模上的经济效益,社会专业更加精益求精,新兴的社会群体(如工人阶级)得以涌现。现代市场经济所要求的流动性和开放途径,打破了很多传统形式的社会权威,代之以更有弹性的自愿组合。分工愈细所造成的转型效果是 19 世纪思想家著作的中心思想,例如马克思、韦伯和涂尔干。

    社会动员和自由民主制之间

    自托克维尔开始,大量的民主理论认为,如果没有积极参与的公民社会,现代的自由民主制无法生存。组织起来的社会群体,允许形单影只的个人汇集各自利益,投身政治领域。即使不追求政治目标,志愿组织也会有意外效用,帮助培养在新奇环境中彼此合作的能力——通常被称为社会资本。

    上述的经济增长有助于自由民主,恐怕要通过社会动员的途径来生效。经济增长促使社会新参与者出现,随之,他们要求在更为公开的政治制度中获得代表权,从而推动向民主的过渡。如果政治系统已有很好的制度化,便可容纳这些新参与者,然后可有迈向全面民主的成功过渡。这就是 20 世纪的前几十年,随着农民运动和社会党的兴起,在英国和瑞典所发生的。这也是 1987 年军事独裁垮台后,在韩国所发生的。

    高度发展的公民社会也能成为民主的危险,甚至可以导致政治衰败。基于民族或种族的沙文主义群体会散播不容忍的偏见;利益群体会尽力追求零和的租金;经济冲突和社会冲突的极度政治化会使社会瘫痪,并破坏民主制度的合法性。社会动员也可导致政治衰败。政治制度拒绝社会新参与者的要求,即所谓的亨廷顿式过程,就发生于 20 世纪 90 年代和 21 世纪初的玻利维亚和厄瓜多尔,高度组织起来的社会群体一再罢免获选的总统。

    民主和法治之间

    民主的兴起和自由主义法治的兴起在历史上一直有密切关联。如我们在第 27 章所看到的,负责制政府在英国的兴起与保卫普通法不可分。越来越多的公民受到法治保护,这一向被视作民主本身的关键组成部分。这个关联在 1975 年之后的第三波民主化中继续有效,共产主义专政的垮台导致了代议民主制的兴起和立宪政府的建立,以保护个人权利。

    思想、合法性和发展的其他方面

    有关合法性的思想,其发展有自己的逻辑,但也受经济、政治、社会的发展的影响。如果没有在大英图书馆奋笔疾书的马克思,20 世纪的历史可能会相当不同,他对早期资本主义作了系统性的批判。同样,共产主义在 1989 年的垮台,多半是因为很少人继续信奉马列主义的基本思想。

    另一方面,经济和政治的发展影响了人们对思想合法性的认同。对法国人来说,人权的思想顺理成章,因为法国阶级结构已发生变化,还有 18 世纪晚期新兴中产阶级高涨的期待。1929—1931 年的金融大危机和经济受挫,破坏了部分资本主义制度的合法性,使国家干涉经济获得合法性。后来,大福利国家的兴起、经济停滞、由此而生的通货膨胀,为 20 世纪 80 年代保守派的里根—撒切尔(Reagan-Thatcher)革命打下基础。同样,社会主义无法兑现关于现代化和平等的诺言,在共产主义社会的居民眼中,反使自己名誉扫地。

    如果政府成功推动经济增长,也可获得合法性。很多迅速发展的东亚国家,如新加坡和马来西亚,即使没有自由民主制,也广受民众支持。相反,经济危机或管理不善所引起的经济倒退,可能动摇政府的稳定,如 1997—1998 年金融危机之后的印尼独裁政府。

    合法性也有赖于经济增长的好处分配。如果好处只给处于社会顶端的寡头小集团,没有得到广泛的分享,反而会动员社会群体奋起反对既有的政治制度。这就是波费里奥·迪亚斯(Porfirio Díaz)专政下的墨西哥。从 1876 年到 1880 年,再从 1884 年到 1911 年,他治下的国民收入得到迅速增长,但产权只适用于富裕精英,为 1911 年的墨西哥革命和长期内战创造了条件。其时,弱势群体为争取份内的国民收入而奋斗。最近,委内瑞拉和玻利维亚民主制度的合法性受到民粹领袖的挑战,后者的政治基础是穷人和先前遭到边缘化的群体。

    现代发展的范例

    发展的不同方面中有多重关联,这表示今天有很多潜在的路径通向现代化,其大部分在马尔萨斯式环境中是无法想象的。让我们以韩国为例,它的发展组件得到特别满意的聚合(参看图 11)。

    图 11. 1954—1999 年的韩国

    朝鲜战争结束时,韩国有相对强大的政府。它自中国继承了儒家的国家传统,并在 1905 年到 1945 年的日本殖民期间建成很多现代制度。朴正熙将军 1961 年通过政变上台。韩国在他的领导下,推行工业化政策,以促进经济的迅速增长(箭头 1)。韩国的工业化仅在一代人的时间,就将一个农业穷国改造成为主要的工业强国,并开启了新兴力量的社会大动员——工会、教会团体、大学生和其他传统社会所没有的民间参与者(箭头 2)。全斗焕将军的军政府因 1980 年的光州镇压而丧失合法性,这些新兴的社会团体开始要求军政府下台。在盟友美国的温和推动下,1987 年军政府下台,宣布了总统的首次民选(箭头 3)。经济的迅速增长和国家的民主过渡,帮助加强了政权的合法性。反过来,这又帮助韩国平安渡过 1997—1998 年的严重亚洲金融危机(箭头 4 和 5)。最后,经济增长和民主莅临都有助于韩国法治的加强(箭头 6 和 7)。

    在韩国的案例中,如现代化理论所表明的,发展中不同方面倾向于互相支持,彼此加强,尽管有明确的次序,如代议民主制和法治的开始,要等到工业化发生之后。韩国模式未必是普世的,通向现代化还有很多其他路径。在欧洲和美国,法治存在于国家巩固之前。在英国和美国,某种形式的民主负责制早于工业化和经济增长。中国迄今为止走的是韩国路径,但忽略了箭头 3、箭头 4、箭头 7。1978 年邓小平发动经济自由化时,中华人民共和国继承了毛泽东时代相当高效的国家。开放政策促使了未来三十年经济快速增长,数百万农民离开农村,来到城市参加工业就业,社会因此而发生巨大的变迁。经济增长帮助国家取得合法性,并建立公民社会萌芽,但没有动摇政治制度,也没有施加民主化的压力。此外,经济增长导致了法治的改善,因为中国试图将其法律制度提高到世界贸易组织所颁布的标准。中国未来的大问题在于,迅速发展所造成的社会大动员,会导致对更多政治参与的难以抑制的需求。

    什么变了

    马尔萨斯经济条件下的政治发展和工业革命以来的政治发展,两者的前景如果放在一起考察,可立即看到大量差异,关键是经济持续密集型增长的可能性。人均产量的增长,其所实现的不只是在国家手中注入更多资源。它还刺激社会的广泛转型,动员各式社会新力量,假以时日,将变成政治参与者。相比之下,在马尔萨斯式的世界中,社会动员非常罕见,要是有,大多源于合法性和思想。

    传统精英锁在寻租联合体之中,由此造成功能失调的均衡,社会动员是打破这种均衡的重要手段之一。丹麦国王能在 18 世纪 80 年代削弱既得利益的贵族的权力,全靠组织良好的有文化农民的涌现——这是世界历史上的新鲜事,以前只有失序动乱的农民起义。这是工业革命前的社会,动员来源是宗教,打起宗教改革和普遍脱盲的旗号。20 世纪 80 年代,韩国军队和商业精英对权力的掌控,因社会新参与者的出现而被打破。二战后韩国经济起飞时,这些新参与者几乎都尚未问世。政治变化因此而来到丹麦和韩国。丹麦的动员似乎是个意外——丹麦国王选择路德教——而韩国的动员却是马尔萨斯式世界中经济增长的结果,可以预测。在这两件案例中,社会动员在民主传播上都有良好影响,但在其他方面,也导致了政治不稳定。

    那时的政治发展与现在相比,另一重要差异是国际因素对国内制度的影响。本书所介绍的几乎所有故事,只涉及单一国家,以及国内不同政治参与者的互动。国际影响基本上是战争、征服、征服的威胁,偶尔还有横跨边界的宗教传播。其时的“跨国”机构,像天主教会和伊斯兰的阿拉伯帝国,在跨越政治边界传播《查士丁尼法典》或伊斯兰教法上,发挥了重要作用。此外,早期现代的欧洲人尝试重新发现古典的希腊和罗马,这属于跨代的学习借鉴。但从整个地球看,发展倾向于各自为政,按地理和地域而分。

    今天,情况已有很大不同。我们所谓的全球化,只是数世纪来持续开展过程的最新篇章,其间,与运输、通讯和信息有关的技术在不断蔓延推广。独立发展、几乎没有外界输入的社会,在今天是微乎其微。即使是世界上最隔离最困难的地区,像阿富汗或巴布亚新几内亚,也不能幸免。国际参与者以外国军队、中国伐木公司、世界银行经理的形式崭露头角,不管邀请与否。与以往所熟悉的相比,他们自己也感受到变化的加速。

    世界各社会的更大交融增加了互相竞争,其本身就足以制造更频繁的政治变化和政治模式的汇聚。特别进化——即新物种形成和增加生物多样性——发生时,有机体扩散进入明显不同的微型环境,互相之间又失去联系。它的反面是生物全球化,暂栖船舱底层的生物从一个生态区域迁徙到另外一个,可能是意外,也可能是故意。斑马贝、野葛、杀人蜂(Africanized killer bee)都与本土物种展开竞争。这一切,再加上竞争力最强的人类,已导致全球物种数量发生骤减。

    这也在政治领域中发生。任何发展中国家可以自由选择自己喜欢的发展模式,无须顾及本土的传统或文化。冷战时期,美国和苏联试图输出各自的政治和经济模式。到了今天,美国仍有促进民主的项目。此外,还有国家指挥的东亚发展模式和中国特色的威权主义。像世界银行、国际货币基金组织和联合国那样的国际机构,随时准备提供关于建立制度的建议,以及资源和技术上的支援,以帮助扩大生产能力。现代的后发达者在制度或政策上无须重新发明车轮。

    另一方面,坏事也得以轻易跨越边界——毒品、犯罪、恐怖主义、各式武器、不法资金等。全球化被称作“主权的黄昏”,这未免太夸张。但技术和增长的流动性,使国家很难在自己领土上执法、征税、规范行为、实施与传统政治秩序有关的其他操作。在大多数财富仍体现在土地上的时代,国家可对富裕精英施以相当大的影响。今天,财富可轻易逃至海外的银行账户。

    所以已不可能光谈“国家的发展”。在政治学中,比较政治和国际关系,在传统上被认为是明显的分支。前者涉及国内发生的事情,后者涉及国家之间的关系。但现在,这两个领域的研究越来越被当作一个综合体。我们如何到达这一步,政治发展如何在当代世界发生,都将是第 2 卷的主题。

    最终,社会并不受困于自己的过去。经济增长、社会新参与者的动员、跨边界社会的组合、竞争和外国模式的流行,都在提供政治变化的契机。在工业革命之前,这些政治变化要么不存在,要么颇受限制。

    然而,社会并不能在一代人时间内自由重组自己。全球化对世界各社会的整合,其程度很容易言过其实。社会之间交换和学习的水平远远超越三百年前,但大多数人继续生活在基于传统文化和习惯的环境中。社会惯性仍然很大,外国的制度模式虽比过去更加容易得到,但仍需要融入本土。

    必须以恰当的眼光看待本书关于政治制度起源的历史介绍。不应该期望,当代发展中国家必须重蹈中国和欧洲社会所经历的狂暴步骤,以建立现代国家;或现代法治必须以宗教为基础。我们看到,制度只是特殊历史情境和意外事件的产物,不同处境的社会很难予以复制。它们起源的偶然,建立它们所需的持久斗争,应让我们在接受建立当代制度的任务时,备感谦逊。如不考虑现有规则和愿意支持的政治力量,很难将现代制度移植入其他社会。建立制度不像建造水电大坝或公路网络,它需要克服很多困难。首先得说服大家制度变革是必需的;再建立支持者的同盟,以战胜旧制度中既得利益者的抵抗;最后让大家接受新行为准则。通常,正式制度需要新文化的补充。例如,没有独立的新闻界和自我组织的公民社会以监督政府,代议民主制将不会行之有效。

    孕育民主的环境和社会条件是欧洲的独特现象,立宪政体似乎因意外事件的环环相连,脱颖而出。但一旦出现,它造就的政治和经济体那么强大,以至在全世界得到广泛的复制。普遍的承认已成为自由民主制的基础,并指向政治发展的初期。其时,社会更加平等,容纳更广泛的参与。我注意到,与取而代之的国家层次社会相比,狩猎采集和部落的社会提供更多的平等和参与。平等尊敬或同等高贵的原则,一旦获得明确的阐述,就很难阻止人们提出此类要求。这可能有助于说明,人人平等的概念在现代世界的无情蔓延,一如托克维尔在《论美国的民主》中所提出的。

    今天的负责制

    如第 1 章所指出的,民主在世界各地未能得到巩固的原因,与其说是思想本身的呼吁不够,倒不如说是物质和社会条件的缺席,无法促使负责制政府出现。成功的自由民主制,既要有强大统一、能在领土上执法的国家,又要有强大凝聚、能将负责制职责强加于国家的社会。强大国家和强大社会之间的平衡方能使民主生效,不管是在 17 世纪的英国,还是在当代的发达民主国家中。

    欧洲早期现代的案例与 21 世纪初的情形之间有很多平行和对照。自第三波开始以来,欲巩固权力的未来威权领袖和希冀民主制度的社会群体,两者之间发生了频繁的斗争。

    图 12. 今天的政治权力

    这是很多苏联继承国的情形,后共产主义的统治者——通常来自前任执政党——开始重建国家,集大权于己身。这也是委内瑞拉、伊朗、卢旺达、埃塞俄比亚的情形。有些地方,像 2000 年之后普京治下的俄罗斯,或 2009 年总统选举之后的伊朗,这种做法得以成功,政治反对派联合不起来,无法阻止专制国家的建立。但在格鲁吉亚和乌克兰,动员起来的政治反对派抵制国家权力,至少在一段时间内获得胜利。在前南斯拉夫,国家彻底崩溃。

    早期现代欧洲的情形显然与 21 世纪初大不相同,但仍有集权化和社会抵抗的相似场景。今天有工会、商业团体、学生、非政府组织、宗教组织和其他社会参与者(参看图 12),以取代贵族、士绅、第三等级、农民。当代社会所动员的社会参与者,与我们研究的农业社会相比,更为广泛,更加多样。相关的政治分析,必须弄清国内外不同参与者的性质和凝聚程度。公民社会是否齐心合力和众志成城,或同盟中已有分裂?军队和情报部门是否忠于政权,或存在愿意与反对派谈判的温和路线派?政权的社会基础是什么,掌控怎样的合法性?

    今天的国际体系,与我们所研究的早期现代案例相比,对这些斗争有着更大的影响。反对派群体可从国外获得资金、训练、甚至偶尔的武器,而当局也可向志趣相投的盟国呼吁支持。此外,经济全球化提供财政收入的其他来源,如自然资源的出租或外援,从而允许政府避开自己的公民。国王和议会的征税争执不会在石油丰富的国家发生,可能解释了它们中极少民主政体的原因。

    未来会怎样

    就未来的政治发展而言,我们可提出迄今尚无答案的两个问题。第一个与中国有关。我从一开始就宣称,现代政治制度由强大的国家、法治、负责制所组成。拥有全部三条的西方社会,发展了充满活力的资本主义经济,因而在世界上占主导地位。中国今天在经济上迅速增长,但三条之中只拥有一条,即强大的国家。这样的情境能否长久?没有法治或负责制,中国能否继续维持经济增长,保持政治稳定?经济增长所引发的社会动员,到底是受控于强大的威权国家,还是激起对民主负责制的强烈追求?国家和社会的平衡长期偏向于前者,如此社会能否出现民主?没有西式的产权或人身自由,中国能否拓展科学和技术的前沿?中国能否使用政治权力,以民主法治社会无法学会的方式,继续促进发展?

    第二个与自由民主制的未来有关。考虑到政治衰败,在某一历史时刻取得成功的社会不会始终成功。自由民主制今天可能被认为是最合理的政府,但其合法性仰赖自己的表现。而表现又取决于维持恰当的平衡,既要有必要时的强大国家行为,又要有个人自由。后者是民主合法性的基础,并孕育私营经济的增长。现代民主制的缺点有很多,呈现于 21 世纪早期的主要是国家的软弱。当代民主制太容易成为僵局,什么都是硬性规定,无法作出困难的决策,以确保自己经济和政治的长期生存。民主的印度发现,很难整修自己行将崩溃的公共基础设施——道路、机场、供水和排污系统等——因为既得利益者借用法律和选举制度横加阻挠。欧盟的重要成员发现,显然已负担不起自己的社会福利,但无法作出削减。日本累积了发达国家中最高水平的公债,仍然没有采取措施,以消除经济中阻碍未来增长的僵硬。

    还有美国,它无法认真处理长期的财政难题,像健康、社会保障、能源等,似乎在政治上日益陷入功能失调的政治均衡。每个人都同意,必须解决长期的财政困境,但消弭赤字而必需的增税或削减开支,仍受到强大利益群体的阻挠。国家制度的设计基于相互制衡,使难题的解决变得尤其困难,加上美国人在意识形态上的僵硬,使之束缚于既定的对策范围。尽管出现这些挑战,美国不太可能重蹈法兰西王国的覆辙,即公职家族化。但它可能也是只有短期的权宜之计,推迟而不是避免最终的危机,像法国政府那样。

    现在回头看,制度的最初出现是为了历史上不确定的原因。其中某些存活并得以流传开来,因为它们能满足某种意义上的普遍需求。这就是为何制度在历史上得以互相结合,为何可以提供政治发展的概论。但制度的继续生存也涉及很多意外。一个人口中位年龄在二十几岁的迅速增长的国家,其政治制度卓有成效,但可能不适合三分之一公民已在退休年龄的停滞社会。如果制度无法适应,社会将面临危机或崩溃,可能被迫改用其他制度。不管是非民主政治制度,还是自由民主制度,它都一视同仁。

    但有重要理由相信,政治负责制的社会将胜过没有政治负责制的。政治负责制为制度的改善提供和平途径。中国政治制度在王朝时期一直无法解决的问题是“坏皇帝”,像武则天或万历皇帝。英明领导下的威权制度,可能不时地超越自由民主制,因为它可作出快速决定,不受法律和立法机关的挑战。另一方面,如此制度取决于英明领袖的持续出现。如有坏皇帝,不受制衡的政府大权很容易导致灾难。这仍是当代中国问题的关键,其负责制只朝上,不朝下。 我在卷首指出,这里所提供的制度发展的历史介绍,必须对照工业革命后的不同条件。在某种意义上,我已经重新洗过牌,以便直接解说和修正《变化社会中的政治秩序》所提出的问题。工业化发轫后,经济增长和社会动员取得极为迅速的进展,大大改变了政治秩序三个组件的发展前景。这将是我在第 2 卷解说政治发展时所用的架构。

  • 弗朗西斯·福山《政治秩序的起源》1

    序言
    第一部分 国家之前
    第 1 章 政治的必需
    第 2 章 自然状态
    第 3 章 表亲的专横
    第 4 章 部落社会的财产、正义、战争
    第 5 章“利维坦”的降临
    第二部分 国家建设
    第 6 章 中国的部落制
    第 7 章 战争和中国国家的兴起
    第 8 章 伟大的汉朝制度
    第 9 章 政治衰败和家族政府的复辟
    第 10 章 印度的弯路
    第 11 章 瓦尔纳和迦提
    第 12 章 印度政体的弱点
    第 13 章 军事奴隶制与穆斯林走出部落制
    第 14 章 马穆鲁克挽救伊斯兰教
    第 15 章 奥斯曼帝国的运作和衰退
    第 16 章 基督教打破家庭观念
    第三部分 法 治
    第 17 章 法治的起源
    第 18 章 教会变为国家
    第 19 章 国家变为教会
    第 20 章 东方专制主义
    第 21 章“坐寇”
    第四部分 负责制政府
    第 22 章 政治负责制的兴起
    第 23 章 寻租者
    第 24 章 家族化跨越大西洋
    第 25 章 易北河以东
    第 26 章 更完美的专制主义
    第 27 章 征税和代表权
    第 28 章 负责制或专制主义?
    第五部分 迈向政治发展理论
    第 29 章 政治发展和政治衰败
    第 30 章 政治发展的过去和现在

    序言

    本书有两个起源。第一,源于我的恩师哈佛大学的塞缪尔·亨廷顿(Samuel Huntington)请我为他 1968 年的经典之作《变化社会中的政治秩序》的再版撰写新序。①亨廷顿的著作代表了从宏观角度论述政治发展的新努力之一,也是我在教学中经常要求学生阅读的。它在比较政治学方面建立了甚多重要见解,包括政治衰败的理论、威权现代化的概念、指出政治发展是有别于现代化其他方面的现象等。

    我在写新序时觉得,《变化社会中的政治秩序》尽管很有启发,但确实需要认真的更新。它的成书时间距离非殖民浪潮席卷二战后的世界仅十年左右。它的很多结论反映了那一时期政变和内战所带来的极端不稳定。但自该书出版以来已发生很多重大变化,像东亚的经济奇迹、全球共产主义的衰退、全球化的加速,以及始于 20 世纪 70 年代亨廷顿所谓的“第三波”民主化。政治秩序在很多地方尚未到位,但在不少发展中地区却取得成功。返回该书的主题,将之用于今日世界,似乎是个好主意。

    我在思考如何修订亨廷顿思想时又突然省悟到,若要详细解说政治发展和政治衰败的起源,还有很多基本工作要做。《变化社会中的政治秩序》将人类历史晚期的政治世界视作理所当然。其时,国家、政党、法律、军事组织等制度(institutions,参见本书第 29 章“制度[机构]”一节的编者按)均已存在。它所面对的是发展中国家如何推动政治制度的现代化,但没有解释这些现代化制度在其发源地是如何成形的。国家并不受困于自己的过去,但在许多情况下,数百年乃至数千年前发生的事,仍对政治的性质发挥着重大影响。如想弄懂当代制度的运作,很有必要查看它们的起源以及帮助它们成形的意外和偶然。

    我对制度起源的关心又与第二份担忧紧密吻合,即现实世界中国家过于薄弱和最终失败的问题。自 2001 年 9 月 11 日以来,就政府濒临崩溃或不稳的国家,我一直在研究其国家和民族构建的难题。与此有关的更早努力,是我在 2004 年出版的《国家构建:21 世纪的治理与世界秩序》。②美国和广大的国际捐赠社区,大力投入世界各地的国家建设项目,包括阿富汗、伊拉克、索马里、海地、东帝汶、塞拉利昂、利比里亚。我本人也跟世界银行和澳大利亚国际发展署(AusAid)接洽,观察包括东帝汶、巴布亚新几内亚、印尼巴布亚省、所罗门群岛在内的美拉尼西亚(Melanesia)的国家建设问题。它们在建造现代国家方面遇到重大困难。

    譬如,如何将现代制度植入美拉尼西亚社会,如巴布亚新几内亚和所罗门群岛。该社会以人类学家所谓的分支世系制(segmentary lineage)组成部落,而分支世系是指共享同一祖先的群体,其中的亲戚人数少至几十,多至数千。这些群体在本地被称为一语部落(wantok),它是英文词语“一种话语”的洋泾浜变种,即操同一语言的人群。存在于美拉尼西亚的社会分裂颇不寻常,巴布亚新几内亚拥有超过九百种互不通用的语言,几乎占世界现存语种的六分之一。所罗门群岛的人口仅 50 万,却有超过七十种的独特语言。巴布亚新几内亚高地的多数居民,从没离开过出生地的小峡谷,他们生活在一语部落内,与邻近的其他一语部落互相竞争。

    美拉尼西亚

    一语部落接受头人(Big Man)的指挥,但没有一个人生来就是头人,也不能将之传给儿子。更确切地说,必须在每一代赢得该职。它不一定落在体力强壮者的头上,通常给赢得社区信任的人——以分配猪肉、贝壳货币和其他资源的能力为基础。在传统的美拉尼西亚社会中,头人必须时时小心,因为权力觊觎者可能就躲在背后。如果没有可供派分的资源,他就会失去其领袖地位。

    20 世纪 70 年代,澳大利亚准许巴布亚新几内亚独立,英国也承认所罗门群岛独立。它们都建立现代“威斯敏斯特”(Westminster)式政府,公民定期参加多党派的选举,以选出议会成员。在澳大利亚和英国,政治选择离不开中立偏左的工党和保守党(澳大利亚的自由党和英国的托利党)。总的来说,选民根据意识形态和政策来决定取向(譬如,他们要更多的政府保护,还是要更多的市场取向)。

    但这种政治制度被植入美拉尼西亚后,结果却一片混乱。原因在于,美拉尼西亚多数选民投票不看政治纲领。更确切地说,他们只支持自己的头人和一语部落。如果头人(偶尔是女头人)被选入议会,这位新议会成员将尽力运用自己的影响,将政府资源搬回自己的一语部落,向自己的拥护者提供学校费用、埋葬开支、建筑工程等。尽管有全国政府和主权象征,如国旗和军队,美拉尼西亚的居民中没几个觉得自己属于一个国家,或属于自己一语部落之外的社会。巴布亚新几内亚和所罗门群岛的议会中,没有凝聚的政党,只有大批单枪匹马的领袖,将尽可能多的猪肉带回自己狭小的拥护者团体。

    美拉尼西亚社会的部落制度限制了经济发展,因为它阻止现代产权涌现。在巴布亚新几内亚和所罗门群岛,95% 以上的土地属于所谓的惯例(customary)土地所有制。根据惯例的规则,财产是私有的,由亲戚团体以非正式形式(就是说没有法律文件)一起拥有。他们对土地享有单独和集体的权利,地产的意义不仅在经济上,还在精神上,因为死去的亲戚都葬于一语部落的土地,其魂魄仍在徘徊。一语部落中的任何人,包括头人,都无权将土地卖与外人。寻觅地产的开矿公司或棕榈油公司,必须与数百人谈判,有时甚至是数千人。此外,根据传统规则,土地产权不受时效法律的限制。

    在很多外国人的眼中,美拉尼西亚政治家的行为看来像政治腐败。但从传统部落社会的角度看,头人只是在履行头人历来的职责,那就是向亲戚分发资源。只是现在,他们不但拥有猪肉和贝壳货币,而且享有开矿和伐木权利的收入。

    从巴布亚新几内亚的首都莫尔兹比港(Port Moresby)起飞,几小时就可抵达澳大利亚的凯恩斯(Cairns)或布里斯班(Brisbane)。在某种意义上,这一航程跨越了几千年的政治发展。在思考美拉尼西亚的政治发展时,我开始考虑:社会如何从部落层次过渡到国家层次,现代产权如何从惯例产权中脱颖而出,倚靠第三方执法的正规法律制度如何问世。美拉尼西亚社会从没见过正规的法律制度。如果想得更远,认为现代社会已远远超越美拉尼西亚,依我看来可能只是夜郎自大,因为头人——将资源派分给亲戚和拥护者的政治家——在当代世界依然到处可见,包括美国国会。如果政治发展的涵义就是脱离家族关系和人格政治,那我们必须解释,为何这些行为仍在多处幸存,为何看似现代的制度往往要走回头路。

    在《变化社会中的政治秩序》中找不到有关答案,这段历史需要认真的梳理,以重温亨廷顿的主题。

    因此就有了现在这本书,考量政治制度的历史起源和政治衰败的过程。这是两卷中的第 1 卷,涵盖从前人类时期到美法革命前夕的政治发展。本书与过去有关——事实上,它并不始于有记载的人类历史,而是人类的灵长目祖先。它的前四个部分讲述人类史前史、国家起源、法治、负责制政府。第 2 卷会一直讲到今天,特别关注非西方社会在追求现代化时受到西方制度的影响,然后再解说当代世界的政治发展。

    阅读本卷时需要预先掂量第 2 卷的内容。我在本卷最后一章中讲得很清楚,现代世界的政治发展所遇到的条件,与 18 世纪晚期之前的截然不同。工业革命发轫后,人类社会退出了直到那时一直所身历的马尔萨斯式处境(Malthusian conditions),一种新动力被注入社会变化的进程,造成了巨大的政治后果。本卷读者可能觉得,这里叙述的漫长历史进程意味着,社会会受困于自己的历史;但实际上,我们今天生活在非常不同且动力多样的环境下。

    本书涵盖众多社会和历史时期;我也使用自己专长之外的资料,包括人类学、经济学、生物学等。为了从事如此广泛的研究,我不得不几乎全然依靠二手资料。尽管我尝试让这些资料承受尽可能严密的专家过滤,但我仍可能犯了事实和解释方面的错误。对深入研究特定社会和历史时期的专家来说,本书很多单独章节是不够格的。但我认为,以比较方式作跨越时间和空间的考量,本身似乎就是一种美德。若全神贯注于特定题材,往往会看不清政治发展的大模式。

    第一部分 国家之前

    第 1 章 政治的必需

    第三波民主化,时人对自由民主制前景的担忧;左右两派憧憬政府消亡,发展中国家却在身受其害;我们视各式制度为理所当然,但对其来龙去脉却一无所知

    1970 年到 2010 年的 40 年间,世界上民主国家的数量经历一次高涨。1973 年,世界 151 个国家中,被“自由之家”(Freedom House)评估为自由国家的仅 45 个。自由之家是一家非政府机构,每年就世界各国的公民权和政治权提供量化评选。该年,西班牙、葡萄牙、希腊是独裁政权;苏联和其东欧卫星国仍显得强大和凝聚;中国正卷入毛泽东的“文化大革命”;一群腐败的“终身总统”正在非洲巩固他们的统治;大部分拉丁美洲处于军人独裁之中。到了下一代,人们亲眼目睹巨大的政治变化。民主制和市场导向的经济,在中东阿拉伯之外的世界各地蓬勃兴起。20 世纪 90 年代后期,约有 120 个国家——占世界独立国家总数的 60%——成为民主制。这一变化,即是亨廷顿所讲的第三波民主化。自由民主制作为预设,已成为 21 世纪初普遍接受的政治景观。

    潜行于体制变化之下的,是社会的一大转型。世界上一度消极的千百万民众组织起来,参与他们各自社会的政治生活,其结果是朝民主制的大幅转向。此次社会大动员,背后有众多因素:广为普及的教育,使民众意识到自我和周遭的政治环境;信息技术,使思想和知识得到迅速传播;廉价的旅行和通讯,让民众得以用脚来参与选举,特别在对政府不满时;经济繁荣,诱发民众渴望获得更齐全的保障。

    第三波在 20 世纪 90 年代后达到顶峰。21 世纪第一个十年则出现“民主衰退”。参与第三波民主化的国家中,约有五分之一,不是回复到威权主义,就是看到其民主制度遭受严重侵蚀。自由之家提及,2009 年是世界自由程度连续下跌的第四年,这是其自 1973 年创办自由度测评以来的首次。

    政治焦虑

    21 世纪第二个十年伊始,民主世界出现若干形式的病状。第一种焦虑,取得民主进展的某些国家出现彻底逆转,如俄罗斯、委内瑞拉、伊朗。其民选领袖忙于拆除各式民主机构、操纵选举、关闭或鲸吞独立的电视和报纸、取缔反对派的活动。自由民主制不仅仅是在选举中获得多数;它由一套复杂制度所组成,通过法律和制衡制度来限制和规范权力的行使。很多国家,虽然正式接受民主合法性,却在系统性地取消对行政权力的制衡,并对法律发起系统性的侵蚀。

    第二种焦虑,那些似乎走出威权政府的国家,却又陷入政论家托马斯·凯罗塞斯(Thomas Carothers)所谓的“灰色地带”,既非完全威权,也非货真价实的民主。苏联的许多继承国家,如中亚的哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦,即如此。1989 年柏林墙倒塌之后有个普遍假设:几乎所有国家将过渡成民主制,而民主实践中的种种挫折会随着时间的推移而获得逐一克服。凯罗塞斯指出,该“过渡模式”的假设是靠不住的,很多威权精英阶层无意建立削弱自身权力的民主制度。

    第三种焦虑,无关乎政治制度能否走向民主化或保持民主化,而关乎它们能否向民众提供所需的基本服务。拥有民主制度这一事实,并不表明其治绩的优劣。未克履行民主所允诺的好处,可能是民主制度所面临的最大挑战。

    乌克兰就是一个案例。2004 年,它给世人带来惊奇,成千上万的民众涌向基辅的独立广场,抗议总统选举的不公。这一系列抗议被称为橙色革命,引发新一轮选举,导致改革家维克托·尤先科(Viktor Yushchenko)当上总统。然而一旦当权,橙色联盟却一无是处,尤先科辜负支持者的期望。政府内部争吵不已,无法应付乌克兰的严重腐败,在 2008—2009 年的全球金融危机中,治下的国民经济陷入崩溃。2010 年初,当选为新总统的是维克托·亚努科维奇(Viktor Yanukovich)。而 2004 年被指控操纵选票、企图窃取选举成果从而触发橙色革命的,恰是此人。

    困扰民主国家的,还有许多其他的治理失误。众所周知,拉丁美洲是世界上贫富最悬殊的地区。那里,阶级等级往往等同于族裔。其民粹领袖的上升,如委内瑞拉的乌戈·查韦斯(Hugo Chávez)和玻利维亚的埃沃·莫拉莱斯(Evo Morales),与其说是不稳定的起因,倒不如说是不均的症状。很多人觉得,名义上是公民,但在现实中却横遭排挤。持久的贫穷经常滋生其他社会功能的失调,如帮会、毒品交易、普通百姓的不安全感。在哥伦比亚、墨西哥、萨尔瓦多,有组织的犯罪活动威胁国家本身和其基本制度。不能有效处理这些难题,民主制合法性便会受到破坏。

    另一案例是印度。自 1947 年独立以来,它一直维持颇为成功的民主制——考虑到其贫穷程度、种族和宗教的多元、幅员的广袤,此成就尤为惊人。(如以更长远的历史眼光来看待印度的政治发展,将会减少我们的惊异。这是本书第 10—12 章的主题。)但印度的民主,就像香肠的制作,越是近距离观察,其吸引力越是下降。举例来说,几乎三分之一的印度立法委员,现正遭受各式的犯罪起诉,有些甚至是重罪,如谋杀和强奸。印度政治家经常从事公开的政治交易,以政治恩惠来交换选票。印度民主的烂搅难缠,令政府在重大的基础设施投资上很难做出决策。印度众多的城市里,在漂亮耀眼的高科技中心旁,往往可见非洲式的贫穷。

    印度民主明显的混乱和腐败,经常与中国快速和有效的决策形成强烈对比。中国统治者不受法治或民主责任的牵制:如想建造大水坝、拆除旧居以造高速公路或机场、实施即时的经济刺激,他们的速度远远超过民主的印度。

    第四种政治焦虑与经济有关。现代全球资本主义,证明是高效的。其创造的财富,远远超越生活在 1800 年前任何人的梦想。自 20 世纪 70 年代的石油危机以来,世界经济几乎翻了四倍。由于贸易和投资的开放政策,亚洲人口的大部已挤入发达国家的行列。但全球性资本主义仍未找到避免大幅波动的良方,尤其是金融业。金融危机定期折磨全球的经济增长,20 世纪 90 年代初是欧洲,1997—1998 年是亚洲,1998—1999 年是俄罗斯和巴西,2001 年是阿根廷。可说是罪有应得,此种危机最终在 2008—2009 年击中全球资本主义的老窝——美国。为促进持续的增长,自由的市场很有必要,但它不善于自动调节,特别在涉及银行和其他大型金融机构时。制度的不稳定最终仍属政治上的失败,即未能在国家和国际层次上提供恰当的管制。

    这些经济危机的累积,未必减弱把市场经济和全球化当作引擎的信心。中国、印度、巴西和其他所谓的新兴市场国家,凭借对全球性资本主义的参与,在经济上继续表现良好。但显而易见,开发恰当的管制以驯服资本主义的大幅波动,这一政治工作尚未完成。

    政治衰败

    就民主前景而言,上述情形涉及另一种紧急但又常被忽略的焦虑。政治制度的发展通常是缓慢和痛苦的,必须经历漫长岁月。人类社会一直在努力组织起来,以征服自己所处的环境。政治制度一旦无法适应不断变化的环境,便会发生政治衰败。制度的保存自有规律。人类是循规蹈矩的生物,生来就倾向于遵守身边的社会规则,并以超越的意义和价值来加固那些规则。周围环境改变时,便会出现新的挑战,现存制度与即时需求便会发生断裂。既得利益者会起而捍卫现存制度,反对任何基本变化。

    美国政治制度可能正面临其适应能力的重大挑战。美国制度基于这样一种信念:集中的政治力量对公民的生命和自由构成了朝不虑夕的危险。因此,美国宪法设有广泛的相互制衡,使政府的某些部门得以防范其他部门的暴政。迄今为止,这个制度表现良好。因为在历史关键时刻,当强大政府是不可或缺时,其政治领导最终能达成共识,取得胜利。

    很不幸,没有机制上的保障能够确保美国制度既防范暴政,又在必要时按照初衷来顺利行使国家权威。后者取决于对政治目的达成社会共识,这恰是最近几年来美国政治生活中所缺乏的。美国现在面对一系列巨大挑战,大部分与其长期财政困境有关。过去一代,美国人把钱花在自己身上,没有缴纳足够的税款。宽松的信贷,以及家庭和政府的超支,无疑是雪上加霜。长期的财政亏空和对外负债,威胁美国在世人眼中的国力根基。其他国家的地位,如中国,则获得相对拔高。

    这些挑战,如采取痛苦和适时的行动,没有一项是无法克服的。美国的政治制度本应促进共识的形成,现在反而加剧挑战的艰巨。国会两极分化,令法案的通过变得异常困难。国会中最保守的民主党人,仍比最开明的共和党人更偏向自由派,这是现代史中的首次。以 10% 或更少选票当选的国会议员席位,19 世纪末仍有将近 200 名,持续下降至 21 世纪初,仅剩 50 余名。此类席位,往往是两党争夺的主要对象。两大政党在意识形态上变得更加物以类聚,审慎的辩论日益退化减少。这种分裂并非史无前例。但在过去,强势的总统总是能够驾驭此类分裂。而近来,则未见强大能干的总统。

    美国政治的未来,不仅依赖政治,而且依赖社会。国会的两极化反映了一大趋势,即美国的社区和地域正在日益同质化。美国人选择在何处居住,从而在意识形态上自我排队。跟志趣相投的人共处,这一倾向因媒体而获得增强。交流途径的多样化,反而减弱了公民的共享经历。

    国会的左右两极化、既得利益团体的成长和力量,都在影响美国政治制度应付财政挑战的能力。工会、农产企业、制药公司、银行、大批有组织的游说团,经常对可能损害其经济利益的法案行使有效的否决权。民主国家里,公民保护自己利益完全合理,也属预计之中。但到一定程度,此类保护将化作索求特权,大家的利益都变得神圣不可侵犯,社会为此而陷入困境。这解释了左右两派高涨的民粹主义愤怒,这种愤怒又进一步推动两极化,更反映出社会现实与国家原则的不协调。

    美国人抱怨美国受制于精英和利益团体。这反映了从 20 世纪 70 年代到 21 世纪初,收入和财富的不均在与日俱增。不均本身,不是美国政治文化中的大问题。美国强调机会均等而非结果均等。如人们相信,通过努力工作,他们和自己的孩子仍有公平机会获得成功,而富人是按规则取得成功的,那么如此制度仍是合法的。

    然而在事实上,美国世代流动性的比率大大低于众多美国人所相信的,甚至低于传统上被认作僵化和等级分明的其他发达国家。日积月累,精英们得以钻政治制度的空子,以保护自己的地位。他们向海外转移财产来避税,通过精英机构的优惠途径将优势传给下一代。该伎俩的大部在 2008—2009 年金融危机期间暴露无遗。人们痛苦地发现,金融服务业的报酬与其对经济的实际贡献没有直接关联。该行业动用相当大的政治力量,在前十年想方设法废除有关的管制和监督。金融危机发生后,它仍在继续抵抗新的管制。经济学家西蒙·约翰逊(Simon Johnson)指出,美国金融寡头的力量无异于新兴市场国家中的类似团体,如俄罗斯或印尼。

    没有自动机制可使政治制度适应不断变化的环境。因应不良,即政治衰败的现象,会在本卷的后半部得到详细介绍。埃及的马穆鲁克王朝没有较早接纳枪械以应付外国威胁,这并不是非发生不可的。最终击败他们的奥斯曼帝国,就这样做了。中国明朝皇帝没向老百姓征收足够税金以支撑一支强大的抗满军队,这也不是无可避免的。两件案例中的症结,都是现存制度的巨大惯性。

    社会如不能通过制度上的认真改革,以应付重大的财政危机,像法兰西国王在 1557 年无力偿还“大借款”(Grand Parti,编按:此指 1555 年,法兰西国王亨利二世为支付战争开销,向里昂银行家大举借贷一事)后所做的,它就会倾向于采取短视的补救,最终却腐化自己的制度。这些补救屈服于各种既得利益者,即法国社会中有财有势的人。国家预算不平衡,导致破产和国家本身非法化,这一历史过程以法国大革命告终。

    美国的道德和财政危机还没到达法兰西王国的地步。危险的是,其处境将会继续恶化,直到某种强大力量彻底打破这当前功能失调的制度均衡。

    无政府幻想

    我们对未来的甚多焦虑,如俄罗斯退回威权、印度腐败、发展中国家政府衰败、当代美国政治受制于既得利益者,均可用一条共同线索串起,那就是如何建立和维持有效的政治制度,虽然强大,但遵守规则,又承担责任。这么明白的道理,看上去像是任何四年级小学生都认可的。然而,想得更深一步,这又是很多聪明人迄今尚没弄清的。

    让我们以第三波的退潮和 21 世纪初世界上发生的民主衰退开始。我认为,当前我们对民主传播的失败感到失望,其原由不在思想这个层次。思想对政治秩序极其重要,它是政府的合法性被接受的基础,它能够凝聚人心,并使民众愿意服从政府的权威。柏林墙的倒塌标志共产主义的破产,共产主义曾是民主制的主要竞争者。自由民主制因此成为被最广泛接受的政府形式,获得快速的蔓延。

    时至今日,这仍是事实。用阿马蒂亚·森(Amartya Sen)的话说,民主制仍是“预设”:“民主尚未获得普遍的实践,甚至未被普遍接受。但在世界舆论的大气候中,民主制已获得被视作基本正确的地位。”世界上很少人公开钦佩弗拉基米尔·普京的石油民族主义、乌戈·查韦斯的“21 世纪社会主义”、马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪-内贾德的伊斯兰共和国。没有重要的国际机构将民主制以外的任何东西认作是公平合理的统治形式。中国迅速的经济增长,刺激了他人的忌妒和兴趣。但它的威权主义模式,不易解释清楚,更少被其他发展中国家轻易模仿。现代自由民主制享有如此威望,以致今日的威权政客,为了合法也必须上演选举,宁可躲在幕后操纵媒体。事实上,不但极权主义从地球上消失,连威权政客也往往假扮成民主人士来称颂民主制。

    民主的失败,与其说是在概念上,倒不如说是在执行中。世界上大多数人极向往这样的社会:其政府既负责又有效,民众需要的服务能获得及时和高效的满足。但没几个政府能真正做到这两点,因为很多国家的制度衰弱、腐败、缺乏能力,甚至根本不存在。世界上的抗议者和民主倡导者,不管是南非和韩国的,还是罗马尼亚和乌克兰的,他们的激情足以带来“政权更替”,使威权政府蜕变成民主制。但如没有漫长、昂贵、艰苦、困难的过程来建设相关的制度,民主制是无法成功的。

    有一种奇妙的想法,对政治制度的重要性视而不见,这几年来影响很多人。他们憧憬超越政治的世界,这种憧憬,不专属于左派或右派,他们各有自己的版本。共产主义之父卡尔·马克思的预测广为人知:无产阶级革命夺取政权后,私人财产废除,“国家消亡”。自 19 世纪的无政府主义者以来,左翼革命家认为,摧毁旧权力机构即已足够,没去认真思考何以代之,这项传统延续至今。反全球化的学者,如迈克尔·哈特(Michael Hardt)和安东尼奥·奈格里(Antonio Negri),建议削减国家主权,代之以互联的“群体”(Multitude),以铲除经济上的不公平。

    现实世界中的共产党政权,恰恰做了与马克思预测相反的事。它们建立庞大且暴力的国家机器,如民众不是自觉自愿,就逼迫他们参与集体行动。这影响了整整一代的东欧民主活动家。他们憧憬心目中的无政府社会,让动员起来的公民社会来取代传统的政党和集权政府。这些活动家随后对无情的现实感到失望,因为没有制度,社会便无从治理,而建造制度又必然需要令人厌烦的妥协。共产主义垮台后的数十年,东欧是民主的,但对其政治或政治家来说,却不一定感到满意。

    右派中最流行的无政府幻想认为,市场经济令政府变得无关紧要。20 世纪 90 年代的网络繁荣期间,参照花旗银行前首席执行官沃尔特·利斯坦(Walter Wriston)的口吻,很多狂热者主张世界正在经历“主权的黄昏”。新兴的信息技术在挑战传统上由国家掌控的政治权力,使边界变得不易管辖,使规则难以执行。互联网的上升,导致电子边疆基金会(Electronic Frontier Foundation)的约翰·巴洛(John Barlow)等活跃分子发布“网络空间的独立宣言”。它通告工业化世界的政府:“在我们中间,你们不受欢迎。我们聚集的地方,你们没有主权。”全球性资本主义,将以市场的主权取代民主制的主权。如果某国议院采用严格条例限制贸易,它将受到债券市场的惩罚,最后还是被迫改用全球资本市场所认可的合理政策。无政府幻想总能在美国找到同情听众,因为美国政治文化的常数就是对政府提高警惕。各式的自由至上主义者(Libertarian),不仅要缩减蔓生的福利计划,甚至要废除像联邦储备委员会和食品与药品管理局这样的基本机构。

    认为现代政府变得臃肿,因而限制经济增长和个人自由,这非常合理。抱怨官僚作风冷漠、政客腐败、政治中不讲原则,也绝对正确。但在发达国家,我们视政府的存在为理所当然,以致忘记它们有多重要、重建它们有多难、缺乏基本政治制度的世界会有多大的不同。

    我们不但视民主为理所当然,还把政府提供的基本服务当作理所当然。我居住多年的弗吉尼亚州费尔法克斯县是美国最富的县之一,位于华盛顿特区郊外。每年的冬天风暴过后,由于季节性的结冰和解冻,县公路上便会出现坑坑洼洼。但在春天结束之前,那些坑洼都得到神奇的填补,无须担心在坑洼里撞断自家汽车的底轴。如没有填补,费尔法克斯县的居民会变得愤怒,会抱怨地方政府的无能。没人(除了政府专家)停下来思忖哪个政府部门在尽此职责。它复杂,但却是看不见摸不着的。也没人停下来问,为何接壤的哥伦比亚特区却需要较长时间来填补坑洼,为何很多发展中国家从不填补它们道路上的坑洼。

    实际上,左右派梦想家所想象的最小政府或无政府的社会,并非只是海市蜃楼,其确实存在于当代的发展中国家。非洲撒哈拉以南的很多地方是自由至上主义者的天堂。该地区大体上都是低税收的乌托邦,政府征收的税金通常不超过国民生产总值的 10%。相比之下,美国超过 30%,部分欧洲国家占 50%。如此低的税收,与其说释放工商创业的热情,倒不如说导致政府资金异常短缺,无法提供健康、教育、填补道路坑洼之类的基本公共服务。现代经济所依据的基础设施,例如道路、法庭、警察,在这里不见踪影。自 20 世纪 80 年代晚期以来,索马里就缺乏强大的中央政府。普通人不但可拥有突击步枪,还可拥有火箭推进榴弹、防空导弹、坦克。民众有保卫自己家庭的自由,但他们是别无选择。尼日利亚生产的电影,数量可与印度闻名的宝莱坞媲美。但必须尽快赚回报酬,因为政府无力保障知识产权,无法避免其产品的非法复制。

    发达国家的民众视政治制度为理所当然。这习惯可见证于 2003 年美国入侵伊拉克的善后计划,或善后计划的缺乏。美国政府似乎认为,萨达姆·侯赛因的独裁政权一倒台,伊拉克就会自动回复到预设的民主政府和市场经济。等到伊拉克的国家机构在疯狂的洗劫和内乱中轰然崩塌时,美国政府似乎感到由衷的惊讶。在阿富汗,美国的目标遇上同样的挫折。十年努力和数千亿美元的投资,迄今没能培植出一个稳定合法的国家。

    政治制度是必要的,不能被视为理所当然。你“叫政府让开”后,市场经济和富裕不会魔术般出现,它们得依赖背后的产权、法治、基本政治秩序。自由市场、充满活力的公民社会、自发的“群众智慧”,都是良好民主制的重要组件,但不能替代强大且等级分明的政府。近几年来,经济学家有了广泛认同,“制度确实重要”。穷国之所以穷,不是因为它们缺少资源,而是因为它们缺少有效的政治制度。因此,我们需要好好了解那些制度的来源。

    达到丹麦

    建立现代政治制度的问题,常被形容为如何“达到丹麦”。这其实是一篇文章的标题,作者是世界银行社会学家兰特·普里切特(Lant Pritchett)和迈克尔·伍考克(Michael Woolcock)。对发达国家居民而言,“丹麦”是个具有良好政治和经济制度的神秘国度。它民主、稳定、热爱和平、繁荣、包容、政治腐败极低。大家都想弄清,如何将索马里、海地、尼日利亚、伊拉克、阿富汗转化成“丹麦”。国际发展团体列出一份假设是丹麦属性的长清单,尝试帮助落后国家来“达到丹麦”的水平。

    这个想法,问题多多。那些异常贫穷和混乱的国家,可以指望在短期内建立起复杂制度吗?这显得有点不靠谱,要知道,那些制度的进化花费了多长时间。此外,制度反映它们所处社会的文化价值。丹麦的民主政治秩序,能在迥然不同的文化土壤中扎根吗?谁也不清楚。富裕稳定的发达国家,其多数居民不知道丹麦本身是如何“达到丹麦”的——甚至对于很多丹麦人自己来说也是这样。建立现代政治制度的斗争,既漫长又痛苦,以致工业国家的居民对自己社会的来龙去脉罹患了历史健忘症。

    丹麦人的祖先是维京人,一个很凶悍的部落,曾战胜和掳掠从地中海到乌克兰基辅的大部分欧洲。率先定居不列颠的凯尔特人、征服他们的罗马人、取代罗马人的日耳曼蛮族,起初都组成部落,像阿富汗、伊拉克中部、巴布亚新几内亚现存的那些部落一样。中国人、印第安人、阿拉伯人、非洲人,几乎地球上所有人类,都有过同样经历。他们尽的主要义务,不是对国家,而是对宗族;他们解决争端,不通过法庭,而通过以牙还牙的正义;他们把死者葬在宗族集体拥有的土地。

    随着时间的推移,这些部落社会逐渐发展出政治制度。首先是中央集权,在固定领土范围内实施有效的军事力量垄断——这就是我们所谓的国家。和平得到维持,不再靠宗族团体之间的大致均势,而靠国家的军队和警察。它们成为常备力量,对抗邻近的部落和国家,保护自己的社区。财产不再归属于宗族,而为个人所拥有,其主人渐渐赢得任意买卖财产的权力。产权的保障不再靠宗族,而靠法庭来解决争端、补偿损失。

    日积月累,社会规则越来越正规化,变成书面法律,不再是习惯或非正式的传统。这些正式规则,不必顾及在特定时间行使该权力的某人,可自主决定制度中的权力分配。换言之,制度替代了领袖。这些法律,最终成为社会中的最高权威,高于暂时指挥军队和官僚的统治者,这就是法治。

    最后,有些社会不仅迫使统治者遵守限制国家权力的书面法律,还责成他们向国会、议会和其他代表较多人口的机构负责。传统的君主制,含有某种程度的负责,但通常只向少量精英顾问征求非正式的咨询。一旦统治者接受正式规则,限制自己的权力,并让自己的统治权臣服于通过选举表现出来的大众意志,现代民主制便呱呱坠地。

    本卷的目的,是想详述那些已被视作理所当然的基本政治制度的起源,从而填补历史健忘症所造成的空白。将要讨论的三种制度,即是刚才所提及的:

    1.国家(the state)

    2.法治(the rule of law)

    3.负责制政府(accountable government)

    成功的现代自由民主制,把这三种制度结合在稳定的平衡中。能取得这种平衡,本身就是现代政治的奇迹。能否结合,答案不是明显的。毕竟,国家功能是集中和行使权力,要求公民遵从法律,保护自己免遭他国的威胁。另一方面,法治和负责制政府又在限制国家权力,首先迫使国家依据公开和透明的规则来行使权力,再确保国家从属于民众愿望。

    这些制度的首次出现是因为民众发现,可借此来保护他们和家人的利益。什么是自利,如何与人合作,都取决于使政治结社取得合法性的思想。因此自利和合法性,形成了政治秩序的基础。

    三种制度中已存在一种,并不意味着其他两种也会出现。例如阿富汗,自 2004 年以来一直举行民主选举,但只拥有非常孱弱的国家,在其领土大部无法执法。相比之下,俄罗斯拥有强劲的国家,也举行民主选举,但其统治者觉得自己不受法治束缚。新加坡拥有强劲国家和英国殖民者遗留下的法治,但只提供缩了水的负责制政府。

    这三种制度最初来自何方?是什么力量驱使它们诞生?又在何等条件下得到发展?建立的顺序如何?彼此间有何关系?如能弄清这些基本制度的出现,我们便可明白,阿富汗或索马里离当代丹麦究竟还有多远。

    如不理解政治衰败的补充过程,就讲不清政治制度的发展。人类的制度很“黏糊”;这是指,它们长期延续,只有经受了重大的艰辛,方能得到变革。为满足某种条件而建立的制度,在该条件改变或消失时,常常得以苟延;未能妥善因应,便会引发政治衰败。这适用于旧式政治制度,也适用于集国家、法治、负责制政府于一身的现代自由民主制国家。不能保证,一个民主政体会继续向公民提供所允诺的;也不能保证,它在公民的眼中继续是合法的。

    此外,人类袒护亲友的自然倾向——我称之为家族主义(patrimonialism)——如未遭遇强大抑制,会一再重现。组织起来的团体——经常是有钱有势的——久而久之,得以盘根错节,并开始向国家要求特权。尤其是在持久和平遇上财务或军事危机时,这些盘踞已久的家族团体更会扩展其优势,或阻挠国家采取妥善的因应。

    政治发展和衰败的故事,曾被讲述多次。多数高中开设“文明之兴起”的课程,提供社会制度如何进化的概论。一个世纪前,讲述给大多数美国学生的历史,以欧洲甚至英国为中心。它可能从希腊和罗马开始,然后转向欧洲中世纪、大宪章、英国内战、光荣革命,再到 1776 年和美国宪法的起草。今天,类似的课程更加多元,囊括像中国和印度那样的非西方社会,更会讲述历史上遭排斥的群体,像土著、妇女、穷人,等等。

    现存的关于政治制度发展的文献,我们有理由表示不满。首先,大部分没在足够广泛的规模上作出比较对照。只有通过比较不同社会的经验,方可梳理复杂的因果关系,弄清为什么某些制度出现于某地,而不在其他地域。很多关于现代化的理论,从卡尔·马克思到道格拉斯·诺斯(Douglass North)等当代经济历史学家的大量研究,都侧重英国作为首个工业化国家的经验。英国的经历在很多方面是特殊的,对处在不同境地的国家来说,未必是好的指南。

    最近几十年,取而代之的多元叙述,很大程度上也没作严肃的比较对照。它们选择的,要么是非西方文明贡献于人类进步的正面故事,要么是其遭受迫害的负面故事。为什么某制度发展于某社会而不在另外社会,我们很难找到严肃的比较分析。

    优秀的社会学家西摩·李普塞特(Seymour Lipset)常说,仅了解一个国家的观察者是不懂国家的人。没有比较对照就无法知道,某一特殊的实践或行为,是某社会中所独具的还是众多社会所共有的。只有通过比较分析,才能理清因果关系,才能把地理、气候、技术、宗教、冲突与今日世界上呈现的各式结果挂上钩。这样做,我们也许能解答下列问题:

    • 为什么阿富汗、印度丛林地区、美拉尼西亚岛国、中东部分地区,至今仍是部落组织?
    • 为什么中国的预设统治是强大的中央政府,而印度在过去三千年历史中,除短暂时期,从没见过如此高度的中央集权?
    • 为什么几乎所有成功的现代威权政体——像韩国、新加坡、中国大陆、台湾地区——都集居在东亚,而不在非洲或中东?
    • 为什么民主制和齐全法治得以在斯堪的纳维亚生根发芽,而处于类似气候和地理条件下的俄罗斯,却产生了不受节制的专制主义?
    • 为什么在过去一个世纪,拉丁美洲国家反复遭遇高通货膨胀和经济危机,而美国和加拿大却没有?

    本卷提供的历史资料很有趣,因为它们照亮现状,解释不同政治秩序的来龙去脉,但人类社会不囿于自己的过去。为了备战和参战,现代国家得以在中国或欧洲出现。这并不意味着,今日非洲的薄弱国家为达到现代化,必须重复同一经验。我会在第 2 卷中讨论,今日政治发展的条件大相径庭于第 1 卷所涵盖的。社会成员的组合,因经济的增长在不断重新洗牌;今天国际因素对个别社会的冲击远远大于旧日。本卷的历史材料可以解释,各种社会是如何走到今天的。但它们走过的路径,既不能决定它们的将来,也不能成为其他社会的楷模。

    中国第一

    伟人所编写的经典现代化理论,如卡尔·马克思、埃米尔·涂尔干(Émile Durkheim)、亨利·梅因(Henry Maine)、斐迪南·滕尼斯(Ferdinand Tönnies)、马克斯·韦伯(Max Weber),倾向于认为西方经验是现代化的范本,因为工业化首先在西方发生。这样注重西方不难理解。1800 年后,在欧洲和北美所发生的生产力爆发和经济持续增长,既是史无前例的,也把世界塑造成今天的模样。但发展不只局限于经济,政治和社会的制度也在不断发展。政治和社会的发展,有时与经济变化紧密相关,有时又独立自主。本卷着重于政治方面的发展和政府制度的进化。现代政治制度在历史上的出现,远早于工业革命和现代资本主义经济。我们现在理解的现代国家元素,在公元前 3 世纪的中国业已到位。其在欧洲的浮现,则晚了整整一千八百年。

    基于此,我在本卷第二部分讲述国家崛起时,就以中国开始。经典现代化理论倾向于把欧洲的发展当作标准,只探询其他社会为何偏离。我把中国当作国家形成的范本,而探询其他文明为何不复制中国道路。这并不表示中国胜于其他社会。我们将看到,没有法治或负责制政府的现代国家,可能实施非常暴虐的专制主义。中国是开发国家制度的先行者,但西方的政治发展史解说,却很少提及此一创新。

    我自中国开始,就跳过了其他重要的早期社会,像美索不达米亚、埃及、希腊、罗马、中南美洲。在此还需要作进一步解释,为何不在本卷详细涵盖希腊和罗马。

    古代地中海世界树起的先例,对后续的欧洲文明发展非常重要,自查理曼(Charlemagne)时代起,便受到欧洲统治者的自觉模仿。一般认为,希腊人发明了民主制,其统治者不是世袭的,而是选出的。多数部落社会也是相对平等的,其统治者也是选出的(参看第 4 章)。但希腊人超前一步,其介绍的公民概念,以政治标准而非亲戚关系为基础。公元前 5 世纪雅典或罗马共和国实践的政府形式,其较为贴切的称号应是“古典共和政府”,而不是“民主制”,因为选举权只属于少数公民,尖锐的阶级差别排斥大批人(包括众多奴隶)的参与。此外,这些不是自由国家,而是社群式(communitarian)国家,不尊重隐私和其公民的自主权。

    希腊和罗马建立的古典共和政府先例,受到以后很多社会的模仿,包括热那亚和威尼斯的寡头共和国、诺夫哥罗德(Novgorod)、荷兰联合省。但这种政府有致命的缺陷,后代学者,包括很多深思该传统的美国创始人,都有广泛认知:古典共和政府不好扩充。它在小型且均质的社会中表现最佳,就像公元前 5 世纪的希腊城市国家或早期的罗马。这些共和国因征服或经济增长而渐渐壮大,难以维持曾凝聚他们的社群价值。随着疆域和居民的扩展,罗马共和国面临无法解决的矛盾:谁该享受公民权,如何分配国家的战利品。君主制最终战胜希腊城邦国家,罗马共和国经历漫长内战,最终也变成帝国。君主制作为一种政府形式,特别在管理庞大帝国时,证明是出类拔萃的。罗马帝国就是在此种政治制度下,达到其权力和疆域巅峰的。

    在第 2 卷里,我将返回古典共和政府作为现代民主制先例的题目。如要研究国家的兴起,中国比希腊和罗马更值得关注,因为只有中国建立了符合马克斯·韦伯定义的现代国家。中国成功发展了统一的中央官僚政府,管理众多人口和广阔疆域,尤其是与地中海的欧洲相比。中国早已发明一套非人格化(impersonal, or impersonality, 译按:“非人格化”在本书指不受基于家族关系的身份的限制)和基于能力的官僚任用制度,比罗马的公共行政机构更为系统化。公元 1 年时,中国总人口可与罗马帝国媲美,而中国人口中受统一规则管辖的比例,要远远超过罗马。罗马自有其重要遗产,尤其在法律领域中(在第 18 章中详述)。作为现代负责制政府的先驱,希腊和罗马非常重要。但在国家发展上,中国更为重要。

    可与中国相比的社会还有印度。大约在相同时间,印度社会也自部落升至国家。大概二千五百年前,由于新婆罗门宗教的兴起,印度走上一段弯路。该宗教限制印度政治组织可达到的权力,却在某种意义上为现代印度民主打下基础。穆罕默德先知的时代,中东也是部落组织。伊斯兰教的诞生,再加上军事奴隶制这一奇特制度,令埃及和土耳其的某些政治组织崛起成为主要的政治力量。欧洲则截然不同,其退出部落行列,不是通过统治者的自上而下,而是通过天主教在社会层次颁布的规则。只有在欧洲,国家层次的制度不必建造于部落组织之上。

    宗教也是法治起源的关键,它是第三部分的主题。基于宗教的法律,存在于古代以色列、印度、穆斯林的中东、基督教的西方。但唯有在西欧,独立法律制度得到最强劲的发展,并设法转成世俗形式,存续至今。

    第四部分中,负责制政府的兴起主要在欧洲,但在这一点上,欧洲各国并不齐整一致。负责制政府在英国和丹麦兴起,却没在法国或西班牙;俄罗斯发展出专制主义,其权力与中国的旗鼓相当。社会能否把负责制强加于君主,取决于各项特殊的历史条件,譬如幸存至现代的某些封建机构。

    与世界其他地区相比,西欧的政治发展次序是高度异常的。其现代国家或资本主义兴起之前,社会层次的个人主义便已出现,而且早了数个世纪;其政治权力集中于中央政府之前,法治已经存在;其负责制机构的兴起,却是因为现代中央集权国家无法击败或消灭旧封建机构,比如议会。

    国家、法治、负责制政府的组合一旦出现,证明是高度强大和极富吸引力的,之后传播到世界各个角落。我们必须记住,这一现象仅是历史上的偶然。中国有强大国家,但没有法治和负责制政府;印度有法治,现又有负责制政府,但传统上一直缺乏强大国家;中东有国家和法治,但阿拉伯世界的大部已扔掉后者。人类社会不囿于自己的过去,可自由借用彼此的思想和制度。它们过去长得如何,帮助塑造了它们今天的面貌,但过去与现在之间不是只有单一的路径。

    底下无数龟

    本卷的宗旨,与其说是介绍政治发展的历史,倒不如说是分析主要政治制度出现的原因。被称作“一连串混账事件”的众多历史著作,不愿意尽量提炼普遍规律和适用于其他场合的因果理论。人类学家所写的民族志,也没跳出这个窠臼,虽然细致详尽,但仍然故意避开广泛的概括。这肯定不是我的方法,我的比较和概括,将跨越众多的文明社会和历史时期。

    本卷有关政治发展的整体构架,与生物进化有很多相似之处。达尔文进化论建筑在差异和选择这两条原则上:有机体发生随意的遗传变化,最适应环境的,得以存活和繁殖。政治发展也是如此,政治制度也会产生变异,最适合当时自然和社会环境的,也得以存活和扩散。但生物进化和政治进化之间,又有很多重大差别。人类的制度不像基因,可得到精心的设计和选择;它们的代代传播凭借文化,而不是遗传;它们因各种心理和社会的机制,而被注入内在价值(intrinsic value),变得不易变革。政治发展因政治衰败而经常逆转,其原因就在人类制度固有的保守性。触发制度变革的外界变化,往往远远超前于社会接受改革的实际意愿。

    然而,该整体构架不是预测政治发展的理论。依我看,要找到政治变化的精简理论,就像经济学家所谓的经济增长理论,根本是不可能的。促使政治制度发展的因素既繁多又复杂,经常依赖于偶然或伴生事件。即使引证出某种发展的原因,却发现其本身仍有先决条件,这样的溯源回归是永无止尽的。

    让我们举例说明。有一条政治发展的著名理论认为,欧洲因需要发动战争而建立国家。在现代欧洲的早期,这两者之间的关系是大家公认的。我们将看到,它也同样适用于古代中国。但在宣布这是国家形成的通理之前,必须回答下列难题:为什么某些地区,尽管历经长期战争,却一直没能发展国家制度(美拉尼西亚)?为什么在另外地区,战争似乎反而削弱了国家制度(拉丁美洲)?为什么某些地区,其冲突水平低于其他地区(印度与中国相比)?要回答这些问题,就要把原因推向其他因素,例如人口密度、自然地理、技术、宗教。战争发生于人口密集、交通方便(平原或大草原)、拥有相应技术(马匹)的地区,与发生于人口稀少、深山老林、全是沙漠的地区相比,会发挥截然不同的政治影响。战争促使国家形成的理论,涉及更多更深的问题,譬如,为何某种战争仅爆发于某种地区。

    我想在本卷推介一种中间理论,既避免高度抽象(经济学家的恶习),又躲开巨细无遗(历史学家和人类学家的问题)。我希望重新拾起已被遗忘的 19 世纪历史社会学或比较人类学的传统。我不想一开始就向普通读者推介庞大的理论构架。在介绍历史的章节中,我会触及各种理论,但对政治发展的抽象讨论(包括基本概念的定义),我会保留至最后三章(第 28—30 章)。这包括政治发展之所以产生的通论,以及政治、经济、社会之间的互动。

    将理论放在历史之后,我认为是正确的分析方法。应从事实推论出理论,而不是相反。当然,没有预先的理论构思,完全坦白面对事实,这也是没有的事。有人认为这样做是客观实证,那是在自欺欺人。社会科学往往以高雅理论出发,再搜寻可确认该理论的实例,我希望这不是我的态度。

    有个可能不真实的故事,由物理学家史蒂芬·霍金(Stephen Hawking)转述。一位著名科学家在作有关宇宙论的演讲,房间后面有位老妇人打断他,说他是废话连天,而宇宙只是驮在龟背上的一只圆盘。该科学家反问,那龟又驮在何物之上?以为就此便可让她闭嘴。她却回答:“你很聪明,年轻人,但底下是无数的龟。”

    这是任何发展理论的难题:作为故事开头你所挑选的龟,究竟是站在另一只龟的背上,还是站在一头大象、一只老虎或一条鲸鱼背上。大多数所谓的发展概论,其失败的原因,在于没有考虑发展史中独立的多维性。他们只是化繁为简,试图从复杂的历史真实提取出单独的诱因。他们没能将故事推至足够原始的历史时期,以解说它的起点和前提。

    我把故事推得很远。讲中国发明了国家制度之前,我们必须了解战争的起源,甚至人类社会的起源。令人惊讶的是,它们不是外在的。自有人类起,就有社会和冲突,因为人类天生是群居和竞争的动物。人类的老祖宗灵长目,就在实践一种缩了水的政治。要弄清这一点,我们必须回到自然状态和人类生物学,在某种意义上为人类的政治行为设定框架。生物学为支撑龟们提供一定的稳固基础,但我们将在下一章看到,即便是生物学,也不是完全固定的起点。

    第 2 章 自然状态

    自然状态的哲学讨论;现代生命科学彰显人性和政治的生物学基础;黑猩猩和灵长目中的政治;诱发政治的人性特征;人类出现于世界不同地域

    西方哲学传统中对“自然状态”的讨论,一直是理解正义和政治秩序的中心议题。而正义和政治秩序,又是现代自由民主制的基础。古典政治哲学把天性和惯例(或称法律)截然分开。柏拉图(Plato)和亚里士多德(Aristotle)主张,合理城邦必须存在,与之相匹配的是永久人性,而不是昙花一现和不断变化的人性。托马斯·霍布斯(Thomas Hobbes)、约翰·洛克(John Locke)、让—雅克·卢梭(Jean-Jacques Rousseau)给予这差别以进一步的拓展。他们撰写有关自然状态的论文,试图以此作为政治权利的基石。讨论自然状态,其实是讨论人性的手段和隐喻,用来建立政治社会应予培养的各级人性美德(a hierarchy of human goods)。

    但在一个关键命题上,亚里士多德与霍布斯、洛克、卢梭泾渭分明。他主张,人类天生是政治的,其自然天赋使之在社会中兴旺发达。而这三位早期现代的哲学家则恰恰相反。他们争辩说,人类天生不是社会性的,社会只是一种手段,使人类得以实现单凭个人所无法得到的东西。

    霍布斯的《利维坦》(Leviathan)在罗列人类的自然激情后主张,人类最深刻、最持久的害怕是暴毙。他由此演绎,大家享有保护自己生命的自由,这就是基本自然权。人性中有三项诱发争端的特征:竞争、畏葸(害怕)、荣誉;“第一项,诱发人类侵略以获好处;第二项,以获安全;第三项,以获荣誉”。因此,自然状态被描绘成“人人相互为敌的战争”。为逃离这一危险处境,人类同意放弃随心所欲的自由,以换取他人尊重自己的生命权。国家,也就是利维坦,以社会契约的形式来执行这一相互的允诺,来保障他们天生拥有但在自然状态中无法享受的权利。政府,也就是利维坦,借保障和平来保障生命权。

    约翰·洛克的《政府论》下篇对自然状态的观念,比霍布斯的温和。他认为,人类所忙碌的,主要是将劳动与自然物结合起来,以生产私人财产,而不是彼此打斗。洛克的基本自然法,不限于霍布斯的生命权,还包括“生命、健康、自由、财产”。依照霍布斯,自然状态中不受节制的自由会引发战争;为保护自然的自由和财产,社会契约便成为必要。依照洛克,国家虽是必要的,但也有可能成为自然权利的褫夺者。所以他保留反抗不公正权威的权利。《美国独立宣言》中,托马斯·杰斐逊(Thomas Jefferson)所提倡的生命、自由、追寻幸福之权,直追霍布斯的天赋人权,再辅以洛克有关暴政的修正。

    霍布斯的暴力的自然状态,与卢梭较和平的版本,一直是鲜明的对照。在霍布斯那里,人生是“孤独、贫困、污秽、野蛮和短暂的”,卢梭在《论人类不平等的起源和基础》中,好几处公开批评霍布斯:“最重要的,让我们与霍布斯一起总结:人天生是恶的,因为他对善念一无所知;他品行不端,因为他根本不知道美德为何物;他拒绝为同类做事,因为他自信不亏欠他们;他因此而理直气壮,要求得到一切想要的,并愚蠢地视自己为整个宇宙的主人。”卢梭认为,霍布斯实际上没能发掘出自然人,《利维坦》讲述的暴虐人,其实只是数世纪承受社会污染的产物。对卢梭而言,自然人虽很孤独,但却是胆小恐惧的;彼此可能互相躲避,而不是交战。野蛮人的“欲望,从不超越其物质需求;除了食物、配偶、休息,他不知道任何其他财产”;他害怕疼痛和饥饿,而不是抽象的死亡。政治社会的产生,不代表拯救于“人人相互为敌的战争”,反而因相互依赖,而造成人与人之间的奴役。

    卢梭在《论人类不平等的起源和基础》中开门见山:“我们此时所从事的研究,不可当作历史真相,只算是假设性和有条件的推论。它适合于解释事物的本性,并不适合于显示其真正起源。”对卢梭和霍布斯而言,自然状态与其说是历史叙述,倒不如说是揭示人性的启发教具——那是指,去掉文明和历史所附加的举止后,人类最深刻最持久的特征。

    很清楚,《论人类不平等的起源和基础》的意图是提供人类行为的发展史。卢梭谈论人的完美性,推测其思想、激情、行为的长期进化。他引证新大陆加勒比人(Caribs)和其他土著的丰富资料,评判观察动物所获得的论据,尝试弄清天生人与社会人的差别。自认懂得伟大思想家的真正意图总是很危险的。霍布斯、洛克、卢梭对自然状态的解释,涉及西方政治的自我理解,至关重要。所以,将之对照我们因生命科学最新进展所认识的人类起源,不能算作不公平。

    此类认识存在于若干领域,包括灵长动物学、人口遗传学、考古学、社会人类学,当然还有进化生物学的总构架。我们可以用更好的实证资料,再次运行卢梭的思考试验。所得的结果,既确认他的部分洞察力,又对他的其他观察提出疑问。以现代生物学来寻找人性,作为政治发展理论的基础,这是非常重要的,因为它将提供最基本的部件。我们可借此来理解人类制度后来的进化。

    卢梭的有些观察是非常精彩的,如他认为,人类不平等起源于冶金、农业、私人财产的发展。但卢梭、霍布斯和洛克,在一个重要论点上是错误的。这三位思想家,都视自然状态的人为隔离中的个体,都视社会为非自然的。根据霍布斯,原始人类的相处,主要表现为害怕、羡慕、冲突。卢梭的原始人更为隔离,性是自然的,但家庭却不是;人类的相互依赖几乎是意外发生的,如农业的技术发明,使大规模的合作成为必要。他们认为,人类社会随着历史进展而出现,人与人相互妥协,从而放弃自然的自由。

    但事实并非如此。英国法律学家亨利·梅因,在 1861 年出版的《古代法》中,以下列词句批评这些自然状态理论:

    这两种理论(霍布斯和洛克的),将英国的严肃政治家长期分裂成敌对的两派。其相似处,只有对史前无法取证的人类状态的基本假设;其分歧处,则有前社会状态的特征,以及人类将自己提升入社会的反常。我们熟悉的,只是社会。但他们一致认为,原始人与社会人之间有一道鸿沟。

    我们可将之称为霍布斯式谬误:人类一开始各行其是,仅在发展中较迟阶段进入社会,因为他们作出理性推算,社会合作是达到各自目标的最佳方法。原始个人主义这个假设,支持美国《独立宣言》对权利的理解,也支持后来兴起的民主政治社群。该假设更支持了当代新古典主义经济学,其各项模型的前提是:人类是理性的,并希望将自己的功效或收益发挥到极点。但在事实上,人类历史上逐渐获得发展的是个人主义,而不是社会性。今天,个人主义似乎是我们经济和政治行为的核心,那是因为我们发展了相关制度,以克服身上更自然的群体本能。亚里士多德说,人类天生是政治的,他比这些早期现代的自由理论家更为正确。从个人主义角度理解人类动机,有助于解释今日美国商品交易者和自由至上主义者的活动,却不是理解人类政治早期发展的最佳途径。

    现代生物学,与人类学所介绍的自然状态完全相反:人类在进化过程中,从没经历过隔离时期;人类的灵长目先驱,早已开发出广泛的社会和政治技巧;促进社会合作的功能是人脑与生俱来的。自然状态,可被描绘为战争状态,因为暴力是自发的。实施暴力的,与其说是个人,不如说是密切结合的社会群体。人类并不因为自觉且理性的决定,而进入社会和政治生活。公共组织在他们中间自然形成,只是不同的环境、思想和文化,塑造出了各自独特的合作方式。

    事实上,人类出现的数百万年前,就有合作的基本形式。生物学家找到合作行为的两个自然来源:亲戚选择(kin selection)和互惠利他(reciprocal altruism)。关于第一,生物进化的竞争,不是指有机体本身的继续生存,而是指有机体体内基因的继续生存。这种情形一再出现,以致生物学家威廉·汉密尔顿(William Hamilton)将之定为包容适存性原则(inclusive fitness)或亲戚选择。该原则认为,有性繁殖物种的个体,对待亲戚时是利他的,利他程度与它们分享的基因呈正比。父母和小孩,亲兄弟姐妹,分享 50% 的基因。他们之间的利他,更强于他们与堂表亲之间,因为后者仅分享 25% 的基因。这种行为可见证于各类物种。譬如,黄鼠在筑巢时竟能分辨嫡庶姐妹。就人类而言,现实世界的裙带关系,不仅基于社会缘由,更基于生物学缘由。将资源传给亲戚的欲望是人类政治中最持久的常态。

    与遗传上的陌生人合作,被生物学家称作互惠利他。这是亲戚选择之外,社会行为的第二生物学来源,也可见证于众多物种。社会合作取决于如何解答博弈论的“囚徒困境”游戏(prisoner’s dilemma)。在那些游戏中,如大家合作,参与者都有可能获益;如他人合作而自己免费搭乘,则可获益更多。20 世纪 80 年代,政治学家罗伯特·艾克塞洛德(Robert Axelrod)组织了解答“囚徒困境”游戏的电脑程式比赛。优胜战略是“一报还一报”:如对方在较早比赛中是合作的,则采用合作态度;如对方以前不予合作,则采用拒绝态度。艾克塞洛德以此论证,随着理性决策者彼此间长期互动,道德可自发产生,尽管一开始是由自私激起的。

    除人类之外,互惠利他还出现于其他众多物种。吸血蝙蝠和狒狒被观察到在群居地喂养和保护伙伴的后代。另一些情况中,就像清洁鱼和它们所清理的大鱼,相互帮忙的纽带可存在于全然不同的物种。狗和人之间的交往,显示了这两个物种相互进化得来的行为。

    黑猩猩政治与人类政治发展的关系

    进化生物学,为我们弄懂人类如何从灵长目先驱进化而来提供了宏大框架。我们知道,人类和现代黑猩猩共享一个类似黑猩猩的祖先。人类分支出来,约在五百万年前。人类和黑猩猩的染色体,约有 99% 的重叠,多于灵长目内任何其他的一对。(除了解剖上的重要差别,那 1% 的偏离与语言、宗教、抽象思维等有关,所以是非常重要的!)我们当然不可能研究这一共同祖先的行为,但灵长学家花费很长时间,在动物园和自然栖息地观察黑猩猩和其他灵长目动物的行为,发现它们与人类拥有明显的连贯性。

    生物人类学家理查德·兰厄姆(Richard Wrangham)在他《雄性恶魔》一书中,叙述成群结队的野外雄性黑猩猩,远离自己领土去攻杀邻近社区的黑猩猩。这些雄性彼此合作,悄悄追踪包围,先杀死单独的邻居,再逐一消灭社区内的其他雄性,然后捕获雌性,以纳入自己的族团。这很像新几内亚高地男人的所作所为,也像人类学家拿破仑·沙尼翁(Napoleon Chagnon)所观察到的雅诺马马印第安人(Yanomamö Indian)。根据兰厄姆的研究,“甚少动物生活于雄性组合的父系群体,其雌性为避近亲繁殖,经常去邻区寻求交配。组成一个紧密的系统,由雄性发起领土进攻,包括突袭邻近社区,寻找弱小敌人,再加以攻击和消灭,如此做的,已知道的仅两种”。这两种,就是黑猩猩和人。

    根据考古学家斯蒂芬·勒布朗(Steven LeBlanc)的研究,“非复杂社会的人类战争,大部分与黑猩猩的攻击相似。在那个社会层次,人类大屠杀其实是罕见的。由消耗战而取得胜利是可行战略之一,另外还有缓冲区域、突袭、收纳女俘、刑辱敌人。黑猩猩和人类的行为,几乎是彻底平行的”。其主要差异,只是人类的更加致命,因为他们的武器更多样、更犀利。

    黑猩猩像人类群体一样,保卫自己的领土,但在其他方面又有很多不同。雄性和雌性不会组成家庭来抚养小孩,只是建立各自的等级组织。然而,等级组织中的统治权运作,又令人想起人类群体中的政治。黑猩猩群体中的雄性老大(Alpha Male),并不生来如此,像美拉尼西亚社会的头人一样,必须借建立同盟来赢得。体力虽然要紧,但最终还得依靠与他人的合作。灵长学家弗兰斯·德瓦尔(Frans de Waal),在荷兰阿恩海姆动物园观察驯养的黑猩猩群体。他叙述两只年轻黑猩猩,如何联手取代较年长的雄性老大。篡夺者之一,取得雄性老大地位后,即凶狠对待它曾经的同盟者,并最终将之杀害。

    雄性或雌性黑猩猩在等级组织中,一旦取得各自的统治地位,便行使权威——即解决冲突和设定等级规则的权力。黑猩猩通过卑顺的招呼来承认权威:一系列短促的咕噜声,再加上深鞠躬;向上级伸手,亲吻上级的脚。德瓦尔介绍一只占统治地位的雌性黑猩猩,名叫妈妈(Mama),相当于西班牙或中国家庭中的老祖母。“群体中的紧张气氛达到巅峰时,甚至包括成年雄性在内的参战者总是求救于她。我多次看到,两只雄性之间的激烈冲突告终于她的手臂。冲突升到顶点时,对手们没有诉诸暴力,反而大声尖叫,奔向妈妈。”

    在黑猩猩社会建立同盟,不是直截了当的,需要有评判他人品质的能力。像人一样,黑猩猩擅长欺骗,所以需要评估潜在同盟者的可信度。在阿恩海姆动物园长期观察黑猩猩行为的人注意到,每只黑猩猩都有显著个性,有的比其他的更可信赖。德瓦尔描述一只名叫普依斯特(Puist)的雌性黑猩猩,被观察到常常出其不意地攻击伙伴或假装和解,等其他黑猩猩放松警惕再有所行动。由于这些行为,低等级的黑猩猩都学会远离她。

    黑猩猩似乎懂得,它们被企盼遵循社交规则,但不总是照办。如违反群体规则或违抗权威,它们会流露像是犯罪或困窘的感觉。德瓦尔讲起一件轶事,一位名叫伊冯的研究生,与一只名叫可可(Choco)的年轻黑猩猩同住:

    可可变得益加淘气,该管管了。一天,可可多次把电话听筒搁起。伊冯一边把可可的手臂攥得特紧,一边给予严厉的责骂。这顿责骂似乎蛮有效果,伊冯便坐上沙发,开始读书。她已把此事忘得一干二净,突然可可跳上她的膝盖,伸出手臂搂她的脖子,并给她一个典型的黑猩猩亲吻(嘴唇敞开)。

    德瓦尔很清楚将动物人格化的危险,但贴近观察黑猩猩的人们,绝对相信这些行为背后的情感潜流。

    黑猩猩行为与人类政治发展的关系是很明显的。人类和黑猩猩,都进化自同一的类人猿祖先。现代黑猩猩和人类,尤其是生活在狩猎采集或其他相对原始的社会中的,表现出相似的社交行为。如霍布斯、洛克或卢梭对自然状态的叙述是正确的,那我们必须假定,在进化成为现代人类的过程中,我们的类人猿祖先短暂抛弃了自己的社交行为和情感,然后在较迟阶段,从头开始第二次进化。较为可信的假定应是:人类从没作为隔离的个体而存在;现代人类出现之前,社交和融入亲戚团体已成为人类行为的一部分。人类的社交性,不是因历史或文化而取得的,而是人类天生的。

    唯独人类

    将人类与类人猿祖先分开的 1% 染色体,还含有什么?我们的智力和认知力,总被认为是我们人类身份的关键。我们给人类的标签是智人(Homo sapiens),即人属(Homo)中“有智慧的”。人类自类人猿祖先分支出来,已有五百万年。其间,人类的脑容量翻了三倍,这在进化史上是异常神速的。不断增大的女人产婴通道,勉强跟上人类婴儿硕大头颅的需求。那么,这认知力又来自何方呢?

    乍看之下,人类似乎需要认知力来适应和征服他们的自然环境。更高的智力,为狩猎、采集、制造工具和适应苛刻气候等提供优势。但这一解释并不令人信服。很多其他物种,也狩猎、采集、制造工具,却没能获得类似人类认知的能力。

    很多进化生物学家推测,人脑如此迅速增长的原因,是为了与人合作,是为了与人竞争。心理学家尼古拉·韩福瑞(Nicolas Humphrey)和生物学家理查德·亚历山大(Richard Alexander)分别表明,人类实际上走进一场相互的军火竞赛;运用新的认知力来理解彼此行为,以建立更复杂的社会组织,成为竞赛中的优胜者。

    前文提及的博弈论表明,经常与人互动的个人,愿意与诚实可靠者合作,避开机会主义者。但要行之有效,他们必须记住彼此的过去,并揣测动机,以测将来。这颇不容易,因为潜在合作者的标记,只是诚实外表,而不是诚实本身。譬如,依照经验你似乎是诚实的,我愿意与你携手合作;但如果在过去,你只是在故意积累信任,将来,你就能从我这里骗得更大好处。所以,自利推动了社会群体中的合作,也鼓励了欺瞒、行骗和其他破坏社会团结的行为。

    黑猩猩能达到数十成员的社会族团层次,因为它们拥有所要求的认知技术来解答基本的“囚徒困境”游戏。如阿恩海姆动物园的普依斯特,因她不可靠的历史,而遭遇其他黑猩猩的回避;“妈妈”取得领袖地位,因她调停纠纷时公正的声誉。黑猩猩拥有足够的记忆和沟通技巧,以解释和预测可能的行为,领袖与合作遂得到发展。

    但黑猩猩无法迈进更高层次的社会组织,因为它们没有语言。早期人类中出现的语言,为改进合作和发展认知力,提供了大好机会。有了语言,谁诚实和谁欺诈,不再取决于直接经验,而变成可传送给他人的社会信息。但语言又是说谎和欺骗的媒介。发展更好的认知力来使用和解释语言,从而测出谎言,能这样做的社会群体,对其竞争者就占有优势。进化心理学家杰弗里·米勒(Geoffrey Miller)认为,求偶对认知力的独特需求促进了大脑皮层的发展,因为男女不同的繁衍战略,为欺骗和侦测生育能力创立了巨大奖励。

    男性繁衍战略是,寻求尽可能多的性伙伴,以取得最大成功。女性繁衍战略是,为自己后代谋求最佳的雄性资源。这两种战略,目的截然相反。所以有人认为,这在进化方面激励人类发展欺骗本领,其中语言扮演了重要角色。另一位进化心理学家斯蒂芬·平克(Steven Pinker)认为,语言、社交能力、掌控环境都在相互加强,为精益求精而施加进化压力。这解释了脑容量增加的必要,大脑皮层很大一部是用于语言的,它恰是行为意义上的现代人类(behaviorally modern humans)所独有的,而在黑猩猩或古人类身上是找不到的。

    语言的发展,不仅允许短期的行动协调,还令抽象和理论成为可能,这就是人类所独有的关键认知力。词语可指具体物件,也可指物件的类别(狗群和树丛),甚至可指抽象的无形力量(宙斯和地心引力)。综合两者,便使心智模型(mental model)成为可能——那是指因果关系的一般声明(“因为太阳发光,所以变得温暖”;“社会强迫女孩进入定型的性别角色”)。所有的人都在制造抽象的心智模型。这样的推论能力给予我们巨大的生存优势。尽管哲学家如大卫·休谟(David Hume)、无数一年级统计学的教授一再告诫,关联不表示因果,但人类经常观察周遭事物的关联,以推断之间的因果关系。不要踩蛇,不吃上周毒死你表亲的草根,你将免遭同样命运,并可迅速将此规矩告诉子孙。

    制造心智模型的能力,将原因归于冥冥中的抽象概念,这就是宗教出现的基础。宗教——笃信一个无形的超自然秩序——存在于所有人类社会。很不幸,试图重建早期人类血统的古人类学家和考古学家,对其精神生活只能提供甚少的线索,因为他们依据的是化石和营地的物质记录。但我们尚未发现没有宗教的原始社会,并有考古迹象表明,尼安德特人(Neanderthals)和其他原始人类群体,也可能有宗教信仰。

    今天有人主张,宗教是暴力、冲突、社会不协调的主要来源。但在历史上,宗教恰恰扮演相反的角色,它是凝聚社会的源泉。经济学家假设,人类是简单、理性、自私的参与者。宗教则允许他们之间的合作变得更广泛更安全。据我们所知,彼此一起玩囚徒困境游戏的参与者,应能取得一定的社会合作。但经济学家曼瑟尔·奥尔森(Mancur Olson)显示,随着合作群体的逐渐扩展,集体行动便开始瓦解。在庞大群体中,越来越难监察每个成员的贡献,免费搭乘和其他机会主义行为变得司空见惯。

    宗教得以解决这集体行动的难题,通过奖罚而大大增强了合作的好处,甚至在今天也是这样。如我认为部落领袖只是像我一样的自私家伙,我就不一定服从他的权威。如我相信部落领袖能调动已死老祖宗的灵魂来奖励或处罚我,我会对他更加尊崇。如我相信已死老祖宗在旁监视,比活人亲戚更能看清我的真正动机,我的羞耻感可能更大。与宗教信徒和世俗者的见解恰恰相反,任何一种宗教信仰都是很难得到证实或证伪的。即使我怀疑部落领袖与已死老祖宗的联系,我也不愿承担风险,万一这是真的呢?根据“帕斯卡赌注”(Pascal’s wager),我们应该相信上帝,因为他可能存在。这在人类历史中一直适用,虽然在早期怀疑者可能会更少。

    在加强规范和支撑社区方面,宗教的功能一直是公认的。“一报还一报”(tit-for-tat),即以牙还牙和报李投桃,是反复互动的合理结果,也是圣经道德的基础,更是人类社会几乎放之四海而皆准的道德准则。你待他人,如他人之待你,这条黄金定律只是“一报还一报”的异体。它只是强调善,不讲恶罢了。(由此看来,基督教以德报怨的原则是反常的。人们可能注意到,即使在基督教社会,它也很少付诸实施。没有一个我所知道的社会,把以怨报德当作其群体的道德准则。)

    进化心理学家主张,凝聚社会所提供的生存优势是人类天生偏爱宗教的原因。思想可增加集体的团结,宗教不是唯一方式——今天,我们有民族主义,还有世俗意识形态,如马克思主义——但在早期社会,宗教在社会组织走向复杂一事上,扮演了至关重要的角色。没有宗教,很难想象人类社会得以超越族团的层次。

    从认知观点出发,可把任何宗教信仰称作现实世界的心智模型。它们把因果关系,归因于日常世界之外的无形力量,归因于形而上的王国。改造自然界的理论由此而生。例如,神的愤怒造成干旱,把婴儿血洒入大地的犁沟,便可使之平息。之后,它又导向礼仪,即有关超自然秩序的重复表演。人类社会希望借此来获得对环境的主导。

    礼仪反过来又帮助区分群体,标记边界,使之有别于其他群体。它促进社会团结,最终会脱节于导致其产生的认知理论。譬如当代世俗欧洲人,仍继续庆祝圣诞节。礼仪本身和支撑它的信念,会被赋予极大的内在价值。它不再代表心智模型,不再是遇上更好选择时可随意抛弃的普通理论,而变成目的本身。

    红脸野兽

    促使人类合作和存活的心智模型和规范,产生时可能是理性的,恰似经济学家所说明的。但宗教信仰在信徒眼中,即便证明有错,也从来不是可弃之如敝屣的简单理论。它被视作无条件的真理,如指控其谬误,会受到社会和心理的沉重惩罚。现代自然科学带来的认知进步,为我们提供了检验理论的实验模式,允许我们更好地改造环境(如使用灌溉系统,而不是人的血祭,来提高农业生产力)。这里有个疑问:人类为何忍受如此僵硬难改的理论构思?

    基本正确的答案是:人类之遵循规则,主要植根于情感,并不依靠理性过程。人脑培养了情绪反应,犹如自动导航装置,以促进社会行为。喂奶的母亲看到婴儿,便会分泌乳汁。不是因为她清楚想到她自己的小孩需要食物,而是因为在不知不觉中,她大脑产生荷尔蒙,诱发了乳腺分泌。对陌生人的好意表示感激,对无缘无故的伤害表示愤怒,这不是精心考虑的反应,也不一定是学来的情感(尽管通过实践,这些感受会获得加强或受到抑制)。同样,当有人表示不敬,在朋友前蔑视我们,或评论我们母亲或姐妹的德行,我们不会核算评论的精确度,也不会考虑为未来交往而保护声誉,我们只是感到愤怒,只想痛揍这不尊重他人的家伙。这些行为——对亲戚的利他主义,捍卫自己的声誉——可用理性的自利来解释,但却是在情绪状态下作出的。一般情况下,情绪化的反应却是理性的正确答复。为什么?这是进化的安排。行动经常是情感的产品,而不是计算的产品。所以我们经常弄错,打了更强壮、更会报复的人。

    这种情绪化反应,使人类中规中矩,遵循规范。规范的独特内容由文化决定(不吃猪肉、尊敬祖先、宴会上不点香烟),遵循规范的能力却是遗传的。同样,语言因文化而异,但都植根于人类普遍的语言能力。例如,在违反规范和他人都遵守的规则时被人看到,大家都会觉得困窘。很明显,困窘不是学来的举止,因为小孩通常比父母更易觉得困窘,即使是小小过失。人类能将自己置于他人位置,并通过他人眼睛观察自己的行为。今天的小孩,如不能做到这一点,就会被诊断为具有自闭症的病理征兆。

    通过愤怒、可耻、有罪、骄傲的特殊情感,遵循规范的习惯得以嵌入人性。规范受到侵犯时,如陌生人费尽心思羞辱我们或团体分享的宗教礼仪受到嘲笑或忽视,我们会感到愤怒。无法跟上规范时,我们会感到耻辱。取得大家赞许的目标,从而获得群体的称赞,我们会感到骄傲。人类在遵循规范中,投入这么多情感,以致失去理性,危害自身的利益。帮派成员因受到侮辱(实际上的或想象的),而向另外帮派的成员施以报复,但心里很清楚,这将导致暴力的逐步升级。

    人类也将情感投入后设规范(metanorm),即如何恰当地阐述和执行规范。如果后设规范得不到妥善的遵循,人类会发起生物学家罗伯特·特里弗斯(Robert Trivers)所称的“说教型进攻”。某命案的结局与自己利益毫不相关,但人们仍想看到“法网恢恢,疏而不漏”。这解释了犯罪影片和法庭戏剧为什么特受欢迎,还解释了人们对巨大丑闻和罪行为什么着迷关注。

    规范化行为植根于情感。它促进社会合作,明显提供生存优势,协助人类进化至今。经济学家主张,盲目遵守规则在经济上却是理性的。如每一次都要计算得失,就会变得非常昂贵和适得其反。如必须跟伙伴不时谈判新规则,我们会陷入瘫痪,无法从事例行的集体行动。我们把某些规则当作目标本身,而不再是达到目标的手段,这一事实大大增加了社会生活的稳定。宗教进一步加强这种稳定,并扩充潜在合作者的圈子。

    这在政治上造成难题。很多案例中成效明显的规则,遇上短期的特殊情况,却变得苍白无力,甚至功能失调,因为导致其产生的情形有了大变。制度规则是很“黏糊”的,它抗拒改革,变成政治衰败的主要根源之一。

    寻求承认的斗争

    规范被赋予内在价值后,便成为哲学家黑格尔(Georg W. F. Hegel)所谓“寻求承认的斗争”的目标。寻求承认的欲望,截然不同于经济行为中获得物质的欲望。承认不是可供消费的实物,而是一种相互的主观意识。借此,个人承认他人的价值和地位,或他人的上帝、习俗、信念。我作为钢琴家或画家,可能很自信。如能获奖或售出画作,我会有更大的满足。自从人类把自己组织起来,进入社会等级制度后,承认往往是相对的,而不是绝对的。这使寻求承认的斗争,大大有别于经济交易的斗争。它是零和(zero sum),而不是正和(positive sum)。即某人获得承认,必然牺牲他人的尊严,地位只是相对的。在地位比赛中不存在贸易中的双赢情形。

    寻求承认的欲望有其生物学根源。黑猩猩和其他灵长目,在各自的族团中,争夺雄性老大和雌性老大的地位。黑猩猩群体的等级制度提供繁衍优势,因为它控制群体内的暴力,凝聚成员,一致对外。雄性老大获得更多性伙伴,以保证繁衍成功。在包括人类的各种动物中,寻求地位的行为已成为遗传,与寻求者大脑中的生化变化直接有关。当猴子或个人顺利取得高级地位时,其血液中重要的神经传递物复合胺(serotonin),会获得大幅提高。

    人类具有更为复杂的认知力,其寻求的承认不同于灵长目。黑猩猩雄性老大只为自己寻求承认,而人类还为抽象概念寻求承认,如上帝、旗帜、圣地。当代政治的大部,以寻求承认为中心。对少数民族、女性、同性恋者、土著等来说,尤其如此。他们有历史理由相信,自身价值从没得到重视。这些寻求可能有经济色彩,如同工同酬,但通常只是尊严的标记,并不是目标本身。

    我们今天把寻求承认称作“身份政治”。这类现象主要出现于流动且多元的社会,其成员可具多重身份。甚至在现代世界出现之前,承认已是集体行为的重要动机。人类奋斗,不仅为自身利益,而且代表群体,要求外人尊重他们的生活方式——习俗、上帝、传统。所采取的形式,有时是统治外人,更多时候是相反。人类自由的基本涵义是自治,即避免隶属于不配的外人。犹太人三千多年前逃离埃及的奴役,以后每逢逾越节所庆祝的,就是此种自由。

    承认现象的根本所在是裁决他人的内在价值,或人为的规范、思想和规则。强迫的承认毫无意义,自由人的赞美远远胜过奴隶的卑从。群体钦佩某成员,因为他显示出彪悍、勇气、智慧、判决纠纷时的公平,政治领袖遂得以产生。政治可说是争夺领导权的斗争,但也是追随者的故事。大众甘做部属,愿意给予领袖更高地位。在凝聚且成功的群体中,部属地位是心甘情愿的,这基于领袖有权统治这一信念。

    随着政治制度的发展,认可自个人移至制度——转移到持续的规则或行为模式,像英国君主制或美国宪制。在这两个范例中,政治秩序都基于合法性,以及合法统治所带来的权威。合法性意味着,社会成员大体上承认制度是基本公正的,愿意遵守其各项规则。我们相信,当代社会的合法性,表现在民主选举和尊重法治。但在历史上,民主制不是唯一的合法政府。

    政治力量最终以社会凝聚为基础。凝聚可源自自利,但光是自利不足以诱使追随者为群体而牺牲自己生命。政治力量不仅是社会可掌控的公民人数和资源,也是对领袖和制度合法性的认可程度。

    政治发展的基础

    现在,我们有了一切重要和自然的构件来组建政治发展的理论。人类虽然自私,但却是理性的,如经济学家所称的为自利而学会互相合作。此外,人性提供通向社会性的既定途径,为人类的政治披上下列特征:

    • 包容适存性、亲戚选择、互惠利他是人类交际性的预设模式。所有的人都倾向于照顾亲戚和互换恩惠的朋友,除非遇上强烈的惩罚。
    • 人享有抽象和理论的能力,以心智模型探究因果关系,又偏爱在无形或非凡的力量中寻找因果关系。这是宗教信仰的基础,而宗教又是凝聚社会的重要源泉。
    • 人倾向于遵循规范,以情感为基础,而不是理性。心智模型和其附属的规则,常被赋予内在价值。
    • 人渴望获得他人的主观承认,或对自己的价值,或对自己的上帝、法律、习俗、生活方式。获得的承认成为合法的基础,合法本身则允许政治权力的实施。

    这些自然特征是社会组织益加复杂的基础。包容适存性和互惠利他,不仅属于人类,也见于众多动物,为(主要是)亲戚小群体的合作作出了解释。人类初期的政治组织,很像在灵长目中看到的族团社会,如黑猩猩的。这可被认作社会组织的预设。照顾家人和朋友的倾向,可通过新的规则和奖励加以克服。譬如,颁发规定,只能雇用合格者,而不是家人。某种意义上,较高层次的制度则显得颇不自然,一旦崩溃,人类就会返回较早的社会形式。这就是我讲的家族制的基础。

    人类以其抽象理论的能力,很快建立征服环境和调节社会行为的新规则,远远超过黑猩猩中存在的规则。尤其是祖先、精神、上帝和其他无形力量的观念,订下新规则和相应的奖励。不同种类的宗教大大提高人类社会的组织程度,并不断开发社会动员的新形式。

    与遵循规范有关的一套高度发达的情感,确保关于世界如何运作的心智模型即使不再符合现实,也不是可丢弃的简单理论。(甚至在现代自然科学领域,虽有假设检验的明确规则,但科学家偏爱现存理论,宁愿抵制相反的实验证据。)心智模型和理论常被赋予内在价值,从而促进社会稳定,允许社会的扩展。但这显示,社会是高度保守的,将顽强抵制对其支配观念的挑战。这在宗教思想上表现得最为明显。世俗的规则,以传统、礼仪、习俗的名义,也被注入极大的情感。

    社会在规则上趋向保守,是政治衰败的来源之一。因应环境而建立的规则或制度,在新的环境中变得功能失调,却得不到更换,因为人类已注入强烈情感。这表示,社会变化不会是直线的——随时势的变动而作频繁的小型调整,而是延长的淤滞,继之以剧烈变革的爆发。

    由此说明暴力对政治发展的重要性。霍布斯指出,对暴毙的恐惧,与获益或经济欲望相比,是截然不同的感受。很难为自己的生命或爱人的生命标出一个价格。所以,害怕和不安全对人类的激发,往往是单纯自利所比不了的。政治出现是为了控制暴力,但暴力又是政治变化的背景。社会可能陷于功能失调的制度均衡中,因为既得利益者否决任何必要的变革。为打破这一平衡,暴力或暴力的威胁有时就变得不可或缺。

    最后,获得承认的欲望,确保政治不会降成简单的经济自利。人类对他人或制度的内在价值、功用、尊严不断作出裁决,再借此建立等级制度。政治力量最终植根于承认——领袖或制度被公认的合法性,得以赢得追随者的尊敬。追随者可能以自利出发,但最强大的政治组织,其合法性以广受欢迎的观念思想为基础。

    生物学为我们提供了政治发展的构件。横跨不同社会的人性是基本不变的。我们所看到政治形式上的巨大差异,不管是现在还是历史上,首先是人类所处环境的产物。人类社会分支蔓延,填补世界上多样的自然环境。他们在特定进化(specific evolution)的过程中,发展出与众不同的规范和思想。此外,各群体也在互动,在促进变化方面,其重要性与自然环境不相上下。

    分隔甚远的社会,对政治秩序问题却提出异常相似的解决方案。几乎每个社会,都曾一度经历过以亲戚关系为基础组织起来的阶段,其规则逐渐变得复杂。多数社会随后发展了国家制度和非人格化管理方式。中国、中东、欧洲和印度的农业社会,得以发展中央集权的君主制,以及益加官僚化的政府。甚少文化联系的社会,却发展出相似的制度,如中国、欧洲、南亚政府所建立的盐业专卖。近年来,民主负责制和人民主权成为普遍接受的规范思想,只在实施程度上有高低之分。不同社会经不同路径而走到一起,这一重聚提示了人类群体在生物学上的相似。

    进化与迁移

    古人类学家追溯从灵长目先驱到“行为意义上的现代人类”的进化。人口遗传学家所作的贡献,则是追踪人类朝地球不同地区的迁移。普遍认为,类人猿至人类的进化在非洲发生。人类离开非洲前往世界各地,经历了两次大迁徙。所谓的古人类——直立人(homo Erectus)和巨人(Homo ergaster)——早在一百六十万至二百万年前就离开非洲,迁往亚洲北部。三十至四十万年前,巨人的后裔海德堡人(Homo heidelbergensis)自非洲抵达欧洲。他们的后裔就是欧洲后来的人类,如赫赫有名、散居多处的尼安德特人。

    解剖学意义上的现代人类(anatomically modern humans)——其尺寸和体格特征,大致等同于现代人类——出现于约二十万年前。行为意义上的现代人类的出现,约在五万年前。他们能用语言进行交流,并开始开发较为复杂的社会组织。

    依据时下的理论,几乎所有非洲之外的人,都是行为意义上的现代人类某群体的后裔。约在五万年前,这个其成员可能仅 150 人的群体离开非洲,穿越阿拉伯半岛的霍尔木兹海峡。虽然缺乏书面材料,但人口遗传学的最新进展,使古人类学家得以跟踪此一进程。人类的遗传,包括 Y 染色体和含历史线索的线粒体 DNA。Y 染色体归男性独有,余下的 DNA 则由母亲和父亲的染色体重组,代代有别。Y 染色体由父亲单传给儿子,基本上完好无损。相比之下,线粒体 DNA 是陷入人类细胞的细菌痕迹。数百万年前,它就为细胞活动提供能源。线粒体有它自己的 DNA,可与 Y 染色体媲美,由母亲单传给女儿,也基本上完好无损。Y 染色体和线粒体都会积累基因的突变,然后由后代儿子或女儿所继承。计算这些基因突变,弄清哪个在前哪个在后,人口遗传学家便可重建世界上不同人类群体的血统。

    于是有下列的假定:几乎所有非洲之外的人,都是行为意义上的现代人类某群体的后裔,因为在中国、新几内亚、欧洲、南美洲,当地人口都可回溯至同一的父母血统。(非洲本身有较多血统,因为现居非洲外的人口,只是当时非洲数个群体之一的后裔。)该群体在阿拉伯半岛分道扬镳,一个族团沿阿拉伯半岛和印度的海岸线,进入现已不存的巽他大陆(Sunda,连接现今的东南亚诸岛)和萨浩尔大陆(Sahul,包括新几内亚和澳洲)。他们的迁移得益于当时出现的冰川期,地球的大部分水源已冻成冰帽和冰川。与今日相比,当时海平面足足低了数百英尺。依据遗传定时法(genetic dating),我们知道,目前居住于巴布亚新几内亚和澳洲的美拉尼西亚人和澳洲土著,已在那里定居了将近四万六千年。这表示,他们的祖先离开非洲后,仅花费不长时间便抵达这一偏远角落。

    其他族团离开阿拉伯半岛后,朝西北和东北两个方向迁移。前者经过近东和中亚,最终抵达欧洲。在那里,他们遇上早先脱离非洲的古人类后裔,如尼安德特人。后者则在中国和亚洲东北部定居繁衍,再穿越其时连接西伯利亚和北美洲的陆地桥梁,最终南下至中南美洲。约在公元前一万二千年,已有人抵达智利南部。 巴别塔(Tower of Babel)的圣经故事称,上帝把统一联合的人类驱散到各地,令他们讲不同语言。在比喻意义上,这确是真相。人类迁移到不同环境,随遇而安,发明新的社会制度,开始退出自然状态。我们将在之后的章节看到,起初的复杂社会组织,仍以亲戚关系为基础,其出现全靠宗教思想的协助。

    第 3 章 表亲的专横

    人类社会进化的事实和性质,以及相关的争议;家庭或族团层次的社会向部落的过渡;介绍血统、宗族和其他人类学基本概念

    卢梭的《论人类不平等的起源和基础》(1754 年)发表之后,涌现出大量涉及人类早期制度起源的理论。首先在 19 世纪末,新兴人类学的首创者,如路易斯·亨利·摩尔根(Lewis Henry Morgan)和爱德华·泰勒(Edward Tylor),收集积累了尚存原始社会的实证资料。摩尔根对日益减少的北美洲土著进行实地勘察,发明了解释其亲戚关系的详尽分类,并将此推及欧洲的史前。在《古代社会》一书中,他将人类历史分为三阶段——野性、野蛮、文明,他认为,所有人类社会都须一一经历这三个阶段。

    卡尔·马克思的合作者弗里德里希·恩格斯读了摩尔根的书,运用该美国人类学家的民族学研究,发展出私人财产和家庭的起源理论,之后变成共产世界的福音。马克思和恩格斯携手推出现代最著名的发展理论:他们设置一系列的进化阶段——原始共产主义、封建主义、资本主义、真正的共产主义——全部由社会阶级的基本矛盾所驱动。马克思主义这一错误和从简的发展模型,误导了后来数代的学者,或寻找“亚细亚生产方式”,或试图在印度找到“封建主义”。

    早期政治发展理论研究的第二动力,来自查尔斯·达尔文(Charles Darwin)出版于 1859 年的《物种起源》,以及其自然淘汰理论的进一步阐述。将生物进化原理应用到社会进化上,像赫伯特·斯宾塞(Herbert Spencer)等在 20 世纪初所作的,在逻辑上讲得通。斯宾塞认为,人类社会都要参与生存竞争,优秀的得以支配低劣的。欧洲之外社会的发展,或受到阻妨,或停滞不前。达尔文之后,进化理论在辩护当时的殖民秩序上确实取得成功。全球等级制度的顶端是北欧人,通过黄色和棕色皮肤的深浅不同,一直降至身处底部的黑色非洲人。

    进化理论中褒贬和种族的特色,酿成 20 世纪 20 年代的逆反回潮,至今仍在影响世界上人类学和文化研究部门。优秀的人类学家弗兰茨·博厄斯(Franz Boas)主张,人类行为受到社会彻头彻尾的改造,并不植根于生物学。他在一项著名研究中,以移民头颅大小的实证资料证明,社会达尔文主义者归因于种族的东西,实际上却是环境和文化的产物。博厄斯还认为,早期社会的研究需摒弃对各式社会组织的高低评估。在方法论上,民族学家应放弃自己文化背景的偏见,全身心投入他们所研究的社会,评估其内在逻辑。克利福德·格尔茨(Clifford Geertz)提倡“深描”(thick description);他认为,不同社会只可解说,不可互比,不分轩轾。博厄斯的学生阿尔弗雷德·克鲁伯(Alfred Kroeber)、玛格丽特·米德(Margaret Mead)和露丝·本尼迪克特(Ruth Benedict),则把文化人类学科继续引向非评判性的、相对的、绝无进化的方向。

    早期的进化理论,包括马克思和恩格斯的,还存有其他问题。它们的社会形式,往往是相对直线的,有严谨的等级,前阶段必须早于后阶段,某元素(像马克思的“生产方式”)决定整个阶段的特征。随着对尚存原始社会的知识积累,大家愈益清楚,政治复杂性的进化不是直线的。任何指定的历史阶段,往往包含前阶段的特征。将社会推至下一阶段,又凭借多重的动态机制。事实上,我们可在以后的章节中看到,前阶段并不被后阶段完全替代。中国早在三千多年前,便由基于亲戚关系的组织过渡至国家层次。但时至今日,复杂的亲戚关系组织,仍是一部分中国社会的特征。

    人类社会是非常复杂的,很难由文化的比较研究总结出真正的普遍规律。发现了违反所谓社会发展规律的冷僻社会,人类学家常常感到兴奋。但这并不表示,不同社会中没有进化形式中的规则性和同类性。

    史前阶段

    以 19 世纪的社会达尔文主义为背景,博厄斯派的文化相对论是可以理解的。但它在比较人类学的领域里,留下了政治上求正确(political correctness)的持久遗产。严格的文化相对论,有悖于进化论,因为后者明确要求厘清社会组织的不同层次,并确定后一层次取代前一层次的原因。人类社会随时间而进化,这是显而易见的。生物进化的两个基本组件——变化和选择——也适合人类社会。即使我们细心避免后期文明“高于”前期文明的评判,但它们确实变得更为复杂、更为丰富、更为强大。因应成功的文明,常常战胜因应不成功的,恰似个体有机体之间的竞争。我们继续使用“发展中”或“开发”的名词(如“发展中国家”和“美国国际开发署”),佐证了下列共识:现存的富裕国家是上一阶段社会经济进化的结果,贫穷国家如有可能,也将参与这一进化过程。在历史长河中,人类的政治制度借文化而获得传递,与借基因的生物进化相比,则面对更多的悉心设计。达尔文的自然淘汰原则与人类社会的进化竞争,仍有很明显的类似。

    这一新认可导致了进化理论在 20 世纪中期的复兴。人类学家如莱斯利·怀特(Leslie White)、朱利安·斯图尔德(Julian Steward)、埃尔曼·塞维斯(Elman Service)、莫顿·弗莱德(Morton Fried)和马歇尔·萨林斯(Marshall Sahlins)认为,各式社会在复杂、规模、能源使用各方面,都呈现出明显的升级。根据萨林斯和塞维斯,人类群体都经历所谓的“特别进化”,以适应他们所占居的生态环境,其结果便是社会形式的多样化。对社会组织的普遍问题,不同社会往往采取类似的应对方法。由此表明,相交相汇的“普遍进化”在生效。

    人类学家的难题是,没人能直接观察,人类社会如何从早期模式发展到较复杂的部落或国家。他们唯一能做的,只是假设现存的狩猎采集或部落社会是早期模式的实例,再通过观察其行为来推测引发变化的力量,如部落何以演变为国家。可能是基于此,对早期社会进化的推理,已从人类学移至考古学。不像人类学家,考古学家可通过不同文明在数十万年间留下的物质记录,追踪其社会活力的伸张。例如,考古学家调查普韦布洛(Pueblo)印第安人住宅和饮食的改变,得以了解战争和环境压力对社会组织的改造。其缺点也是显而易见的,即缺乏民族学研究的丰富细节。太依赖考古学记录,会导致对唯物主义解释的偏爱,因为史前文明的精神和认知世界,其大部已永远丢失。

    泰勒、摩尔根、恩格斯之后,对社会发展的进化阶段的分类系统,也经历了自身的进化。放弃了具强烈道德色彩的词句,如“野性”和“野蛮”,而改用中性的描述,如点明主要技术的旧石器、新石器、青铜器、铁器时代。另一系统则点明主要的生产方式,如狩猎采集、农业、工业社会。进化人类学家,以社会或政治组织的形式来排列阶段。这是我在此所选用的,也是我的主题。埃尔曼·塞维斯发明了四个层次的分类,即族团、部落、酋邦、国家。族团和部落中,社会组织以亲戚关系为基础,成员之间相对平等。相比之下,酋邦和国家等级分明,不以亲戚关系而以领土为基础来行使权力。

    家庭和族团层次的组织

    很多人相信,原始人类社会组织是部落的,这一见解可追溯到 19 世纪。早期的比较人类学家,如努马·丹尼斯·甫斯特尔·德·库朗日(Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges)和亨利·梅因,认为要在复杂的亲戚团体中去理解早期的社会生活。但部落组织的兴起,要到九千年前定居社会和农业出现时。这之前,狩猎采集社会历时数万年,由类似灵长目族团的流浪家庭集居而成。这样的社会,至今尚存于合适的边缘环境,如爱斯基摩人、卡拉哈里沙漠的布须曼人(Bushmen)、澳洲的土著。(也有例外,如美国太平洋西北部的土著,属狩猎采集者,却生活于可支撑复杂社会的富饶区域。)

    卢梭指出,政治不平等起源于农业的兴起,他在这点上是基本正确的。出现农业之前的族团层次社会,不存在任何现代意义的私人财产。就像黑猩猩的族团,狩猎采集者居住于他们守卫的领土,偶尔为之争斗。但他们不像农人,犯不上在一块土地上设立标志,说“这是我的”。如有其他族团前来侵犯,或有危险猎食者渗入,由于人疏地广,族团层次的社会有移居他方的选择。他们较少拥有像已开垦的耕地、房子等投资。

    族团层次的内部,类似现代经济交易和个人主义的东西是绝对不存在的。这个阶段没有国家暴政,更确切地说,人类只体验到社会人类学家厄内斯特·格尔纳(Ernest Gellner)所称的“表亲的专横”。你的社交生活囿于你周遭的亲戚,他们决定你做什么,跟谁结婚,怎样敬拜,还有其他一切。家庭或数户家庭合在一起打猎和采集。特别是打猎,与分享直接有关,因为那时没有储存肉类的技术,猎到的动物必须马上吃掉。进化心理学家纷纷推测,现代流行的进餐分享(圣诞节、感恩节、逾越节),都起源于长达数千年的猎物分享传统。此类社会中,大多数的道德规则不是针对偷人财产者,而是针对不愿与人分享者。在永久匮乏的阴影下,拒绝分享往往影响到族团的生存。

    族团层次的社会高度平等,其主要差别仅在年龄和性别上。在狩猎采集社会中,男人打猎,女人采集,繁衍一事自有天然分工。族团内,家庭之间仅有极小的差别,没有永久领袖,也没有等级制度。个人因突出的品质,如力大、智慧、可信,而被授予领袖地位。但该地位是流动的,很容易移至他人。除了父母和孩子,强制的机会非常有限。如弗莱德所说:

    简易平等社会的民族学研究中,很难找到某人要求他人“做这做那”的案例,却充满了某人说“如能完成此事,那真太好了”之类的话语。之后他人可能照办,也可能不予理睬……因为领袖无法迫使他人。在我们的叙述中,领袖扮演的角色只牵涉权威,无关乎权力。

    此类社会中,领袖因群体的共识而浮现。但他们没有职权,不能传予子孙。没有集中的强制力量,自然就没有现代意义的第三方执法的法律。

    族团层次的社会围绕核心家庭而建,通常奉行人类学家所称的异族通婚和父系中心(patrilocal)。女人嫁出自己的社会群体,搬到丈夫的居所。这种习惯鼓励群体之间的交往互动,增加基因的多样化,创造群体之间发生贸易的条件。异族通婚也在减轻冲突中发挥作用。群体之间有关资源或领土的争议,可通过女人的交换而获得谅解,就像欧洲君主为政治目标而安排的战略性联姻。群体的成员组成,与之后的部落社会相比,则更为流动:“任何地域的食物来源,不管是派尤特人(Pauite)的松果或野草籽的丰收,冬春猎场上海豹的数量,还是中部爱斯基摩人在内陆峡谷遇上驯鹿群的迁移,都是不可预测的,且分布太疏,以致任何一代的亲戚,即使想组成凝聚排外的群体,也屡屡遭挫。因为生态机遇时时在诱惑个人和家庭采取机会主义。”

    从族团到部落

    农业的发展,使族团层次过渡到部落层次变得可行。九千到一万年前,世界上很多地区出现农业,包括美索不达米亚、中国、大洋洲、中美洲,常常位于肥沃的冲积流域。野草和种子的驯化逐一发生,伴以人口的大增。新兴的产粮技术促使人口繁密,似乎是符合逻辑的。但埃斯特·博塞鲁普(Ester Boserup)认为,这样讲是因果颠倒了。无论如何,它对社会的影响是巨大的。取决于气候,狩猎采集社会的人口密度是每平方公里 0.1 到 1 人,而农业的发明,则允许人口密度上升至每平方公里 40 到 60 人。至此,人类的相互接触更加广泛,便会要求截然不同的社会组织形式。

    “部落、氏族、家族、宗族”,被用来描绘高于族团的新层次社会组织,但用得不够精确,甚至靠此吃饭的人类学家也是如此。其共同特征是:第一是分支式(segmentary)的,第二是以共同的老祖宗为原则。

    社会学家涂尔干以“分支”一词来解释由小型社会单位自我复制而成的社会,如蚯蚓的分段。这样的社会以添加新的支系而获得扩展,但没有集中的政治机构,没有现代的分工,也没有他所描绘的“有机”团结。发达社会里,没有人是自给自足的,每个人都要依赖社会中大批他人。发达社会的多数人,不知道如何生产自己的粮食、修理自己的汽车、制造自己的手机。在分支式社会中,每个“支系”都是自给自足的,都能丰衣足食,都能自我防卫。因此,涂尔干称之为“机械”团结。各支系可为共同目的聚在一起,如自卫,但他们不依赖对方以获生存。在同一层次上,每个人只能属于一个支系。

    部落社会里,支系以共同老祖宗为原则。其最基本单位是宗族,成员们可追溯到好几代之前一名共同老祖宗。人类学家使用的术语中,后裔可以是单传(unilineal),也可是双传(cognatic)。单传系统中,后裔追随父亲,被标为父系;追随母亲,被标为母系。双传系统中,后裔可追随父母双方。稍作思考便可明白,分支式社会只能是单传。为了避免支系的重叠,每名小孩只可分给一个后裔群,或是父亲的,或是母亲的。

    在中国、印度、中东、非洲、大洋洲、希腊、罗马曾经流行的宗族组织是父系家族。它是最普遍的,也存在于战胜欧洲的野蛮部落。罗马人称之为 agnatio(族亲),人类学家遂称之为 aganation。父系家族只追踪男性的血脉。女人结婚时,便离开自己家族,转而加入丈夫家族。中国和印度的男系家族制度中,女人几乎彻底切断与自己家族的联系。所以,婚姻之日变成妻子的父母悲伤时,只能在女儿的聘礼上获求补偿。女人在丈夫家里没有地位,直到生下儿子。其时,她彻底融入丈夫的宗族组织,在她丈夫的祖先坟前祷告祭祀,保障儿子将来的遗产。

    父系家族虽是最普遍,但不是单传的唯一形式。在母系社会里,后裔和遗产追随母亲家族。母系社会(matrilineal)不同于女性掌权得以支配男性的女家长社会(matriarchal)。似乎没有证据显示,真正的女家长社会真有存在。母系社会仅表示,结婚时是男子离开自己家族,转而加入妻子的家族;权力和资源,基本上仍掌握在男子手中;家庭中的权威人士通常是妻子的兄弟,而非孩子的生父。母系社会远比父系社会罕见,但仍可在世界各地找到,如南美洲、美拉尼西亚、东南亚、美国西南部、非洲。埃尔曼·塞维斯指出,它们通常建立于特殊环境,如依靠女人劳作的雨林园艺区域。但该理论无法说明,为什么美国西南沙漠地带的霍皮人(Hopi),也是母系社会和母系中心的(matrilocal)。

    宗族有个神奇的特点,只要追溯到更早祖先,便能进入更为庞大的宗族组织。例如,我是追溯到我爷爷的小宗族成员,邻人的爷爷便是外人。如作进一步的追溯,到第四代、第五代甚至更早,我们两个宗族又找到亲戚关系。如情况合适,大家就有可能携手合作。

    此类社会的经典描述是爱德华·埃文斯—普理查德(Edward Evans-Pritchard)对努尔人(Nuer)的研究,他的著作《努尔人》为数代人类学的学生所必读。努尔人是居住在苏丹南方养牛的游牧民族。20 世纪末,他们和传统对手的丁卡人(Dinka)联合起来,在约翰·加朗(John Garang)和苏丹人民解放军的领导下,向喀土穆的中央政府展开长期斗争,以争取南方独立。但在 20 世纪 30 年代,埃文斯—普理查德进行实地考察时,苏丹仍是英国殖民地,努尔人和丁卡人仍生活在传统中。

    根据埃文斯—普理查德,“努尔人部落是分支式的。我们把最大的支系,称之为主要部落。它再一步步分割成第二层次和第三层次的部落……第三层次由数个村庄组成,其居民相互之间都有亲戚和家庭的关系”。

    努尔人的宗族组织彼此经常打架,通常是为了在他们文化中占中心地位的牛。同一层次内,血统之间互相打斗。但他们又能联合起来,在更高层次作战。到了最高层,全体努尔人同仇敌忾,向以同样方法组织起来的丁卡人开战。埃文斯—普理查德解释说:

    每个支系,本身也是可分的,其成员互相存有敌意。为反对同样层次的邻近支系,支系的成员会联合起来;为反对更高层次的支系,又会与同样层次的邻近支系联合起来。努尔人以政治价值来解释这些联合原则,他们会说:如果娄(Lou)部落的郎(Leng)第三层次支系与努阿克瓦科(Nyarkwac)第三层次支系打仗——事实上,两支系之间战事频频——组成这两支系的各个村庄都会参战;如果努阿克瓦科第三层次支系与鲁莫乔科(Rumjok)第二层次支系发生争执——不久前,为了用水——郎和努阿克瓦科将团结起来,以反对共同敌人鲁莫乔科。鲁莫乔科也将组成其各支系的联盟。

    各支系能在较高的层次汇总。一旦联合的原因(如外部威胁)消失,它们又倾向于迅速瓦解。可在众多不同的部落社会中,看到多层次的支系。它体现在阿拉伯的谚语中:“我针对我兄弟、我和我兄弟针对我表亲、我和我表亲针对陌生人。”

    努尔人社会里没有国家,没有执行法律的中央权威,没有制度化的领导等级。像族团层次的社会,努尔人社会也是高度平等的。男女之间有分工,宗族之内有分代的年龄级别。所谓的豹皮酋长,只扮演礼仪的角色,帮助解决成员的冲突,但没有强迫他人的权力。“在整体上我们可以说,努尔人酋长是神圣的人,但这神圣并没给他们带来特殊场合之外的权力。我从未看到,努尔人特别尊敬酋长,或在谈话中把他们当作重要人物。”

    努尔人是分支世系组织获得充分发展的范例,其宗族系谱的规则严格决定社会的结构和地位。其他的部落社会,则更为松散。共同老祖宗,与其说是严格的亲戚规定,倒不如说是建立社会义务的借口。甚至在努尔人中,仍有可能把陌生人带入宗族,视之为亲戚(人类学家称之为虚拟的亲戚关系)。很多时候,亲戚关系只是政治联盟的事后理由,并非构建社团的原动力。中国的宗族往往有成千上万的成员,整个村庄使用同样的姓,这显示中国亲戚关系的假想和包容。当西西里岛的黑手党把自己称作“家庭”时,它的血誓仅是血亲的象征。现代的种族划分,把共同老祖宗推到很远,使宗族系谱的追溯变得异常艰难。我们把肯尼亚的卡冷金(Kalenjin)或基库尤(Kikuyus)称作部落,该称呼是非常松散的,因为他们各自的人数,少至数十万,多至数百万。

    祖先和宗教

    实际上,所有的人类社会都曾经组成部落。因此,很多人倾向于相信,这是自然的情形,或有生物学上的原因。但弄不清,为什么你想与四圈之外的表亲合作,而不愿与非亲的熟人合作。难道,这只是因为你与表亲分享了六十四分之一的基因。动物不这样做,族团层次的人也不这样做。人类社会到处建立部落组织,其原因是宗教信仰,即对死去祖先的崇拜。

    对死去祖先的崇拜开始于族团层次社会,每个族团内都会有巫师或宗教人,专司与死去祖先联络的工作。随着宗族的发展,宗教变得更加复杂,更加建制化,反过来又影响其他制度,如领导权和产权。相信死去祖先对活人的作用,才是凝聚部落社会的动力,并不是什么神秘的生物本能。

    19 世纪法国历史学家甫斯特尔·德·库朗日,提供了有关祖先崇拜的最著名描述之一。他的《古代城市》初版于 1864 年,给数代欧洲人带来启示。欧洲人习惯于把希腊和罗马的宗教与奥林匹克的众神挂起钩来。甫斯特尔·德·库朗日则揭示更古老的宗教传统,其他印欧群体,包括移居印度北部的印度—雅利安人,也在遵循这一古老传统。他认为,对希腊和罗马人来说,死者的灵魂并不飞上天国,却住在葬地的底下。基于此,“他们总是陪葬他们认为死者需要的东西——服装、器皿、武器。他们在他坟上倒酒以解渴,放置食物以充饥。他们殉葬马匹和奴隶,认为这些生命将在坟里为死者继续服务,就像生前一样”。死者的精灵——拉丁文是 manes——需要在世的亲戚不断的维持,定期供上食物和饮料,免得他们发怒。

    在最早期的比较人类学家中,甫斯特尔·德·库朗日的知识领域远远超出欧洲史。他注意到,灵魂转世(死时灵魂进入另一肉体)和婆罗门宗教的兴起之前,印度教徒奉行类似希腊罗马的祖先崇拜。亨利·梅因也强调这一点,他认为,祖先崇拜“影响着自称为印度教徒的大多数印度人的日常生活,在多数人的眼中,自己家神比整个印度万神庙更为重要”。假如库朗日的知识领域涉及更远,他很有可能发现古代中国相似的葬礼。那里,崇高地位人士的墓穴填满了青铜和陶瓷的三足鼎、食物、马、奴隶、计划陪伴死者的妾。像希腊和罗马人,印度—雅利安人也在家里供养圣火。圣火代表家庭,永远不得熄灭,除非家族本身不复存在。所有这些文化中,圣火被当作代表家庭健康和安全的神而受到崇拜——这里家庭不仅是现存的,而且是死去多年的列祖列宗的。

    部落社会中,宗教生活和亲戚关系紧密相连。祖先崇拜是特定的,不存在整个社群都崇拜的神。你只对自己祖先有责任,对你邻居或酋长的祖先则没有责任。通常,祖先并不久远,不像所谓的罗马人祖先的罗慕路斯(Romulus)。祖先只是三或四代之前的人,家中老人可能还记得。根据甫斯特尔·德·库朗日,它丝毫不像基督教对圣徒的崇拜:“葬礼的礼仪只容最亲近的亲戚做虔诚表演……他们相信,祖先不会接受他人的奉献,只接受家人的;祖先不需要崇拜,除非是自家的后裔。”此外,每人都渴望有男性后裔(父系家族),因为只有他们才能在其死后照料他的灵魂。因此,结婚和育有男性后裔变得非常重要。大多数情形下,独身在早期希腊和罗马都是非法的。

    这些信念的结果是,除了现存子女,每个人与死去的祖先和未来的后裔都有关联。裴达礼(Hugh Baker)这样解释中国的宗族关系,一条绳子代表血脉,“两端是无穷尽的,经过一把象征现在的剃刀。如果绳子遭到腰斩,两端就会自行掉离,绳子不复存在。如果一名男子死而无后,其祖先和后裔的连续体便跟着一起消亡……他的存在是必须的,因为他是整体的代表。除此之外,他又是无关紧要的”。

    部落社会中,以宗教信仰形式出现的思想,对社会组织有极大影响。对先祖的信仰得以凝聚众人,其规模大大超过家庭或族团层次。该“共同体”包括的,不仅是宗族、氏族、部落现有成员,而且是祖先和未来后裔的整条绳子。甚至最疏远的亲戚都会觉得,他们之间有牵连和职责。这种感受,借共同体共同遵循的礼仪,而获得加强。对如此的社会制度,成员不相信有选择的权力。说得确切些,他们的角色在出生之前已被社会预定。

    宗教和权力

    军事上,部落社会远比族团层次社会强大。一获通知,他们可动员数百乃至数千名的亲戚。第一个以祖先崇拜来动员大量亲戚的社会,很可能享有对付敌人的巨大优势。一经发明,它就会刺激他人的模仿。因此,战争不仅造就了国家,也造就了部落。

    宗教在促进大规模的集体行动方面扮演了重要角色。很自然,人们要问:部落组织是既存宗教信仰的结果呢?抑或,宗教信仰是后添的,以加强既存的社会组织?很多 19 世纪的思想家,包括马克思和涂尔干,都相信后者。马克思有句名言:宗教是大众的“麻醉剂”,它是精英们发明出来以巩固其阶级特权的神话。据我所知,他没有对部落社会的祖先崇拜发表过任何意见。但也可推而广之,说家长在操纵死去祖先的愤怒,以加强自己在活人中的权威。另一解释是,需要帮助以对抗共同敌人的族团领袖,为赢得邻人支持,而求援于传奇或神话中死去多年的共同祖先。虽是他的首倡,但这想法蔓延滋长后自成一体。

    很不幸,我们只能推测思想与物质利益之间的因果关系,因为无人目睹从族团层次到部落社会的过渡。考虑到宗教观念在后来历史中的重要性,假如因果关系不是双向交流的,人们反而会感到惊讶。宗教创意影响社会组织,物质利益也影响宗教观念。但要记住,部落社会不是“自然”的,不是其他更高社会崩溃时回归的首选。它出现于家庭和族团层次社会之后,只在特殊环境中繁荣昌盛。它产生于特定历史时期,靠某种宗教信仰获得维持。如若新宗教引入,原有信仰发生变化,部落社会就会分崩离析。我们将在第 19 章看到,这就是基督教挺进野蛮欧洲后所发生的。随时间流逝,部落社会被更有弹性、更易扩张的社会所取代,但其缩了水的变种从未消失。

    第 4 章 部落社会的财产、正义、战争

    第 4 章 部落社会的财产、正义、战争

    亲戚关系和产权发展;部落社会中正义的性质;部落社会作为军事组织;部落组织的优缺点

    法国大革命以来,分隔左右两派的最大争议之一就是私人财产。卢梭在《论人类不平等的起源和基础》中,将不公平的起源追溯到圈地标为己产的首位男人。卡尔·马克思把废除私有财产定为政治目标,受他激励的所有共产党政权,所采取的最早施政之一就是“生产工具的国有化”,不单是土地。相比之下,美国创始人之一的詹姆斯·麦迪逊(James Madison),在《联邦论》第 10 篇中坚持,政府最重要功能之一就是保护个人不均平的致富能力。现代新古典主义的经济学家,将私人产权视作经济持续增长的源泉。用道格拉斯·诺斯的话,“增长根本不会发生,除非现存经济组织是高效的”,这意味着“必须建立制度和产权”。20 世纪 70 年代末 80 年代初,发生了里根—撒切尔的革命。自那以后,市场导向的政策制定者,其当务之急就是将国有企业私有化,以提高经济效率,虽然遭到左派的激烈反对。

    共产主义的经验,大大提升了现代私人财产的重要性。基于对摩尔根等人类学家的误解,马克思和恩格斯认为,阶级剥削兴起之前,曾存在“原始共产主义”阶段,是共产主义意图恢复的理想国。摩尔根描述的惯例财产(customary property),由密切相处的亲戚团体所拥有。前苏联和中国的共产党政权,则强迫数百万无亲无故的农民,参加集体农庄。集体化打破努力和报酬之间的关联,摧毁对工作的奖励,在俄罗斯和中国造成大规模饥荒,严重降低农业生产力。在前苏联,仍在私人手中的 4% 土地,却提供将近四分之一的农业总产量。1978 年中国的人民公社,在改革家邓小平的领导下获得解散,农业产量仅在四年间就翻了一番。

    私人财产重要性的争论,大都牵涉所谓的“公地悲剧”(tragedy of the commons)。传统英国村庄,其放牧地由村庄居民集体所拥有,共同使用。但其资源是可耗尽的,常因使用过度而荒芜。将共有财产转为私人财产是避免荒芜的对策。业主甘心投资于维护,在持续基础上开发资源。加勒特·哈丁(Garrett Hardin)的著名文章认为,众多全球性的资源,如洁净空气和渔场等,都会遇上公地悲剧;如无私人产权或严格管理,将因过度消耗而变得一无用处。

    现代有关产权的非历史性讨论中,人们往往觉得,因为缺乏现代私人产权,人类一直面对公地悲剧。集体所有与有效使用是背道而驰的。现代产权的出现被认为是经济上的理性行为,人们讨价还价来分割共有财产,就像霍布斯的“利维坦”从自然状态中脱颖而出。如此解释会遇上两个疑问。第一,现代产权出现之前,曾存在各种各样的共有财产,虽未能像现代产权那样鼓励高效地使用,但也没导致类似的公地悲剧。第二,找不到很多案例来证明,现代产权始于和平自发的讨价还价。共有财产让位于现代产权,其过程是狂暴的,武力和欺骗扮演了重要角色。

    亲戚关系和私人财产

    最早的私人财产,不属于个人,而属于宗族或其他亲戚团体。主要动机不仅是经济的,而且是宗教和社会的。20 世纪苏联和中国的强迫性集体化,试图逆转时光,进入想象的、从未存在的理想国。它们让无亲戚关系的人合在一起,拥有共同财产。

    把希腊和罗马人的家庭牵连到具体地产的有两样东西:屋内供圣火的家灶(hearth)和附近的祖坟。渴望得到地产,不仅是为了它的生产潜力,还为了死去的祖先和不可移动的家灶。地产必须是私人的,只有如此,陌生人或国家才无法侵犯祖先的安息地。另一方面,早期私人财产缺乏现代产权的重要特征,通常只是使用权(usufructuary),不能出售,也不得改造。其主人不是单独的业主,而是现存和死去亲戚的整个社团。财产就像一种信托,为了死去的祖先和未来的后裔。很多现代社会也有类似安排。20 世纪初,一名尼日利亚酋长说,“我想,地产属于一个大家庭,其成员中,很多已死,少数还活着,还有无数尚未出生的”。地产和亲戚关系由此而紧密相连。它使你有能力照顾前世和后世的亲人,并通过与你休戚相关的祖先和后裔来照顾你本人。

    沦为殖民地前的部分非洲,其亲戚团体受土地的束缚,因为他们祖先葬在那里,就像希腊和罗马人。西非的长期定居点则有不同形式的宗教运作。首批定居者的后裔,被指定为土地祭司来维持土地庙,并主持有关土地使用的各式礼仪。新移民不是通过买卖,而是通过加入当地礼仪社团,以取得土地使用权。社团把种植、狩猎、捕鱼权,当作社团会员的特权,但不是永久的。

    部落社会中,财产有时由部落集体拥有。历史人类学家保罗·维诺格拉多夫(Paul Vinogradoff)如此描绘凯尔特部落(Celtic),“自由民和非自由民,依亲戚关系而聚居(父系家族)。他们集体拥有土地,其地界往往与村庄边界不同,像蜘蛛网分布在不同定居点”。集体拥有并不表示集体耕耘,像 20 世纪苏联或中国的集体农庄,个别家庭经常分到自己的耕地。其他情况下,个人可以拥有地产,但受严重限制,因为他有对亲戚的义务——活的、死的,还有未出生的。你的土地挨着你表亲的,收获时互相合作,很难想象将你的土地卖给陌生人。如你死而无后,你的土地归还给亲戚团体,部落经常有权再分配地产。根据维诺格拉多夫,在印度的边界地区,战胜的部落在大块土地上定居下来,但没把土地划分给亲戚。有时或定期的重新分配,证明部落对土地的有效统治。

    现代的美拉尼西亚,仍有亲戚团体的共有财产。在巴布亚新几内亚和所罗门群岛,95% 以上的土地仍是共有财产。采矿公司或棕榈油公司想买地产,必须应付整个一语部落。任何交易,部落中每个人都享有潜在的否决权,而且不受时效法律限制。因此,某亲戚团体决定将土地卖给公司;十年后,另一团体会站出来说土地是他们的,只在数代前被人偷走了。还有很多人,不愿在任何情况下出卖土地,因为祖先的神灵仍在那里居住。

    亲戚团体中的个人不能充分利用其财产,不能将之出售。但这并不表示,他们会忽略或不负责任。部落社会中的产权分得很清楚,即使不是正式或法律上的。部落拥有的财产是否得到很好照顾,与部落内部的聚合力有关,与部落所有权无关。哈丁叙述的共有财产灾难,在英国历史中到底造成多大灾难,尚不清楚。因议会圈地运动(Parliamentary Enclosure Movement)而告终的敞田制(open-field),并不是有效的土地使用方法。18 和 19 世纪的富裕地主,怀有强烈动机,把农民赶出共有地产。起初,敞田制与亲戚关系有关,以邻里耕耘者的团结为前提,通常没有使用过度和浪费的现象。如果有,也是由于英国乡村中社会凝聚力的下降。世界上其他运作良好的部落社会里,很难找到公地悲剧的纪录。此类问题,肯定没有骚扰美拉尼西亚。

    努尔人那样的部落社会,从事畜牧而非农业,其规则略有不同。他们不把祖先埋入需永久保护的坟墓,乃因追随牛群而要跋涉宽广地域。他们对土地的权利不是排他的,只是为了通行和使用,就像希腊和罗马家庭的土地。权利不全是私人的,但像其他的共有安排,这并不表示牧场一定会遭到过度开发。肯尼亚的图尔卡纳人(Turkana)和马赛人(Masai),西非的游牧民族富来尼人(Fulani),都发展了互相可以享用牧场但拒绝外人的制度。

    西方人没能理解共有财产的性质,以及它与亲戚团体的难解难分,或多或少是非洲目前政治失调的根源之一。欧洲殖民官员相信,缺乏现代产权,经济发展是不可能发生的。这个产权是独立且可转让的,并获法律制度的确认。很多人相信,如听任自由,非洲人将不懂如何有效且持久地使用土地。他们自己也有私心,或为天然资源,或为商业农场,或代表欧洲移民。他们想获得地契,便假设酋长“拥有”部落土地,宛如欧洲的封建君主,可以擅自签约转让。在其他情况下,他们请酋长做代理人,不仅为了土地,还把他招为殖民政府的一员。非洲的部落社会中,传统领袖的权力曾受到复杂亲戚制度的有效制衡。马哈默德·马姆达尼(Mahmood Mamdani)认为,欧洲人欲建立现代产权,故意让一帮贪婪的非洲头人攫取权力,以非传统的方式欺负自己部落的伙伴,从而助长了独立后世袭政府的滋长。

    法律和正义

    部落社会只有软弱的中央权威——头人或酋长,因此,其强制他人的能力远远低于国家。他们没有现代法律制度中的第三方执法。维诺格拉多夫指出,部落社会中的正义,有点像现代世界上国与国之间的关系:各式各样的主权决策者,有时互相谈判,有时全靠自助。埃文斯—普理查德如此解说努尔人的正义:

    血亲复仇是部落社会的规则,发生于违反法律之后,以获补偿。事实上,对血亲复仇的恐惧是部落中最重要的合法惩罚,也是个人生命和财产的主要保障……个人觉得受了损害,但投诉无门,无法得到赔偿。所以,他便向损害自己的人提出决斗,这一挑战必须获得接受。

    显而易见,埃文斯—普理查德在此提到的“法律”和“合法惩罚”都是泛指的,因为国家层次的法律与部落社会的正义很少存在关联。

    然而,如何实施血亲复仇,又有一套规则。遇害努尔人的亲戚,可以追缉作案者和作案者的男性近亲,但不能碰作案者母亲的兄弟、父亲的姐妹、母亲的姐妹,因为他们不是作案者的宗族成员。豹皮酋长会在中间调解,其住房又供作案者寻求避难和遵循礼仪,以净化自己沾上的遇害者的血。有关各方也需遵守精心的礼仪,以防冲突的扩大。例如,将伤害对方的矛送到受害者的村庄,以获魔法处理,从而避免伤口变得致命。豹皮酋长作为中立人士,享受一定的权威。他与被告村庄的其他长者一起,倾听对方的申述,但没权执行判决,就像无法执行现代国家之间判决的联合国仲裁人。仍以国际关系为例,实力是至关重要的,弱小的宗族很难从强大的宗族获得赔偿。讨回公道的程度,则取决于争执双方出于自利的斟酌。大家都不愿看到,血亲复仇逐步升级,造成更多伤害。

    实际上,所有部落社会都有寻求正义的相似规则:亲戚们有义务为受害者寻求报仇和赔偿;无约束力的仲裁制度,以帮助争端的和平解决;与各种犯罪相对称的赔偿表,北欧日耳曼部落将之称为赔偿金(wergeld)。《贝奥武夫》(Beowulf)传奇,就是一篇亲戚为遇害者寻求报仇或赔偿的英雄叙事长诗。不同的部落社会,自有不同的仲裁制度。太平洋海岸克拉马斯河(Klamath)的印第安社会中,“尤罗克(Yurok)人如想提出诉求,就要雇用二、三或四名越界者(crosser)。他们是来自其他社团的非亲人士,被告也要雇用自己的越界者。这群人合在一起充当中间人,确定诉求和反驳,并收集证据。听过所有证据之后,越界者会作出赔偿裁决”。像努尔人的豹皮酋长,越界者无权执行自己的判决,如当事人拒绝接受裁决,只能付诸排斥的威胁。部落男性同居于“流汗屋”(sweathouse)的事实,使之较为有效。被告核算,如自己将来受到委屈,也需要流汗屋伙伴的支持。因此,付出赔偿是得到鼓励的。

    同样,自 6 世纪克洛维一世(Clovis)时代以来,萨利族法兰克人(Salian Franks)在日耳曼各部落中胜出,他们的萨利克法典(Lex Salica)也建立正义规则:“萨利族法兰克部落成员,如向邻居提出诉求,在传召对方时一定要遵循精确的程序。他必须前往对方居处,在其他目击者面前宣布自己的诉求,并定下对方出席司法聚会的日期。如被告不来,他必须数次重复如此的传召。”维诺格拉多夫总结说:“我们清楚看到部落社会司法的固有弱点:其法律裁决的执行,通常不靠最高权威,在很大程度上落在诉讼者和其朋友的手中。所以只能说,这是部落社会在司法上批准和认可的自助。”

    第三方强制执行司法裁决,还必须等待国家的出现。但部落社会确实开发了愈益复杂的制度,以便在民事和刑事纠纷中提供妥当的裁决。部落法律通常不是书面的,但为了引用前例和建立赔偿额,仍需要监护人。斯堪的纳维亚发明了雷格曼一职(laghman),他是民选的法律专家,专门在审讯时发表有关法律规则的演讲。

    民众聚会起源于部落纠纷的判决。《伊利亚特》(Iliad)有关阿喀琉斯护盾(shield of Achilles)的章节,就描述一场涉及被杀男子价格的争论,在市场的大庭广众面前发生,再由部落长者读出最后的裁决。讲个更具体的案例,执行萨利克法律的是条顿制度(Teutonic),称作百户法庭,由当地村民组成,即现代模拟法庭(moot court)的源头。百户法庭在露天开会,其法官都是住在本地的自由民。百户法庭的主席(Thingman)是推选的,他主持实际上的仲裁法庭。亨利·梅因认为,“其主要功能是让热血有时间冷却,防止人们自行寻求赔偿,把争执接管过来,并协调赔偿的方法。如有不服从法庭的,最早的惩罚可能是逐入另册。不愿遵守其判决的人,将受不到法律的保护;如被杀,其亲戚们迫于舆论压力,将不得参与本属职责和权利的复仇”。梅因指出,英国国王也派代表出席类似的法庭,最初是为了分享罚款。随着国家的出现,英国国王逐渐坚持自己的裁决权和更重要的执法权(参看第 17 章)。百户法庭和主席一职,作为司法制度早已消失,作为地方政府的工具却得以保存。我们将看到,它最终成为现代民主代议制的一部分。

    战争和军事组织

    迄今为止,我还没从理论上解说,人类为什么自族团层次过渡到部落社会。我只提及,它与历史上出现农业后生产力大大提高有关。农业使人口的高度密集成为可能,并间接创造了对大型社会和私人财产的需求。如我们所见,私人财产与复杂的亲戚组织,紧密纠结,盘根错节。

    人类过渡到部落社会的另一原因是战争。定居的农业社会的发展意味着,人类群体变成近邻。他们生产的粮食,远远超过生存所必需,因此有更多的动产和不动产需要保护,或可供偷窃。部落社会的规模,远远超过族团层次,在人口数量上可压倒后者。它还有其他优势,其中最重要的是组织上的灵活性。我们在努尔人身上看到,部落社会遇上紧急状况可迅速扩展,不同层次的分支能组成各式联盟。恺撒在介绍他所战胜的高卢人(Gauls)时指出,一俟战争爆发,其部落便选出联盟的共同领袖,开始对他手下行使生死权。基于此,人类学家马歇尔·萨林斯把分支式宗族描述成“掠夺性的扩张组织”。

    类人猿祖先和人类的连贯性似乎是暴力倾向。霍布斯有个著名断言:自然状态是“人人相互为敌的战争”。卢梭则不同,明确表示霍布斯弄错了。他认为,原始人是温和隔绝的,只是在社会使人腐化的较晚阶段才出现暴力。霍布斯比较接近事实,但要有重大调整,即暴力应发生于社会群体中,而不是隔离的个人之间。人类高度成熟的社交技术和合作能力,与黑猩猩和人类社会中常见的暴力并不矛盾。说得确切些,前者还是后者的必要条件。这表示暴力是一项社交活动,参与者是成群结队的雄性,有时还有雌性。黑猩猩或人类都面对同类的暴力威胁,因此需要更多的社会合作。孤独者容易受到相邻领土的打劫帮派的攻击,与伙伴携手合作得以自保的,方能将自己的基因传给下一代。

    对很多人来说,人性中的暴力倾向是很难接受的。众多人类学家像卢梭一样,坚信暴力是文明社会的产物。还有很多人情愿相信,早期社会懂得如何与生态环境保持平衡。但很不幸,无法找到任何证据来支撑这两种观点。人类学家劳伦斯·基利(Lawrence Keeley)和考古学家斯蒂芬·勒布朗,以详尽的考古记录显示,史前人类社会的暴力一直持续不断。基利还指出,根据跨文化的调查,每五年中,70% 到 90% 的初期社会——族团、部落、酋邦的层次——参与战争。这样的社会中,只有极少数经历低水平的突袭或暴力,通常是由于环境提供了屏障阻止邻人来犯。狩猎采集者的残余群体,如卡拉哈里沙漠的布须曼人和加拿大的爱斯基摩人,如果不受干涉,我行我素,其凶杀率是美国的四倍。

    就黑猩猩和人类而言,狩猎似乎是战争的源泉。黑猩猩组织起来,成群结队地追捕猴子,再以同样技术追捕其他黑猩猩。人类也是如此,只不过人类的猎物更大、更危险,所以要求更高度的社会合作和更精良的武器。将狩猎技术用于杀人是司空见惯的,我们有历史记录。例如,蒙古人的骑术和马背上打猎,正好用来对付敌人。人类完善了追猎大动物的技术,以致考古学家往往把某处巨大动物群的绝迹,定在人类迁移至该地的时期。乳齿象、剑齿虎、巨型鸸鹋、大树懒——这些大动物,似乎都被组织良好的原始猎人斩尽杀绝了。

    随着部落社会的出现,我们看到武士阶层的兴起,还看到人类最基本最持久的政治组织,即领袖和他的武装侍从。后续的历史中,这种组织实际上无孔不入,至今依然安在,如军阀和手下、民兵队、贩毒卡特尔、社区帮派。他们掌握了武器和战争的专门技术,开始行使以前族团层次中所没有的强制权力。

    部落社会中,致富显然是发动战争的动机。讲到 10 世纪末战胜俄罗斯的维京人精英时,历史学家杰罗姆·布鲁姆(Jerome Blum)说:

    君主(维京人酋长)支持和保护他的侍从,以换取他们的服务。起初,他们与君主同住,像他的家庭成员。其赡养费,则靠斩获的战利品和部落上缴的保护费……弗拉基米尔王的侍从埋怨,因为没有银勺,他们必须用木勺进食。君主旋即命令,赶快安排银勺,并说“金银难买侍从,有了侍从,就能获得金银”。

    20 世纪 90 年代,塞拉利昂和利比里亚两国沦为军阀混战,因为福戴·桑科(Foday Sankoh)和查尔斯·泰勒(Charles Taylor)积极招募侍从。这次,他们凭借武装侍从争夺的不是银勺,而是血钻石。

    但战争的爆发,不单单依靠致富的冲动。武士可能贪婪金银,但他们在战场上表现勇敢,不是为了资源,而是为了荣誉。为一个目标而甘冒生命危险,为获得其他武士的认可,这就是荣誉。请看塔西佗(Tacitus)在 1 世纪编写的日耳曼部落历史,这是有关欧洲人祖先的罕见的同代人观察:

    侍从中有很大竞争,决定谁是酋长手下第一副将;酋长中也有很大竞争,决定谁拥有最多、最犀利的侍从。身边有大量精选青年的簇拥,这意味着等级和实力……到达战场时,酋长的膂力比不上他人的,侍从的膂力跟不上酋长的,那是丢脸;比酋长活得更久,得以离开战场的,那是终身的臭名和耻辱;保卫酋长,以壮举颂扬酋长,那是侍从忠诚的精髓。酋长为胜利而战,侍从为酋长而战。

    即使从事农业或贸易的报酬更高,武士也不愿与农夫或商人交换地位,因为致富只是其动机的一部分。武士发现农夫生活可鄙,因为它不共担危险和团结:

    如果出生地的社区长期享有和平和宁静,很多出身高贵的青年,宁可自愿寻求其时忙于战争的其他部落;休息于比赛无补,他们更容易在动乱中功成名就;再说,除了战争和暴力,你很难挽留优秀的侍从……说服他们向敌人挑战,以伤疤为荣,比让他们犁地以待丰收更为容易;凭流血可获的,你偏要通过辛苦劳作,这似乎有点窝囊和闲散。

    塔西佗评论,战争之间的空闲期,年轻武士们懒散度日,因为从事任何民间工作只会降低他们的身份。这种武士道德被取代,一直要等到欧洲资产阶级兴起的 17 和 18 世纪。其时,以获利和经济计算为内涵的道德规范替代荣誉,成为杰出人士的标志。

    政治是一门艺术,而不是一门科学,其原因之一,就是无法预知领袖与侍从之间的道德信任。他们的共同利益以经济为主,组织起来主要是为了掠夺。但单靠经济是不能把追随者与领袖捆绑在一起的。1991 年和 2003 年,美国与萨达姆·侯赛因的伊拉克作战时,它相信战场上失败将迅速导致其政府的倒台,因为他的重要部属会意识到,去掉侯赛因应是一件好事。但那些部属,由于家庭和私人的联系,加上害怕,结果却紧密团结,同舟共济。

    长期互惠所建立的互相忠诚,是凝聚力的非经济原因。部落社会向亲戚关系注入宗教意义和神灵制裁。此外,民兵通常由尚未成家、没有土地和其他财产的年轻人组成。他们身上荷尔蒙高涨,偏爱冒险生活,对他们而言,经济资源不是掠夺的唯一对象。我们不应低估,性和俘获女人在造就政治组织方面的重要性,尤其是在通常用女人作为交换中介的分支式社会。这些社会相对狭小,由于缺少非亲女子,其成员往往通过对外侵略来遵循异族通婚的规则。蒙古帝国的创始者成吉思汗,据称如此宣称:“最大的快乐是……击败你的敌人、追逐他们、剥夺他们的财富、看他们的亲人痛哭流涕、骑他们的马、把他们的妻女拥入怀中。”在实现最后一项抱负上,他是相当成功的。根据 DNA 的测试,亚洲很大一块地区,其现存的男性居民中约有 8% 是他的后裔,或属于他的血统。

    部落社会中的酋长和侍从,不同于国家层次中的将军和军队,因为两者的领导性质和权威是截然不同的。在努尔人中,豹皮酋长基本上是一名仲裁人,没有指挥权,也不是世袭的。现代的巴布亚新几内亚或所罗门群岛,其头人处于同等地位。根据传统,他是亲戚们选出的,也可能会以同样方式失去该职。塔西佗写道,日耳曼部落中,“他们国王的权力不是无限或任意的;他们的将军不是通过命令,而是通过榜样及他人由衷的赞美,站在队伍的前列来控制人民”。其他部落则组织得更为松懈。“19 世纪的科曼奇(Comanche)印第安人,甚至没有称作部落的政治组织,没有率领百姓的强悍酋长……科曼奇的人口,由大量组织松散的自治族团组成,没有应付战争的正式组织。战争头领只是战绩累累的杰出战士;如能说服他人,任何人都可动员一支战斗队伍;但其领导地位只在攻袭期间有效,还必须依赖他人的自愿。”等到欧洲移民入侵北美,施加了军事压力,夏安人(Cheyenne)等的印第安部落才开始发展出持久和集中的指挥机构,如固定的部落会议。

    疏松且分散的组织,对部落社会来说,既是优点,也是缺点。他们联网的组织,有时可以发起强大的攻击。配备以马匹,游牧民族的部落能奔赴远方,征服广袤的领土。阿尔莫哈德王朝就是一个案例,其柏柏尔部落在 12 世纪突然崛起,征服了北非全地和西班牙南部的安达卢斯。没人可与蒙古帝国媲美,他们来自亚洲内陆的大本营,在一个多世纪的时间里,设法攻克了中亚、中东大部、俄罗斯、部分东欧、印度北部、整个中国。但其永久领导的缺席、分支式联盟的松散、继位规则的缺乏,注定了部落社会最终衰弱的命运。他们没有永久的政治权力和行政能力,无法治理征服的领土,只好依赖当地定居社会提供的例行管理。几乎所有征战的部落社会——至少是没能迅速演进为国家层次的——都会在一代或两代以内四分五裂,因为兄弟、表亲、孙子都要争夺创始领袖的遗产。

    国家层次的社会,在继承部落层次的社会后,其中的部落制并不消失。在中国、印度、中东、哥伦布到来之前的美洲,国家制度只是重叠在部落制度上,两者长期共存,处于勉强的平衡。早期现代化理论的错误,一是认为政治、经济、文化必须相互匹配,二是认为不同历史“阶段”之间的过渡是干净和不可逆转的。世界上只有欧洲,自觉自愿和个人主义的社会关系完全取代部落制,基督教发挥决定性作用,打破了以亲戚关系为凝聚基础的传统。多数早期的现代化理论家,都是欧洲人。他们假设,世界其他地区走上现代化,会经历与亲戚关系的类似告别,但他们错了。中国虽是发明现代国家的第一文明,但在社会和文化的层面,却从未能成功压抑亲戚关系的弄权。因此,其两千年政治历史的大部分,一直围绕在如何阻止亲戚关系重新渗透国家行政机构。在印度,亲戚关系与宗教互动,演变成种姓制度(caste),迄今仍是定位印度社会的最好特征。从美拉尼西亚的一语部落、阿拉伯部落、台湾人宗族,到玻利维亚的“艾柳”(ayllu)村社,复杂的亲戚关系组织仍是现代世界众多社交生活的主要场所,并塑造其与现代政治制度的互动。

    从部落制到保护人—依附者和政治机器

    我以亲戚关系来定位部落制(tribalism),但部落社会也在进化。分支世系制的严格系谱,慢慢变成父母双传的部落,甚至是接受无亲戚关系成员的部落。如果我们采用更广泛的定义,部落不但包括分享共同祖先的亲戚,还包括因互惠和私人关系而绑在一起的保护人和依附者,那么,部落制便成了政治发展的常数。

    例如在罗马,甫斯特尔·德·库朗日所描述的父系亲族,叫作家族(gentes)。但到共和国初期,家族开始积累大量无亲戚关系的追随者,叫作依附者(clientes)。他们由自由民、佃户、家庭侍从所组成,到后来甚至包括愿意提供支持以换取金钱或其他好处的贫穷平民(plebeian)。从共和国晚期至帝国初期,罗马的政治离不开强悍领袖动员各自依附者来攫取国家机构,像恺撒、苏拉(Sulla)、庞培。富有的保护人,把他们的依附者编成私人军队。在考察共和国末期的罗马政治时,历史学家塞缪尔·芬纳(Samuel Finer)很小心地指出,“如果抛开具体人物……你会发现所有这些尔虞我诈、大公无私、高贵庄严,并不比一个拉丁美洲的香蕉共和国多多少。如果把罗马共和国看成是弗里多尼亚共和国(Freedonian Republic),将时间设在 19 世纪中期,将苏拉、庞培和恺撒想象成加西亚·洛佩兹、佩德罗·波德里拉和海梅·比列加斯,你会发现两者有许多相似之处,如由依附者构成的派系、私人军队和对总统职位的武装争夺”。

    宽泛意义中的部落制,仍是活生生的事实。例如,印度自 1947 年建国以来,一直是成功的民主政体,但印度政治家在议会竞选中,仍需依赖保护人和依附者之间的私人关系。严格讲,这些关系有时仍属部落的,因为部落制仍存在于印度较穷、较落后的地区。其他时候,政治支持以种姓制度或宗派主义为基础。但在每一件案例中,政治家与支持者的社会关系,与在亲戚团体中的一模一样。它仍建基于领袖和追随者的相互交换恩惠:领袖帮助促进团体利益,团体帮他获得竞选。异曲同工的是美国城市的赞助政治。其政治机器所依据的,仍是谁为谁搔了痒,而不是意识形态和公共政策的“现代”动机。所以,以非人格化形式的政治关系取代“部落”政治的斗争,仍在 21 世纪继续。

    第 5 章 “利维坦”的降临

    不同于部落社会的国家层次社会;国家的“原生”形成和竞争形成;国家形成的不同理论,包括此路不通的灌溉论;国家为何仅出现于部分地区

    与部落社会相比,国家层次社会具有下列重要差别:

    第一,它们享有集中的权力,不管是国王、总统,还是首相。该权力委任等级分明的下属,至少在原则上,有能力在整个社会执行统一规则。该权力超越领土中所有其他权力,这表示它享有主权。各级行政机关,如副首脑、郡长、地方行政官,凭借与主权的正式关联而获得决策权。

    第二,该权力的后盾是对合法强制权力的垄断,体现在军队和警察上。国家有足够权力,防止分支、部落、地区的自行退出。(这也是国家与酋邦的分别。)

    第三,国家权力是领土性的,不以亲戚关系为基础。因此,墨洛温王朝(Merovingian)时期,法兰西还不算国家。其时,统治法兰西的是法兰克国王,而不是法兰西国王。国家的疆土可远远超越部落,因为其成员资格不受亲戚关系的限制。

    第四,与部落社会相比,国家更为等级分明,更为不平等。统治者和他的行政官员,常与社会中的他人分隔开来。某种情况下,他们成为世袭的精英。部落社会中已有听闻的奴役和农奴,在国家的庇护下获得极大发展。

    第五,更为精心雕琢的宗教信仰,将合法性授予国家。分开的僧侣阶层,则充任庇护者。有时,僧侣阶层直接参政,实施神权政治;有时,世俗统治者掌管全部权力,被称作政教合一(caesaropapist);再有时,政教并存,分享权力。

    随着国家的出现,我们退出亲戚关系,走进政治发展的本身。下面几章将密切关注中国、印度、穆斯林世界以及欧洲如何自亲戚关系和部落过渡到非人格化的国家机构。一旦国家出现,亲戚关系便成为政治发展的障碍,因为它时时威胁要返回部落社会的私人关系。所以,光发展国家是不够的,还要避免重新部落化(tribalization),或我所谓的家族化。

    世界上,不是所有社会都能自己过渡到国家层次。欧洲殖民者出现之前,19 世纪的大部分美拉尼西亚,由群龙无首的部落社会组成(即缺乏集中的权力)。撒哈拉以南的非洲的一半,南亚和东南亚的部分地区,也是如此。缺乏悠久国家历史的事实,大大影响了它们在 20 世纪中期独立后的进展。与国家传统悠久的前东亚殖民地相比,这一点显得尤其突出。中国很早就开发了国家,而巴布亚新几内亚一直没有,尽管人类抵达后者更早。为什么?这就是我希望回答的问题。

    国家形成的理论

    人类学家和考古学家把国家形成分成两种,“原生”和“竞争”。国家原生形成是指国家在部落社会(或酋邦)中的首次出现。国家竞争形成是指第一个国家出现后的仿效追随。与周边的部落社会相比,国家通常组织得更为紧密、更为强大。所以,不是国家占领和吸收邻里的部落社会,就是不甘被征服的部落社会起而仿效。历史上有很多国家竞争形成的案例,但从没观察到国家原生形成的版本。政治哲学家、人类学家、考古学家,只能猜测第一个或第一批国家的出现,有众多解释,包括社会契约、灌溉、人口压力、暴力战争以及地理界限。

    国家源于自愿的社会契约

    社会契约论者,如霍布斯、洛克、卢梭,一开始并不想提供国家如何出现的实证。相反,他们只是试图弄清政府的合法性。但最先的国家是否通过部落成员的明确协议而建立集中权力,弄清这一点还是很值得的。

    托马斯·霍布斯如此解说有关国家的“交易”:国家(即利维坦)通过权力的垄断,保证每个公民的基本安全,公民放弃各行其是的自由以作交换。国家还可向公民提供无法独自取得的公共服务,如产权、道路、货币、统一度量衡、对外防卫。作为回报,公民认可国家的征税和征兵等。部落社会也可提供一定的安全,但因缺乏集中的权力,其公共服务非常有限。假如国家确实源于社会契约,我们必须假设,在历史上的某一天,部落群体自愿决定将独裁的统治权委托给个人。这种委托不是临时的,如部落酋长的选举,而是永久的,交到了国王和其后裔手中。这必须是部落中所有支系的共识,因为如有不喜欢,每一支系仍可出走。

    若说主要动机是经济,即产权的保护和公共服务的提供,国家源于社会契约似乎是不可能的。部落社会是很平等的,在密切相处的亲戚团体中,又很自由自在。相比之下,国家是强制、专横、等级分明的。尼采(Friedrich Nietzsche)把国家称作“最冷酷的怪物”。我们想象,自由的部落社会只会在极端逼迫之下才出此下策。譬如面对即将来临的异族入侵和灭绝,委托一名独裁者;或面对即将摧毁整个社团的瘟疫,委托一名宗教领袖。实际上在共和国期间,罗马独裁者就是这样选出的,如公元前 216 年坎尼会战后,汉尼拔(Hannibal)对罗马造成了切实的威胁。这表明,国家形成的真正原因是暴力,或暴力的威胁。社会契约只是有效途径,并非终极原因。

    国家源于水利工程

    社会契约论的变种是卡尔·魏特夫(Karl Wittfogel)的“水利工程”论,前人为此花费了很多不必要的笔墨。魏特夫原是马克思主义者,后来蜕变成反共产主义者。他发展了马克思的亚细亚生产方式理论,为专政出现于非西方社会提供了经济解释。他认为,大规模的灌溉需求,只有中央集权的官僚国家方能满足,从而促进了美索不达米亚、埃及、中国和墨西哥的国家兴起。

    水利工程的假设要解答很多疑问。新生国家的地区,其早期灌溉工程多数都是小型的,地方上自己就能应付。像中国大运河这种大工程,是在建立强大国家之后,只能算是结果,不应该是原因。魏特夫的假设若要成真,我们必须假设,部落成员聚集起来说:“我们将心爱的自由交给一名独裁者,让他来管理举世无双的大型水利工程,我们将变得更加富有。我们放弃自由,不仅在工程期间,而是永远,因为我们的后代也需要卓越的工程主管。”此种情形如有说服力,欧洲联盟早已变成一个国家了。

    密集人口

    人口统计学家埃斯特·博塞鲁普主张,人口的增加和密集是技术革新的主要动力。埃及、美索不达米亚、中国江河流域的密集人口,创造了精耕细作的农业。它涉及大规模灌溉、高产作物、各式农业工具。人口密集允许专业化,允许精英和百姓的分工,从而促进国家的形成。低密度人口的族团和部落社会,为减少冲突可分道扬镳;如发现不能共存,便自立门户。但新兴城市的密集人口并无如此的选择,土地匮乏,如何取得重要公共资源,这一切都可触发冲突,从而要求权力的高度集中。

    即使人口密集是国家形成的必要条件,我们仍有两个未获答案的疑问:一开始是什么造就了密集人口?密集人口与国家又是怎样互动的?

    第一个问题似乎有简单的马尔萨斯式答案:如农业革命的技术革新大大提高了土地产量,导致父母生育更多孩子,从而造成密集人口。问题是,有些狩猎采集社会的利用率,远远低于当地环境的富饶能力。新几内亚高地居民和亚马孙印第安人开发了农业,尽管在技术上做得到,却不愿生产余粮。有了提高效率和产量的技术,可以增加人口,但并不保证这一切确实发生。人类学家表明,在某些狩猎采集社会,粮食供给的上升反而导致工作量的降低,因为其成员更在乎休闲。按平均来说,农业社会的居民比较富庶,但必须工作得更加努力,这样的交换可能并不诱人。或者说,狩猎采集者只是陷入了经济学家所谓的低平衡。那是指,他们掌握了转移至农业的技术,因为面对他人分享盈余的前景,旋又打消了转移念头。

    这里的因果关系,可能被颠倒了。早期社会的人们不愿生产盈余,除非挥鞭的统治者强迫他们这样做。主人自己不愿辛苦工作,却很乐意压迫他人。等级制度的出现,不在经济因素,而在政治因素,如军事征服或强迫。埃及金字塔的建造,顿时浮现在眼前。因此,密集人口可能不是国家形成的终极原因,只是中间的变数,其本身又是尚未确定原因的产物。

    国家源于暴力和强迫

    经济解释的弱点和空缺,把国家形成的来源指向暴力。部落到国家的过渡,涉及了自由和平等的巨大损失。很难想象,为了灌溉可能带来的巨大收益,部落社会愿意这么做。所以,牵涉的利害关系必须更大,威胁生命的有组织暴力比较可信。

    我们知道,人类社会实际上一直参与暴力,尤其是在部落层次。一个部落战胜另外一个时,可能出现等级和国家。为了在政治上控制战败部落,战胜者建立了集中的强迫机构,渐渐演变成原生国家的官僚系统。如果两个部落在语言或种族上是不同的,战胜者可能建立主仆关系,等级制度慢慢变得根深蒂固。异族部落前来征服的威胁,也会鼓励部落群体建立起更永久、更集中的指挥中心,如夏安和普韦布洛的印第安人。

    部落征服定居社会的案例,在历史记载中屡有发生,如党项、契丹、匈奴、女真、雅利安(Aryans)、蒙古、维京人(Vikings)、日耳曼人,他们都是以此建国的。唯一的问题是,最早国家也是这样起家的吗?巴布亚新几内亚和苏丹南部的部落战争,历时数世纪,却一直没能建起国家层次的社会。人类学家认为,部落社会自有平衡的机制,冲突之后会重新分配权力。努尔人只收纳敌人,并不统治他们。于是,解释国家的兴起似乎还要寻找其他原因。彪悍的部落群体,从亚洲内陆草原、阿拉伯沙漠、阿富汗山脉向外出征时,才会建立更为集中的政治组织。

    地理界限和其他环境因素

    人类学家罗伯特·卡内罗(Robert Carneiro)注意到,就国家形成而言,战争虽然是普遍和必要的,但还不够。他认为,生产力增长,如发生于地理上被环绕的地区,或发生在敌对部落的有效包围中,才能解释等级制国家的出现。在非环绕地区或人口稀少地区,衰弱的部落或个人可随时跑掉。夹在沙漠和海洋中间的尼罗河峡谷,以沙漠、丛林、高山为界的秘鲁峡谷,都不存在逃跑的选择。地理界限也能解释,由于没人搬走,生产力的增长只会导致人口密度的增加。

    新几内亚高地的部落也有农业,也住在被环绕的峡谷。所以单凭这些因素,也是无法解说国家兴起的。绝对规模可能很重要,美索不达米亚、尼罗河峡谷、墨西哥峡谷,都是相当规模的农业区,又有山脉、沙漠、海洋的环绕。他们可以组成较大、较集中的军队,尤其是在马或骆驼已获驯养的情况下,可在广阔地区施展威力。所以,不仅是地理界限,还有被环绕地区的大小和交通,决定国家的形成与否。地理界限尚可提供额外的帮助,暂时保护他们免遭峡谷或岛屿外敌人的攻击,让他们有时间扩军备战。大洋洲的酋邦和雏形国家,只在斐济、汤加、夏威夷那样的大岛上出现,而不在所罗门群岛、瓦努阿图(Vanuatu)、特洛布里恩群岛(Trobriands)那样的小岛。新几内亚虽是大岛,但多山,被分割成无数个微型的生态环境。

    国家源于魅力型权威

    推测政治起源的考古学家,偏爱唯物主义的解释,如环境和技术;不大喜欢文化因素,如宗教。这是因为,我们对早期社会的物质环境,已有较多了解。但宗教思想对早期国家的形成,很可能是至关重要的。部落社会丧失自由,过渡到等级制度,都可从宗教那里获得合法性。在传统和现代理性的权威中,马克斯·韦伯挑出了他所谓的魅力型(charisma)权威。这是希腊文,意思是“上帝碰过的”。魅力型领袖行使权力,不是因为部落伙伴推崇能力而选他,而是因为他是“上帝选中的”。

    宗教权威和军事威武携手并进,让部落领袖得以调度自治部落之间的大规模集体行动。它也让自由的部落成员,将永久权力委托给领袖和其亲戚,这比经济利益更有说服力。之后,领袖可使用该权力建立集中的军事机器,战胜反抗部落,确保境内的和平和安全,在良性循环中再一次加强宗教权威。祖先崇拜等宗教受到其固有规模的限制,因此需要一个有的放矢的新宗教。

    展示此一过程的具体案例是正统哈里发和倭马亚王朝(Patriarchal & Umayyad caliphates)时期第一个阿拉伯国家的兴起。数世纪以来,部落群体居住在阿拉伯半岛,属埃及、波斯、罗马、拜占庭等国家层次社会的边缘地域。他们的环境恶劣,不适合农耕,所以没有遭遇他人的侵占,也没遇上仿效建国的军事压力。他们只在附近定居社会之间充任中介和商人,自己不能生产相当的粮食盈余。

    公元 570 年,先知穆罕默德诞生于阿拉伯城镇的麦加,便发生了戏剧性变化。根据穆斯林传统,穆罕默德 40 岁那年获得上帝的首次启示,随即开始向麦加部落布道。他和追随者由于受到迫害,在 622 年搬至麦地那。麦地那部落的争执需要他的调解,他便草拟所谓的麦地那宪法,为超越部落忠诚的信徒团体(umma)定位。穆罕默德创立的政体,尚无真正国家的所有特征。但它脱离了亲戚关系,不靠征服,而靠社会契约,这全凭他作为先知的魅力型权威。新成立的穆斯林政治体经过数年征战,赢得信徒,占领麦加,统一阿拉伯半岛的中部,一举成为国家层次的社会。

    在征战国家中,创始部落的领袖血统通常开创新朝代。但在穆罕默德的案例中,这没有发生,因为他只有女儿法蒂玛(Fatima),没有儿子。新兴国家的领导权因此传给穆罕默德的同伴,他属倭马亚氏族,也是穆罕默德的古莱什部落(Quraysh)中的支系。之后,倭马亚氏族确实开创了新王朝。倭马亚国家在奥斯曼(Uthman)和穆阿维叶(Mu‘awiya)的领导下,迅速战胜叙利亚、埃及、伊拉克,在这些现存的国家层次社会中实施阿拉伯统治。

    就政治思想的重要性而言,先知穆罕默德促使阿拉伯国家兴起是最好的证明。之前,阿拉伯部落只在世界历史中扮演边缘角色。多亏穆罕默德的魅力型权威,他们获得统一,并把势力扩展到整个中东和北非。阿拉伯部落自己没有经济基础,但通过宗教思想和军队组织的互动,不但获得经济实力,还接管了产生盈余的农业社会。这不是纯粹国家原生形成的案例,因为阿拉伯部落已有周边如波斯和拜占庭等现成国家,先作为仿效榜样,后予以征服。不过,其部落制的力量非常强大,后来的阿拉伯国家不能完全予以控制,也建不成无部落影响的官僚机构(参看第 13 章)。这迫使后来的阿拉伯和土耳其朝代采取特别措施,如军事奴隶制和招聘外国人充当行政官,以摆脱亲戚关系和部落的影响。

    第一个阿拉伯国家的创立,昭示了宗教思想的政治力量。这是非常突出的案例,但几乎所有国家,都倚靠宗教使自己获得合法地位。希腊、罗马、印度和中国的创始传说,都把统治者的祖先追溯到神灵,或至少一名半神半人的英雄。如弄不清统治者如何控制宗教礼仪以取得合法地位,就不能理解早期国家的政治力量。请看中国《诗经》中,献给商朝创始者的商颂《玄鸟》:

    天命玄鸟,降而生商,宅殷土芒芒。古帝命武汤,正域彼四方。

    (天帝任命燕子降,入世生下我商王,居衍殷地广且强。古时帝命神武汤,整顿边界安四方。)

    另一首颂诗《长发》称:

    濬哲维商,长发其祥。洪水芒芒,禹敷下土方。

    (睿智的商君,早现朝代的祯祥。洪水滔滔,禹来治理大地四方。)

    我们似乎在接近国家原生形成的齐全解释,它需要若干因素的汇合。首先,那里必须资源丰富,除维持生活,还有盈余。这类丰裕可以是纯粹自然的,太平洋西北地区充满猎物和鱼,其狩猎采集社会得以发展成酋邦,虽然还不是国家。但更多时候,创造丰裕的是技术进步,比如农业的兴起。其次,社会的绝对规模必须够大,允许初级分工和执政精英的出现。再次,居民必须受到环境的束缚,技术机遇来到时,其密度会增高;受到逼迫时,会无处可逃。最后,部落群体必须有强烈动机,愿意放弃自由来服从国家权力。这可通过组织日益良好的团体的武力威胁,也可通过宗教领袖的魅力型权威。上述因素加在一起,国家出现于像尼罗河峡谷那样的地方,这似乎是可信的。

    霍布斯主张,国家或“利维坦”的产生,起源于个人之间理性的社会契约,以终止暴力不断和战争状态。在第 2 章的开头,我曾表明,全部自由社会契约论都有一个基本谬误:因为它假设在史前自然状态时期,人类生活于隔离状态。但这种最早的个人主义从没存在过。人类天生是社会的,自己组成群体,不需要出于私心。在高层次阶段,社会组织的特别形式往往是理性协议的结果;但在低层次阶段,它由人类生物本能所决定,全是自发的。

    霍布斯式谬误,还有其另外一面。从蛮荒的自然状态到井然有序的文明社会,从来未见干净利落的过渡;而人类的暴力,也从未找到彻底的解决办法。人类合作是为了竞争;他们竞争,也是为了合作。利维坦的降临,没能永久解决暴力问题,只是将之移至更高层次。以前是部落支系之间的战斗,现在是愈益扩大的战争,主要角色换成了国家。第一个国家问世,可建立胜利者的和平。但假以时日,借用同样政治技术的新兴国家将奋起提出挑战。

    国家为何不是普世共有?

    我们现在明白,国家为何没在非洲和大洋洲出现,部落社会又为何持续存在于阿富汗、印度、东南亚高地。政治学家杰弗里·赫伯斯特(Jeffrey Herbst)认为,非洲很多地区缺乏自生国家,原因在于各式因素的聚合:“非洲的建国者——不管是殖民地的国王和总督,还是独立后的总统——所面对的基本问题是,如何在人口稀少且不适居住的领土上行使统治权。”他指出,与大众的想象相悖,非洲大陆上仅 8% 的地区处于热带,50% 的地区降雨不够,难以支撑农业。人类虽在非洲起家,却在世界其他地域繁荣昌盛。现代农业和医学到来之前,非洲的人口密度一直很低,其在 1975 年的程度,刚刚达到欧洲在 1500 年的水平。也有例外,如非洲肥沃的大湖区和东非大裂谷(the Great Rift Valley),养活了高密度的居民,并出现集权国家的萌芽。

    非洲的自然地理,使权力的行使变得艰巨。非洲只有很少适合长途航行的河流(这一规则的例外是尼罗河下游,它是世界上最早国家之一的摇篮)。萨赫勒地区(Sahel)的沙漠与欧亚的大草原迥然不同,成为贸易和征服的一大障碍。那些骑在马背上的穆斯林战士,虽然设法越过这道障碍,却发现自己的坐骑纷纷死于孑孓蝇传染的脑炎。这也解释了,西非的穆斯林区为何仅局限于尼日利亚北部、象牙海岸、加纳等。在热带森林覆盖的非洲部分,建造和维修道路的艰难是建立国家的重要障碍。罗马帝国崩溃一千多年后,其在不列颠岛上建造的硬面道路仍在使用,而热带的道路能持续数年的寥寥无几。

    非洲只有少数在地理上被环绕的地区。统治者因此而遇上极大的困难,将行政管理推入内地,以控制当地居民。因为人口稀少,通常都有荒地可开;遇上被征服的威胁,居民可轻易朝灌木丛做进一步的撤退。非洲的战后国家巩固,从没达到欧洲的程度,因为战争征服的动机和可能性实在有限。根据赫伯斯特,这显示,自部落社会向欧洲式领土政体的过渡从来没有发生于非洲。非洲的被环绕地区,如尼罗河峡谷,则看到国家的出现,这也符合相关规则。

    澳洲本身没有国家出现,原因可能与非洲雷同。大体上说,澳洲非常贫瘠,而且甚少差别。尽管人类在那里已居住良久,但人口密度总是很低。没有农业,也没有被环绕地区,由此解释了超越部落和宗族的政治组织的缺乏。

    美拉尼西亚的处境则不同。该地区全由岛屿组成,所以有自然环境的界限,此外,农业发明也在很久以前。考虑到多数岛屿都是山脉,这里的问题与规模大小和行政困难有关。岛屿中峡谷太小,仅能养活有限人口,很难在远距离行使权力。就像较早时指出的,具大片肥沃平原的大岛,如斐济和夏威夷,确有酋邦和国家出现。

    山脉也解释了部落组织为何持续存在于世界上的高山地区,包括:阿富汗,土耳其、伊拉克、伊朗、叙利亚的库尔德地区,老挝和越南的高地,巴基斯坦的部落区域。对国家和军队来说,山脉使这些地区难以征服和占领。土耳其人、蒙古人、波斯人、英国人、俄国人,还有现在的美国人和北约,都试图降伏和安抚阿富汗部落,以建立集权国家,但仅有差强人意的成功。

    弄清国家原生形成的条件是很有趣的,因为它有助于确定国家出现的物质条件。但到最后,有太多互相影响的因素,以致无法发展出一条严密且可预测的理论,以解释国家怎样形成和何时形成。这些因素或存在,或缺席,以及为之所作的解释,听起来像是吉卜林的《原来如此》(Just So Stories)。例如,美拉尼西亚的部分地区,其环境条件与斐济或汤加非常相似——都是大岛,其农业能养活密集人口——却没有国家出现。原因可能是宗教,也可能是无法复原的历史意外。

    找到这样的理论并不见得有多重要,因为世界上大多数国家不是原生形成的,而是竞争形成的。很多国家的形成是在我们有书面记录的年代。中国国家的形成开始得很早,比埃及和美索不达米亚略晚,与地中海和新世界(New World)的国家兴起几乎同时。早期中国历史,有详尽的书面和考古资料,为我们提供了细致入微的中国政治纹理。但最重要的是,依马克斯·韦伯的标准,中国出现的国家比其他任何一个更为现代。中国人建立了统一和多层次的官僚行政机构,这是在希腊或罗马从未发生的。中国人发展出了明确反家庭的政治原则,其早期统治者刻意削弱豪门和亲戚团体的力量,提倡非人格化的行政机构。中国投入建国大业,建立了强大且统一的文化,足以承受两千年的政治动乱和外族入侵。中国政治和文化所控制的人口,远远超过罗马。罗马统治一个帝国,其公民权最初只限于意大利半岛上的少数人。最终,罗马帝国的版图横跨欧亚非,从不列颠到北非,从日耳曼到叙利亚。但它由各式民族所组成,并允许他们相当可观的自治权。相比之下,中国帝王把自己称作皇帝,不叫国王,但他统治的更像王国,甚至更像统一国家。

    中国的国家是集权官僚制的,非常霸道。马克思和魏特夫认识到中国政治这一特点,所以用了“亚细亚生产方式”和“东方专制主义”这样的词语。我将要在后续章节论证,所谓的东方专制主义不过是政治上现代国家的早熟出世。在中国,国家巩固发生在社会其他力量建制化地组织起来之前,后者可以是拥有领土的世袭贵族,组织起来的农民,以商人、教会和其他自治团体为基础的城市。不像罗马,中国军队一直处于国家的严密控制之下,从没对政治权力构成独立威胁。这种初期的权力倾斜却被长期锁定,因为强大的国家可采取行动,防止替代力量的出现,不管是经济的,还是政治的。要到 20 世纪,充满活力的现代经济才能出现,打破这种权力分配。强大的外敌曾不时占领部分或整个中国,但他们多是文化不够成熟的部落,反被中国臣民所吸收和同化。一直到 19 世纪,欧洲人带来的外国模式向以国家为中心的发展途径提出挑战,中国这才真正需要作出应对。

    中国政治发展的模式不同于西方,主要表现在:其他建制化的力量,无法抵消这早熟现代国家的发展,也无法加以束缚,例如法治。在这一方面,它与印度截然不同。马克思最大错误之一是把中国和印度都归纳在“亚细亚”模式中。印度不像中国,但像欧洲,其建制化的社会抵抗力量——组织起来的祭司阶层和亲戚关系演变而成的种姓制度——在国家积累权力时发挥了制动器作用。所以,过去的二千二百年中,中国的预设政治模式是统一帝国,缀以内战、入侵、崩溃;而印度的预设模式是弱小政治体的分治,缀以短暂的统一和帝国。

    中国国家形成的主要动力,不是为了建立壮观的灌溉工程,也不在魅力型宗教领袖,而是无情的战争。战争和战争的需求,在一千八百年内,把成千上万的弱小政治体凝聚成大一统的国家。它创立了永久且训练有素的官僚和行政阶层,使政治组织脱离亲戚关系成为可行。就像查尔斯·蒂利(Charles Tilly)在评论后期欧洲时所说的,“战争创造国家,国家发动战争”,这就是中国。

    第二部分 国家建设

    第 6 章 中国的部落制

    中国文明的起源;古代中国的部落社会组织;中国家庭和宗族的特征;周朝的封建扩张和政治权威的性质

    自有文字记载以来,中国就有部落制,分支世系制迄今仍残留于中国南部和台湾。历史学家谈起中国“家庭”时,不是指夫妇带小孩的小家庭,而是指成员达数百乃至数千的父系家族。中国早期历史有相当齐全的记载,提供了观察国家自部落社会脱颖而出的罕见良机。

    人类长居中国。早在 80 万年前,像古直立人的古人类已现踪迹。智人离开非洲数千年后,也抵达中国。稷(北方)和稻(南方)很早获得人工培植,冶金和定居社区的首次出现,则在中国朝代之前的仰韶时期(公元前 5000—前 3000 年)。到龙山时期(公元前 3000—前 2000 年),可见城郭和社会等级分化的明显遗迹。在这之前,宗教基于祖先崇拜或鬼神崇拜,由巫师主持。他不是专家,像在大多数其他族团层次社会,只是社区的普通一员。随着等级社会的逐渐成形,统治者开始垄断巫术,借此来提升自己的合法性。

    开发农业后,最重要的技术革新恐怕是马匹驯养,公元前四千年在乌克兰率先发生,又在公元前二千年早期传至中西亚。过渡到草原游牧业则完成于公元前一千年初,也是马背部落向中国挺进的开始。这种挺进主宰了中国后续历史的大部分。

    古代中国的分期有点让人困惑。仰韶和龙山不是朝代,而是考古学的范畴,以中国北部黄河中下游的定居点而命名。中国王朝始于三代,即夏、商、周,公元前 770 年,周朝又发生分裂,从陕西的镐京迁都至现代河南的洛阳,前为西周,后为东周。东周本身又分春秋和战国前后两段。

    年份(公元前)朝代时期政治体数量
    5000仰韶
    3000龙山
    2000三代3000
    15001800
    1200西周170
    770东周春秋(前 770—前 476)23
    战国(前 475-前 221)7
    2211

    从远古到统一中国的秦是古代中国所涵盖的历史。我们的有关知识来自浩淼的考古资料,包括用于占卜的甲骨文(通常是羊肩骨)、青铜器彝文、官员用来记录政务的竹简。另一来源是问世于东周最后数世纪的伟大经典文献,其中最重要的是五经:《诗》、《书》、《礼》、《易》、《春秋》,嗣后成为中国官员的教育之本。据称,这五部经典是孔子编纂和传播的,再加上卷帙浩繁的注释,构成了塑造千年中国文化的儒家意识形态。这些经典的形成背景是东周时期,其时内战方兴未艾,政治分崩离析;《春秋》就是鲁国十二名国君的编年史,在孔子眼中,显示了这段时期的退化和堕落。这些经典和孔子、孟子、墨子、孙子等人的著作,虽然蕴含大量历史信息,但大体上仍属文学作品,其精确性尚不明确。

    但有确凿证据显示,中国政治体数量经历了极大的收缩,从夏初的大约一万,到西周开国时的一千二百,到战国时只剩下七个。中国西部的秦孝公和谋臣商鞅,奠基了世界上第一个真正现代的国家。秦王征服所有对手,建立统一国家,并将秦首创的制度推向中国北方的大部,国家巩固由此告成。

    部落的中国

    从部落到国家层次的过渡在中国慢慢发生,新的国家制度重叠在亲戚关系的社会组织之上。夏商时期被称作“国”的,虽然有日益明显的等级和集中领导,实际上只是酋邦或部落。一直到商末,亲戚团体仍是中国社会组织的主要形式。到了周朝才有变更,涌现了拥有常备军队和行政机构的真正国家。

    中国历史的早期社会由宗族组成,即同一祖先的父系家族。基本军事单位由宗族内大约百家男子组成,以宗族领袖为首,聚集在同一旗号下。宗族又可灵活组合,凝聚而成氏族(clan)或更高层次的宗族,而国王只是特定地区所有宗族的最高领袖。

    三代时期,宗族中的仪式被编纂成一系列法律。这些仪式涉及对共同祖先的崇拜,在祭有祖先神位的庙堂举行。庙堂内分划不同的祭殿,对应不同层次的宗族,宗族领袖掌控仪式以加强自身权力。未能正确遵守仪式或军事命令,会引来国王或宗族领袖的严苛处罚。依此类推,如要彻底摧毁敌人,一定要毁其祖庙,劫其珍宝,杀其子孙,绝其香火。

    像其他部落社会,中国社会组织的层次也时高时低。一方面,村庄范围的宗族为战争、自卫、商业而团结起来,有时出于自愿和共同利益,有时出于对个别领袖的尊敬,但更多时候是迫于强制。战争变得愈益频繁,夯土围墙的城镇在龙山时期变得星罗棋布。

    另一方面,宗族社会又在分化瓦解。年轻人开发荒野,自立门户。其时,中国仍属地广人稀,只要搬到他地就能逃避现存宗族的管辖。因此,正如国家形成理论所预测的,人口稀少和缺乏界限阻碍了国家和等级制度的形成。

    尽管如此,在黄河峡谷的古老地段,人口密度与农业生产力一起上升。商朝的等级制度愈加分明,这可见证于领袖对追随者施加的惩罚,以及其时流行的奴役和人祭。甲骨文提及五种处罚:墨(面部刺字涂墨)、劓(割鼻)、剕(断足)、宫(阉割)、大辟(处死)。很多当时的葬地,挖掘出八至十具作揖的无首骨骼,许是奴隶,又许是战俘。高级领袖的陪葬人数竟高达五百。在殷墟出土的陪葬人总共一万,还有大量马匹、战车、三足鼎和其他珍贵工艺品。为平息死去祖先的灵魂,活人竟投入如此巨大的资源,包括人、动物、器物。很明显,自部落到等级分明政体的过渡正在展开。

    中国的家庭和亲戚关系

    社会组织中家庭和亲戚的重要性是中国历史上重大常数之一。秦国君主试图抑制亲戚裙带,以推崇非人格化的行政管理,先在自己王国,统一成功后再推向全中国。中国共产党 1949 年上台后,也尝试使用专政权力消灭中国传统的家庭主义,使个人与国家紧密相连。但这两项政治工程,都没获得发明者所期待的成功。中国家庭证明是颇有韧性的,父系家族迄今仍活跃于中国部分地区。短暂的秦朝之后,非人格化管理最终在西汉期间得以确立(公元前 206—公元 9 年)。到了东汉末期和隋唐,亲戚团体又卷土重来。要到第二个千年初期的宋明,非人格化国家管理才得以恢复。尤其是在中国南方,宗族和氏族一直处于强势,直到 20 世纪。它们在地方上发挥准政治的功能,在很多事情上取代国家成为权力的来源。

    关于中国亲戚关系,我们有很丰富的资料,大部分由人类学家所编撰。他们研究台湾和中国南部的现代社区,所使用的亲戚团体记载可追溯到 19 世纪。个别亲戚团体所保存的详细记录,有助于研究更为早期的家庭关系。但在古代中国亲戚关系上,我们却只有很少信息。将现代趋势投射得那么久远,风险不小。有学者主张,当代宗族是宋明理学家所提倡的政策的产物,与公元 1000 年之前的亲戚关系是迥然不同的。尽管如此,在中国数世纪的历史中,亲戚团体的某些特征是万变不离其宗的。

    中国社会的亲戚关系严格遵循父系社会或父系家族的规则。有人类学家将之定义为“使用统一礼仪、显示共同祖先的集团(corporate)”。某些现代宗族的祖先可追溯到二十五代以上,但历史上的宗族通常不超过五代。相比之下,氏族是容纳若干宗族的更高级组合,通常基于虚拟(fictive)的亲戚关系。这种氏族和相关的姓氏联盟之所以存在,只是为了确定异族通婚。

    像其他父系家族社会一样,继承和遗产只通过男子。女子不是宗族的永久成员,而是与其他重要家庭联姻的潜在资源。结婚后,她与生身家庭一刀两断,在很多中国历史时期,只可在规定时日回访娘家。妻子不再往生身的家庙祭拜,而是改去丈夫家的。香火传承全靠男子,因此,她在新家庭中没有地位,直到生下儿子。除非有了将来为父母灵魂祈祷的儿子,她的灵魂将不得安宁。讲得实在些,儿子又是她晚年的经济保障。

    数世纪来,无数中国小说和戏剧记载了年轻妻子与婆婆之间的紧张关系。婆婆虐待未生儿子的媳妇是理所当然的。但一旦有了儿子,女子作为重要宗族继承人的生母,又可获很高的地位。中国王朝众多的宫廷权术,都涉及意欲提升儿子政治地位的擅权遗孀。西汉时期的皇太后,至少六次得以选择皇帝继承人。

    前现代(premodern)社会的可悲真相之一,就是很难把儿子抚养成人。现代医药发明之前,地位和财富只能提供很有限的差别。世界君主政体的历史,充斥着王后或妃嫔没能生下儿子而引起的政治危机。日本皇太子徳仁亲王于 1993 年结婚,与妻子雅子一起尝试生个儿子(而未成功),引起众多现代日本人的急切关注。与一连串早期皇帝相比,这又算不了什么:仁孝天皇(1800—1846)十五个孩子中,仅有三个活到三岁;明治天皇(1852—1912)十五个孩子中,仅有五个活到成年。

    跟其他社会一样,传统中国的因应对策是纳妾。地位高级的人士可娶二房、三房甚至更多的妻子。为确定个中的继承权,中国发展了复杂的正式规章制度。妻子再年幼的儿子对妾的儿子,仍享有优先继承权,但也有违反此例的皇帝。虽然有具体规矩,继承权的不确定性仍是宫廷政治的主题。公元前 71 年,霍光妻霍显设法谋害了坐月子的许皇后,让女儿成君取而代之。公元 115 年,汉安帝多年不育的阎皇后鸩杀了刚生下儿子的皇妃李氏。

    像库朗日所描述的希腊和罗马,中国亲戚制度也与私人财产制度有关。周朝宣称,所有土地都是国家财产,但周天子太弱,难以付诸实现。土地日益私人化,买卖和改造也变得普遍。作为整体,宗族拥有祖庙或祠堂。较富的宗族又投资于共同财产,如水坝、桥、井、灌溉系统。单独家庭拥有自己的耕田,但不得随意处置,因为有对宗族的礼仪义务。

    宗族增长始终给遗产的继承制造难题。周朝早期有长子继承权制度,之后又改为儿子们平分。这一规矩延续了中国历史的大部,直到 20 世纪。根据这个制度,家庭的土地经常越分越小,以致无法维生。中国开发了大家庭概念,数代男子同堂。成年的儿子或在分到的祖地上安家,或试图购买邻地。对宗族的共同财产,他们仍然有份;对共同的祖先,他们仍有祭拜的责任。这一切阻止了他们的搬迁,或出售祖地。

    在财产和同堂方面,不同区域出现了巨大差异。中国北方,宗族力量逐渐变弱,宗族成员搬往分散的村庄,丧失了相互之间的认同。在南方,宗族和氏族成员继续并肩生活,以至整村人只有一个姓。为此出现很多解释,其中之一是这么认为的:很多世纪以来,南方一直是蛮荒地带,宗族即使增长却仍能抱成一团;而在北方,战争频仍,流离失所时有发生,从而拆散了数代同堂的宗族。

    要记住,宗族组织在很多情形中纯属富人特权。只有他们才能负担得起平分的庞大地产、共同财产、为传宗接代而娶的多房妻妾等。事实上,周朝首次编纂的宗法规则,只适用于精英家庭。贫困家庭只能负担很少的孩子,有时为弥补无子无孙,而让入赘女婿改用妻子的姓氏。这在日本很普通,在中国却遭否定。

    中国的“封建”时期

    商灭于周。周的部落定居于渭河流域(当代陕西省),在商的西方。周的征服始于公元前 11 世纪初,历时数年。其时,商的军队还必须在山东应付马背游牧民族的袭击。周王杀死商的储君,谋害自己兄弟,夺取政权,建立新朝。

    这一征服开创了很多学者所谓的中国封建时期。其时,政治权力非常分散,掌控在一系列等级分明的氏族和宗族手中。从西周到东周早期,亲戚关系仍是社会组织的原则。到了春秋和战国,这些亲戚团体之间战火纷飞,国家开始慢慢成形。我们可仔细追溯国家形成的各项因素,所依靠的不再是考古学的重新组合,而是历史记载中的证据。

    从对比角度看,中国国家的形成过程格外有趣。它在很多方面为欧洲几乎一千年后的历程树立了先例。周部落征服长期定居的商朝领土,建立了封建贵族阶层。无独有偶,日耳曼野蛮部落打败衰败凋零的罗马帝国后,也创立了类似的分散政体。不管是中国还是欧洲,发动战争的需求促使了国家的形成:封建属地逐渐聚合成领土的国家,政治权力趋于集中,现代非人格化行政脱颖而出。

    然而,中国和欧洲又有重要差别。英语版的中国朝代史,给中国平行制度贴上既定标签,如“封建的”、“家庭”、“国王”、“公爵”、“贵族”,从而遮掩了中间的差别。所以,我们需要确定这些标签的意义,既指出重要对应,也挑明不同文明的分道扬镳。

    最混乱和误用最多的,可算是“封建的”和“封建主义”。由于学者和辩论家的混乱使用,这两词基本上变得毫无意义。根据卡尔·马克思开创的传统观念,“封建主义”往往指欧洲中世纪庄园上领主和农民之间的经济剥削关系。马克思主义历史学认为,现代资本主义兴起之前有个避不开的封建阶段。这种按图索骥的僵硬,迫使传统学者到处寻找封建阶段,即使在毫不相干的社会。

    历史学家马克·布洛赫(Marc Bloch)关注存在于中世纪欧洲的采邑(fief)和属臣(vassalage)制度,从而给封建主义提供了历史上比较准确的定义。采邑是领主和属臣之间的契约,后者获得保护和土地,一定要向领主提供军事服务作为交换。契约在特定仪式中获得尊严,领主将属臣的手放入自己的手中,以亲吻来锁定相互的关系。这种双方兑现义务的从属关系,需要一年一度的更新。属臣之后还可将采邑分割成更小的子采邑(subfief),与自己的属下再签新的契约。该制度自有一套复杂的道德规范,与荣誉、忠诚、宫廷婚姻有关。

    从政治发展的角度看,欧洲封建主义的关键不是领主和属臣之间的经济关系,而是隐含的权力分散。历史学家约瑟夫·斯特雷耶(Joseph Strayer)说:“西欧的封建主义基本上是政治性的——它是一种政府……其中,一队军事领袖垄断政治权力,队员之间的权力分配却又相对平等。”这个定义与马克斯·韦伯有关,也是我在本卷所使用的。该制度的核心是分派采邑或封地,属臣可以在其上实施一定程度的政治控制权。封建契约在理论上可随意取消,但随着时间的推移,欧洲的属臣们把采邑转换成自己的家族财产。这表示,后裔得以继承采邑。他们在自己采邑享有征兵征税的政治权力,能独立作出司法裁决,不受领主的干涉。因此,他们一点不像领主的代理人,却是实打实的小领主。马克·布洛赫指出,封建制度晚期的家族性质实际上代表了该制度的退化。总之,封建制度的独特处恰恰是它分散的政治权力。

    在这个意义上,周朝的中国是个封建社会,与中央集权国家没有相似之处。像很多征战的朝代,不管是之前还是之后,周天子发现自己没有足够军队或资源来直接统治所占领的土地,特别是在草原游牧部落频繁骚扰的西方,还有后来成为楚国的南方边境。所以,他分派封地给麾下的将领。考虑到周社会的部落性质,那些将领多是他的亲戚。周天子共设七十一处封地,其中五十三处由他的亲戚治理,剩下的则分给其他文武官员,以及已被击败但愿效忠的商贵族。这些属臣在治理自己封地时享有实质性的自治。

    周朝的中国封建主义与欧洲的相比,仍有重大区别。在欧洲,野蛮部落一旦皈依基督教,分支式的部落制度在封建社会初期即遭摧毁,通常在数代人的时间内。欧洲的封建主义是一种机制,把没有亲戚关系的领主和属臣绑在一起,在亲戚关系不复存在的社会中促进社会合作。相比之下,中国的政治参与者不是独立分散的领主,而是领主和他们的亲戚团体。在欧洲领主的境内,领主与农民签署封建合同,非人格化管理已开始扎根。权力在领主手中,而不在领主亲戚团体的手中。采邑只是他的家庭财产,并不属于更大的亲戚集团。

    另一方面,中国的封地授予亲戚团体,之后又逐次分封给下一级的宗族或部落分支。中国贵族与欧洲领主相比,其权力比较薄弱,其等级森严比较缓和,因为他陷入了限制他擅权的亲戚架构。我曾提到,部落社会的领袖地位往往是赢取的,而不是继承得来的。周朝的中国领袖,虽然趋向于等级分明,但仍受亲戚人脉的限制,看起来比欧洲的更像是“部落的”。有位评论家指出,在春秋时期,“国家像一个放大了的家庭。君主统而不治;大夫们很重要,不是因为其职位,而是因为他们是君主的亲戚,或是显赫家庭的家长”。君主与其说是真正的一国之主,倒不如说是伙伴中的老大。“各种故事讲到,贵族当众责备君主,并吐口水,却没受到他的训斥或处罚;拒绝他对珍玩的索求;在他妻妾群中与他一起玩游戏;未获邀请而坐上他的桌子;上门邀他分享晚餐,却发现他在外射鸟。”

    周朝社会的氏族组织中,军队也是分支式的,没有中央统领。各个宗族动员自己的军队,再蜂聚到更大单位中(像努尔人的分支)。“有关战争的记述透露,战场上,征来的士兵只跟随自己的将领;重要的决定通常由将领们集体讨论决定;部队编制松散,以致将领只能指挥自己手下,而顾不上其余。”很多案例显示,因为没有严格的统领制度,部将得以修改名义上君主的命令。根据第 5 章介绍的人类学分类,周朝早期政体是部落的,至多是酋邦的,而绝不是国家的。

    中国的封建社会与欧洲的非常相似,都发展了悬殊的阶级分化和贵族阶层,起因是关于荣誉、暴力、冒险的道德信念。开始时,早期部落社会相对平等,并有防止地位悬殊的各式调整机制。然后,某些人开始在狩猎中出类拔萃。狩猎与战争有关联,这可追溯到人类的灵长目祖先。等级制度在狩猎和征战中脱颖而出,因为有些人或群体就是略胜一筹。优秀猎手往往又是优秀战士,狩猎所需要的合作技能进化成军事战术和战略。通过战绩,有些宗族获得更高的地位;宗族内,卓越的战士崛起而成为将领。

    这也在中国发生。狩猎和战争的关联保存于一系列礼仪,使武士贵族的社会地位获得合法化。陆威仪(Mark Lewis)解释说,春秋时期,“君主之所以在群众中鹤立鸡群,全靠在圣坛前的‘壮举’,即礼仪化的暴力,如献祭、战争、狩猎”。狩猎把动物送上祖先的祭台,战争把战俘送上祖先的祭台。血祭是商朝的习俗,到周朝仍然继续,一直到公元前 4 世纪。军事征战出发于庙堂,为确保战争的胜利,既有牺牲品又有祈祷。礼仪中,大家分享祭肉,战鼓因战俘的血液而变得神圣,特别可恨的敌人则被剁成肉酱,供宫廷或军队成员进食。

    周朝早期的贵族战争高度礼仪化。发动战争是为了使另一氏族承认自己的霸权,或是为了荣誉受到藐视而实施报仇。军队向前冲是为了保护“继承下来的祖业”,不克尽责的领袖,死后将得不到妥善的祭拜。他们通过在仪式上展示的力量和荣誉来达到目的,不需付诸殊死的实战。战役经常在贵族之间预先安排,需要遵守复杂的规矩。敌人一旦在战场出现,军队一定要上前迎战,否则就是耻辱。不向敌人的最强部位发起攻击,有时也被认作丢脸。敌方君主去世时,为了不影响对方的哀悼义务,军队就会退出战役。春秋初期,贵族打仗多用战车。而这种战车,既昂贵,操作起来又需要高超技术。显而易见,军事战略家孙子依靠奇袭和欺骗的“迂回”战术,还要等到中国历史的后期。

    周朝早期的中国社会,处于部落和酋邦之间。史书中称为“国”的,都不是真正的国家。周朝的中国好比是家族社会的教科书,换言之,整个国家为一系列封地君主和其亲戚团体所“拥有”。土地和定居于此的民众,都是可传给后裔的家族财产,只受父系家族亲戚规则的约束。这个社会中没有公私之分,每个占统治地位的宗族都可征兵征税,并作出自认妥善的司法裁决。然而,这一切将很快发生变化。

    第 7 章 战争和中国国家的兴起

    国家源于军事竞争;商鞅的现代化改革;法家对儒家家庭主义的批判;没有经济和社会发展做伴的政治发展

    东周时期(公元前 770—前 256 年),真正的国家开始在中国成形。它们设立常备军,在界定领土内实行统一规则;配备官僚机构,征税执法;颁布统一的度量衡;营造道路、运河、灌溉系统等公共基建。尤其秦国,全力投入不寻常的现代化工程,目标直指周朝早期亲戚家族的社会秩序。它绕过武士贵族,直接征募大量农民,使军队趋于民主化;从事大规模土地改革,将家族大地主的土地分给农民;破坏世袭贵族的权力和威望,从而提高社会流动性。这些改革听起来像是“民主的”,但其唯一目的是富国强兵,打造冷酷的专政。这些现代政治制度的优势,令秦国打败所有对手,进而一统天下。

    战争与国家建设

    政治学家查尔斯·蒂利有个著名论点:欧洲君主发动战争的需求,驱动了欧洲的国家建设。战争和国家建设的关联不是普世共有的。总的来说,拉丁美洲就没有这一历史过程。但毫无疑问,在中国的东周时期,国家形成的最重要动力就是战争。从公元前 770 年的东周初期到前 221 年的秦朝统一,中国经历了连绵不绝的战争,规模、耗资、人命的牺牲有增无已,从分散封建国家到统一帝国的过渡全凭武力征服。这时所建立的几乎每一个现代国家制度,都直接或间接地与发动战争息息相关。

    与其他好战社会相比,中国在东周期间的血腥记录仍然突出。有学者计算,春秋时期的 294 年,中国的“国家”之间共打了 1211 次战役,和平岁月仅有 38 年,超过 110 个政治体被灭绝。后续的 254 年战国时期,打了 468 次战役,仅有 89 年太平无事。兼并使国家数量大跌,战役总数因此减少,战国七雄灭了其余十六国。另一方面,战役的规模和历时却有显著的上升。春秋时,有些战役只打一个回合,一天就完。到战国末期,围攻可持续数月,战役可持续多年,参战将士高达 50 万。

    与其他军事化社会相比,周朝的中国异常残暴。有个估计,秦国成功动员了其总人口的 8% 到 20%,而古罗马共和国的仅 1%,希腊提洛同盟(Delian League)的仅 5.2%,欧洲早期现代则更低。人员伤亡也是空前未有的。李维(Livy)报道,罗马共和国在特拉西美诺湖战役(Lake Trasimene)和坎尼会战(Cannae)中,总共损失约 5 万军人。而一名中国史官称,24 万战死于公元前 293 年的战役,45 万战死于公元前 260 年的战役。总而言之,从公元前 356 年到前 236 年,秦国据说一共杀死 150 多万他国士兵。历史学家认为,这些数字夸大其词,无法证实。但它仍颇不寻常,中国的数字简直是西方对应国的 10 倍。

    持续战争带来的制度改革

    激烈战争造就强烈的奖励,导致了旧制度被摧毁和新制度取而代之。它们都与军事组织、征税、官僚机关、民间的技术革新以及思想有关。

    军事组织

    一点也不令人惊奇,激烈战争的最初影响是参战各国军事机构的演变。

    如早先提到的,春秋早期的战事是驾战车贵族的互相厮杀。每辆战车配备一名御手和至少两名武士,还需多达七十人的后勤支持。驾车开打是高难度的技术,需要实质性的训练,的确是适合贵族的职业。这时的步兵仅发挥辅助作用。

    从战车到步兵加骑兵的转变逐渐发生于春秋末期。在南方湖泊和沼泽众多的吴越两国,战车用处非常有限,在多山地区更是相形见绌。很显然,与西方草原马背野蛮人打交道的经验,促使骑兵出现于战国初期。随着铁兵器、弩、盔甲的广泛使用,步兵变得更为有效。西部的秦是最早重整军队的国家之一,它淘汰战车,改换为步骑兵的混成。其主因,既是秦的地形,又是野蛮人的持续压力。楚是在他国征兵的第一国,击败陈之后,强迫当地农民提供军事服务。这些军队不再是亲戚团体的组合,而是等级分明的军事单位,统领着固定数量的部下。公元前 6 世纪中期,第一支全步兵军队投入战斗,在未来两个世纪内,完全取代战车军队。到战国初期,将农民大批征入军队已成司空见惯。

    中国军队打击力量的核心从战车转到步兵;无独有偶,欧洲也从盔甲骑士转到弓箭和长矛的步兵军队。担任战车手和骑士的贵族,在这两个转向中,根本无法提升自身的社会地位。在这两个文明中,负担得起旧式装备和培训的只有贵族精英。这个转向似乎与技术改革有关;中国贵族数量持续下降,够格的战车手日渐稀少,可能是另外原因。

    贵族阶层的人员损失,推动了军内的论功封赏。周朝早期,军事将领全凭亲戚关系和在氏族中的地位。斗转星移,越来越多的非贵族将领,单凭自己的骁勇善战而获晋级。国家也开始分配土地、爵位、家奴给将士以作奖励,无名小卒跃升为将军时有发生。参战的野战军队中,骁勇善战不是文化规范,而是存活的前提。所以很有可能,论功封赏的原则始于军队,辗转传入文官体系。

    征税和人口注册

    将农民大批征入军队,需要相应的物质资源来支付和装备他们。从公元前 594 年到前 590 年,鲁国开始征收田赋,不再作为亲戚团体的财产,而是以众多农家合成的“丘”为计量单位。邻国齐的入侵,迫使鲁国快速增征甲兵。从公元前 543 年到前 539 年,子产在郑国重划带渠的田地,把农民编成五户一组以征收新税。在公元前 548 年,楚国丈量土地,登记盐池、鱼塘、沼泽、森林、人口。这项调查是为日后的征税征兵预作准备。

    官僚机构的发展

    可以肯定地说,是中国发明了现代官僚机构。永久性的行政干部全凭能力获选,不靠亲戚关系或家族人脉。官僚机构自周朝中国的混乱中崛起,全没计划,只为征收战争所需的税金。

    周朝头几年的管理是家族式的,像其他早期国家一样,如埃及、苏美尔、波斯、希腊、罗马。行政官位配给君主的亲戚,被视作君主家庭的延伸。决策时,并不严格遵守等级分工,而是以咨询和忠诚为依据。所以,君主可能掌控不住大夫,如有分歧,也不能予以解雇。像一语部落中的头人,面对让贤的强大共识,周朝一名君主只好束手听命;除非他铤而走险,如公元前 669 年的晋献公,把合谋反己的所有亲戚统统杀光。宫廷权术不是个人操作的,而是宗族,满门抄斩才能绝其香火。

    官僚化始于军队,各项职能由贵族转让给庶民。军队需要征募、装备、训练大批新兵,记录和后勤也是不可或缺的。支援军队的需要又增加了对文官体系的需求。他们帮助征税,确保大规模军事动员中的连贯性。军事机构成为文官的训练场所,并促进统领体系的形成。同时,周朝贵族内部的自相残杀,为大夫家庭提供了社会升迁良机。大夫虽在传统上也来自贵族阶层,但经常属于远离君主和其亲戚的外围。士族是低于贵族的另一阶层,包括军人和其他有功绩的庶民,也得以取代家族关系的大夫,承担重要职位。所以,随着贵族阶层的日渐式微,论功封赏而不是论出身封赏的原则开始慢慢获得认同。

    民间的技术革新

    公元前 4 世纪到前 3 世纪,中国经历了集约型和粗放型的经济增长。集约型增长靠的是技术革新,包括青铜工具转向铁工具、基于双向活塞鼓风的生铁冶铸、牲口耕犁的改进、土地和灌溉的改善。中国各区域之间的商业交流增加,人口密度也开始出现显著上升。粗放型增长靠的是人口增长,以及开发像四川那样的新边境。

    在某种程度上,这些经济增长源于经济学家所谓的“外部因素”。这表示,它不是经济制度的内部逻辑所造成的,而是得益于意外的技术革新。军事上的不安全是非常重要的外部动力。战国时期的每个国家都面对增税的巨大压力,为此必须提高农业生产效率,仿效对方的技术革新以加强自己实力。

    思想

    那么剧烈狂暴的春秋末期和战国时代,竟产生了中国历史上最伟大的文化思潮,这很值得钦佩。战乱不断所造成的流离失所,促使了对政治和道德的深刻反思,并为天才的老师、学者、谋士提供了出人头地的良机。其时,众多老师四下游学,招揽学生。其中有孔子,他出身于贵族,但只是作为学者和老师而谋生。战国初所谓的百家争鸣时期,还有很多如此的学者,包括墨子、孟子、孙子、韩非子、荀子,身后都留下影响中国未来政治的著作。当时的政治不稳定,似乎造就了文人的无根无蒂,这反映在文人的周游列国,不管何等政权,只要感兴趣,他们都愿奉献自己的服务。

    这种智慧横溢有两层政治意义。首先,它创建了宛如意识形态的东西,即政府如何施政的思想,后代中国人可以此来评判自己政治领袖的表现。最为著名的就是儒家,而儒家学者又与其他学派展开激烈争辩,例如法家——这些争辩其实是当时政治斗争的真实写照。中国的学者和文人享有最高级荣誉,甚至高于武士和巫师。事实上,文人和官僚的作用合二为一,在其他文明中是找不到的。

    其次,中国文人的流动性又孕育了愈来愈像全国文化的东西。其时创作的伟大经典著作,变成精英教育的基石和中国文化的基础。有关经典著作的知识,成为国民身份的坐标。它们享受如此高的威望,以至在中华帝国无远弗届,甚至传播到边界之外。边境线上的游牧王国,有时在武力上强于中国,但无法匹配中国的智慧传统。所以,他们倾向于以中国的制度和技术来治理中国。

    商鞅的反家庭运动

    周朝晚期,中国各地逐渐采用现代国家制度,但都比不上西部的秦国。大多数情况下,新制度的采用全凭运气,是反复试验和政府别无选择的结果。相比之下,秦确立国家建设的意识形态,率直地阐明中央集权新国家的道理。秦的建国者清楚看到,早期的亲戚网络是中央集权的障碍,为了取而代之,特意实施把个人与国家绑在一起的新制度。这些原则被称作法家思想。

    商鞅起初在魏国做官,后来投奔相对落后的秦,一举成为秦孝公的总顾问。他上任初期,就向既存的家族管理发起进攻。他攻击继承得来的特权,最终以论功封赏的二十等爵制取代了世袭官职。在这个边境国家,论功封赏中的功就是军功,土地、家臣、女奴、服饰,都按各人战绩来分配。另一方面,不服从国家法令的将面对一系列严厉处罚。最重要的是该制度下获得的职位不可转为世袭财产,像家族贵族那样,而要由国家定期重新分配。

    商鞅最重要的改革之一是废除井田制,再把土地分给由国家直接监护的农家。井田制中,农田分成九方块,就像中文的井字。八户农家各耕一块,中间的是公田。每个贵族家庭拥有若干井田,耕耘的农家为此需要履行徭赋和其他义务,很像封建欧洲的农民。井田上布满路径和水渠,方便管理,八户农家组成贵族地主保护下的公社。废除井田制使农民挣脱对地主的传统义务,并允许他们搬往他人新开发的土地,或干脆拥有自己的土地。这使国家避开贵族,向全体地主征收以实物支付的统一地赋。

    此外,为了资助军事行动,商鞅还向所有成年男子征收人头税。国家颁布,家庭如有若干儿子,长大后一定要分居,不然就要缴双倍的税。商鞅的矛头直指传统儒家的大家庭,而赞许夫妇带小孩的小家庭。对没有足够财产可分的穷苦家庭来说,该制度造成了莫大艰辛。其目的可能是提倡个人奖励,也加强了国家对个人的控制。

    这次改革还与新的家庭注册有关。传统中国由庞大的亲戚团体组成,商鞅则把家庭分为五户和十户的群体,让他们相互监督。其他国家也在实施类似改革,如鲁国的“丘”,不同之处是秦在执行中的暴虐。群体中的犯罪活动,如不予检举,惩罚是腰斩;举报人有赏,等同于在战斗中斩敌首级。该制度的翻版在明朝得以复活,称为保甲。

    政治学家詹姆斯·斯科特(James Scott)在《国家的视角》(Seeing Like a State)一书中认为,所有国家都具备共同的特征:它们都试图掌控各自的社会,一开始就“昭告”天下。它们清除自生自长的弯曲小街的旧区,代之以几何图形般秩序井然的新区,就是为此。19 世纪,奥斯曼男爵(Baron Haussmann)在巴黎中世纪废墟上建造宽敞的林荫大道,不单是为了美观,还有控制人口的动机。

    类似的事情也发生于商鞅治下的秦。除了废除井田制,他还将郡县制推向全国。他把市镇和乡村合并起来,设四十一个县;县令不是地方推举的,而是中央政府指派的。一开始,这些县位于边境地区,表明其作为军事区的起源。取代井田制的是更大的整齐矩形,与东南西北的轴心相对称。现代地图学显示,曾是秦国的地域都有这种直线布局的地貌。商鞅还颁布在秦国通用的统一度量衡,以此来替代封建制度下的杂乱标准。

    商鞅竭尽全力投入社会工程,将传统亲戚关系的权力和地产制度转换成以国家为中心的非人格化统治。显而易见,他招惹了秦国家族贵族的极大反感。庇护人秦孝公一去世,继位人立即反目,商鞅只得逃亡。他最终遭人检举,所依据的恰恰就是自己颁布的严禁庇护罪犯的法律。据传,商鞅遭车裂之刑,即四车分尸,他的宗族成员全被诛杀。

    东周的中国,每一项制度革新都与战争的需求直接相连:服役扩充至全体男子、先是军队后是文官的永久性官僚体系、家族官职减少、论功封赏、人口注册、土地改革、家族精英地产的重新洗牌、更好的通信和基建、非人格化的等级行政部门、统一的度量衡。这一切,都可在军事要求中找到根源。战争可能不是国家形成的唯一引擎,但肯定是第一个现代国家在中国涌现的主要动力。

    儒家与法家

    商鞅在秦国实施的政策得到后续学者的肯定,如韩非子,并被归纳成全套的法家意识形态。在法家和儒家的紧张关系中,可以读懂中国后来历史的大部,直到 1949 年共产党胜利,那份紧张都与政治中的家庭作用有关。

    儒家极力主张向后看,其合法性扎根于古代实践。孔子在春秋末期编辑他的经典作品,十分怀恋周朝的社会秩序。但它因战事不断,已在分崩离析中。家庭和亲戚关系是家族秩序的核心。在很多方面,儒家可被视作以家庭为榜样、为国家建立道德原则的意识形态。

    所有部落社会都实行祖先崇拜,虽有形式上的不同,但儒家给中国版本涂上了特殊的道德色彩。儒家的道德原则规定,对父母的责任,尤其是对父亲的,要大于对妻子或子女的。对父母不敬,或在经济上没尽扶养责任,就要受到严厉惩罚。儿子对妻子或子女的关心,如超过对他父母的,也要受到严厉惩罚。如发生冲突,例如父亲被控犯了罪,父亲的利益一定高于国家的。

    家庭和国家的紧张关系、家庭责任高于政治责任的道德合法性,在中国历史上经久不衰。迄今,中国家庭仍是一种强有力的制度,竭力捍卫它的自治,不愿接受政治权力的干涉。家庭和国家的力量关系呈反比。19 世纪清朝式微,中国南方强大的宗族干脆接管地方事务的治理。1978 年的中国,邓小平推行包产到户的改革,农民家庭又变得生龙活虎,成为后来影响全国的经济奇迹的主要引擎。

    相比之下,法家向前看。它把儒家和对家庭的尊崇,看作巩固政治权力的绊脚石。儒家精致微妙的道德和责任,对他们丝毫没用。作为替代,他们追求直截了当的赏罚分明——特别是惩罚——使百姓臣服。如法家思想家韩非子所说的:

    故韩子曰“慈母有败子而严家无格虏”者,何也?则能罚之加焉必也。故商君之法,刑弃灰于道者。夫弃灰,薄罪也,而被刑,重罚也。彼唯明主为能深督轻罪。夫罪轻且督深,而况有重罪乎?故民不敢犯也。……明主圣王之所以能久处尊位,长执重势,而独擅天下之利者,非有异道也,能独断而审督责,必深罚,故天下不敢犯也。

    法家建议,不可把臣民当作可以教诲的道德人,只可当作仅对赏罚有兴趣的自私人——特别是惩罚。所以,法家的国家试图打破传统,废除家庭道德责任,以新形式将臣民与国家绑在一起。

    1949 年后,中国共产党推动的社会工程与法家有明显关联。就像早先的商鞅,毛泽东也把传统的儒家道德和中国家庭看作社会进步的绊脚石。他的反孔运动意在铲除家庭道德的合法性,共产党、国家、公社变成帮助中国人团结起来的新式制度。一点不令人惊讶,商鞅和法家在毛泽东时代得以复兴,在很多共产党学者的眼中成为现代中国的先例。

    有学者说,“儒家推崇圣王理想,可被视作道德的专制主义;作为对照,法家否定道德与政府的关联,可被视作赤裸裸的专制主义”。对皇帝的权力,儒家无法想象任何制度上的制衡。更确切地说,儒家试图教育君主,缓和他的激情,使他深感对人民的责任。让君主获得良好教育,以建良好政府,西方传统对此并不陌生。这实际上是苏格拉底在描绘合理城邦时所简述的,记载于柏拉图的《理想国》。中国皇帝到底深感多少对人民的责任,还是仅仅利用儒家道德来保护自身利益,那是后续章节的主题。法家直接剥去道德政府的外衣,公开宣称臣民是为君主而活的,不可颠倒过来。

    我们不应存任何幻想,推崇法令的法家思想与我在本卷中常提的法治有任何关联。西方、印度、穆斯林世界有一套受宗教庇荫的既存法律,并获得教士等级制度的捍卫。它独立于国家,其历史比国家更长。与当前统治者相比,这套法律更古老、更高级、更合法,因此对统治者也具有约束力。法治的含义就在:甚至国王或皇帝也是受法律束缚的,不可随心所欲。

    这种法治从没存在于中国,对法家来说,简直是匪夷所思。他们认为,法律只是记录国王或君主口述的典章。在弗里德里希·哈耶克(Friedrich Hayek)看来,这是命令,而不是法律。它只反映君主的利益,不是治理社区的道德共识。商鞅认为,惩罚一旦确定,适用于社会所有成员——贵族不得豁免。那是法家法令与现代法治所分享的唯一共同点。

    战国时期的中国

    商鞅所创建的新式国家制度,使秦国在调动资源方面,比以前更加广泛,比邻国更加有效。但仍不是取胜的保票,因为敌对国家的强烈竞争导致了互相仿效。秦国崛起进而称霸全中国的故事,与其说是发展领域的,倒不如说是国际关系领域的。

    春秋末期为巩固国家而发起的争战中,秦国实际上是配角,只在更强大的对手中间发挥平衡作用。它处于争战国家中的最西面,在地理上受一定保护(参看地图)。从公元前 656 年到前 357 年,涉及大国的 160 场战役中,秦仅发动 11 场。秦孝公和商鞅开展国家改革后,这就有了大变。从公元前 356 年到前 221 年,秦发动了 96 场大战役中的 52 场,打胜 48 场。公元前 4 世纪最后十年,秦打败南方大国楚,又在前 293 年打败东面的邻国魏和韩。东方的齐国是仅存的主要敌人,也败于前 284 年。到了公元前 257 年,所有他国都丧失了大国地位。始于公元前 236 年的统一战争,最终导致中国在前 221 年出现大一统的秦朝。

    争战国家到底图什么?在某种程度上,东周冲突背后的症结是旧贵族秩序分崩瓦解,取而代之的庶民寻觅新机会,以攀登权力阶梯。这也是意识形态问题,儒家和法家为此而争论不休。这个争论发生于一国之内,也发生于各国之间;既是争战的原因,又是争战的结果。秦国把自己当作法家的旗手,它的动机与其说是信服,倒不如说是实用。

    这里利害攸关的主导思想,不同于上述争论,而是商周统一中国的古老理念。统一中国的实现,其传说的色彩大于现实。东周的分裂始终被看作旷日弥久的异数,需要承担天命的血统崛起,予以拨乱反正。寻求承认的斗争,就是看哪个宗族获得统治整个中国的荣誉。

    中国发展路径为何异于欧洲

    许田波(Victoria Hui)等学者提出这样的超历史大题目:公元前 3 世纪的中国由多极国家体系组成,最后巩固成单一的庞大帝国,而欧洲却没有。欧洲国家体系实际上也有兼并巩固,从中世纪末的 400 个主权政治体降至第一次世界大战前夕的 25 个。尽管有不少尝试,包括哈布斯堡(Habsburg)的查理五世、路易十四、拿破仑、希特勒,但还是没有见到单一的欧洲大国。

    有下列可能的解释,第一条是地理。欧洲因河流、森林、海洋、山脉而分成众多区域,如阿尔卑斯山脉、比利牛斯山、莱茵河、多瑙河、波罗的海、喀尔巴阡山脉,等等。不列颠岛屿又是很重要的因素,在欧洲历史上扮演了破坏霸权组合的平衡角色。相比之下,第一个中华帝国仅拥有今日中国的部分领土,由西向东,只是从渭河峡谷到山东半岛而已。战国时期已修筑很多道路和运河,当时的军队很容易在这个地区纵横驰骋。这个核心地区巩固成单一强国之后,才开始向南、北、西南方向拓展。

    第二条与文化有关。商和周的部落之间有种族差异,但周朝时期涌现出的各国,则无种族和语言的明显区分,不像罗马人、日耳曼人、凯尔特人、法兰克人、维京人、斯拉夫人、匈人之间。中国北方有不同方言,但商鞅和孔子的周游列国,以及相互的思想交流,都证实了日益增长的文化统一。

    第三条是领导,或领导的缺乏。许田波指出,多极国家体系不是自我调整的机器,不能永远取得防止霸权崛起的平衡。国家有自己领袖,解读自身利益。秦国领袖运用机智的治国术,以分而治之的策略击破敌国的联合。而敌人无视秦国的凶险,反而经常自相残杀。

    最后一条与中国和欧洲政治发展走上不同路径直接相关。欧洲从没见过像秦朝那样的强大专制国家,唯一例外是莫斯科大公国。但它发展较晚,一直处于欧洲政治的边缘,直到 18 世纪的下半叶。(俄罗斯进入欧洲国家体系后,很快占据欧洲的大部,先是在 1814 年亚历山大一世时期,后在 1945 年斯大林时代。)17 世纪晚期,像法国和西班牙那样的国家通常也被称作“专制主义”。我们将会看到,它们在征税和动员方面,远远比不上公元前 3 世纪的秦朝。潜在的专制君主开始其国家建设大业时,就会遇上组织良好团体的阻挠。例如,既得利益的世袭贵族、天主教会、组织起来的农民、独立自治的城市。所有这一切,都可在国境内外灵活运作。

    中国情形很不同,它依赖广泛的亲戚体系。中国的封建贵族,从没建立起与欧洲领主一样的地方权力。根于宗族的中国贵族,其权力往往分散于各地,又纠缠于其他亲戚团体;作为对照,欧洲封建社会发展了强大且等级分明的地方政治主权。此外,不像欧洲贵族,中国贵族得不到法律、古老权利、特权的保护。中国贵族的人数,因数世纪不断的部落战争而几近耗尽;专业政客得以组织强大的庶民军队,轻易击败早期的贵族军团。周朝的中国从没发展出可与欧洲媲美的强大世袭地主贵族。君主、贵族、庶民阶层之间的交叉斗争,对欧洲现代政治制度的发展至关重要,却从没在中国发生。相反,它有个早熟的现代集权国家,一开始就打败所有的潜在对手。

    马克斯·韦伯定为本质上的现代特征,秦朝如果没有全部,至少也有很多。很熟悉中国的韦伯为何把中华帝国描述成家族国家,这是个谜。迷惑韦伯的原因,也许是中国的政治现代化没有经济现代化的陪伴,即资本主义市场经济。它也没有社会现代化的陪伴,亲戚关系没有转换为现代个人主义,反而与非人格化管理共存,一直到今日。像其他现代化理论家一样,韦伯相信发展中的各个方面——经济、政治、社会、意识形态——都是紧密相连的。很可能是因为现代化的其他方面没在中国出现,所以韦伯认不出中国的现代政治秩序。欧洲的实际发展中,政治、经济、社会现代化也没有密切相连,有顺序上的先后,它的社会现代化早于现代国家的形成。所以,欧洲的经验是独特的,不一定能在其他社会复制。

    多种现代化

    秦统一中国后,政治现代化为何没有导致经济和社会的现代化?现代国家的出现是集约型经济发展的必要条件,但还不够。如要资本主义出现,其他制度也要到位。西方资本主义革命之前有一场认知革命,发明了科学方法、现代大学、以科学观察创造财富的技术革新、鼓励革新的产权体系。秦朝的中国在很多方面的确是智慧的沃土,但其主要学术传统是向后看,无法达到现代自然科学所需要的抽象。

    此外,战国时期没有出现独立的商业资产阶级。城市只是政治和行政的中心,不是商业中心,也没有独立自治的传统。商人或工匠没有社会威望,崇高地位只属于地主。虽有产权存在,但其形式无法推动现代市场经济的发展。秦朝的独裁政府,剥夺大批家族地主的土地来削弱其权力,向新地主征收重税来支持军事扩张。国家不是创造奖励,让农人的耕耘更为有效,而是订出产量定额,如果完不成,还要加以处罚。秦朝最初的土地改革,打破了世袭的地主庄园,开辟了土地买卖市场,但随之没有出现自耕农阶层,土地又被新贵阶层所吸纳。没有法治来限制主权国家没收私人财产的权力。

    亲戚关系体系崩溃,被更自愿、更个人形式的团体所取代,这就是社会现代化。但它在秦统一后没有发生,原因有二。首先,资本主义市场经济没有出现,促进新社会团体和新身份的广泛分工也无从说起。其次,破坏中国亲戚关系的努力是独裁国家自上而下的计划。相比之下,破坏西方亲戚关系的是基督教,既在理论层次上,又通过教会对家事和遗产的影响力(参看第 16 章)来进行。西方社会现代化的生根发芽,比现代国家或资本主义市场经济的兴起,足足早了数个世纪。 自上而下的社会工程经常不能达到目标。中国的父系宗族和以此为基础的家族政府,其相关制度虽遭受痛击,但百足之虫,死而不僵。我们将看到,昙花一现的秦朝之后,它们又卷土重来,并作为权力和感情寄托的来源,在后续世纪中一直与国家明争暗斗。

    第 8 章 伟大的汉朝制度

    秦始皇和他所创建的朝代为何迅速倒塌;汉朝恢复儒家制度,但仍保留法家原则;秦汉时期的中国治理

    中国第一个大一统王朝的创始人嬴政(死后庙号是秦始皇帝,生于公元前 259 年,卒于公元前 210 年),精力充沛,且不可一世,全凭政治权力改变了中国社会。世界闻名的兵马俑是特地为他铸造的,在 1974 年出土于一个 2 平方英里的陵墓区。汉朝历史学家司马迁声称,造秦始皇陵动用了 70 万劳工。即便是夸大其词,但很明显,他创建的国家掌控大量盈余,以惊人的规模调配资源。

    秦始皇把秦的制度推广到全中国,其所创造的不仅是一个国家,而且将在后继者汉朝手里变成一种统一的中国精英文化。这不同于群众现象的现代民族主义。尽管如此,将中国社会精英链结起来这一新意识,坚韧不拔,在朝代兴亡和内乱之后,总能浴火重生。外邦人好几次打败中国,但无法改变中国制度,反被吸收消化,直到 19 世纪欧洲人抵达。邻居的朝鲜、日本、越南,虽独立于中国政体,但借鉴了大量中国思想。

    秦始皇用来统一中国的是赤裸裸的政治权力。他实施了商鞅所阐述的法家原则,其时,秦仍是个边陲国家。他攻击既存传统,推行庞大的社会工程,所作所为几近极权主义,从而激发了社会中几乎每个阶层的强烈反对。仅十四年后,秦朝轰然倒塌,改朝换了姓。

    秦朝为后世君主留下一份复杂遗产。一方面,受秦始皇攻击的儒家和传统派,在之后的世纪中,诅咒它是中国历史上最不道德、最为暴虐的政权之一。儒家在汉朝重新得势,试图推翻秦的很多革新。另一方面,秦朝凭借政治权力所建立的强大现代制度,不但活过了汉初的贵族复辟,而且在事实上定义了中国文明。尽管在后来中国王朝中,法家不再是钦准的意识形态,但在国家制度中仍可看到它留下的遗迹。

    秦朝国家和崩溃

    秦始皇的政策由丞相李斯执行。李斯是法家思想家韩非子的同学,但设下阴谋让后者蒙辱自杀。一旦掌权,这名建国设计师的最初行动是将帝国行政分为两级,共设三十六郡,郡以下设县。郡县的长官全由皇帝从首都咸阳指派,旨在取代地方上的家族精英。早已孱弱的封建贵族是打击对象,历史记载说,为方便监督,全国十二万贵族被迫迁至首都近郊。在人类历史这么早的时期,很难找到如此使用政治集权的案例。这显示中国离开部落社会已有多远。

    秦始皇留用的儒家官员抵抗国家集权,在公元前 213 年建议皇帝重新分封,试图在乡野为自己打下新的权力基础,这似乎不是偶然的。李斯认为,这将破坏他们的国家建设大业:

    如此不禁,则主势降乎上,党与成乎下。禁之便。臣请诸有文学《诗》、《书》百家语者,蠲除去之。令到满三十日弗去,黥为城旦。

    秦始皇表示同意,遂命令焚烧经典,据称还下令活埋了四百名不服的儒家信徒。这些行为招致了后世儒家对他经久不衰的憎恨。

    商鞅治下的秦国已有统一度量衡,现在推广至全中国。秦始皇还以史籀大篆统一全国文字,这也是秦国当初改革的延伸。改革目的是为了促进政府文件中的文字统一。就是今天,中国各地仍有不同方言。文字统一为确定中国身份发挥了不可估量的作用,不但行政部门有统一语言,而且全国各地都可分享经典的同一文本。

    秦朝严格遵守法家方法,其统治如此暴虐,以致在全国激起一系列起义。它的轰然倒塌是在秦始皇死后不久的公元前 210 年。被押去军事营地的一队罪犯,因暴雨而受阻,遂揭竿而起。法律规定,无论什么原因,延迟到达者都是死罪。小队领袖决定,即使造反,他们的命运也不会变得更糟。叛乱迅速蔓延至帝国其他地区,很多幸存的前君主和前封建贵族,看到秦朝变得衰弱,便拥兵宣告独立。同时,丞相李斯与一名宦官共谋拥戴秦始皇次子胡亥登基,反而死于宦官之手。接下来,宦官又死于他想立为皇帝的子婴之手。出身楚国贵族的项羽,还有其庶民出身的部下刘邦,组织新军队,攻入秦首都,消灭秦朝。项羽分派土地给亲戚和拥护者,试图返回周朝的封建主义。刘邦(死后谥号是汉高祖)转过身来反对项羽,四年内战后成为胜利者。他在前 202 年建立汉朝,史称西汉。

    在项羽封建复辟和秦始皇现代专政之间,新皇帝汉高祖的政权采取折中路线。不像秦始皇,汉高祖没有既存国家的权力基础。他的合法性来自他的魅力,他是反暴政的造反军的成功领袖。为取得政权,他统领一个由杂乱军队组成的同盟,包括很多传统家族和前君主。此外,他还须提防北方游牧部落的匈奴。因此一开始,他改造中国社会的能力,远远低于其前任秦始皇。

    高祖创建双轨制度,部分地区恢复了周朝的封建主义。他把内战中支持自己的前君主和将军们分封去小王国,又给自己家庭成员分派新的封地。剩下的地区则保留秦朝的非人格化郡县制,构成高祖自己的权力核心。最初几年,朝廷对小王国的控制很弱。秦朝统一中国的工作本来就不彻底,汉朝早期仍需继续努力。高祖启动这一过程,逐渐取消地方封王中不是刘姓的权力。继承者汉文帝在公元前 157 年,废了长沙最后一个小王国。皇族成员管辖的封地持续较久,与搬到长安的中央政府日益疏远。公元前 154 年,它们中的七个为取得完全独立而反叛。成功的镇压导致汉景帝宣布,剩下的封地不再享有行政权力。政府提高征税,迫使封地在兄弟姐妹中分家。西汉开国一百年后,封建统治最后的残余变得无权无势,地方官几乎都是中央政府指派的。

    家族拥有地方权力、不受中央政府管辖的周朝封建主义,在中国后来历史上定期回潮,尤其是在朝代交替的混乱时期。中央政府一旦站稳脚跟,又夺回对这些政治体的控制。从来没有一次,封王强大到可逼迫帝王作出宪法上的妥协,如英国的大宪章。中国地方上的封王,不像封建欧洲的对应阶层,从未获得法律上的合法性。我们将看到,以后的世袭贵族试图在中国掌权,不是打造地方上的权力基础,而是直接攫取中央政府。强大国家早期的中央集权,随着时间的推移,竟使自己变得永久化了。

    在中国不同地区根除家族统治,代之以统一的国家政府,事实上是法家的胜利,也是秦建立集权强国传统的胜利。但在其他方面,尤其是在意识形态上,儒家的传统主义得以东山再起。汉武帝(公元前 141—前 87 年在位)治下,儒家学者重返行政高位,兴办太学,设置儒学五经博士,专门研究各自的经典。读好经典成为做官的敲门砖,著名的科举制度的雏形也于此而起。

    思想领域也发生重大变化。法家为君主着想的残酷统治,原是商鞅和韩非所倡导的,此时遭到贬谤,民为邦本的古代儒家见解重又获得尊敬。这离民主观念还很远,没有一名儒者相信,对皇帝的权力或权威应有制度上的正式制衡,更不用说普选或个人权利。对皇帝权力的唯一制衡是道德;也就是说,给予皇帝正确的道德教育,敦促他仁民爱物,并时常劝诫他不可辜负这些理想。

    早期的皇权也有限制,因为皇帝身处儒家官僚机构之中。官僚机构只是皇帝的代理人,没有制衡皇帝的正式权利。但像所有的官僚,凭借专长和帝国运作的知识,他们施加了可观的非正式影响。像任何等级组织的领袖,从军队、公司到现代国家,坐在汉朝政府顶端的皇帝,必须依赖众多顾问来制定政策、执行命令、判决呈入朝廷的案件。这些官员负责训练年轻太子,等他们长大登基后,再提供咨询服务。传统和文化上的威望,增加了高级官僚左右皇帝的影响。历史记载中,丞相和尚书批评皇帝的案例很多,有时还得以扭转有争议的决定。

    武装起义是对坏皇帝的最后制裁,根据儒家天命流转的原则,又是正当合法的。天命的首次提出是为了辩解公元前 10 世纪周对商的篡夺,之后又被用来辩解对不公或腐败皇帝的造反。没有精确规则来确定谁享有天命,其获得往往是在造反成功之后(第 20 章对此有更详尽的讨论)。显而易见,这种制衡是非常极端的,带有极大风险。

    君以民为贵的儒家思想,把负责制的原则带进了中国政府。但要注意,这个负责制不是正式或程序上的,而是基于皇帝自己的道德观念,而这观念又是官僚机构所塑造的。列文森(Levenson)和舒尔曼(Schurmann)认为,官僚机构所塑造的道德说教,主要反映了自身利益。也就是说,他们强烈反对法家君主赤裸裸的专制统治,因为儒家就是这种权力的首批受害者。他们只想在汉朝复辟时期保护自己的地位。这些官僚不是公众利益的监护人,而在代表基于亲戚关系的社会等级制度;他们自己,又恰恰身处该制度的顶端。尽管如此,对这一执政的意识形态,还是要多讲几句。它至少在原则上坚持君主应对人民负责,并执意保护抗衡集权的现存社会制度。

    汉朝政府的性质

    汉朝时期涌现出的中央政府,在秦朝的独裁集权与周朝的亲戚制度之间,取得了更好的平衡。它日愈合理化和建制化,一步步解决家族统治的地方势力。在西汉末期王莽的土地改革之前,没有试图使用权力来从事大规模的社会工程。基本上,它不触及既存的社会人脉和产权。为营造公共工程,它也征用徭赋,但没有秦朝那样穷凶极恶。

    汉朝时期,中国政府愈益建制化。在家族制中,无论是周朝的中国,还是当代的非洲或中亚国家,政府官员获得任命,靠的不是自己的资格,而是与统治者的亲戚或私人关系。权力不在职位,而在担任此职的人。政治制度的现代化,就是指家族统治被官僚机构所取代。根据马克斯·韦伯的经典定义,现代官僚机构的特征包括:因功能而分的官职需有明确专长、在界定清晰的等级制度中设立各级官职、官员不得有独立的政治基础、官员必须遵守等级制度中的严格纪律、薪俸官职只是谋生的职业。

    西汉的中国政府几乎符合现代官僚机构的全部特征。政府内确实有很多留用的家族官员,尤其是在高祖统治的早期,因为皇帝需要反秦和内战盟友,以帮助自己巩固新政权。但在中央政府,非人格化基础上选出的官员逐一取代家族官员。朝廷显贵和执行君主决策的永久官僚机构之间,出现了日益明显的差别。

    始于公元前 165 年,皇帝昭告全国高级官员,推荐定额的优秀青年以任公职。汉武帝治下,官员被要求担保其推荐人选的孝悌和正直。在公元前 124 年,郡官推荐的学生赴都城长安的太学参加考试。考试成绩最好的,接受老师和学者的一年培训,以钦准的儒家经典为基础,然后再次参加考试,以担任政府要职。用人的来源也在进化,例如设立专职人员巡游帝国查找人才,或邀请公众就帝国现状撰文参加竞赛。这种非人格化用人,允许非汉族人才脱颖而出,例如出身匈奴的军事将领公孙昆邪。

    公元前 5 年,中国的编户人口是六千万,在首都和省级供职的就有大约十三万官员。政府设立专门培养公职人员的学校,训练十七岁或以上的青年,测试他们阅读不同文体、管账等能力。(到隋唐时期,科举制度将变得更为成熟。)汉朝仍有很强的家族因素,高官可推荐儿子或兄弟担任要职,推荐制度肯定不能杜绝一切私人影响。就像后续的朝代,任人唯贤仍有教育条件的限制。只有富贵人家才能培育出满腹经纶的儿子,有资格获得推荐或参加考试。

    尽管尚有家族制的残余,根据韦伯的定义,汉朝的中央政府日愈官僚化。职位最高的官员是三公,从高到低分别是丞相、御史大夫、太尉。有时,丞相职位一分为二,分成左右丞相,可以互相监督,互相制衡。三公之下是九卿,各有自己的僚属和预算。最重要的卿中,有掌管宗庙祭祀的奉常(后改称太常)、负责皇帝禁卫的光禄勋(秦时称郎中令)、负责皇宫和京城守军的卫尉、负责皇帝财政的少府、负责司法的廷尉、负责粮食和税收的大司农。在当时农业社会里,这最后一职无疑是非常重要的。他手下有六十五个机构,派遣高级官员去各州帮助管理谷仓、农活、水利。

    理性的官僚机构不一定追求理性的目的。奉常手下的机构分管奏乐(太乐)、祝祷(太祝)、牺牲(太宰)、星象(太史)、占卜(太卜)。太史向皇帝提供举办大事和仪式的凶吉日期,还监督文官考试。太祝下设三十五名僚属,太乐掌管三百八十名乐人,政府的规模于此可见一斑。

    汉朝政府最不寻常的特征之一,就是文官政府对军队的有效控制,这可追溯到中国历史的最早时期。中国截然不同于罗马,后者雄心勃勃的将军,如庞培(Pompey)和尤利乌斯·恺撒(Julius Caesar),经常争夺政治权力。中国也不同于军事政变频繁的现代发展中国家。

    这不是因为中国缺乏军人权威或魅力,其历史上充满了常胜将军和赫赫武功。即使在战国之后,中国仍继续打仗,主要与草原游牧民族,但也包括朝鲜、西藏以及南方部落。几乎所有朝代的创始皇帝,都凭借自己的军事能耐而登上龙位。如我们所知,刘邦原是农家子,全凭军事上的组织和战略能力才当上汉高祖,他当然不会是最后一个。到了唐朝,像安禄山那样野心勃勃的将军也试图争夺王位。唐朝的最终崩溃,是因为防御北方野蛮部落的边境军队得以挣脱中央政府的控制。

    一般来讲,征战成功的王朝创始人一旦登基,就会卸下戎装,实施文官统治。他们和他们的继承人,摒除将军于政治之外,放逐野心军人至遥远边境,镇压妄图起兵造反者。不像罗马近卫军(Praetorian Guards)或土耳其禁卫军(Janissaries),皇帝的宫廷卫士在中国历史上从没扮演过王者之王的角色。考虑到战争对国家形成的重要性,中国文官统治为何如此强大?弄清此事非常重要。

    原因之一是军事等级的建制化比不上文官。太尉、前将军、左将军、右将军、后将军,按理说,其地位都高于九卿,但这些职位经常是空挂的。它们多被认为是仪式性的,没有真正军事权力,通常由文官担任。此时,军队中尚无专业军官,皇帝手下的官员出将入相,被认作文武双全。一旦开国的内战结束,军事长官通常被派去边远的草原或要塞,远离文明。抱负不凡者所追求的,不会是这种职业。

    这些理由又带出新的疑问,中国制度中的武官为何获得如此低下的威望,答案很可能是规范化。春秋和战国的严峻考验中涌现出一种思想:真正的政治权威在于教育和教养,而不在于军队威力。觊觎王位的军人发现,必须披上儒家学问的外衣,方能获得他人的信服;必须让儿子接受大儒的调教,方能继承王位。光说笔杆子比剑更为强大,这似乎还不够。我们应该考虑,文官政府得以成功控制军队,最终还得依赖有关合法权威的规范思想。如有需要,美国军队明天就可夺走总统权力,但它没有这样做。这意味着,大多数军官即使在梦中也不想去推翻美国宪法,如果真的想做,他们指挥的大多数士兵也不会服从命令。 汉朝在两种利益群体中取得平衡:一方面,大家都想创建强大统一的中央政府,以避免东周式的动乱和战争;另一方面,全国的地方精英又试图尽量保留自己的权力和特权。秦始皇打破制度上的平衡,过于偏向集权国家,所侵犯的不仅是家族精英的利益,而且是普通农民的利益。农民以前面对地方领主的暴政,现在则换成了国家暴政。汉朝重作平衡,既考虑曾是秦朝打击对象的封王和贵族的利益,又致力于逐渐减少他们的影响。它的儒家思想,虽糅入法家精神,但又矢口否认,使自己重归合法。西汉创建的国家是稳定的,因为大家达成妥协。但与秦朝比,它又是薄弱的,尽量避免与残余的贵族影响发生正面冲突。这一新平衡是成功的。除了篡位皇帝王莽(公元前 45—公元 23 年)短命的“新朝”,汉朝存活了四个多世纪,从公元前 202 年到公元 220 年。这是颇不寻常的政治成就,但很遗憾,最终还是不免寿终正寝。

    第 9 章 政治衰败和家族政府的复辟

    四百年汉朝为何倒塌;大庄园增长的意义和马尔萨斯式社会的不公;门阀士族攫取政府和国家变弱;中国意义的国家

    不能假定,政治秩序一旦出现就能自我持续。亨廷顿的《变化社会中的政治秩序》,开初只是一篇名叫“政治秩序和政治衰败”的文章。他认为,与现代化理论的循序渐进相反,没有理由可以假设,政治发展比政治衰败更有可能。社会中各竞争力量取得平衡,政治秩序便会涌现。随着时间的推移,内部和外部都会发生变化。当初建立平衡的参与者在进化,或干脆消失了,又出现新参与者;经济和社会条件也会发生变更,社会遭遇外部侵略,或面对新的贸易条件,或引进新的思想。因此,先前的平衡不再有效,引起政治衰败,直到现存参与者发明新的规则和制度来恢复秩序。

    汉朝的崩溃原因多种多样,涉及早先政治平衡方方面面的变迁。公元 2 世纪,由于外戚和宦官的干涉,汉朝皇族的团结和它的合法性受到严重破坏。除了中国,宦官还在很多帝王的宫廷中扮演重要角色。他们已被阉割,不再有性感觉和性能力,所以深得信任。他们没有家庭,在心理上完全依赖主人,也不会想方设法为子女(因为不存在)争夺利益。他们扮演重要角色,帮助中国皇帝避开强大自治的官僚机构,并慢慢发展了自己的集团利益。

    先是外戚梁太后一族的领袖挑选软弱的汉桓帝(公元 147—167 年在位)继承皇位,以便自己的宗族获得政府高位和特权。不久,大难临头。皇帝在宦官的帮助下发动了现代拉丁美洲人所谓的自我政变(auto-golpe),残杀梁氏外戚。宦官摇身一变,成了强大政治力量,获得皇帝褒奖的官职、免税等,从而威胁了官僚和儒家的地位。始于 165 年,官僚和儒家开始发起反宦官运动,最终取得彻底胜利。

    环境条件令形势雪上加霜。173、179、182 年发生瘟疫;176、177、182、183 年发生饥荒;175 年发大水。广大民众的悲惨导致道教的兴起,它在农民和其他庶民中吸引众多信徒。儒家是一种道德,不是超现实的宗教,一直是精英的行为准则。道教源于古老的民间信仰,现在变成非精英的抗议宗教。184 年爆发的黄巾(他们头戴黄色头巾)起义以它为精神支柱,更因过去十年中农民所忍受的艰辛,而迅速星火燎原。虽在二十年后遭到血腥镇压(据传死去五十万人),它摧毁了大量的国家设施和生产力。这些灾难的结果是中国人口的骤减,从 157 年到 280 年,骇人听闻地减少了四千万,等于人口总数的三分之二。

    从中国政治发展的角度看,家族精英攫取国家权力以削弱中央政府,是汉朝衰败的最重要原因之一。秦朝消灭封建主义,创建非人格化现代国家,这一努力现在遭受极大挫折。在中国,亲戚关系再次成为权力和地位的主要途径,一直延续到 9 世纪的晚唐时期。

    但这不是周朝封建主义的复辟。秦朝以来已有太多变动,包括强大的中央政府、官僚机构、披上礼仪合法性的宫廷。西汉已逐步消除封地上的家族影响,当贵族家庭卷土重来时,他们没有重建地方上的权力基础,而是直接参与中央政府机构。周贵族和汉贵族之间的区别,有点类似 17 世纪晚期英国贵族和法国贵族之间的区别:英国领主仍住在自己庄园,行使地方上的权力;而法国贵族被迫迁去凡尔赛,以靠近宫廷和国王来谋取权力。在中国,宫廷中的权力就是通向地产的阳关大道,有权有势的官员可获得土地、侍从、农民、免税特权。

    富人更富

    随着时间的推移,中国经历了大庄园(latifundia)愈益扩张。它们受贵族家庭的控制,其家人身居高位,要么在长安的中央政府,要么在地方州郡。这加剧了贫富悬殊,一小群贵族家庭掌控日益集中的财富。他们逐步剥夺政府的税收,因为自己的富饶农地无需纳税,这些家庭就是今天所谓的追求租金精英的早期版本。他们利用政治关系攫取国家权力,再使用国家权力使自己富上加富。

    农业社会有条大庄园的铁律:富人将变得更富,除非遭到遏制——或是国家的,或是农民起义的,或是国家害怕农民起义而采取的。在前现代农业社会里,财富上的不均不一定反映能力或性格上的不均。技术是呆滞的,创业或创新的人得不到奖励。农业机械化之前,没有大规模生产的好处,所以无法解释大庄园的扩张。大地主的耕田都是分成小块,让单独农民家庭各自耕作。因债务机制,最初资源的小差别将与日俱增。富农或地主会借钱给较贫困的;遇上坏季节或坏收成,负债人不但赔掉家产,甚至可能沦为农奴或奴隶。大地主又可购买政治影响,以保护和扩充自己的财产,长此以往,富人优势自我更新,有增无已。

    所以,把现代产权理论误用于历史场景,只会导致根本上的误会。很多经济学家相信,健全的产权促进经济成长,因为它保护私人投资的回报,从而刺激投资和经济成长。但中国汉朝的经济生活,不像工业革命后二百年的世界,却像托马斯·马尔萨斯(Thomas Malthus)《人口学原理》中所描述的。今天,我们期待技术革新所带来的劳工效率增长(人均产量)。但在 1800 年之前,效率增长全靠运气。开发农业、灌溉、印刷机、火药、帆船远航,都促进了生产效率的增长。但在间隔的漫长岁月中,人口增加,人均收入反而降低。很多农业社会已达到其技术可能性的顶端,进一步投资不会增加产量。唯一的经济增长是粗放增长,即开发新耕地,或干脆争夺他人的。所以,马尔萨斯的世界就是零和,一方得益,另一方必然受损。富有地主不一定比小地主更为勤劳,他只是有更多资源来挨过难关。

    在集约增长不可能的马尔萨斯式世界,健全产权只会巩固资源的既存分配。财富的实际分配,代表不了生产效率或勤劳与否,只能代表起初的运气,或者业主与政治权力的关联。(甚至在今天流动和创业的资本主义经济,古板的产权捍卫者经常忘记,现存财富分配并不一定反映富人美德,市场也不一定是高效的。)

    如由他们自由选择,精英们倾向于扩张大庄园。在这面前,君主有两种选择。他们可与农民站在一起,运用国家权力来促进土地改革和平均地权,剪去贵族的翅膀。这发生在斯堪的纳维亚,18 世纪末瑞典和丹麦的国王与农民站在一起,反对相对较弱的贵族(参看第 28 章)。或者,君主站在贵族一边,运用国家权力来加强地方寡头对农民的控制。这发生在俄罗斯、普鲁士、易北河以东地区,那里的农民原本多是自由的,但自 17 世纪以来,由于国家的同流合污,却逐渐沦为农奴。法兰西王国的君主政体太软弱,不能剥夺贵族,也不能取消其免税地位,只好把新税负担全部压在农民头上,直到整个制度在法国大革命中自我爆炸。君主的何去何从——保护现有的寡头政治,或反戈一击——取决于很多具体因素,如贵族和农民的凝聚力、国家面临的外部威胁、宫廷内部的钩心斗角。

    汉朝的中国君主最初选择支持农民,一起反对愈益强大的大地主。西汉时期,有人不时呼吁回到商鞅废除的井田制。当时,它被视作农业社会地方自治的象征,而不是封建制度。贫困农民因大庄园兼并而丧失土地,其困境促使了恢复井田制的呼吁。公元前 7 年,有人建议大庄园地产不得超过三千亩(1 亩等于 0.165 英亩),由于大地主的反对,最后无疾而终。篡夺王位终止西汉的王莽也尝试实施土地改革,使大庄园国有化。他也面对极大反抗,最终在应付赤眉军(他们把眉毛画成红色)起义中筋疲力尽。

    王莽土地改革的失败,反让家族贵族在东汉恢复时扩充财产,巩固权力。大庄园成功控制成百上千的侍从、佃户、族人,还经常拥有私人军队。他们为自己和部下取得免税地位,减少帝国税收以及可供劳役和征兵的农村人口。

    中央政府因军队的衰退而进一步变弱。中国大部分军队专注于西北部的匈奴部落,驻扎在遥远的要塞,供应线拖得很长。农民很不愿意服这样的兵役,政府只好改在当地野蛮居民中招募雇佣军,或招募奴隶和罪犯。军人愈来愈像一个特殊阶层,在边境要塞的附近居住和务农,子承父业。这种情况下,获得军人忠诚的更可能是曹操和董卓那样的当地将领,而不是遥远的中央政府。

    日益增加的土地不均,加上 2 世纪 70 年代的自然灾害和瘟疫,黄巾起义终于爆发。秩序荡然无存,中央政府因派系斗争而分崩瓦解,这一切促使大户家庭躲在围墙后的庄园和地区,不再接受软弱国家的控制。汉朝的最后几十年,中央国家完全崩溃,权力落到一系列地方军阀手中,他们要么选择自己中意的皇帝,要么自己黄袍加身。

    国家分裂和家族制复辟

    秦朝统一中国之后最长命的朝代汉朝,终于在公元 220 年彻底崩溃。除了很短的例外,中国在今后的三百年中不再有统一国家。中国最伟大的历史小说之一《三国演义》,讲的就是东汉到晋朝这段时期。晋朝始于 280 年,但持续很短时间。小说作者罗贯中,在明朝写成(也许在 14 世纪晚期,但没有确定日期)这部作品。其时,明朝已从蒙古人手中解放中国,在汉人自己统治下,再度统一中国。小说的潜在主题是中国的不统一(内乱),造成混乱和外国侵略(外患),还阐述了恢复国家统一的条件。在塑造现代中国人历史意识方面,《三国演义》可与莎士比亚的历史剧媲美。它被改编成电子游戏和无数电影版本。北京要求统一台湾,其背后对分裂的痛苦记忆,就可以追溯到这一时期。

    从中国政治发展的观点看,值得关注的是亲戚关系和家族制,如何在汉和隋之间的空白时期(581 年中国再度统一)重新成为中国政治的组织原则。中央国家的力量,正好与家族团体的力量成反比。即使在现代国家获得建立之后,各种形式的部落制仍是预设的政治组织。

    汉朝终止之后的时期是非常复杂的,但从发展角度看,细节就不那么重要。中国最初分裂成所谓的三国:魏、蜀汉、吴。魏得以在西晋名下重新统一中国,但很快发生内战。西晋的都城洛阳在 311 年遭到匈奴部落的洗劫和占领,匈奴国王在中国北部创建众多外族朝代中的第一个。逃至南方的西晋幸存者,在长江边上的建康(现代的南京),也建立数个南方朝代中的第一个,即东晋。北方和南方一分为二,都经受了持续动乱。在北方,洗劫洛阳导致了所谓十六国的部落战争。有两次新的野蛮人入侵,第一次是原始西藏人的氐和羌部落,第二次是拓跋部落,即突厥鲜卑人的分支。拓跋部落建立了北魏(386—534),随着时间的推移而日益汉化。他们冠中国人的姓,与汉人家庭通婚联姻。拓跋部落中的紧张导致再一次的内战,到 6 世纪早期分成东魏和西魏。在南方,迁自北方的旧宫廷重组东晋朝代,大量贵族家庭和侍从跟踪而来。到 4 世纪中,东晋灭于军事政变,之后又有武将建立的数个孱弱朝代。

    汉朝军阀曹操和儿子曹丕在 220 年建立魏国,制定九品中正制,从而加速了始于东汉的家族制倾向。每个郡和州,都派有仲裁人,官名叫中正,依据品德和能力评议官职的候选人。不像早先的汉朝推荐制度,遴选仲裁人的不是中央,而是地方,显然要受更多地方精英的影响。新招聘制度将所有精英家庭排成正式等级,又与各层官位挂上钩。汉朝时,不做官的人仍可有高级地位。自从有了九品中正制,官位变成争取高级地位的唯一途径。加上对血统的愈益重视,子承父位便成家常便饭。

    在强大中央政府的手中,九品中正制可以是削弱豪门、加强国家的对策。17 世纪和 18 世纪初,法国君主出售一套精细的爵位和等级给贵族阶层,从而削弱该阶层采取集体行动的能力。每个贵族家庭太忙碌了,沾沾自喜,瞧不起底下人,以致不能互相合作来保护自己广泛的阶级利益。3 世纪的中国,九品中正制却似乎成了贵族攫取国家的手段。庶民人才不能再通过推荐或考试攀至高位,这些官位只保留给现任官员的孩子,好像他们是战胜部落的领袖。其时的皇帝往往不能保证自己的宠臣得到高位,因为宠臣缺乏合适的血统。这一切证明,真正的权力不在国家手中,而在贵族家庭手中。

    西晋垮台后,家族制在北方和南方各有不同发展。在南方,东晋宫廷由本地大户和洛阳迁来的贵族流亡者所掌控。他们把九品中正制也带来,政府操纵在王、陆、张姓的大户手中,都是高级血统的近距离表亲。

    大庄园的继续扩张加剧了贵族控制。早在 3 世纪晚期,西晋颁布土地法,规定所有农民有权获得最低数量的土地,以换取他们的徭赋负担。它也规定了贵族家庭拥有土地、免税租户和侍从的最高限额。但它和东晋时颁布的类似法律,从没得到执行。像王莽夭折的土地改革,这些失败证明了大庄园势力的日益壮大,直接威胁到国家的控制和资源。

    在北方,战胜的羌人和突厥人首先是部落组织,就把自己的主要宗族安插到重要官位。初期仍有持续的冲突和部落之间的争战,这些外族家庭便是整个地区的领导精英。汉朝时兴起的中国贵族家庭,要么南逃去投奔东晋宫廷,要么退回自己的庄园。他们仍拥有地方权力,但避开宫廷政治。5 世纪的后半叶,北魏朝代得以集中权力,5 世纪 90 年代迁都到历史名城洛阳,事情于是开始发生转变。魏孝文帝禁止在宫廷使用鲜卑语和鲜卑服,鼓励鲜卑人与汉人通婚,邀请主要的汉贵族家庭赴宫廷供职。他得以创造统一的贵族阶层,将所有精英家庭排成正式等级,就像南方的九品中正制。在这样的环境中,多数高级官员同属一个宗族,贵族等级又是晋升高级官位的必要条件。大庄园兼并土地,贵族阶层权力日益增加,也都是北方的难题。485 年北魏颁布一条法令,限制大庄园,保证农民获得最低数量的土地。

    强大的中国国家

    6 世纪中期,北方的东魏和西魏被北齐和北周所取代。577 年,北周进攻并打败了北齐。时任北周将领的杨坚成为风云人物,他出身鲜卑族,妻子来自匈奴一个强大氏族。杨坚在内斗中击败对手,于 581 年建立隋朝。他的军队在 587 年打败南方的梁,在 589 年打败南方的陈。这是 220 年汉朝崩溃以来,中国在单一中央政府治理下的首次统一(实际领土与秦汉时不同)。谥号为文帝的新皇帝把京城搬回长安,以汉朝为榜样重新打造强大的中央政府。他儿子兼继位人炀帝执迷于运河营造,还向朝鲜的高句丽王国发起草率的进攻最终失败。他死于 618 年,隋朝很快消失,这一段空白很短。名叫李渊的北方贵族在 617 年起兵,下一年攻取长安,宣布成立新朝代。唐朝是中国最伟大的朝代之一,持续了将近三百年,直到 10 世纪初。

    隋唐重建中央集权,但没能终止贵族家庭的影响。他们在间隔的空白时期,攫取了众多小国的政府权力。我们将在第 20 章和第 21 章看到,反对家族制的斗争将持续随后的三个世纪,一直要到 11 世纪的宋朝,行政机构才返回汉朝时的“现代”基础。中国国家的重新集权,得以激活像科举考试和学而优则仕那样的制度。在先前的数世纪中,这些制度在门阀贵族面前一输再输。

    汉隋之间三百年混乱所提出的最有趣问题之一,不是中国为何崩溃,而是中国为何再次统一。在如此广阔的领土上维持政治统一,这个命题绝对不是琐碎的。罗马帝国崩溃后,尽管有查理大帝和其他神圣罗马皇帝的努力,仍然得不到重组。汉朝之后的多国制度凝固成像欧洲一样的半永久制度,众多国家,相互竞争,这也不是不可想象的。

    这个问题的部分答案已经有了。中国国家早熟的现代化,使之成为社会中最强大的社会组织。即使中央国家崩溃了,它的许多继承者在自己边界内,仍尽量复制汉朝的中央集权制度,仍尽量追求在自己领导之下完成统一大业。合法性最终来自天命的继承,而不在于偏安一隅。那些继承国家在边界内复制汉朝机构,从而防止进一步的分崩离析。所以,没有在中国出现像欧洲那样的一再分封。

    中国何以再次统一的第二个原因也许更为重要,能向当代发展中国家提供启示。中国在秦汉时期所创造的,除了强大国家,还有共同文化。这种文化不能算所谓的现代民族主义的基础,因为它仅存在于中国统治阶级的精英阶层,而不存在于广大老百姓。但产生一种很强烈的感情:中国的定义就是共同的书面语、经典著作、官僚机构的传统、共同的历史、全国范围的教育制度、在政治和社会的层次主宰精英行为的价值观。即使在国家消失时,这种统一文化的意识仍然炽烈。

    遇上不同传统的外族野蛮人时,这种共同文化的力量变得尤为显著。占领中国的几乎所有入侵者——匈奴、鲜卑(拓跋),或更迟的女真(满人)、蒙古、党项(西夏)、契丹——起初都希望保留自己的部落传统、文化、语言。但他们很快发现,如不采用中国精湛的政治制度,便无法治理中国。更有甚者,中国文化的威望迫使他们要么同化,要么回到老家的草原或森林以维护自身文化。

    中国得以重新统一是因为秦汉两朝已创下先例,统治整体比统治其中一部更为合法。谁有此权利呢?这是个复杂题目,要作出回答,先要认真弄清中国对政治合法性的概念。在这个问题上,中国朝代的间隔期尤其富有启示。这段时期无疑是一场自由竞赛,政治权力的门外汉——农家子、可疑种族背景的外族人、未受儒家教育的军人——都有机会攀爬到制度的尖顶。中国人愿意向他们和其后裔提供合法性和绝对权力,其原因有点扑朔迷离。在后面论以及其他的改朝换代时,我会重新回到这一问题。

    中国是创造现代国家的第一个世界文明。但这个国家不受法治限制,也不受负责制机构的限制,中国制度中唯一的责任只是道德上的。没有法治和负责制的强大国家,无疑是一个专制国家,越是现代和制度化,它的专制就越是有效。统一中国的秦朝作出雄心勃勃的努力,想把中国社会重新整顿为一种原始极权主义国家。这个工程最终失败了,因为国家没有工具或技术来实现这个野心。它没有激励人心的意识形态来为自己辩解,也没有组织一个党派来实现它的愿望,凭借当时的通信技术还无法深入中国社会。它的权力所到之处,它的专制是如此暴虐,以至激起了导致自己迅速灭亡的农民起义。

    后续的中国政府学会收敛雄心,学会与现有的社会力量并存不悖。在这一方面,它们是专制的,但不是极权的。与其他世界文明相比,中国集中政治权力的能力颇不寻常。

    在这方面,中国政治发展的路程与印度截然不同。这两个社会作为“亚洲”或“东方”的文明,经常放在一起。它们在早期表现出相似特征,后来却各奔东西,南辕北辙了。过去两千年中,中国的预设政治模式是中央官僚国家,缀以分裂和衰败;而印度的预设模式是一系列弱小王国和公国,缀以短暂的政治统一。我们如果察看印度的历史长河,它是民主国家的事实就丝毫不足为奇。这不是说印度早期就有民主思想,从而创下先例;而是说很难在印度政治中,建立起专制统治。我们将在后续章节中看到,其原因在宗教和思想的领域。

    第 10 章 印度的弯路

    印度早期的发展因婆罗门教的兴起而不同于中国;瓦尔纳和迦提;印度早期的部落社会;印度亲戚关系的特征;印度在建国大道上的弯路

    印度早期的政治发展明显与中国形成分流。一开始,它们都是分支式的部落社会组织。到公元前第一个千年的中期,第一批酋邦和国家从印度北部的部落社会中脱颖而出,比中国晚不了太多。在这两个文明中,酋邦和国家不以亲戚关系为基础,而是由等级分明的政府,开始在领土范围内行使强制权力。

    就战争而言,它们的轨迹却截然不同。印度从没经历像中国的春秋和战国时期持续数世纪的暴力。原因不很明确,可能是由于印度河和恒河流域的人口密度大大低于中国,受地理局限较少;与其顺从等级分明的社会秩序,倒不如迁移他处。无论如何,早期印度国家无须像中国所经历的那样,应对社会动员的极端要求。

    更为重要的是,印度出现一种独特的社会发展模式,对印度政治造成巨大影响,一直持续到今天。大约在国家刚刚形成之际,便涌现出界限分明的四大社会阶层,被称为瓦尔纳(varnas,阶层):它们是祭司的婆罗门(Brahmins)、武士的刹帝利(Kshatriyas)、商人的吠舍(Vaishyas)、包罗其余的首陀罗(Sudras,主要是农民)。从政治观点看,这是非常重要的发展,它把世俗和宗教的权力一分为二。中国也有祭司和宗教官员,像主持宫廷礼仪和皇帝祖陵的礼部尚书,但只是国家雇员,严格屈从于皇家权力。中国祭司从没作为独立集团而存在,中国也就发展成“政教合一”的国家。另一方面,印度的婆罗门与刹帝利判然分开,甚至比武士享有更高权威。虽然它没有组成像天主教一样的严密集团,但仍享有类似的道德权威,不受国家干涉。此外,婆罗门阶层被当作神圣法律的监护人,而这法律不但独立于政治统治,且具更长历史。所以,国王必须遵从他人所编纂的法律,自己不是一言九鼎的法律制定者,如中国皇帝。跟欧洲类似,印度也有可称作法治的萌芽,以限制世俗的政治权力。

    第二项重要社会发展是迦提(jatis)的涌现,最终演变成种姓制度(caste)。它把所有的瓦尔纳,再细分为数百种分支式、对内通婚的职业群体,从各式祭司、商人、鞋匠到农民,达成评论家所谓的职业秩序的神圣化。迦提重叠在现有血统结构之上,为氏族的异族通婚设定界限。也就是说,异族通婚的父系家族的血统,必须在迦提范围内谈婚论嫁,鞋匠女儿必须嫁给不同氏族的鞋匠儿子。成员相互合作,共同生活于自给自足的社区,在这一点上,迦提保留了其他部落社会的分支式特征。但他们又是相互依靠的,是更广泛分工的一部分。与工业社会相比,这种分工非常有限;尽管如此,它又远比单纯的部落社会复杂。依照涂尔干的标准,迦提显示了机械团结和有机团结的双重特征——这是指,个人既是自我复制相同单位的成员,又参与更为广泛的社会互助。

    在中国,出现于周朝的国家在社会顶端取代了分支式或部落的组织。宗族仍是重要的社会组织,国家和亲戚团体之间出现了权力的此起彼落,一方强大了,另一方就变弱。到最后,塑造中国文明的决定性因素是国家。在印度,瓦尔纳和迦提所创造的社会分类成为社会基石,大大限制了国家权力的渗透和掌控。以瓦尔纳和迦提为定义的印度文明,获得广泛扩散,从开伯尔山口(Khyber Pass)到东南亚,统一了语言和种族的众多群体。不像中国,这块辽阔领土从没受到独家政治权力的统治,也没发展出独家文学语言。20 世纪晚期之前,印度历史只是持久的政治分裂和政治软弱,最为成功的统一政治体中不少是外国入侵者,其政治力量依赖完全不同的社会基础。

    印度部落社会

    与中国相比,我们对印度部落社会以及其向国家的过渡,所知极其有限。虽然处于对应的社会发展阶段,印度社会的文化水平要低得多,绝对比不上记载商朝政治活动的大量甲骨文或东周的冗长编年史。印度最早的定居点是旁遮普(Punjab)和西部的摩亨佐—达罗(Mohenjo-Daro),它的哈拉帕(Harappan)文明仅留存于考古学资料。我们所了解的印度早期社会组织,都是从“吠陀本集”(Vedic texts)中推断而来。该本集记载圣歌、祈祷、注释等,可追溯到公元前两千年或三千年,以前是口口相传,直到公元前一千年中期才变成书面记录。印度第一个本土帝国是孔雀王朝(Mauryas,公元前 321—前 185 年),在很多方面,它又是最伟大的本土帝国。但它的文字记载仅有流散到次大陆的数块法令岩石,再加上希腊、中国和其他外国著作的提及。这里可能有因果关系:缺乏流传广泛的书面文化,尤其是在印度统治者和行政官员中,大大阻碍了强大集权国家的开发。

    印度—雅利安部落自黑海和里海(Caspian)之间的俄罗斯南部迁移至印度,由此开创了印度政治发展。某些部落群体转向西方,成为希腊、罗马、日耳曼和其他欧洲团体的祖先;另一群体朝南抵达波斯,第三群体向东到阿富汗东部,再穿越巴基斯坦西北部的斯瓦特峡谷(Swat Valley),直达旁遮普和印度河—恒河(Indo-Gangetic)分水岭。现在通过 Y 染色体和线粒体,可以追踪印度—雅利安群体之间的血缘关联,但首次确定相互关系的却是语言学家,他们在印度梵语(Sanskrit)和西方语言之间找出相似,因为它们同属更大的印欧语系。

    早期印度—雅利安部落是游牧民族,放牧牛群,以牛为食,并已驯养马匹。他们第一次迁入印度河—恒河平原时,碰上他们称作达萨(dasas)的其他定居者,后者可能属于不同种族,使用达罗毗荼语(Dravidian)或澳斯特罗—亚细亚语(Austro-Asiatic,又称南亚语)。这段时期,这些部落的行为与他处部落非常相似。他们袭击达萨社区,偷他们的牛,与其他部落打仗。如果遇上强有力的军事抵抗,他们就退避三舍,该地当时仍属人烟稀少。吠陀本集中最古老的是《梨俱吠陀》(Rg Veda),它提及部落之间的频繁冲突、拉贾(Raja)或部落领袖的涌现、确保战争成功的祭司。印度—雅利安人开始在恒河平原安顿下来,从单一游牧业转为游牧业和农业的混合。种植由小麦改成稻米,农业技术因此获得改进,使更多盈余、更突出的送礼和礼仪奉献成为可能。大约同时,奶牛地位开始发生变化,从印度—雅利安人主要的蛋白质来源(像努尔人一样),到受人崇拜的图腾动物。

    在这个发展阶段,与我们已经解说的其他分支式社会相比,印度—雅利安社会似乎没有任何的别具一格。例如,拉贾一词经常被译成国王,但实际上只是当时的部落领袖。历史学家罗米拉·塔帕(Romila Thapar)指出,拉贾的主要词根是“发光、带领”,但它的另一词根是“使人满意”。这显示,拉贾在部落中的权威有赖于众人的共识。拉贾又是军事领袖,帮助保卫自己的社区,率领众人向邻近部落发起袭击以攫取战利品。他的权力受亲戚团体集会的制衡,如维达萨(vidatha)、萨巴(sabha)、萨米提(samiti)。其中的维达萨,专门负责在社区内分派战利品。像美拉尼西亚社会的头人,拉贾的地位取决于他在奉献和盛宴中分配资源的能力。拉贾们彼此竞争,看谁可摆出最多的财富以及最终的浪费,很像夸扣特尔(Kwakiutl)和其他西北太平洋海岸印第安人的庆典。

    像其他部落社会,印度没有法律制度,以赔偿金解决争端(杀人赔偿金是一百头奶牛)。拉贾没有征税权力,也不在现代意义上拥有土地。所有权都在家庭手中,还有对亲戚团体的义务。像其他分支式社会,印度—雅利安部落可团结起来,组成像般庶王朝(Panchalas)那样的高层次分支,高层次分支之间可以再次联手,以达成更高层次的联盟。

    印度家庭和亲戚关系

    像希腊、罗马、中国,印度—雅利安部落也组成父系家族的血统。19 世纪的历史人类学家,包括甫斯特尔·德·库朗日和亨利·梅因,在希腊、罗马、凯尔特、条顿、当代印度人中,找到甚多相似的亲戚结构。我曾提及,希腊、罗马、早期印度人都在家庭祭坛供养圣火(参看第 3 章)。从 1862 年到 1869 年,梅因是在印度度过的。作为总督会议的法律成员,他潜心攻读印度的原始文献。他确信曾有过统一的“雅利安”文明,包括罗马和印度。由于共同的历史起源,他们有关财产、遗产、继承的法律条款都非常相似。他相信,印度以某种方式保存了法律和社会实践的古代形式,人们可从印度的现在看到欧洲的过去。

    后来的人类学家对梅因提出严格批评,认为他过于简化印度的亲戚关系,并在它之上强加了不妥当的进化结构。在显示欧洲人和印度人的共同种族起源上,他似乎确有强烈兴趣,也许是为了提供英国统治印度的历史基础。但他仍是比较人类学的伟大创始人之一,并以渊博知识展示,不同文明发展了相似方案,以解决社会组织问题。当代人类学家都意识到,各社会的亲戚结构中存有难以置信的微妙差异,但有时只见树木不见森林,认不清同级发展水平的不同社会之间的相似程度。

    像中国一样,我们也不能将当代印度亲戚组织,投射到早期的印度—雅利安人。亲戚关系作为社会基本结构原则,从没在印度消失,这不像西方,倒与中国相近。所以,印度的社会组织自有其潜在的持续性,我们必须心领神会,方能解释其政治发展的此起彼伏。

    印度的亲戚组织分属三大区,与次大陆的三大民族语言区相对应:第一,北部,其居民是讲梵语的印度—雅利安后裔;第二,南部,其居民讲达罗毗荼语;第三,东部,与缅甸和东南亚其他地区非常相似。几乎所有的印度亲戚团体,都形成分支式的世系,绝大多数是父系社会。然而,在印度的南部和东部又有重要团体,分属母系社会和母系中心,例如马拉巴地区(Malabar)的那雅人(Nayar)。跟中国一样,后裔团体基于共同祖先,通过某种形式的共有财产而取得集团身份。

    印度亲戚关系不同于中国,因为瓦尔纳和迦提的等级制度参与其中。迦提确立异族通婚的界限。这意味着,任何人通常不得与自己瓦尔纳或迦提之外的人谈婚论嫁。瓦尔纳和迦提的制度等级森严,较低地位女子如何“高攀”较高地位男子,或较低地位男子如何“高攀”较高地位女人(后者比较少见)(人类学家称之为向上通婚[hypergamy]和向下通婚[hypogamy]),它都设有精细规则来作规范。每个瓦尔纳和迦提的本身,在地位级别上又作进一步的条分缕析。所以,即使在自己分类中通婚,也会遇上甚多禁忌。例如,婆罗门中有些必须主持家庭仪式,而另一些则不必;有些主持葬礼,而另一些则不必。婆罗门最高级别的男子,绝不可能娶最低级别婆罗门的女儿(即主持葬礼的)。

    梵语的北方和达罗毗荼语的南方,它们在亲戚规则上的差别涉及表亲通婚,从而影响政治组织。在北方,儿子必须与父亲血统之外的人通婚,不可与第一表亲通婚。在南方,儿子同样必须与父亲血统之外的人通婚,但是,与父亲姐妹的女儿通婚,不但允许,而且获得鼓励。这种做法叫作交叉表亲(cross-cousin)的婚姻。而平行表亲(parallel cousin)的婚姻,即与父亲兄弟的女儿通婚,则不可,因为这违反了氏族的异姓通婚规矩。所以,男子可与姐姐的女儿和舅舅的女儿通婚。换言之,像很多阿拉伯部落一样,南方的印度部落倾向于把婚姻(以及相关的遗产)局限于狭窄的亲戚小圈子,相连的血统因此而聚居在一起。在北方,家庭为了孩子能找到合适的配偶,被迫在更大范围内撒网。达罗毗荼的交叉表亲婚姻,加强了其社会关系狭小内向的特征,这存在于所有的部落社会。可以假定,这样的婚姻实践降低奖励,使南方的国王不愿去寻求远方的婚姻同盟,如建立现代西班牙的阿拉贡国王(Aragon)和卡斯提尔女王(Castile)的联姻。

    这段简洁的概述,尚未触及印度复杂亲戚关系的皮毛。对梵语的北方和达罗毗荼语的南方,虽然可做出一个概述,但这两个地区在亲戚规则方面,因地理位置、种姓制度以及宗教的不同,而展示出巨大的内部差异。

    过渡到国家

    促使印度从部落社会过渡到国家,其原动力是什么?我们所拥有的相关信息,远远少于中国案例。我们有两种关于国家形成的虚幻解说,与人类学家的暴力和社会契约理论遥相呼应。第一种解说,“吠陀本集”中较晚文本的《爱达罗氏梵书》(Aitareya Brahmana,或译《他氏梵书》)解释:“众神与魔鬼大打出手,但在敌人手中吃尽苦头,便聚会讨论,决定要一名拉贾来率领打仗,于是指定因陀罗(Indra)为他们的国王,战势很快获得逆转。”这个传奇显示,印度最早的国王应人们和军事的需求而生,其首要职责是率领部下打仗。第二种解说来自佛教资料:

    当人们丧失原始的光荣,阶级差别(瓦尔纳)遂出现。他们签订协议,接受私人财产和家庭的制度,盗窃、谋杀、通奸和其他罪行由此而起。人们聚会讨论,决定要选出一名成员来维持秩序,报酬是分享一份土地和畜牧的收获。他被称为“大选出王”(Mahasammata),头衔是拉贾,因为他取悦于其他成员。

    佛教始终是印度教的翻版,只是更为仁慈,更为温和。它强调非暴力,以及轮回转生的更为可行。所以,佛教徒认为国家形成获得大家同意,也属意料之中。但上述两种解说都不是历史记载。

    实际的过渡也许牵涉到其他社会在建立国家时所遇到的所有因素。第一是征服:《梨俱吠陀》讲到印度—雅利安人遇上达萨人,发动战争,最终征服后者。最早提及的瓦尔纳,不是大家熟悉的四大社会阶层,而是两大社会阶层,分别是雅利安阶层和达萨阶层。所以很明显,从平等部落社会到等级国家社会的过渡,开始于军事征服。最初,达萨人只是因为自己的种族和语言而与征服者有所区别,到后来,达萨一词变成了从属或奴隶的代名词。这个转变是逐渐发生的,时间在印度—雅利安从游牧社会过渡到农业社会之后。剥削从属阶级创造庄稼收获的盈余,自己部落不必投入劳动,便可收取一笔地租。“拉贾”的意思,也从部落领袖变为“自土地或村庄享受收入的人”。大约在公元前 6 世纪早期,等级的日益分明又与永久定居、雏形城市、土地所有权紧密相连。在土地上劳作的,不再是亲戚团体共同协作的家庭,而是与地主并不沾亲带故的农民。为了使低级阶层永远处于被主宰的地位,为了防止他们逃逸,常备军和领土的政治控制变得不可或缺。

    跟中国相似,促进政治巩固的还有技术变化。其中之一是铁器,它在公元前 800 年之后得到与日俱增的使用。铁斧可用来清除密集的森林,铁犁可帮助耕地。国家没有控制铁的生产,但铁工具的使用带来威望,并增加国家可挪用的有效盈余的总水平。

    像中国和其他从部落过渡到国家的社会,独特和永久的祭司阶层婆罗门,赋予部落领袖愈益增长的合法性,使后者权力获得很大提升。拉贾行使政治权力,祭司通过仪式使之合法化;拉贾又支持祭司,并提供资源来补偿这些服务。早期的拉贾凭借祭司而获得神性,从而将自己职位转为祖传财产,通过渐渐流行的长子继承权再传给儿子。显而易见,半神半人不再是部落长者中的老大。所以,部落集会的萨巴失去了选择氏族领袖的能力,开始扮演咨询的角色。国王的授权仪式发展成持续一年的献祭仪式;其间,拉贾经历净化和象征性的新生;到终结时,婆罗门再赋予他职位和神性。

    公元前 6 世纪末,印度河—恒河平原上的社会已从部落过渡到雏形国家或酋邦,被称为伽那—僧伽(gana-sangha,编按:前者意为“众多”,后者意为“集合体”)。北方的国家,如鸯伽(Anga)、摩揭陀(Magadha)、俱卢(Kuru)、般庶,控制界定的领土,治理城市中相对密集的人口,完全是主权政治体。它们等级森严,王位世袭,其精英向农民抽取租金。相比之下,伽那—僧伽尚保留部落社会的特征:等级松弛,领导权模糊,不能像真正国家一样行使强制权力。

    弯路

    到此为止,印度北部和两三千年前的中国西周,它们所经历的政治发展没有重大差别。最初,社会组成父系氏族的联合体,信奉祖先崇拜;大约在过渡到定居农业社会时,转向等级分明、世袭领袖、统治者和祭司的分工。很有可能,商朝统治者比印度的统治者行使更多权力,但差别不很惊人。

    首批真正国家出现于印度河—恒河平原时,印度的政治演变以戏剧性的方式与中国模式分道扬镳。印度国家没有经历五百年日益激烈的连续战争,就像中国早期国家在东周时所承受的。之后的数世纪内,印度国家也彼此打仗,也与伽那—僧伽交战,但从没达到中国所实施的相互灭绝的惨烈程序。如我们所知,中国独立政治体的总数,从东周初的数百持续下跌到东周末的一枝独秀。相比之下,印度只有较少较不激烈的战争,以及较低程度的统一。较为原始的伽那—僧伽,没被强大的国家所兼并,一直生存至公元第一个千年的中期,这就很说明问题了。在发展现代国家制度方面,战国时期的中国政治体不得不仿效邻国,而印度政治体显然没有此种压力。公元前 3 世纪末,孔雀王朝得以统一次大陆的大部,建成单一帝国,但仍有部分地区从没被征服,甚至其核心地带的统治也没得到彻底的巩固。孔雀王朝持续仅 136 年,这种幅员辽阔的政治体再也没有在本土政权下重现,直到 1947 年印度共和国出现。

    差别的第二领域涉及宗教。中国设立了专业祭司,主持向国王和皇帝赋予合法性的礼仪,但其国家宗教从没超越祖先崇拜的层次。祭司主持对皇帝祖先的崇拜,但没有自己的司法权。末代皇帝失去合法性时,或朝代之间没有合法统治者时,没有作为机构的祭司来宣布谁享有天命。这种合法性可由任何人赋予,从农民、军人到官僚。

    印度宗教则走上迥然不同的路。印度—雅利安部落的原始宗教,可能也像中国那样基于祖先崇拜。但始于公元前第二个千年,即“吠陀本集”创作时,它发展成精细的形而上学系统,以无形超然的世界来解释尘世的全部现象。新兴的婆罗门宗教,把重点从个人的祖先和后裔转到包罗万象的宇宙系统。为这超然世界把关的就是婆罗门阶层,其权威是很重要的。他们在未来世界中所保障的,不但是国王的血统,而且是最低级农民的福祉。

    在婆罗门教的影响下,分别是雅利安人和达萨人的两大瓦尔纳,进化成四大瓦尔纳:婆罗门、刹帝利、吠舍、首陀罗。处于顶端的是祭司阶层,他们创作了构成“吠陀本集”的仪式祈祷。随着宗教的发展,历代的婆罗门默记这些祈祷。这礼仪咒语的倒背如流成为他们的专业,与其他瓦尔纳争夺社会地位时,又变成其优势。法律就从这些仪式中脱颖而出,起初只是惯例,口口相传,最终写入法律书籍,像英国人所称的《摩奴法典》(Manava-Dharmasastra)。所以在印度传统中,法律并不来自政治权力,这不像中国;它的源泉既独立于统治者,又比统治者更为崇高。事实上,《摩奴法典》讲得很清楚,国王之存在是为了保护瓦尔纳制度,不可颠倒过来。 如果我们把中国案例当作政治发展的标准直线,印度社会大约在公元前 600 年走上一条大弯路。印度没有经历漫长的战争,以开发现代非人格化的集权国家。权力没有集中于国王,而在界限分明的祭司阶层和武士阶层之间平分。他们相互依赖,以求生存。印度虽然没在当时开发出像中国一样的现代国家,但创造了限制国家权力和权威的法治雏形,中国则没有。很明显,印度始终不能以中国方式集中权力,其根源就是印度宗教,我们将对此作更仔细的审视。

    第 11 章 瓦尔纳和迦提

    经济与宗教,作为社会变化的源头;印度的社会生活因宗教而变得包罗万象;印度宗教对政治权力的启示

    作为社会变化的源头,经济利益与思想到底谁占鳌头?这是社会理论家最古老的争辩之一。从卡尔·马克思到持现代理性选择理论的经济学家都认为,物质利益享有优先权。马克思认为,宗教是大众的“麻醉剂”,这个神话是精英编出的,为了辩护其对社会他人的掌控。很多现代经济学家不像马克思那么尖刻,但仍认为他们的功利最大化的理性架构(rational utility-maximizing framework),足以解释几乎所有的社会行为。诺贝尔奖得主加里·贝克(Gary Becker)曾表示,不同意者只是研究得不够认真。思想被认为是外在因素,也就是说,为了解释物质利益,它只是在事后建立的,并不是社会行为的独立原因。

    站在该论点对面的是一批现代社会学创始人,包括韦伯和涂尔干。他们认为,宗教和宗教观念是主要因素,既是人类行动的动力,又是社会身份的来源。韦伯坚持,在现代经济学家所运作的架构中,个人是主要决策者,物质利益是主要动机;但最终,这架构本身又是新教改革的观念的产品。写完《新教伦理与资本主义精神》后,韦伯继续写出有关中国、印度和其他非西方文明的著作。它们显示,要理解经济生活是如何组织的,宗教观念不可或缺。

    如果要举马克思一方的例子,即宗教在为少数精英掌控他人作辩护,一定不会选普世平等的基督教或伊斯兰教,而要选公元前最后两个千年出现在印度的婆罗门教。根据《梨俱吠陀》:

    众神奉献牺牲时,以普鲁沙(Man)为祭品……

    他们分解普鲁沙时,将他分成多少块?

    他的嘴和双臂叫什么?双腿和两足又叫什么?

    婆罗门是他的嘴,他的双臂成为武士。

    他的双腿成为吠舍,从两足生出首陀罗……

    众神作完奉献,这是神圣法律之首。

    这些大力神飞天,那里住有永久神灵。

    婆罗门不仅将自己安置在这四大社会阶层的顶端,而且授予自己对祈祷和圣歌的永久垄断。那些祈祷和圣歌在赋予合法性的各种仪式中不可或缺,从最高级的国王授权,到最低级的婚礼或葬礼。

    以纯唯物主义来解释印度社会中的宗教功能,难以让人满意。首先,它无法解释神话中的实际内容。如我们所见,在过渡到国家的前夕,中国社会和印度社会有很多结构上的相似。中国精英,像每个已知社会的精英,也利用赋予合法性的仪式来提升自己的权力。但中国人想象不出一个像印度那样的既深刻又复杂的形而上学系统。事实上,即使没有超然宗教的帮助,他们仍能有效夺取和保有权力。

    此外,在印度占居首位的不是拥有强制和经济权力的精英,反而是仅有仪式权力的精英。即使有人相信物质原因是最重要的,他仍要回答这一疑问:为什么刹帝利和吠舍——武士和商人——甘愿臣服于婆罗门,不仅向后者提供土地和经济资源,而且让后者控制自己个人生活的隐私。

    最终,就印度社会而言,不管是经济解释,还是唯物主义解释,都必须解释该制度为何经久不衰。公元前 600 年,婆罗门教适合精英小团体的利益,但随着时间的推移,它并不适合印度社会中其他阶层和团体的利益。为何没有反精英运动的兴起,宣扬新的宗教思想,以提倡普世平等?在某种意义上,佛教和耆那教就是抗议宗教。两者继承了很多婆罗门教的形而上学假设,但在次大陆却得不到广泛接纳。对婆罗门教霸权的最大挑战,却是外国入侵者凭借武力进口的——莫卧儿帝国带来了伊斯兰教,英国人带来了西方自由和民主的思想。所以,必须把宗教和政治本身看作行为和变化的动力,不可视之为宏大经济力量的副产品。

    印度宗教的合理性

    就现代经济的需求而言,很难想象还有另外一个社会制度,其兼容度低于婆罗门教迦提制度。现代劳工市场理论要求,每个人通过在教育和技能方面的投资,自由地与人签约来出售自己的服务,从而“改善自己的处境”,这是亚当·斯密(Adam Smith)的原话。信息流通的灵活劳工市场,能够导致个人处境的最大改善和资源的优化分配。相比之下,根据迦提制度,个人天生只能从事有限行业。他们必须继承父业,必须与同一迦提团体的成员通婚。投资教育是没有意义的,因为个人永远都不能在生活中提高自己的地位。在迦提制度中,社会升迁只适用社区总体,不适用个人。所以,迦提的团体可决定搬往新区,或开发新的商机,但不允许个人创业。该制度对社会合作造成了巨大障碍,对某些婆罗门来说,光是看见贱民就需要一个冗长的净化仪式。

    从现代经济观点看,这很不合理;对接受婆罗门教根本前提的人来说,这又完全合理。整个社会制度,包括种姓制度中最细微的规则,作为宏观形而上学系统的逻辑结论,却是非常完美的。现代评论家经常试图以实用或经济功利来解释印度的社会规则,例如,禁食奶牛刚开始只是卫生措施,为了避开受污染的牛肉。除了不符合早期印度—雅利安人像努尔人一样吃奶牛的事实,这种解释无法看透主观上体验到的社会凝聚,反而折射了评论家自己的世俗偏见。

    韦伯认识到婆罗门教理后面的高度合理性——自然神学(theodicy),或上帝的理由,他称之为“天才的手笔”。去印度修道院研读的西方皈依者,往往能体会到这一天才,其始于否认现实的现象世界。下面是皈依者自己的话语:

    所有印度宗教系统,其终级目的是为了超越生命(moksha)。它们都假设,感知的存在是对现实(maya)的误解,仅是外表,躲在背后的才是终级存在的梵(brahman)。它无形无体,正因为无形无体,所以永恒。它是唯一的现实。我们所感觉的,我们因自己的物质存在而有所依恋的,都是稍纵即逝的(都会凋零和死亡),所以是虚无缥缈的(maya)。不像有些解说者所宣称的,存在的“目的”实际上不是“获得”对梵的认同,而是排除万难去体会,个人内心(atman)中真实永久的东西就是梵。

    凡人的生存涉及物质的生物生存,其对立面,就是超越此时此地的无形无体的真正存在。早期婆罗门认为,“与分娩有关的流血、与疾病和暴力有关的痛苦和变形、与人体排泄物有关的污浊恶臭、与死亡有关的衰败腐烂”,都会牵涉凡人生命,都需要得到超度。这就是为什么婆罗门在社会等级制度中授予自己特权地位:“污染物质渗透了凡人的生存,在现世和漫长的上升轮回(samsara)中,需要婆罗门主持的仪式来予以控制和削减,这是获得解脱(moksha)的必要途径。”

    迦提制度源于业力(karma),即个人在现世所做的一切。职业的地位有高有低,取决于它们离污染源有多远——诸如血液、死亡、泥土、腐败的有机物。皮革匠、屠夫、理发匠、清扫夫、收生婆,以及处理动物尸体或死人的行业,被认为是最不洁净的。相比之下,婆罗门是最完美的,因为遇上血液、死亡、泥土时,他们可依赖他人的服务。这解释了婆罗门的素食主义,因为吃肉就好比吃尸体。

    社会升迁在现世是不可能的,但可以指望来世。业力只在代代相传时才有变更,因此,个人一生都陷于自己的业力。在迦提等级制度中,个人到底获得升级还是降级,则取决于自己是否履行了所属迦提的法(dharma),即良好行为的准则。未能遵守准则的,将在来世等级制度中降级,从而更加远离真正的存在。婆罗门教将神圣化赋予现有的社会秩序,履行现存迦提的法变成了宗教责任。

    瓦尔纳秩序发展自同样的形而上学前提。前三级瓦尔纳——婆罗门、刹帝利、吠舍——被认为是“两次投胎”,所以获得允许,进入仪式地位。包含大多数人口的首陀罗是“一次投胎”,只能希望在来世获得仪式地位。历史上不是很清楚,印度社会离开部落组织时,瓦尔纳和迦提的出现谁早谁晚。可能是宗族进化为迦提,它们在很多方面非常相似,都有精细的亲戚关系规则。但也有可能是先进化为瓦尔纳,再为随后出现的迦提设置架构。

    宗教信仰所造成的迦提制度,创造了颇不寻常的组合,既有分支式的隔离,同时又有社会中的相互依赖。每个迦提成为世袭地位,以调整现存的宗族系统。迦提设置了氏族的异姓通婚的外限,在众多分支式单位中,又倾向于成为自给自足的社区。另一方面,每种职业又是更大分工的一部分,所以需要相互依赖,从高级祭司到葬礼工。法国人类学家路易·杜蒙(Louis Dumont)引用布兰特(编按:E. A. H. Blunt,1877—1941,英属印度殖民地官员)的资料:

    理发匠联合抵制曾拒绝为他们婚礼跳舞的舞女。

    在格拉克珀(Gorakhpur),一名地主试图中断皮革匠的生意。他相信他们在毒死自己的牛群(经常有如此的怀疑),便命令他的租户将无缘无故死去的牛的皮革故意割碎。皮革匠奋起反抗,命令他们的女人停止收生婆的服务。地主只好让步。

    在艾哈迈达巴德(Ahmedabad,又译阿默达巴德,位于古吉拉特邦),一名正在重盖屋顶的钱庄老板与糖果店主发生争执,糖果店主说服瓦片制造商,拒绝为钱庄老板提供瓦片。

    这不单是经济上的相互依赖,因为每个执行自己功能的迦提,对其他迦提都具有仪式上的重要意义。

    思想及其政治后果

    瓦尔纳制度对政治有巨大影响,它要求武士的刹帝利服从婆罗门。根据哈罗德·古尔德(Harold Gould),“婆罗门和刹帝利之间……有共生的相互依赖。王室权力需要连续获得祭司(即仪式)权力所赋予的神圣化,以维持神圣的合法性”。每位统治者需要与宫廷祭司(purohita)建立私人关系,他作为世俗领袖所采取的每一次行动,都要得到宫廷祭司所赋予的神圣化。

    宗教权威和世俗权力在理论上的分离,何以在实践中对后者设限,初看上去不很清楚。婆罗门教的等级制度,没有像天主教那样组成正式的中央权威机构。它有点像巨大的社会网络,单独的婆罗门互相交流和合作,但并不行使制度化的权威。单独婆罗门拥有土地,但作为制度的祭司阶层,不像欧洲教会,却没有自己的领地和资源。婆罗门肯定不能像中世纪的教皇,召集统领自己的军队。教皇格里高利七世在 1076 年将神圣罗马帝国皇帝革出教门,并迫使后者赤脚来卡诺莎(Canossa)请求赦免,这在印度历史中绝对找不出可媲美的案例。世俗统治者需要宫廷祭司来祝福自己的政治计划,在收买后者一事上,好像总能如愿以偿。印度宗教和社会的制度等级分明,各有分支,但它们如何使政治集权难以实现,我们还需寻找其他原委。

    瓦尔纳和迦提的制度限制了军事组织的发展,这个影响很明显。武士的刹帝利是瓦尔纳制度四大阶层之一,自动限制了印度社会军事动员的潜力。像匈奴、匈人、蒙古人的武装游牧民族,之所以如此强大,原因之一就是可以动员几近 100% 的健壮男子。就必不可少的技能或组织而言,武装掠夺和游牧漂泊没有什么两样。仍是游牧民族时,印度—雅利安人曾经也很强大,但现已定居下来,建立了瓦尔纳社会。武士地位成为少数贵族精英的专业,如想加入,不但讲究训练和出身,还具有强烈的宗教意义。

    在实践中,该制度并没有始终限制他人的加入。很多印度统治者出生于刹帝利阶层,但也有不少来自婆罗门、吠舍、首陀罗。新统治者夺取政治权力后,倾向于在事后获得刹帝利地位。以这种方式成为刹帝利,比成为婆罗门更为容易。瓦尔纳四个阶层都参与战争,婆罗门中有级别很高的军事将领,首陀罗倾向于充当辅助部队。就从属关系而言,军队的等级制度就是社会等级制度的拷贝。不像秦国和其他后期东周列国,印度政治体从未能动员大部分的农民。考虑到仪式上对血液和尸体的厌恶,很难想象,受伤军人能从高贵战友手中获得很多救助。在采用新兴军事技术方面,如此保守的社会显然是迟疑不决的。他们在基督时代之后才放弃战车,比中国人晚了好多世纪;大象继续用于战争,尽管其效用早已被人怀疑。印度军队从没开发有效的射箭骑兵,以致惨败于公元前 4 世纪的希腊人和 12 世纪的穆斯林。

    从社会上层一直到底层,印度社会以迦提为基础形成众多紧密结合的小集团,其组织动力正是由婆罗门教提供的。这是限制政治权力的第二条途径。这些集团自我管理,不需要国家帮忙组织。事实上,它们抵抗国家的渗透和控制,政治学家乔尔·米格代尔(Joel Migdal)称之为软弱国家和强势社会。这种情形维持至今,种姓制度和村民组织仍是印度社会的支柱。

    19 世纪的西方评论家,包括卡尔·马克思和亨利·梅因,注意到印度社会自我组织的特征。马克思宣称国王拥有一切土地,但又指出,印度村庄在经济上偏向于自治,以一种原始共产主义为基础(这种解释有点自相矛盾)。梅因指的是自我调整、一成不变的村庄社区,这种看法在维多利亚的英国非常流行。19 世纪早期,英国行政官员把印度村庄当作能幸存于帝国毁灭的“小小共和国”。

    20 世纪的印度民族主义者,部分原因是依据上述解释,想象出一幅本土村庄民主的田园画像,即潘查亚特制度(panchayat)。他们声称,这是印度政治秩序的源头,直到被英国殖民者破坏。现代印度宪法的第 40 条,详细解释了复原的潘查亚特机构,旨在促进地方民主,曾在 1989 年获得拉吉夫·甘地政府的特别关注。其时,政府正试图在印度联邦制中推动权力分散。但印度早期的地方统治,不像后来评论家和民族主义者所宣称的,实际上不是民主和世俗的,而是基于迦提或种姓制度的。每座村庄倾向于有个强势种姓,也就是说,其人数和拥有的土地都超过其他种姓,而潘查亚特制度仅仅是该强势种姓的传统领导组织。

    单独村庄自有地方的统治机构,不需要国家从外部提供服务。潘查亚特制度的重要功能之一是司法,它依据惯例来裁决迦提成员之间的争论。村庄中的产权不是共有的,这有悖于马克思的想象。像其他分支世系社会,财产为复杂的亲戚团体所拥有,单独家庭在处理土地时要面临很多责任和限制。这意味着,国王虽是名义上的主权君主,却没有真正“拥有”村庄土地。我们将在后续章节看到,在征税和征地时,印度政治统治者的权力往往非常有限。

    商业活动也依据迦提,宛如不需外界支持的自控公司。从 9 世纪到 14 世纪,印度南部的贸易大多由像阿育尔(Ayyvole)那样的商人行会控制。它们派出的代表满布次大陆,与印度之外的阿拉伯人商人打交道。古吉拉特邦的商人,不管是穆斯林还是印度教徒,长期控制印度洋、东非、阿拉伯半岛南部、东南亚的贸易。艾哈迈达巴德商人组成全市大公司,吸引所有主要职业团体的成员。在中国,贸易网络只靠宗族,不像印度同行那样组织良好。中国宗族的司法权,往往局限于家法、遗产和其他家庭琐事(尤其在强大政府时期)。印度的迦提除了地方社会的行政管理,还发挥公开的政治功能。根据萨提希·萨贝瓦尔(Satish Saberwal),“迦提提供了社会动员的各式场合:进攻性的,则争取掌控权和统治权……防御性的,则抵制国家和帝国入侵迦提领域……破坏性的,则任职于更大政治体,运用其权力和高位来谋取私人利益”。迦提还为成员提供地理和社会上的升迁。例如,泰米尔(Tamil)纺织种姓的凯寇拉(Kaikolar),在朱罗王朝(Chola)时期改行,变成商人和军人;19 世纪后期,锡克人的木匠和铁匠离开家乡的旁遮普,迁往阿萨姆邦(印度的 Assam)和肯尼亚(非洲的 Kenya)。这些决定由众多家庭集体作出,以便在新环境中相互依赖、相互支持。在印度北部,拉杰普特(Rajput)迦提在扩充地域方面尤为成功,得以控制大片土地。

    限制政治权力的第三条途径是婆罗门教社会制度对文化的控制,这一习俗延续至今,使大批印度人陷于贫穷和绝望。现代印度处于某种吊诡状态。一方面有大量印度人接受良好教育,攀登众多领域的世界顶峰,从信息技术、医药、娱乐到经济。境外印度人始终享受较多的社会升迁机会,这一事实多年前便引起小说家奈保尔爵士(V.S. Naipaul)的注意。经济改革在 20 世纪 80 年代晚期和 90 年代出现,境内印度人也开始兴旺起来。另一方面,接受良好教育的居民仍是少数,国内文盲和贫穷的程度高得惊人。快速增长的城市,如班加罗尔(Bangalore)和海得拉巴(Hyderabad),其郊外是广阔的乡村内地,那里的人类发展指数在世界上竟名列底层。

    这些差距的历史根源最终还归罪于瓦尔纳和迦提的制度。作为仪式监护人,婆罗门当然掌控学习和知识。一直到公元前第一个千年末期,他们坚决反对把最重要的“吠陀本集”付诸文字。根据萨贝瓦尔,“为仪式上的使用而默记圣歌——既为自己,又为主顾——是婆罗门最独特的学习方式。仪式上和学习过程中的高效,并不要求弄懂所背诵的东西……很多婆罗门献身于浩瀚的默记、逻辑分析、辩论”。为达到所需求的仪式效果,精确默记“吠陀本集”是必须的。据说,朗诵中的小错将导致灾难。

    也许并非偶然,婆罗门坚持口头传诵“吠陀本集”,设置加入婆罗门的额外障碍,更加强自己的至高无上。犹太人、基督徒、穆斯林,从他们宗教传统的一开始就是“圣书上的民族”,婆罗门却顽强抵抗文字和有关的书写技术。5 世纪和 7 世纪,中国取经人来印度寻求佛教传统的文献,竟找不到书面文本。中国人和欧洲人改用羊皮纸之后很久,印度人仍在使用棕榈树叶和树皮。讨厌耐用的羊皮纸有宗教起源,因为它来自动物的皮肤。11 世纪造纸技术来到时,婆罗门仍然迟迟不用。在马哈拉施特拉(Maharashtra)的乡村,日常行政管理中的纸张使用一直要等到 17 世纪中期。一出现,它们就大大改善了记账和监管的效率。

    公元 1000 年之后,书写才变得普遍,自婆罗门扩散到印度社会其他群体。商人开始制作商业记录,迦提开始记载家庭谱系。在喀拉拉邦(Kerala),“王家和贵族血统”的那雅人开始学习书面梵语,该邦的统治阶级开始制作大量政治和商业的记录。(20 世纪晚期,当地共产党政府治理的喀拉拉邦成为印度治绩最佳的邦之一。有人怀疑,这样的治绩是否植根于数世纪前的文化传统。)

    与中国相比,婆罗门垄断知识,抵制书写,严重影响了现代国家的发展。从商朝以来,中国统治者一直使用文字传递命令、记录法律、保管账目、书写详尽的政治历史。在中国,对官僚的教育集中于识字、攻读漫长复杂的文学传统;对行政官员的训练,依现代标准看仍属有限,但仍涉及反复分析书本、以史为鉴。汉朝以来,科举制度获得采用,政府用人基于对文学技能的掌握,并不局限于特定阶层。虽然在实际情形中,普通老百姓登上政府高位的机遇非常有限,但中国人都知道,教育是社会升迁的重要途径。所以,宗族和地方社区在儿子的教育上全力以赴,充分利用科举制度。

    如此情形在印度是不存在的。统治者自己是文盲,依靠同样无知的家族官员来维持治理。文化是婆罗门阶层的特权,他们维持对知识和仪式的垄断来保障自身利益。跟军队的情形一样,瓦尔纳和迦提的等级制度阻止了大多数人获得教育和文化,从而减少了可为国家所用的称职人才。

    在印度发展历史中,宗教影响政治权力的最后途径是建立了所谓法治的基础。法治的本质是一组反映社会正义感的规则,比国王的意愿更为崇高。这就是印度的情形,各种法典中的法律不是国王创建的,而是婆罗门依据仪式知识所制定的。这些法律讲得很清楚,瓦尔纳不是为国王服务的,更确切地说,国王只有变成瓦尔纳的保护人,方可获得合法性。如果国王触犯了神圣法律,史诗《摩诃婆罗多》公开认可反抗,宣称此人已不再是国王,而是一条疯狗。在《摩奴法典》中,主权在法律,而不在国王:“在本质上,法律(danda)即是国王,享有权力,维持秩序,发挥领导作用。”(《摩奴法典》第 7 章第 17 节)

    不少古典文献叙述有关梵那(Vena)国王的警世故事,他禁止除了给自己的所有其他祭品,还推行种姓之间的通婚。结果,神圣的众神向他发起攻击,以奇迹般化成矛的青草叶,将他杀死。很多印度朝代,包括难陀王朝(Nanda)、孔雀王朝、巽伽王朝(Sunga),都因婆罗门的阴谋而变弱。当然,就像中世纪的天主教,很难弄清婆罗门是在捍卫神圣法律,还是在保护自己利益。像欧洲而非中国,印度的权威是分裂的,对政治权力造成了颇具意义的制衡。 印度的社会制度源于宗教,大大限制了国家的集权能力。统治者不能动员大批人口以建立强大军队;不能渗透存在于每座村庄的自治且严密组织的迦提;自己和部下缺乏教育和文化;还要面对维护规范化秩序的严密的祭司阶层;自己在这一秩序中仅扮演从属角色。就上述的方方面面而言,印度统治者的处境非常不同于中国。

    第 12 章 印度政体的弱点

    孔雀王朝何以成为印度第一个且最成功的本土统治者;孔雀王朝治下的国家性质;阿育王的性格;式微、分裂、笈多王朝的复兴;印度为何被外国所征服

    一开始,印度的社会发展就压倒政治和经济的发展。次大陆获得一种以宗教信仰和社会实践为特征的共同文化,在尝试取得政治统一之前,就被标为与众不同的文明。统一过程中,社会力量足以抵制政治权力,阻止后者对社会的改造。中国发展了强大国家,其社会因此而处于孱弱地位,并自我延续。印度有个强大社会,先发制人,反而阻止了强大国家的兴起。

    公元前第一个千年初的印度次大陆,成千上万的小国和酋邦,自部落社会脱颖而出。其中三个王国——迦尸(Kashi)、拘萨罗(Kosala)、摩揭陀——和酋邦(或伽那—僧伽)的弗栗恃(Vrijji),成为印度河—恒河平原上的逐鹿者。摩揭陀(其核心地区在现代的比哈尔邦[Bihar])注定要扮演秦国角色,统一印度次大陆的大部。公元前 6 世纪的下半世纪,频毗娑罗王(Bimbisara)登基,凭借一系列战略性的婚姻和征服,使摩揭陀成为印度东部的主要国家。摩揭陀开始征收土地税和收成税,以代替国家形成之前低级血统的自愿进贡,由此而招聘征税人员。税率据说是农业产品的六分之一,如果属实,这在早期农业社会是相当高的。国王并不拥有国内所有土地,只享有荒地,其时人口稀少,应该是相当广袤的。

    儿子阿阇世王(Ajatashatru)谋杀频毗娑罗,兼并西部的拘萨罗和迦尸,并与弗栗恃展开持久斗争。后来,他在伽那—僧伽领袖中挑拨离间,终获大胜。他死于公元前 461 年,其时,摩揭陀已迁都至华氏城(Pataliputra),控制了恒河三角洲和恒河下游的大部。统治权传给一系列国王,包括出身首陀罗的短命的难陀王朝(Nanda)。亚历山大大帝曾遭遇难陀军队,由于军队哗变,而不得不转向旁遮普。希腊的资料称,难陀军队有两万骑兵、二十万步兵、一千辆战车、三千头大象。这些数字肯定是夸大的,以证明希腊人的退却是正确战略。

    继承难陀王朝的是旃陀罗笈多·孔雀(Chandragupta Maurya,又称月护王)。他极力扩充领土,在公元前 321 年建立了印度次大陆第一个本土政治体——孔雀帝国。他是婆罗门学者兼大臣考底利耶(Kautilya)的门生,后者的《政事论》(Arthasastra)被视作是印度经世王道的经典论文。月护王率军攻击亚历山大大帝的继承者塞琉古一世(Seleucus Nicator),征服西北部,并将旁遮普、阿富汗东部、俾路支地区并入孔雀王朝的版图。至此,他的帝国西到波斯,东到阿萨姆邦。

    对印度南方达罗毗荼人的征服,则留给了月护王的儿子宾头娑罗(Bindusara)和孙子阿育王(Ashoka)。宾头娑罗将帝国扩展到南方德干高原的卡纳塔克(Karnataka)。经过一场众所周知的持久的血腥征战,阿育王在公元前 260 年占领东南部的羯陵伽(Kalinga)(包含现代奥里萨邦[Orissa]和部分安得拉邦[Andhra Pradesh])。其时,印度缺乏文学文化,阿育王的功绩从未见于史书,像中国的《尚书》和《春秋》。后代印度人一直要等到 1915 年,方才把他视作伟大的国王;其时,大批法令岩石的古文字获得译解,考古学家终于拼搭出他治下的帝国疆域。

    孔雀王朝历经三代而建起的帝国,占据了喜马拉雅山脉以南的整个印度北方,西至波斯,东至阿萨姆,南至卡纳塔克。印度次大陆上,唯一没被统一的是南方边缘地带,分别是现代的喀拉拉邦、泰米尔纳德邦(Tamil Nadu)、斯里兰卡。没有单独的印度本土政权再一次统治这么辽阔的领土。莫卧儿帝国所征服的德里苏丹国要小得多,英国人在次大陆的帝国更大,但不得不问:说阿育王、阿克巴(Akhbar)、英国总督统治印度,这到底意味着什么?

    孔雀帝国:何等国家?

    历史学家在古印度国家的性质上争论不休。如果从比较眼光看,特别是对照阿育王的印度和秦始皇的中国,我们也许能看得更加清楚。这两个帝国几乎在同时形成(公元前 3 世纪的中到晚期),但它们政体的性质可说相差十万八千里。

    两个帝国都环绕一个核心而组成,分别为摩揭陀国和秦国。秦国是个真正的国家,具有马克斯·韦伯所界定的现代国家政府的许多特征。管理国家的世族精英,大多已在数世纪的战争中战死,取而代之的是日益凭借非人格化基础而获选的新人。秦国废除井田制,推翻传统的产权,以统一的郡县制取代世族封地。它最终打败对手,建立大一统帝国,便将这中央集权政府推向全中国。推广至被征服国家的,还有郡县制、统一度量衡、统一文字。我们已在第 8 章看到,秦朝君主的社会工程最终还是归于失败,因为在某种程度上,家族统治在西汉卷土重来。但汉朝统治者坚持中央集权,逐渐取消剩余的封地。它所建立的不算帝国,而是统一的中央国家。

    阿育王的帝国

    此类事项在孔雀帝国发生得很少,核心国的摩揭陀好像没有任何现代特征。与秦国相比,我们对其行政管理的性质了解得实在太少。政府用人完全是家族式的,受种姓制度的严格限制。考底利耶在《政事论》中讲明,高级官位的主要资格应是高尚出身,其“父亲和爷爷”必须是大臣(amatya)或更高,他们几乎全是婆罗门。官僚的薪俸非常悬殊,最低与最高之间的比率是 1∶4,800。没有证据显示,官府用人是选贤与能的,或前三级瓦尔纳之外的人也可申请公职。这些事实曾得到希腊旅行家麦加斯梯尼(Megasthenes)的确认。将摩揭陀推上战胜国地位的战争没有那么持久和残忍,不像秦国所经历的那样。旧精英得以留存,摩揭陀的处境从没恶化到非要动员男子总人口的地步。据我们所知,孔雀王朝没有统一度量衡,也没有在管辖地区统一语言。事实上,迟至公元 16 世纪,印度国家仍在努力推行统一标准,其最终实行是在英国治下,距孔雀王朝已将近整整两千年。

    通过联姻和征服获得的地区,其与摩揭陀的关系也大大不同于中国。秦国灭绝他国,往往是消灭或放逐整个统治宗族,并鲸吞其领土。东周时期,中国精英宗族的数量大幅下降。孔雀帝国的建立则较为温和,涉及大量伤亡和焦土战术的唯一战役是对羯陵伽的攻占,给战胜者阿育王带来很大震撼。其他情形中,现有统治者吃了败仗后,便接受孔雀帝国在名义上的主权。《政事论》建议,孱弱的国王最好屈服,自愿向强大邻国进贡。没有出现中国或欧洲式的“封建主义”,即剥夺现有统治者,把领土赏赐给王室成员或侍从。印度历史学家有时谈到属臣国(vassal),但它没有欧洲属臣的契约意义。说孔雀王朝重新分配权力是不准确的,因为它一开始就没有中央集权。孔雀王朝也没有设法将其国家制度,自核心国推向帝国其他地方。地方政府完全是家族的,没有试图建立永久且专业的行政制度。这意味着,每位新国王带来新的忠诚侍从,替换现有的行政官员。

    孔雀帝国在它管辖区域内,仅行使松弛的统治;它称霸的整段时期,部落联盟或酋邦(伽那—僧伽)始终存活,就是明证。与等级分明的王国相比,伽那—僧伽的政治决策涉及较多的参与和共识,但它仍是基于亲戚关系的幸存的部落政体。印度历史学家有时称之为“共和国”,这只是在为它涂上现代光彩。

    考底利耶在《政事论》中详尽讨论了财政政策和征税,只是不清楚他的建议究竟有多少被付诸实践。与“东方专制主义”的信徒相悖,国王并不“拥有”全部土地。他有自己地盘,另外宣称掌控荒地、森林等,但通常不向现存产权提出挑战。不过,国家坚持向各式地主征税的权利,缴税可依据个人、土地、收成、村庄、边界的小统治者,基本上以实物或劳役的形式。似乎没有一名印度统治者尝试大型变革,像商鞅的废除井田制,或王莽雄心勃勃但一败涂地的土地改革。

    阿育王死于公元前 232 年,他的帝国旋即衰落。西北部落到了大夏国(Bactrian Greek)手中,部落的伽那—僧伽在西部的旁遮普和拉贾斯坦(Rajasthan)重又兴起,南方的羯陵伽、卡纳塔克和其他领土纷纷脱离,返回独立王国的地位。孔雀王朝重又回到中央恒河平原的摩揭陀王国,其末代国王波罗诃德罗陀(Brihadratha)于公元前 185 年遇害。还要等五百多年,笈多王朝(Gupta)方才崛起,再次统一印度,其规模可与孔雀帝国媲美。次大陆的孔雀帝国仅维持一代,它的王朝持续一百三十五年。孔雀王朝的终止导致帝国分崩离析,分割成数百个政治体,很多尚处于国家之前的层次。

    孔雀帝国的统治如此短暂,至少从外表上看,它对下辖区域从没实施强有力的控制。事实上,这不是牵强附会。孔雀王朝从没建立强大的国家制度,也从没自家族政府过渡到非人格化政府。它在整个帝国维持广泛的间谍网,但没有证据显示,它像中国一样建造道路或运河,以促进交通。很不寻常,除了首都华氏城,孔雀王朝没在任何地方留下有关它强盛国力的纪念物。后代没把阿育王当作帝国创建者,这也许是原因之一。

    孔雀王朝的统治者从没想到国家建设,也就是说,没有尝试以一套新颖的共同规范和价值穿透整个社会。孔雀王朝没有真正的主权概念,即在全国范围实施非人格化统治的权利。次大陆没有统一的印度刑法,直到英国统治下诗人兼政治家托马斯·巴宾顿·麦考莱(Thomas Babington McCaulay)第一次引入。国王没有从事大规模的社会工程,反而保护现存的各式社会秩序。

    印度从没开发出像中国法家一样的思想,即政治目标就是赤裸裸地集权。《政事论》之类的论述,可向马基雅维利式(Machiavellian)的君主提供建议,但只针对价值观和社会结构,与政治无关。此外,婆罗门教的精神孵育了非军事思想。非暴力主义(ahimsa)可在“吠陀本集”中找到根源,认为杀生对业力造成负面影响。它的有些文本批评吃肉和动物祭品,但另一些却予以批准。如我们所知,像佛教和耆那教的抗议宗教,非暴力更是中心思想。

    孔雀王朝第一位国王旃陀罗笈多最后皈依耆那教,为了遂愿当一名苦行者,而自动让位给儿子宾头娑罗。他与一批僧侣搬到印度南方,据说,最后以耆那教的方式慢慢饿死。他的孙子阿育王起初是正统的印度教徒,在生命后期皈依佛教。羯陵伽征战中的伤亡激起阿育王深深的悔恨,据传十五万羯陵伽人被杀或受逐。根据他的岩石赦令(Rock Edicts),“羯陵伽已被兼并,此后,陛下便开始了对宗教法律的热诚追求”。他还宣布,“曾遭杀戮和俘虏的羯陵伽人,其百分之一或千分之一,如在今天遭受同样厄运,也会是陛下的遗憾。此外,如果有人冒犯他,只要还可以忍受,陛下也必须忍耐”。阿育王继续敦促仍在帝国边境的外人,“不用怕他,应信任他,应从他那里获得幸福,而不是悲伤”。他还呼吁他的儿子和孙子避免进一步征战。帝国扩展由此戛然而止。不管阿育王后裔究竟是遵从他的意愿,还是本身就不中用,反正他们治下的帝国冰消瓦解。有人会问,如果印度开发了像中国法家一样的权力原则,而不是婆罗门教、耆那教、佛教,阿育王的帝国会变成怎样——如果真是这样,它就不是印度了。

    社会战胜政治

    孔雀帝国崩溃后,印度经历了政治衰败,尤其是在北方,部落政体在西部的拉贾斯坦和旁遮普再次出现。该地区又受到来自中亚部落的侵略者的骚扰,部分原因是中华帝国的政治发展太具优势。秦朝开始建设长城以御外人,迫使游牧的匈奴返回中亚,取代当地一系列部落。这一连锁反应又导致斯基台人(Scythians,即塞克人[Shakas])对印度北部的侵犯,紧跟在后的是月氏,它在现为阿富汗的地方建起贵霜帝国(Kushana)。印度北方的王国中,没有一个组织良好,可以考虑像长城那样的浩大工程。所以,部分印度北方平原为这些部落所占。

    在遥远的南方,地方上的酋邦发展成王国,例如公元前 1 世纪统治西部的等乘王朝(Satavahana)。但这个政治体持续不长,没有发展出强大的中央机构,尚比不上孔雀王朝。为了控制德干北部,它与其他小王国发生冲突。此外,小王国之间也在争斗,如注辇国(Cholas)、潘地亚国(Pandyas)、萨提亚普特拉国(Satiyaputras)。这段历史相当复杂,难以融入政治发展的大叙述,也就缺乏启发功能,从中呈现出来的只是普遍的政治衰败。南方国家经常无法发挥最基本的政府功能,例如征税,因为其治下的社区既强大,又组织严密。没有一国得以在永久基础上扩展疆域,实现霸权,也没开发更为复杂的行政机构,以实施更为有效的统治。这个地区的政治分裂状态还要持续一千多年。

    在印度第二次成功创建大型帝国的是笈多王朝(Guptas),始于旃陀罗笈多一世(Chandra Gupta I)。公元 320 年,他在摩揭陀国当政,其权力基础与孔雀王朝相同。他和儿子沙摩陀罗笈多(Samudra Gupta),再次统一印度北方的大部。沙摩陀罗笈多在拉贾斯坦和印度西北部其他地区,兼并了众多伽那—僧伽,这种政治机构因此而寿终正寝。他还征服克什米尔,逼迫贵霜帝国和塞克国进贡。在他儿子旃陀罗笈多二世(375—415)的治下,文化生活变得繁荣,建了不少印度教、佛教、耆那教的庙宇。笈多王朝再持续两代,直到塞建陀笈多国王(Skanda Gupta)死于 5 世纪的下半叶。其时,西北部的酋邦变得衰弱,中亚新兴的游牧部落匈人(Huns 或 Huna)趁虚而入。笈多帝国在这场战争中耗尽自身,在 515 年将克什米尔、旁遮普、恒河平原的大部都输给匈人。

    姑且不论它的文化成就,笈多王朝没在国家制度方面作出任何革新,也没有试图把征服的政治体整合成统一的行政机构。被打败的统治者,以典型的印度方式留下来继续执政,只是以后需要上缴贡品。笈多王朝的官僚,甚至比孔雀王朝的前任更为分散,能力更差。它征收农业收成税,拥有关键的生产资料,像盐场和矿山,但没有干预现存的社会安排。笈多帝国的疆土更小,因为没能统一印度南方。它持续了将近两百年,最后分裂为相互竞争的众多小国,从而进入政治衰败的新时期。

    外国人的国家建设

    10 世纪后,印度的政治历史不再是本土发展史,而是一连串外国入侵史,先是穆斯林,后是英国人。从今以后,政治发展成为外国人如何将自己制度移植到印度土壤。他们仅取得部分成功。每个外国入侵者必须对付这同一的“小王国”社会,四分五裂,却又组织紧密;它们不团结,所以很容易征服;它们屈服后,又很难统治。外国入侵者留下了一层层新制度和新价值,在某些方面是移风易俗的,但在另外很多方面,又没触碰内在社会秩序的一根毫毛。

    10 世纪末之后,一系列突厥—阿富汗的穆斯林侵入印度北方。伊斯兰教在 7 世纪涌现后,阿拉伯人和突厥人,先后从部落过渡到国家层次,在很多方面开发了比印度本土政体更为精细的政治制度。其中最重要的是军事奴隶制和外国人充任行政官的制度(将在后续章节中讨论),允许阿拉伯人和突厥人超越亲戚关系,实施选贤与能的用人制度。一批批穆斯林入侵者来自阿富汗,最为著名的是拉杰普特人部队(Rajputs)。印度国家的军队竭力抵抗,但实在太薄弱、太分散。13 世纪早期,马穆鲁克(Mamluk)朝代的顾特布-乌德-丁·艾贝克(Qutb-ud-din Aybak)得以建立德里苏丹国。

    德里苏丹国维持三百二十年,长过任何一个本土印度帝国。虽然穆斯林建立持久的政治秩序,但其国家权力有限,仍不能改造印度社会。跟笈多王朝一样,它也没能向印度南方推进太多。用苏迪普塔·卡维拉吉(Sudipta Kaviraj)的话说,“伊斯兰政治统治者,在社会习俗方面,含蓄地接受了对自己权力的限制,这与印度本土统治者非常相像……伊斯兰国家知道自己像其他印度国家,既有局限,又游离于社会之外”。今天,穆斯林统治的遗产体现在巴基斯坦和孟加拉两个国家,还有印度一亿五千多万的穆斯林公民。就幸存的制度而言,穆斯林的政治遗产不是很大,除了像查明达利(zamindari)土地所有制之类的实践。

    英国统治则不同,其影响既持久又深远。在很多方面,现代印度是外国人建国计划的产物。卡维拉吉认为,与印度民族主义者的叙述相悖,“英国人没有征服一个既存的印度。更确切地说,他们只是征服了一系列独立王国。在他们的统治时期,这些独立王国又聚合成政治层次的印度,也算是对英国统治的答复”。这呼应了苏尼尔·基尔纳尼(Sunil Khilnani)的见解,与社会层次相对,政治层次的“印度”在英国统治之前是不存在的。将印度凝成政治体的重要制度,如行政机构、军队、共同的行政语言(英语)、实施统一和非人格化的法律制度、民主本身,既是印度人与英国殖民政府互动之后的成果,又是西方思想和价值融入印度历史经验之后的产物。

    另一方面,就社会层次的印度而言,英国的影响又很有限。英国人修改了他们发现的可恶社会习俗,例如自焚殉夫(Sati),引进了人人平等的西方观念,促使印度人反思种姓制度的哲学前提,鼓励对社会平等的追求。自由主义和民族主义的印度精英,在 20 世纪争取独立的斗争中,以子之矛,攻子之盾。但种姓制度本身、自给自足的村庄社区、高度地方化的社会秩序,基本上完整无缺,远离殖民政府的权力。

    中国和印度

    21 世纪初,中国和印度作为快速增长的新兴市场国家,其前景引起极大的讨论。讨论的大部分围绕它们各自政治制度的性质。作为威权国家,中国在推动大型基建工程方面比印度更为成功,像高速公路、机场、发电厂、大型水电项目。它的三峡大坝需要在漫水区迁走百万以上的居民。中国的人均储水量是印度的五倍,主要依靠大坝和灌溉工程。中国政府一旦决定拆除街区,以建设工厂或公寓大厦,可以直接要求居民搬走。后者几乎没有途径保护自身权利或表述愿望。另一方面,印度是个多元的民主政体,各式社会团体都能组织起来,利用政治制度来达到自身的目标。印度的市或邦政府想建造新发电厂或新机场,很可能遭到反对,从环保非政府组织到传统的种姓协会。很多人认为,这会使决策程序瘫痪,经济增长的远景因此而变得暗淡。

    这类比较都有问题,因为他们没有考虑到,各自的政治制度均植根于自己的社会结构和历史。例如,很多人相信当代印度民主只是历史发展的副产品,而这历史发展又是相对近代的,甚至是出乎意料的。有些民主理论认为,印度自 1947 年独立以来一直维持成功的民主,这使很多人感到惊奇。印度丝毫不符合稳定民主“结构上”的前提:它过去非常贫困,从某种角度看,现在依然如此;在宗教、种族、语言、阶级等方面,它又是高度分裂的;它在公众暴力的狂乱中诞生,随着不同小团体的相互争斗,公众暴力又会定期重现。根据这个见解,在印度高度不平等的文化中,民主只是文化舶来品,由殖民政权输入,并不深植于国家传统。

    这是对当代印度政治相当肤浅的见解。这倒不是说,现代制度所表现出的民主深深植根于古代印度实践,如阿马蒂亚·森等评论家所提示的。而是说,印度政治发展的历程显示,它从来没有为暴政国家的发展提供社会基础,以便其有效集中权力来渗透社会和改造基本社会制度。在中国或俄罗斯出现的专制政府,即剥夺全社会(包括精英阶层)财产和私人权利的制度,从没存在于印度大地——不管是印度本土政府,还是蒙古人和英国人的外来政府。因此而引发了如下的吊诡事态:印度有很多对社会不公的抗议,但不像欧洲和中国,大体上从不针对印度的执政当局。更确切地说,它们只是针对婆罗门所控制的社会秩序,经常表现为异端的宗教运动,像耆那教或佛教,以否定现世秩序的形而上学基础。政治当局被认为离日常生活太遥远,也就太不相干了。

    中国情形则不同。那里,拥有现代制度的强大国家早已产生,可刻意追求对现有社会秩序的广泛干预,并在塑造国家的文化和身份上取得成功。当新的社会组合出现并提出挑战时,国家的早期独尊给自己带来优势。今天,由于经济发展和融入世界全球化,有迹象显示,中国公民社会正在渐渐成形,但中国的社会参与者始终比印度的更为薄弱,更加不能抵抗国家。公元前 3 世纪,秦始皇和阿育王正在建造各自的帝国,这一比照在当时很明显,在今天依然真实。

    中国早熟出世的强大国家,始终能够完成印度所做不到的任务,从建造阻挡游牧入侵者的长城,到兴建 21 世纪的大型水电工程。从长远看,中国人是否因此而得益,那是另外一个故事。中国强大的国家从来不受法治的约束,也就无法遏制其统治者的异想天开。它可睹的成绩,都以普通中国人的生命和生活作为代价,而老百姓基本上无力(过去和现在)来抵制国家的征召。

    印度人也身历专横,不是中国特色的政治专横,而是我前文提出的“表亲的专横”。在印度,个人自由受到诸多限制,如亲戚关系、种姓制度、宗教义务、风俗习惯。在某种意义上,印度的表亲专横允许他们对抗暴君的专横,社会层次的强大组织平衡和抑制了国家层次的强大机构。

    中国和印度的经验表明,强大国家和强大社会同时出现,随着时间的流逝,而互相平衡,互相抵消,这样才会有较好形式的自由。这个主题,我以后还会回顾。但此时,我将考察浮现于穆斯林世界的国家及其独特制度,它们允许阿拉伯和土耳其的政体走出部落制。

    第 13 章 军事奴隶制与穆斯林走出部落制

    奥斯曼帝国的军事奴隶制;部落制是阿拉伯政治发展的主要障碍;军事奴隶制最早兴起于阿拔斯王朝;部落成员长于征服,却短于管理;柏拉图应付家族制的对策

    16 世纪早期,奥斯曼帝国正处权力的巅峰,大约每隔四年就会看到一次非同寻常的征召。1453 年,拜占庭首都君士坦丁堡(Constantinople)落到土耳其手中。1526 年,奥斯曼帝国军队在莫哈奇(Mohács)战役中征服匈牙利;到 1529 年,才受挫于维也纳城门。在帝国的巴尔干半岛省份,官员分头寻找十二至二十岁的年轻男子,这便是德米舍梅征募制(devshirme),或基督徒壮丁征募制。这些官员像寻找足球明星的探子,在评判年轻人潜在体力和智力方面经验丰富,要完成首都伊斯坦布尔(Istanbul)规定的配额。官员访问村庄时,基督教士被要求提供所有获洗礼男童的名单,适龄的被带来供官员检验。多数富有潜力的男孩被强行从父母身边带走,编成一百至一百五十人的小组。他们的名字仔细登记在两本花名册中,一本是在家乡获选时,另一本是在抵达伊斯坦布尔时,互相对照,以防止父母把孩子赎回。如果儿子们长得特别强壮,父母身边可能一个也留不住。官员带着俘虏一起返回伊斯坦布尔,家人将永远见不到自己孩子。那段时期,这样带走的孩子估计为每年三千。

    他们不是注定在卑微和耻辱中度过一生。恰恰相反,最优秀的 10% 会在伊斯坦布尔和埃迪尔内(Edirne)的宫殿中长大,受伊斯兰教世界中最好的培训,为充任帝国高级官员而作准备。其余的则被抚养成说土耳其语的穆斯林,加入著名的土耳其禁卫军。这是精英的步兵部队,陪伴苏丹左右,在欧洲和亚洲南征北战。

    服务于宫殿的精英男孩,在宦官的监督下接受两至八年的训练。最为杰出的,再被派去托普卡帕宫(Topkapi),以获取进一步的调教,那是苏丹在伊斯坦布尔的居所。他们在那里攻读《古兰经》,学阿拉伯语、波斯语、土耳其语、音乐、书法、数学,还参与严格的体育锻炼,以及学习马术、剑术和其他武器,甚至要涉猎绘画和书籍装订。那些进不了宫殿的,则在皇家骑士队(sipahis of the Porte)中担任高级职位。如果年轻的奴隶军人证明是强壮能干的,可逐步升级为将军、维齐尔(vizier,大臣)、外省总督,甚至是苏丹治下最高级的大维齐尔(grand vizier),即政府首相。在苏丹皇家军队服完役之后,很多军人会被安置在指定的庄园,靠居民的缴税而安享晚年。

    另有一个平行的女奴制度,不属于军事奴隶制度。这些女孩是在奴隶市场从巴尔干半岛和南俄罗斯的掠夺者手中买来的。她们将担任奥斯曼帝国高级官员的妻妾,像男孩一样,也被养在宫殿,高度制度化的规则督导她们的成长和教育。很多苏丹是奴隶母亲的儿子,像其他君主的母亲,她们也可通过儿子施展重要影响。

    但这些奴隶必须面对一个重要禁忌。他们的职位和庄园不算私人财产,既不可出售,也不能传予子女。事实上,这些军人中的多数被迫终生保持单身。也有人与来自基督教省份的女奴组织家庭,但孩子不能继承父亲的地位或职位。不管如何有权有势,他们永远是苏丹的奴隶。苏丹稍有不满,就可对他们罚以降级或砍头。

    奥斯曼帝国的军事奴隶制度是非常奇特的。没有一名穆斯林可成为合法的奴隶,所以,也就没有帝国的穆斯林居民追求政府高位。像中国一样,文武官员都是量才录用,以固定的程序招聘和提拔最能干的军人和文官。但又不像中国,这个招聘和提拔只对外国人开放,他们在种族上不同于自己所治理的社会各阶层。这些奴隶的军人和官僚在泡沫中长大,与主人和同僚建立亲密纽带,但与自己所治理的社会却格格不入。像在封闭阶层工作的许多人一样,他们发展了高度的内部团结,成为一个凝聚的团体。在帝国的晚期,他们变成了王者之王,擅自决定苏丹的废黜和任命。

    不出意料,面临此种征召的基督教欧洲人,包括那些住得遥远只是听说此事的人,都心怀恐惧。等级分明的奴隶在治理一个强盛的帝国,这一图像在基督教西方的眼中,成了东方专制主义的象征。到了 19 世纪,奥斯曼帝国已趋式微。不少评论家认为,土耳其禁卫军是怪诞且过时的制度,在阻挡土耳其帝国的现代化。禁卫军在 1807 年罢免塞利姆三世(Selim Ⅲ),在下一年拥戴马哈茂德二世(Mahmud Ⅱ)登基。后者在后续年份中巩固自己的地位,在 1826 年放火焚烧禁卫军兵营,害死大约四千人。扫除了挡道的禁卫军,奥斯曼帝国统治者现在可以推动改革,照现代欧洲的模式重建一支军队。

    显而易见,把孩子从父母身边抢走,使之成为改信伊斯兰教的奴隶,这种制度非常残酷,与现代民主价值格格不入,即使这些奴隶享有特权。穆斯林世界之外,没有看到可以媲美的相似制度,丹尼尔·派普斯(Daniel Pipes)等评论家认为,它的创建最终归于伊斯兰教深处的宗教原因。

    但进一步观察后发现,穆斯林的军事奴隶制并不从宗教原则进化而来,仅仅是强大部落社会中建国的对策。它发明于阿拉伯的阿拔斯王朝,其统治者发现,不能依赖部落组织的军队来维持帝国。阿拉伯部落的征召和扩军很快,以取得速胜。统一后,他们凭借伊斯兰教的激励,又成功占领中东的大部和地中海世界的南部。如我们所知,中国、印度、欧洲的部落层次制度,因不能完成持续的集体行动,而被国家层次的制度所取代。部落社会高度平等,以共识为基础,不轻易服从,倾向于发生内讧和分裂,很难长期守卫领土。

    为了创建国家层次的强大制度,军事奴隶制在世界最强大部落社会之一应运而生,成为一个精彩的适应。它作为集中和巩固国家权力的措施,极为成功,哲学家伊本·赫勒敦(Ibn Khaldun)认为,它挽救了伊斯兰教,使之成为世界主要宗教之一。

    创建穆斯林国家

    先知穆罕默德诞生于阿拉伯半岛西部的古莱什部落,其时,该地不属于任何国家。如第 5 章所提及的,他运用社会契约、实力、超凡魅力的组合,首先统一了争吵不休的麦地那部落,然后是麦加和周边城镇的部落,从而建成了国家层次的社会。在某个意义上,先知的布道是故意反部落的。它宣称有个信徒团体,其忠诚只献给上帝和上帝的话语,而不是自己的部落。这个意识形态上的发展,在内争好斗的分支式社会中,为拓宽集体行动的范围和延伸信任的半径打下了非常重要的基础。

    维持政治统一始终是阿拉伯部落制背景下的艰辛斗争。穆罕默德死于公元 632 年,麻烦立即露出端倪。先知的超凡魅力足以凝聚他所创建的政治体,现在却面临四分五裂的威胁,其组成部分很有可能分道扬镳,如以麦加为基的古莱什部落、来自麦地那的“辅士”(Ansar)和其他部落的信徒。穆罕默德同伴之一的艾布·伯克尔(Abu Bakr),以他娴熟的政治运作,说服部落团体承认自己为第一任哈里发(caliph),即继承者。此外,他还是部落系谱的专家,借用他在部落政治上的渊博知识而赢得拥护自己的共识。

    在头三个哈里发的治下——艾布·伯克尔(632—634 年在位)、欧麦尔(Umar,634—644 年在位)、奥斯曼(644—656 年在位)——穆斯林帝国以惊人的速度扩张,兼并整个阿拉伯半岛,以及今日的黎巴嫩、叙利亚、伊拉克、伊朗、埃及的主要地区。最壮观的胜仗是卡迪西亚会战(Qadisiyyah),打败了波斯的萨珊帝国。20 世纪 80 年代两伊战争时期,萨达姆·侯赛因(Saddam Hussein)曾大肆庆祝这一历史战役。661 年,随着倭马亚王朝建立于大马士革,版图扩展仍在继续,进一步征服了北非、小亚细亚(Anatolia)、信德(Sind)和中亚。阿拉伯军队在 711 年占领西班牙,在比利牛斯山的北边继续挺进,直到 732 年在法国的图尔战役(Battle of Poitiers)中受到查理·马特(Charles Martel)的遏制。

    阿拉伯部落虽有宗教动机,但同样重要的是经济奖励。他们所征服的定居农业社会,可提供大量土地、奴隶、女子、马匹、动产。最初的统治问题是所有掠夺游牧民族所面临的:如何分配战利品,以避免各部落之间的内讧。通常当场分配可搬走的战利品,五分之一给哈里发,运回麦地那。被征服地区的土地变成哈里发治下的国家领土,不少干脆落到参与战役的各部落手中。

    过不多久,阿拉伯部落男子必须由征服者变为管理富饶农地和居民的统治者。哈里发不需要重新开发国家制度,因为四周都是成熟的国家或帝国。被阿拉伯人征服之后,萨珊帝国提供最及时的中央管理模式。曾属君士坦丁堡的领土现已被阿拉伯征服,居住于此的很多基督徒前来参加穆斯林政府的工作,从而带来拜占庭政府的治理方法。

    真正的穆斯林国家何时出现?与文学描述相对的历史记载,相对来说比较缺乏,使精确判定变得异常困难。维持常备军队和警察、定期向居民征税、设立行政机构以收税、裁定司法以解决争端、主持像大清真寺那样的公共建设,从事上述这一切的政体,肯定存在于倭马亚王朝阿卜杜勒-马利克(Abd al-Malik,685—705 年在位)时期。或许更早,甚至在倭马亚王朝第二任哈里发穆阿维叶(Mu‘awiya,661—680 年在位)时期。很难说先知穆罕默德创建的不是部落联合体而是国家,因为上述的制度特征在他生前尚未出现。

    波斯的理想绝对君主制中,其国王强大得能够维护和平和遏制贪婪的武装精英,后者是农业社会中冲突和混乱的主要来源。从现代民主角度看这样的社会,我们倾向于认为,农业社会的君主只是掠夺性精英团体的一员,也许由其他寡头选出来保护他们的租金和利益。但实际上,这些社会中几乎总有三角斗争,分别是国王、精英的贵族或寡头、非精英的农民和市民。国王经常站在非精英一边来反对寡头,既可削弱潜在的政治挑战,又可争到份下的税收。于此,我们可看到国王代表大众利益的概念的雏形。我们已经知道,中国寡头精英的大庄园扩展,皇帝为此而受到威胁,遂运用国家权力来予以限制和破坏。同样道理,萨珊帝国的绝对君主政体被视作秩序的壁垒,以反对损害大众利益的精英的相互争执。所以有人强调,君主执行法律便是正义的标志。

    从部落过渡到国家层次的社会,早期阿拉伯统治者享有几点优势。绝对君主制的中央行政官僚模式,作为国家层次社会的规范,早已存在于周边国家。更重要的是,他们拥有上帝之下人人平等的宗教意识形态。就某种意义而言,以巴士拉(Basra)和阿拉伯半岛为基地的哈瓦利吉派(Kharijites),从先知布道中得出了最符合逻辑的结论。他们认为,穆罕默德的继承人只要是穆斯林就够,不管他是不是阿拉伯人,也不管他来自哪个部落。如果穆罕默德的继承者如此照办,他们可能会尝试创建一个包容不同种族的超级帝国,基于意识形态,不靠亲戚关系,就像神圣罗马帝国。但对倭马亚王朝来说,光是维持帝国统一,且不谈建立横跨各地域的中央政府,已证明是一项异常艰巨的任务。顽强的部落忠诚胜过意识形态,穆斯林国家继续受困于亲戚关系的争吵和仇恨。

    先知死去不久就爆发了一起最重要的冲突。穆罕默德属于古莱什部落的哈希姆(Hashemite)血统,但又与竞争的倭马亚血统共享曾祖父阿卜杜·玛纳夫(Abd Manaf)。倭马亚血统和哈希姆血统争吵得很厉害,不管是先知出生之前,还是先知在世时,前者甚至起兵,反对穆罕默德和他在麦地那的穆斯林信徒。穆罕默德征服麦加后,倭马亚血统改信伊斯兰教,但两个血统之间的仇恨仍在继续。穆罕默德没有儿子,只跟最心爱的妻子阿以莎(Aisha)生了女儿法蒂玛(Fatima),长大后嫁给先知的表亲阿里(Ali)。第三位哈里发奥斯曼属于倭马亚血统,把很多亲戚带入权力圈,最终死于行刺。继承他的是阿里,却被赶出阿拉伯半岛,在库法(Kufa,今日伊拉克)祈祷时,又被哈瓦利吉派系的人杀死。随之,哈希姆血统、哈瓦利吉派、倭马亚血统之间爆发了一系列内战(fitnas)。等到阿里儿子侯赛因(Husain)战死于伊拉克南部的卡尔巴拉(Karbala)战役,倭马亚血统才得以巩固政权,开拓新朝代。阿里的党羽被称为什叶派(Shiites),信奉正统主义,认为阿拉伯帝国只能属于穆罕默德的直系后裔。倭马亚王朝穆阿维叶的追随者发展成为逊尼派(Sunnis),声称自己是正统理论与实践的奉行者。逊尼派和什叶派的大分裂,起源于阿拉伯部落竞争,在 21 世纪的今天,仍引发汽车爆炸、对清真寺的恐怖袭击等。

    早期的哈里发尝试创建超越部落忠诚的国家组织,尤其是在军队里,其十人和百人单位都是跨越部落的。如一位历史学家所说,新兴的穆斯林精英“知道部落身份在阿拉伯社会中植根太深,既不能以法令废除,也不能以超越部落排外性的措施将之驱走。他们能否将部落成员成功融入国家,既取决于为自身利益利用部落关系的能力,也取决于自己超越部落关系的能力”。占领伊拉克安巴(Anbar)省的美国人,在 2003 年入侵之后发现,倚靠部落领袖的传统权威,比创建无视社会现实的非人格化单位,更容易掌控部落军人。部落成员与指挥官发生争吵,可能会悄悄溜走,返回自己的亲人中。如指挥官又是自己部落的酋长,他就会三思而不行了。

    但是,以部落为基础的国家本质上是孱弱和动荡的,部落领袖的暴躁闻名遐迩。他们缺乏纪律,经常因为争吵,或受到忽略,而与亲戚们逃之夭夭。早期哈里发对所招募的部落领袖满腹狐疑,通常不让他们担任重要的指挥职位。此外,新建国家经常受到独立游牧部落的威胁,穆斯林领袖对之只有轻蔑。据传,哈里发奥斯曼不愿理会一名重要部落领袖的见解,斥之为“低能贝都因人”的唠叨。

    军事奴隶制的起源

    军事奴隶制发展于 9 世纪中期的阿拔斯王朝,用以克服之前穆斯林军队基于部落征召的重重弊端。阿拔斯王朝属于哈希姆血统,在什叶派和波斯的呼罗珊(Khorasani)义军帮助下,于 750 年推翻倭马亚王朝,并把首都从大马士革迁至巴格达。早期的阿拔斯王朝在巩固其统治方面非常残忍,尽量灭绝倭马亚王朝的血统,并镇压曾经的盟友什叶派和呼罗珊义军。国家集权有增无减,大权独揽的是称为维齐尔的首相。宫廷的规模和奢华均有增加,定居城市的帝国与其发源的部落区域则更加分隔。

    一开始,阿拔斯王朝统治者就暗示,基于亲戚关系的政治权力趋于浮躁善变,可能的解决之道就是军事奴隶制。哈里发马赫迪(al-Mahdi,775—785 年在位)宁可选择一批毛拉(mawali,释奴)作为自己的仆人或助手,也不愿挑选亲戚或呼罗珊盟军。他解释道:

    我坐在观众席里,可以唤来毛拉,让他坐在身边,他的膝盖触碰我的膝盖。等到散席,我可命令他去侍候我的坐骑,他仍然高兴,不会生气。如果我要求其他人做同样的事,他会说:“我可是你的拥护者和亲密盟友的儿子”,或“我可是你(阿拔斯王朝)霸业的老兵”,或“我可是首先投入你霸业的人的儿子”。而且我不能改变他的(顽固)立场。

    到马蒙(al-Ma’mun,813—833 年在位)和穆尔台绥姆(al-Mu’tasim,833—842 年在位)的治下,阿拔斯王朝征服中亚的河中地区(Transoxania),大批突厥部落投靠帝国,外国人充当国家军事力量的核心方才成为惯例。当阿拉伯人遇上生活在中亚大草原的突厥部落时,其领土扩展受到阻止,后者优秀的打仗能力获得很多阿拉伯学者的承认。哈里发不能招募整个突厥部落为自己打仗出力,因为它们同样有着部落组织的缺陷。所以,突厥人只是作为个别奴隶,在非部落军队中接受训练。马蒙创建了四千突厥奴隶的卫兵队,称作马穆鲁克,到穆尔台绥姆时期,壮大至将近七万人。他们是凶悍的游牧人,新近皈依伊斯兰教,充满了对穆斯林事业的热情。他们成为阿拔斯军队的核心,“因为他们在威力、血气、勇敢、无畏方面,都比其他种族优越”。根据一名见证马蒙征战的观察员,

    停战区道路两侧站着两行骑士……右首一侧是一百名突厥骑士,左首一侧是一百名“其他”骑士(即阿拉伯人)……大家都排成战斗行列,等待马蒙的莅临……时值正午,天气愈益炎热。马蒙到达时发现,除三四人外,突厥骑士依然危坐于马背,而“混杂的其他人”……早在地上东倒西歪。

    穆尔台绥姆把突厥人组成马穆鲁克团,因为本地居民与突厥士兵的暴力争端,而把首都从巴格达迁至萨迈拉(Samarra)。他让他们在自己学院中接受训练,购买突厥女奴配给他们成家,但不准与本地人混杂,由此创建了一个与周围社会分隔的军事种姓。

    忠于家庭,还是忠于公正的政治秩序,两者之间存在矛盾。这种思想在西方政治哲学中具有悠久历史。柏拉图的《理想国》记载了哲学家苏格拉底和一群年轻人的讨论,他们试图在“讲说中”创造一个“正义之城”。苏格拉底说服他们,正义之城需要特别激昂的保卫者阶层,为防御自己城邦而感到无比自豪;保卫者是武士,其首要原则是对朋友友善、对敌人凶狠;他们必须接受妥善的音乐和体操的训练,以培养公益精神。

    早期阿拉伯帝国治下的扩张

    《理想国》第五卷有段著名论述,谈到保卫者应实行妻小共有制度。苏格拉底指出,性欲和生儿育女都是自然的,但保卫者又要忠于自己防御的城邦,两者会有竞争;为此,必须告诉孩子一个“高尚谎言”,他们没有生身父母,只是大地之子。他还主张,保卫者必须过集体生活,可有不同的性伙伴,但不可跟单独女子结婚,生下的孩子也必须过集体生活。自然家庭是公益的敌人:

    那么,我们已讲过的和我们正在这里讲的这些规划,是不是能确保他们成为更名副其实的保卫者,防止他们把国家弄得四分五裂,把公有的东西各各说成“这是我的”,各人把他所能从公家弄到手的东西拖到自己家里去,把妇女儿童看作私产,各家有各家的悲欢苦乐呢?

    不很清楚,苏格拉底或柏拉图是否相信此举的可行性。事实上,苏格拉底的对话者,对“讲说中”的正义之城能否成为现实,表示了巨大疑问。讨论的目的在于指明,亲戚关系和对公共政治秩序的义务之间永远存在紧张关系。它的启示是,成功的秩序需要通过某种机制来抑制亲戚关系,使保卫者把国家利益放在自己的家庭之上。

    如果说马蒙、穆尔台绥姆或其他早期穆斯林领袖读到了柏拉图的著作,或知道他的想法,这非常可疑。但军事奴隶制确实应答了柏拉图所提出的必需,没说他们是大地的孩子,只知道出生地非常遥远,除了代表国家和公益的哈里发,不欠任何人。奴隶们不知道生身父母,只认主人,忠心耿耿。他们获得通常是突厥语的普通新名,身处基于血统的社会,却与任何血统毫不关联。他们没有实行女人和孩子的共产主义,但隔离于阿拉伯社会,不准扎根,尤其不可自立门户,以避免“把能弄到手的所有东西都搬回家”。传统的阿拉伯社会中,裙带关系和部落忠诚的难题,就此获得一劳永逸的解决。

    作为军事制度的马穆鲁克来得太迟,以致不能保住阿拔斯王朝。9 世纪中期,帝国已分裂成一系列独立主权政治体。756 年,逃亡的倭马亚王子在西班牙设立第一个独立伊斯兰国,帝国分裂自此开始。8 世纪末 9 世纪初,独立王朝建立于摩洛哥和突尼斯;9 世纪末 10 世纪初,独立王朝又在伊朗东部出现。到 10 世纪中期,埃及、叙利亚、阿拉伯半岛也从版图上消失,阿拔斯国家只保留伊拉克的部分地区。阿拉伯政权,不管是王朝还是现代,再也没有统一的穆斯林或阿拉伯世界。统一大业只好留给土耳其的奥斯曼帝国。

    阿拔斯帝国灭亡了,但军事奴隶制得以幸存。事实上,它在后续世纪中,为伊斯兰教本身的生存发挥了至关重要的作用。三个新的权力中心涌现出来,都基于军事奴隶制的行之有效。第一个是伽色尼(Ghaznavid)帝国,曾在前一章中提及。它以阿富汗的伽色尼为中心,统一了波斯东部和中亚,还渗入印度北部,为穆斯林统治次大陆铺平道路。第二个是埃及的马穆鲁克苏丹国,在阻止基督教十字军和蒙古军方面,扮演了生死攸关的角色,可能因此而挽救了作为世界宗教的伊斯兰教。最后一个就是奥斯曼帝国,它改善军事奴隶制,为自己作为世界强国的崛起打下基础。所有三个案例中,军事奴隶制解决了部落社会中建立持久军事工具的难题。但在伽色尼和埃及马穆鲁克的案例中,亲戚关系和家族制渗入马穆鲁克制度,使该制度衰落。此外,作为埃及社会最强大制度的马穆鲁克,不愿接受文官的控制,进而接管国家,预示了 20 世纪发展中国家的军事专政。只有奥斯曼帝国清楚看到,必须把家族制赶出国家机器,其照章办事将近三个世纪。尽管文官政府严格控制军队,但从 17 世纪晚期起,当家族制和世袭原则重新抬头时,它也开始走下坡路。

    第 14 章 马穆鲁克挽救伊斯兰教

    马穆鲁克如何在埃及上台;中东阿拉伯的权力却在突厥奴隶之手;马穆鲁克挽救伊斯兰教于十字军和蒙古军;马穆鲁克实施军事奴隶制的缺陷导致政权的最终衰落

    军事奴隶制帮助穆斯林政权在埃及和叙利亚掌权近三百年,从阿尤布(Ayyubid)王朝终结的 1250 年到 1517 年。其时,马穆鲁克苏丹国败在奥斯曼帝国的手中。今天,我们把伊斯兰教和全球的穆斯林社区(现今总人口约 15 亿)视作理所当然。但伊斯兰教的扩张,不仅取决于宗教思想的号召和吸引力,很大程度上,还取决于政治权力。根据穆斯林的信念,穆斯林军队必须向身处战争土地(Dar-ul Harb)的非信徒发起圣战(jihad),再把他们带入伊斯兰土地(Dar al-Islam)。归功于穆斯林,基督教和琐罗亚斯德教(Zoroastrianism)在中东不再是主要宗教。同样道理,如果十字军得以掌控中东,或蒙古军一路扫到北非,伊斯兰教也可能成为次要流派。尼日利亚、象牙海岸、多哥、加纳等北部边界,就是当初穆斯林部队的远征终点线。要不是穆斯林部队的打仗威力,巴基斯坦、孟加拉、印度的穆斯林少数派就不复存在。它的出现不仅靠宗教狂热,还靠国家建立有效制度来集中使用权力——最重要的就是军事奴隶制。

    伊斯兰教本身的生存取决于军事奴隶制,这一见解与阿拉伯伟大的历史学家和哲学家伊本·赫勒敦不谋而合。他活在 14 世纪的北非,与埃及的马穆鲁克苏丹国同一时代。他在《历史绪论》(Muqadimmah)中说:

    (阿拔斯)国家淹没于颓废和奢华,披上灾难和衰弱的外衣,被异教的鞑靼所推翻。鞑靼废了哈里发的宝座,毁掉该地的辉煌,使非信徒在信念之地得逞。这全是因为信徒们自我放纵,只顾享乐,追求奢侈,精力日衰,不愿在防卫中重振旗鼓,放弃了勇敢的脸面和男子汉的象征——然后,善良的上帝伸出救援之手,复苏气息奄奄的人,在埃及恢复穆斯林的团结,维持秩序,保卫伊斯兰教的城墙。上帝从突厥人和其众多部落给穆斯林送来保护他们的统治者和忠实助手。这些助手借助奴役的渠道,从战争土地来到伊斯兰土地,本身便藏有神的祝福。他们通过奴役学习荣誉和祝福,荣获上帝的恩惠;受了奴役的治疗,他们以真正信徒的决心走进穆斯林宗教,保持游牧人的美德,没受低级品行的玷污、享乐的腐蚀、文明生活的污染,他们的激情不受奢华的影响,仍完好无缺。

    马穆鲁克制度创立于库尔德人的阿尤布王朝末期,那是 12 世纪末 13 世纪初,阿尤布王朝短暂统治埃及和叙利亚,其最著名的子孙是萨拉丁(Salah al-Din,在西方被称作 Saladin)。阿尤布王朝曾在巴勒斯坦和叙利亚的反十字军战争中,投入了突厥奴隶军。它的最后一任苏丹萨里(al-Salih Ayyub),创建了伯海里(Bahri,编按:意即河洲)团,以总部所在地的尼罗河小岛的城堡命名。据传,库尔德士兵的不可靠使他转向突厥人。该团含八百至一千的奴隶骑士,主要是钦察突厥人(Kipchak Turkish)。像钦察一样的众多突厥部落,开始在中东扮演日渐重要的角色。其时,他们受到另一强大游牧民族的挤压,蒙古人正在把他们从中亚传统的部落地域赶走。

    伯海里团很早就证明了自己的骁勇善战。法王路易九世 1249 年在埃及登陆,发动第七次十字军东征。翌年,他败在伯海里团手中。率领伯海里团的是一名钦察人,名叫拜伯尔斯(Baybars)。他曾是蒙古人的俘虏,作为奴隶卖到叙利亚,最后被招聘为新马穆鲁克的领袖。由此,十字军在埃及遭到驱逐,路易九世的赎金相当于法国一年的国民生产总值。

    1260 年,拜伯尔斯和伯海里团,在巴勒斯坦的阿音札鲁特(Ayn Jalut)战役中取得更为重大的胜利,他们打败了蒙古军。其时,蒙古军已经征服欧亚大陆的大部。成吉思汗于 1227 年去世,此前蒙古各部落已经在他手上完成统一。13 世纪 30 年代,他们摧毁了统治中国北方的金朝;打败了中亚的花剌子模帝国;同时又战胜了阿塞拜疆、格鲁吉亚、亚美尼亚的王国;侵犯和占领了俄罗斯的大部,1240 年洗劫基辅;在 13 世纪 40 年代挺进东欧和中欧。他们最终停止前进,不是由于基督教军队的威力,而是因为大汗窝阔台(成吉思汗的儿子)的去世。蒙古指挥官奉召撤退,以讨论继承人选。1255 年,蒙哥命令成吉思汗的孙子旭烈兀征服中东。他占领伊朗,建立伊儿汗国(Ilkhanid),再朝叙利亚挺进,旨在征服埃及。1258 年,陷落的巴格达遭到彻底蹂躏,阿拔斯王朝的末代哈里发也被处死。

    马穆鲁克在阿音札鲁特的胜利,一定程度上归功于兵力优势,由于蒙哥的去世,旭烈兀不得不率领主力部队撤退。尽管如此,为了攻击马穆鲁克,他仍留下最好的指挥官之一和实质性的兵力。蒙古人是优秀的战术家和战略家,以迅速转移和简易给养,设法包抄敌人。相比之下,马穆鲁克装备得更好,战马更为高大,携带更为坚实的盔甲、弓、矛、剑,并且纪律异常严明。阿音札鲁特的胜利不只是侥幸,马穆鲁克曾与伊儿汗国发生一连串战役,以保卫叙利亚,直到 1281 年战争结束。它后来在 1299、1300、1303 年,又三次阻挡蒙古人的入侵。

    伯海里系马穆鲁克苏丹国,1250—1392 年

    马穆鲁克取代阿尤布王朝,与伊儿汗国开战时,就以拜伯尔斯为第一任苏丹,开始了他们的统治。以马穆鲁克为基础的政权比之前的王朝更为稳定。萨拉丁是伟大的军事领袖和穆斯林的英雄,但他组建的政体非常脆弱,与其说是一个国家,倒不如说是基于亲戚关系的公国联邦。他的军队并不忠于王朝,在萨拉丁死后,分裂成一群相互竞争的民兵。相比之下,马穆鲁克治理一个真正的国家,设有中央官僚机构和专业军队——实际上军队就是国家,这既是优点也是缺点。不像阿尤布王朝,马穆鲁克没有瓜分国家,也没有分发封地给亲戚或宠臣。不像萨拉丁死后,叙利亚在马穆鲁克的治理下,也没有马上脱离埃及。

    马穆鲁克制度在埃及马穆鲁克政权的统治下获得进一步的加强。苏丹国得以从中亚草原、西北和北方的拜占庭领土获得一波波新兵,这是成功的关键之一。有些新兵已是穆斯林,另外的是异教徒和基督徒。皈依伊斯兰教的过程是至关重要的,重建了他们的忠诚,并拉近了他们与新主人的感情。新兵与家庭和部落完全隔绝,经过从小伊始的培训而获得新家,即苏丹家庭和马穆鲁克相互的手足情谊,这是另一个关键。

    太监在制度运作上也扮演重要角色。不像中国或拜占庭帝国的太监,穆斯林太监几乎都是在穆斯林土地之外出生的外国人。有位评论家这么说,“穆斯林没有生下他。他也没生下一名穆斯林”。马穆鲁克几乎都是突厥人或欧洲人,太监则有可能是从努比亚(Nubia)或南方其他地区招募来的非洲黑人。跟马穆鲁克一样,他们也与自己家庭完全隔绝,因此对主人忠心耿耿。去势得以让他们发挥重要作用,成为年轻马穆鲁克的教师。后者的获选,除了体力和尚武,还取决于他们的健美。作为只有袍泽之谊而难近女色的军人集体,老牌马穆鲁克的同性恋索求,始终是一件头痛事,太监还可从中发挥缓冲的作用。

    作为政治制度的马穆鲁克之所以成功,除了教育特殊,还因为贵不过一代的原则。他们不能将马穆鲁克地位传给孩子,儿子会融入普通老百姓,孙子则完全享受不到任何特权。其中的道理简单明了:穆斯林不能是奴隶,而马穆鲁克的孩子生来就是穆斯林。此外,马穆鲁克的孩子生于城市,没经历过草原上流浪生涯的锻炼,在那里,孱弱就等于夭亡。假如马穆鲁克地位变成世袭,就会违反当年获选时严格的量才录用原则。

    马穆鲁克的衰退

    马穆鲁克制度的设计中至少有两个问题,随着时间的推移,使它本身变得日益软弱。第一,马穆鲁克军中没有制度化的统治机制。苏丹以下有等级分明的指挥链,但苏丹本身却没有明确的选任规则。有两条相互竞争的原则,第一条是王朝原则,当政的苏丹选择一个儿子来继位;第二条是非世袭原则,各派马穆鲁克一边争权夺利,一边试图达成人选的共识。第二条比较占上风时,各资深埃米尔(emir,王公)所选出的苏丹,经常只是门面装饰。

    马穆鲁克国家结构的第二个缺陷是缺乏最高的政治权威。马穆鲁克创建时,仅是阿尤布王朝的军事工具。到最后一任阿尤布苏丹去世,马穆鲁克却接管了国家,造成了逆向的代理。大多数政治等级制度中,主人拥有权力,委任代理人去执行自己的政策。很多政体发生功能的紊乱,因为代理人自有打算,与主人的目标大相径庭。制度的设计就是要鼓励代理人遵循主人的命令。

    相比之下,在马穆鲁克的案例中,代理人自己又变成了主人。他们既是服务苏丹的军事等级机构,同时自己又在争夺苏丹职位。这意味着,他们既要做军官工作,又要图谋攫取权力并削弱对手。这自然给纪律和等级制度造成极坏的影响,就像现代发展中国家的军政府。这个问题在 1399 年变得异常尖锐,其时,蒙古的帖木儿国侵犯叙利亚,洗劫阿勒颇(Aleppo),而马穆鲁克忙于内斗,无暇组织防御,竟撤回开罗。此外,他们也让地方部落夺走对上埃及的控制。最终幸免于难,只是因为帖木儿国需要应对另一新兴力量的威胁,即奥斯曼帝国。如果马穆鲁克服从于文官政府,像奥斯曼帝国那样,文官政府就可采取措施予以解决。

    反世袭原则逐渐衰退,最终导致埃及马穆鲁克国家的崩溃。随着时间的推移,世袭不但用于苏丹,甚至蔓延至马穆鲁克,他们也试图建立自己的朝代。像中国的非人格化科举制度,贵不过一代的原则违背人们的生物性追求,马穆鲁克都试图保障家人和后裔的社会地位。富有的马穆鲁克发现,他们可以捐赠给伊斯兰宗教慈善事业瓦克夫(waqf)、伊斯兰学校(madrassa)、医院和其他信托机构,让自己的后裔担任主管,从而战胜贵不过一代的原则。此外,有些马穆鲁克没有直系亲戚,却把种族关系当作团结基础。苏丹盖拉温(Qalawun)废弃钦察人,开始招募切尔克斯人(Circassian)和阿布哈兹人(Abkhaz)的奴隶,以组建新的布尔吉团(Burji)。最终,切尔克斯派从钦察派的手中夺走苏丹国。

    到 14 世纪中期,马穆鲁克制度的严重退化已经相当明显。事实上,其时的情形是一片和平繁荣,对马穆鲁克的纪律却有灾难性的影响。圣地巴勒斯坦的基督徒多已消失,马穆鲁克在 1323 年与蒙古人签订和平条约。自己不是马穆鲁克的苏丹纳绥尔·穆罕默德(al-Nasir Muhammad),开始委派非马穆鲁克的效忠者担任高级军职,并清洗他心疑的能干军官。

    政府随着苏丹巴库克(Barquq)在 1390 年的上台而获得短暂活力。他的掌权全靠布尔吉,即切尔克斯人的马穆鲁克,他还恢复了招募外国奴隶的旧制度。后续的苏丹使用国家垄断所积累的资源,大大扩充了对年轻马穆鲁克的招募,从而造成代沟问题。老牌马穆鲁克开始演变成军事贵族,像现代美国大学的终身制教授,在等级制度中盘根错节,固守现状,以应对年轻一代的挑战。资深首领的平均年龄开始上升,人员流通显著减缓,古老贵族分为氏族。马穆鲁克开始提拔自己的家人,以财富的炫耀来确立自己的地位,女眷也在争取子孙利益上扮演更大角色。马穆鲁克制度,最初创建时是为了在军事招募中克服部落制,自己现在反而变成部落。新的部落不一定基于亲戚关系,但反映出人们内心深处的冲动:应付非人格化社会制度,以促进和保障后裔、朋友、依附者的利益。

    久而久之,马穆鲁克制度从中央国家退化成军阀的寻租联合体。年轻的马穆鲁克不再忠于苏丹,如一名历史学家所说的,反而变成

    一个利益团体,它在战场上的可靠性是可疑的,它的造反倾向却是自然的。苏丹国的最后几十年,开罗的逐日编年史就是一个不断要求苏丹付款以换取国内稍稍稳定的故事。招募来的马穆鲁克以掠夺……欢迎甘素卧·胡里(al-Ghawri,一位晚期苏丹)的登基。受训新兵烧了五名高级长官的豪宅,以表达对自己低报酬的不满,作为对照,大首领通常聚敛巨额的财富。

    将马穆鲁克与早期苏丹绑在一起的道德关系,已被经济考虑所替代。高级马穆鲁克向低级军人购买忠诚,后者再向国家或平民百姓榨取租金,以期获得赞助人的奖励。苏丹只是伙伴中的老大,有些遭到了马穆鲁克派系的行刺或撤职,所有晚期的苏丹都不免会提心吊胆。

    除了政治上的不稳定,政府在 15 世纪晚期又遭遇财政危机。葡萄牙海军在印度洋取得首要地位,切断了香料贸易,苏丹的收入在 14 世纪末开始下跌,只好依靠税率的增加。这迫使经济主体——农民、商人、手艺人——想方设法隐瞒资产来逃税,征税官员愿意低报税率来换取自己荷包的回扣。结果,虽然税率增高,实际税收反而下降。政府只好诉诸没收所能找到的资产,包括马穆鲁克用来为后裔隐藏财富的伊斯兰慈善事业瓦克夫。

    作为犯罪集团的国家

    政治学家将早期现代的欧洲国家比作有组织犯罪。他们的意思是,国家统治者使用自己组织暴力的专长,向社会上其他人榨取资源,经济学家称之为租金。有些学者使用“掠夺国家”的字眼来描绘一系列现代发展中国家的政权,像蒙博托·塞塞·塞科(Mobutu Sese Seko)治下的扎伊尔(刚果),或查尔斯·泰勒治下的利比里亚。在掠夺国家里,掌权精英试图向社会提取最高程度的资源,以供自己的私人消费。这些精英之所以追求权力,就是因为权力可向他们提供经济租金。

    毫无疑问,有些国家是高度掠夺性的。在一定意义上,所有国家都是掠夺性的。在理解政治发展时要面对一个重要议题,即国家是否在掠夺最大化的租金,或出于其他考虑,仅在提取远远低于理论上最大化的租金。以租金最大化来描绘成熟的农业社会,如奥斯曼土耳其、明朝中国、“旧制度”下的法兰西王国,并不一定恰当。但对有些政治秩序来说,如蒙古人等游牧部落所设置的征服政权,这肯定是精确的,也愈来愈成为后期马穆鲁克政权的特征。马穆鲁克苏丹的征税,既是没收性的,又是任意的,使长期投资变得难以想象,主人只好将财产投入非优化的用途,像宗教慈善事业瓦克夫。有个有意思的推测:当商业资本主义开始在意大利、荷兰、英国起飞时,在埃及却被扼杀在摇篮中。

    另一方面,高水平征税仅出现于埃及马穆鲁克三百年统治的末期。这表明,早期苏丹的征税远远低于最大化。换言之,最大化的租金提取并不是农业社会中前现代国家不可避免的特征。根据波斯的中东国家理论,君主功能之一就是保护农民,以正义和稳定的名义来对抗贪婪的地主和其他追求租金最大化的精英。这个理论为阿拉伯人所采用。所以,国家不单是占据领土的强盗,更是新兴公共利益的监护人。马穆鲁克国家最终走向完全的掠夺,归因于内外力量的交汇。

    诸多原因导致马穆鲁克政权的政治衰败,它在 1517 年遭到奥斯曼帝国的摧毁。从 1388 年到 1514 年,埃及承受二十六年的瘟疫。由于奥斯曼帝国的兴起,马穆鲁克越来越难以招募奴隶军,因为奥斯曼帝国直接挡在赴中亚的贸易途径上。最后,马穆鲁克制度证明太僵硬,不愿采用新军事技术,尤其是步兵军队的火器。面对欧洲敌人的奥斯曼帝国,早在 1425 年就开始使用火器,约在欧洲探索此项革新的一个世纪之后。他们很快掌握这些新武器,其大炮在 1453 年攻陷君士坦丁堡时发挥了重要作用。相比之下,马穆鲁克要到甘素卧·胡里苏丹(1501—1516 年在位)时期,方才认真试验火器,离他们毁灭于奥斯曼帝国已经不远。马穆鲁克骑士发现使用火器有损自己尊严,而政府又受铜铁矿产匮乏的限制。经过一些夭折的测试(十五门火炮在试用时全部炸坏),苏丹国设法装备了有限数量的火炮,并组建了非马穆鲁克的火枪第五军团。但这些革新姗姗来迟,无法保住这个资金短缺、堕落、传统的政权。

    阿尤布苏丹创建伯海里团,所想解决的问题与早期中国建国者所面临的完全相同,即在高度部落化的社会中组建军队,不得忠于自己的部落,只能忠于以他为代表的国家。他的对策是购买年轻外国人,切断其对家庭的忠诚。他们进入马穆鲁克奴隶大家庭后,在选贤与能的基础上获得晋升;每年招募新人,前途全凭自己的才干。如此建起的军事机器令人印象深刻,顶住两代蒙古军的进攻,将十字军战士赶出圣地巴勒斯坦,为保卫埃及而打退帖木儿国。如伊本·赫勒敦所说的,马穆鲁克在历史的关键时刻挽救了伊斯兰教,否则,后者可能早已变得无足轻重。

    另一方面,马穆鲁克的制度设计又包含了自己消亡的种子。马穆鲁克直接参政,不满足于担任国家的代理人。没人可以管教他们,每一名马穆鲁克都能追求苏丹一职,因此蓄谋弄权。王朝原则很早为最高层领袖所接受,很快传染给整个马穆鲁克上层,变成既得利益的世袭贵族精英。同时,这些精英没有安全产权,想方设法从苏丹手中保住自己的收入,以传给后裔。在布尔吉系马穆鲁克的治下,精英群体分化于年龄的差异,老牌马穆鲁克将年轻者招入自己的家族网络。曾将年轻马穆鲁克与国家绑在一起的训练不见了,只有为自己派别的赤裸裸的租金追求,他们使用强制力量,从平民百姓和其他马穆鲁克那里榨取资源。马穆鲁克精英为这些权力斗争煞费苦心,以致不得不采用非常谨慎的外交政策。仅仅凭运气,15 世纪早期的帖木儿国侵略,没给他们带来巨大的外部威胁,一直到奥斯曼帝国和葡萄牙逐一崛起的世纪末。由于瘟疫造成的人口减少和外贸的丧失,马穆鲁克的财政日渐捉襟见肘。没有外部威胁,也就没有军事现代化的激励。奥斯曼帝国完善了军事奴隶制,并组建了更为强大的国家。所以,马穆鲁克 1517 年败于奥斯曼帝国,早成定局。

    第 15 章  奥斯曼帝国的运作和衰退

    奥斯曼帝国以欧洲君主做不到的方式集中权力;奥斯曼帝国完善军事奴隶制;不稳定的土耳其国家依赖持续的对外扩展;奥斯曼制度衰退的原因;军事奴隶制走进发展的死胡同

    尼科洛·马基雅维利(Niccolò Machiavelli)著名的政论《君主论》写于 1513 年。其时,奥斯曼帝国正处在权力的巅峰,将征服匈牙利,还将向哈布斯堡首都维也纳发起首次进攻。在该书第 4 章中,马基雅维利作出以下观察:

    在我们的时代,两种各异的政府是土耳其和法国国王。土耳其整个君主政体由一人统治,其余的都是他的仆人。他将王国分割为众多桑贾克(sanjaks,编按:相当于中国的县或区),派去不同的行政官,可以随意调换。而法国国王身处自古就有的领主中间,后者在国内获得百姓的认可和爱戴,享有自己的特权,国王不可予以取消,否则会有危险。因此,无论谁在觊觎这两个国家,你将发现很难征服土耳其,但一旦征服,维持非常容易;作为对照,在某些方面,你会发现攫取法国比较容易,但很难维持。

    马基雅维利抓住了奥斯曼帝国的本质:它在 16 世纪早期的治理,比法国更加集中、更加非人格化,因此更加现代化。16 世纪后期,法国国王攻击地主贵族的特权,试图创建同样集中统一的政权。他从巴黎派遣总督(intendents)——现代地方长官的前身——去直接管理王国,像治理各桑贾克的土耳其长官贝伊(bey,县长或区长),以取代地方的家族精英。奥斯曼帝国采用的制度与众不同,以征募制和军事奴隶制为基础,建成了高度强大且稳定的国家,可匹敌欧洲其时的任何政权,治理着比阿拉伯哈里发或苏丹所打造的任何一个都要大的帝国。奥斯曼社会与同时代的中国明朝有相似处,它们都有强大的中央国家,国家之外的社会参与者都相当薄弱,缺乏组织。(不同之处在于,奥斯曼政权仍受法律限制。)奥斯曼的国家制度是现代和家族制的奇怪混合体。家族制一旦以现代因素为代价来保护既得利益,国家制度就会衰败。奥斯曼帝国完善了马穆鲁克的军事奴隶制,但最终还是屈服于精英把地位和资源传给孩子的天性。

    仅一代的贵族

    马基雅维利所描述的行政制度,即土耳其苏丹随意派遣和调换去外省的行政官,其根源在于,奥斯曼帝国尚是新兴的征战朝代,没有古老的制度可以继承,只能创建全新的制度。蒙古人 13 世纪的征服把一系列土库曼(Turcoman)部落,从中亚和中东赶到小亚细亚西部的边境地区,使之夹在西方的拜占庭帝国和东方的塞尔柱(Seijuk,自 1243 年起成为蒙古伊儿汗国的属国)苏丹国之间。这些部落组织起来,向拜占庭发动攻击(gaza)。领袖之一的奥斯曼(Osman)1302 年在巴菲翁(Baphaeon)打败拜占庭军队,因此而声名鹊起,鹤立鸡群,吸引其他边境领袖前来投靠。于是,宛如暴发户的边境国家奥斯曼得以站稳脚跟。它东西出击,以征服新领土,并向周边的成熟国家借用现成制度。

    16 世纪的奥斯曼帝国

    奥斯曼帝国的地方行政制度源于 15 世纪的西帕希骑士(sipahi)和其封地蒂玛(timar,养马的意思)。最小的封地只有一至数座村庄,其税收只能负担拥有马和其他装备的单名骑士。较大的封地叫扎美(zeamet),分配给称为扎伊姆(zaim)的中级官员,高级官员分到的封地叫哈斯(has)。骑士或扎伊姆住在自己的封地,向本地农民征收实物税,通常是每个农民每年上缴一车木材和饲料,再加上半车干草。该制度是拜占庭的,奥斯曼帝国只是信手拈来。像欧洲的领主,骑士也提供地方政府的功能,如安全和司法。他还要想方设法将实物转换成现金,以支付装备和奔赴前线的旅费。较大封地的主人被要求提供第二名骑士,包括侍从和装备。整个制度称作迪立克采邑制(dirlik),迪立克意即生计,这也是它的功能。其时的经济仅取得部分货币化,苏丹的军队由此获得维持,无须增税以付军饷。

    地方政府围绕桑贾克组成,包括数千平方英里和将近十万人口。奥斯曼帝国征服新领土,便组成新的桑贾克,并实施详尽的土地清查,列出每个村庄的人力和经济资源,目的就是为了纳税和分配封地。起初,用于各地的规则因地制宜,但随着时间的推移和新领土的快速增加,法律和规则趋于统一。桑贾克长官贝伊不是从本地招聘的,而由伊斯坦布尔的中央政府指派。跟中国的地方官一样,他们任职三年后必须改任他职。参战时,他们又是率领自己治下的骑士军队的将领。比桑贾克级别更高的行政区是州(beylerbeyilik),他们构成了帝国的主要区域。

    如马基雅维利承认的,迪立克制度与欧洲封建制的最重要区别在于,土耳其封地不能转换成遗传财产,不能传给骑士的后裔。由于新兴帝国的多数领土都是新近征服的,国家拥有大量土地(约 87% 在 1528 年获得),封给骑士的期限只是他的一生。封地是为了换取军事服务,如果没有提供军事服务,苏丹就可收回封地。跟欧洲不同,大片封地的主人不可再作进一步的分封。骑士太老不能参与战役,或中途夭亡时,他的封地便要上缴,被分配给新骑士。骑士的地位不可遗传,军人的孩子必须回归平民。在封地上耕种的农民,只有使用权,但不像他们的主人,其孩子可继承这种使用权。所以,奥斯曼帝国创造出仅一代的贵族,防止了享有资源基础和世袭特权的强大地主贵族涌现。

    防止领土贵族的出现还有其他实际的原因。奥斯曼帝国经常处于战争,因此要求骑士在夏季前来报到候战。所以每年有好几个月,封地主人外出,既减轻农民的负担,又削弱了骑士与封地的联系。有时,骑士必须在他处过冬,妻子和孩子要在家里独立谋生。骑士经常利用外出机会,挑上新的配偶。所有这一切都在破坏贵族与封地的联系,而这种联系在欧洲发展中是异常重要的。

    完善军事奴隶制

    迪立克采邑制得靠军事奴隶制,不然就会管理失当。奥斯曼帝国以阿拔斯王朝、马穆鲁克和其他土耳其统治者的军事奴隶制为基础,但剔除了使马穆鲁克制度失灵的缺陷。

    最重要的是文官和军官之间有明确差别,后者严格服从前者。军事奴隶制始于苏丹家庭的延伸,像阿尤布的马穆鲁克。但又有不像之处,奥斯曼帝国统治者一直保留对军事奴隶制的控制,直到帝国晚期。王朝原则仅适用于奥斯曼统治者的家庭。不管职位多高,才能多大,奴隶永远都不能成为苏丹,或在军事机构中创建自己的小朝廷。因此,文官政府可建立招收、训练、晋升的明确规则,侧重于建立高效的军事管理机构,不必担心其以军政府名义夺取政权。

    为了防止军事机构中的小朝廷,遂定下有关孩子和遗产的严格规则。禁卫军的儿子不得加入禁卫军,在帝国早期,他们甚至不得结婚和组织家庭。皇家禁卫骑士(sipahis of the Porte)的儿子可加入骑士团队充任侍从,但孙子绝对不可。奥斯曼帝国似乎一开始就明白,军事奴隶制就是为了避免既得利益的世袭精英。军事奴隶制中的招收和晋升全靠能力和服务,他们的奖励是免税地位和庄园。神圣罗马皇帝查理五世派驻苏莱曼一世(Suleiman the Magnificent)宫廷的大使布斯贝克(Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq)提及,缺乏世袭贵族的事实允许苏丹挑选奴隶,全凭能力来提拔,“出身于牧羊人的杰出大维齐尔,欧洲评论家对他一直着迷不止”。

    奥斯曼帝国改善了马穆鲁克制度,将招募进执政机构的非穆斯林奴隶(askeri)与帝国的穆斯林和非穆斯林的百姓(reaya)严格分开。后者可有家庭和财产,可将财产和土地遗传给子孙。他们也可根据宗派附属关系,组织成半自治的社区米勒特(millets),但不能成为执政精英的一员,不能携带兵器,不能当兵或在奥斯曼政府中当官。非穆斯林奴隶的干部通常每年更新,因为年年都有新招募的基督徒。他们被切断与家庭的关联,只对奥斯曼国家效忠,没有行会、派别、自治协会,一切忠诚献给统治者。

    作为治理机构的奥斯曼国家

    有证据显示,初期的奥斯曼帝国没有实施最大化征税。说得更确切些,他们视自己为监护人,除了较低水平的征税,还在保护农民对抗更像有组织犯罪的精英。我们这样说,是因为奥斯曼帝国晚期发生财政困难,苏丹不得不大大提高征税水平。

    继承于早期中东政权的自我约束已融入奥斯曼的国家理论。波斯萨珊王朝的库思老一世(Chosroes I,531—579 年在位)曾说,“如有公正和适度,百姓将生产更多,税收将增加,国家将变得富强,公正是强国的基石”。这里的“公正”意味着适度的征税。我们可能发现,这无疑是里根执政时流行的拉弗曲线(Laffer curve)的中东版本:低税率给予个人较多奖励,个人因此生产较多,最后的总税收也水涨船高。这种想法获得早期土耳其学者的赞同,并进入所谓的公平圆圈(circle of equity),由八条谚语组成:
    1. 没有军队就没有皇家权力。
    2. 没有财富就没有军队。
    3. 百姓生产财富。
    4. 苏丹以公正统治来留住百姓。
    5. 公正需要世界的和谐。
    6. 世界是花园,国家是花园的围墙。
    7. 国家支柱是宗教法律。
    8. 没有皇家权力,宗教法律就失去支持。 

    这些谚语通常环绕一个圆圈写下,到了第八条再轮回到第一条。这显示,对皇家权力(第一条)来说,宗教合法性(第八条)又是不可或缺的。这是一份异常简洁的声明,阐述军事力量、经济资源、公正(包括税率)、宗教合法性的相互关系。这表明,土耳其统治者的目标不是经济租金最大化,而是平衡了权力、资源和合法性的综合国力最大化。

    与同期的欧洲君主政体相比,奥斯曼制度有个重大缺陷,因此而变得不稳定,那就是缺乏成熟的长子继承制或其他继承规则。按照中东的古老传统,统治者的继承权在上帝手中,建立继承规则有悖上帝的愿望。在继承权未定时,不同候选人急需禁卫军、宫廷官员、乌里玛(ulama,教权阶层)、行政机器的支持。苏丹青春期的儿子跟导师一起去不同省城,以获取总督的工作经验,最靠近首都的儿子在影响禁卫军和宫廷方面就占了便宜。苏丹死后,儿子之间经常发生内战。偶尔,苏丹尚未死去就有人抢班夺权。在这些情况下,兄弟之间的残杀在所难免。穆罕默德三世(Mehmed Ⅲ,1595—1603 年在位)夺权时,在宫殿里处决了十九个兄弟。他终止将儿子送去外省的安排,让他们住在宫殿内特别居所,其生活宛如囚犯。有人会说,这种制度确保新苏丹将是最严厉最残忍的儿子。但没有制度化的继承规则,往往造成致命弱点,在继承期间容易受到外国威胁,并让制度中的参与者获得过度的影响力,如仅是苏丹代理人的禁卫军。

    奥斯曼帝国混乱的继承机制,让人们怀疑其制度在总体上的建制化。像处理中国情形一样,马克斯·韦伯也把奥斯曼制度归为家族制,而不属于现代。如果把“家族制”定位为整个政府听从统治者家庭,一切取决于统治者的心血来潮,奥斯曼制度确实如此。几乎国家的所有雇员,其正式地位都是奴隶,这表明苏丹对整个官僚机构享有绝对控制权。跟中国皇帝一样,他可以命令处决上至大维齐尔(首相)的任何官员。苏丹还有权更改制度上的任何规则,如苏莱曼一世决定放松禁卫军不得组织家庭的禁令。

    另一方面,不管苏丹在理论上的权力,他治下的政府照章办事,所作的决定可以预测。首先,奥斯曼苏丹受穆斯林宗教法律——伊斯兰教法(sharia)——的束缚,不管是理论上还是实践中。像中世纪的基督教君主,苏丹正式承认上帝的主权和法律,他自己的权力只是来自上帝的委托。法律的监护人是庞大庄严的宗教机构,乌里玛(神职学者)解说法律,主持宗教法庭,裁决家庭、婚姻、遗产和其他私人事务。对日常层次的执法,苏丹不予干涉。私人产权和国家土地的使用权受到类似保护(参看第 19 章)。甚至混乱的继承权争斗,在一定意义上也以伊斯兰法律为依据,其原则就是禁止长子继承权。

    奥斯曼政府照章办事,还出于代理制的需要。绝对统治者必须将自己的权力和权威委托给代理人,这是简单的生活常识。由于专长和能力,代理人开始营建自己的权力。这在统治像奥斯曼帝国这样辽阔、多样、复杂的地域时,尤其如此。

    很奇怪,征募制和军事奴隶制却是奥斯曼帝国最现代的特征之一。在功能上,它的目标与中国科举完全相同:都是国家非人格化招聘的来源,确保源源不断的候选人面对激烈的选择,只效忠于国家,与家庭和亲戚没有牵连,以攀高位。与中国相比,它比较不合理,因为它只允许外国人参与。另一方面,这种限制是为了防止家族化,可以撇开与家庭或地方藕断丝连的本地精英。

    衡量国家制度现代性的另一尺度是法律和程序在帝国的统一。理所当然,中国人设下了最佳标准,很早就创造了不同寻常的统一行政制度,很少例外。奥斯曼制度则允许较多的差异,帝国的中央地区、小亚细亚、巴尔干半岛开始实施相当统一的规则,如土地租佃、征税、司法等。奥斯曼帝国强迫奴隶军改信伊斯兰教,但没将自己的社会制度强加于外省的行政机构。希腊人、亚美尼亚基督徒、犹太人,虽然享受不到穆斯林的法律权利,但仍能组织半自治社区。这些社区的宗教领袖负责财政、教育、执法和其他有关家庭法律和人身地位的事务。离帝国的中心越远,地方上的制度就越偏离核心规则。在 1517 年打败马穆鲁克之后,中东的重要地区,包括埃及、叙利亚、汉志(Hejaz,现代沙特阿拉伯沿红海的西部地区),并入帝国的版图。马穆鲁克获准保留自己的军事奴隶制,但必须承认奥斯曼帝国的主权。汉志则实施自己的特殊规则,因为拥有穆斯林圣城麦加和麦地那,奥斯曼帝国现是穆斯林的监护人。

    家族制的复辟和衰败

    奥斯曼制度的衰退归罪于内外两种因素。外部因素包括帝国的地理极限,以及人口和环境的巨大变化。这些 16 世纪末 17 世纪初的变化,不仅影响了土耳其,而且影响了所有的农业大国。内部因素包括军事奴隶制的崩溃、禁卫军由国家权力的工具蜕变成既得利益团体。

    如我们所知,奥斯曼制度一开始就是一个征服王朝,依赖领土的持续扩张来增加税收和封地。到 16 世纪 30 年代末,奥斯曼帝国面对两条战线,相隔几乎两千英里:在东欧与奥地利人对峙,在波斯与新近崛起的萨非王朝(Safavid)争锋。奥斯曼帝国虽能动员其人力的大部,但军队不能整年驻扎在外。以当时的技术,他们开发了先进的物流制度,但军队仍需在春天聚合,行军数百英里,奔赴前线。第一次征服维也纳败北,因为军队抵达维也纳郊外已是 1529 年 9 月 27 日,围攻不到三个星期,就不得不放弃,因为军队要在冬天之前返回自己的土地和家庭。类似的局限也存在于波斯前线。

    奥斯曼帝国为此决定全年防守匈牙利,并改善海军,以开展地中海的军事行动。他们继续赢得战利品(如塞浦路斯岛和克里特岛),直到 17 世纪中期。但是,轻易的领土征服到 16 世纪中已近尾声,武装的外部掠夺不再是经济租金的良好来源。这给内部统治造成严重后果,因为更高水平的资源榨取必须来自帝国核心地区,而不是边境地区。没有新的基督教领土,也就减少了征募制人选的供应。

    另一个外部发展是持续的通货膨胀和人口增长,互为表里。从 1489 年到 1616 年,小亚细亚谷物的恒定银价上升了 400%。很多学者将价格上升归罪于来自西班牙新大陆的金银增长,但杰克·戈德斯通(Jack Goldstone)认为,有理由说奥斯曼帝国的通货膨胀不是货币事件,因为没有找到新金银进入奥斯曼土地的证据。实际上,政府因为白银短缺而一再降低铸币的含银量。更确切地说,通货膨胀是由于快速的人口增长。从 1520 年到 1580 年,小亚细亚的人口增长了 50% 到 70%。从 1520 年到 1600 年,伊斯坦布尔的人口从十万增至七十万。这种人口增长同时也在欧洲和中国发生,原因不明,但一定与 15 世纪摧毁欧亚大陆人口的瘟疫的退潮有关。戈德斯通认为这可能与气候有关,再加上人类由此而增强的免疫力。

    这些变化大大影响了奥斯曼帝国的制度,通货膨胀使采邑制度愈来愈靠不住。采邑的骑士靠土地生活,但另有土地和军事装备的货币开支,现在变得不堪忍受。很多人拒绝参与战役,另外的干脆放弃封地,开始组成掠夺农民和地主的强盗帮派。驻扎在城市的禁卫军,为应付开支,获准从事手艺人或商人的民间职业,这模糊了奴隶和百姓之间的明显界限。有些禁卫军当上财政官员,操纵采邑登记以谋私利,或授予自己土地,或分配土地给百姓以换取贿赂。

    16 世纪晚期,中央国家也面对财政危机。火器的引进使曾是 15 世纪奥斯曼部队支柱的骑士变成老皇历,国家必须以骑士为代价迅速扩充步兵。从 1527 年到 1609 年,禁卫军的人数从五千增至三万八千,再增至 1669 年的六万七千五百。此外,政府开始招募无地农民(sekbans)充任临时火枪手。不像自我负担的旧骑士,这些新式步兵需配备现代武器,领取现金薪水。所以,政府急需将征税得来的实物,转换成已是经济交易基础的现金。骑士人数的跌幅相当于步兵人数的涨幅,放弃的采邑现在租给私人经营者,出身于非奴隶的税务承包商向他们征收现金。先前,政府约束对农民的剥削,现在为应付财政收入的燃眉之急,也就顾不上了。

    考虑到财政困境,军事奴隶制的规则受到腐蚀也许是不可避免的。根据马穆鲁克的经验,阻止奴隶军人将地位和资源传给孩子的规则很难执行,因为这有悖人性。奥斯曼帝国的原始制度非常严格,规定禁卫军坚持独身,不得组织家庭。但在制度内部,一直有放松规则的压力。当遇上与日俱增的财政压力时,政府只得作出让步。这一过程始于塞利姆一世(Selim the Grim,1512—1520 年在位)和苏莱曼一世(1520—1566 年在位),先允许禁卫军结婚和组织家庭。随之,这些禁卫军又向宫廷施加压力,允许他们的儿子加入军队。这发生于塞利姆二世(Selim Ⅱ,1566—1574 年在位)时期,设立了专收禁卫军儿子的定额。苏丹穆拉德四世(Murad Ⅳ)在 1638 年正式废除征募制,这等于确认了禁卫军子承父业的纳新制度,甚至百姓也被允许加入军人阶层。晋升不再依据规则,愈来愈靠国家制度中的私人关系。以前局限于宫廷政治的家族制,现在扩散到整个体系。

    跟布尔吉马穆鲁克一样,将禁卫军与苏丹绑在一起的道德关系也受到蛀蚀,他们全神贯注于自己的福利和家庭,变成一个为己谋利的利益团体。纪律趋于崩溃,禁卫军开始定期在首都发动骚乱,以抗议薪酬的拖欠或铸币的贬值。跟马穆鲁克相似,他们与民用经济挂钩,收购商业,或提取被人遗弃的采邑的租金。

    很多历史学家认为,奥斯曼帝国从 17 世纪初开始的衰落并非不可避免。事实上它还维持了三百多年,直到 1908 年的青年土耳其党人运动。奥斯曼帝国仍能展示令人惊讶的精力,例如 17 世纪的下半世纪,科普鲁律(Köprülüs)大维齐尔得以在帝国的中央省恢复秩序,在地中海继续扩张,征服克里特岛,并于 1683 年再一次向维也纳发起进攻。但这次中兴又遭逆转。什叶派的萨非王朝在波斯崛起,导致什叶派和逊尼派的长期战争。奥斯曼帝国鼓励在全国贯彻逊尼派的正统观念,并杜绝外部新思想。它发现自己愈来愈无法赶上邻近欧洲帝国在技术和组织上的革新,从而不得不割让领土,每隔十年再来一次。虽然如此,土耳其仍在加里波利(Gallipoli)打败英国人,进入 20 世纪时,继续是欧洲政治的主要角色。

    奥斯曼帝国的遗产

    奥斯曼帝国是穆斯林世界中迄今最成功的政权。他们凭借自己创造的制度基础,集中权力,其规模在那个地区是空前的。他们在异常短暂的时间内,从部落过渡到国家层次的社会,然后发展了具有显著现代特征的国家制度。他们建立了中央集权的官僚和军队,以非人格化的择优标准,挑选和晋升有限的外国招聘对象。这一制度得以克服中东社会的部落机构的局限。

    此外,奥斯曼帝国创造了可从中央遥控的省级行政制度。通过这个制度,他们实施相对统一的规则,确定经济的日常运作,维护辽阔帝国的治安。不像欧洲的封建主义,奥斯曼帝国从没允许制造政治分裂的地方贵族涌现。所以,不像早期现代的欧洲君主,苏丹也无需向贵族讨回权力。奥斯曼帝国的制度,比 15 世纪同期的欧洲政治组织更为成熟和先进。

    就集权和支配社会的能力而言,鼎盛时期的奥斯曼帝国,比较不像同期的欧洲国家和印度次大陆上建立的本土国家,而更接近于中华帝国。跟中国类似,它只有很少独立于国家的组织良好的社会团体。如马基雅维利所注意到的,没有古老的贵族血统,没有获得宪章的独立商业城市,没有民兵组织和法律制度。跟印度不同,村庄没有依照古老的宗教社会规则组织起来。

    奥斯曼国家和其他阿拉伯先驱者,其不同于中国之处是存在立法的宗教机构,至少在理论上独立于国家。它能否限制国家的集权,说到底,取决于宗教权威本身的制度化程度。(我在第 21 章讨论法治起源时,将回到这一题目。)

    就全球的政治发展而言,作为奥斯曼帝国核心力量的军事奴隶制只是一条死胡同。它的产生基于一种担忧,同样的担忧促使中国人发明了科举制度。今天,中国科举制度的实用等同物都在应用之中,不管是现代欧洲和亚洲的官僚招聘,还是美国的学术能力评估测试(SAT)和法国的高中毕业会考(baccalauréate)。相比之下,军事奴隶制作为一种制度已从世界政治舞台消失,不留任何痕迹。穆斯林世界之外的人,从未认为它是合法的。问题不在奴隶,众所周知,直到 19 世纪西方都视奴隶制为合法制度。欧洲人或美国人所无法想象的,是奴隶后来又变成政府高官。

    从 14 世纪到 16 世纪,军事奴隶制充任奥斯曼帝国迅速崛起的基石。但它面对各种内部矛盾,不能幸免于 16 世纪晚期帝国面临的外部变化。奥斯曼帝国从没发展出本土的资本主义,不能长期取得持续的生产力增长,所以只能依赖粗放式增长来增加财政资源。经济和外交的政策失败,彼此雪上加霜,使本土制度无法承受。它继续生存于 20 世纪,多亏了创新的苏丹和最后的青年土耳其党人改用西方制度。但这一切不足以保住政权,继承它的土耳其共和国则依据截然不同的制度原则。